In order that Fourth Army might be conveniently placed to embark from the Humber and other northern ports should it be necessary to resuscitate the threat, it was now decided to move it to Yorkshire, where the Army Headquarters could become merged with Northern Command. The object of the latter arrangement was twofold: first, to allay German fears and make it appear that an operation was not intended in the immediate future; second, to help us to give direction to the threat when we wanted to revive it. ‘7 (7) reports from Yorkshire … that Fourth Army and Northern Command are being amalgamated and will control any future landing in Germany … in the same way as other commands have been given similar roles; for instance, Norway in the case of Scottish Command and the Channel Islands in the case of Southern Command.’1
All these arrangements were provided for in a paper dated 6th November and entitled ‘Regrouping of the Notional Order of Battle in the United Kingdom’.2 Here the following story is given to account for the changes. ‘The capture of the Pas de Calais by 21 Army Group rendered the seaborne assault by First United States Army Group unnecessary. During the first weeks of September it appeared that the total defeat of Germany was imminent. First United States Army Group was therefore allotted a new role in support of the final breakthrough. First Allied Airborne Army was placed under command First United States Army Group and Fourteenth United States Army reverted to SHAEF control. The airborne attack on Arnhem constituted the first phase of a major assault from the United Kingdom. Had this attack succeeded, a combined airborne and seaborne assault would have been launched by Fourth British Army supported by the remaining airborne divisions of First Allied Airborne Army, the whole force operating under the control of First United States Army Group. After the setback at Arnhem and the general stabilisation on the Western front, it was realised that an Allied victory in 1944 was unattainable. In these circumstances the operation of Fourth British Army and the special airborne force was held in suspense.’
No sooner had the decision to move Fourth Army to Yorkshire been made than the request, already referred to, from 21 Army Group in connection with their cover operation TROLLEYCAR was received. TROLLEYCAR sought to contain certain of the enemy’s lay-back reinforcing divisions, mainly in Holland, by convincing the Germans that an attack would be made by the First Canadian Army west of Arnhem in conjunction with a sea and airborne attack from the United Kingdom. In these circumstances it seemed as if the move to Yorkshire might be made to serve two purposes. It could first be allowed to appear that the formations were moving to embarkation in the east coast ports, thus providing the threat required by TROLLEYCAR; later it could be discovered that they were merely proceeding from one home station to another.
Before observing the effect of Fourth Army’s move, a few general remarks on the German fear of an amphibious attack across the North Sea may be useful. During the latter months of the war the Germans seem to have been haunted by this fear in an ever-increasing degree.3 Between the invasion and Arnhem practically all reports of impending attacks on Scandinavia were regarded as false. JOSEPHINE scored rather heavily by saying that such attacks were not contemplated. But he went down with his message of 28th August in which he forecast the assault on Denmark and Norway which has already been referred to in connection with the Arnhem operation. This report was regarded as false. The first affirmative report which the Germans marked as true was that of BRUTUS sent on 14th September, also in connection with Arnhem. Two uncontrolled messages4 which followed shortly after that of BRUTUS also received full marks. They probably derived an adventitious benefit from the British-controlled report. Thereafter their belief in the North Sea assault seems to have waned as most of the messages are classified once more as false.5
Such was the position when TROLLEYCAR and the move of Fourth Army to Yorkshire became a factor in the case. This move was effected between the 10th and 20th November. It was conveyed to the Germans in the usual way by messages from GARBO, BRUTUS, TATE and BRONX.6 Early in November, in conformity with the requirements of TROLLEYCAR, certain wireless links had been opened between 21 Army Group and the airborne forces in the United Kingdom. On 17th November BRUTUS reported: ‘As a result of my personal observations and conversations with my colleagues, I can confirm that your fears about the airborne attack are justified. From one of my airborne colleagues it is thought that the attack will take place against the region of Emden to capture the coastal installations in this region. It will be preceded, according to him, by a heavy attack by the Canadians in the North. I now regret very much that I was unable to visit the headquarters of the Fourth Army during my visit to Colchester, but nevertheless this plan is confirmed by the information which I received that the Fourth Army has begun to move towards the North, probably towards the region of embarkation.’7 And two days later: ‘Urgent: From an officer of the British 19th Airborne Corps, which has its headquarters at Salisbury, this corps includes the 2nd British Airborne Division which is in a high state of preparedness for departure.’8 BRUTUS’s first message was regarded as possible and given XX. After this, reports of Fourth Army’s move began to come in. The Germans were obviously puzzled. ‘The move, several times reported, of the formations of the 7th English Army Corps (38th [58th?] and 80th Infantry Divisions, 5th Armoured Division) from their previous locations in the South-East of the Island to Central England seems to be confirmed, though the reason for these moves is not clear. Since, however, for the present there is no sign of a move to port areas, we cannot yet speak of any impending embarkation of this division (sic corps).’9 A fortnight later they were still somewhat perplexed. ‘There is no fresh information regarding the shipment of formations to France; the presence of the Fourth English Army is again confirmed by a useful source. The apparently still uncompleted move of the 7th English Army Corps with the 58th Infantry and 5th Armoured Divisions from South-Eastern England to the neighbourhood of the Humber estuary is striking and the reasons for this are still not clear. Any new landing intentions (Denmark, German Bight) can, however, not be deduced from this move, particularly as they could not be in any way operationally connected with recognisable objectives in France. The possible concentration of landing craft in the Humber area must be investigated by air reconnaissance.’10 By the 14th it had become fairly clear that no operation was imminent and that the move of Fourth Army had no special significance. ‘From England there have come in no important messages during the last days, in particular we have been unable to obtain any fresh information regarding the purpose behind the move of the 7th English Army Corps, which has now been joined by the 80th English Infantry Division (now accepted in the Catterick area, north-west of Hull). In any case we cannot accept the intention to transfer these formations to the Western front in the near future after their withdrawal from South-Eastern England. Similarly, the fact that the 80th English Infantry Division belonging to the 7th English Army Corps was not placed in the area of a port when it was moved North gives reason to suppose that no imminent new landing operation is planned which would include this formation.’11 Nevertheless, it would have been unsafe to leave anything to chance and so GARBO was told on 14th December: ‘I should be very pleased if you could arrange that either you, 7 (2) or another of the sub-agents will make regular trips to the North and East of Scotland, once or twice monthly, in order to keep control over this district and its ports as we must always be prepared for the possibility of new landing operation which could have its bases of concentration in the North.’12