P30: No thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, it is contrary to us.

[15] Dem.: We call evil what is the cause of Sadness (by P8), i.e. (by the Definition of Sadness, see IIIP11S), what diminishes or restrains our power of acting. So if a thing were evil for us through what it has [20] in common with us, then the thing could diminish or restrain what it has in common with us. But (by IIIP4) this is absurd. Therefore, no thing can be evil for us through what it has in common with us. On the contrary, insofar as it is evil, i.e. (as we have already shown), [25] insofar as it can diminish or restrain our power of acting, it is contrary to us (by IIIP5), q.e.d.

P31: Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good.

[30] Dem.: Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot be evil (by P30). So it must either be good or indifferent. If the latter is [II/230] posited, viz. that it is neither good nor evil, then (by A3)18 nothing will follow from its nature that aids the preservation of our nature, i.e. (by hypothesis), that aids the preservation of the nature of the [5] thing itself. But this is absurd (by IIIP6). Hence, insofar as it agrees with our nature, it must be good, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or better, it is for us, and conversely, the [10] more a thing is useful to us, the more it agrees with our nature.

For insofar as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be different from it or contrary to it. If it is different from it, then (by P29) it can be neither good nor evil. And if it is contrary, then it will [15] also be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, i.e. (by P31), contrary to the good, or evil. Nothing, therefore, can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature. So the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is, and conversely, q.e.d.

[20] P32: Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree in nature.

Dem.: Things that are said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power (by IIIP7), but not in lack of power, or negation, and [25] consequently (see IIIP3S) not in passion either. So insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree in nature, q.e.d.

Schol.: This matter is also evident through itself. If someone says [30] that black and white agree only in this, that neither is red, he affirms absolutely that black and white agree in nothing. Similarly, if someone says that a stone and a man agree only in this, that each is finite, lacks [II/231] power, does not exist from the necessity of its nature, or, finally, is indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, he affirms completely that a stone and a man do not agree in anything. For things that agree only in a negation, or in what they do not have, really agree [5] in nothing.

P33: Men can disagree in nature insofar as they are torn by affects which are passions; and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconstant.

[10] Dem.: The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature, alone (by IIID1 and D2), but must be defined by the power, i.e. (by IIIP7), by the nature of external causes compared with our own. That is why there are as many species of [15] each affect as there are species of objects by which we are affected (see IIIP56); that is why men are affected differently by one and the same object (see IIIP51), and to that extent, disagree in nature. And finally, that is also why one and the same man (again, by IIIP51) is affected differently toward the same object, and to that extent is [20] changeable, etc., q.e.d.

P34: Insofar as men are torn by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.

[25] Dem.: A man—Peter, say—can be a cause of Paul’s being saddened, because he has something like a thing Paul hates (by IIIP16), or because Peter alone possesses something which Paul also loves (see IIIP32 and P32S), or on account of other causes (for the main causes, see [30] IIIP55S). And so it will happen, as a result (by Def. Aff. VII), that Paul hates Peter. Hence, it will easily happen (by IIIP40 and P40S) [II/232] that Peter hates Paul in return, and so (by IIIP39) that they strive to harm one another; i.e. (by P30), that they are contrary to one another. But an affect of Sadness is always a passion (by IIIP59). Therefore, [5] men, insofar as they are torn by affects which are passions, can be contrary to one another, q.e.d.

Schol.: I have said that Paul hates Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses what Paul himself also loves. At first glance it seems [10] to follow from this that these two are injurious to one another because they love the same thing, and hence, because they agree in nature. If this were true, then P30 and P31 would be false.

But if we are willing to examine the matter fairly, we shall see that all these propositions are completely consistent. For these two are not [15] troublesome to one another insofar as they agree in nature, i.e., insofar as each loves the same thing, but insofar as they disagree with one another. For insofar as each loves the same thing, each one’s love is thereby encouraged (by IIIP31). I.e. (by Def. Aff. VI), each one’s Joy is thereby encouraged. So it is far from true that they are troublesome to one another insofar as they love the same thing and agree in nature.

[20] Instead, as I have said, the cause of [their enmity] is nothing but the fact that (as we suppose) they disagree in nature. For we suppose that Peter has the idea of a thing he loves which is already possessed, whereas Paul has the idea of a thing he loves which is lost. That is why the one is affected with Joy and the other with Sadness, and to that extent they are contrary to one another.

[25] In this way we can easily show that the other causes of hate depend only on the fact that men disagree in nature, not on that in which they agree.

[30] P35: Only insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, must they always agree in nature.

Dem.: Insofar as men are torn by affects which are passions, they can be different in nature (by P33), and contrary to one another (by [II/233] P34). But insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they are said only to act (by IIIP3). Hence, whatever follows from human nature, insofar as it is defined by reason, must be understood through [5] human nature alone (by IIID2), as through its proximate cause. But because each one, from the laws of his own nature, wants what he judges to be good, and strives to avert what he judges to be evil (by P19), and moreover, because what we judge to be good or evil when we follow the dictate of reason must be good or evil (by IIP41), it [10] follows that insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they must do only those things that are good for human nature, and hence, for each man, i.e. (by P31C), those things that agree with the nature of each man. Hence, insofar as men live according to the guidance [15] of reason, they must always agree among themselves, q.e.d.

Cor. 1: There is no singular thing in Nature that is more useful to man than a man who lives according to the guidance of reason.

For what is most useful to man is what most agrees with his nature [20] (by P31C), i.e. (as is known through itself), man. But a man acts entirely from the laws of his own nature when he lives according to the guidance of reason (by IIID2), and only to that extent must he always agree with the nature of the other man (by P35). Therefore, among singular things there is nothing more useful to man than a man, etc., q.e.d.

[25] Cor. 2.: When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another.

For the more each one seeks his own advantage, and strives to preserve himself, the more he is endowed with virtue (by P20), or what [30] is the same (by D8), the greater is his power of acting according to the laws of his own nature, i.e. (by IIIP3), of living from the guidance of reason. But men most agree in nature, when they live according to the guidance of reason (by P35). Therefore (by P35C1), men will be most useful to one another, when each one most seeks his own advantage, [35] q.e.d.

[II/234] Schol.: What we have just shown is also confirmed by daily experience, which provides so much and such clear evidence that this saying is in almost everyone’s mouth: man is a God to man.

Still, it rarely happens that men live according to the guidance of [5] reason. Instead, their lives are so constituted that they are usually envious and burdensome to one another. They can hardly, however, live a solitary life; hence, that definition which makes man a social animal19 has been quite pleasing to most. And surely we do derive, from the society of our fellow men, many more advantages than disadvantages. [10]

So let the Satirists laugh as much as they like at human affairs, let the Theologians curse them, let Melancholies praise as much as they can a life that is uncultivated and wild, let them disdain men and admire the lower animals. Men still find from experience that by helping one another they can provide themselves much more easily with [15] the things they require, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers that threaten on all sides—not to mention that it is much preferable and more worthy of our knowledge to consider the deeds of men, rather than those of the lower animals. But I shall treat this topic more fully elsewhere.

[20] P36: The greatest good of those who seek virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally.

Dem.: To act from virtue is to act according to the guidance of reason (by P24), and whatever we strive for from reason is understanding [25] (by P26). Hence (by P28), the greatest good of those who seek virtue is to know God, i.e. (by IIP47 and P47S), a good that is common to all men, and can be possessed equally by all men insofar as they are of the same nature, q.e.d.

[30] Schol.: But suppose someone should ask: what if the greatest good of those who seek virtue were not common to all? Would it not follow [II/235] from that, as above (see P34), that men who live according to the guidance of reason, i.e. (by P35), men, insofar as they agree in nature, would be contrary to one another?

[5] To this the answer is that it is not by accident that man’s greatest good is common to all; rather, it arises from the very nature of reason, because it is deduced from the very essence of man, insofar as [that essence] is defined by reason, and because man could neither be nor be conceived if he did not have the power to enjoy this greatest good. For it pertains to the essence of the human Mind (by IIP47) to have [10] an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence.

P37: The good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men; and this Desire is greater as his knowledge of God is greater.

[15] Dem.: Insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they are most useful to man (by P35C1); hence (by P19), according to the guidance of reason, we necessarily strive to bring it about that men live according to the guidance of reason. Now, the good which everyone [20] who lives according to the dictate of reason (i.e., by P24, who seeks virtue) wants for himself is understanding (by P26). Therefore, the good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men.

Next, Desire, insofar as it is related to the Mind, is the very essence of the Mind (by Def. Aff. I). Now the essence of the Mind consists [25] in knowledge (by IIP11), which involves knowledge of God (by IIP47). Without this [knowledge the Mind] can neither be nor be conceived (by IP15). Hence, as the Mind’s essence involves a greater knowledge of God, so will the Desire also be greater by which one who seeks [30] virtue desires for another the good he wants for himself, q.e.d.

Alternative dem.: The good which man wants for himself and loves, [II/236] he will love more constantly if he sees that others love it (by IIIP31). So (by IIIP31C), he will strive to have the others love the same thing. And because this good is common to all (by P36), and all can enjoy it, he will therefore (by the same reason) strive that all may enjoy it. [5] And this striving will be the greater, the more he enjoys this good (by IIIP37), q.e.d.

Schol. 1: He who strives, only because of an affect, that others should love what he loves, and live according to his temperament, acts [10] only from impulse and is hateful—especially to those to whom other things are pleasing, and who also, therefore, strive eagerly, from the same impulse, to have other men live according to their own temperament. And since the greatest good men seek from an affect is often such that only one can possess it fully, those who love are not of one [15] mind in their love—while they rejoice to sing the praises of the thing they love, they fear to be believed. But he who strives from reason to guide others acts not by impulse, but kindly, generously, and with the greatest steadfastness of mind.

Again, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I relate to [20] Religion. The Desire to do good generated in us by our living according to the guidance of reason, I call Morality. The Desire by which a man who lives according to the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship, I call Being Honorable, and I call that honorable which men who live according to the guidance of reason praise; on the other hand, what is contrary to the formation of friendship, [25] I call dishonorable.

In addition to this, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are.20

Furthermore, from what has been said above, one can easily perceive the difference between true virtue and lack of power; true virtue is nothing but living according to the guidance of reason, and so lack of power consists only in this, that a man allows himself to be guided [30] by things outside him, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself, demands.

These are the things I promised, in P18S, to demonstrate. From them it is clear that the law against killing animals is based more on [35] empty superstition and unmanly compassion than sound reason. The [II/237] rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us the necessity of joining with men, but not with the lower animals, or with things whose nature is different from human nature. We have the same right against them that they have against us. Indeed, because [5] the right of each one is defined by his virtue, or power, men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against men. Not that I deny that the lower animals have sensations. But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own advantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us. [10] For they do not agree in nature with us, and their affects are different in nature from human affects (see IIIP57S).

It remains now for me to explain what is just and what unjust, what sin is, and finally, what merit is. These matters will be taken up in the following scholium.

[15] Schol. 2: In the Appendix of Part I, I promised to explain what praise and blame, merit and sin, and justice and injustice are. As far as praise and blame are concerned, I have explained them in IIIP29S. This will be the place to speak of the others. But first a few words must be said about man’s natural state and his civil state.

[20] Everyone exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently everyone, by the highest right of nature, does those things that follow from the necessity of his own nature. So everyone, by the highest right of nature, judges what is good and what is evil, considers his own advantage according to his own temperament (see P19 and P20), [25] avenges himself (see IIIP40C2), and strives to preserve what he loves and destroy what he hates (see IIIP28).

If men lived according to the guidance of reason, everyone would possess this right of his (by P35C1) without any injury to anyone else. But because they are subject to the affects (by P4C), which far surpass [30] man’s power, or virtue (by P6), they are often drawn in different directions (by P33) and are contrary to one another (by P34), while they require one another’s aid (by P35S).

In order, therefore, that men may be able to live harmoniously and be of assistance to one another, it is necessary for them to give up [II/238] their natural right and to make one another confident that they will do nothing which could harm others. How it can happen that men who are necessarily subject to affects (by P4C), inconstant and changeable [5] (by P33) should be able to make one another confident and have trust in one another, is clear from P7 and IIIP39. No affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than and contrary to the affect to be restrained, and everyone refrains from doing harm out of timidity regarding a greater harm.

[10] By this law, therefore, Society can be maintained,21 provided it appropriates to itself the right everyone has of avenging himself, and of judging concerning good and evil. In this way Society has the power to prescribe a common rule of life, to make laws, and to maintain them—not by reason, which cannot restrain the affects (by P17S), but [15] by threats. This Society, maintained by laws and the power it has of preserving itself, is called a State, and those who are defended by its law, Citizens.

From this we easily understand that there is nothing in the state of nature which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil; for everyone [20] who is in the state of nature considers only his own advantage, and decides what is good and what is evil from his own temperament, and only insofar as he takes account of his own advantage. He is not bound by any law to submit to anyone except himself. So in the state of nature no sin can be conceived.

But in the Civil state, of course, it is decided by common agreement [25] what is good or what is evil. And everyone is bound to submit to the State. Sin, therefore, is nothing but disobedience, which for that reason can be punished only by the law of the State. On the other hand, obedience is considered a merit in a Citizen, because on that account he is judged worthy of enjoying the advantages of the State.

Again, in the state of nature there is no one who by common consent [30] is Master of anything, nor is there anything in Nature which can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s. Instead, all things belong to all. So in the state of nature, there cannot be conceived any will to give to each his own, or to take away from someone what is his. I.e., in the state of nature nothing is done which can be called just or unjust.

[35] But in the civil state, of course, where it is decided by common [II/239] consent what belongs to this man, and what to that [, things are done which can be called just or unjust].

From this it is clear that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, not attributes that explain the nature of the Mind. But enough of this.

[5] P38: Whatever so disposes the human Body that it can be affected in a great many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external Bodies in a great many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the Body capable of being affected in a great many ways, or of affecting other bodies, the more useful it is; on [10] the other hand, what renders the Body less capable of these things is harmful.

Dem.: The more the Body is rendered capable of these things, the more the Mind is rendered capable of perceiving (by IIP14). And so what disposes the Body in this way, and renders it capable of these [15] things, is necessarily good, or useful (by P26 and P27), and the more useful the more capable of these things it renders the Body. On the other hand (by the converse of IIP14, and by P26 and P27), it is harmful if it renders the body less capable of these things, q.e.d.

[20] P39: Those things are good which bring about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest the human Body’s parts have to one another; on the other hand, those things are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human Body have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another.

[25] Dem.: To be preserved, the human Body requires a great many other bodies (by IIPost. 4). But what constitutes the form of the human Body consists in this, that its Parts communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed proportion (by the Definition [at II/99-100]). Therefore, things which bring it about that the Parts of the [II/240] human Body preserve the same proportion of motion and rest to one another, preserve the human Body’s form. Hence, they bring it about that the human Body can be affected in many ways, and that it can affect external bodies in many ways (by IIPost. 3 and Post. 6). So [5] they are good (by P38).

Next, things which bring it about that the human Body’s parts acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another bring it about (by the same Definition [at II/99-100]) that the human Body takes on another form, i.e. (as is known through itself, and as I pointed out at the end of the preface of this Part), that the human Body is [10] destroyed, and hence rendered completely incapable of being affected in many ways. So (by P38), they are evil, q.e.d.

Schol.: In Part VI shall explain how much these things can be [15] harmful to or beneficial to the Mind. But here it should be noted that I understand the Body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another. For I dare not deny that—even though the circulation of the blood is maintained, as well as the other [signs] on account of which the Body is thought to be alive—the human Body can nevertheless be changed [20] into another nature entirely different from its own. For no reason compels me to maintain that the Body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse.

And, indeed, experience seems to urge a different conclusion. Sometimes a man undergoes such changes that I should hardly have said he was the same man. I have heard stories, for example, of a [25] Spanish Poet22 who suffered an illness; though he recovered, he was left so oblivious to his past life that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had written were his own. He could surely have been taken for a grown-up infant23 if he had also forgotten his native language.

If this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of advanced years believes their nature to be so different from his own [30] that he could not be persuaded that he was ever an infant, if he did not make this conjecture concerning himself from [NS: the example of] others. But rather than provide the superstitious with material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave this discussion unfinished.

[II/241] P40: Things which are of assistance to the common Society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; those, on the other hand, are evil which bring discord to the State.

[5] Dem.: For things which bring it about that men live harmoniously, at the same time bring it about that they live according to the guidance of reason (by P35). And so (by P26 and P27) they are good.

And on the other hand (by the same reasoning), those are evil which arouse discord, q.e.d.

[10] P41: Joy is not directly evil, but good; Sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil.

Dem.: Joy (by IIIP11 and P11S) is an affect by which the body’s [15] power of acting is increased or aided. Sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained. And so (by P38) joy is directly good, etc., q.e.d.

[20] P42: Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good; Melancholy, on the other hand, is always evil.

Dem.: Cheerfulness (see its Def. in IIIP11S) is a Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that all parts of the Body [25] are equally affected. I.e. (by IIIP11), the Body’s power of acting is increased or aided, so that all of its parts maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another. And so (by P39), Cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive.

[II/242] But Melancholy (see its Def., also in IIIP11S) is a Sadness, which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that the Body’s power of acting is absolutely diminished or restrained. And so (by P38) it is always evil, q.e.d.

[5] P43: Pleasure can be excessive and evil, whereas Pain can be good insofar as the Pleasure, or Joy, is evil.

[10] Dem.: Pleasure is a Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that one (or several) of its parts are affected more than the others (see its Def. in IIIP11S). The power of this affect can be so great that it surpasses the other actions of the Body (by P6), remains [15] stubbornly fixed in the Body, and so prevents the Body from being capable of being affected in a great many other ways. Hence (by P38), it can be evil.

Pain, on the other hand, which is a Sadness, cannot be good, considered in itself alone (by P41). But because its force and growth are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our power [20] (by P5), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of the powers of this affect (by P3). And so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain Pleasure, so that it is not excessive, and thereby prevent the body from being rendered less capable (by the first part of this Proposition). To that extent, therefore, it will be good, q.e.d.

[25] P44: Love and Desire can be excessive.

Dem.: Love is Joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Def. Aff. VI). Pleasure, therefore (by IIIP11S), accompanied by [30] the idea of an external cause, is Love. And so, Love (by P43) can be excessive.

[II/243] Again, Desire is greater as the affect from which it arises is greater (by IIIP37). Hence, as an affect (by P6) can surpass the rest of man’s actions, so also the Desire which arises from that affect can surpass the rest of his Desires. It can therefore be excessive in the same way [5] we have shown Pleasure can be (in P43), q.e.d.

Schol.: Cheerfulness, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affects by which we are daily torn are [10] generally related to a part of the Body which is affected more than the others. Generally, then, the affects are excessive, and occupy the Mind in the consideration of only one object so much that it cannot think of others. And though men are liable to a great many affects, so that one rarely finds them to be always agitated by one and the same [15] affect, still there are those in whom one affect is stubbornly fixed. For we sometimes see that men are so affected by one object that, although it is not present, they still believe they have it with them.

When this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is [20] mad or insane. Nor are they thought to be less mad who burn with Love, and dream, both night and day, only of a lover or a courtesan. For they usually provoke laughter. But when a greedy man thinks of nothing else but profit, or money, and an ambitious man of esteem, they are not thought to be mad, because they are usually troublesome [25] and are considered worthy of Hate. But Greed, Ambition, and Lust really are species of madness, even though they are not numbered among the diseases.

P45: Hate can never be good.

[30] Dem.: We strive to destroy the man we hate (by IIIP39), i.e. (by P37), we strive for something that is evil. Therefore, etc., q.e.d.

[II/244] Schol.: Note that here and in what follows I understand by Hate only Hate toward men.

[5] Cor. 1: Envy, Mockery, Disdain, Anger, Vengeance, and the rest of the affects which are related to Hate or arise from it, are evil. This too is evident from P37 and IIIP39.

Cor. 2: Whatever we want because we have been affected with hate [10] is dishonorable; and [if we live] in a State, it is unjust. This too is evident from IIIP39, and from the Definitions of dishonorable and unjust (see P37S).

Schol.: I recognize a great difference between Mockery (which, in Cor. 1, I said was evil) and laughter. For laughter and joking are pure [15] Joy. And so, provided they are not excessive, they are good through themselves (by P41). Nothing forbids our pleasure except a savage and sad superstition. For why is it more proper to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy?

My account of the matter,24 the view I have arrived at, is this: no [20] deity, nor anyone else, unless he is envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune; nor does he ascribe to virtue our tears, sighs, fear, and other things of that kind, which are signs of a weak mind. On the contrary, the greater the Joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, i.e., the more we must participate in the divine nature. To use things, therefore, and [25] take pleasure in them as far as possible—not, of course, to the point where we are disgusted with them, for there is no pleasure in that—this is the part of a wise man.

It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, the theater, and other [30] things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. For the human Body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which constantly require new and varied nourishment, so that the whole Body may be equally capable of all the things which [II/245] can follow from its nature, and hence, so that the Mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things.

This plan of living, then, agrees best both with our principles and with common practice. So, if any other way of living [is to be commended], this one is best, and to be commended in every way. Nor is it [5] necessary for me to treat these matters more clearly or more fully.

P46: He who lives according to the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay the other’s Hate, Anger, and Disdain toward him, with Love, or Nobility.

[10] Dem.: All affects of Hate are evil (by P45C1). So he who lives according to the guidance of reason will strive, as far as he can, to bring it about that he is not troubled with affects of Hate (by P19), and consequently (by P37), will strive that the other also should not [15] undergo those affects. Now Hate is increased by being returned, and on the other hand, can be destroyed by Love (by IIIP43), so that the Hate passes into Love (by IIIP44). Therefore, one who lives according to the guidance of reason will strive to repay the other’s Hate, etc., [20] with Love, i.e., with Nobility (see its Def. in IIIP59S), q.e.d.

Schol.: He who wishes to avenge wrongs by hating in return surely lives miserably. On the other hand, one who is eager to overcome Hate by Love, strives joyously and confidently, resists many men as [25] easily as one, and requires the least help from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield joyously, not from a lack of strength, but from an increase in their powers. All these things follow so clearly simply from the definitions of Love and of intellect, that there is no need to demonstrate them separately.

[30] P47: Affects of Hope and Fear cannot be good of themselves.

[II/246] Dem.: There are no affects of Hope or Fear without Sadness. For Fear is a Sadness (by Def. Aff. XIII), and there is no Hope without Fear (see the explanation following Def. Aff. XII and XIII). Therefore [5] (by P41) these affects cannot be good of themselves, but only insofar as they can restrain an excess of Joy (by P43), q.e.d.

Schol.: We may add to this that these affects show a defect of [10] knowledge and a lack of power in the Mind. For this reason also Confidence and Despair, Gladness and Remorse are signs of a mind lacking in power. For though Confidence and Gladness are affects of Joy, they still presuppose that a Sadness has preceded them, viz. Hope and Fear. Therefore, the more we strive to live according to the guidance [15] of reason, the more we strive to depend less on Hope, to free ourselves from Fear, to conquer fortune as much as we can, and to direct our actions by the certain counsel of reason.

P48: Affects of Overestimation and Scorn are always evil.

[20] Dem.: These affects are contrary to reason (by Def. Aff. XXI and XXII). So (by P26 and P27) they are evil, q.e.d.

[25] P49: Overestimation easily makes the man who is overestimated proud.

Dem.: If we see that someone, out of love, thinks more highly of us than is just, we shall easily exult at being esteemed (by IIIP41S), or be affected with Joy (by Def. Aff. XXX), and we shall easily believe [30] the good we hear predicated of us (by IIIP25). And so, out of love of ourselves, we shall think more highly of ourselves than is just, i.e. (by Def. Aff. XXVIII), we shall easily become proud, q.e.d.

[II/247] P50: Pity, in a man who lives according to the guidance of reason, is evil of itself, and useless.25

[5] Dem.: For pity (by Def. Aff. XVIII) is a Sadness, and therefore (by P41), of itself, evil.

Moreover, the good which follows from it, viz. that we strive to free the man we pity from his suffering (by IIIP27C3), we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone (by P37), and we can only do from [10] the dictate of reason alone something which we know certainly to be good (by P27).

Hence, Pity is both evil of itself, and, in a man who lives according to the dictate of reason, useless, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that man who lives according to the dictate [15] of reason, strives, as far as he can, not to be touched by pity.

Schol.: He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and happen according to the eternal laws and rules of nature, will surely find nothing worthy of Hate, Mockery26 [20] or Disdain, nor anyone whom he will pity. Instead he will strive, as far as human virtue allows, to act well, as they say,27 and rejoice.

To this we may add that he who is easily touched by the affect of Pity, and moved by another’s suffering or tears, often does something he later repents—both because, from an affect, we do nothing which we certainly know to be good, and because we are easily deceived by [25] false tears.

Here I am speaking expressly of a man who lives according to the guidance of reason. For one who is moved to aid others neither by reason nor by pity is rightly called inhuman. For (by IIIP27) he seems to be unlike a man.28

[II/248] P51: Favor is not contrary to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.

[5] Dem.: For Favor is a Love toward him who has benefited another (by Def. Aff. XIX), and so can be related to the Mind insofar as it is said to act (by IIIP59), i.e. (by IIIP3), insofar as it understands. Therefore, it agrees with reason, etc., q.e.d.

[10] Alternate dem.: He who lives according to the guidance of reason, desires for the other, too, the good he wants for himself (by P37). So because he sees someone benefiting another, his own striving to do good is aided, i.e. (by IIIP11S), he will rejoice. And this Joy (by hypothesis) will be accompanied by the idea of him who has benefited [15] another. He will, therefore (by Def. Aff. XIX), favor him, q.e.d.

Schol.: Indignation, as we define it (see Def. Aff. XX), is necessarily evil (by P45). But it should be noted that when the supreme power, bound by its desire to preserve peace, punishes a citizen who has [20] wronged another, I do not say that it is indignant toward the citizen. For it punishes him, not because it has been aroused by Hate to destroy him, but because it is moved by duty.

P52: Self-esteem can arise from reason, and only that self-esteem which does [25] arise from reason is the greatest there can be.

Dem.: Self-esteem is a Joy born of the fact that man considers himself and his power of acting (by Def. Aff. XXV). But man’s true [30] power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by IIIP3), which man considers [II/249] clearly and distinctly (by IIP40 and P43). Therefore, self-esteem arises from reason.

Next, while a man considers himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except those things which follow from [5] his power of acting (by IIID2), i.e. (by IIIP3), which follow from his power of understanding. And so the greatest self-esteem there can be arises only from this reflection, q.e.d.

Schol.: Self-esteem is really the highest thing we can hope for. For [10] (as we have shown in P25) no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of any end. And because this self-esteem is more and more encouraged and strengthened by praise (by IIIP53C), and on the other hand, more and more upset by blame (by IIIP55C), we are guided [15] most by love of esteem and can hardly bear a life in disgrace.

P53: Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.

Dem.: Humility is a Sadness which arises from the fact that a man [20] considers his own lack of power (by Def. Aff. XXVI). Moreover, insofar as a man knows himself by true reason, it is supposed that he understands his own essence, i.e. (by IIIP7), his own power. So if a man, in considering himself, perceives some lack of power of his, this is not because he understands himself, but because his power of acting [25] is restrained (as we have shown in IIIP55). But if we suppose that the man conceives his lack of power because he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his power of acting, then we conceive nothing but that the man understands himself distinctly or (by P26) that his power of acting is [30] aided. So Humility, or the Sadness which arises from the fact that a man reflects on his own lack of power, does not arise from a true reflection, or reason, and is a passion, not a virtue, q.e.d.

[II/250] P54: Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; instead, he who repents what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power.

[5] Dem.: The first part of this is demonstrated as P53 was. The second is evident simply from the Definition of this affect (see Def. Aff. XXVII). For first he suffers himself to be conquered by an evil Desire, and then by Sadness.

[10] Schol.: Because men rarely live from the dictate of reason, these two affects, Humility and Repentance, and in addition, Hope and Fear, bring more advantage than disadvantage. So since men must sin, they ought rather to sin in that direction.29 If weak-minded men were [15] all equally proud, ashamed of nothing, and afraid of nothing, how could they be united or restrained by any bonds?

The mob is terrifying, if unafraid. So it is no wonder that the Prophets, who considered the common advantage, not that of the few, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so greatly. Really, [20] those who are subject to these affects can be guided far more easily than others, so that in the end they may live from the guidance of reason, i.e., may be free and enjoy the life of the blessed.

P55: Either very great Pride or very great Despondency is very great ignorance of oneself.

[25] Dem.: This is evident from Defs. Aff. XXVIII and XXIX.

P56: Either very great Pride or very great Despondency indicates very great weakness of mind.

[II/251] Dem.: The first foundation of virtue is preserving one’s being (by P22C) and doing this from the guidance of reason (by P24). Therefore, he who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the [5] virtues, and consequently, of all the virtues. Next, acting from virtue is nothing but acting from the guidance of reason (by P24), and he who acts from the guidance of reason must know that he acts from the guidance of reason (by IIP43). Therefore, he who is ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just now shown) of all the [10] virtues, does not act from virtue at all, i.e. (as is evident from D8), is extremely weak-minded. And so (by P55) either very great pride or very great despondency indicate very great weakness of mind, q.e.d.

[15] Cor.: From this it follows very clearly that the proud and the despondent are highly liable to affects.

Schol.: Nevertheless, despondency can be corrected more easily than pride, since pride is an affect of Joy, whereas despondency is an affect [20] of Sadness. And so (by P18), pride is stronger than despondency.

P57: The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates the presence of the noble.

[25] Dem.: Pride is a Joy born of the fact that man thinks more highly of himself than is just (see Defs. Aff. XXVIII and VI). The proud man will strive as far as he can to encourage this opinion (see IIIP13S). And so the proud will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (I have omitted the definitions of these because they are too well known),30 and will flee the presence of the noble, who think of them as is appropriate, [30] q.e.d.

[II/252] Schol.: It would take too long to enumerate all the evils of Pride here, since the proud are subject to all the affects (though they are least subject to affects of Love and Compassion).

[5] But we ought not to pass over in silence here the fact that he also is called proud who thinks less highly of others than is just. So in this sense Pride should be defined as a Joy born of a man’s false opinion that he is above others. And the Despondency contrary to this Pride would need to be defined as a Sadness born of a man’s false opinion that he is below others.

[10] But this being posited, we easily conceive that the proud man must be envious (see IIIP55S) and hate those most who are most praised for their virtues, that his Hatred of them is not easily conquered by Love or benefits (see IIIP41S), and that he takes pleasure only in the presence of those who humor his weakness of mind and make a madman [15] of a fool.

Although Despondency is contrary to Pride, the despondent man is still very near the proud one. For since his Sadness arises from the fact that he judges his own lack of power from the power, or virtue, of others, his Sadness will be relieved, i.e., he will rejoice, if his imagination [20] is occupied in considering the vices of others. Hence the proverb: misery loves company.

On the other hand, the more he believes himself to be below others, the more he will be saddened. That is why no one is more prone to Envy than the despondent man is, and why they strive especially to [25] observe men’s deeds, more for the sake of finding fault than to improve them, and why, finally, they praise only Despondency, and exult over it—but in such a way that they still seem despondent.

These things follow from this affect as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right [30] angles. I have already said that I call these, and like affects, evil insofar as I attend only to human advantage. But the laws of nature concern the common order of nature, of which man is a part. I wished to remind my readers of this here, in passing, in case anyone thought my purpose was only to tell about men’s vices and their absurd deeds, [35] and not to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. For as I [II/253] said in the Preface of Part III, I consider men’s affects and properties just like other natural things. And of course human affects, if they do not indicate man’s power, at least indicate the power and skill of nature, no less than many other things we wonder at and take pleasure [5] in contemplating. But I continue to note, concerning the affects, those things that bring advantage to men, and those that bring them harm.

P58: Love of esteem is not contrary to reason, but can arise from it.

[10] Dem.: This is evident from Def. Aff. XXX, and from the Definition of what is Honorable (see P37S1).

Schol.: The love of esteem which is called empty is a self-esteem that is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude. When that [15] ceases, the self-esteem ceases, i.e. (by P52S), the highest good that each one loves. That is why he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, sacrifices, and schemes, in order to preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant; unless one’s reputation is guarded,31 it is quickly destroyed. Indeed, because everyone desires to secure the applause of the multitude, [20] each one willingly puts down the reputation of the other. And since the struggle is over a good thought to be the highest, this gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible. The one who at last emerges as victor exults more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself. This love of esteem, or [25] self-esteem, then, is really empty, because it is nothing.

The things which must be noted about Shame are easily inferred from what we said about Compassion and Repentance. I add only this, that like Pity, Shame, though not a virtue, is still good insofar as it indicates, in the man who blushes with Shame, a desire to live [30] honorably. In the same way pain is said to be good insofar as it indicates that the injured part is not yet decayed. So though a man who [II/254] is ashamed of some deed is really sad, he is still more perfect than one who is shameless, who has no desire to live honorably.

These are the things I undertook to note concerning the affects of Joy and Sadness. As far as desires are concerned, they, of course, are [5] good or evil insofar as they arise from good or evil affects. But all of them, really, insofar as they are generated in us from affects which are passions, are blind (as may easily be inferred from what we said in P44S), and would be of no use if men could easily be led to live according to the dictate of reason alone. I shall now show this concisely. [10]

P59: To every action to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason, without that affect.

[15] Dem.: Acting from reason is nothing but doing those things which follow from the necessity of our nature, considered in itself alone (by IIIP3 and D2). But Sadness is evil insofar as it decreases or restrains this power of acting (by P41). Therefore, from this affect we cannot be determined to any action which we could not do if we were led by [20] reason.

Furthermore, Joy is bad [only]32 insofar as it prevents man from being capable of acting (by P41 and P43), and so to that extent also, we cannot be determined to any action which we could not do if we [25] were guided by reason.

Finally, insofar as Joy is good, it agrees with reason (for it consists in this, that a man’s power of acting is increased or aided), and is not a passion except insofar as the man’s power of acting is not increased to the point where he conceives himself and his actions adequately. So if a man affected with Joy were led to such a great perfection that [30] he conceived himself and his actions adequately, he would be capable—indeed more capable—of the same actions to which he is now determined from affects which are passions.

But all affects are related to Joy, Sadness, or Desire (see the explanation [II/255] of Def. Aff. IV), and Desire (by Def. Aff. I) is nothing but the striving to act itself. Therefore, to every action to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be led by reason alone, without the affect, q.e.d.

[5] Alternate dem.: Any action is called evil insofar as it arises from the fact that we have been affected with Hate or with some evil affect (see P45C1). But no action, considered in itself, is good or evil (as we have shown in the Preface of this Part); instead, one and the same action is [10] now good, now evil. Therefore, to the same action which is now evil, or which arises from some evil affect, we can (by P19) be led by reason, q.e.d.

Schol.: These things are more clearly explained by an example. The [15] act of beating, insofar as it is considered physically, and insofar as we attend only to the fact that the man raises his arm, closes his fist, and moves his whole arm forcefully up and down, is a virtue, which is conceived from the structure of the human Body. Therefore, if a man moved by Anger or Hate is determined to close his fist or move his [20] arm, that (as we have shown in Part II) happens because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things whatever. And so we can be determined to one and the same action both from those images of things which we conceive confusedly and [from those images of things?] we conceive clearly and distinctly.

It is evident, therefore, that every Desire that arises from an affect [25] which is a passion would be of no use if men could be guided by reason. Let us see now why we call a Desire blind which arises from an affect which is a passion.

P60: A Desire arising from either a Joy or a Sadness related to one, or several, [30] but not to all parts of the Body, has no regard for the advantage of the whole man.

[II/256] Dem.: Suppose, for example, that part A of the Body is so strengthened by the force of some external cause that it prevails over the others (by P6). This part will not, on that account, strive to lose its powers [5] so that the other parts of the body may fulfill their function. For [if it did], it would have to have a force, or power, of losing its own powers, which (by IIIP6) is absurd. Therefore, that part will strive, and consequently (by IIIP7 and P12), the Mind also will strive, to preserve that state. And so the Desire that arises from such an affect of Joy does not have regard to the whole.

[10] If, on the other hand, it is supposed that part A is restrained so that the others prevail, it is demonstrated in the same way that the Desire which arises from Sadness also does not have regard to the whole, q.e.d.

Schol.: Therefore, since Joy is generally (by P44S) related to one [15] part of the body, for the most part we desire to preserve our being without regard to our health as a whole. To this we may add that the Desires by which we are most bound (by P9C) have regard only to the present and not to the future.

[20] P61: A Desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive.

Dem.: Desire, considered absolutely, is the very essence of man (by Def. Aff. I), insofar as it is conceived to be determined in any way to [25] doing something. And so a Desire that arises from reason, i.e. (by IIIP3), that is generated in us insofar as we act is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined to doing [30] those things that are conceived adequately through man’s essence alone (by IIID2). So if this desire could be excessive, then human nature, considered in itself alone, could exceed itself, or could do more than it can. This is a manifest contradiction. Therefore, this Desire cannot be excessive, q.e.d.

[II/257] P62: Insofar as the Mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.

[5] Dem.: Whatever the Mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the same species of eternity, or necessity (by IIP44C2) and is affected with the same certainty (by IIP43 and P43S). So whether the idea is of a future or a past thing, or of a present one, the Mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the [10] same certainty. And whether the idea is of a future or a past thing or of a present one, it will nevertheless be equally true (by IIP41), i.e. (by IID4), it will nevertheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea. And so, insofar as the Mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way, whether the idea is [15] of a future or a past thing, or of a present one, q.e.d.

Schol.: If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine by reason their times of existing, we would regard future things with the same affect as present ones, and the [20] Mind would want the good it conceived as future just as it wants the good it conceives as present. Hence, it would necessarily neglect a lesser present good for a greater future one, and what would be good in the present, but the cause of some future ill, it would not want at all, as we shall soon demonstrate.

But we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration [25] of things (by IIP31), and we determine their times of existing only by the imagination (by IIP44S), which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing and the image of a future one. That is why the true knowledge we have of good and evil is only abstract, or universal, and the judgment we make concerning the order of things and the [30] connection of causes, so that we may be able to determine what in the present is good or evil for us, is imaginary, rather than real. And so [II/258] it is no wonder if the Desire that arises from a knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this looks to the future, can be rather easily restrained by a Desire for the pleasures of the moment. On this, see P16.

[5] P63: He who is guided by Fear, and does good to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

Dem.: The only affects that are related to the Mind insofar as it acts, i.e. (by IIIP3), that are related to reason, are affects of Joy and [10] Desire (by IIIP59). And so (by Def. Aff. XIII) one who is guided by Fear, and does good from timidity regarding an evil, is not guided by reason, q.e.d.

Schol.: The superstitious know how to reproach people for their [15] vices better than they know how to teach them virtues, and they strive, not to guide men by reason, but to restrain them by Fear, so that they flee the evil rather than love virtues. Such people aim only to make others as wretched as they themselves are, so it is no wonder that they are generally burdensome and hateful to men.

[20] Cor.: By a Desire arising from reason, we directly follow the good, and indirectly flee the evil.

Dem.: For a Desire that arises from reason can arise solely from an affect of Joy which is not a passion (by IIIP59), i.e., from a Joy which [25] cannot be excessive (by P61). But it cannot arise from Sadness, and therefore this Desire (by P8) arises from knowledge of the good, not knowledge of the evil. And so from the guidance of reason we want the good directly, and to that extent only, we flee the evil, q.e.d.

[30] Schol.: This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of the sick and the healthy. The sick man, from timidity regarding death, eats what he is repelled by, whereas the healthy man enjoys his food, and [II/259] in this way enjoys life better than if he feared death, and directly desired to avoid it. Similarly, a judge who condemns a guilty man to death—not from Hate or Anger, etc., but only from a Love of the general welfare—is guided only by reason.

[5] P64: Knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Dem.: Knowledge of evil (by P8) is Sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. But Sadness is a passage to a lesser perfection (by Def. [10] Aff. III), which therefore cannot be understood through man’s essence itself (by IIIP6 and P7). Hence (by IIID2), it is a passion, which (by IIIP3) depends on inadequate ideas. Therefore (by IIP29), knowledge of this, viz. knowledge of evil, is inadequate, q.e.d.

[15] Cor.: From this it follows that if the human Mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.

P65: From the guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods or [20] the lesser of two evils.

Dem.: A good that prevents us from enjoying a greater good is really an evil. For good and evil (as we have shown in the Preface of this Part) are said of things insofar as we compare them to one another. [25] By the same reasoning, a lesser evil is really a good, so (by P63C)33 from the guidance of reason we want, or follow, only the greater good and the lesser evil, q.e.d.

Cor.: From the guidance of reason, we shall follow a lesser evil as [30] a greater good, and pass over a lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here called lesser is really good, and [II/260] the good which is here called lesser, on the other hand, is evil. So (by P63C) we want the [lesser evil] and pass over the [greater good], q.e.d.

P66: From the guidance of reason we want a greater future good in preference [5] to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.

Dem.: If the Mind could have an adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be affected toward it with the same affect as it is [10] toward a present one (by P62). So insofar as we attend to reason itself, as in this Proposition we suppose ourselves to do, the thing will be the same, whether the greater good or evil is supposed to be future or present. And therefore (by P65), we want the greater future good in preference to the lesser present one, etc., q.e.d.

[15] Cor.: From the guidance of reason, we shall want a lesser present evil which is the cause of a greater future good, and pass over a lesser present good which is the cause of a greater future evil. This Corollary stands to P66 as P65C does to P65.

[20] Schol.: If these things are compared with those we have shown in this Part up to P18, concerning the powers of the affects, we shall easily see what the difference is between a man who is led only by an affect, or by opinion, and one who is led by reason. For the former, [25] whether he will or no, does those things he is most ignorant of, whereas the latter complies with no one’s wishes but his own, and does only those things he knows to be the most important in life, and therefore desires very greatly. Hence, I call the former a slave, but the latter, a free man.

I wish now to note a few more things concerning the free man’s temperament and manner of living.

[II/261] P67: A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.34

[5] Dem.: A free man, i.e., one who lives according to the dictate of reason alone, is not led by Fear (by P63), but desires the good directly (by P63C), i.e. (by P24), acts, lives, and preserves his being from the foundation of seeking his own advantage. And so he thinks of nothing [10] less than of death. Instead his wisdom is a meditation on life, q.e.d.

P68: If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.

[15] Dem.: I call him free who is led by reason alone. Therefore, he who is born free, and remains free, has only adequate ideas, and so has no concept of evil (by P64C). And since good and evil are correlates, he also has no concept of good, q.e.d.

[20] Schol.: It is evident from P4 that the hypothesis of this proposition is false, and cannot be conceived unless we attend only to human nature, or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is the cause of man’s existence.

[25] This, and the other things I have now demonstrated seem to have been indicated by Moses in that story35 of the first man. For in it the only power of God conceived is that by which he created man, i.e., the power by which he consulted only man’s advantage. And so we are told that God prohibited a free man from eating of the tree of [30] knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, he immediately feared death, rather than desiring to live; and then, that, [II/262] the man having found a wife who agreed completely with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature more useful to him than she was; but that after he believed the lower animals to be like himself, he immediately began to imitate their affects (see IIIP27) and to lose [5] his freedom; and that afterwards this freedom was recovered by the Patriarchs, guided by the Spirit of Christ, i.e., by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man should be free, and desire for other men the good he desires for himself (as we have demonstrated above, by P37).

[10] P69: The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.

Dem.: The affects can be neither restrained nor removed except by [15] an affect contrary to and stronger than the affect to be restrained (by P7). But blind Daring and Fear are affects which can be conceived to be equally great (by P3 and P5). Therefore, an equally great virtue of the mind, or strength of character (for the definition of this, see IIIP59S) is required to restrain Daring as to restrain Fear, i.e. (by Defs. Aff. [20] XL and XLI), a free man avoids dangers by the same virtue of the mind by which he tries to overcome them, q.e.d.

Cor.: In a free man, a timely flight is considered to show as much Tenacity as fighting; or a free man chooses flight with the same Tenacity, [25] or presence of mind, as he chooses a contest.

Schol.: I have explained in IIIP59S what Tenacity is, or what I understand by it. And by danger I understand whatever can be the [30] cause of some evil, such as Sadness, Hate, Discord, etc.

P70: A free man who lives among the ignorant strives, as far as he can, to avoid their favors.

[II/263] Dem.: Everyone judges according to his own temperament what is good (see IIIP39). Someone who is ignorant, therefore, and who has conferred a favor on someone else, will value it according to his own temperament, and will be saddened if he sees it valued less by him to [5] whom it was given (by IIIP42). But a free man strives to join other men to him in friendship (by P37), not to repay men with benefits that are equivalent in their eyes, but to lead himself and the others by the free judgment of reason, and to do only those things that he himself knows to be most excellent. Therefore, a free man will strive, as [10] far as he can, to avoid the favors of the ignorant, so as not to be hated by them, and at the same time to yield only to reason, not to their appetite, q.e.d.

Schol.: I say as far as he can. For though men may be ignorant, they are still men, who in situations of need can bring human aid. And [15] there is no better aid than that. So it often happens that it is necessary to accept favors from them, and hence to return thanks to them according to their temperament [i.e., in a way they will appreciate].

To this we may add that we must be careful in declining favors, so that we do not seem to disdain them, or out of Greed to be afraid of [20] repayment. For in that way, in the very act of avoiding their Hate, we would incur it. So in declining favors we must take account both of what is useful and of what is honorable.

P71: Only free men are very thankful to one another.

[25] Dem.: Only free men are very useful to one another, are joined to one another by the greatest necessity of friendship (by P35 and P35C1), and strive to benefit one another with equal eagerness for love (by P37). So (by Def. Aff. XXXIV) only free men are very thankful to [30] one another, q.e.d.

Schol.: The thankfulness which men are led by blind Desire to [II/264] display toward one another is for the most part a business transaction or an entrapment, rather than thankfulness.

Again, ingratitude is not an affect. Nevertheless, ingratitude is dishonorable because it generally indicates that the man is affected with too much Hate, Anger, Pride, or Greed, etc. For one who, out of [5] foolishness, does not know how to reckon one gift against another, is not ungrateful; much less one who is not moved by the gifts of a courtesan to assist her lust,36 nor by those of a thief to conceal his thefts, nor by those of anyone else like that. On the contrary, he shows firmness of mind who does not allow any gifts to corrupt him, to his or to the general ruin.

[10] P72: A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively.

Dem.: If a free man, insofar as he is free, did anything by deception, he would do it from the dictate of reason (for so far only do we [15] call him free). And so it would be a virtue to act deceptively (by P24), and hence (by the same Prop.), everyone would be better advised to act deceptively to preserve his being. I.e. (as is known through itself), men would be better advised to agree only in words, and be contrary to one another in fact. But this is absurd (by P31C). Therefore, a free [20] man etc., q.e.d.

Schol.: Suppose someone now asks: what if a man could save himself from the present danger of death by treachery? would not the principle of preserving his own being recommend, without qualification, that he be treacherous?

The reply to this is the same. If reason should recommend that, it [25] would recommend it to all men.37 And so reason would recommend, without qualification, that men make agreements, join forces, and have common rights only by deception—i.e., that really they have no common rights. This is absurd.

[30] P73: A man who is guided by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself.

[II/265] Dem.: A man who is guided by reason is not led to obey by Fear (by P63), but insofar as he strives to preserve his being from the dictate [5] of reason, i.e. (by P66S), insofar as he strives to live freely, desires to maintain the principle of common life and common advantage (by P37). Consequently (as we have shown in P37S2), he desires to live according to the common decision of the state. Therefore, a man who is guided by reason desires, in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state, q.e.d.

[10] Schol.: These and similar things which we have shown concerning the true freedom of man are related to Strength of Character, i.e. (by IIIP59S), to Tenacity and Nobility. I do not consider it worthwhile to demonstrate separately here all the properties of Strength of Character, [15] much less that a man strong in character hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, scorns no one, and is not at all proud. For these and all things which relate to true life and Religion are easily proven from P37 and P46, viz. that Hate is to be conquered by returning Love, and that everyone who is led [20] by reason desires for others also the good he wants for himself.

To this we may add what we have noted in P50S and in other places: a man strong in character considers this most of all, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and hence, that whatever he thinks is troublesome and evil, and moreover, whatever [25] seems immoral, dreadful, unjust, and dishonorable, arises from the fact that he conceives the things themselves in a way that is disordered, mutilated, and confused. For this reason, he strives most of all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, like Hate, Anger, Envy, Mockery, Pride, and [30] the rest of the things we have noted in the preceding pages.

And so, as we have said [II/47/21], he strives, as far as he can, to act well and rejoice. In the following Part I shall demonstrate how far human virtue can go in the attainment of these things, and what it is capable of.

[II/266] APPENDIX

The things I have taught in this Part concerning the right way of living have not been so arranged that they could be seen at a glance. Instead, I have demonstrated them at one place or another, as I could more easily deduce one [5] from another. So I have undertaken to collect them here and bring them under main headings.

I. All our strivings, or Desires, follow from the necessity of our nature in such a way that they can be understood either through it [10] alone, as through their proximate cause, or insofar as we are a part of nature, which cannot be conceived adequately through itself without other individuals.

II. The Desires which follow from our nature in such a way that [15] they can be understood through it alone are those that are related to the Mind insofar as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The remaining Desires are not related to the Mind except insofar as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and growth must be [20] defined not by human power, but by the power of things that are outside us. The former, therefore, are rightly called actions, while the latter are rightly called passions. For the former always indicate our power, whereas the latter indicate our lack of power and mutilated knowledge.

[25] III. Our actions—i.e., those Desires that are defined by man’s power, or reason—are always good; but the other [Desires] can be both good and evil.

[II/267] IV. In life, therefore, it is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists man’s highest [5] happiness, or blessedness. Indeed, blessedness is nothing but that satisfaction of mind that stems from the intuitive knowledge of God. But perfecting the intellect is nothing but understanding God, his attributes, and his actions, which follow from the necessity of his nature. [10] So the ultimate end of the man who is led by reason, i.e., his highest Desire, by which he strives to moderate all the others, is that by which he is led to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall under his understanding.

[15] V. No life, then, is rational without understanding, and things are good only insofar as they aid man to enjoy the life of the Mind, which is defined by understanding. On the other hand, those that prevent man from being able to perfect his reason and enjoy the rational life, [20] those only we say are evil.

VI. But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause must be good, nothing evil can happen to a man except by external causes, viz. insofar as he is a part of the whole of nature, whose laws [25] human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is forced to accommodate itself in ways nearly infinite.

[II/268] VII. It is impossible for man not to be a part of nature and not to follow the common order of nature. But if he lives among such individuals [5] as agree with his nature, his power of acting will thereby be aided and encouraged. On the other hand, if he is among such as do not agree at all with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without greatly changing himself.

[10] VIII. It is permissible for us to avert, in the way that seems safest, whatever there is in nature that we judge to be evil, or able to prevent us from being able to exist and enjoy a rational life. On the other hand, we may take for our own use, and use in any way, whatever [15] there is that we judge to be good, or useful for preserving our being and enjoying a rational life. And absolutely, it is permissible for everyone to do, by the highest right of nature, what he judges will contribute to his advantage.

[20] IX. Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species. And so (by VII) nothing is more useful to man in preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Again, because, among singular things, we know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, [II/269] we can show best how much our skill and understanding are worth by educating men so that at last they live according to the command of their own reason.

X. Insofar as men are moved against one another by Envy or some [5] [NS: other] affect of Hate, they are contrary to one another, and consequently are the more to be feared, as they can do more than other individuals in nature.

XI. Minds, however, are conquered not by arms, but by Love and [10] Nobility.

XII. It is especially useful to men to form associations, to bind themselves by those bonds most apt to make one people of them, and [15] absolutely, to do those things which serve to strengthen friendships.

XIII. But skill and alertness are required for this. For men vary—there being few who live according to the rule of reason—and yet generally they are envious, and more inclined to vengeance than to [20] Compassion. So it requires a singular power of mind to bear with each one according to his understanding, and to restrain oneself from imitating their affects.

But those who know how to find fault with men, to castigate vices rather than teach virtues, and to break men’s minds rather than [25] strengthen them—they are burdensome both to themselves and to others. That is why many, from too great an impatience of mind, and a false [II/270] zeal for religion, have preferred to live among the lower animals rather than among men. They are like boys or young men who cannot bear calmly the scolding of their parents, and take refuge in the army.38 They choose the inconveniences of war and the discipline of an absolute [5] commander in preference to the conveniences of home and the admonitions of a father; and while they take vengeance on their parents, they allow all sorts of burdens to be placed on them.

XIV. Though men, therefore, generally direct everything according [10] to their own lust, nevertheless, more advantages than disadvantages follow from their forming a common society. So it is better to bear men’s wrongs calmly, and apply one’s zeal to those things that help to bring men together in harmony and friendship.

[15] XV. The things that beget harmony are those which are related to justice, fairness, and being honorable. For men find it difficult to bear, not only what is unjust and unfair, but also what is thought dishonorable, [20] or that someone rejects the accepted practices of the state. But especially necessary to bring people together in love, are the things which concern Religion and Morality. On this, see P37S1 and S2, P46S, and P73S.

[25] XVI. Harmony is also commonly born of Fear, but then it is without trust. Add to this that Fear arises from weakness of mind, and [II/271] therefore does not pertain to the exercise of reason. Nor does Pity, though it seems to present the appearance of Morality.

[5] XVII. Men are also won over by generosity, especially those who do not have the means of acquiring the things they require to sustain life. But to bring aid to everyone in need far surpasses the powers and advantage of a private person. For his riches are quite unequal to the [10] task. Moreover the capacity of one man39 is too limited for him to be able to unite all men to him in friendship. So the case of the poor falls upon society as a whole, and concerns only the general advantage.

[15] XVIII. In accepting favors and returning thanks an altogether different care must be taken. See P70S, and P71S.

XIX. A purely sensual love,40 moreover, i.e., a lust to procreate that arises from external appearance, and absolutely, all love that has [20] a cause other than freedom of mind, easily passes into hate—unless (which is worse) it is a species of madness. And then it is encouraged more by discord than by harmony. See IIIP31C.41

[25] XX. As for marriage, it certainly agrees with reason, if the Desire for physical union is not generated only by external appearance but [II/272] also by a Love of begetting children and educating them wisely, and moreover, if the Love of each, of both the man and the woman, is caused not by external appearance only, but mainly by freedom of mind.

[5] XXI. Flattery also gives rise to harmony, but by the foul crime of bondage, or by treachery. No one is more taken in by flattery than the proud, who wish to be first and are not.

[10] XXII. In Despondency, there is a false appearance of morality and religion. And though Despondency is the opposite of Pride, still the despondent man is very near the proud. See P57S.

XXIII. Shame, moreover, contributes to harmony only in those [15] things that cannot be hidden. Again, because Shame itself is a species of Sadness, it does not belong to the exercise of reason.

XXIV. The other affects of Sadness toward men are directly opposed to justice, fairness, being honorable, morality, and religion. And [20] though Indignation seems to present an appearance of fairness, nevertheless, when each one is allowed to pass judgment on another’s deeds, and to enforce either his own or another’s right, we live without a law.

[25] XXV. Courtesy, i.e., the Desire to please men which is determined [II/273] by reason, is related to Morality (as we said in P37S1). But if it arises from an affect, it is Ambition, or a Desire by which men generally arouse discord and seditions, from a false appearance of morality. For [5] one who desires to aid others by advice or by action, so that they may enjoy the highest good together, will aim chiefly at arousing their Love for him, but not at leading them into admiration so that his teaching will be called after his name.42 Nor will he give any cause for Envy. [10] Again, in common conversations he will beware of relating men’s vices, and will take care to speak only sparingly of a man’s lack of power, but generously of the man’s virtue, or power, and how it can be perfected, so that men, moved not by Fear or aversion, but only by an affect of Joy, may strive to live as far as they can according to the rule [15] of reason.

XXVI. Apart from men we know no singular thing in nature whose Mind we can enjoy, and which we can join to ourselves in friendship, or some kind of association. And so whatever there is in nature apart [20] from men, the principle of seeking our own advantage does not demand that we preserve it. Instead, it teaches us to preserve or destroy it according to its use, or to adapt it to our use in any way whatever.

[25] XXVII. The principal advantage which we derive from things outside us—apart from the experience and knowledge we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another—lies [II/274] in the preservation of our body. That is why those things are most useful to us which can feed and maintain it, so that all its parts can perform their function properly. For the more the Body is capable of [5] affecting, and being affected by, external bodies in a great many ways, the more the Mind is capable of thinking (see P38 and P39).

But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature. So to nourish the body in the way required, it is necessary to use many [10] different kinds of food. Indeed, the human Body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which require continuous and varied food so that the whole Body may be equally capable of doing everything which can follow from its nature, and consequently, so that the Mind may also be equally capable of conceiving many things.

[15] XXVIII. But to achieve these things the powers of each man would hardly be sufficient if men did not help one another. And indeed, money has provided a convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids. That is why its image usually occupies the Mind of the multitude [20] more than anything else. For they can imagine hardly any species of Joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.

XXIX. But this is a vice only in those who seek money neither from need nor on account of necessities, but because they have learned the [25] art of making money and pride themselves on it very much. As for the body, they feed it according to custom, but sparingly, because [II/275] they believe they lose as much of their goods as they devote to the preservation of their Body. Those, however, who know the true use of money, and set bounds to their wealth according to need, live contentedly with little.

[5] XXX. Since those things are good which assist the parts of the Body to perform their function, and Joy consists in the fact that man’s power, insofar as he consists of Mind and Body, is aided or increased, all [10] things that bring Joy are good. Nevertheless, since things do not act in order to affect us with Joy, and their power of acting is not regulated by our advantage, and finally, since Joy is generally related particularly to one part of the body, most affects of Joy are excessive [15] (unless reason and alertness are present). Hence, the Desires generated by them are also excessive. To this we may add that when we follow our affects, we value most the pleasures of the moment,43 and cannot appraise future things with an equal affect of mind. See P44S and P60S.

[20] XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to maintain that the good is what brings Sadness, and the evil, what brings Joy. But as we have already said (see P45S), no one, unless he is envious, takes pleasure [25] in my lack of power and misfortune. For as we are affected with a greater Joy, we pass to a greater perfection, and consequently participate more in the divine nature. Nor can Joy which is governed by [II/276] the true principle of our advantage ever be evil. On the other hand, he who is led by Fear, and does the good only to avoid the evil, is not governed by reason.

[5] XXXII. But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. So we do not have an absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear calmly those things which happen to us contrary to what the principle [10] of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the power we have could not have extended itself to the point where we could have avoided those things, and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we understand [15] this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. Hence, insofar [20] as we understand these things rightly, the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.

[II/277] Fifth Part of the Ethics On the Power of the Intellect, [5] or on Human Freedom

PREFACE

I pass, finally, to the remaining Part of the Ethics,1 which concerns the means, or way, leading to Freedom. Here, then, I shall treat of the power of reason, [10] showing what it can do against the affects, and what Freedom of Mind, or blessedness, is. From this we shall see how much more the wise man can do than the ignorant. But it does not pertain to this investigation to show how the intellect must be perfected, or in what way the Body must be cared for, so [15] that it can perform its function properly. The former is the concern of Logic, and the latter of Medicine.2

Here, then, as I have said, I shall treat only of the power of the Mind, or of reason, and shall show, above all, how great its dominion over the affects is, and what kind of dominion it has for restraining and moderating them. For we have already demonstrated above that it does not have an absolute [20] dominion over them. Nevertheless, the Stoics thought that they depend entirely on our will, and that we can command them absolutely. But experience cries out against this, and has forced them, in spite of their principles, to confess that much practice and application are required to restrain and moderate them. If [25] I remember rightly, someone tried to show this by the example of two dogs, one [II/278] a house dog, the other a hunting dog. For by practice he was finally able to bring it about that the house dog was accustomed to hunt, and the hunting dog to refrain from chasing hares.

Descartes was rather inclined to this opinion. For he maintained that the [5] Soul, or Mind, was especially united to a certain part of the brain, called the pineal gland, by whose aid the Mind is aware of all the motions aroused in the body and of external objects, and which the Mind can move in various ways simply by willing. He contended that this gland was suspended in the middle of the brain in such a way that it could be moved by the least motion of the [10] animal spirits. He maintained further that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many varying ways as there are varying ways that the animal spirits strike against it, and moreover, that as many varying traces are impressed upon it as there are varying external objects which drive the animal [15] spirits against it. That is why, if the Soul’s will afterwards moves the gland so that it is suspended as it once was by the motion of the animal spirits, the gland will drive and determine the animal spirits in the same way as when they were driven back before by a similar placement of the gland.

[20] Furthermore, he maintained that each will of the Mind is united by nature to a certain fixed motion of this gland. For example, if someone has a will to look at a distant object, this will brings it about that the pupil is dilated. But if he thinks only of the pupil which is to be dilated, nothing will be accomplished by having a will for this, because nature has not joined the motion of the gland [25] which serves to drive the animal spirits against the Optic nerve in a way suitable for dilating or contracting the pupil with the will to dilate or contract it. Instead, it has joined that motion with the will to look at distant or near objects.

Finally, he maintained that even though each motion of this gland seems to [II/279] have been connected by nature from the beginning of our life with a particular one of our thoughts, they can still be joined by habit to others. He tries to prove this in The Passions of the Soul I, 50.

From these claims, he infers that there is no Soul so weak that it cannot—when [5] it is well directed—acquire an absolute power over its Passions. For as he defines them, these are

… perceptions, or feelings, or emotions of the soul, which are particularly related to the soul, and which [NB] are produced, preserved, and strengthened by some motion of the spirits (see The Passions of the Soul I, 27).3

[10] But since to any will we can join any motion of the gland (and consequently any motion of the spirits), and since the determination of the will depends only on our power, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our Passions, if we determine our will by firm and certain judgments according to which we will [15] to direct the actions of our life, and if we join to these judgments the motions of the passions we will to have.4

Such is the opinion of that most distinguished Man—as far as I can gather it from his words. I would hardly have believed it had been propounded by so great a Man, had it not been so subtle. Indeed, I cannot wonder enough that [20] a Philosopher of his caliber—one who had firmly decided to deduce nothing except from principles known through themselves, and to affirm nothing which he did not perceive clearly and distinctly, one who had so often censured the Scholastics for wishing to explain obscure things by occult qualities—that such a Philosopher should assume a Hypothesis more occult than any occult quality.5

[25] What, I ask, does he understand by the union of Mind and Body? What clear and distinct concept does he have of a thought so closely united to some little portion of quantity? Indeed, I wish he had explained this union by its [II/280] proximate cause. But he had conceived the Mind to be so distinct from the Body that he could not assign any singular cause, either of this union or of the Mind itself. Instead, it was necessary for him to have recourse to the cause of the whole Universe, i.e., to God.

Again, I should like very much to know how many degrees of motion the [5] Mind can give to that pineal gland, and how great a force is required to hold it in suspense. For I do not know whether this gland is driven about more slowly by the Mind than by the animal spirits, or more quickly; nor do I know whether the motions of the Passions which we have joined closely to firm judgments can be separated from them again by corporeal causes. If so, it would [10] follow that although the Mind had firmly resolved to face dangers, and had joined the motions of daring to this decision, nevertheless, once the danger had been seen, the gland might be so suspended that the Mind could think only of flight. And of course, since there is no common measure between the will and motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the Mind [15] and those of the Body. Consequently, the forces of the Body cannot in any way be determined by those of the Mind.

To this we may add that this gland is not found to be so placed in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend to the cavities of the brain.6

[20] Finally, I pass over all those things he claimed about the will and its freedom, since I have already shown, more than adequately, that they are false.

Therefore, because the power of the Mind is defined only by understanding, as I have shown above, we shall determine, by the Mind’s knowledge alone, the remedies for the affects.7 I believe everyone in fact knows them by experience, [25] though they neither observe them accurately, nor see them distinctly. From that we shall deduce all those things which concern the Mind’s blessedness.

[II/281] AXIOMS

A1: If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will have to occur, either in both of them, or in one only, until they cease to be contrary.

[5] A2: The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, insofar as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.

This axiom is evident from IIIP7.

[10] P1: In just the same way as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in the Mind, so the affections of the body, or images of things are ordered and connected in the body.

Dem.: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order [15] and connection of things (by IIP7), and vice versa, the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas (by IIP6C and P7). So just as the order and connection of ideas happens in the Mind according to the order and connection of affections of the Body (by IIP18), so vice versa (by IIIP2), the order and connection of [20] affections of the Body happens as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in the Mind, q.e.d.

P2: If we separate emotions, or affects,8 from the thought of an external cause, [25] and join them to other thoughts, then the Love, or Hate, toward the external cause is destroyed, as are the vacillations of mind arising from these affects.

[II/282] Dem.: For what constitutes the form of Love, or Hate, is Joy, or Sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Defs. Aff. VI, VII). So if this is taken away, the form of Love or Hate is taken away at the same time. Hence, these affects, and those arising from [5] them, are destroyed, q.e.d.

P3: An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

[10] Dem.: An affect which is a passion is a confused idea (by Gen. Def. Aff.). Therefore, if we should form a clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea will only be distinguished by reason from the affect itself, insofar as it is related only to the Mind (by IIP21 and P21S). Therefore (by IIIP3), the affect will cease to be a passion, [15] q.e.d.

Cor.: The more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and the less the Mind is acted on by it.

[20] P4: There is no affection of the Body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept.

Dem.: Those things that are common to all can only be conceived [25] adequately (by IIP38), and so (by IIP12 and L2 [II/98]) there is no affection of the Body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot [30] form some clear and distinct concept. For an affect is an idea of an [II/283] affection of the Body (by Gen. Def. Aff.), which therefore (by P4) must involve some clear and distinct concept.

[5] Schol.: There is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by IP36), and we understand clearly and distinctly whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us (by IIP40); hence, each of us has—in part, at least, if not absolutely—the power to understand himself [10] and his affects, and consequently, the power to bring it about that he is less acted on by them.

We must, therefore, take special care to know each affect clearly and distinctly (as far as this is possible), so that in this way the Mind may be determined from an affect to thinking those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and with which it is fully satisfied, [15] and so that the affect itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts. The result will be not only that Love, Hate, etc., are destroyed (by P2), but also that the appetites, or Desires, which usually arise from such an affect, cannot be excessive (by IVP61).

For it must particularly be noted that the appetite by which a man [20] is said to act, and that by which he is said to be acted on, are one and the same. For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that each of us wants the others to live according to his temperament (see IIIP31S).9 And indeed, in a man who is not led by reason this appetite is the passion called Ambition, which does not [25] differ much from Pride. On the other hand, in a man who lives according to the dictate of reason it is the action, or virtue, called Morality (see IVP37S1 and P37 Alternate dem.).

In this way, all the appetites, or Desires, are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and are counted as virtues when [30] they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the Desires by which we are determined to do something can arise as much from adequate ideas as from inadequate ones (by IVP59). And—to return to the point from which I have digressed—we can devise no other [35] remedy for the affects which depends on our power and is more excellent [II/284] than this, which consists in a true knowledge of them. For the Mind has no other power than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown (by IIIP3) above.

[5] P5: The greatest affect of all, other things equal, is one toward a thing we imagine simply, and neither as necessary, nor as possible, nor as contingent.

Dem.: An affect toward a thing we imagine to be free is greater [10] than that toward a thing we imagine to be necessary (by IIIP49), and consequently is still greater than that toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent (by IVP11). But imagining a thing as free can be nothing but simply imagining it while we are ignorant of the causes [15] by which it has been determined to act (by what we have shown in IIP35S). Therefore, an affect toward a thing we imagine simply is, other things equal, greater than that toward a thing we imagine as necessary, possible, or contingent. Hence, it is the greatest of all, q.e.d.

[20] P6: Insofar as the Mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects, or is less acted on by them.

Dem.: The Mind understands all things to be necessary (by IP29), [25] and to be determined by an infinite connection of causes to exist and produce effects (by IP28). And so (by P5) to that extent [the mind] brings it about that it is less acted on by the affects springing from these things, and (by IIIP48) is less affected toward them, q.e.d.

[30] Schol.: The more this knowledge that things are necessary is concerned [II/285] with singular things, which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the Mind over the affects, as experience itself also testifies. For we see that Sadness over some good which has perished is lessened as soon as the man who has lost it [5] realizes that this good could not, in any way, have been kept. Similarly, we see that no one pities infants because of their inability to speak, to walk, or to reason, or because they live so many years, as it were, unconscious of themselves. But if most people were born grown up, and only one or two were born infants, then everyone would pity [10] the infants, because they would regard infancy itself, not as a natural and necessary thing, but as a vice of nature, or a sin. We could point out many other things along this line.

P7: Affects that arise from, or are aroused by, reason are, if we take account [15] of time, more powerful than those that are related to singular things which we regard as absent.

Dem.: We regard a thing as absent, not because of the affect by which we imagine it, but because the Body is affected by another [20] affect which excludes the thing’s existence (by IIP17). So an affect which is related to a thing we regard as absent is not of such a nature that it surpasses men’s other actions and power (see IVP6); on the contrary, its nature is such that it can, in some measure, be restrained [25] by those affections which exclude the existence of its external cause (by IVP9). But an affect that arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things (see the Def. of reason in IIP40S2), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing which excludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in the [30] same way (by IIP38).10 So such an affect will always remain the same, and hence (by A1), the affects that are contrary to it, and that are not encouraged by their external causes, will have to accommodate themselves [II/286] to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it. To that extent, an affect arising from reason is more powerful, q.e.d.

P8: The more an affect arises from a number of causes concurring together, the [5] greater it is.

Dem.: A number of causes together can do more than if they were fewer (by IIIP7). And so (by IVP5), the more an affect is aroused by a number of causes together, the stronger it is, q.e.d.

[10] Schol.: This proposition is also evident from A2.

P9: If an affect is related to more and different causes which the Mind considers [15] together with the affect itself, it is less harmful, we are less acted on by it, and we are affected less toward each cause, than is the case with another, equally great affect, which is related only to one cause, or to fewer causes.

Dem.: An affect is only evil, or harmful, insofar as it prevents the [20] Mind from being able to think (by IVP26 and P27). And so that affect which determines the Mind to consider many objects together is less harmful than another, equally great affect which engages the Mind solely in considering one, or a few objects, so that it cannot think of others. This was the first point.

[25] Next, because the Mind’s essence, i.e., power (by IIIP7), consists only in thought (by IIP11), the Mind is less acted on by an affect which determines it to consider many things together than by an equally great affect which keeps the Mind engaged solely in considering one [30] or a few objects. This was the second point.

[II/287] Finally (by IIIP48), insofar as this affect is related to many external causes, it is also less toward each one, q.e.d.

P10: So long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, we have [5] the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the Body according to the order of the intellect.

Dem.: Affects which are contrary to our nature, i.e. (by IVP30), [10] which are evil, are evil insofar as they prevent the Mind from understanding (by IVP27). Therefore, so long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, the power of the Mind by which it strives to understand things (by IVP26) is not hindered. So long, then, the Mind [15] has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing some from others (see IIP40S2 and P47S). And hence, so long do we have (by P1) the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the Body according to the order of the intellect, q.e.d.

[20] Schol.: By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the Body, we can bring it about that we are not easily affected with evil affects. For (by P7) a greater force is required for restraining Affects ordered and connected according to the order of the intellect than for restraining those which are uncertain and random. The best [25] thing, then, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of living, or sure maxims of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the particular cases frequently encountered in life. In this way our imagination will be extensively affected by them, and we shall always have them ready.

[30] For example, we have laid it down as a maxim of life (see IVP46 and P46S) that Hate is to be conquered by Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it with Hate in return. But in order that we may always [II/288] have this rule of reason ready when it is needed, we ought to think about and meditate frequently on the common wrongs of men, and how they may be warded off best by Nobility. For if we join the image of a wrong to the imagination of this maxim, it will always be [5] ready for us (by IIP18) when a wrong is done to us. If we have ready also the principle of our own true advantage, and also of the good which follows from mutual friendship and common society, and keep in mind, moreover, that the highest satisfaction of mind stems from the right principle of living (by IVP52), and that men, like other things, [10] act from the necessity of nature, then the wrong, or the Hate usually arising from it, will occupy a very small part of the imagination, and will easily be overcome.

Or if the Anger which usually arises from the greatest wrongs is not so easily overcome, it will still be overcome, though not without some vacillation. And it will be overcome in far less time than if we [15] had not considered these things beforehand in this way (as is evident from P6, P7, and P8).

To put aside Fear, we must think in the same way of Tenacity: i.e., we must recount and frequently imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character.

[20] But it should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images, we must always (by IVP63C and IIIP59) attend to those things which are good in each thing so that in this way we are always determined to acting from an affect of Joy. For example, if someone sees that he pursues esteem too much, he should think of its correct use, the end [25] for which it ought be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired, not of its misuse and emptiness, and men’s inconstancy, or other things of this kind, which only someone sick of mind thinks of. For those who are most ambitious are most upset by such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honor they strive for; while they spew forth their Anger, they wish to seem wise. So it is certain that [30] they most desire esteem who cry out most against its misuse, and the emptiness of the world.

Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious—it is common to everyone whose luck is bad and whose mind is weak. For the poor man, when he is also greedy, will not stop talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich. In doing this he only distresses himself, and [35] shows others that he cannot bear calmly either his own poverty, or [II/289] the wealth of others.

So also, one who has been badly received by a lover thinks of nothing but the inconstancy and deceptiveness of women, and their other, often sung vices. All of these he immediately forgets as soon as his lover receives him again.11

[5] One, therefore, who is anxious to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of Freedom alone will strive, as far as he can, to come to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge of them, but not at all to consider men’s vices, or to disparage men, or to enjoy a false appearance [10] of freedom. And he who will observe these [rules] carefully—for they are not difficult—and practice them, will soon be able to direct most of his actions according to the command of reason.

[15] P11: As an image is related to more things, the more frequent it is, or the more often it flourishes, and the more it engages the Mind.

Dem.: For as an image, or affect, is related to more things, there are more causes by which it can be aroused and encouraged, all of [20] which the Mind (by Hypothesis) considers together with the affect. And so the affect is the more frequent, or flourishes more often, and (by P8) engages the Mind more, q.e.d.

P12: The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things [25] we understand clearly and distinctly than to other images.

Dem.: Things we understand clearly and distinctly are either common properties of things or deduced from them (see the Def. of reason in IIP40S2), and consequently (by P11) are aroused in us more often. [30] And so it can more easily happen that we consider other things together with them rather than with [things we do not understand clearly and distinctly]. Hence (by IIP18), [images of things] are more easily [II/290] joined with [things we understand clearly and distinctly] than with others, q.e.d.

P13: The more an image is joined with other images, the more often it flourishes.

[5] Dem.: For the more an image is joined with other images, the more causes there are (by IIP18) by which it can be aroused, q.e.d.

P14: The Mind can bring it about that all the Body’s affections, or images of [10] things, are related to the idea of God.

Dem.: There is no affection of the Body of which the Mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by P4). And so it can bring it [15] about (by IP15) that they are related to the idea of God, q.e.d.

P15: He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and does so the more, the more he understands himself and his affects.

[20] Dem.: He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly rejoices (by IIIP53), and this Joy is accompanied by the idea of God (by P14). Hence (by Def. Aff. VI), he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) does so the more, the more he understands himself and his affects, q.e.d.

[25] P16: This Love toward God must engage the Mind most.

Dem.: For this Love is joined to all the affections of the Body (by [II/291] P14), which all encourage it (by P15). And so (by P11), it must engage the Mind most, q.e.d.

[5] P17: God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of Joy or Sadness.

Dem.: All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by [10] IIP32), i.e. (by IID4), adequate. And so (by Gen. Def. Aff.), God is without passions.

Next, God can pass neither to a greater nor a lesser perfection, (by IP20C2); hence (by Defs. Aff. II, III) he is not affected with any affect of Joy or Sadness, q.e.d.

[15] Cor.: Strictly speaking, God loves no one, and hates no one. For God (by P17) is not affected with any affect of Joy or Sadness. Consequently (by Defs. Aff. VI, VII), he also loves no one and hates no one.

[20] P18: No one can hate God.

Dem.: The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (by IIP46, P47). So insofar as we consider God, we act (by IIIP3). Consequently [25] (by IIIP59), there can be no Sadness accompanied by the idea of God, i.e. (by Def. Aff. VII), no one can hate God, q.e.d.

Cor.: Love toward God cannot be turned into hate.

[30] Schol.: But, it can be objected, while we understand God to be the [II/292] cause of all things, we thereby consider God to be the cause of Sadness. To this I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of Sadness, it ceases (by P3) to be a passion, i.e. (by IIIP59), to that extent it ceases to be Sadness. And so, insofar as we understand God to be [5] the cause of Sadness, we rejoice.

P19: He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.

[10] Dem.: If a man were to strive for this, he would desire (by P17C) that God, whom he loves, not be God. Consequently (by IIIP19), he would desire to be saddened, which is absurd (by IIIP28). Therefore, he who loves God, etc., q.e.d.

[15] P20: This Love toward God cannot be tainted by an affect of Envy or Jealousy: instead, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of Love, the more it is encouraged.

Dem.: This Love toward God is the highest good which we can [20] want from the dictate of reason (by IVP28), and is common to all men (by IVP36); we desire that all should enjoy it (by IVP37). And so (by Def. Aff. XXIII), it cannot be stained by an affect of Envy, nor (by P18 and the Def. of Jealousy, see IIIP35S) by an affect of Jealousy. [25] On the contrary (by IIIP31), the more men we imagine to enjoy it, the more it must be encouraged, q.e.d.

Schol.: Similarly we can show that there is no affect which is directly [30] contrary to this Love and by which it can be destroyed. So we [II/293] can conclude that this Love is the most constant of all the affects, and insofar as it is related to the Body, cannot be destroyed, unless it is destroyed with the Body itself. What the nature of this Love is insofar as it is related only to the Mind, we shall see later.

And with this, I have covered all the remedies for the affects, or all [5] that the Mind, considered only in itself, can do against the affects. From this it is clear that the power of the Mind over the affects consists:

I. In the knowledge itself of the affects (see P4S);

II. In the fact that it separates the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly (see P2 and P4S);

[10] III. In the time by which the affections related to things we understand surpass those related to things we conceive confusedly, or in a mutilated way (see P7);

IV. In the multiplicity of causes by which affections related to common properties or to God are encouraged (see P9 and P11);

[15] V. Finally,12 in the order by which the Mind can order its affects and connect them to one another (see P10, and in addition, P12, P13, and P14).

But to understand better this power of the Mind over the affects, the most important thing to note is that we call affects great when we [20] compare the affect of one man with that of another, and see that the same affect troubles one more than the other, or when we compare the affects of one and the same man with each other, and find that he is affected, or moved, more by one affect than by another. For (by IVP5) the force of each affect is defined by the power of the external [25] cause compared with our own. But the power of the Mind is defined by knowledge alone, whereas lack of power, or passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge, i.e., by that through which ideas are called inadequate.

From this it follows that that Mind is most acted on, of which inadequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that it is distinguished [30] more by what it undergoes than by what it does. On the other hand, that Mind acts most, of which adequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that though it may have as many inadequate ideas as the other, it is still distinguished more by those which are attributed to human virtue than by those which betray man’s lack of power.

[35] Next, it should be noted that sickness of the mind and misfortunes [II/294] take their origin especially from too much Love toward a thing which is liable to many variations and which we can never fully possess. For no one is disturbed or anxious concerning anything unless he loves it, nor do wrongs, suspicions, and enmities arise except from Love for a [5] thing which no one can really fully possess.

From what we have said, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge—and especially that third kind of knowledge (see IIP47S), whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself—can accomplish against the affects. Insofar as the affects are passions, if clear and distinct [10] knowledge does not absolutely remove them (see P3 and P4S), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the Mind (see P14). And then it begets a Love toward a thing immutable and eternal (see P15), which we really fully possess (see IIP45), and which therefore cannot be tainted by any of the vices which are in ordinary [15] Love, but can always be greater and greater (by P15), and occupy the greatest part of the Mind (by P16), and affect it extensively.

With this I have completed everything which concerns this present life. Anyone who attends to what we have said in this Scholium, and at the same time, to the definitions of the Mind and its affects, and [20] finally to IIIP1 and P3, will easily be able to see what I said at the beginning of this Scholium, viz. that in these few words I have covered all the remedies for the affects. So it is time now to pass to those things which pertain to the Mind’s duration without relation to the body.13

[25] P21: The Mind can neither imagine anything, nor recollect past things, except while the Body endures.

Dem.: The Mind neither expresses the actual existence of its Body, [30] nor conceives the Body’s affections as actual, except while the Body endures (by IIP8C); consequently (by IIP26), it conceives no body as actually existing except while its body endures. Therefore, it can neither imagine anything (see the Def. of Imagination in IIP17S) nor [II/295] recollect past things (see the Def. of Memory in IIP18S) except while the body endures, q.e.d.

P22: Nevertheless, in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence [5] of this or that human Body, under a species of eternity.

Dem.: God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human Body, but also of its essence (by IP25), which therefore must be conceived through the very essence of God (by IA4), by a certain [10] eternal necessity (by IP16), and this concept must be in God (by IIP3), q.e.d.

P23: The human Mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the Body, but [15] something of it remains which is eternal.

Dem.: In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, which expresses the essence of the human Body (by P22), an idea, therefore, which is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human [20] Mind (by IIP13). But we do not attribute to the human Mind any duration that can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the Body, which is explained by duration, and can be defined by time, i.e. (by IIP8C), we do not attribute duration to it except while the Body endures. However, since what is conceived, [25] with a certain eternal necessity, through God’s essence itself (by P22) is nevertheless something, this something that pertains to the essence of the Mind will necessarily be eternal, q.e.d.

Schol.: There is, as we have said, this idea, which expresses the [30] essence of the body under a species of eternity, a certain mode of thinking, which pertains to the essence of the Mind, and which is [II/296] necessarily eternal. And though it is impossible that we should recollect that we existed before the Body—since there cannot be any traces of this in the body, and eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time—still, we feel and know by experience that [5] we are eternal.14 For the Mind feels those things that it conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves.

Therefore, though we do not recollect that we existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is eternal, and that [10] this existence it has cannot be defined by time or explained through duration. Our mind, therefore, can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body, and to that extent only does it have the power of determining the existence of things by time, and of conceiving them [15] under duration.

P24: The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.15

[20] Dem.: This is evident from IP25C.

P25: The greatest striving of the Mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge.

[25] Dem.: The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its Def. in IIP40S2), and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God (by P24). Therefore (by IVP28), the greatest virtue of the Mind, i.e. (by IVD8), the Mind’s [30] power, or nature, or (by IIIP7) its greatest striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, q.e.d.

[II/297] P26: The more the Mind is capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of knowledge.

[5] Dem.: This is evident. For insofar as we conceive the Mind to be capable of understanding things by this kind of knowledge, we conceive it as determined to understand things by the same kind of knowledge. Consequently (by Def. Aff. I), the more the Mind is capable of [10] this, the more it desires it, q.e.d.

P27: The greatest satisfaction of Mind there can be arises from this third kind of knowledge.

[15] Dem.: The greatest virtue of the Mind is to know God (by IVP28), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (by P25). Indeed, this virtue is the greater, the more the Mind knows things by this kind of knowledge (by P24). So he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection, and consequently [20] (by Def. Aff. II), is affected with the greatest Joy, accompanied (by IIP43) by the idea of himself and his virtue. Therefore (by Def. Aff. XXV), the greatest satisfaction there can be arises from this kind of knowledge, q.e.d.

[25] P28: The Striving, or Desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but can indeed arise from the second.

Dem.: This Proposition is evident through itself. For whatever we [II/298] understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through something else which is conceived through itself; i.e., the ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to the third kind of knowledge (see IIP40S2), cannot follow from mutilated [5] and confused ideas, which (by IIP40S2) are related to the first kind of knowledge; but they can follow from adequate ideas, or (by IIP40S2) from the second and third kind of knowledge. Therefore (by Def. Aff. I), the Desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but can from the second, q.e.d.

[10] P29: Whatever the Mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact that it conceives the Body’s present actual existence, but from the fact that it conceives the Body’s essence under a species of eternity.

[15] Dem.: Insofar as the Mind conceives the present existence of its Body, it conceives duration, which can be determined by time, and to that extent it has only the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by P21 and IIP26). But eternity cannot be explained by duration [20] (by ID8 and its explanation). Therefore, to that extent the Mind does not have the power of conceiving things under a species of eternity.

But because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under a species of eternity (by IIP44C2), and it also pertains to the nature of the Mind to conceive the Body’s essence under a species of eternity [25] (by P23), and beyond these two, nothing else pertains to the Mind’s essence (by IIP13), this power of conceiving things under a species of eternity pertains to the Mind only insofar as it conceives the Body’s essence under a species of eternity, q.e.d.

[30] Schol.: We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow [II/299] from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God (as we have shown in IIP45 and P45S).

[5] P30: Insofar as our Mind knows itself and the Body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

[10] Dem.: Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves necessary existence (by ID8). To conceive things under a species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things insofar as they are conceived through God’s essence, as real beings, or insofar as through God’s essence they involve existence. Hence, insofar as our Mind conceives [15] itself and the Body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc., q.e.d.

P31: The third kind of knowledge depends on the Mind, as on a formal cause, insofar as the Mind itself is eternal.

[20] Dem.: The Mind conceives nothing under a species of eternity except insofar as it conceives its Body’s essence under a species of eternity (by P29), i.e., (by P21 and P23), except insofar as it is eternal. So (by P30) insofar as it is eternal, it has knowledge of God, knowledge [25] which is necessarily adequate (by IIP46). And therefore, the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which can follow from this given knowledge of God (by IIP40), i.e., of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see the Def. of this in IIP40S2); [30] therefore, the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause of the third kind of knowledge (by IIID1), q.e.d.

[II/300] Schol.: Therefore, the more each of us is able to achieve in this kind of knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, i.e., the more perfect and blessed he is. This will be even clearer from what follows.

[5] But here it should be noted that although we are already certain that the Mind is eternal, insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity, nevertheless, for an easier explanation and better understanding of the things we wish to show, we shall consider it as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under a species of eternity, as we have done up to this point. [10] We may do this without danger of error, provided we are careful to draw our conclusions only from evident premises.

P32: Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.

[15] Dem.: From this kind of knowledge there arises the greatest satisfaction of Mind there can be (by P27), i.e. (by Def. Aff. XXV), Joy; this Joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (by [20] P30) it is also accompanied by the idea of God, as its cause, q.e.d.

Cor.: From the third kind of knowledge, there necessarily arises an intellectual Love of God. For from this kind of knowledge there arises (by P32) Joy, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, i.e. (by [25] Def. Aff. VI), Love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by P29), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call intellectual love of God.

P33: The intellectual Love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, [30] is eternal.

[II/301] Dem.: For the third kind of knowledge (by P31 and by IA3) is eternal. And so (by IA 3), the Love that arises from it must also be eternal, q.e.d.

[5] Schol.: Although this Love toward God has had no beginning (by P33), it still has all the perfections of Love, just as if it had come to be (as we have feigned in P32C). There is no difference here, except that the Mind has had eternally the same perfections which, in our [10] fiction, now come to it, and that it is accompanied by the idea of God as an eternal cause. If Joy, then, consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in the fact that the Mind is endowed with perfection itself.

[15] P34: Only while the Body endures is the Mind subject to affects which are related to the passions.

Dem.: An imagination is an idea by which the Mind considers a thing as present (see its Def. in IIP17S), which nevertheless indicates [20] the present constitution of the human Body more than the nature of the external thing (by IIP16C2). An imagination, then, is an affect (by the gen. Def. Aff.), insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the Body. So (by P21) only while the body endures is the Mind subject [25] to affects which are related to passions, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that no Love except intellectual Love is eternal.

[30] Schol.: If we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their Mind, but that [II/302] they confuse it with duration, and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death.

P35: God loves himself with an infinite intellectual Love.

[5] Dem.: God is absolutely infinite (by ID6), i.e. (by IID6), the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection, accompanied (by IIP3) by the idea of himself, i.e. (by IP11 and D1), by the idea of his cause. And this [10] is what we said (P32C) intellectual Love is.

P36: The Mind’s intellectual Love of God is the very Love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained [15] by the human Mind’s essence, considered under a species of eternity; i.e., the Mind’s intellectual Love of God is part of the infinite Love by which God loves himself.

Dem.: This Love the Mind has must be related to its actions (by P32C and IIIP3); it is, then, an action by which the Mind contemplates [20] itself, with the accompanying idea of God as its cause (by P32 and P32C), i.e. (by IP25C and IIP11C), an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human Mind, contemplates himself, with the accompanying idea of himself [as the cause];16 so (by P35), this Love the Mind has is part of the infinite love by which God [25] loves himself, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and consequently that God’s love of men and the Mind’s intellectual Love of God are one and the same.

[II/303] Schol.: From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or Freedom, consists, viz. in a constant and eternal Love of God, or in God’s Love for men. And this Love, or blessedness, is [5] called Glory in the Sacred Scriptures17—not without reason. For whether this Love is related to God or to the Mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind, which is really not distinguished from Glory (by Defs. Aff. XXV and XXX). For insofar as it is related to God (by P35), it is Joy (if I may still be permitted to use this term),18 accompanied [10] by the idea of himself [as its cause].19 And similarly insofar as it is related to the Mind (by P27).

Again, because the essence of our Mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is the beginning and foundation (by IP15 and IIP47S), it is clear to us how our Mind, with respect both to essence and existence, [15] follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God.

I thought this worth the trouble of noting here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things I have called intuitive, or knowledge of the third kind (see IIP40S2), can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge I have called knowledge of the second kind. For although [20] I have shown generally in Part I that all things (and consequently the human Mind also) depend on God both for their essence and their existence, nevertheless, that demonstration, though legitimate and put beyond all chance of doubt, still does not affect our Mind as much as when this is inferred from the very essence of any singular thing which [25] we say depends on God.

P37: There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual, Love, or which can take it away.

[30] Dem.: This intellectual Love follows necessarily from the nature of the Mind insofar as it is considered as an eternal truth, through God’s nature (by P33 and P29). So if there were something contrary to this [II/304] Love, it would be contrary to the true; consequently, what could remove this Love would bring it about that what is true would be false. This (as is known through itself) is absurd. Therefore, there is nothing in nature, etc., q.e.d.

[5] Schol.: IVA1 concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place. I believe no one doubts this.

P38: The more the Mind understands things by the second and third kind of [10] knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death.

Dem.: The Mind’s essence consists in knowledge (by IIP11); therefore, the more the Mind knows things by the second and third kind [15] of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains (by P23 and P29), and consequently (by P37), the greater the part of it that is not touched by affects which are contrary to our nature, i.e., which (by IVP30) are evil. Therefore, the more the Mind understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the greater the part of it that [20] remains unharmed, and hence, the less it is acted on by affects, etc., q.e.d.

Schol.: From this we understand what I touched on in IVP39S, and what I promised to explain in this Part, viz. that death is less harmful to us, the greater the Mind’s clear and distinct knowledge, [25] and hence, the more the Mind loves God.

Next, because (by P27) the highest satisfaction there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows from this that the human Mind can be of such a nature that the part of the Mind which we have shown perishes with the body (see P21) is of no moment in relation [30] to what remains. But I shall soon treat this more fully.

P39: He who has a Body capable of a great many things has a Mind whose greatest part is eternal.

[II/305] Dem.: He who has a Body capable of doing a great many things is least troubled by evil affects (by IVP38), i.e. (by IVP30), by affects [5] contrary to our nature. So (by P10) he has a power of ordering and connecting the affections of his Body according to the order of the intellect, and consequently (by P14), of bringing it about that all the affections of the Body are related to the idea of God. The result (by P15) is that it is affected with a Love of God, which (by P16) must [10] occupy, or constitute the greatest part of the Mind. Therefore (by P33), he has a Mind whose greatest part is eternal, q.e.d.

Schol.: Because human Bodies are capable of a great many things, [15] there is no doubt but what they can be of such a nature that they are related to Minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and of which the greatest, or chief, part is eternal. So they hardly fear death.

But for a clearer understanding of these things, we must note here that we live in continuous change, and that as we change for the better [20] or worse, we are called happy or unhappy. For he who has passed from being an infant or child to being a corpse is called unhappy. On the other hand, if we pass the whole length of our life with a sound Mind in a sound Body, that is considered happiness. And really, he who, like an infant or child, has a Body capable of very few things, and very heavily dependent on external causes, has a Mind which [25] considered solely in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things.

In this life, then, we strive especially that the infant’s Body may change (as much as its nature allows and assists) into another, capable [30] of a great many things and related to a Mind very much conscious of itself, of God, and of things. We strive, that is, that whatever is related to its memory or imagination is of hardly any moment in relation to the intellect (as I have already said in P38S).

[II/306] P40: The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.

[5] Dem.: The more each thing is perfect, the more reality it has (by IID6), and consequently (by IIIP3 and P3S), the more it acts and the less it is acted on. This Demonstration indeed proceeds in the same way in reverse, from which it follows that the more a thing acts, the more perfect it is, q.e.d.

[10] Cor.: From this it follows that the part of the Mind that remains, however great it is, is more perfect than the rest.

For the eternal part of the Mind (by P23 and P29) is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act (by IIIP3). But what we have [15] shown to perish is the imagination (by P21), through which alone we are said to be acted on (by IIIP3 and the gen. Def. Aff.). So (by P40), the intellect, however extensive it is, is more perfect than the imagination, q.e.d.

Schol.: These are the things I have decided to show concerning the [20] Mind, insofar as it is considered without relation to the Body’s existence. From them—and at the same time from IP21 and other things—it is clear that our Mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect.

[25] P41: Even if we did not know that our Mind is eternal, we would still regard as of the first importance Morality, Religion, and absolutely all the things we have shown (in Part IV) to be related to Tenacity and Nobility.

[30] Dem.: The first and only foundation of virtue, or of the method of living rightly (by IVP22C and P24) is the seeking of our own advantage. But to determine what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the eternity of the Mind, which we only came to know in [II/307] the Fifth Part. Therefore, though we did not know then that the Mind is eternal, we still regarded as of the first importance the things we showed to be related to Tenacity and Nobility. And so, even if we also did not know this now, we would still regard as of the first importance [5] the same rules of reason, q.e.d.

Schol.: The usual conviction of the multitude20 seems to be different. For most people apparently believe that they are free to the extent that they are permitted to yield to their lust, and that they give up their right to the extent that they are bound to live according to the [10] rule of the divine law. Morality, then, and Religion, and absolutely everything related to Strength of Character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to put down after death, when they also hope to receive a reward for their bondage, that is, for their Morality and Religion. They are induced to live according to the rule of the divine [15] law (as far as their weakness and lack of character allows) not only by this hope, but also, and especially, by the fear that they may be punished horribly after death. If men did not have this Hope and Fear, but believed instead that minds die with the body, and that the wretched, exhausted with the burden of Morality, cannot look forward to a life to come, they would return to their natural disposition, and would prefer to govern all their actions according to lust, and to [20] obey fortune rather than themselves.

These opinions seem no less absurd to me than if someone, because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food to eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons and other deadly things, or because he sees that the Mind is not eternal, or immortal, should prefer to be mindless, and to live without reason. These [common [25] beliefs] are so absurd they are hardly worth mentioning.

P42: Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we are able to restrain them.

[30] Dem.: Blessedness consists in Love of God (by P36 and P36S), a Love which arises from the third kind of knowledge (by P32C). So [II/308] this Love (by IIIP59 and P3) must be related to the Mind insofar as it acts. Therefore (by IVD8), it is virtue itself. This was the first point.

Next, the more the Mind enjoys this divine Love, or blessedness, [5] the more it understands (by P32), i.e. (by P3C), the greater the power it has over the affects, and (by P38) the less it is acted on by evil affects. So because the Mind enjoys this divine Love or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts. And because human power to [10] restrain the affects consists only in the intellect, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained the affects. Instead, the power to restrain lusts arises from blessedness itself, q.e.d.

Schol.: With this I have finished all the things I wished to show [15] concerning the Mind’s power over the affects and its Freedom. From what has been shown, it is clear how much the Wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than one who is ignorant and is driven only by lust. For not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor [20] things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be. On the other hand, the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of mind.

If the way I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, still, it can be found. And of course, what is found so rarely [25] must be hard. For if salvation were at hand, and could be found without great effort, how could nearly everyone neglect it? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.