We now enter the post-assault phase, and we will start by visiting Von Rundstedt’s headquarters on the morning of the invasion. The interrogation of a clerk who was then employed in the IC section of OB West provides an interesting, if not very high level, first-hand account of the effect which the first news of the invasion had at his headquarters.1 ‘D Day at OB West was marked by a “let’s not get excited” attitude. I was aroused at 0130 by an Ia officer with orders to take down reports from Army Group B. For the time being I was not to awaken anyone else, Major Doeternbach stood by at the telephone for important messages, Rommel and the Ia, Colonel Meyer-Detring, were in Berlin. The first reports from Vierville, Grandcamp, Ste Honorine, Port en Bessin and Courseulles mentioned both sea and airborne landings. However, as the excitement of Dieppe was on everybody’s mind, this was regarded as just another feint. Further feints and landings were expected. The situation map of England showed only a few units along the S.W. shore, but heavy concentration in the S.E.’2
The OKH Intelligence Summary for 6th June tells us: ‘The enemy landing on the Normandy coast represents a large-scale undertaking; but the forces already engaged represent a comparatively small part of the total available. Of the approximately sixty divisions at present in the South of England, it is likely that at the most ten to twelve divisions are at present taking part, including airborne troops. The main objective of the undertaking must be regarded as the capture of the port of Cherbourg, and the simultaneous closing of the Cotentin Peninsula to the south…. Within the framework of his group of forces Montgomery still has over twenty divisions available to reinforce his operations, which allows us to expect further air and sea landing attempts in the area of the Cotentin Peninsula, to force the capture of his objective. Attacks against the Channel Islands, coupled with attacks against the west coast of Normandy, seem possible here, as well as surprise thrusts against Brest. The entire group of forces which make up the American First Army Group, comprising about twenty-five divisions north and south of the Thames, has not yet been employed. The same applies to the ten to twelve active divisions held ready in the Midlands3 and in Scotland. The conclusion is, therefore, that the enemy command plans a further large-scale undertaking in the Channel area which may well be directed against a coastal sector in the central Channel area.’4
With the departure of 21 Army Group for Normandy, BRUTUS lost no time in underlining the independence of FUSAG and the sense of imminent action which pervaded his headquarters. ‘Received, this morning, news of the beginning of the invasion. Extremely surprised because our FUSAG remains unmoved. It is clear that the landing was made only by units of the 21 Army Group. I do not yet know whether all units of the 21 Army Group are taking part. Am returning to Wentworth and will seek the details. Am surprised that the army groups, although independent, are attacking separately. The general opinion at Wentworth was that it should arrive simultaneously. FUSAG, as I reported, was ready for an attack which is capable of being released at any moment, but it is now evident that it will be an independent action.’5
On 8th June the belief that Montgomery might put in an attack against Brittany seemed to be losing ground. The opinion was also expressed that the Seine might form the dividing line between Montgomery and Patton. ‘Since for reasons of concentration of forces as well as for tactical reasons of command, the employment of other of Montgomery’s forces at any far distant place seems unlikely, it is conceivable that the dividing line between the 21 Army Group and the American Army Group standing ready in South-East England (Patton?) will be roughly along the Seine. Within the framework of the operations so far carried out, we must, therefore, reckon with the rapid arrival of further Montgomery formations in the Normandy area, and here new landings, especially on the west coast of Cotentin, seem possible. The employment of strong forces against Brittany or against the Atlantic front seems at the moment not very probable, on account of the Anglo-Saxon concentration and of the fact that both the enemy armies held ready in South-West England have been used against Normandy.… The fact that still no formations of the forces held ready in South-East and Eastern England have so far been identified in the landing operations, strengthens the view that the strong Anglo-American forces still available in that area are being held together for further designs in other areas.’6
By the 10th it had become clear to the Germans that Montgomery was concentrating his whole effort on the Normandy bridgehead. ‘Of the English 21 Army Group concentrated in South-West England, approximately sixteen divisions have so far been in action in Northern France, while a further nineteen divisions of this group of forces are available and uncommitted in England. Reinforcement to the extent of three further divisions from the West of England and the West of Scotland7 is possible. Since nearly half of all Montgomery’s formations are employed in Normandy it is to be expected that his remaining formations will also be used here. The group of forces in South-East England, which has not yet been touched, comprises at the moment about twenty-seven divisions, and could possibly be joined by a further five divisions from the centre of England and three more from Scotland.’8
In the South of France VENDETTA was holding well. ‘The opening of the invasion against the north coast of France makes it probable that the approximately twelve divisions available in French North Africa will be used in operations against the south coast of France, since the enemy command will presumably try by every means to prevent the German troops stationed in the latter place from being transferred to the main front.’9 The only reference to an attack on the west coast of France, for which IRONSIDE could scarcely claim the credit, occurred on 9th June. ‘The enemy convoys seen off Southern Ireland and west of Brest on 8th June, among which was a troop transport convoy, may possibly indicate small and insignificant diversionary undertakings in the Biscay area.’10
What was the effect of these opinions on the reinforcement of the bridgehead during the first few days of the invasion? On 6th June Von Rundstedt requested the unconditional release of the OKW Armoured Reserve.11 This request was only satisfied in part. The 1st SS Panzer Corps, comprising the 12th SS Panzer Division, the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the Panzer Lehr Division, were made available at once. The 2nd and 21st Panzer Divisions, being already under the control of Rommel, were also ordered to the bridgehead immediately.12 On the other hand a situation report sent by Von Rundstedt to Jodl on 7th June tells us that ‘C. in C. West refuses to consider any weakening of the south coast of France. Army Group B must try to arrange from its own resources any redistribution of forces that may be necessary.’ So far, then, the only armoured formation ordered away from the area of Fifteenth Army was the 2nd Panzer Division.
On 8th June, in view of the growing Allied strength in the bridgehead, the remainder of the OKW armoured reserve was released, and at half-past ten on that evening an order was issued by C in C West stating that the 1st SS Panzer Division, the Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland of the 116th Panzer Division, and certain other troops would with immediate effect come under command of Army Group B. Further, the Commander of Army Group B was to earmark two infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais for employment in the Normandy bridgehead. The Daily Situation Report for 9th June from the Commander of Army Group B stated that the 1st SS Panzer Division was now ‘moving out of its present are in the district east north-east of Bruges’.
At half-past seven on the morning of the following day, 10th June, C in C West issued an order which reads as follows: ‘As a consequence of certain information, C in C West has declared “a state of alarm II” for Fifteenth Army in Belgium and Northern France (for Netherlands Command if Army Group B thinks fit). The move of the 1st SS Panzer Division will therefore be halted and it will go into the area previously occupied by the 19th Luftwaffe Division.’ The 1st SS Panzer, together with the 116th Panzer Division, both of which had already started for Normandy, now converged on the Pas de Calais, while the whole of Fifteenth Army area as well as Belgium and Holland were ordered to adopt the second or highest degree of alert.13 On the following day Rommel reported: ‘In the Netherlands Command and in the fifteenth Army area every German soldier and man is standing by night and day for defence.’
Speaking of these early and critical days the OKW War Diary says: ‘That it actually was the long-anticipated D Day emerged from an order of Eisenhower broadcast in the morning hours and followed by speeches of the enemy Prime Ministers. It was, however, not yet clear whether it was the case of an initial attack to pin down our own forces or really the main operation…. It seemed possible that the enemy first wanted to cut off the Contentin Peninsula and thus get Cherbourg into their own hands in order, simultaneously or subsequently, to attack the Fifteenth Army with the forces waiting in South-East England…. Reinforcements from the West and from the Reich were brought up to the aid of our main forces, but it presently became evident that these forces were not sufficient to hurl the enemy back again into the sea. Therefore the Fuehrer gave orders on 9th June, in accordance with a report of the Chief of Armed Forces Operational Staff, that more forces should be sent in.’ The divisions selected to provide the reinforcements are then listed. The War Diary goes on to say: ‘As a report had come to hand according to which the enemy was planning a landing in Belgium, the 1st SS Armoured Division was transferred as reserves to the rear of the 48th Division, that area having been left exposed owing to the withdrawal of the 19th GAF Assault Detachment.’ This was rather an understatement when one remembers that the movements of at least four divisions, and perhaps six, were effected by the counter order.
What was this report which caused such a drastic change in the plan and on whose initiative had the change been made? As the order was issued by Von Rundstedt it seemed right, after the Allied victory had brought him within our reach, to ask him to give his own explanation.14 Both he and his Chief of Staff, Blumentritt, who were interrogated together, had no hesitation in saying that the countermanding order was given as the result of a personal telephone call from Keitel. Von Rundstedt complained strongly that the battle on the beaches had been lost because the OKW would not release their reserves soon enough. When the release of the 1st SS Division and the armoured elements of the 116th Panzer Division was given on the evening of 8th June it was already too late. This does not quite fit in with the situation report sent by him to the OKW on 7th June in which he said: ‘Having regard to the strength and resources used by the enemy against Normandy it is to be anticipated that a landing operation at: least as strong, if not stronger, will shortly take place at another part of the coast.’ Be that as it may, he held firmly to the statement that he wished to send all available resources to the bridgehead from the time of the first landing and refused to accept any responsibility for the countermanding order. It therefore became necessary to interrogate Keitel and Jodl. They both agreed that the initiative had come from the OKW. What had occurred between 10.30 p.m. on 8th June and 7.30 a.m. on 10th June to cause such a complete reversal of plan? It is clear that Hitler and his entourage were in a highly undecided frame of mind from the moment that the first landing took place and that their fear of a second landing was based chiefly on their belief in the First American Army Group in South-Eastern England. Under pressure from C in C West they had on 8th June agreed to release armoured formations from the Fifteenth Army area. Then some report had reached them which had made them change their minds.
Before going any further a word must be said about how these Abwehr reports reached the High Command. In the early part of the war when the Germans thought they were winning, Hitler had not thought it necessary for the OKW to have an intelligence branch at all. Reverses in the Russian campaign, however, led him to revise that opinion. Such a branch was accordingly formed and at its head was placed a certain Colonel Krummacher, who had hitherto acted as a kind of liaison officer between the Abwehr and the OKW. Krummacher was essentially an Abwehr man. Feeling himself more at home with agents’ reports than with other forms of intelligence, he seems to have concentrated his attention mainly on these, which of course was a great help to us.15 All Abwehr reports went direct to the RSHA Headquarters, who would circulate by teleprinter summarised versions to the OKW and other interested headquarters. C in C West was usually included. If Krummacher thought a message was of sufficient importance he would show it to Jodl and perhaps to Warlimont, who initialled it. If Jodl in his turn thought that the Fuehrer should see it, he put a different kind of mark on it and added, if Hitler had seen it, either ‘erl.’ (erledigt) or ‘hat K.’ (hat Kenntnis).16
Having discovered this procedure, the next step was to see what messages had passed through Krummacher’s hands during these critical hours which might have influenced the German High Command. There are three competitors for the distinction. The first came in at 1335 hours on 9th June. It concerned an intercepted wireless message from London to an Allied sabotage organisation in Brussels of which the Germans had gained control. The message contained two code phrases: ‘Message pour la petite Berte’ and ‘Salomon a sauté ses grands sabots.’ The first code phrase was alleged by the German Intelligence Service to mean that a landing would take place ‘the day after tomorrow at the latest’ and the second that the invasion fleet had already started. The Abwehr Stelle forwarding the message commented that the Allies must have known that this network was under German control and that in consequence it was probably deceptive, but the senior headquarters through which the message passed expressed the view that the Allies had not had time to discover that their organisation had been penetrated and that it must in consequence be taken at its face value. It is referred to in the OKW Intelligence Summary. ‘There is still no concrete evidence regarding the beginning of the attack or the objective of this group of forces. Observations from wireless interplay with the enemy Intelligence Service again point to the area of Belgium and to an early commencement of the attack.’17 On the other hand Krummacher did not think it of sufficient importance to show to Jodl. It has been found impossible to discover the origin of this message. Deliberate deception at no time formed a part of the SOE policy, though admittedly they did at times continue to run organisations which were known to be under enemy control, mainly to give their agents a chance of escaping. It is possible that the construction placed by the Germans upon this message may have resulted from a misinterpretation of the code phrases. In passing one may point out that this provides a good example of the dangers which attend any attempt to use an espionage network of our own which has fallen into enemy hands for deception by the triple-cross method.
The second message came in on 9th June at 1810 hours. As this was the work of an uncontrolled agent it will be necessary to explain very shortly a new development in their technique which was becoming evident at this time and was causing us a good deal of embarrassment. The evidence of Most Secret Sources was beginning to make the conclusion almost irresistible that the uncontrolled agents, or at any rate the two most highly regarded ones, OSTRO18 in Lisbon and JOSEPHINE19 in Stockholm, had acquired some knowledge of the FORTITUDE story. It is true that a second attack on the Pas de Calais following after the Normandy invasion might have been guessed at by any intelligent but uniformed person as the likely sequence of future events, but there were too many similarities of detail to allow us to attribute this development to chance. We now know that Dr Kraemer had in fact access to German Intelligence documents. This is also very probably true in the case of OSTRO, though the point has not been proved. It was in these documents that Dr Kraemer read successive instalments of the FORTITUDE story and handed them to the Germans a second time with his own embellishments. The effect, mainly unfortunate, of this practice upon our own efforts to deceive will be considered in greater detail in a later chapter. All that need be said here is that if this particular message of JOSEPHINE contributed in any way to the issue of the countermanding order we may perhaps be allowed to claim a part of the credit since he was taking his cue from us and basing his appreciation on the assumed presence of FUSAG in the South-East of England, a force which he himself had done nothing to establish in the German mind. JOSEPHINE’s message runs as follows: ‘Very reliable V-man20 reports regarding invasion situation early on 9th June (time of report the night of 8th June): General opinion, according to statements of War Office spokesman to English and American journalists afternoon of 8th June (conference takes place thrice daily), is that conditions for Allied landing troops have improved. Impression shared in authoritative British military circles. According to statements by Harrison,21 an absolutely clear picture on the British side cannot yet be given as the critical period for the invading troops is only just beginning. Strength so far employed is also described by him as considerable, greater than was originally intended. In his opinion and according to information from other sources a second main attack across the Channel directed against the Pas de Calais is to be expected…. British public very optimistic. But views in political circles more cautious. In Conservative circles the danger of too heavy losses is continually emphasised, whereas the Labour Party and other Left-wing movements are very satisfied with the beginning of the invasion.’ It is marked ‘sofort’ in Krummacher’s handwriting and was seen by Jodl and the Fuehrer.
The third and last message arrived at 2220 hours on 9th June. It came from GARBO. As soon as GARBO had learned from Agent Four that the invasion had started, he called his three trusted subagents, 7 (2), 7 (4) and 7 (7), to a meeting in London. At half-past seven on the evening of 8th June he informed Madrid: ‘I have had an extremely agitated day today, but I have the satisfaction of being able to give you the most important reports of my work. As I have not got all the messages ready, I hope you will be listening tonight at 10 GMT.’22 At seven minutes past midnight on 9th June GARBO began to send his great message, the transmission continuing without a break until nine minutes past two in the morning. Having announced that agents 7 (2), 7 (4) and 7 (7) had arrived in London and delivered their reports, GARBO proceeded to give a full list of all major formations, real and fictitious, in Sussex, Kent and East Anglia. This, in effect, was a summary and a recapitulation of the reports of the previous days.23 He also referred for the first time to landing craft on the rivers Deben and Orwell.24 Following closely on the lines recommended by GARBO’s case officer a month previously the message concluded thus: ‘From the reports mentioned it is perfectly clear that the present attack is a large-scale operation but diversionary in character for the purpose of establishing a strong bridgehead in order to draw the maximum of our reserves to the area of operation and to retain them there so as to be able to strike a blow somewhere else with ensured success. I never like to give my opinion unless I have strong reasons to justify my assurances, but the fact that these concentrations which are in the East and South-East of the Island are now inactive means that they must be held in reserve to be employed in the other large-scale operations. The constant aerial bombardment which the area of the Pas de Calais has suffered and the strategic disposition of these forces give reason to suspect an attack in that region of France which, at the same time, offers the shortest route for the final objective of their illusions, which is to say Berlin. This advance could be covered by a constant hammering from the air since the bases would be near the field of battle and they would come in behind our forces which are fighting at the present moment with the enemy disembarked in the West of France. From J (5) I learnt yesterday that there were seventy-five divisions in this country before the present assault commenced. Supposing they should use a maximum of twenty to twenty-five divisions, they would be left with some fifty divisions with which to attempt a second blow. I trust you will submit urgently all these reports and studies to our High Command since moments may be decisive in these times and before taking a false step, through lack of knowledge of the necessary facts, they should have in their possession all the present information which I transmit with my opinion which is based on the belief that the whole of the present attack is set as a trap for the enemy to make us move all our reserves in a hurried strategical disposition which we would later regret.’25
GARBO’s message reached Krummacher in the following abbreviated form: ‘After personal consultation on 8th June in London with my agents, Jonny,26 Dick and Dorick, whose reports were sent today, I am of the opinion, in view of the strong troop concentrations in South-East and Eastern England which are not taking part in the present operations, that these operations are a diversionary manœuvre designed to draw off enemy reserves in order then to make a decisive attack in another place. In view of the continued air attacks on the concentration area mentioned, which is a strategically favourable position for this, it may very probably take place in the Pas de Calais area, particularly since in such an attack the proximity of air bases will facilitate the operation by providing continued strong air support.’27 Krummacher underlined the words ‘diversionary manœuvre designed to draw off enemy reserves in order then to make a decisive attack in another place’, and added at the end: ‘confirms the view already held by us that a further attack is to be expected in another place (Belgium?)’. This message was seen by Jodl, who underlined the words ‘in South-East and Eastern England’ and took it to the Fuehrer.
Berlin acknowledged GARBO’s report in the following terms: ‘The report is credible. The reports received in the last week from the ARABAL (GARBO) undertaking have been confirmed almost without exception and are to be described as especially valuable. The main line of investigation in future is to be the enemy group of forces in South-Eastern and Eastern England.’28
Attempts to find out from Keitel and Jodl which of these was the message referred to in Von Rundstedt’s order and in the War Diary were not altogether satisfactory because it was evident that they could not clearly remember the individual reports which they had received at that busy time. Professor Percy Schramm, who had the specific task of keeping the diary, stated that he would not have seen the document in question. When confronted with the text of GARBO’s message, Keitel replied: ‘There you have your answer. If I were writing a history I would say, with ninety-nine per cent certainly, that that message provided the reason for the change of plan.’ Later when the other two messages came to light these too were put before Keitel and Jodl. They both dismissed the message containing the code phrases to the sabotage organisation in Brussels as being of little importance. Jodl did so largely on the ground that the hieroglyphics proved that Krummacher had not thought it of sufficient importance to show to himself. They both thought that the other two must have had a decisive influence. Jodl gave slight preference to JOSEPHINE. Keitel on the other hand held to his original view. ‘I am personally still of the opinion that message A played the decisive role, B had the second place in importance and C the last in the forming of the decision.’29 Whatever the relative importance of the three messages, they both agreed that GARBO’s message as it came last of the three must have tipped the balance.30 There is, however, yet one more pointer in GARBO’s favour. It will be remembered that his messages came through Madrid, while those of JOSEPHINE came from Stockholm. Attached to the OKW War Diary were a number of appendices, one of which contained copies of important documents relating to the Normandy invasion which were received from day to day at the OKW. On Jodl’s instructions the OKW War Diary was preserved with a view to its probable value to historians in the future, but unfortunately, according to Professor Schramm, the appendices were destroyed, so that we only have the bare headings. Of the four ‘invasion’ documents included for 10th June one is entitled ‘News from Madrid’ (Nachricht aus Madrid). There is no corresponding heading entitled ‘News from Stockholm’. It is natural to suppose that any message which altered the course of a campaign should have been thought worthy of inclusion in an appendix to the War Diary.
Taking the evidence as a whole, the reader will probably agree that GARBO’s report decided the issue. But whatever view one may take it must always be remembered that no message would have spurred the Germans to action on the morning of 10th June had they not already been convinced of the presence of FUSAG beyond the Straits of Dover. And the establishment of that force on either side of the Thames Estuary had been the combined achievement of GARBO and BRUTUS.31
Of the four ‘invasion’ documents appended to the War Dairy on 10th June there is another which claims our attention for it bears the title ‘Enemy Propaganda Directive’ (Richtlinien der feindlichen Propaganda). A copy of GARBO’s ‘inverted’ PWE Directive is to be found in Krummacher’s file. This entry in the War Diary therefore provides fairly circumstantial evidence that this plot also worked successfully and that GARBO’s activities at the Ministry of Information played a decisive part in influencing German plans at this vital period.
The reader may wonder why the transmission of GARBO’s message was delayed for more than forty-eight hours after the first landing in Normandy had been made. It was, of course, necessary to give Donny, Dick and Dorick time to get from Harwich, Dover and Brighton to London, but to find the main reason we must look back to a memorandum written by GARBO’s case officer on 4th May, more than a month before. ‘With the approach of D Day and even after, until the nature and full significance of NEPTUNE is discovered, there will almost inevitably be a certain divergence of opinion as to Allied intentions even in the German High Command. There will, we hope, be among the leaders of Germany some who will draw the conclusions we are trying to inspire through FORTITUDE. If we can continue through GARBO and the Abwehr to supply those Germans who are already inclined to believe in our cover plan with further ammunition for their arguments … it may well be that we shall be helping those elements in Germany to influence plans in our favour during the few critical days of the post-assault period.’ It may be thought that the message went a few hours too late, but it was not late enough to matter. Perhaps this was an advantage, for people who have changed their minds once seldom care to do so again.