We have recorded in some detail the immediate impression made by FORTITUDE SOUTH upon the enemy’s intelligence service from the day on which it was put into operation until the time of the invasion. Let us now consider the effect which this false intelligence had upon their military appreciations and how it influenced their actions during the weeks which preceded the Normandy assault. We have already seen that until the second half of April they had made their appreciations without any assistance from us. During May a growing belief in the imaginary FUSAG combined with the bombing programme of the Air Force undoubtedly tended to ‘shift the centre of gravity’ from west to east. But Allied deception could not yet claim to exercise a decisive influence on the enemy’s opinion as to our aims, nor was it intended that it should.
We will first consider the enemy’s latest opinions as to invasion objectives. Hitler could always be relied upon to hold a view about Allied intentions. But, like so many other gamblers, he was apt to pursue the unprofitable system of backing every chance. We already know of his predilection for the Pas de Calais. In April he began to hedge extensively. ‘In the Fuehrer’s opinion’, says the OKW War Diary, ‘the targets aimed at by the enemy were the Peninsula of Cotentin and Brittany with the ports of Cherbourg and Brest.’ About the same time we read: ‘Contrary to the opinion that had cropped up from time to time that it had recently been a question of bluff, the Fuehrer maintained the same standpoint as that held by the Chief of the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab that at any time an attack had to be reckoned with on the Atlantic coast and also against the South of France.’ We are told chat C in C West submitted a strategic plan and proposed distribution of forces to meet the possibility of the enemy attacking in the Bay of Biscay and the south coast of France only, and that a memorandum was prepared by the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab to provide for simultaneous landings in the Channel and on the south coast. During May the belief in an impending attack on the south coast of France was maintained, though it was expected that it would be in the nature of a holding operation. On the other hand ‘action against the southern part of the Bay of Biscay might have to be regarded as cover operations of small calibre’.1 From this it will be seen that FERDINAND had a better start than IRONSIDE.
As to the date of the invasion, the Germans remained entirely in the dark until the very hour of the assault. ‘The enemy command continues to attempt, by every method of nerve warfare, to obscure its invasion plans. Rumours of political differences which compel a postponement of the invasion alternate with announcements of imminent attack. The object of these machinations is the gradual blunting of German watchfulness designed to bring about the conditions necessary for successful surprise.’2 The uncontrolled agents must be allowed their share of the credit for producing this atmosphere of frustration and bewilderment.
The OKW War Diary contains a general survey of the situation as seen during these later weeks which is of unusual interest and provides as full an exposition of the FORTITUDE story, so far as it had yet been revealed, as one could reasonably hope for. On 27th April Fremde Heere West established that there was a concentration of American troops noticeable in Southern England. In the Midlands of England it was the same case with British formations. Forces having apparently been augmented in Scotland and Iceland, there seemed to be an increasing possibility of a thrust against Norway, in which an attack against Central and Southern Norway appeared to be more likely than against the North. The first half of May was mentioned latterly as the date which seemed probable judging by various indications. Operations to be expected in Southern France as well as the fighting in Italy would be, it was thought, of a holding nature. The weather now no longer furnished any decisive reason for delaying the offensive, and the setting up of the second front was demanded by the Soviet press; time, however, went on and nothing happened. By mid-May the Scottish force, owing to withdrawals to the South, had become so weakened that it was now only capable of operations of a restricted nature; the risk of a landing in the northern area became again correspondingly less likely. On 21st May C in C West’s estimate of the situation was as follows: ‘Schwerpunkte of the enemy invasion concentration lie in the South and South-East of England. The area round the Isle of Wight (Portsmouth, Southampton) is a main gate of preparation. The Channel front between the Scheldt and Normandy, together with the northern part of Brittany including Brest remains unequivocally3 the threatened main front.’ Seventy to eighty formations were assumed to be on our opponents’ side, a fairly clear idea having been formed of their organisation and employment.
By the end of May, although the main story was still held back and was not to be told until after the invasion had begun, enough clues had been given to enable an intelligent observer to make a fairly shrewd guess as to what was coming. Hitler’s renowned intuition was equal to the task. A conversation between him and the Japanese Ambassador shows that by 28th May he had acquired a thorough grasp of the FORTITUDE SOUTH plot, thus anticipating by more than a week the systematic programme of disclosure which the Allied deception staff had set for the performance of the game. ‘Speaking of the Second Front, Hitler said that he, himself, thought that sooner or later operations for the invasion of Europe would be undertaken. He thought that about eighty divisions had already been assembled in England (of these divisions about eight had had actual experience of fighting and were very good troops). I accordingly asked the Fuehrer if he thought that these British and American troops had completed their preparations for landing operations and he replied in the affirmative. I then asked him in what form he thought the Second Front would materialise, and he told me that at the moment what he himself thought was most probable was that after having carried out diversionary operations in Norway, Denmark and the southern part of the west coast of France and the French Mediterranean coast, they would establish a bridgehead in Normandy or Brittany, and after seeing how things went would them embark upon the establishment of a real second front in the Channel. Germany would like nothing better, he said, than to be given an opportunity of coming to blows with large forces of the enemy as soon as possible. But if the enemy adopted these methods his numerical strength would be dispersed and he (Hitler) intended to watch for this….’4 Irresistibly the parable of the mote and the beam springs to mind.
An appreciation5 issued by Von Rundstedt on 5th June shows that the enemy remained wholly ignorant of the Allied objective and of the date of the attack, even after the invasion fleet had put to sea, and is a notable tribute to the work of the Allied Security Services. When one finds that the same commander, who knew so little about the invasion when the Allied forces were already approaching the coast of France, was able to state that during the third week of May ‘244,385 British Mines were laid at sea’,6 one is forced to the conclusion that the Germans could not see the wood for the trees.
We are now familiar with the main trends of opinion which influenced the German Command during the first half of 1944. Let us consider the effect of these opinions upon the disposition of their forces in France and in particular upon the struggle which took place for the control of the mobile reserve.7 Early in the year Rommel, the Commander of Army Group B, pointing out that every possible means should be employed to intercept and repulse the enemy on the beaches, argued that the resources not only of C in C West but also of the OKW should be placed under his control. Von Rundstedt did not agree. ‘His main idea was to hold his strategical reserves in readiness, so as to be able, in case of need, to meet the enemy in pitched battle.’ In other words, since the Allied objective was not known, the reserves must remain in a central position. Rommel then seems to have gone straight to Hitler. ‘Field-Marshal Rommel had been urging that his powers should be extended and had asked the Fuehrer, on the occasion of his visit to Klessheim8 (middle of March), even then to place the armoured formations, the mechanised troops and army artillery under his orders, in order to make all the preparations for the defence.’ He had also ‘claimed it as his right to exert his influence on the First and Nineteenth Armies’.9 After discussion, Von Rundstedt appears to have gone some way towards meeting Rommel’s demands, but not far enough to satisfy the Commander of Army Group B. C in C West, so we are informed, ‘established the powers of Army Group B on a fresh basis. But Field-Marshal Rommel’s wishes were not in this way fulfilled. C in C West declining to meet them any further it was necessary to obtain a decision from the Supreme Command, more especially in regard to the highly mobile formations and their command.’ On the advice of the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, Hitler gave his decision in favour of Von Rundstedt. Rommel obtained control neither of the mobile reserves nor of the First and Nineteenth Armies. The War Diary goes on to point out, however, that as Army Group B’s orders then stood Rommel was responsible for meeting an enemy landing wherever it came, even, for example, if the attack was made on the south coast of France. In consequence, ‘it still remained possible for him to bring his influence to bear on them (i.e. the First and Nineteenth Armies) within the scope of his orders. Overlapping of orders was thus unavoidable.’
At the beginning of May Rommel adopted new tactics. ‘On 4th May C in C West sent a report from Field-Marshal Rommel on his impressions of his visits of inspection to the coast. According to this report no men could be spared either from the right or from the left for Normandy. The Field-Marshal proposed therefore to move formation of OKW reserve. C in C West demurred at this on the grounds that reserves would thus already be pinned down before the fighting had started.’ Rommel had been beaten last time on the ground that the enemy’s objective was not known and that in consequence the mobile reserve could not be committed to advance. Rommel now, however, offered the objective. The interesting thing to note is that he chose Normandy.
Meanwhile Von Rundstedt had foiled Rommel’s efforts to obtain control of the First and Nineteenth Armies by the formation of Army Group G in the South. He justified his action on the ground that had Army Group B been called upon to meet an attack in the South of France and had this been followed by a second attack on the Channel coast, there would have been no one left but himself to conduct the operations.
About this time the following allocation of the mobile reserve was made by the OKW:
Army Group G |
OKW Reserve |
|
| 2nd Panzer Division | 9th Panzer Division | 1st SS Panzer Division |
| 21st Panzer Division | 11th Panzer Division | 12thSSPanzerDivision |
| 116th Panzer Division | 2nd SS Panzer Division | 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division |
| Panzer Lehr Division |
Rommel still did not give up hope of getting more of the reserve under his control. It will be remembered that the Fuehrer had more than once expressed the view that the Cotentin Peninsula of Brittany would be the first point of attack. Already the 3rd and 5th Parachute Divisions had been sent to Brittany as a direct result of Hitler’s fear. A rather obscure passage in the War Diary suggests that in the face of opposition from C in C West he was seeking to play on Hitler’s fears with regard to the Cherbourg Peninsula in order to get his way. ‘The OKW Operational Staff, in a telephone message at 1900 hours on 6th May, drew the attention of the Chief of the General Staff of the Western Command to the fact that the Cotentin Peninsula would be the first target of the enemy. The OKW reserves, however, would not be released to reinforce it; other forces would have to be drawn upon.’ As a concession to Rommel, however, the 243rd Infantry Division was sent to the Peninsula and a little later the 91st Infantry Division, which Von Rundstedt had preferred to hold near Rennes.10 At the same time the Pas de Calais was reinforced in the latter half of May by sending the 19th Panzer Division to Holland.
All this time the fixed coastal defences were being improved. In April we read of a shortage of cement and in May of transport difficulties. Finally the OKW War Diary tells us that ‘in addition, ready for service, a second position was consolidated, which, by the end of May, was already constructed almost as a continuous line along the Channel coast or was already in the course of construction’. It may be claimed that the second object of FORTITUDE, that of inducing the enemy ‘to expand his available effort on fortifications in areas other than the target areas had at any rate in part been achieved.