THE Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE), a short, difficult, but fascinating discourse on method, was first published in Spinoza’s Opera posthuma in 1677. But as the editors of that collection tell us in their preface, both its style and its content show it to be one of Spinoza’s earliest works. If the reference in Letter 6 to a “whole short work” (integrum opusculum) is indeed to this treatise, as scholars have generally assumed,1 then a draft of it must have existed at least by early in 1662, and quite likely Spinoza wrote it before that.2
Various forward references in Spinoza’s notes to this treatise indicate that at some stage of his work on it Spinoza conceived it as introductory to another work, to be called (perhaps) Philosophy, a work which would have discussed in a systematic way topics in philosophical theology (II/29, n. z), philosophy of mind (II/15, n. o), epistemology (II/14, nn. k and l), ethics (II/6, n. a; II/7, n. b; II/8, n. c), and perhaps much else (cf. II/9, n. d). Some of the references suggest a work more like the Short Treatise than the Ethics,3 and Gebhardt argued that the “short work” referred to in Letter 6 was a two-part work, with the TdIE as a methodological prolegomenon to the more systematic KV. According to Gebhardt (I/407), the Latin original of the KV was already in existence when Spinoza began writing the TdIE around the time of Letter 6. But if what I have suggested above is correct (see n. 2), then Gebhardt must be wrong at least about the date of composition of the TdIE. Mignini would argue that Gebhardt is wrong also in thinking that the TdIE was an integral part of the short work Spinoza refers to in Letter 6. Emphasizing the incompleteness of our text of the TdIE, he contends that it could not have been correctly described in Letter 6 as having been composed and that it is earlier than the KV, not merely in date of composition, but also in the stage of the development of Spinoza’s thought that it represents.4 If Mignini’s arguments for the priority of the TdIE are not conclusive, he has, I think, at least established that there is no reason to regard the KV as the earlier work.5 So at this stage the position would seem to be that, if the TdIE is not in fact earlier that the KV, it was probably written at about the same time as the KV and as an introduction to it.
In its importance for the study of the development of Spinoza’s thought, the Treatise on the Intellect invites comparison with Descartes’ Regulae. Both are early, unfinished works that show the direction of their author’s thought at a formative stage, that indicate the problems concerning him and the solutions he was inclined toward. Both discuss certain important themes more fully than does any work their author later published. But both works also need to be read with the consciousness that the lines of thought presented in them may not have proved ultimately to be satisfactory to the author.
For example, some have argued that in this treatise Spinoza has not fully emancipated himself from Descartes on the distinction between will and intellect,6 and it seems clear that he does tend to confuse mind and intellect.7 I would argue that the discussion of the four kinds of knowledge is not clearly thought out.8 And Joachim has suggested that the whole work may have been intended only to present a popular, imprecise exposition of Spinoza’s thought on these topics.9
The most important question, perhaps, is whether the whole concept of method, as Spinoza here presents it, is not incoherent, and so doomed to failure.10 On the one hand, the truth is supposed to require no sign, and having a true idea is supposed to be sufficient to remove doubt (§ 36); on the other, the method is supposed, among other things, to teach us what a true idea is, and how to distinguish it from other perceptions (§ 37).
But whatever reservations we may have about the doctrine of this work, it is clear that in the main it continued to satisfy Spinoza for some years. A letter to Bouwmeester in 1666 (Letter 37) repeats some of the Treatise’s main themes—that the intellect, unlike the body, is not subject to chance, external causes, but has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas; that it is necessary above all to distinguish between the intellect and the imagination (this being identified with distinguishing between true ideas and all the rest, the false, fictitious and doubtful). And an interchange with Tschirnhaus in 1675 (Letters 59 and 60) indicates that Spinoza had communicated something similar to him informally, and had given Tschirnhaus some reason to expect that before long he would publish his treatise on method.
Naturally, then, there have been a variety of suggestions as to why the Treatise never was published in Spinoza’s lifetime. The editors of the Opera posthuma remark that the importance of the topic, the deep contemplations and extensive knowledge it required, made Spinoza’s progress with it very slow. Appuhn suggests that Spinoza broke off the composition because he could not see any satisfactory solution to the problems raised at the end (§§ 102-103, 106-110), and that he did not return to finish it because he came to think it more important to concentrate on his other works on moral and political philosophy (the Ethics, the Theological-Political Treatise, and the Political Treatise). Koyré, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the difficulty raised in § 46 (see the note to II/18/1-2). Ironically, Joachim’s excellent commentary on this work itself remained unfinished at his death because he was unable to resolve to his satisfaction the problem of how Spinoza meant to conclude the Treatise.
If the character of this work as unfinished, highly problematic, and only posthumously published invites comparison with Descartes’ Regulae, the apparently autobiographical character of the opening sections equally invites comparison with the Discourse on Method. The tone of the two works is quite different, of course. The dissatisfaction Descartes presents as leading him to philosophy is with the uncertainty of the learning that had been imparted to him as a student. Spinoza’s dissatisfaction is with the insufficiency of the ends men commonly pursue.
Of course scholars have doubted whether these opening passages should be taken as strictly autobiographical (just as they have doubted the accuracy of Descartes’ account of his life in the Discourse). As Koyré remarks (Koyré 2, xix), the theme de vero bono et de contemptu mundi is as old as the world itself. Various Stoic authors (e.g., Marcus Aurelius and Seneca) have been cited. And Elbogen calls attention to the work of a medieval Jewish author, Shem Tov Falaquera, whose Ha-Mevak-kesh similarly offers knowledge as the path to salvation. However that may be, it remains, as Koyré also remarks, highly significant that Spinoza should begin a treatise on method by reflecting on the true good.
The paragraph numbers in brackets are those introduced by Bruder and are included for ease in making and following references. Lettered footnotes are Spinoza’s, numbered footnotes are mine. I have adopted the lettering of Gebhardt’s edition, though (even allowing for differences in the Latin alphabet) it is not entirely consecutive.
THIS Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [NS: and defective] state, was written by the author many years ago now. He always intended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations, and finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the desired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and useful things, which—we have no doubt—will be of great benefit to anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you of them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.
[1] AFTER experience had taught me that all the things which regularly occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the [10] things which were the cause or object of my fear had nothing of good or bad in themselves, except insofar as [my] mind was moved by them, I resolved at last to try to find out whether there was anything which would be the true good, capable of communicating itself, and which alone would affect the mind, all others being rejected—whether there [15] was something which, once found and acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy, to eternity.
[2] I say that I resolved at last—for at first glance it seemed ill-advised to be willing to lose something certain for something then uncertain. I saw, of course, the advantages that honor and wealth bring, and that I would be forced to abstain from seeking them, if I wished to devote [20] myself seriously to something new and different; and if by chance the greatest happiness lay in them, I saw that I should have to do without it. But if it did not lie in them, and I devoted my energies only to acquiring them, then I would equally go without it.
[3] So I wondered whether perhaps it would be possible to reach my new goal—or at least the certainty of attaining it—without changing [25] the conduct and plan of life which I shared with other men. Often I tried this, but in vain. For most things which present themselves in life, and which, to judge from their actions, men think to be the highest [II/6] good, may be reduced to these three: wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure.3 The mind is so distracted by these three that it cannot give the slightest thought to any other good.
[4] For as far as sensual pleasure is concerned, the mind is so caught up in it, as if at peace in a [true] good, that it is quite prevented from thinking of anything else. But after the enjoyment of sensual pleasure [5] is past, the greatest sadness follows. If this does not completely engross, still it thoroughly confuses and dulls the mind.
The mind is also distracted not a little by the pursuit of honors and wealth, particularly when the lattera is sought only for its own sake, because it is assumed to be the highest good. [5] But the mind is far [10] more distracted by honor. For this is always assumed to be good through itself and the ultimate end toward which everything is directed.
Nor do honor and wealth have, as sensual pleasure does, repentance as a natural consequence. The more each of these is possessed, the more joy is increased, and hence the more we are spurred on to increase [15] them. But if our hopes should chance to be frustrated, we experience the greatest sadness. And finally, honor has this great disadvantage: to pursue it, we must direct our lives according to other men’s powers of understanding—fleeing what they commonly flee and [20] seeking what they commonly seek.
[6] Since I saw that all of these things stood in the way of my working toward this new goal, indeed were so opposed to it that one or the other must be given up, I was forced to ask what would be more useful to me. For as I say, I seemed to be willing to lose the [25] certain good for the uncertain one. But after I had considered the matter a little, I first found that, if I devoted myself to this new plan of life, and gave up the old, I would be giving up a good by its nature uncertain (as we can clearly infer from what has been said) for one uncertain not by its nature (for I was seeking a permanent good) but only in respect to its attainment.
[30] [7] By persistent meditation, however, I came to the conclusion that, if only I could resolve, wholeheartedly,4 [to change my plan of life], I would be giving up certain evils for a certain good. For I saw that I [II/7] was in the greatest danger, and that I was forced to seek a remedy with all my strength, however uncertain it might be—like a man suffering from a fatal illness, who, foreseeing certain death unless he employs a remedy, is forced to seek it, however uncertain, with all [5] his strength. For all his hope lies there. But all those things men ordinarily strive for, not only provide no remedy to preserve our being, but in fact hinder that preservation, often cause the destruction of those who possess them,b and always cause the destruction of those who are possessed by them.5
[10] [8] There are a great many examples of people who have suffered persecution to the death on account of their wealth, or have exposed themselves to so many dangers to acquire wealth that they have at last paid the penalty for their folly with their life. Nor are there fewer examples of people who, to attain or defend honor, have suffered most [15] miserably. And there are innumerable examples of people who have hastened their death through too much sensual pleasure.
[9] Furthermore, these evils seemed to have arisen from the fact that all happiness or unhappiness was placed in the quality of the object to which we cling with love. For strife will never arise on account of [20] what is not loved, nor will there be sadness if it perishes, nor envy if it is possessed by another, nor fear, nor hatred—in a word, no disturbances of the mind. Indeed, all these happen only in the love of those things that can perish, as all the things we have just spoken of can do.
[10] But love toward the eternal and infinite thing feeds the mind [25] with a joy entirely exempt from sadness.6 This is greatly to be desired, and to be sought with all our strength.
But not without reason did I use these words if only I could resolve in earnest.7 For though I perceived these things [NS: this evil] so clearly in my mind, I still could not, on that account, put aside all greed, [30] desire for sensual pleasure and love of esteem.
[11] I saw this, however: that so long as the mind was turned toward these thoughts, it was turned away from those things, and was thinking seriously about the new goal. That was a great comfort to me. For I saw that those evils would not refuse to yield to remedies. And [II/8] although in the beginning these intervals were rare, and lasted a very short time, nevertheless, after the true good became more and more known to me, the intervals became more frequent and longer—especially after I saw that the acquisition of money, sensual pleasure, and [5] esteem are only obstacles so long as they are sought for their own sakes, and not as means to other things. But if they are sought as means, then they will have a limit, and will not be obstacles at all. On the contrary, they will be of great use in attaining the end on account of which they are sought, as we shall show in its place.
[10] [12] Here I shall only say briefly what I understand by the true good, and at the same time, what the highest good is. To understand this properly, it must be noted that good and bad are said of things only in a certain respect, so that one and the same thing can be called both good and bad according to different respects. The same applies [15] to perfect and imperfect. For nothing, considered in its own nature, will be called perfect or imperfect, especially after we have recognized that everything that happens happens according to the eternal order, and according to certain laws of Nature.
[13] But since human weakness does not grasp that order by its own thought, and meanwhile man conceives a human nature much stronger [20] and more enduring8 than his own, and at the same time sees that nothing prevents his acquiring such a nature, he is spurred to seek means that will lead him to such a perfection. Whatever can be a means to his attaining it is called a true good; but the highest good is to arrive—together with other individuals if possible—at the enjoyment [25] of such a nature. What that nature is we shall show in its proper place: that it is the knowledgec of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature.9
[14] This, then, is the end I aim at: to acquire such a nature, and to strive that many acquire it with me. That is, it is part of my happiness [30] to take pains that many others may understand as I understand, so that their intellect and desire agree entirely with my intellect and desire. To do this it is necessary,d first to understand as much of Nature [II/9] as suffices for acquiring such a nature; next, to form a society of the kind that is desirable, so that as many as possible may attain it as easily and surely as possible.
[15] Third, attention must be paid to Moral Philosophy and to Instruction [5] concerning the Education of children. Because Health is no small means to achieving this end, fourthly, the whole of Medicine must be worked out. And because many difficult things are rendered easy by ingenuity, and we can gain much time and convenience in this life, fifthly, Mechanics is in no way to be despised.
[10] [16] But before anything else we must devise a way of healing the intellect, and purifying it, as much as we can in the beginning, so that it understands things successfully, without error and as well as possible.10 Everyone will now be able to see that I wish to direct all the sciences toward one ende and goal, viz. that we should achieve, as we [15] have said, the highest human perfection. So anything in the sciences which does nothing to advance us toward our goal must be rejected as useless—in a word, all our activities and thoughts are to be directed to this end.
[17] But while we pursue this end, and devote ourselves to bringing [20] the intellect back11 to the right path, it is necessary to live. So we are forced, before we do anything else, to assume certain rules of living as good:
1. To speak according to the power of understanding of ordinary people, and do whatever does not interfere with our attaining our [25] purpose. For we can gain a considerable advantage, if we yield as much to their understanding as we can. In this way, they will give a favorable hearing to the truth.
2. To enjoy pleasures just so far as suffices for safeguarding our health.
[30] 3. Finally, to seek money, or anything else, just so far as suffices for sustaining life and health, and conforming to those customs of the community that do not conflict with our aim.
[18] Having laid down these rules, I come now to what must be [35] done first, before all else: emending12 the intellect and rendering it [II/10] capable of understanding things in the way the attainment of our end requires. To do this, the order we naturally have requires me to survey here all the modes of perceiving which I have had up to now for affirming or denying something without doubt, so that I may choose [5] the best of all, and at the same time begin to know my powers and the nature that I desire to perfect.
[19] If I consider them accurately, I can reduce them all to four13 main kinds:
1. There is the Perception we have from report or from some [10] conventional sign.14
2. There is the Perception we have from random experience,15 that is, from experience that is not determined by the intellect. But it has this name only because it comes to us by chance, and we have no other experiment that opposes it. So it remains with [15] us unshaken.
3. There is the Perception that we have when the essence of a thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately. This happens, either fwhen we infer the cause from some effect, or when something is inferred from some universal, which some property always accompanies.17
[20] 4. Finally, there is the Perception we have when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or through knowledge of its proximate cause.
[20] I shall illustrate all of these with examples. I know only from report my date of birth, and who my parents were, and similar things, which I have never doubted. By random experience I know that I [25] shall die, for I affirm this because I have seen others like me die, even though they had not all lived the same length of time and did not all die of the same illness. Again, I also know by random experience that [II/11] oil is capable of feeding fire, and that water is capable of putting it out. I know also that the dog is a barking animal, and man a rational one. And in this way I know almost all the things that are useful in life.
[21] But we infer [one thing]18 from another in this way: after we [5] clearly perceive that we feel such a body, and no other, then, I say, we infer clearly that the soul is unitedg to the body, which union is the cause of such a sensation; but we cannot understand absolutely from this whath that sensation and union are. Or after we have come to know the nature of vision, and that it has the property that we see [10] one and the same thing as smaller when we look at it from a great distance than when we look at it from close up, we infer that the sun is larger than it appears to be, and other things of the same kind.20
[22] Finally, a thing is perceived through its essence alone when, from the fact that I know something, I know what it is to know something, [15] or from the fact that I know the essence of the soul, I know that it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge, we know that two and three are five, and that if two lines are parallel to a third line, they are also parallel to each other, etc. But the things I have so far been able to know by this kind of knowledge have been very few.
[20] [23] That you may understand all these things better, I shall use only one example. Suppose there are three numbers. Someone is seeking a fourth, which is to the third as the second is to the first. Here merchants will usually say that they know what to do to find the fourth number, because they have not yet forgotten that procedure [25] which they simply heard from their teachers, without any demonstration.
[II/12] Others will construct a universal axiom from an experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is evident through itself—as in the numbers 2, 4, 3, and 6. Here they find by trial that if the second is multiplied by the third, and the product then divided by the first, the result is 6. Since they see that this produces the same number [5] which they knew to be the proportional number without this procedure, they infer that the procedure is always a good way to find the fourth number in the proportion.
[24] But Mathematicians know, by the force of the demonstration of Proposition 19 in Book VII of Euclid, which 21 numbers are proportional to one another, from the nature of proportion, and its property, [10] viz. that the product of the first and fourth numbers is equal to the product of the second and third. Nevertheless, they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers. And if they do, they see it not by the force of that Proposition, but intuitively, [NS: or] without going through any procedure.
[25] To choose the best mode of perceiving from these, we are required [15] to enumerate briefly the means necessary to attain our end:
1.22 To know exactly our nature, which we desire to perfect, and at the same time,
2. [To know] as much of the nature of things as is necessary,
(a) to infer rightly from it the differences, agreements and [20] oppositions of things,
(b) to conceive rightly what they can undergo and what they cannot,
(c) to compare [the nature of things] with the nature and power of man.
This done, the highest perfection man can reach will easily manifest itself.
[25] [26] Having considered these requirements, let us see which mode of perceiving we ought to choose.
As for the first, it is evident in itself that from report—apart from the fact that it is a very uncertain thing—we do not perceive any essence of a thing, as is clear from our example. And since the existence [30] of any singular thing23 is not known unless its essence is known (as we shall see afterwards), we can clearly infer from this that all the certainty we have from report is to be excluded from the sciences. For no one will ever be able to be affected by simple report, unless his own intellect has gone before.
[II/13] [27] As for the second,i again, no one should be said to have the idea of that24 proportion which he is seeking. Apart from the fact that it is a very uncertain thing, and without end, in this way no one will ever perceive anything in natural things except accidents. But these [5] are never understood clearly unless their essences are known first. So that also is to be excluded.
[28] Concerning the third, on the other hand, we can, in a sense, say that we have an idea of the thing, and that we can also make inferences without danger of error. But still, it will not through itself [10] be the means of our reaching our perfection.
[29] Only the fourth mode comprehends the adequate essence of the thing and is without danger of error. For that reason, it is what we must chiefly use. So we shall take care to explain how it is to be used, that we may understand unknown things by this kind of knowledge [15] and do so as directly as possible; [30] [NS: i.e.] after we know what Knowledge is necessary for us, we must teach the Way and Method by which we may achieve this kind of knowledge of the things that are to be known.
To do this, the first thing we must consider is that there is no infinite regress here. That is, to find the best Method of seeking the [20] truth, there is no need of another Method to seek the Method of seeking the truth, or of a third Method to seek the second, and so on, to infinity. For in that way we would never arrive at knowledge of the truth, or indeed at any knowledge.
Matters here stand as they do with corporeal tools,25 where someone [25] might argue in the same way. For to forge iron a hammer is needed; and to have a hammer, it must be made; for this another hammer, and other tools are needed; and to have these tools too, other tools will be needed, and so on to infinity; in this way someone might try, in vain, to prove that men have no power of forging iron.
[30] [31] But just as men, in the beginning, were able to make the easiest things with the tools they were born with (however laboriously and imperfectly), and once these had been made, made other, more difficult things with less labor and more perfectly, and so, proceeding [II/14] gradually from the simplest works to tools, and from tools to other works and tools, reached the point where they accomplished so many and so difficult things with little labor, in the same way the intellect, by its inborn power,k makes intellectual tools for itself, by which it [5] acquires other powers for other intellectual works,l and from these works still other tools, or the power of searching further, and so proceeds by stages, until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom.
[32] It will be easy to see that this is the situation of the intellect, provided we understand what the Method of seeking the truth is, and [10] what those inborn tools are, which it requires only26 to make other tools from them, so as to advance further. To show this, I proceed as follows.
[33] A27 true ideam (for we have a true idea) is something different from its object. For a circle is one thing and an idea of the circle [15] another—the idea of the circle is not something which has a circumference and a center, as the circle does. Nor is an idea of the body the body itself. And since it is something different from its object, it will also be something intelligible through itself; that is, the idea, as far as its formal essence is concerned, can be the object of another objective essence, and this other objective essence in turn will also be, considered [20] in itself, something real and intelligible, and so on, indefinitely.
[34] Peter, for example, is something real; but a true idea of Peter28 is an objective essence of Peter, and something real in itself, and altogether different from Peter himself. So since an idea of Peter is something real, having its own particular essence, it will also be something intelligible, i.e., the object of a second idea, which will have in [25] itself, objectively, whatever the idea of Peter has formally; and in turn, the idea which is [the idea] of the idea of Peter has again its essence, which can also be the object of another idea, and so on indefinitely. Everyone can experience this, when he sees that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and again, knows that he knows that he knows, etc.
[30] From this it is evident that to understand the essence of Peter, it is [II/15] not necessary to understand an idea of Peter, much less an idea of an idea of Peter. This is the same as if I said that, in order for me to know, it is not necessary to know that I know, much less necessary to know that I know that I know—no more than it is necessary to understand the essence of a circle in order to understand the essence [5] of a triangle.n Indeed, in these ideas the opposite is the case. For to know that I know, I must first know.
[35] From this it is clear that certainty is nothing but the objective essence itself, i.e., the mode by which we are aware of the formal essence29 is certainty itself. And from this, again, it is clear that, for [10] the certainty of the truth, no other sign is needed than having a true idea. For as we have shown, in order for me to know, it is not necessary to know that I know. From which, once more, it is clear that no one can know what the highest certainty is unless he has an adequate idea or objective essence of some thing. For certainty and an objective essence are the same thing.
[15] [36] Since truth, therefore, requires no sign, but it suffices, in order to remove all doubt, to have the objective essences of things, or, what is the same, ideas, it follows that the true Method is not to seek a sign of truth after the acquisition of ideas, but the true Method is the way [20] that truth itself, or the objective essences of things, or the ideas (all those signify the same) should be soughto in the proper order.
[37] Again, the Method must speak about Reasoning, or30 about the intellection; i.e., Method is not the reasoning itself by which we understand the causes of things, much less the understanding of the causes of things; it is understanding what a true idea is by distinguishing it [25] from the rest of the perceptions; by investigating its nature, so that from that we may come to know our power of understanding and so restrain the mind that it understands, according to that standard, everything that is to be understood; and finally by teaching and constructing certain rules as aids, so that the mind does not weary itself in useless things.
[30] [38] From this it may be inferred that Method is nothing but a [II/16] reflexive knowledge, or an idea of an idea; and because there is no idea of an idea, unless there is first an idea, there will be no Method unless there is first an idea. So that Method will be good which shows how the mind is to be directed according the standard of a given true idea.31
[5] Next, since the relation between the two ideas is the same as the relation between the formal essences of those ideas, it follows that the reflexive knowledge of the idea of the most perfect Being will be more excellent than the reflexive knowledge of any other ideas. That is, the most perfect Method will be the one that shows how the mind is to be directed according to the standard of the given idea of the most [10] perfect Being.
[39] From this you will easily understand how the mind, as it understands more things, at the same time acquires other tools, with which it proceeds to understand more easily. For, as may be inferred from what has been said, before all else there must be a true idea in us, as an inborn tool; once this true idea is understood, we understand [15] the difference between that kind of perception and all the rest. Understanding that difference constitutes one part of the Method.
And since it is clear through itself that the mind understands itself the better, the more it understands of Nature, it is evident, from that that this part of the Method will be more perfect as the mind understands more things, and will be most perfect when the mind attends [20] to, or reflects on, knowledge of the most perfect Being.
[40] Next, the more the mind knows, the better it understands its own powers and the order of Nature. The better the mind understands its own powers, the more easily it can direct itself and propose rules to itself; the better it understands the order of Nature, the more easily it can restrain itself from useless pursuits. In these things, as [25] we have said, the whole of the Method consists.
[41] Moreover, the idea is objectively in the same way as its object is really. So if there were something in Nature that did not interact with other things, and if there were an objective essence of that thing which would have to agree completely with its formal essence, then [30] that objective essence would not interactp with other ideas, i.e., we could not infer anything about it.32 And conversely, those things that do interact with other things (as everything that exists in Nature does) will be understood, and their objective essences will also have the same interaction, i.e., other ideas will be deduced from them, and [II/17] these again will interact with other ideas, and so the tools for proceeding further will increase, which is what we were trying to demonstrate.
[42] Next, from what we have just said, that an idea must agree completely with its formal essence, it is again evident that for our mind [5] to reproduce completely the likeness of Nature,33 it must bring all of its ideas forth from that idea which represents the source and origin of the whole of Nature, so that that idea is also the source of the other ideas.
[43] Here, perhaps, someone will be surprised that, having said that a good Method is one which shows how the mind is to be directed [10] according to the standard of a given true idea, we should prove this by reasoning. For that seems to show that this is not known through itself. So it may be asked whether our reasoning is good? If our reasoning is good, we must begin from a given [true?] idea; and since to begin from a given [true?] idea requires a demonstration, we must again prove our reasoning, and then once more prove that other reasoning, [15] and so on to infinity.
[44] To this I reply that if, by some fate, someone had proceeded in this way in investigating Nature, i.e., by acquiring other ideas in the proper order, according to the standard of the given true idea, he would never have doubtedq the truth he possessed (for as we have shown, the truth makes itself manifest) and also everything would have flowed to him of its own accord.34
[20] But because this never or rarely happens, I have been forced to lay things down in this way, so that what we cannot acquire by fate, we may still acquire by a deliberate plan, and at the same time so that it would be evident that to prove the truth and good reasoning, we require no tools except the truth itself and good reasoning. For I have [25] proved, and still strive to prove, good reasoning by good reasoning. [45] Moreover, in this way men become accustomed to their own internal meditations.
But the reason why Nature is rarely investigated in the proper order, is, first, that men have prejudices whose causes we shall explain afterwards in our Philosophy. And then, the task requires a considerable [30] capacity for making accurate distinctions (as we shall show later) and much effort. Finally, there is the condition of human affairs, which are quite changeable, as we have already shown. There are still other reasons, which we shall not go into.
[II/18] [46] If, by chance, someone should ask why I did [not]35 immediately, before anything else, display the truths of Nature in that order—for does not the truth make itself manifest?—I reply to him […] and at the same time I warn him not to try to reject these things as false because of Paradoxes that occur here and there; he should first [5] deign to consider the order in which we prove them, and then he will become certain that we have reached the truth; and this was the reason why I have put these things first.
[47] But perhaps, afterwards, some Skeptic would still doubt both the first truth itself and everything we shall deduce according to the [10] standard of the first truth. If so, then either he will speak contrary to his own conciousness, or we shall confess that there are men whose minds also are completely blinded, either from birth, or from prejudices, i.e., because of some external chance. For they are not even aware of themselves. If they affirm or doubt something, they do not know that they affirm or doubt. They say that they know nothing, [15] and that they do not even know that they know nothing. And even this they do not say absolutely. For they are afraid to confess that they exist, so long as they know nothing. In the end, they must be speechless, lest by chance they assume something that might smell of truth.
[48] Finally, there is no speaking of the sciences with them. (For as far as the needs of life and society are concerned, necessity forces them [20] to suppose that they exist, and to seek their own advantage, and in taking oaths, to affirm and deny many things.) For, if someone proves something to them, they do not know whether the argument is a proof or not. If they deny, grant, or oppose, they do not know that they deny, grant, or oppose. So they must be regarded as automata, completely [25] lacking a mind.
[49] Let us now return to our subject. First [§§ 1-17], we have treated the end toward which we strive to direct all our thoughts; second [§§ 18-29], we learned which is the best perception, by whose aid we can reach our perfection; third [§§ 30-48], we learned which is the first [30] path our mind must enter on to begin well—which is to proceed in its investigation according to certain laws, taking as a standard a given true idea.
If this is to be done properly, the Method must, first [§§ 50-90], show how to distinguish a true idea from all other perceptions, and to restrain the mind from those other perceptions; second [§§ 91-98], [35] teach rules so that we may perceive things unknown according to such [II/19] a standard; third [§ 99-?], establish an order, so that we do not become weary with trifles. When we came to know this Method [§ 38], we saw, fourth, that it will be most perfect when we have the idea of the most perfect Being. So in the beginning we must take the greatest care [5] that we arrive at knowledge of such a Being as quickly as possible.
[50] Let us begin, therefore, from the first part of the Method, which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate true ideas from all other perceptions, and to restrain the mind from confusing false, fictitious, and doubtful ideas with true ones. It is my intention to explain this fully here, so as to engage my Readers in the thought of a thing so [10] necessary, and also because there are many who doubt even true ideas, from not attending to the distinction between a true perception and all others. So they are like men who, when they were awake, used not to doubt that they were awake, but who, after they once thought in a dream that they were certainly awake (as often happens), and later [15] found that to be false, doubted even of their waking states. This happens because they have never distinguished between the dream36 and the waking state.
[51] In the meantime, I warn the reader that I shall not discuss the essence of each perception, and explain it by its proximate37 cause, because that pertains to Philosophy, but shall discuss only what the [20] Method demands, i.e., what false, fictitious and doubtful ideas are concerned with, and how we shall be freed from each of them. Let the first inquiry, therefore, be about the fictitious idea.
[52] Since every perception is either of a thing considered as existing, or of an essence alone, and since fictions occur more frequently [25] concerning things considered as existing, I shall speak first of them—i.e., where existence alone is feigned, and the thing which is feigned in such an act is understood, or assumed to be understood. E.g., I feign that Peter, whom I know, is going home, that he is coming to visit me, and the like.r Here I ask, what does such an idea concern? I [30] see that it concerns only possible, and not necessary or impossible things.
[53] I call a thing impossible whose nature38 implies that it would be contradictory for it to exist; necessary whose nature implies that it [II/20] would be contradictory for it not to exist; and possible whose existence,39 by its very nature, does not imply a contradiction—either for it to exist or for it not to exist—but whose necessity or impossibility of existence depends on causes unknown to us, so long as we feign its [5] existence. So if its necessity or impossibility, which depends on external causes, were known to us, we would have been able to feign nothing concerning it.
[54] From this it follows that, if there is a God, or something omniscient, he can feign nothing at all.40 For as far as We are concerned, after I know that I exist,s I cannot feign either that I exist or that I do [10] not exist; nor can I feign an elephant which passes through the eye of a needle; nor, after I know the nature of God, can I feign either that he exists or that he does not exist.t The same must be understood of the Chimera, whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it to exist. From this what I have said is evident: that the fiction of which we are speaking here does not occur concerning eternal truths.u [15] I shall also show immediately that no fiction is concerned with eternal truths.
[55] But before proceeding further, I must note here in passing that the same difference that exists between the essence of one thing and the essence of another also exists between the actuality or existence of [20] the one thing and the actuality or existence of the other. So if we wished to conceive the existence of Adam, for example, through existence in general, it would be the same as if, to conceive his essence, we attended to the nature of being, so that in the end we defined him by saying that Adam is a being. Therefore, the more generally existence [25] is conceived, the more confusedly also it is conceived, and the more easily it can be ascribed fictitiously to anything. Conversely, the more particularly it is conceived, then the more clearly it is understood, and the more difficult it is for us, [even] when we do not attend [II/21] to the order of Nature, to ascribe it fictitiously to anything other than the thing itself.41 This is worth noting.
[56] Now we must consider those things that are commonly said to be feigned, although we understood clearly that the thing is not really [5] as we feign it. E.g., although I know that the earth is round, nothing prevents me from saying to someone that the earth is a hemisphere and like half an orange on a plate, or that the sun moves around the earth, and the like. If we attend to these things, we shall see nothing that is not compatible with what we have already said, provided we [10] note first that we have sometimes been able to err, and now are conscious of our errors; and then, we can feign, or at least allow, that other men are in the same error, or can fall into it, as we did previously.
We can feign this, I say, so long as we see no impossibility and no [15] necessity. Therefore, when I say to someone that the earth is not round, etc., I am doing nothing but recalling the error which I, perhaps, made, or into which I could have fallen, and afterwards feigning, or allowing, that he to whom I say this is still in the same error, or can fall into it. As I have said, I feign this so long as I see no [20] impossibility and no necessity. For if I had understood this, I could have feigned nothing at all, and it would have had to be said only that I had done something.42
[57] It remains now to note also those things that are supposed in Problems. This sometimes happens even concerning impossible things. E.g., when we say “Let us suppose that this burning candle is not [25] now burning, or let us suppose that it is burning in some imaginary space, or where there are no bodies.” Things like this are sometimes supposed, although this last is clearly understood to be impossible.43 But when this happens, nothing at all is feigned. For in the first case [II/22] I have done nothing but recall to memoryx another candle that was not burning (or I have conceived this candle without the flame), and what I think about that candle, I understand concerning this one, so long as I do not attend to the flame.
In the second case, nothing is done except to abstract the thoughts [5] from the surrounding bodies so that the mind directs itself toward the sole contemplation of the candle, considered in itself alone, so that afterwards it infers that the candle has no cause for its destruction. So if there were no surrounding bodies, this candle, and its flame, would remain immutable, or the like. Here, then, there is no fiction, buty [10] true and sheer assertions.44
[58] Let us pass now to fictions that concern either essences alone or essences together with some actuality or existence. The most important consideration regarding them is that the less the mind understands and the more things it perceives, the greater its power of feigning [15] is; and the more things it understands, the more that power is diminished.
For example, as we have seen above, we cannot feign, so long as we are thinking, that we are thinking and are not thinking; in the same way, after we know the nature of body, we cannot feign an infinite [20] fly, or after we know the nature of the soul,z we cannot feign that it is square, though there is nothing that cannot be put into words.
But as we have said, the less men know Nature, the more easily they can feign many things, such as, that trees speak, that men are changed in a moment into stones and into springs, that nothing becomes something, that even Gods are changed into beasts and into [25] men, and infinitely many other things of that kind.45
[II/23] [59] Someone, perhaps, will think that fiction is limited by fiction, but not by intellection.46 That is, after I have feigned something, and willed by a certain freedom to assent that it exists in nature in this way, this has the consequence that I cannot afterwards think it in any [5] other way. For example, after I have feigned (to speak as they do) that body has such a nature, and willed, from my freedom, to be convinced that it really exists in this way, I can no longer feign an infinite fly; and after I have feigned the essence of the soul, I can no longer feign that it is square.
[60] But this needs to be examined. First, either they deny or they grant that we can understand something. If they grant it, then necessarily [10] what they say about fiction will also have to be said about intellection. But if they deny it, let us—who know that we know something—see what they say.
Evidently, they say that the soul can sense and perceive in many ways, not itself, nor the things that exist, but only those things that [15] are neither in itself nor anywhere; that is, the soul can, by its own force alone, create sensations or ideas, which are not of things; so they consider it, to some extent, as like God.47
Next, they say that we, or our soul, has such a freedom that it compels us, or itself, indeed its own freedom. For after it has feigned something, and offered its assent to it, it cannot think or feign it in any other way, and is also compelled by that fiction so that even other [20] things are thought in such a way as not to conflict with the first fiction, just as here too because of their own fiction, they are forced to admit the absurdities which I review here, and which we shall not bother to refute with any demonstrations.
[25] [61] Rather, leaving them to their madness, we shall take care to draw from the words we have exchanged with them something true and to our purpose, viz.:a when the mind attends to a fictitious thing which is false by its very nature, so that it considers it carefully, and understands it, and deduces from it in good order the things to be deduced, it will easily bring its falsity to light. And if the fictitious [II/24] thing is true by its nature, then when the mind attends to it, so that it understands it, and begins to deduce from it in good order the things that follow from it, it will proceed successfully, without any interruption—just as we have seen that, from the false fiction just mentioned, the intellect immediately applies itself to show its absurdity, and the [5] other things deduced from that.
[62] So we ought not to fear in any way that we are [merely] feigning something, if only we perceive the thing clearly and distinctly. For if by chance we should say that men are changed in a moment into beasts, that is said very generally, so that there is in the mind no concept, i.e., [10] idea, or connection of subject and predicate. For if there were any concept, the mind would see together the means and causes, how and why such a thing was done. And one does not attend to the nature of the subject and of the predicate.
[63] Next, provided the first idea is not fictitious, and all the other ideas are deduced from it, the haste to feign things will gradually [15] disappear. And since a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but only confused, and since all confusion results from the fact that the mind knows only in part a thing that is a whole, or composed of many things, and does not distinguish the known from the unknown (and besides, attends at once, without making any distinction, to the many [20] things that are contained in each thing), from this it follows, first, that if an idea is of some most simple thing, it can only be clear and distinct. For that thing will have to become known, not in part, but either as a whole or not at all.48
[64] Secondly, it follows that if, in thought, we divide a thing that is composed of many things into all its most simple parts, and attend [25] to each of these separately, all confusion will disappear.
Thirdly, it follows that a fiction cannot be simple, but that it is made from the composition of different confused ideas, which are different things and actions existing in nature; or rather, from attending at once,b without assent, to such different ideas. For if it were simple, [30] it would be clear and distinct, and consequently true. And if it were made from the composition of distinct ideas, their composition would [II/25] also be clear and distinct, and therefore true. For example, once we know the nature of the circle, and also the nature of the square, we cannot then compound these two and make a square circle, or a square soul, and the like.
[5] [65] Let us sum up again briefly, and see why we do not need to fear that the fiction will in any way be confused with true ideas. For as for the first [fiction]49 of which we spoke before, viz. where the thing is clearly conceived, we saw that if that thing that is clearly conceived (and also its existence) is, through itself, an eternal truth, we [10] can feign nothing concerning such a thing. But if the existence of the thing conceived is not an eternal truth, we need only to take care to compare the existence of the thing with its essence, and at the same time attend to the order of Nature.
As for the second fiction, we said that it consists in attending at once, without assent, to different confused ideas, which are of different [15] things and actions existing in Nature. We saw also that a most simple thing cannot be feigned, but [only] understood, and also that a composite thing can be understood, provided that we attend to the most simple parts of which it is composed. Indeed we also cannot feign from them any actions that are not true; for at the same time we will be forced to consider how and why such a thing happened.
[20] [66] With these matters thus understood, let us pass now to the investigation of the false idea so that we may see what it is concerned with, and how we can take care not to fall into false perceptions. Neither of these will be difficult for us now, after our investigation of the fictitious idea. For between fictitious and false ideas there is no [25] other difference except that the latter suppose assent; i.e. (as we have already noted), while the presentations appear to him [who has the false idea], there appear no causes from which he can infer (as he who is feigning can) that they do not arise from things outside him. And this is hardly anything but dreaming with open eyes, or while we are awake. Therefore the false idea is concerned with, or (to put it better) [30] is related to the existence of a thing whose essence is known, or to an essence, in the same way as a fictitious idea.
[67] [The false idea] that is related to existence is emended in the same way as the fiction. For if the nature of the thing known presupposes necessary existence, it is impossible for us to be deceived concerning the existence of that thing. But if the existence of the thing is not an eternal truth (as its essence is), so that50 its necessity or impossibility [35] of existing depends on external causes, then take everything in [II/26] the same way as we said when we were speaking of fictions. For it may be emended in the same way.
[68] As for the other kind of false idea, which is related to essences, or also to actions, such perceptions must always be confused, composed [5] of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature—as when men are persuaded that there are divinities in the woods, in images, in animals, etc.; or that there are bodies from whose composition alone the intellect is made; or that corpses reason, walk, and speak; or that God is deceived, and the like. But ideas that are clear [10] and distinct can never be false. For the ideas of things that are conceived clearly and distinctly, are either most simple, or composed of most simple ideas, i.e., deduced from most simple ideas. But that a most simple idea cannot be false, anyone can see—provided that he knows what the true is, or the intellect, and at the same time, what the false is.
[15] [69] As for what constitutes the form of the true, it is certain that a true thought is distinguished from a false one not only by an extrinsic, but chiefly by an intrinsic denomination. For if some architect conceives a building in an orderly fashion, then although such a building never existed, and even never will exist, still the thought of it is true, [20] and the thought is the same, whether the building exists or not.51 On the other hand, if someone says, for example, that Peter exists, and nevertheless does not know that Peter exists, that thought, in respect to him is false, or, if you prefer, is not true, even though Peter really exists. Nor is this statement, Peter exists, true, except in respect to [25] him who knows certainly that Peter exists.
[70] From this it follows that there is something real in ideas, through which the true are distinguished from the false. This will now have to be investigated, so that we may have the best standard of truth (for we have said that we must determine our thoughts from the given standard of a true idea, and that method is reflexive knowledge), and [30] may know the properties of the intellect. Nor must we say that this difference arises from the fact that the true thought is knowing things through their first causes.52 In this, indeed, it differs greatly from the false, as I have explained it above. For that Thought is also called true which involves objectively the essence of some principle that does not have a cause, and is known through itself and in itself.
[35] [71] So the form of the true thought53 must be placed in the same [II/27] thought itself without relation to other things, nor does it recognize the object as its cause, but must depend on the very power and nature of the intellect. For if we should suppose that the intellect had perceived some new being, which has never existed (as some conceive [5] God’s intellect, before he created things—for that perception, of course, could not have arisen from any object), and that from such a perception it deduced others legitimately, all those thoughts would be true, and determined by no external object, but would depend only on the power and nature of the intellect. So what constitutes the form of the [10] true thought must be sought in the same thought itself, and must be deduced from the nature of the intellect.
[72] To investigate this, therefore, let us consider some true idea, of which we know most certainly that its object depends on our power of thinking, and that it has no object in nature. For it is clear from what has already been said that we shall be able more easily to investigate [15] what we wish to in such an idea. E.g., to form the concept of a sphere, I feign a cause at will, say that a semicircle is rotated around a center, and that the sphere is, as it were, produced by this rotation. This idea, of course, is true, and even though we may know that no sphere in nature was ever produced in this way, nevertheless, this perception is true, and a very easy way of forming the concept of a sphere.
[20] Now it must be noted that this perception affirms that the semicircle is rotated, which affirmation would be false if it were not joined to the concept of a sphere, or to a cause determining such a motion, or absolutely, if this affirmation were isolated. For then the mind would only tend to affirm of the semicircle nothing but motion, which neither is contained in the concept of the semicircle nor arises from the [25] concept of the cause determining the motion. So falsity consists only in this: that something is affirmed of a thing that is not contained in the concept we have formed of the thing, as motion or rest of the semicircle.
From this it follows that simple thoughts cannot but be true; for example, the simple idea of a semicircle, or of motion, or of quantity, [30] etc. Whatever they contain of affirmation matches their concept, and does not extend itself beyond [the concept]. So we may form simple ideas at will, without fear of error.
[73] It only remains, then, to ask by what power our mind can form these [simple ideas] and how far this power extends. For once this is [35] discovered, we shall easily see the highest knowledge we can reach. It [II/28] is certain that this power does not extend to infinity. For when we affirm of a thing something not contained in the concept we form of it, that indicates a defect of our perception, or that we have thoughts, [5] or ideas, which are, as it were, mutilated and maimed. For we saw that the motion of a semicircle is false when it is in the mind in isolation, but true if it is joined to the concept of a sphere, or to the concept of some cause determining such a motion. But if it is—as it seems at first54—of the nature of a thinking being to form true, or [10] adequate, thoughts, it is certain that inadequate ideas arise in us only from the fact that we are a part of a thinking being, of which some thoughts wholly constitute our mind, while others do so only in part.
[74] But we still need to consider something which was not worth [15] the trouble of noting concerning fictions, and which gives rise to the greatest deception—viz. when it happens that certain things that appear in the imagination are also in the intellect, i.e., that they are conceived clearly and distinctly. For then, so long as the distinct is not distinguished from the confused, certainty, i.e., a true idea, is mixed up with what is not distinct.
[20] For example, some of the Stoics heard, perhaps, the word soul, and also that the soul is immortal, which they only imagined confusedly; they also both imagined and at the same time understood that the most subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are not penetrated by any. Since they imagined all these things at once—while remaining certain of this [25] axiom—they immediately became certain that the mind was those most subtle bodies55 and that those most subtle bodies were not divided, etc.
[75] But we are freed from this also, as long as we strive to consider all our perceptions according to the standard of a given true idea, being on guard, as we said in the beginning, against those we have from report or from random experience. Moreover, such a deception [30] arises from the fact that they conceive things too abstractly. For it is sufficiently clear through itself that I cannot apply what I conceive in its true object to something else. Finally, it arises also from the fact that they do not understand the first elements of the whole of Nature; so proceeding without order, and confusing Nature with abstractions [35] (although they are true axioms), they confuse themselves and overturn [II/29] the order of Nature. But we shall not need to fear any such deception, if we proceed as far as we can in a manner that is not abstract, and begin as soon as possible from the first elements, i.e., from the source and origin of Nature.56
[5] [76]57 But as for knowledge of the origin of Nature, we need not have any fear of confusing it with abstractions. For when things are conceived abstractly (as all universals are), they always have a wider extension in our intellect than their particulars can really have in nature. And then, since there are many things in nature whose difference [10] is so slight that it almost escapes the intellect, it can easily happen, if they are conceived abstractly, that they are confused. But since, as we shall see later, the origin of Nature can neither be conceived abstractly, or universally, nor be extended more widely in the intellect than it really is, and since it has no likeness to changeable things, we [15] need fear no confusion concerning its idea, provided that we have the standard of truth (which we have already shown). For it is a unique and infinitez being, beyond which there is no being.a
[77] So far we have been speaking of the false idea. It remains now [20] to investigate the doubtful idea—i.e., to ask what are the things that can lead us into doubt, and at the same time, how doubt is removed. I am speaking of true doubt in the mind, and not of what we commonly see happen, when someone says in words that he doubts, although his mind does not doubt. For it is not the business of the Method to emend that. That belongs rather to the investigation of [25] stubbornness, and its emendation.
[78] There is no doubt in the soul, therefore, through the thing itself concerning which one doubts. That is, if there should be only one idea in the soul, then, whether it is true or false, there will be neither doubt nor certainty, but only a sensation of a certain sort. For in itself [this idea] is nothing but a sensation of a certain sort.
[30] But doubt will arise through another idea which is not so clear and distinct that we can infer from it something certain about the thing [II/30] concerning which there is doubt. That is, the idea that puts us in doubt is not clear and distinct. For example, if someone has never been led, either by experience or by anything else, to think about the deceptiveness of the senses, he will never doubt whether the sun is larger or smaller than it appears to be. So Country People are generally [5] surprised when they hear that the sun is much larger than the earth. But in thinking about the deceptiveness of the senses, doubt arises. I.e., [the person] knows that his senses have sometimes deceived him, but he knows this only confusedly; for he does not know how the senses deceive.58 And if someone, after doubting, acquires a true knowledge of the senses and of how, by their means, things at a [10] distance are presented, then the doubt is again removed.
[79] From this it follows that, only so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God, can we call true ideas in doubt by supposing that perhaps some deceiving God exists, who misleads us even in the things most certain. I.e., if we attend to the knowledge we have concerning [15] the origin of all things and do not discover—by the same knowledge we have when, attending to the nature of the triangle, we discover that its three angles equal two right angles—anything that teaches us that he is not a deceiver [NS:, then the doubt remains]. But if we have the kind of knowledge of God that we have of the triangle, then all [20] doubt is removed. And just as we can arrive at such a knowledge of the triangle, even though we may not know certainly whether some supreme deceiver misleads us, so we can arrive at such a knowledge of God, even though we may not know whether there is some supreme deceiver. Provided we have that knowledge, it will suffice, as I have [25] said, to remove every doubt that we can have concerning clear and distinct ideas.
[80] Further, if someone proceeds rightly, by investigating [first] those things which ought to be investigated first, with no interruption in the connection of things, and knows how to define problems precisely,59 before striving for knowledge of them, he will never have anything but the most certain ideas—i.e., clear and distinct ideas. For [30] doubt is nothing but the suspension of the mind concerning some affirmation or negation, which it would affirm or deny if something did not occur to it, the ignorance of which must render its knowledge of the thing imperfect. From this it is [to be] inferred that doubt always arises from the fact that things are investigated without order.
[35] [81] These are the matters I promised to discuss in this first part of [II/31] the Method. But to omit nothing that can lead to knowledge of the intellect and its powers, I shall say a few words about memory and forgetting. The most important consideration is that memory is strengthened both with the aid of the intellect and also without its aid. [5] For regarding the first, the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily it is retained; and conversely, the less intelligible, the more easily forgotten. E.g., if I give someone a large number of disconnected words, he will retain them with much more difficulty than if I give him the same words in the form of a story.
[82] It is also strengthened without the aid the intellect, by the force [10] with which the imagination, or what they call the common sense, is affected by some singular corporeal thing. I say singular, for the imagination is affected only by singular things. If someone, e.g., has read only one Comedy,60 he will retain it best so long as he does not read several others of that kind, for then it will flourish in isolation in the [15] imagination. But if there are several of the same kind, we imagine them all together and they are easily confused. I say also corporeal, for the imagination is affected only by bodies. Therefore since the memory is strengthened both by the intellect and also without the intellect, we may infer that it is something different from the intellect, and that concerning the intellect considered in itself there is neither memory nor forgetting.
[20] [83] What, then, will memory be? Nothing but a sensation of impressions on the brain, together with the thought of a determinate durationd of the sensation, which recollection also shows. For there the soul thinks of that sensation, but not under a continuous duration. And so the idea of that sensation is not the duration itself of the sensation, [25] i.e., the memory itself. But whether the ideas themselves undergo some corruption, we shall see in [my] Philosophy.
If this seems quite absurd to anyone, it will suffice for our purpose if he thinks that the more singular a thing is, the more easily it may be retained, as the example of the Comedy just mentioned makes clear. [II/32] Further, the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily it too is retained. So we cannot but retain a thing that is most singular if only it is also intelligible.
[84] In this way, then, we have distinguished between a true idea [5] and other perceptions, and shown that the fictitious, the false, and the other ideas have their origin in the imagination, i.e., in certain sensations that are fortuitous, and (as it were) disconnected; since they do not arise from the very power of the mind, but from external causes, as the body (whether waking or dreaming) receives various motions.
[10] But if you wish, take imagination any way you like here, provided it is something different from the intellect, and in which the soul has the nature of something acted on. For it is all the same, however you take it, after we know that it is something random, by which the soul is acted on, and at the same time know how we are freed from it with the help of the intellect. So let no one be surprised that here, where I [15] have not yet proved that there is a body, and other necessary things, I speak of the imagination, the body and its constitution. For as I have said, it does not matter what I take it to be, after I know that it is something random, etc.62
[85] We have shown that a true idea is simple, or composed of [20] simple ideas; that it shows how and why something is, or has been done; and that its objective effects proceed in the soul according to the formal nature of its object. This is the same as what the ancients said, i.e., that true knowledge proceeds from cause to effect—except that so far as I know they never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting [25] according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton.
[86] From this we have acquired as much knowledge of our intellect as was possible in the beginning, and such a standard of the true idea that now we do not fear confusing true ideas with false or fictitious ones. Nor will we wonder why we understand certain things that do [30] not fall in any way under the imagination, why there are some things in the imagination which are completely opposed to the intellect, and finally why there are others that agree with the intellect; for we know that those activities by which imaginations are produced happen according to other laws, wholly different from the laws of the intellect, and that in imagination the soul only has the nature of something acted on.
[35] [87] From this it is also established how easily they can fall into [II/33] great errors, who have not accurately distinguished between imagination and intellection. Such errors as: that extension must be in a place, that it must be finite, that its parts must be really distinguished from one another, that it is the first and only foundation of all things, [5] that it occupies more space at one time than at another, and many other things of the same kind, all of which are completely opposed to the truth, as we shall show in the proper place.
[88] Next, since words are part of the imagination, i.e., since we feign many concepts, in accordance with the random composition of [10] words in the memory from some disposition of the body, it is not to be doubted that words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause of many and great errors, unless we are very wary of them.
[89] Moreover, they are established according to the pleasure and power of understanding of ordinary people, so that they are only signs of things as they are in the imagination, but not as they are in the [15] intellect. This is clear from the fact that the names given to things that are only in the intellect, and not in the imagination, are often negative (for example, infinite, incorporeal, etc.), and also from the fact that they express negatively many things that are really affirmative, and conversely (for example, uncreated, independent, infinite, [20] immortal). Because the contraries of these are much more easily imagined, they occurred first to the earliest men, and they used positive names. We affirm and deny many things because the nature of words—not the nature of things—allows us to affirm them. And in our ignorance of this, we easily take something false to be true.
[25] [90] We avoid, moreover, another great cause of confusion which prevents the intellect from reflecting on itself—viz. when we do not distinguish between imagination and intellection, we think that the things we more easily imagine are clearer to us, and think we understand what we imagine. Hence, what should be put later we put first, [30] and so the true order of making progress is overturned, and no conclusion is arrived at legitimately.
[91]e To arrive finally at the second part of this Method, I shall set [II/34] forth first our aim in this Method, and then the means to attain it. The aim, then, is to have clear and distinct ideas, i.e., such as have been made from the pure mind, and not from fortuitous motions of the body. And then, so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shall [5] strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts.
[92] As for the first, our ultimate end requires (as we have already said) that the thing be conceived either through its essence alone or [10] through its proximate cause. If the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, is the cause of itself, then it must be understood through its essence alone; but if it is not in itself, but requires a cause to exist, then it must be understood through its proximate cause. For really, knowledgef of the effect is nothing but acquiring a more perfect knowledge of its cause.
[15] [93] Therefore, so long as we are dealing with the Investigation of things, we must never infer anything from abstractions, and we shall take very great care not to mix up the things that are only in the intellect with those that are real. But the best conclusion will have to be drawn from some particular affirmative essence, or, from a true and [20] legitimate definition. For from universal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to the contemplation of one singular thing rather than another.
[94] So the right way of discovery is to form thoughts from some given definition. This will proceed the more successfully and easily, [25] the better we have defined a thing. So the chief point of this second part of the Method is concerned solely with this: knowing the conditions of a good definition, and then, the way of finding good definitions. First, therefore, I shall deal with the conditions of definition.
[95] To be called perfect, a definition will have to explain the inmost [30] essence of the thing, and to take care not to use certain propria in its place. So as not to seem bent on uncovering the errors of others, I shall use only the example of an abstract thing to explain this. For it [II/35] is the same however it is defined. If a circle, for example, is defined as a figure in which the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, no one fails to see that such a definition does not at all explain the essence of the circle, but only a property of it. And though, as I have said, this does not matter much concerning figures and other [5] beings of reason, it matters a great deal concerning Physical and real beings, because the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are not known. If we neglect them, we shall necessarily overturn the connection of the intellect, which ought to reproduce the connection of Nature, and we shall completely miss our goal.
[10] [96] These are the requirements which must be satisfied in Definition, if we are to be free of this fault:
1. If the thing is created, the definition, as we have said, will have to include the proximate cause. E.g., according to this law, a circle would have to be defined as follows: it is the figure that [15] is described by any line of which one end is fixed and the other movable. This definition clearly includes the proximate cause.63
2. We require a concept, or definition, of the thing such that when it is considered alone, without any others conjoined, all the thing’s properties can be deduced from it (as may be seen in this definition [20] of the circle). For from it we clearly infer that all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal.
That this is a necessary requirement of a definition is so plain through itself to the attentive that it does not seem worth taking time to demonstrate it, nor to show also, from this second requirement, that every definition must be affirmative.
[25] I mean intellectual affirmation—it matters little whether the definition is verbally affirmative; because of the poverty of language it will sometimes, perhaps, [only] be able to be expressed negatively, although it is understood affirmatively.
[97] These are the requirments for the definition of an uncreated thing:
1. That it should exclude every cause, i.e., that the object should [30] require nothing else except its own being for its explanation.64
2. That, given the definition of this thing, there should remain no room for the Question—does it exist?
3. That (as far as the mind is concerned) it should have no substantives that could be changed into adjectives, i.e., that it should not be explained through any abstractions.
[35] 4. Finally (though it is not very necessary to note this) it is required [II/36] that all its properties be inferred65 from its definition.
All these things are evident to those who attend to them accurately.
[98] I have also said that the best conclusion will have to be drawn from a particular affirmative essence. For the more particular an idea [5] is, the more distinct, and therefore the clearer it is. So we ought to seek knowledge of particulars as much as possible.
[99] As for order, to unite and order all our perceptions, it is required, and reason demands,66 that we ask, as soon as possible, whether there is a certain being, and at the same time, what sort of being it is, [10] which is the cause of all things, so that its objective essence may also be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will (as we have said)67 reproduce Nature as much as possible. For it will have Nature’s essence, order, and unity objectively.
From this we can see that above all it is necessary for us always to [15] deduce all our ideas from Physical things, or from the real beings, proceeding, as far as possible, according to the series of causes, from one real being to another real being, in such a way that we do not pass over to abstractions and universals, neither inferring something real from them, nor inferring them from something real. For to do [20] either interferes with the true progress of the intellect.
[100] But note that by the series of causes and of real beings I do not here understand the series of singular, changeable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things. For it would be impossible for human weakness to grasp the series of singular, changeable things, not [25] only because there are innumerably many of them, but also because of the infinite circumstances in one and the same thing, any of which can be the cause of its existence or nonexistence. For their existence has no connection with their essence, or (as we have already said) is not an eternal truth.
[30] [101] But there is also no need for us to understand their series. The essences of singular, changeable things are not to be drawn from their series, or order of existing, since it offers us nothing but extrinsic denominations, relations, or at most, circumstances, all of which are [35] far from the inmost essence of things. That essence is to be sought [II/37] only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, and are ordered. Indeed these singular, changeable things depend so intimately, and (so to speak) essentially, on the fixed things that they can neither be nor be conceived [5] without them. So although these fixed and eternal things are singular, nevertheless, because of their presence everywhere, and most extensive power, they will be to us like universals, or genera of the definitions of singular, changeable things, and the proximate causes of all things.
[10] [102] But since this is so, there seems to be a considerable difficulty in our being able to arrive at knowledge of these singular things. For to conceive them all at once is a task far beyond the powers of the human intellect. But to understand one before the other, the order must be sought, as we have said, not from their series of existing, nor [15] even from the eternal things. For there, by nature, all these things are at once. So other aids will have to be sought beyond those we use to understand the eternal things and their laws.
Nevertheless, this is not the place to treat them, nor is it necessary until after we have acquired a sufficient knowledge of the eternal things [20] and their infallible laws, and the nature of our senses has become known to us. [103] Before we equip ourselves for knowledge of singular things, there will be time to treat those aids, all of which serve to help us know how to use our senses and to make, according to certain laws, and in order, the experiments that will suffice to determine [25] the thing we are seeking, so that at last we may infer from them according to what laws of eternal things it was made, and its inmost nature may become known to us, as I shall show in its place.68
Here, to return to our theme, I shall only try to treat those things that seem necessary for us to be able to arrive at knowledge of eternal things, and for us to form their definitions according to the conditions [30] laid down above. [104] To do this, we must recall what we said above:69 when the mind attends to a thought—to weigh it, and deduce from it, in good order, the things legitimately to be deduced from it—if it is false, the mind will uncover the falsity; but if it is true, the mind will [35] continue successfully, without any interruption, to deduce true things [II/38] from it. This, I say, is required for our purpose. For our thoughts cannot be determined from any other foundation.70 [105] If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of all, there must be some foundation that directs our thoughts to it.
[5] Next, because Method is reflexive knowledge itself, this foundation, which must direct our thoughts, can be nothing other than knowledge of what constitutes the form of truth, and knowledge of the intellect, and its properties and powers. For once we have acquired this [knowledge], we shall have the foundation from which we shall deduce our [10] thoughts and the way by which the intellect, according to its capacity, will be able to reach the knowledge of eternal things, with due regard, of course, to its own powers.
[106] But if forming true ideas pertains to the nature of thought, as shown in the first part, here we must investigate what we understand [15] by the powers of the intellect. Since the chief part of our Method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the intellect, and its nature, we are necessarily forced, by what I have taught in this second part of the Method, to deduce these from the very definition of thought and intellect.
[107] But so far we have had no rules for discovering definitions. [20] And because we cannot give them unless the nature, or definition, of the intellect, and its power are known, it follows that either the definition of the intellect must be clear through itself, or else we can understand nothing. It is not, however, absolutely clear through itself; but because its properties (like all the things we have from intellect) [25] cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly unless their nature is known, if we attend to the properties of the intellect that we understand clearly and distinctly, its definition will become known through itself. We shall, therefore, enumerate the properties of the intellect here, and consider them, and begin to deal with out innate tools.g
[30] [108] The properties of the intellect which I have chiefly noted, and understand clearly, are these:
1. That it involves certainty, i.e., that the intellect knows that things are formally as they are contained objectively in itself.
2. That it perceives certain things, or forms certain ideas, absolutely, [II/39] and forms certain ideas from others. For it forms the idea of quantity absolutely, without attending to other thoughts, but it forms the ideas of motion only by attending to the idea of quantity.
3. Those that it forms absolutely express infinity, but determinate [5] ideas it forms from others. For if it perceives the idea of a quantity through a cause, then it determines [that idea] through [the idea] of a quantity,71 as when it perceives that a body arises from the motion of some plane, a plane from the motion of a line, and finally, a line from the motion of a point. These perceptions do not help to understand the quantity, but only to determine it. [10] This is evident from the fact that we conceive them as arising from the motion, although the motion is not perceived unless the quantity is perceived, and also because we can continue the motion to form a line to infinity, which we could not do at all, if we did not have the idea of infinite quantity.
[15] 4. It forms positive ideas before negative ones.
5. It perceives things not so much under duration as under a certain species of eternity, and in an infinite number—or rather, to perceive things, it attends neither to number nor to duration; but when it imagines things, it perceives them under a certain [20] number, determinate duration and quantity.
6. The clear and distinct ideas that we form seem to follow so from the necessity of our nature alone that they seem to depend absolutely on our power alone. But with confused ideas it is quite the contrary—they are often formed against our will.
[25] 7. The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things that the intellect forms from others—as, for example, to determine the plane of an ellipse, it feigns that a pen attached to a cord is moved around two centers, or conceives infinitely many points always having the same definite relation to some given straight line, or a [30] cone cut by some oblique plane, so that the angle of inclination is greater than the angle of the cone’s vertex, or in infinite other ways.
8. The more ideas express of the perfection of some object, the more perfect they are. For we do not admire the architect who has designed a chapel so much as one who has designed a notable [35] temple.
[II/40] [109] I shall not linger over the other things that are referred to thought, such as love, joy, etc. For they contribute nothing to our present purpose, nor can they be conceived unless the intellect is perceived. For if perception is altogether taken away, then all these are taken away.
[5] [110] False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive (as we have shown abundantly) through which they are called false or fictitious, but they are considered as such only from a defect of our knowledge. So false and fictitious ideas, as such, can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought. It is rather to be sought from the positive [10] properties just surveyed, i.e., we must now establish something common from which these properties necessarily follow, or such that when it is given, they are necessarily given, and when it is taken away, they are taken away.
The rest is lacking.