[II/105] Cor.: Although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected neither exist nor are present, the mind will still be able to regard them as if they were present.

[5] Dem.: While external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they often thrust against the softer parts, they change (by Post. 5) their surfaces with the result (see A2” after L3) that they are reflected from it in another way than they used to be before, and [10] still later, when the fluid parts, by their spontaneous motion, encounter those new surfaces, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven against those surfaces by the external bodies. Consequently, while, thus reflected, they continue to move, they will affect the human Body with the same mode, concerning which the Mind [15] (by P12) will think again, i.e. (by P17), the Mind will again regard the external body as present; this will happen as often as the fluid parts of the human body encounter the same surfaces by their spontaneous motion. So although the external bodies by which the human Body has once been affected do not exist, the Mind will still regard [20] them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated, q.e.d.

Schol.: We see, therefore, how it can happen (as it often does) that we regard as present things that do not exist. This can happen from other causes also, but it is sufficient for me here to have shown one [25] through which I can explain it as if I had shown it through its true cause; still, I do not believe that I wander far from the true [cause] since all those postulates which I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established by experience which we cannot doubt, after we have shown that the human Body exists as we are aware of it (see P13C).

[30] Furthermore (from P17C and P16C2), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea of, say, Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man, say in Paul. For the former directly explains the essence of Peter’s body, and does not involve existence, except so long as Peter exists; [II/106] but the latter indicates the condition of Paul’s body more than Peter’s nature [NS: see P16C2],44 and therefore, while that condition of Paul’s [5] body lasts, Paul’s Mind will still regard Peter as present to itself, even though Peter does not exist.

Next, to retain the customary words, the affections of the human Body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, even if they do not reproduce the [NS: external] figures of things. And when the Mind regards bodies in this way, we [10] shall say that it imagines.

And here, in order to begin to indicate what error is, I should like you to note that the imaginations of the Mind, considered in themselves contain no error, or that the Mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those things that it imagines to be present [15] to it. For if the Mind, while it imagined nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things did not exist, it would, of course, attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice—especially if this faculty of imagining depended only on its own nature, i.e. (by ID7), if the Mind’s faculty of imagining [20] were free.

P18: If the human Body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the Mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.

[25] Dem.: The Mind (by P17C) imagines a body because the human Body is affected and disposed as it was affected when certain of its parts were struck by the external body itself. But (by hypothesis) the [30] Body was then so disposed that the Mind imagined two [or more] bodies at once; therefore it will now also imagine two [or more] at once, and when the Mind imagines one, it will immediately recollect the other also, q.e.d.

[35] Schol.: From this we clearly understand what Memory is. For it is [II/107] nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human Body—a connection that is in the Mind according to the order and connection of the affections of the human Body.

I say, first, that the connection is only of those ideas that involve [5] the nature of things which are outside the human Body, but not of the ideas that explain the nature of the same things. For they are really (by P16) ideas of affections of the human Body which involve both its nature and that of external bodies.

I say, second, that this connection happens according to the order [10] and connection of the affections of the human Body in order to distinguish it from the connection of ideas which happens according to the order of the intellect, by which the Mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men.

And from this we clearly understand why the Mind, from the thought [15] of one thing, immediately passes to the thought of another, which has no likeness to the first: as, for example, from the thought of the word pomum a Roman will immediately pass to the thought of the fruit [viz. an apple], which has no similarity to that articulate sound and nothing in common with it except that the Body of the same man has often [20] been affected by these two [NS: at the same time], i.e., that the man often heard the word pomum while he saw the fruit.

And in this way each of us will pass from one thought to another, as each one’s association has ordered the images of things in the body. For example, a soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a [25] horseman, and from that to the thought of war, etc. But a Farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, and then to that of a field, etc. And so each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect the images of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought to another.

[30] P19: The human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of affections by which the Body is affected.

[II/108] Dem.: For the human Mind is the idea itself, or knowledge of the human Body (by P13), which (by P9) is indeed in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing, or45 [5] because (by Post. 4) the human Body requires a great many bodies by which it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and [NS: because] the order and connection of ideas is (by P7) the same as the order and connection of causes,46 this idea will be in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by the ideas of a great many singular things. Therefore, [10] God has the idea of the human Body, or knows the human Body, insofar as he is affected by a great many other ideas, and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human Mind, i.e. (by P11C), the human Mind does not know the human Body.47

But the ideas of affections of the Body are in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human Mind, or the human Mind perceives [15] the same affections (by P12), and consequently (by P16) the human Body itself, as actually existing (by P17).

Therefore to that extent only, the human Mind perceives the human Body itself, q.e.d.

[20] P20: There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human Mind, which follows in God in the same way and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the human Body.

Dem.: Thought is an attribute of God (by P1), and so (by P3) there [25] must necessarily be in God an idea both of [NS: thought] and of all of its affections, and consequently (by P11),48 of the human Mind also. Next, this idea, or knowledge, of the Mind does not follow in God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by P9). But the order and connection of ideas is [30] the same as the order and connection of causes49 (by P7). Therefore, this idea, or knowledge, of the Mind follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the Body, q.e.d.

[II/109] P21: This idea of the Mind is united to the Mind in the same way as the Mind is united to the Body.

[5] Dem.: We have shown that the Mind is united to the Body from the fact that the Body is the object of the Mind (see P12 and 13); and so by the same reasoning the idea of the Mind must be united with its own object, i.e., with the Mind itself, in the same way as the Mind is united with the Body, q.e.d.

[10] Schol.: This proposition is understood far more clearly from what is said in P7S; for there we have shown that the idea of the Body and the Body, i.e. (by P13), the Mind and the Body, are one and the same Individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, [15] now under the attribute of Extension. So the idea of the Mind and the Mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, viz. Thought. The idea of the Mind, I say, and the Mind itself follow in God from the same power of thinking and by the same necessity. For the idea of the Mind, i.e., the idea [20] of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object. For as soon as someone knows something, he thereby knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows, and so on, to infinity. But more on these matters later.

[25] P22: The human Mind perceives not only the affections of the Body, but also the ideas of these affections.

Dem.: The ideas of the ideas of the affections follow in God in the same way and are related to God in the same way as the ideas themselves [30] of the affections (this is demonstrated in the same way as P20). But the ideas of the affections of the Body are in the human Mind (by [II/110] P12), i.e. (by P11C), in God, insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human Mind. Therefore, the ideas of these ideas will be in God insofar as he has the knowledge, or idea, of the human Mind, i.e. (by P21), they will be in the human Mind itself, which for that reason [5] perceives not only the affections of the Body, but also their ideas, q.e.d.

P23: The Mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the Body.

[10] Dem.: The idea, or knowledge, of the Mind (by P20) follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. But since (by P19) the human Mind [15] does not know the human Body itself, i.e. (by P11C), since the knowledge of the human Body is not related to God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human Mind, the knowledge of the Mind is also not related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human Mind. And so (again by P11C) to that extent the human Mind does not know itself.

[20] Next, the ideas of the affections by which the Body is affected involve the nature of the human Body itself (by P16), i.e. (by P13), agree with the nature of the Mind. So knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve knowledge of the Mind. But (by P22) knowledge of these ideas is in the human Mind itself. Therefore, the human [25] Mind, to that extent only, knows itself, q.e.d.

P24: The human Mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human Body.

[30] Dem.: The parts composing the human Body pertain to the essence of the Body itself only insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed manner (see the Definition after L3C), [II/111] and not insofar as they can be considered as Individuals, without relation to the human Body. For (by Post. 1) the parts of the human Body are highly composite Individuals, whose parts (by L4) can be [5] separated from the human Body and communicate their motions (see A1″ after L3) to other bodies in another manner, while the human Body completely preserves its nature and form. And so the idea, or knowledge, of each part will be in God (by P3), insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing (by P9), a singular thing which is prior, in the order of nature, to the part itself [10] (by P7). The same must also be said of each part of the Individual composing the human Body. And so, the knowledge of each part composing the human Body is in God insofar as he is affected with a great many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the [15] human Body, i.e. (by P13), the idea that constitutes the nature of the human Mind. And so, by (P11C) the human Mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human Body, q.e.d.

[20] P25: The idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body.

Dem.: We have shown (P16) that the idea of an affection of the human Body involves the nature of an external body insofar as the [25] external body determines the human Body in a certain fixed way. But insofar as the external body is an Individual that is not related to the human Body, the idea, or knowledge, of it is in God (by P9) insofar as God is considered to be affected with the idea of another thing which (by P7) is prior in nature to the external body itself. So adequate [30] knowledge of the external body is not in God insofar as he has the idea of an affection of the human Body, or the idea of an affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body, q.e.d.

[II/112] P26: The human Mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own Body.

[5] Dem.: If the human Body is not affected by an external body in any way, then (by P7) the idea of the human Body, i.e. (by P13) the human Mind, is also not affected in any way by the idea of the existence of that body, or it does not perceive the existence of that external [10] body in any way. But insofar as the human Body is affected by an external body in some way, to that extent [the human Mind] (by P16 and P16C1) perceives the external body, q.e.d.

Cor.: Insofar as the human Mind imagines an external body, it does [15] not have adequate knowledge of it.

Dem.: When the human Mind regards external bodies through ideas of the affections of its own Body, then we say that it imagines (see [20] P17S); and the Mind cannot in any other way (by P26) imagine external bodies as actually existing. And so (by P25), insofar as the Mind imagines external bodies, it does not have adequate knowledge of them, q.e.d.

P27: The idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate [25] knowledge of the human body itself.

Dem.: Any idea of any affection of the human Body involves the nature of the human Body insofar as the human Body itself is considered to be affected with a certain definite mode (see P16). But insofar [30] as the human Body is an Individual, which can be affected with many [II/113] other modes, the idea of this [affection] etc. (See P25D.)

P28: The ideas of the affections of the human Body, insofar as they are related [5] only to the human Mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Dem.: For the ideas of the affections of the human Body involve the nature of external bodies as much as that of the human Body (by [10] P16), and must involve the nature not only of the human Body [NS: as a whole], but also of its parts; for the affections are modes (by Post. 3) with which the parts of the human Body, and consequently the whole Body, are affected. But (by P24 and P25) adequate knowledge of external bodies and of the parts composing the human Body is in [15] God, not insofar as he is considered to be affected with the human Mind, but insofar as he is considered to be affected with other ideas.50 Therefore, these ideas of the affections, insofar as they are related only [20] to the human Mind, are like conclusions without premises, i.e. (as is known through itself), they are confused ideas, q.e.d.

Schol.: In the same way we can demonstrate that the idea that constitutes the nature of the human Mind is not, considered in itself alone, [25] clear and distinct; we can also demonstrate the same of the idea of the human Mind and the ideas of the ideas of the human Body’s affections [viz. that are confused],51 insofar as they are referred to the Mind alone. Anyone can easily see this.

P29: The idea of the idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve [30] adequate knowledge of the human Mind.

Dem.: For the idea of an affection of the human Body (by P27) does not involve adequate knowledge of the Body itself, or does not express [II/114] its nature adequately, i.e. (by P13), does not agree adequately with the nature of the Mind; and so (by IA6) the idea of this idea does not express the nature of the human mind adequately, or does not involve adequate knowledge of it, q.e.d.

[5] Cor.: From this it follows that so long as the human Mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it does not have an adequate, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own Body, and of external bodies. For the Mind does not know itself except [10] insofar as it perceives ideas of the affections of the body (by P23). But it does not perceive its own Body (by P19) except through the very ideas themselves of the affections [of the body], and it is also through them alone that it perceives external bodies (by P26). And so, insofar as it has these [ideas], then neither of itself (by P29), nor of its [15] own Body (by P27), nor of external bodies (by P25) does it have an adequate knowledge, but only (by P28 and P28S) a mutilated and confused knowledge, q.e.d.

Schol.: I say expressly that the Mind has, not an adequate, but only [20] a confused [NS: and mutilated] knowledge, of itself, of its own Body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the common order of nature, i.e., so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous encounters with things, to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number [25] of things at once, to understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed internally, in this or another way, then it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show below.

P30: We can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of [30] our Body.

Dem.: Our body’s duration depends neither on its essence (by A1), [II/115] nor even on God’s absolute nature (by IP21). But (by IP28) it is determined to exist and produce an effect from such [NS: other] causes as are also determined by others to exist and produce an effect in a [5] certain and determinate manner, and these again by others, and so to infinity. Therefore, the duration of our Body depends on the common order of nature and the constitution of things. But adequate knowledge of how things are constituted is in God, insofar as he has the ideas of all of them, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the [10] human Body (by P9C). So the knowledge of the duration of our Body is quite inadequate in God, insofar as he is considered to constitute only the nature of the human Mind, i.e. (by P11C), this knowledge is quite inadequate in our Mind, q.e.d.

[15] P31: We can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things which are outside us.

Dem.: For each singular thing, like the human Body, must be determined [20] by another singular thing to exist and produce effects in a certain and determinate way, and this again by another, and so to infinity (by IP28). But since (in P30) we have demonstrated from this common property of singular things that we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our Body, we shall have to draw [25] the same conclusion concerning the duration of singular things [outside us], viz. that we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of their duration, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that all particular things are contingent [30] and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration (by P31), and that is what we must understand by the contingency [II/116] of things and the possibility of their corruption (see IP33S1). For (by IP29) beyond that there is no contingency.

P32: All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.

[5] Dem.: For all ideas which are in God agree entirely with their objects52 (by P7C), and so (by IA6) they are all true, q.e.d.

[10] P33: There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.

Dem.: If you deny this, conceive (if possible) a positive mode of thinking which constitutes the form of error, or falsity. This mode of [15] thinking cannot be in God (by P32). But it also can neither be nor be conceived outside God (by IP15). And so there can be nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false, q.e.d.

[20] P34: Every idea that in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

Dem.: When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we are saying nothing but that (by P11C) there is an adequate and perfect idea in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our [25] Mind, and consequently (by P32) we are saying nothing but that such an idea is true, q.e.d.

P35: Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.

[II/117] Dem.: There is nothing positive in ideas that constitutes the form of falsity (by P33); but falsity cannot consist in an absolute privation53 (for it is Minds, not Bodies, which are said to err, or be deceived), [5] nor also in absolute ignorance. For to be ignorant and to err are different. So it consists in the privation of knowledge that inadequate knowledge of things, or inadequate and confused ideas, involve, q.e.d.

[10] Schol.: In P17S I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge. But to explain the matter more fully, I shall give [NS: one or two examples]: men are deceived in that they think themselves free [NS: i.e., they think that, of their own free will, they can either do a thing or forbear doing it],54 an opinion which consists only in this, [15] that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom—that they do not know any cause of their actions. They say, of course, that human actions depend on the will, but these are only words for which they have no idea. For all are ignorant of what the will is, and how it [20] moves the Body; those who boast of something else, who feign seats and dwelling places of the soul, usually provoke either ridicule or disgust.55

Similarly, when we look at the sun, we imagine it as about 200 feet away from us, an error that does not consist simply in this imagining, but in the fact that while we imagine it in this way, we are ignorant [25] of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining. For even if we later come to know that it is more than 600 diameters of the earth away from us, we nevertheless imagine it as near. For we imagine the sun so near not because we do not know its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our [30] body is affected by the sun.56

P36: Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas.

[II/118] Dem.: All ideas are in God (by IP15); and, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by P32), and (by P7C) adequate. And so there [5] are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular Mind of someone (see P24 and P28). And so all ideas—both the adequate and the inadequate—follow with the same necessity (by P6C), q.e.d.

[10] P37: What is common to all things (on this see L2, above) and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.

Dem.: If you deny this, conceive (if possible) that it does constitute [15] the essence of some singular thing, say the essence of B. Then (by D2) it can neither be nor be conceived without B. But this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, it does not pertain to the essence of B, nor does it constitute the essence of any other singular thing, q.e.d.

[20] P38: Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.

Dem.: Let A be something which is common to all bodies, and which is equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that [25] A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (by P7C) will necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human Body and insofar as he has ideas of its affections, which (by P16, P25, and P27) involve in part both the nature of the human Body [30] and that of external bodies. That is (by P12 and P13), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human [II/119] Mind, or insofar as he has ideas that are in the human Mind. The Mind therefore (by P11C) necessarily perceives A adequately, and does so both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own or any external body. Nor can A be conceived in another way, q.e.d.

[5] Cor.: From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men.57 For (by L2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by P38) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all.

[10] P39: If something is common to, and peculiar to, the human Body and certain external bodies by which the human Body is usually affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the Mind.

[15] Dem.: Let A be that which is common to, and peculiar to, the human Body and certain external bodies, which is equally in the human Body and in the same external bodies, and finally, which is equally in the part of each external body and in the whole. There will be an [20] adequate idea of A in God (by P7C), both insofar as he has the idea of the human Body, and insofar as he has ideas of the posited external bodies. Let it be posited now that the human Body is affected by an external body through what it has in common with it, i.e., by A; the [25] idea of this affection will involve property A (by P16), and so (by P7C) the idea of this affection, insofar as it involves property A, will be adequate in God insofar as he is affected with the idea of the human Body, i.e. (by P13), insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human Mind. And so (by P11C), this idea is also adequate in the human [30] Mind, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that the Mind is the more capable of [II/120] perceiving many things adequately as its Body has many things in common with other bodies.

P40: Whatever ideas follow in the Mind from ideas that are adequate in the [5] mind are also adequate.

Dem.: This is evident. For when we say that an idea in the human Mind follows from ideas that are adequate in it, we are saying nothing but that (by P11C) in the Divine intellect there is an idea of which [10] God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite,58 nor insofar as he is affected with the ideas of a great many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human Mind [NS: and therefore, it must be adequate].59

[15] Schol. I:60 With this I have explained the cause of those notions which are called common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning.

But some axioms, or notions,61 result from other causes which it would be helpful to explain by this method of ours. For from these [explanations] it would be established which notions are more useful than the others, and which are of hardly any use; and then, which are [20] common, which are clear and distinct only to those who have no prejudices, and finally, which are ill-founded. Moreover, we would establish what is the origin of those notions they call Second,62 and consequently of the axioms founded on them, and other things I have thought about, from time to time,63 concerning these matters. But since I have [25] set these aside for another Treatise,64 and do not wish to give rise to disgust by too long a discussion, I have decided to pass over them here.

But not to omit anything it is necessary to know, I shall briefly add something about the causes from which the terms called Transcendental have had their origin—I mean terms like Being, Thing and something. [30] These terms arise from the fact that the human Body, being limited, is capable of forming distinctly only a certain number of images at the same time (I have explained what an image is in P17S). If that number is exceeded, the images will begin to be confused, and if the number of images the Body is capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is [II/121] greatly exceeded, they will all be completely confused with one another.

Since this is so, it is evident from P17C and P18, that the human Mind will be able to imagine distinctly, at the same time, as many bodies as there can be images formed at the same time in its body. [5] But when the images in the body are completely confused, the Mind also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any distinction, and comprehend them as if under one attribute, viz. under the attribute of Being, Thing, etc. This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally vigorous and from other causes like [10] these, which it is not necessary to explain here. For our purpose it is sufficient to consider only one. For they all reduce to this: these terms signify ideas that are confused in the highest degree.

Those notions they call Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, etc., have arisen from similar causes, viz. because so many images (e.g., of men) [15] are formed at one time in the human Body that they surpass the power of imagining—not entirely, of course, but still to the point where the Mind can imagine neither slight differences of the singular [men] (such as the color and size of each one, etc.) nor their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only what they all agree in, insofar as they [20] affect the body. For the body has been affected most [NS: forcefully] by [what is common], since each singular has affected it [by this property]. And [NS: the mind] expresses this by the word man, and predicates it of infinitely many singulars. For as we have said, it cannot imagine a determinate number of singulars.

But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by all [NS: [25] men] in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance with what the body has more often been affected by, and what the Mind imagines or recollects more easily. For example, those who have more often regarded men’s stature with wonder will understand by the word man an animal of erect stature. But those who have been [30] accustomed to consider something else, will form another common image of men—e.g., that man is an animal capable of laughter, or a featherless biped, or a rational animal.

And similarly concerning the others—each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his body. Hence it is not surprising that so many controversies have arisen among the philosophers, who have wished to explain natural things by mere images of [35] things.

[II/122] Schol. 2: From what has been said above, it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions:

I. from singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for [5] the intellect (see P29C); for that reason I have been accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from random experience;

II. from signs, e.g., from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of them, which are like them, and through which we imagine the things (P18S). These [10] two ways of regarding things I shall henceforth call knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination.

III. Finally, from the fact that we have common notions65 and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see P38C, P39, P39C, and P40). This I shall call reason and the second kind of knowledge.

[15] [IV.] In addition to these two kinds of knowledge, there is (as I shall show in what follows) another, third kind, which we shall call intuitive knowledge. And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things.

I shall explain all these with one example. Suppose there are three [20] numbers, and the problem is to find a fourth which is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first, because they have not yet forgotten what they heard from their teacher without any demonstration, or because they have often found this in the simplest [25] numbers, or from the force of the Demonstration of P7 in Bk. VII of Euclid, viz. from the common property of proportionals. But in the simplest numbers none of this is necessary. Given the numbers 1, 2, and 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6—and we see this much more clearly because we infer the fourth number from the ratio which, in one glance, we see the first number to have [30] the second.66

P41: Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, whereas knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarily true.

[II/123] Dem.: We have said in the preceding scholium that to knowledge of the first kind pertain all those ideas which are inadequate and confused; and so (by P35) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. [5] Next, we have said that to knowledge of the second and third kinds pertain those which are adequate; and so (by P34) this knowledge is necessarily true.

P42: Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches [10] us to distinguish the true from the false.

Dem.: This Proposition is evident through itself. For he who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and of the false, i.e. (P40S2), must know the [15] true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

P43: He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.

[20] Dem.: An idea true in us is that which is adequate in God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human Mind (by P11C). Let us posit, therefore, that there is in God, insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human Mind, an adequate idea, A. Of this idea there must necessarily also be in God an idea which is related to God in the same way as idea A (by P20, whose demonstration is [25] universal [NS: and can be applied to all ideas]). But idea A is supposed to be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human Mind; therefore the idea of idea A must also be related to [30] God in the same way, i.e. (by the same P11C), this adequate idea of idea A will be in the Mind itself which has the adequate idea A. And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by P34) who knows a thing truly, [II/124] must at the same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge. I.e. (as is manifest through itself), he must at the same time be certain, q.e.d.

Schol.: In P21S I have explained what an idea of an idea is. But it [5] should be noted that the preceding proposition is sufficiently manifest through itself. For no one who has a true idea is unaware that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly, or in the best way. And [10] of course no one can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode of thinking, viz. the very [act of] understanding. And I ask, who can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands it? I.e., who can know that he is certain about some thing unless he is first certain about it? What can there be which is clearer and more certain than a true [15] idea, to serve as a standard of truth? As the light makes both itself and the darkness plain, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false.

By this I think we have replied to these questions: if a true idea is distinguished from a false one, [NS: not insofar as it is said to be a mode of thinking, but] only insofar as it is said to agree with its object, [20] then a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished only through the extrinsic denomination [NS: and not through the intrinsic denomination])—and so, does the man who has true ideas [NS: have any more reality or perfection] than [25] him who has only false ideas? Again, why do men have false ideas? And finally, how can someone know certainly that he has ideas which agree with their objects?67

To these questions, I say, I think I have already replied. For as far as the difference between a true and a false idea is concerned, it is [30] established from P35 that the true is related to the false as being is to nonbeing. And the causes of falsity I have shown most clearly from P19 to P35S. From this it is also clear what is the difference between the man who has true ideas and the man who has only false ideas. [35] Finally, as to the last, viz. how a man can know that he has an idea that agrees with its object? I have just shown, more than sufficiently, that this arises solely from his having an idea that does agree with its object—or that truth is its own standard. Add to this that our Mind, [II/125] insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (by P11C); hence, it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are.

[5] P44: It is of the nature of Reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent.

Dem.: It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by P41), [10] viz. (by IA6) as they are in themselves, i.e. (by IP29), not as contingent but as necessary, q.e.d.

Cor. 1: From this it follows that it depends only on the imagination that we regard things as contingent, both in respect to the past and in respect to the future.

[15] Schol.: I shall explain briefly how this happens. We have shown above (by P17 and P17C) that even though things do not exist, the Mind still imagines them always as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Next, we have shown [20] (P18) that if the human Body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, then afterwards, when the Mind imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also, i.e., it will regard both as present to itself unless causes occur which exclude their [25] present existence. Moreover, no one doubts but what we also imagine time, viz. from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly, or more quickly, or with the same speed.

Let us suppose, then, a child, who saw Peter for the first time yesterday, in the morning, but saw Paul at noon, and Simon in the [30] evening, and today again saw Peter in the morning. It is clear from P18 that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will immediately imagine the sun taking the same course through the sky as he saw on the preceding day, or he will imagine the whole day, and Peter to [II/126] gether with the morning, Paul with noon, and Simon with the evening. That is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and of Simon with a relation to future time. On the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will relate Paul and Peter to the time past, by imagining [5] them together with past time. And he will do this more uniformly, the more often he has seen them in this same order.

But if it should happen at some time that on some other evening he sees James instead of Simon, then on the following morning he will imagine now Simon, now James, together with the evening time, but [10] not both at once. For it is supposed that he has seen one or the other of them in the evening, but not both at once. His imagination, therefore, will vacillate and he will imagine now this one, now that one, with the future evening time, i.e., he will regard neither of them as certainly future, but both of them as contingently future.

And this vacillation of the imagination will be the same if the imagination [15] is of things we regard in the same way with relation to past time or to present time. Consequently we shall imagine things as contingent in relation to present time as well as to past and future time.

[20] Cor 2: It is of the nature of Reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity.

Dem.: It is of the nature of Reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent (by P44). And it perceives this necessity of [25] things truly (by P41), i.e. (by IA6), as it is in itself. But (by IP16) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God’s eternal nature. Therefore, it is of the nature of Reason to regard things under this species of eternity.

Add to this that the foundations of Reason are notions (by P38) [30] which explain those things that are common to all, and which (by P37) do not explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they must be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity, q.e.d.

[II/127] P45: Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an68 eternal and infinite essence of God.

[5] Dem.: The idea of a singular thing which actually exists necessarily involves both the essence of the thing and its existence (by P8C). But singular things (by IP15) cannot be conceived without God—on the [10] contrary, because (by P6) they have God for a cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the things are modes, their ideas must involve the concept of their attribute (by IA4), i.e. (by ID6), must involve an eternal and infinite essence of God, q.e.d.

[15] Schol.: By existence here I do not understand duration, i.e., existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity. For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes (see [20] IP16). I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. Concerning this, see IP24C.

[25] P46: The knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.

Dem.: The demonstration of the preceding Proposition is Universal, [30] and whether the thing is considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or a part (by P45), will involve God’s eternal and infinite essence. So what gives knowledge of an eternal [II/128] and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole. And so (by P38) this knowledge will be adequate, q.e.d.

P47: The human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite [5] essence.

Dem.: The human Mind has ideas (by P22) from which it perceives (by P23) itself, (by P19) its own Body, and (by P16C1 and P17) external [10] bodies as actually existing. And so (by P45 and P46) it has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence, q.e.d.

Schol.: From this we see that God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived [15] through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, and so can form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in P40S2 and of whose excellence and utility we shall speak in Part V.

But that men do not have so clear a knowledge of God as they do [20] of the common notions comes from the fact that they cannot imagine God, as they can bodies, and that they have joined the name God to the images of things which they are used to seeing. Men can hardly avoid this, because they are continually affected by bodies.

And indeed, most errors consist only in our not rightly applying [25] names to things. For when someone says that the lines which are drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he surely understands (then at least) by a circle something different from what Mathematicians understand. Similarly, when men err in calculating, they have certain numbers in their mind and different ones on the paper. So if you consider what they have in Mind, they really do [30] not err, though they seem to err because we think they have in their mind the numbers which are on the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe that they were erring, just as I did not believe that [II/129] he was erring whom I recently heard cry out that his courtyard had flown into his neighbor’s hen [NS: although his words were absurd], because what he had in mind seemed sufficiently clear to me [viz. that his hen had flown into his neighbor’s courtyard].

And most controversies have arisen from this, that men do not rightly explain their own mind, or interpret the mind of the other man badly. [5] For really, when they contradict one another most vehemently, they either have the same thoughts, or they are thinking of different things,69 so that what they think are errors and absurdities in the other are not.

P48: In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined [10] to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.

Dem.: The Mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by P11), and so (by IP17C2) cannot be a free cause of its own actions, or [15] cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing. Rather, it must be determined to willing this or that (by IP28) by a cause which is also determined by another, and this cause again by another, etc., q.e.d.

[20] Schol.: In this same way it is also demonstrated that there is in the Mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. From this it follows that these and similar faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but Metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from particulars. So intellect and will are to this or [25] that idea, or to this or that volition as ‘stone-ness’ is to this or that stone, or man to Peter or Paul.

We have explained the cause of men’s thinking themselves free in the Appendix of Part I. But before I proceed further, it should be [30] noted here70 that by will I understand a faculty of affirming and denying, and not desire. I say that I understand the faculty by which [II/130] the Mind affirms or denies something true or something false, and not the desire by which the Mind wants a thing or avoids it.

But after we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions which are not distinguished from the singulars from which we [5] form them, we must now investigate whether the volitions themselves are anything beyond the very ideas of things. We must investigate, I say, whether there is any other affirmation or negation in the Mind except that which the idea involves, insofar as it is an idea—on this see the following Proposition and also D3—so that our thought does not fall into pictures. For by ideas I understand, not the images that [10] are formed at the back of the eye (and, if you like, in the middle of the brain),71 but concepts of Thought [NS: or the objective Being of a thing insofar as it consists only in Thought].

[15] P49: In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea.

Dem.: In the Mind (by P48) there is no absolute faculty of willing [20] and not willing, but only singular volitions, viz. this and that affirmation, and this and that negation. Let us conceive, therefore, some singular volition, say a mode of thinking by which the Mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

This affirmation involves the concept, or idea, of the triangle, i.e., it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. For to say that [25] A must involve the concept of B is the same as to say that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation (by A3) also cannot be without the idea of the triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of the triangle.

Next, this idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation, [30] viz. that its three angles equal two right angles. So conversely, this idea of the triangle also can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation.

So (by D2) this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle, and is nothing beyond it. And what we have said concerning this volition (since we have selected it at random), must also be said [35] concerning any volition, viz. that it is nothing apart from the idea, q.e.d.

[II/131] Cor.: The will and the intellect are one and the same.

Dem.: The will and the intellect are nothing apart from the singular [5] volitions and ideas themselves (by P48 and P48S). But the singular volitions and ideas are one and the same (by P49). Therefore the will and the intellect are one and the same, q.e.d.

Schol.: [I.] By this we have removed what is commonly maintained [10] to be the cause of error.72 Moreover, we have shown above that falsity consists only in the privation that mutilated and confused ideas involve. So a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he [15] does not doubt, or that he rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination wavers [NS: or to cause him to doubt them]. On this, see P44S.

Therefore, however stubbornly a man may cling to something false [NS: so that we cannot in any way make him doubt it], we shall still [20] never say that he is certain of it. For by certainty we understand something positive (see P43 and P43S), not the privation of doubt. But by the privation of certainty, we understand falsity.

However, to explain the preceding Proposition more fully, there remain certain things I must warn you of. And then I must reply to [25] the objections that can be made against this doctrine of ours. And finally, to remove every uneasiness, I thought it worthwhile to indicate some of the advantages of this doctrine. Some, I say—for the most important ones will be better understood from what we shall say in Part V.

[30] [II.] I begin, therefore, by warning my Readers, first, to distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept, of the Mind, and the images of things that we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because many people either completely confuse these three—ideas, images, [II/132] and words—or do not distinguish them accurately enough, or carefully enough, they have been completely ignorant of this doctrine concerning the will. But it is quite necessary to know it, both for the sake of speculation73 and in order to arrange one’s life wisely.

[5] Indeed, those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us from encounters with [NS: external] bodies, are convinced that those ideas of things [NS: which can make no trace in our brains, or] of which we can form no similar image [NS: in our brain] are not ideas, but only fictions which we feign from a free choice of the will. [10] They look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel, and preoccupied with this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.74

And then, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation that the idea involves, think that they can will something contrary to what they are aware of, when they only affirm or deny [15] with words something contrary to what they are aware of.75 But these prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words. For the essence [20] of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of thought.

It should suffice to have issued these few words of warning on this matter, so I pass to objections mentioned above.

[III.A.(i)] The first of these is that they think it clear that the will extends more widely than the intellect, and so is different from the [25] intellect. The reason why they think the will extends more widely than the intellect is that they say they know by experience that they do not require a greater faculty of assenting, or affirming, and denying, than we already have, in order to assent to infinitely many other things which we do not perceive—but they do require a greater faculty [30] of understanding. The will, therefore, is distinguished from the intellect because the intellect is finite and the will is infinite.

[III.A.(ii)] Secondly, it can be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend our judgment so as not to assent to things we perceive. This also seems to be confirmed [35] from the fact that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. E.g., someone who feigns a winged horse does not on that account grant [II/133] that there is a winged horse, i.e., he is not on that account deceived unless at the same time he grants that there is a winged horse. Therefore, experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that the will, or faculty of assenting, is free, and different from the faculty of understanding.

[5] [III.A.(iii)] Thirdly, it can be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, i.e., we do not seem to require a greater power to affirm that what is true, is true, than to affirm that something false is true. But [NS: with ideas it is different, [10] for] we perceive that one idea has more reality, or perfection, than another. As some objects are more excellent than others, so also some ideas of objects are more perfect than others. This also seems to establish a difference between the will and the intellect.

[III.A.(iv)] Fourth, it can be objected that if man does not act from [15] freedom of the will, what will happen if he is in a state of equilibrium, like Buridan’s ass?76 Will he perish of hunger and of thirst? If I concede that he will, I would seem to conceive an ass, or a statue of a man, not a man.77 But if I deny that he will, then he will determine himself, and consequently have the faculty of going where he wills and doing what he wills.

Perhaps other things in addition to these can be objected. But because [20] I am not bound to force on you what anyone can dream, I shall only take the trouble to reply to these objections—and that as briefly as I can.

[III.B.(i)] To the first I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they understand only clear [25] and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving. And indeed, I do not see why the faculty of willing should be called infinite, when the faculty of sensing is not. For just as we can affirm infinitely many things by the same faculty of willing (but one after another, for we cannot affirm [30] infinitely many things at once), so also we can sense, or perceive, infinitely many bodies by the same faculty of sensing (viz. one after another [NS: and not at once].78

If they say that there are infinitely many things which we cannot perceive, I reply that we cannot reach them by any thought, and [35] consequently, not by any faculty of willing. But, they say, if God willed to bring it about that we should perceive them also, he would have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has given us. This is the same as if they said that, [II/134] if God should will to bring it about that we understood infinitely many other beings, it would indeed be necessary for him to give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being, in order for us to embrace79 the same infinity of beings. For we have shown that the will is a universal being, or idea, by which we explain all the [5] singular volitions, i.e., it is what is common to them all.

Therefore, since they believe that this common or universal idea of all volitions is a faculty,80 it is not at all surprising if they say that this faculty extends beyond the limits of the intellect to infinity. For the universal is said equally of one, a great many, or infinitely many [10] individuals.

[III.B(ii)] To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we are saying nothing but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension of judgment, [15] therefore, is really a perception, not [an act of] free will.

To understand this clearly, let us conceive a child imagining a winged horse, and not perceiving anything else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by P17C), and the child does not perceive anything else that excludes the existence of the horse, he will [20] necessarily regard the horse as present. Nor will he be able to doubt its existence, though he will not be certain of it.

We find this daily in our dreams, and I do not believe there is anyone who thinks that while he is dreaming he has a free power of suspending judgment concerning the things he dreams, and of bringing [25] it about that he does not dream the things he dreams he sees. Nevertheless, it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, viz. when we dream that we dream.

Next, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives, i.e., I grant that the imaginations of the Mind, considered in themselves, [30] involve no error. But I deny that a man affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of the horse? For if the Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as present to itself, and would not have any cause of doubting its existence, or any faculty of dissenting, [35] unless either the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that its idea of a winged horse was inadequate. And then either it will necessarily deny the horse’s existence, or it will necessarily doubt it.

[II/135] [III.B.(iii)] As for the third objection, I think what has been said will be an answer to it too: viz. that the will is something universal, which is predicated of all ideas, and which signifies only what is common to all ideas, viz. the affirmation, whose adequate essence, there [5] fore, insofar as it is thus conceived abstractly, must be in each idea,81 [10] and in this way only must be the same in all, but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the idea’s essence; for in that regard the singular affirmations differ from one another as much as the ideas themselves do. For example, the affirmation that the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle.

[15] Next, I deny absolutely that we require an equal power of thinking, to affirm that what is true is true, as to affirm that what is false is true. For if you consider the mind,82 they are related to one another as being to not-being. For there is nothing positive in ideas which [20] constitutes the form of falsity (see P35, P35S, and P47S). So the thing to note here, above all, is how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real beings.

[III.B. (iv)] Finally, as far as the fourth objection is concerned, I say [25] that I grant entirely that a man placed in such an equilibrium (viz. who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food and drink as are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me whether such a man should not be thought an ass, rather than a man, I say that I do not know—just as I also do not know how [30] highly we should esteem one who hangs himself, or children, fools, and madmen, etc.83

[IV.] It remains now to indicate how much knowledge of this doctrine is to our advantage in life. We shall see this easily from the following considerations:

[A.] Insofar as it teaches that we act only from God’s command, [35] that we share in the divine nature, and that we do this the more, the more perfect our actions are, and the more and more we understand God. This doctrine, then, in addition to giving us complete peace of mind, also teaches us wherein our greatest happiness, or blessedness, [II/136] consists: viz. in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love and morality advise. From this we clearly understand how far they stray from the true valuation of virtue, who expect to be honored by God with the greatest rewards for [5] their virtue and best actions, as for the greatest bondage—as if virtue itself, and the service of God, were not happiness itself, and the greatest freedom.

[B.] Insofar as it teaches us how we must bear ourselves concerning matters of fortune, or things which are not in our power, i.e., concerning things which do not follow from our nature—that we must [10] expect and bear calmly both good fortune and bad. For all things follow from God’s eternal decree with the same necessity as from the essence of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

[C.] This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at [15] no one, to envy no one; and also insofar as it teaches that each of us should be content with his own things, and should be helpful to his neighbor, not from unmanly compassion, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason, as the time and occasion demand. I shall show this in the Fourth Part.84

[D.] Finally, this doctrine also contributes, to no small extent, to [20] the common society insofar as it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led, not so that they may be slaves, but that they may do freely the things that are best.

And with this I have finished what I had decided to treat in this scholium, and put an end to this our Second Part. In it I think that I have explained the nature and properties of the human Mind in sufficient [25] detail, and as clearly as the difficulty of the subject allows, and that I have set out doctrines from which we can infer many excellent things, which are highly useful and necessary to know, as will be established partly in what follows.

 

 

[II/137] Third Part Of the Ethics On the Origin and Nature of the Affects1

PREFACE

Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men’s way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, [10] but of things which are outside nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his [15] actions, and that he is determined only by himself. And they attribute the cause of human impotence, not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as usually happens) curse. And he who knows how to censure more [20] eloquently and cunningly the weakness of the human Mind is held to be Godly.

It is true that there have been some very distinguished men (to whose work and diligence we confess that we owe much), who have written many admirable things about the right way of living, and given men advice full of prudence. But no one, to my knowledge, has determined the nature and powers of the [25] Affects,2 nor what, on the other hand, the Mind can do to moderate them. I know, of course, that the celebrated Descartes, although he too believed that the [II/138] Mind has absolute power over its own actions, nevertheless sought to explain human Affects through their first causes, and at the same time to show the way by which the Mind can have absolute dominion over its Affects.3 But in my opinion, he showed nothing but the cleverness of his understanding, as I shall [5] show in the proper place.

For now I wish to return to those who prefer to curse or laugh at the Affects and actions of men, rather than understand them. To them it will doubtless seem strange that I should undertake to treat men’s vices and absurdities in the Geometric style, and that I should wish to demonstrate by certain [10] reasoning things which are contrary to reason, and which they proclaim to be empty, absurd, and horrible.

But my reason is this:4 nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to any defect in it, for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same, i.e., the laws and rules of nature, [15] according to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, viz. through the universal laws and rules of nature.

The Affects, therefore, of hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, [20] follow from the same necessity and force of nature as the other singular things. And therefore they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, by the mere contemplation of which we are pleased. Therefore, I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the power of the [25] Mind over them, by the same Method by which, in the preceding parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies.

[II/139] DEFINITIONS

D1: I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its [5] effect cannot be understood through it alone.

D2: I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by D1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and [10] distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.

D3: By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body’s [15] power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.

Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by the Affect an action; otherwise, a passion.

[20] POSTULATES

Post. 1: The human Body can be affected in many ways in which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in others which render its power of acting neither greater nor less.

[25] This Postulate, or Axiom, rests on Post. 1, L5, and L7 (after IIP13).

Post. 2: The human Body can undergo many changes, and nevertheless [II/140] retain impressions, or traces, of the objects (on this see IIPost. 5), and consequently, the same images of things. (For the definition of images, see IIP17S.)

P1: Our Mind does certain things [acts] and undergoes other things, viz. [5] insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things.

Dem.: In each human Mind some ideas are adequate, but others are [10] mutilated and confused (by IIP40S).5 But ideas that are adequate in someone’s Mind are adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of that Mind [only]6 (by IIP11C). And those that are inadequate in the Mind are also adequate in God (by the same Cor.), not [15] insofar as he contains only the essence of that Mind, but insofar as he also contains in himself, at the same time, the Minds7 of other things. Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (IP36), of which effect God is the adequate cause (see D1), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by that given [20] idea (see IIP9). But if God, insofar as he is affected by an idea that is adequate in someone’s Mind, is the cause of an effect, that same Mind is the effect’s adequate cause (by IIP11C). Therefore, our Mind (by D2), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily does certain things [acts]. This was the first thing to be proven.

[25] Next, if something necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the Mind of one man only, but insofar as he has in himself the Minds of other things together with the Mind of that man, that man’s Mind (by the same IIP11C) is not its adequate cause, but its partial cause. Hence (by D2), insofar as [30] the Mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes certain things. This was the second point. Therefore, our Mind, etc., q.e.d.

[II/141] Cor.: From this it follows that the Mind is more liable to passions the more it has inadequate ideas, and conversely, is more active the more it has adequate ideas.

[5] P2: The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).

[10] Dem.: All modes of thinking have God for a cause, insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by another attribute (by IIP6). So what determines the Mind to thinking is a mode of thinking and not of Extension, i.e. (by IID1), it is not the Body. This was the first point.

[15] Next, the motion and rest of the Body must arise from another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another; and absolutely, whatever arises in the body must have arisen from God insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of Extension, and not insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of thinking (also by IIP6), i.e., it cannot arise from the Mind, [20] which (by IIP11) is a mode of thinking. This was the second point. Therefore, the Body cannot determine the Mind, etc., q.e.d.

Schol.: These things are more clearly understood from what is said in IIP7S, viz. that the Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, [25] which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and passions of our Body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the Mind. This is also [30] evident from the way in which we have demonstrated IIP12.

But although these things are such that no reason for doubt remains, [II/142] still, I hardly believe that men can be induced to consider them fairly unless I confirm them by experience. They are so firmly persuaded that the Body now moves, now is at rest, solely from the Mind’s command, and that it does a great many things which depend only on the Mind’s will and its art of thinking.

[5] For indeed, no one has yet determined what the Body can do, i.e., experience has not yet taught anyone what the Body can do from the laws of nature alone, insofar as nature is only considered to be corporeal, and what the body can do only if it is determined by the Mind. For no one has yet come to know the structure of the Body so accurately that he could explain all its functions8—not to mention that [10] many things are observed in the lower Animals that far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep that they would not dare to awake. This shows well enough that the Body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things which its Mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how, or by what means, the Mind moves the [15] body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give the body, nor with what speed it can move it. So it follows that when men say that this or that action of the Body arises from the Mind, which has dominion over the Body, they do not know what they are saying, and they do nothing but confess, in fine-sounding words, that they are ignorant of [20] the true cause of that action, and that they do not wonder at it.

But they will say [i] that—whether or not they know by what means the Mind moves the Body—they still know by experience that unless the human Mind were capable of thinking, the Body would be inactive.9 And then [ii], they know by experience, that it is in the Mind’s power alone both to speak and to be silent,10 and to do many other [25] things which they therefore believe depend on the Mind’s decision.

[i] As far as the first [objection] is concerned, I ask them, does not experience also teach that if, on the other hand, the Body is inactive, the Mind is at the same time incapable of thinking? For when the Body is at rest in sleep, the Mind at the same time remains senseless with it, nor does it have the power of thinking, as it does when awake. [30] And then I believe everyone has found by experience that the Mind is not always equally capable of thinking of the same object, but that as the Body is more susceptible to having the image of this or that object aroused in it, so the Mind is more capable of regarding this or that object.

They will say, of course, that it cannot happen that the causes of [35] buildings, of paintings, and of things of this kind, which are made [II/143] only by human skill, should be able to be deduced from the laws of nature alone, insofar as it is considered to be only corporeal; nor would the human Body be able to build a temple, if it were not determined and guided by the Mind.

But I have already shown that they do not know what the Body can do, or what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, [5] and that they know from experience that a great many things happen from the laws of nature alone which they never would have believed could happen without the direction of the Mind—such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, which they wonder at while they are awake.

I add here the very structure of the human Body, which, in the ingenuity of its construction, far surpasses anything made by human [10] skill—not to mention that I have shown above, that infinitely many things follow from nature, under whatever attribute it may be considered.

[ii] As for the second [objection], human affairs, of course, would be conducted far more happily if it were equally in man’s power to be silent and to speak. But experience teaches all too plainly that men [15] have nothing less in their power than their tongue, and can do nothing less than moderate their appetites.

That is why most men believe that we do freely only those things we have a weak inclination toward (because the appetite for these things can easily be reduced by the memory of another thing which we frequently recollect), but that we do not at all do freely those things we [20] seek by a strong affect, which cannot be calmed by the memory of another thing. But if they had not found by experience that we do many things we afterwards repent, and that often we see the better and follow the worse (viz. when we are torn by contrary affects), nothing would prevent them from believing that we do all things freely.

So the infant believes he freely wants the milk; the angry child that [25] he wants vengeance; and the timid, flight. So the drunk believes it is from a free decision of the Mind that he speaks the things he later, when sober, wishes he had not said. So the madman, the chatterbox, the child, and a great many people of this kind believe they speak from a free decision of the Mind, when really they cannot contain their impulse to speak.

[30] So experience itself, no less clearly than reason, teaches that men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined, that the decisions of the Mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the Body varies. For each [35] one governs everything from his affect; those who are torn by contrary [II/144] affects do not know what they want, and those who are not moved by any affect are very easily driven here and there.11

All these things, indeed, show clearly that both the decision of the Mind and the appetite and the determination of the Body by nature exist together—or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a [5] decision when it is considered under, and explained through, the attribute of Thought, and which we call a determination when it is considered under the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will be still more clearly evident from what must presently be said.

For there is something else I wish particularly to note here, that we [10] can do nothing from a decision of the Mind unless we recollect it. E.g., we cannot speak a word unless we recollect it. And it is not in the free power of the Mind to either recollect a thing or forget it.12 So this only is believed to be in the power of the Mind—that from the Mind’s decision alone we can either be silent about or speak about a thing we recollect.

[15] But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the Mind—and yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is from a spontaneous motion of the Body. And we dream that we conceal certain things from men, and this by the same decision of the Mind by which, while we wake, we are silent about the things we [20] know. We dream, finally, that, from a decision of the Mind, we do certain things we do not dare to do while we wake.

So I should very much like to know whether there are in the Mind two kinds of decisions—those belonging to our fantasies and those that are free? And if we do not want to go that far in our madness, it must be granted that this decision of the Mind which is believed to be free [25] is not distinguished by the imagination itself, or the memory, nor is it anything beyond that affirmation which the idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves (see IIP49). And so these decisions of the Mind arise by the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist. Those, therefore, who believe that they either speak or are silent, or do anything from a free decision of the Mind, dream with [30] open eyes.

P3: The actions of the Mind arise from adequate ideas alone; the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.

[II/145] Dem.: The first thing that constitutes the essence of the Mind is nothing but the idea of an actually existing Body (by IIP11 and P13); this idea (by IIP15) is composed of many others, of which some are [5] adequate (IIP38C), and others inadequate (by IIP29C). Therefore, whatever follows from the nature of the Mind and has the Mind as its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate idea or an inadequate one. But insofar as the Mind has inadequate ideas (by P1), it necessarily is acted on. [10] Therefore, the actions of the Mind follow from adequate ideas alone; hence, the Mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas, q.e.d.

Schol.: We see, then, that the passions are not related to the Mind [15] except insofar as it has something which involves a negation, or insofar as it is considered as a part of nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself, without the others. In this way I could show that the passions are related to singular things in the same way as to the Mind,13 and cannot be perceived in any other way. But my [20] purpose is only to treat of the human Mind.

P4: No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause.

Dem.: This Proposition is evident through itself. For the definition [25] of any thing affirms, and does not deny, the thing’s essence, or it posits the thing’s essence, and does not take it away. So while we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall not be able to find anything in it which can destroy it, q.e.d.

[30] P5: Things14 are of a contrary nature, i.e., cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.

[II/146] Dem.: For if they could agree with one another, or be in the same subject at once, then there could be something in the same subject which could destroy it, which (by P4) is absurd. Therefore, things [5] etc., q.e.d.

P6: Each thing, as far as it can by its own power,15 strives to persevere in its being.

[10] Dem.: For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by IP25C), i.e. (by IP34), things that express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts. And no thing has anything in itself by [15] which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by P4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by P5). Therefore, as far as it can, and it lies in itself, it strives to persevere in its being, q.e.d.

[20] P7: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.

Dem.: From the given essence of each thing some things necessarily follow (by IP36), and things are able [to produce] nothing but what [25] follows necessarily from their determinate nature (by IP29). So the power of each thing, or the striving by which it (either alone or with others) does anything, or strives to do anything—i.e. (by P6), the power, or striving, by which it strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself, q.e.d.

[II/147] P8: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

[5] Dem.: For if [the striving by which a thing strives to persevere in its being] involved a limited time, which determined the thing’s duration, then it would follow just from that very power by which the thing exists that it could not exist after that limited time, but that it would have to be destroyed. But (by P4) this is absurd. Therefore, the striving by which a thing exists involves no definite time. On the [10] contrary, since (by P4) it will always continue to exist by the same power by which it now exists, unless it is destroyed by an external cause, this striving involves indefinite time, q.e.d.

[15] P9: Both insofar as the Mind has clear and distinct ideas, and insofar as it has confused ideas, it strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in its being and it is conscious of this striving it has.

Dem.: The essence of the Mind is constituted by adequate and by [20] inadequate ideas (as we have shown in P3). So (by P7) it strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has inadequate ideas and insofar as it has adequate ideas; and it does this (by P8) for an indefinite duration. But since the Mind (by IIP23) is necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the Body’s affections, the Mind (by P7) is conscious [25] of its striving, q.e.d.

Schol.: When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite. This Appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of [30] man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation. And so man is determined to do those things.

[II/148] Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.

[5] From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.16

[10] P10: An idea that excludes the existence of our Body cannot be in our Mind, but is contrary to it.

Dem.: Whatever can destroy our Body cannot be in it (by P5), and [15] so the idea of this thing cannot be in God insofar as he has the idea of our Body (by IIP9C), i.e. (by IIP11 and P13), the idea of this thing cannot be in our Mind. On the contrary, since (by IIP11 and P13) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the Mind is the idea of an actually existing Body, the first and principal [tendency] of the striving17 [20] of our Mind (by P7) is to affirm the existence of our Body. And so an idea that denies the existence of our Body is contrary to our Mind, etc., q.e.d.

P11: The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our [25] Body’s power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Mind’s power of thinking.

Dem.: This proposition is evident from IIP7, or also from IIP14.

[30] Schol.: We see, then, that the Mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, [II/149] indeed, explain to us the affects of Joy and Sadness. By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the Mind passes to a greater perfection. And by Sadness, that passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection. The affect of Joy which is related to the Mind and Body at [5] once I call Pleasure or Cheerfulness, and that of Sadness, Pain or Melancholy.

But it should be noted [NS: here] that Pleasure and Pain are ascribed to a man when one part of him is affected more than the rest, whereas Cheerfulness and Melancholy are ascribed to him when all are equally affected.

[10] Next, I have explained in P9S what Desire is, and apart from these three I do not acknowledge any other primary affect.18 For I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three. But before I proceed further, I should like to explain P10 more fully here, so that it may be more clearly understood how one idea is contrary to another.

[15] In IIP17S we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the Mind involves the existence of the Body so long as the Body itself exists. Next from what we have shown in IIP8C and its scholium, it follows that the present existence of our Mind depends [20] only on this, that the Mind involves the actual existence of the Body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the Mind by which it imagines things and recollects them also depends on this (see IIP17, P18, P18S), that it involves the actual existence of the Body.

From these things it follows that the present existence of the Mind [25] and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as the Mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the Body. But the cause of the Mind’s ceasing to affirm this existence of the Body cannot be the Mind itself (by P4), nor also that the Body ceases to exist. For (by IIP6) the cause of the Mind’s affirming the Body’s existence is not that the Body has [30] begun to exist. So by the same reasoning, it does not cease to affirm the Body’s existence because the Body ceases to exist, but (by IIP8)19 this [sc. ceasing to affirm the Body’s existence] arises from another idea which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our Mind, and which is thus contrary to the idea that [35] constitutes our Mind’s essence.

[II/150] P12: The Mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the Body’s power of acting.

[5] Dem.: So long as the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of an external body, the human Mind will regard the same body as present (by IIP17) and consequently (by IIP7) so long as the human Mind regards some external body as present, i.e. [10] (by IIP17S), imagines it, the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of that external body. Hence, so long as the Mind imagines those things that increase or aid our body’s power of acting, the Body is affected with modes that increase or aid its power of acting [15] (see Post. 1), and consequently (by P11) the Mind’s power of thinking is increased or aided. Therefore (by P6 or P9), the Mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things, q.e.d.

[20] P13: When the Mind imagines those things that diminish or restrain the Body’s power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things that exclude their existence.

Dem.: So long as the Mind imagines anything of this kind, the [25] power both of Mind and of Body is diminished or restrained (as we have demonstrated in P12); nevertheless, the Mind will continue to imagine this thing until it imagines something else that excludes the thing’s present existence (by IIP17), i.e. (as we have just shown), the power both of Mind and of Body is diminished or restrained until the [30] Mind imagines something else that excludes the existence of this thing; so the Mind (by P9), as far as it can, will strive to imagine or recollect that other thing, q.e.d.

[II/151] Cor.: From this it follows that the Mind avoids imagining those things that diminish or restrain its or the Body’s power.

[5] Schol.: From this we understand clearly what Love and Hate are. Love is nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause, and Hate is nothing but Sadness with the accompanying idea of an external cause. We see, then, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand, one [10] who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But all of these things will be discussed more fully in what follows.

P14: If the Mind has once been affected by two affects at once, then afterwards, when it is affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.

[15] Dem.: If the human Body has once been affected by two bodies at once, then afterwards, when the Mind imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also (by IIP18). But the imaginations of the Mind indicate the affects of our Body more than the nature of [20] external bodies (by IIP16C2). Therefore, if the Body, and consequently the Mind (see D3) has once been affected by two affects [NS: at once], then afterwards, when it is affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other, q.e.d.

[25] P15: Any thing can be the accidental cause of Joy, Sadness, or Desire.

Dem.: Suppose the Mind is affected by two affects at once, one of which neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, while the [30] other either increases it or diminishes it (see Post. 1). From P14 it is clear that when the Mind is afterwards affected with the former affect [II/152] as by its true cause,20 which (by hypothesis) through itself neither increases nor diminishes its power of thinking, it will immediately be affected with the latter also, which increases or diminishes its power of thinking, i.e. (by P11S), with Joy, or Sadness. And so the former [5] thing will be the cause of Joy or Sadness—not through itself, but accidentally. And in the same way it can easily be shown that that thing can be the accidental cause of Desire, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this alone—that we have regarded a thing with an affect [10] of Joy or Sadness, of which it is not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it.

Dem.: For from this alone it comes about (by P14) that when the Mind afterwards imagines this thing, it is affected with an affect of [15] Joy or Sadness, i.e. (by P11S), that the power both of the Mind and of the Body is increased or diminished. And consequently (by P12), the Mind desires to imagine the thing or (by P13C) avoids it, i.e. (by P13S), it loves it or hates it, q.e.d.

[20] Schol.: From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate some things without any cause known to us, but only (as they say) from Sympathy or Antipathy. And to this must be related also those objects that affect us with Joy or Sadness only because they have [25] some likeness to objects that usually affect us with these affects, as I shall show in P16. I know, of course, that the Authors who first introduced the words Sympathy and Antipathy intended to signify by them certain qualities of things. Nevertheless, I believe we may be permitted to understand by them also qualities that are known or manifest. [30]

P16: From the mere fact that we imagine a thing to have some likeness to an object that usually affects the Mind with Joy or Sadness, we love it or hate it, [II/153] even though that in which the thing is like the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.

[5] Dem.: What is like the object, we have (by hypothesis) regarded in the object itself with an affect of Joy or Sadness. And so (by P14), when the Mind is affected by its image, it will immediately be affected also with this or that affect. Consequently the thing we perceive to have this same [quality] will (by P15) be the accidental cause of Joy or [10] Sadness; and so (by P15C) although that in which it is like the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we shall still love it or hate it, q.e.d.

P17: If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of [15] Sadness is like another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of Joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.

Dem.: For (by hypothesis) this thing is through itself the cause of [20] Sadness, and (by P13S) insofar as we imagine it with this affect, we hate it. And moreover, insofar as it has some likeness to the other thing, which usually affects us with an equally great affect of Joy, we shall love it with an equally great striving of Joy (by P16). And so we shall both hate it and at the same time love it, q.e.d.

[25] Schol.: This constitution of the Mind which arises from two contrary affects is called vacillation of mind, which is therefore related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination (see IIP44S); nor do vacillation of mind and doubt differ from one another except in degree.

[30] But it should be noted that in the preceding Proposition I have deduced these vacillations of mind from causes which are the cause through themselves of one affect and the accidental cause of the other. I have done this because in this way they could more easily be deduced from what has gone before, not because I deny that vacillations [II/154] of mind for the most part arise from an object which is the efficient cause of each affect. For the human Body (by IIPost. 1) is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, and so (by IIA1″ [at II/99]), it can be affected in a great many different ways by one and [5] the same body. And on the other hand, because one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many different ways. From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many and contrary affects.

[10] P18: Man is affected with the same affect of Joy or Sadness from the image of a past or future thing as from the image of a present thing.

Dem.: So long as a man is affected by the image of a thing, he will [15] regard the thing as present, even if it does not exist (by IIP17 and P17C); he imagines it as past or future only insofar as its image is joined to the image of a past or future time (see IIP44S). So the image of a thing, considered only in itself, is the same, whether it is related [20] to time past or future, or to the present, i.e. (by IIP16C2), the constitution of the Body, or affect, is the same, whether the image is of a thing past or future, or of a present thing. And so, the affect of Joy or Sadness is the same, whether the image is of a thing past or future, or of a present thing, q.e.d.

[25] Schol. I:21 I call a thing past or future here, insofar as we have been affected by it, or will be affected by it. E.g., insofar as we have seen it or will see it, insofar as it has refreshed us or will refresh us, has injured us or will injure us. For insofar as we imagine it in this way, we affirm its existence, i.e., the Body is not affected by any affect [30] that excludes the thing’s existence. And so (by IIP17) the Body is affected with the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. However, because it generally happens that those who have experienced many things vacillate so long as they regard a [II/155] thing as future or past, and most often doubt the thing’s outcome (see IIP44S), the affects that arise from similar images22 of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, [5] until men become more certain of the thing’s outcome.

Schol. 2: From what has just been said, we understand what Hope and Fear, Confidence and Despair, Gladness and Remorse are. For Hope is nothing but an inconstant Joy which has arisen from the image of a [10] future or past thing whose outcome we doubt; Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant Sadness, which has also arisen from the image of a doubtful thing. Next, if the doubt involved in these affects is removed, Hope becomes Confidence, and Fear, Despair—viz. a Joy or Sadness which has arisen from the image of a thing we feared or hoped for. Finally, Gladness is [15] a Joy which has arisen from the image of a past thing whose outcome we doubted, while Remorse is a sadness which is opposite to Gladness.

P19: He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but he who imagines it to be preserved, will rejoice.

[20] Dem.: Insofar as it can, the Mind strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the Body’s power of acting (by P12), i.e. (by P13S), those it loves. But the imagination is aided by what posits the existence of a thing, and on the other hand, is restrained by what excludes [25] the existence of a thing (by IIP17). Therefore, the images of things that posit the existence of a thing loved aid the Mind’s striving to imagine the thing loved, i.e. (by P11S), affect the Mind with Joy. On the other hand, those which exclude the existence of a thing loved, restrain the same striving of the Mind, i.e. (by P11S), affect the Mind [30] with Sadness. Therefore, he who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened, etc., q.e.d.

[II/156] P20: He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.

Dem.: The Mind (by P13) strives to imagine those things that exclude [5] the existence of things by which the Body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained, i.e. (by P13S), strives to imagine those things that exclude the existence of things it hates. So the image of a thing that excludes the existence of what the Mind hates aids this striving [10] of the Mind, i.e. (by P11S), affects the Mind with Joy. Therefore, he who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice, q.e.d.

P21: He who imagines what he loves to be affected with Joy or Sadness will [15] also be affected with Joy or Sadness; and each of those affects will be greater or lesser in the lover as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.

Dem.: The images of things (as we have demonstrated in P19) which posit the existence of a thing loved aid the striving by which the Mind [20] strives to imagine the thing loved. But Joy posits the existence of the joyous thing, and posits more existence, the greater the affect of Joy is. For (by P11S) it is a transition to a greater perfection. Therefore, the image in the lover of the loved thing’s Joy aids his Mind’s striving, i.e. (by P11S), affects the lover with Joy, and the more so, the greater [25] this affect was in the thing loved. This was the first thing to be proved.

Next, insofar as a thing is affected with Sadness, it is destroyed, and the more so, the greater the Sadness with which it is affected (by P11S). So (by P19) he who imagines what he loves to be affected with Sadness, will also be affected with Sadness, and the more so, the [30] greater this affect was in the thing loved, q.e.d.

[II/157] P22: If we imagine someone to affect with Joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with Love toward him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect [5] the same thing with Sadness, we shall also be affected with Hate toward him.

Dem.: He who affects a thing we love with Joy or Sadness affects us also with Joy or Sadness, if we imagine that the thing loved is [10] affected by that Joy or Sadness (by P21). But this Joy or Sadness is supposed to be accompanied in us by the idea of an external cause. Therefore (by P13S), if we imagine that someone affects with Joy or Sadness a thing we love, we shall be affected with Love or Hate toward him, q.e.d.

[15] Schol.: P21 explains to us what Pity is, which we can define as Sadness that has arisen from injury to another. By what name we should call the Joy that arises from another’s good I do not know. Next, Love toward him who has done good to another we shall call Favor, and Hatred toward him who has done evil to another we shall call Indignation.

[20] Finally, it should be noted that we do not pity only a thing we have loved (as we have shown in P21), but also one toward which we have previously had no affect, provided that we judge it to be like us (as I shall show below). And so also we favor him who has benefited someone [25] like us, and are indignant at him who has injured one like us.

P23: He who imagines what he hates to be affected with Sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he should imagine it to be affected with Joy, he will be saddened. And both these affects will be the greater or lesser, as its contrary is [30] greater or lesser in what he hates.

[II/158] Dem.: Insofar as a hateful thing is affected with Sadness, it is destroyed, and the more so, the greater the Sadness by which it is affected (by P11S). Therefore (by P20), he who imagines a thing he hates to be affected with Sadness will on the contrary be affected with [5] Joy, and the more so, the greater the Sadness with which he imagines the hateful thing to have been affected. This was the first point.

Next, Joy posits the existence of the joyous thing (by P11S), and the more so, the greater the Joy is conceived to be. [Therefore] if someone imagines him whom he hates to be affected with Joy, this [10] imagination (by P13) will restrain his striving, i.e. (by P11S), he who hates will be affected with Sadness, etc., q.e.d.

Schol.: This Joy can hardly be enduring and without any conflict [15] of mind. For (as I shall show immediately in P27) insofar as one imagines a thing like oneself to be affected with an affect of Sadness, one must be saddened. And the opposite, if one imagines the same thing to be affected with Joy. But here we attend only to Hate.

[20] P24: If we imagine someone to affect with Joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with Hate toward him also. On the other hand, if we imagine him to affect the same thing with Sadness, we shall be affected with Love toward him.

[25] Dem.: This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as P22.

Schol.: These and similar affects of Hate are related to Envy which, therefore, is nothing but Hate, insofar as it is considered so to dispose a man [30] that he is glad at another’s ill fortune and saddened by his good fortune.

[II/159] P25: We strive to affirm, concerning ourselves and what we love, whatever we imagine to affect with Joy ourselves or what we love. On the other hand, we strive to deny whatever we imagine affects with Sadness ourselves or what [5] we love.

Dem.: Whatever we imagine to affect what we love with Joy or Sadness, affects us with Joy or Sadness (by P21). But the Mind (by P12) strives as far as it can to imagine those things which affect us [10] with Joy, i.e. (by IIP17) and P17C), to regard them as present; and on the other hand (by P13) it strives to exclude the existence of those things which affect us with Sadness. Therefore, we strive to affirm, concerning ourselves and what we love, whatever we imagine to affect with Joy ourselves or what we love, and conversely, q.e.d.

[15] P26: We strive to affirm, concerning what we hate, whatever we imagine to affect it with Sadness, and on the other hand to deny whatever we imagine to affect it with Joy.

Dem.: This proposition follows from P23, as P25 follows from P21.

[20] Schol.: From these propositions we see that it easily happens that a man thinks more highly of himself and what he loves than is just, and on the other hand, thinks less highly than is just of what he hates. [25] When this imagination concerns the man himself who thinks more highly of himself than is just, it is called Pride, and is a species of Madness, because the man dreams, with open eyes, that he can do all those things which he achieves only in his imagination, and which he therefore regards as real and triumphs in, so long as he cannot imagine those things which exclude the existence [of these achievements] and [30] determine his power of acting.

Pride, therefore, is Joy born of the fact that a man thinks more highly of [II/160] himself than is just. And the Joy born of the fact that a man thinks more highly of another than is just is called Overestimation, while that which stems from thinking less highly of another than is just is called Scorn.23

[5] P27: If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.

Dem.: The images of things are affections of the human Body whose [10] ideas represent external bodies as present to us (by IIP17S), i.e. (by IIP16), whose ideas involve the nature of our Body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. So if the nature of the external body is like the nature of our Body, then the idea of the [15] external body we imagine will involve an affection of our Body like the affection of the external body. Consequently, if we imagine someone like us to be affected with some affect, this imagination will express an affection of our Body like this affect.24 And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to be affected with an affect, we are [20] affected with a like affect. But if we hate a thing like us, then (by P23) we shall be affected with an affect contrary to its affect, not like it,25 q.e.d.

Schol.: This imitation of the affects, when it is related to Sadness [25] is called Pity (on which, see P22S); but related to Desire it is called Emulation, which, therefore, is nothing but the Desire for a thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same Desire.

[30] Cor. 1: If we imagine that someone toward whom we have had no affect affects a thing like us with Joy, we shall be affected with Love toward him. On the other hand, if we imagine him to affect it with Sadness, we shall be affected with Hate toward him.

[II/161] Dem.: This is demonstrated from P27 in the same way P22 is demonstrated from P21.

[5] Cor. 2: We cannot hate a thing we pity from the fact that its suffering affects us with Sadness.

Dem.: For if we could hate it because of that, then (by P23) we [10] would rejoice in its Sadness, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Cor. 3: As far as we can, we strive to free a thing we pity from its suffering.

[15] Dem.: Whatever affects with Sadness what we pity, affects us also with a like Sadness (by P27). And so (by P13) we shall strive to think of whatever can take away the thing’s existence, or destroy the thing, i.e. (by P9S), we shall want to destroy it, or shall be determined to [20] destroy it. And so we strive to free the thing we pity from its suffering, q.e.d.

Schol.: This will, or appetite to do good, born of our pity for the [25] thing on which we wish to confer a benefit, is called Benevolence, which is therefore nothing but a Desire born of pity. As for Love and Hate toward him who has done well or ill to a thing we imagine to be like us, see P22S.

[30] P28: We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it, or will lead to Sadness.

[II/162] Dem.: We strive to imagine, as far as we can, what we imagine will lead to Joy (by P12), i.e. (by IIP17), we strive, as far as we can, to [5] regard it as present, or as actually existing. But the Mind’s striving, or power of thinking, is equal to and at one in nature with the Body’s striving, or power of acting (as clearly follows from IIP7C and P11C). Therefore, we strive absolutely, or (what, by P9S, is the same) want and intend that it should exist. This was the first point.

[10] Next, if we imagine that what we believe to be the cause of Sadness, i.e. (by P13S), what we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (by P20), and so (by the first part of this [NS: proposition]) we shall strive to destroy it, or (by P13) to avert it from ourselves, so that we shall not regard it as present. This was the second point. Therefore, [we strive [15] to further the occurrence of] whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, etc., q.e.d.

P29: We shall strive to do also whatever we imagine mena to look on with Joy, and on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men are averse to.

[20] Dem.: From the fact that we imagine men to love or hate something, we shall love or hate it (by P27), i.e. (by P13S), we shall thereby rejoice in or be saddened by the thing’s presence. And so (by P28) we shall strive to do whatever we imagine men to love, or to look on with Joy, etc., q.e.d.

Schol.:26 This striving to do something (and also to omit doing something) solely to please men is called Ambition, especially when we strive so eagerly [30] to please the people that we do or omit certain things to our own injury, or another’s. In other cases, it is usually called human [II/163] kindness. Next, the Joy with which we imagine the action of another by which he has striven to please us I call Praise. On the other hand, the Sadness with which we are averse to his action I call Blame.

[5] P30: If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with Joy, he will be affected with Joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with Joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he imagines affects others with Sadness, he will regard himself with Sadness.