XXXI

FORTITUDE Ended

After the defeat of the German Seventh Army in Normandy at the beginning of August it was supposed that the enemy would take up a defensive position on the Seine and that the Allies would have to regroup for a new attack. It was believed that deception might assist the operation and it was proposed that part of FUSAG should be transferred to France for that purpose. This suited the position in England well enough. By the middle of August the Pas de Calais was rapidly being denuded of troops. If nothing were done to meet this change in the situation the Germans would soon begin to wonder why we did not attack. The transfer of one of the FUSAG armies to Normandy would help to solve the problem. The choice between the Fourth British and the Fourteenth US Armies was decided by the nature of the wireless organisations by which they were represented. 3103 Signals Service Battalion was trained and equipped for operations overseas. 12th Reserve Unit included a large number of low category men who could not serve abroad. So it was the American army which was chosen for the battle of the Seine.¹

At this time events were moving fast and the defeat of the Germans was becoming more complete than had been anticipated. The Seine was crossed without a battle and before the end of the month British and Canadian forces were approaching the Pas de Calais. Thus the two arguments which had made the reorganisation of FUSAG necessary earlier in the month, now ceased to apply. There was no need to reinforce the attack on the Seine line because the Seine had already been crossed. There was no need to relieve pressure on the Pas de Calais from the United Kingdom because we were now approaching it overland and that was obviously a more economical way of capturing the North-West of France than an amphibious operation. However there appeared to be other good reasons for continuing with the proposed reorganisation.

One is apt to forget the general optimism which prevailed during the month of August 1944. The Germans were retreating on every front. Their armies in France had suffered a defeat from which it seemed unlikely that they would be able to recover. The recent attempt on Hitler’s life made it appear as if his authority was being undermined at home. It will be agreed that Mr Churchill as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence was never given to over-statement, yet in The Times of 3rd August we read: ‘Mr Churchill, in a long and heartening review in the House of Commons today of the war situation, declared that, although he greatly feared to raise false hopes, he “no longer felt bound to deny” that victory would perhaps come soon.’ In these circumstances what better role could deception perform than to convince the enemy by an overwhelming show of force of the hopelessness of resistance? This in fact became the new deception policy which was ultimately embodied in the directive of 8th September which formally brought FORTITUDE SOUTH II to an end. The situation is there described in these words: ‘The enemy is in retreat in the West in face of superior Allied forces. He is being compelled on all sectors to conform to the Allied manœuvres. It is considered that he is unlikely to react to any large-scale deceptive operations on the Allied front in the West, though he may be susceptible to making faulty dispositions elsewhere, and is in a position where disintegration of control may take place at any time.’ In order to create the desired state of alarm in the mind of the German Command they were to be told that the armies in France were being reinforced by two additional armies, the Ninth and the Fourteenth; the former, a real formation, would be going overseas in September in any case. At the same time their rear and right flank was to be threatened by a large-scale combined seaborne and airborne assault launched from the United Kingdom.

In reporting the impending move of the Fourteenth Army to France GARBO did not lose the opportunity of promoting the new terror campaign by hinting at frightfulness to come. Having explained that the Fourteenth Army had originally been intended for Japan, 4 (3) had told GARBO ‘a lot of curious things about the basis of the composition of this Fourteenth US Army; amongst them he said that in their ranks there were many convicts who were released from prisons in the United States to be enrolled in a foreign legion of the French or Spanish type. It can almost be said that there are brigades composed of gangsters and bloodthirsty men, specially selected to fight against the Japanese, men who were not supposed to take prisoners, but, instead, to administer a cruel justice at their own hands.’²

In mounting the threat across the North Sea the task of deception was assisted by the formation of the First Allied Airborne Army at the beginning of August. This reorganisation of the Allied airborne forces had been begun in June. General Eisenhower had pointed out that there was no suitable agency available to the High Command for assuming responsibility for joint planning between the troop carrier command and airborne forces. ‘My idea in setting the Airborne Commander directly under this Headquarters is to give him this responsibility … he would not command troops actually fighting on the ground, but would be responsible for providing them all with logistical support until normal lines of communication could be established. Assuming that an airborne attack by two or three divisions took place within a single area, a temporary corps commander would be designated to conduct the fighting on the ground. He would operate under directives issued by this Headquarters until his force could join up with the nearest army, whereupon he would be taken over by the army commander both operationally and logistically.’³

The formation of the new airborne army was announced on 10th August, and on the same day we read in the OKH Situation Report: ‘According to an official British announcement all British and American airborne forces, including the Anglo-American gliders and transport formations are being combined to form a new airborne army. The commander of this army is an American, Lieutenant-General Louis H. Brereton (hitherto Commander of the Ninth American Air Force). Lieutenant-General Frederick A. M. Browning (hitherto Commander-in-Chief “Army Air Corps”) has been appointed his deputy.’⁴ The Germans naturally wanted to know what it was all about and immediately circulated their principal agents. On 15th August BRUTUS was asked: ‘What do you know about the new command under Brereton and Browning? Which divisions belong to it? Are airborne operations now planned on a big scale?’⁵ And to GARBO on the following day: ‘According to news given by Daventry on 11th August, there has been created in England an Allied Airborne Army, Commander-in-Chief, Brereton, Deputy Commander Browning. We would like to know details about this army such as organisation, composition, disposition and tasks…. Has this army been created for a special important operation or is its appearance only the result of an organisation measure which has been diffused for reasons of propaganda?’⁶

For some time the Germans had been preoccupied with the idea that the Allies might be increasing the striking power of their airborne forces. Early in April when TRICYCLE went for his last interview in Lisbon he had been asked: ‘Which English divisions are being formed into airborne divisions? Divisional numbers and localities.’⁷ BRUTUS, being an airman himself, had taken several opportunities during the summer of playing on these fears. He suggested that airborne transport was becoming almost a normal form of conveyance in the American Army. ‘A great part of the American troops carry out exercises in “Airborne” as a normal part of their training. So far as I can understand, regiments of glider pilots have been attached to the higher formations in order to render the divisions more mobile. These regiments are to play the same part towards the Americans as the transport companies play in the British Army.’⁸ He also spoke of British gliders which were capable of carrying tanks, artillery and other weapons of war.⁹ All this made a good foundation for the new airborne assault force. On 21st August BRUTUS said: ‘With regard to General Brereton: a new force has been formed composed of all airborne divisions, of whom the Chief is General Brereton and his Second in Command General Browning. As reported, the Allies attach great importance to airborne operations in the future in the hope of bringing them under a joint command. In addition certain infantry divisions have undergone airborne training and can also be included in this type of operation.’¹⁰ This found its reflection in the Intelligence Summary of 26th August. A further report from a particularly trusted source about the retention of the Allied Airborne Army for a big operational task deserves special notice. Concrete indications of the target are not available.’¹¹

In order to give effect to the proposals outlined above it was decided to reorganise the deceptive forces in the following manner. The Ninth and Fourteenth Armies were to be detached from FUSAG and placed directly under SHAEF as a strategic reserve, the latter army moving forthwith from the Eastern counties to embarkation camps in the Southampton area. FUSAG would retain the Fourth British Army and would take command of the First Allied Airborne Army. The ground forces which it now controlled would concentrate north of the Thames where they would be more centrally placed for the amphibious operation.

3103 Signals Service Battalion, being now required overseas,¹² the Fourteenth Army went off the air on the 17th August, and from that day onwards information regarding its activities was made available to the enemy through the reports of the controlled agents only. The move from East Anglia to the south coast was initiated by BRUTUS on 20th August. ‘On returning to Wentworth I learned that there is great activity in the affairs of the Fourteenth American Army, as though it were a question of changing its location.’¹³ Thereafter each division was seen off in the Eastern counties by agent 7 (7) and received on the south coast by agent 7 (4), the latter being assisted by BRUTUS, who visited Hampshire at the beginning of September. TATE, who lived at Radlett, was lucky enough to see several of the convoys travelling between Hatfield and Watford, while agent Three himself heard on 28th August that the Blackwall Tunnel under the Thames had been closed for three days for the passage of American troops. These were to be the Fourteenth Army’s new locations:¹⁴

Fourteenth US Army:	Fareham.
XXXIII Corps:	Romsey.
17th US Infantry Division:	Brighton–Burgess Hill.
59th US Infantry Division:	Rolands Castle.
XXXVII Corps:	Worthing.
11th US Infantry Division:	Winchester.
48th US Infantry Division:	Brockenhurst.
25th US Armoured Division:	Tidworth.

All the moves were to be completed by 31st August.

On 31st August the German Intelligence Summary recorded: ‘Parts of the Fourteenth American Army (XXXIII Army Corps) have, according to several reports, been transferred from their existing area, Ipswich–Cambridge, to the South. The 11th, 17th and 59th Infantry Divisions were reported in this connection. The 17th Infantry Division is said to have been moved to the Brighton area.’¹⁵ By 12th September they had become fully acquainted with the new situation. ‘According to a report from a particularly trustworthy source the American Fourteenth Army with XXXIII and XXXVII Army Corps has been transferred from South-Eastern England to the south coast. According to this report the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Army is at Fareham (north-west of Portsmouth) while the American XXXIII Corps is in the Winchester area and the American XXXVII Corps with under command the 17th and 59th American Infantry Divisions is reported in the Worthing area. The transfer of the 11th and 48th American Infantry Divisions from the Cambridge area to the neighbourhood of Southampton is also reported by a good source.’¹⁶ That the implications which lay behind the move were sufficiently well understood is shown by the following extract from the OKH Situation Report of 10th September. ‘According to a message from a particularly trustworthy Abwehr source a large-scale concentration of American troops (some five infantry divisions and one armoured division partly from the East of England) seems to be taking place under XXXIII American Army Corps in the Southampton area. Simultaneously the Fourteenth American Army is said to have been transferred to this embarkation area. A move to France is probable and corresponds with the expectations which we have already expressed. This would mean the withdrawal of all American military formations from the South-East and South of England.’¹⁷

Even if we had wanted to do so it would have been impossible at this time to move the whole of the Fourth Army out of Kent so long as we wished to maintain its wireless traffic. The 55th, 61st, and 80th Infantry Divisions were obliged to remain. The two former were real training divisions and supplied their own links in the fictitious network. The 80th Division, an imaginary one, was represented on the air by signallers belonging to the 61st Infantry Division, who had to remain within a reasonable distance of their parent formation. In these circumstances there was no object in moving 2nd British Corps, which commanded the 55th and 61st Infantry Divisions. Consequently it was only the Fourth Army Headquarters, 7th Corps and the 58th Infantry Division which crossed the Thames. The 5th British Armoured Division remained at Newmarket where it had been all the time.¹⁸ In order to bring the grouping of these formations into line with the new geographical dispositions, 7th Corps now took all the divisions north of the Thames and 2nd Corps those to the south. The 61st and 80th British Infantry Divisions thus went from 7th Corps to 2nd Corps, while the 58th British Infantry Division went from 2nd to 7th Corps.¹⁹

As the British formations of Fourth Army would be using many of the billets that had previously been occupied by formations of the American Fourteenth Army they could not begin their move to the North until the Americans had left. The first news came from GARBO on 9th September. ‘7 (7): Have not seen following US units in this area since beginning of month: Fourteenth US Army, XXXVII US Corps, 11th US Infantry Division, XXXIII US Corps. Apart from some odd units, all US troops have left the area. Innkeepers at Ipswich and Colchester have received orders from billeting officers to continue to reserve accommodation previously commandeered for arrival of further troops. Saw several staff cars in Harwich and Ipswich with the sign of the Fourth British Army but no troops or lorries seen. When in Colchester a week ago discovered that all US troops had left. Large numbers of staff cars with the sign of Fourth British Army and 58th British Division seen outside Cups Hotel.’²⁰ On the next day TATE saw a convoy of the 7th Corps moving through London in a northerly direction.²¹ Before 14th September 7 (4) had told GARBO that the 7th Corps had left Folkestone and the 58th Division Gravesend.²² Subsequent messages from agents 7 (2) and 7 (7) located Fourth Army at Hatfield Peverel, the 58th Division at Colchester and 7th British Corps as being in the immediate neighbourhood. The German Intelligence Summary for 17th September contains the following paragraph: ‘According to messages from a particularly trustworthy source, following on the withdrawal of the American divisions hitherto in the area north-east of London (County of Essex) parts of the Fourth English Army (hitherto 7th English Army Corps and 58th Infantry Division confirmed) have been moved into the area vacated. As part of this regrouping, the Headquarters of the Fourth English Army has moved to Colchester (north-east of London). It is probable that further divisions not yet named will follow this army.’²³ The Germans did not know about the wireless difficulty which prevented the 55th, 61st and 80th British Infantry Divisions from moving with the rest.

By 8th September the regrouping was accomplished. The Ninth and Fourteenth US Armies, the latter no longer represented by wireless, now formed the SHAEF strategic reserve and were about to embark for France. FUSAG, consisting of Fourth Army and the First Allied Airborne Army, were preparing for the great amphibious assault across the North Sea. FORTITUDE was ended. The new story is given in the directive of that date. ‘After the Allied victories in Normandy and Brittany, General Eisenhower decided to make his main thrusts into Germany from that area. Subsequent exploitation of the successful Seine battle has made possible a rapid advance to the heart of Germany. In order to assist this advance and to prevent the escape of remnants of the German armies, Eisenhower has decided to retain a large airborne and amphibious striking force and a highly trained strategic reserve in the United Kingdom. The tasks of this force will be to reinforce the Allied armies in France as the situation may demand, to carry out large-scale airborne operations anywhere on the enemy’s lines of communication, to open new lines of communication from the United Kingdom against limited opposition and to occupy areas in the event of German withdrawal.’²⁴ This story had been made available to the Special Means Staff before the end of the month of August and the controlled agents had been taking steps to bring it to the enemy’s notice for some time before FORTITUDE officially ended. The position was comprehensively summarised in a message sent by GARBO on the 31st August. At that time the race through Northern France had attained its full momentum. Montgomery had crossed the Belgian frontier and was heading north-west. Patton had reached the outskirts of Metz. Already the lines of supply had become abnormally stretched. In view of this GARBO’s case officer asked which was to be the main thrust, for now would be the moment to bring the full weight of Special Means in support of the feint and thus draw German forces away from the true line of advance. Although it was not possible to give an answer to that question, there could be no objection to preparing the ground. On 31st August agent Three addressed the Germans in these terms. ‘Important! The following obtained at meeting between myself, GARBO and 4 (3) yesterday, in reply to your questionnaire about airborne army and also explains the move of the Fourteenth US Army from the east coast. 4 (3): He says that the original FUSAG plan for attacking Pas de Calais has been definitely cancelled and the FUSAG forces are again being reorganised in the following way: The Fourteenth US Army and the Ninth US Army are now under the direct command of SHAEF, as SHAEF strategic reserve. This force will be at the disposal of SHAEF for Eisenhower to be able to reinforce the Allied armies in France if they want assistance in the advance which is now about to be driven to prevent the German Army from escaping to Germany. The Fourteenth US Army is being replaced in FUSAG by the new airborne army which has now been given the name of the First Allied Airborne Army. With this rearrangement a great part of FUSAG is now composed of airborne troops and will be used for special operations, in fact FUSAG will become a sort of modern version of Combined Operations. For instance they will carry out large-scale airborne operations anywhere in France, Belgium, Holland or Germany to attack the enemy lines of communication. They will also be used to occupy any areas or countries which the Germans give up unexpectedly and this will avoid the necessity of having to make sudden dispersals of forces in the battle at the expense of carrying out their original plans. Following just arrived, urgently, from GARBO. This morning I happened to be present at an interview between J (3) and a war press correspondent of SHAEF, at M of I. He told us, in confidence, that a large attack in France is imminent. He was recently at advanced HQ of SHAEF in France where he learnt about the following discussions. 21 Army Group demands that Patton’s advance should stop. They want him to make a feint attack towards the East, keeping back the weight of his forces to turn north to attack the German flank whilst the 21 Army Group, reinforced by FUSAG, makes a definite attack against the Pas de Calais, to occupy that zone. On the other hand Patton requests that all reinforcements and supplies are put at his disposal to attack into the centre of Germany, asking, at the same time, that the British Armies should make a deceptive attack against the Pas de Calais to maintain all the German forces there, leaving Patton’s troops with freedom of action. The correspondent said that it would, therefore, be absurd to speculate without knowing what personal decision Eisenhower will eventually take as to which of the two attacks is the feint attack and which is the one destined to make the advance.’²⁵ On 2nd September the German Intelligence Summary contained the following appreciation. ‘According to a report from a hitherto particularly trustworthy source the Ninth and Fourteenth American Armies have been parted from FUSAG and have come under the direct command of Eisenhower. (The strength of these two armies in Great Britain is at present to be taken as some eight infantry and two armoured divisions.) The object of this measure is said to be the creation of a large strategic reserve for Eisenhower in order to give him the opportunity of exploiting his successes France by deploying new armies. The withdrawal of American formations from the South-East of England which was already reported in the “Short Appreciation for the West” of 31st August is thus confirmed. We must therefore reckon with a considerable influx of forces into France and the setting up of new higher formation staffs, and in this connection we must count on the immediate shipment of further formations from the United States to complete the Ninth and Fourteenth Armies. FUSAG, which is still held ready in England, is thus composed after reorganisation of the strong Fourth English Army (some twenty divisions) and the First Allied Airborne Army (six airborne divisions). This source suggests widespread use of this airborne army against rear lines of communication, while it does not express an opinion on the probable employment or the significance of the Fourteenth (?Fourth) English Army. The double change in the direction of the American Army Group which has been observed since the thrust forward from the area south of Paris particularly on the part of the Third American Army is attributed by the agent mentioned above to differences of opinion in the command. Montgomery is said to have demanded only a deceptive attack towards the East by the Third American Amy so as to enable him to envelop the German flank from the South with the mass of the American formations, while Patton wanted to press forward directly towards Germany and demanded for this purpose all available reinforcements of the whole of the supply arrangements for himself. It is not yet clear in which direction the decisive effort will finally be made since particularly the employment of the mass of the First American Army is at present not clear. But it must be assumed that with the further successes of the Americans in an easterly direction Patton’s view has carried the day.’²⁶ This appreciation probably marks the zenith of GARBO’s influence on the German High Command. At this moment, however, Allied policy did not require that his powers should be put to the test. On 12th September, nearly a fortnight after GARBO’s message had gone, 21 Army Group submitted to SHAEF a cover plan with the object of making the enemy reinforce the Metz and Nancy fronts at the expense of the Northern front. The following story was proposed. ‘21 Army Group and the First US Army of Twelfth Army Group, having advanced as far as the Dutch and German frontiers, have now outrun their supplies. The failure of the Allies to capture Brest, Le Havre, as well as Calais and Boulogne, has caused an administrative crisis in the two army groups. General Eisenhower has, therefore, decided to hold with the Second British Army and First US Army whilst the Canadian Army deals with the ports of Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais, and to concentrate his administrative resources in order to enable the reinforced army under command General Patton to drive through the Metz–Nancy gap towards Saarbrucken. It is estimated that Second British Army and First US Army are likely to remain inactive until the first week of October.’²⁷ On 15th September the Twelfth Army Group notified SHAEF that the suggested plan was acceptable. On 16th September SHAEF informed 21 Army Group that it was not considered desirable to put into effect the proposed cover plan because the date of Arnhem had been advanced since this proposal had been submitted and because Third Army’s operations around Nancy and Metz were producing actual threats in place of the proposed notional threats.²⁸

The termination of FORTITUDE made it possible to release most of the troops and technical resources which had hitherto been employed on strategic deception in the United Kingdom. 5 Wireless Group had already joined 21 Army Group on the Continent. Units of 3103 Signals Service Battalion were now on their way. Only 12th Reserve Unit remained. Owing to the withdrawal of the German forces in Western Europe, it was now considered most unlikely that they would be able clearly to pick up low-powered wireless traffic. 12th Reserve Unit therefore issued a new signals programme which provided that there should be no further exercises, that the static wireless links of Fourth Army should be maintained down to and including divisional and independent brigade headquarters and that there should be no further restriction on the use of wireless in the signals training of the 55th and 61st Divisions.²⁹

Of the three naval wireless deception units, Force ‘F’ at Harwich and Sheerness was to close down on 5th September and Forces ‘M’ and ‘N’, located respectively at Gosport and Studland, on the 7th. The last two were to reappear for a few days in the Humber and Firth of Forth. This would help to emphasise the fact that the old FORTITUDE assault force had been dispersed and would place them conveniently should they be required to take part in the new operation. The dummy landing craft had been manned throughout the period of their display by two infantry battalions, the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcester. Dismantling of these craft was begun on 25th August and completed by the end of September. The 4th Northants were released on 21st August and the 10th Worcester on 15th September, the work of dismantling being taken over by the 24th Armoured Brigade, a formation specially trained in camouflage which had recently returned from the Middle East. After 25th August the use of other forms of camouflage such as dummy camps and signposts was discontinued. The remaining security regulations which had been imposed to help FORTITUDE were also removed.