The Collected Works of Spinoza Volume I and II

[iii] knowledge should be considered more powerful and necessary as it contributes more to educating men to virtue and rousing them to it, he claims that

[15] [iv] all opinions about God and his worship, and about everything pertaining to religion, are to be approved, or at least not rejected, if they’re true in the opinion of those who favor them, and are so established that uprightness may thrive and flourish.

To establish this doctrine he cites the Prophets themselves as the authors of, and witnesses to, his opinion. Having learned that God [20] considers it unimportant what opinions men have about religion, but that all worship and opinions are pleasing to God if they proceed from a zeal for virtue and reverence for divinity, they took such liberties that they even offered arguments to incite men to virtue when the arguments were indeed not true in themselves, but were merely thought [25] to be true by the people they were addressing, and naturally suited to spur them to prepare themselves more eagerly for the practice of virtue. He affirms, then, that God permitted the Prophets to use those arguments which would be adapted to the times and reasoning of the people, and which they, according to their understanding of things, [30] thought good and effective.

[20] He thinks that’s why some Divine Teachers used one kind of argument, and others, others, often using arguments inconsistent with one another—for example, why Paul taught that man is not justified by works, whereas James advocated the opposite view. James, the author thinks, saw that Christians take the doctrine of justification by faith off in a different [IV/215] direction, and so proves by many arguments that man is justified by faith and by works. For he understood that it wasn’t in the interests of the Christians of his time to advocate and propose, as Paul had done, that doctrine about faith according to which men rested quietly in God’s [5] mercy, and had almost no concern for good works. Paul was addressing the Jews, who erroneously placed their Justification in the works of the law, specially handed down to them by Moses, by which they’d been raised above the nations. Thinking that a way to blessedness was prepared for them alone, they rejected that account of salvation by faith which made [10] them equal to the nations and deprived them of all their privileges.

Since each proposition, then—both Paul’s and James’s—contributed admirably to making men apply their minds to piety, each according to the different circumstances of the times when they were preaching and the people they were preaching to, the Author thinks it was a matter of Apostolic prudence to teach now this doctrine and now that.

[15] [21] And this is one reason (among many others) why the Author thinks it is very far from the truth to try to explain the sacred text by reason and to establish it as the interpreter of Scripture, or to interpret one holy Teacher through another, since they are of equal authority, and the words they used are to be explained by the manner of speaking and [20] the property of the language familiar to those Teachers. In investigating Scripture’s true meaning, [the Author thinks,] we must attend only to its literal meaning, not to the nature of the thing.

Christ himself, then, and the other Teachers God sent, led the way by their example and practice, and showed that only by zeal [25] for the virtues do men proceed to happiness, and that other things ought to be thought of no importance. From that the Author tries to show that the Magistrate’s only concern ought to be that justice and uprightness flourish in the Republic, but that it is no part of his duty to decide what worship and what doctrine are most in accord [30] with the truth. He need only take care that things not be accepted which pose an obstacle to virtue, even according to the opinion of those who profess them.8

The Magistrate, therefore, without offense to the divinity, can easily tolerate different forms of worship in his Republic. To make this convincing, the Author takes the following course. He offers an account of the moral virtues—insofar as they are useful in Societies and concerned with [IV/216] external actions—according to which no one is obliged to practice them according to his private judgment and initiative, but the cultivation, practice and regulation of the virtues depend on the authority and command of the Magistrate. This is true for two reasons: first, because the external [5] acts expressing the virtues take their nature from the circumstances, and second, because a man’s duty regarding which external acts of this kind ought to be performed is judged by the advantage or disadvantage arising from them. So those external acts not done at the right time lose the nature of virtues, and their opposites ought to be counted as virtues.

The Author thinks there is another kind of virtues, which, insofar [10] as they subsist within the Mind, always keep their nature and do not depend on the changeable state of circumstances. [23] It is never permitted to anyone to be disposed to cruelty or savagery, not loving either his neighbor or the truth. But occasions can occur when it may be permitted, not indeed to set aside the mind’s intention [15] and devotion to the virtues mentioned, but either to refrain from the external acts [the virtues would normally require], or even to do things which, as far as external appearance is concerned, are thought to be inconsistent with these virtues. So it may happen that it’s no longer the duty of a decent man to state the truth openly, [20] and to share it, either orally or in writing, with [his fellow] citizens, and communicate it to them—[not, for example,] if we think more harm than good will come to the citizens from that publication. And although each of us ought to embrace all men in love, and it’s never permitted to abandon this affect, nevertheless, it turns out rather [25] frequently that we can treat certain men harshly without this vice, when it’s established that the mercy we are prepared to use toward them will lead to great evil for us.

So, indeed, everyone agrees that not all truths—whether they pertain to religion or to civil life—are fittingly told at all times. No one [30] thinks that roses should be cast before swine, if there’s a risk that the swine will rage against those who offer them the roses. Similarly, no one thinks a good man has a duty to teach ordinary people certain basic doctrines of religion, when there’s a fear that if they were spread among ordinary people, they would so disturb the Republic or the Church that more harm than good would result, both for citizens and saints alike.

[IV/217] Moreover, Civil Societies, from which rule and the authority to make laws cannot be separated, have also established, among other things, the principle that what would be useful to men united in a civil body, must not be left to the decision of individuals, but yielded to the rulers. From that the Author proves that the Magistrate has a right to [5] decide what kind of doctrines, and which doctrines, ought to be taught publicly in the Republic, and that subjects have a duty to refrain, as far as external profession is concerned, from teaching and professing doctrines the Magistrate has decreed there should be public silence about. For God did not allow the judgment of private individuals [to determine what doctrines they would publicly profess] any more than [10] he permitted them to do things contrary to the Magistrate’s intentions and decrees, or the judges’ decision, by which the force of the laws would be mocked and the Magistrates frustrated in their end.

The Author thinks men can agree about things of this kind, regarding external worship and its profession, and that external acts of Divine worship can be committed to the Judgment of the Magistrate as safely [15] as is conceded to him the right and 'power to appraise an injury done to the state and to punish it by force. For a private individual is not bound to adapt his own judgment to the judgment of the Magistrate concerning an injury done to the state, but can still have his own opinion (though he is bound, if necessary, to do his part in carrying out the [20] Magistrate’s judgment). In the same way, the Author thinks, it is within the province of private individuals in a State to judge about truth and falsity, and also about the necessity, of some doctrine. He holds that a private individual cannot be bound by the laws of the state to think the same about religion [as the Magistrate does], even though it may [25] depend on the Magistrate’s judgment what doctrines ought to be publicly propounded and private citizens have a duty to keep to themselves any religious opinions which disagree with the Magistrate’s, and not to do anything which would prevent the laws established by the Magistrate concerning worship from maintaining their force.

[30] But because it can happen that a Magistrate who disagrees with many of the ordinary people about the fundamental principles of religion wants some things to be publicly taught which the people’s judgment rejects, and nevertheless thinks it a matter of the divine honor that there be a public profession of such doctrines in his Republic, the Author sees that a difficulty remains: very great harm could be done to the citizens [IV/218] because the Magistrate’s judgment differs from that of ordinary people.9 So to the preceding argument he adds this other one, which at the same time calms the minds both of the Magistrate and of his subjects, and preserves freedom of religion intact. Namely, the Magistrate does not [5] have to fear God’s anger, even though he permits what in his judgment are improper religious practices to occur in his Republic, provided they are not in conflict with moral virtues and do not subvert them.

The reason for this opinion cannot escape you, since I have already explained it fully above. The Author maintains that God is indifferent to, is not concerned with, what kind of opinions men cherish in religion, [10] and approve and uphold in their heart, or what kind of religious practices they publicly engage in, since all these things ought to be regarded as having no relation to virtue and vice—although everyone has a duty to conduct his reasoning in such a way that he holds those doctrines, and engages in that worship, with which he thinks he can make the greatest progress in the pursuit of virtue.

[15] Here, most Distinguished Sir, you have a brief account of the main points of the teaching of this Theologico-politician. In my judgment his teaching destroys and completely subverts all worship and religion, secretly introduces Atheism, or at least imagines a God who cannot move men to reverence for his Divinity. His God is subjected to fate; [20] no room is left for any divine governance or providence; the whole distribution of punishments and rewards is destroyed. At least it’s easy to see from the Author’s writing that the authority of the whole of Sacred Scripture is shattered by his reasoning and arguments, and that it is mentioned by the Author only for the sake of the appearances. It [25] follows from his positions that the Koran must be regarded as equal to the Word of God. The Author does not have even one argument by which he might prove that Mohammed was not a true Prophet, because the Turks too, in accordance with the prescriptions of their Prophet, cultivate moral virtues concerning which there is no dispute among the nations. Moreover, according to the Author’s teaching, it is [30] not unusual for God to also bring the nations which did not receive the oracles given to the Jews and Christians into the circle of reason and obedience by other revelations.

So I think I am not deviating very far from the truth, or doing the Author any injustice, if I denounce him for teaching pure Atheism, by disguised and counterfeit arguments.

[Lambertus van Velthuysen
Utrecht, 24 January 1671]10

[IV/219b] LETTER 43 (A)

TO THE MOST LEARNED AND DISTINGUISHED JACOB OSTENS FROM B. D. S.

[answer to the preceding letter]

Friend,

[20] No doubt you’re surprised that I have made you wait so long, but till now I could hardly bring myself to reply to that man’s pamphlet,11 which you wanted to share with me. Even now, my only reason for doing this is that I promised you. But to satisfy both you and myself, as much as possible, I’ll keep my promise as succinctly as I can, and [25] show briefly how wrongly he has interpreted my meaning. Whether he did this from malice or from ignorance, I can’t easily say.12 But to the matter.

First, he says: it’s not important to know what my nation is, or what way of life I follow.¹³ But of course if he had known, he would not so easily [30] have persuaded himself that I teach atheism. For atheists are accustomed to seek honors and riches immoderately.14 But I have always scorned those things. Everyone who knows me knows that.

[IV/220b] Next, to prepare the path to his goal, he says I am not stupid, so that [20] he can more easily persuade people that I’ve written skillfully, cunningly, and maliciously, for the most wicked cause of the Deists.15 This shows well enough that he hasn’t understood my arguments. Who can be so intellectually skillful and cunning that he can give, insincerely, so many and such strong arguments for a thing he regards as false? Who, I say, [25] will he afterward think has written sincerely if he thinks fictions can be as solidly demonstrated as truths? But I don’t wonder now at this. For Voetius once defamed Descartes in the same way.16 So the best men are always maligned.

Next, he continues: to avoid the fault of superstition, he seems to have cast off all religion.¹⁷ What he understands by Religion, and what by [30] superstition, I don’t know. Has someone who maintains that God must be recognized as the highest good, and that he should be freely loved as such, cast off all religion? Is someone who holds that our greatest happiness and freedom consist only in this [love of God] irreligious? Or that the reward of virtue is virtue itself, whereas the punishment of folly and weakness is folly itself? And finally, that each person ought [IV/221b] to love his neighbor and obey the commands of the supreme 'power? [20] Not only have I explicitly said these things, I have also proven them by the strongest arguments.

But I think I see what mud this man is stuck in. He finds nothing in virtue itself, or in understanding, which delights him, and he would prefer to live according to the impulse of his affects, if one thing did not stand in his way: he fears punishment. So he abstains from evil actions, and obeys the divine commandments, like a slave, reluctantly [25] and with a vacillating heart. For this slavery he expects God to load him down with gifts far more pleasant to him than the love of God. And he expects this all the more, the more he resists the good he does and the more unwillingly he does it. As a result, he believes everyone not held back by this fear lives without restraint and casts off all religion.

[30] But enough of these things. I pass to the deduction by which he tries to show that I teach atheism by disguised and counterfeit arguments.18 The foundation of his reasoning is this: he thinks I take away God’s freedom and subject him to fate. This is false, of course. For I’ve maintained that everything follows with inevitable necessity from God’s nature in the same way everyone maintains that it follows from God’s nature that he [IV/222b] understands himself. Of course, no one denies that [God’s understanding of himself] follows necessarily from the divine nature. Nevertheless, no [20] one conceives that God has been coerced by some fate, but [everyone thinks] God understands himself completely freely, even if necessarily. I find nothing here which anyone can’t perceive. Nevertheless, if he believes these things are said with evil intent, what does he think about his Descartes, who maintained that everything we do was previously [25] preordained by God,19 who indeed creates us anew, as it were, at each moment,²⁰ and that nevertheless we act from the freedom of our will. Surely, as Descartes himself confesses, no one can comprehend this.²¹

Next, this inevitable necessity of things does not destroy either divine or human laws. For whether moral teachings take the form of a law [30] from God himself or not, they are still divine and salutary. Whether we receive the good which follows from virtue and divine love from God as a Judge, or because it emanates from the necessity of the divine nature, it is not for that reason either more or less desirable. Similarly, the evils which follow from evil deeds are not less to be feared because they follow from them necessarily.

[IV/223b] Finally, whether we do what we do necessarily or freely, we are still led by hope or fear. So he’s wrong when he says that I maintain that [20] there’s no place for precepts and commands,22 or as he continues afterward, that there is no expectation of reward or punishment, when all things are ascribed to fate, and it is maintained that all things emanate from God with inevitable necessity.²³

I do not ask here and now why it is the same thing (or not much different) to maintain that all things emanate necessarily from God’s nature and that the universe itself is God.²⁴ But I should like you to [25] note what he quickly adds, no less offensively: namely, that I don’t hold that a man ought to attend to virtue because of God’s precepts and law, or because he hopes for a reward or fears punishment, but, etc.25

Of course, you won’t find this anywhere in my treatise. On the contrary, I said explicitly in Ch. 4 that the chief point of the divine law—which [30] I said (in Ch. 12) has been inscribed divinely in our mind—and its main precept is that we should love God as the greatest good, not from fear of any punishment (for love can’t arise from fear), and not from love of anything else in which we wish to delight (for then we would love, not so much God himself, as the other thing we desire).

Moreover, I showed in the same chapter that God revealed this very law to the prophets.26 And whether I maintain that that law of God [IV/224b] has received the form of a law from God himself, or I conceive it like [20] the rest of God’s decrees, which involve eternal necessity and truth, it will nevertheless remain God’s decree and a salutary teaching. And whether I love God freely or from the necessity of his decree, I shall nevertheless love God, and I will be saved.

[25] So I can affirm here and now: that man is one of those of whom I said at the end of my preface [§34] that I would prefer that they neglect my book completely, rather than be troublesome by interpreting it perversely, as they usually do everything. They do themselves no good; others they harm.

Although I would think what I have written is enough to show what [30] I wanted to, I nevertheless thought it would be worthwhile to note a few further things:

[1] he is wrong to think that I had in mind that axiom of the theologians who distinguish between the speech of a prophet who is propounding a doctrine and that of one who is simply relating something. [IV/210/10–13] For if by this axiom he understands the one I attributed in Chapter 15 to a certain Rabbi Jehuda Alfakhar, how could I think that mine agrees with it, since in that chapter I rejected it as false? But if he’s thinking of something else, [IV/225b] I confess I still don’t know what, and so could not have had it in mind.

[2] Next, I also don’t see why he says [IV/210/14–15] that I think [20] everyone who denies that reason and philosophy are the interpreter of Scripture will follow my opinion. For I refuted their opinion as well as that of Maimonides.

It would take too long to enumerate all the passages where he shows that he has not made his judgment about me with a completely dispassionate [25] mind, so I pass to his conclusion, where he says

[3] that I have no argument left to me by which I might prove that Mohammed was not a true prophet. He tries, indeed, to show this from my opinions. Nevertheless, it clearly follows from them that Mohammed was an impostor, since he completely takes away that freedom which [30] the Universal religion concedes (by the natural light and by what the prophets revealed), which I have shown by all means ought to be granted.

But even if this were not the case, I ask you: am I bound to show that anyone is a false prophet? Surely the contrary is true: the prophets were bound to show that they were true.

If he should reply that Mohammed also taught the divine law and gave certain signs of his mission, as the other prophets did, there [IV/226b] will surely be no reason why he should deny that Mohammed was a true prophet. Moreover, as far as the Turks and the other nations are concerned, if they worship God with the practice of justice and with [20] loving-kindness toward their neighbor, I believe they have the spirit of Christ and are saved, whatever, in their ignorance, they may believe about Mohammed and the oracles.27

There, my friend, you see how far that man has wandered from the truth. Nevertheless I grant that he does me no injury, but himself the greatest injury, when he does not blush to say that I teach atheism by disguised and counterfeit arguments.

[25] For the rest, I don’t think you will find anything here which you could judge to have been said too harshly against that man. However, if you do come upon anything like that, I beg you either to delete it, or to correct it, as it seems best to you. For whoever he may be, it’s not my intention to provoke him, and to acquire enemies of my own [30] making. Because this often happens in such debates, I could hardly prevail upon myself to reply. I could not have prevailed, if I had not promised. Farewell. I commit this letter to your prudence, I who am, etc.

[The Hague, February 1671]

[IV/227a] LETTER 44 (NS)

TO THE MOST WORTHY AND WISE JARIG JELLES FROM B. D. S.

Dear Friend,

When Professor . . .28 visited me recently, he said, among other things, that he had heard that my Theological-Political Treatise has been translated into Dutch,²⁹ and that someone (he didn’t know who) intended to have [10] it printed. So I beg you, very earnestly, to please find out about this, to prevent the printing, if that’s possible. This is not only my request, but also that of many of my good friends, who would not like to see [15] this book prohibited.30 If it’s published in Dutch, that will doubtless happen. I don’t doubt that you will do me and the cause this service.

Some time ago one of my friends sent me a little book, titled Homo [IV/228] Politicus, or Political Man,31 which I’d previously heard a lot about. I’ve read through it and found it to be the most harmful book men can devise. The Author’s supreme goods are money and honor. He organizes [5] his teaching for these ends and shows how to reach them: by rejecting all religion internally, and externally professing whatever can most serve your advancement. In addition, you should not be true to anyone, except insofar as it’s to your advantage. For the rest, he puts the highest value on dissembling, promising without performing, lying, [10] false oaths, and many other things.

When I read this, I thought about writing a little book indirectly against it, in which I would treat of the supreme good, and further, to show the anxious and miserable condition of those who are greedy for money and honor, and finally, by clear reasoning and many examples [15] to show that Republics which have an insatiable desire for honor and money must necessarily perish, and that they have [in fact] perished.32

How much better and more excellent the thoughts of Thales of Miletus were than those of this Author will be evident from the following reasoning. All things, he said, are common among friends; the wise are friends of the gods; [OP: all things belong to the gods]; [IV/229] therefore, all things belong to the wise.33 In this way this very wise man made himself the richest of all, more by nobly scorning wealth than by greedily pursuing it.

On another occasion³⁴ he showed that it is not by necessity, but [5] voluntarily, that the wise possess no wealth. For when his friends reproached him for his poverty, he made them this reply: “do you want me to prove that I can acquire what I consider unworthy of my labor, and what you seek so eagerly?” When they said “yes,” he leased all [10] the presses in Greece. For being very experienced in the movement of the stars, he had seen that that year there would be a great abundance of olives, whereas there had been a shortage in preceding years. He leased out at a high price presses he had leased for very little money, [15] because people needed to use them to press the oil from the olives. By doing this, he acquired in one year great wealth for himself, which he subsequently shared with as much generosity as he had shown cleverness in acquiring it.

I close with a declaration that I am, etc.
The Hague, 17 February 1671

[IV/230] LETTER 45 (OP)

TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST DISTINGUISHED MR. B. D. S. FROM GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ

Illustrious and Most Esteemed Sir,

Among the other praises the common report has bestowed on You, I understand that you also have outstanding skill in Optics.35 That’s why I wanted to send You my essay, such as it is. I will not easily find a better critic for this sort of study. I’ve titled the piece I’m sending [10] you, A Note on Advanced Optics,36 and have published it so that I could more conveniently share it with friends or with those interested in the subject. I hear also that the Esteemed Hudde is distinguished in this kind of study, and I do not doubt that You know him very well. So you would add wonderfully to your kindness if you also got me his judgment [15] and approval. The article itself explains sufficiently what its subject is.

I believe you have received the Prodromo37 of Francis Lana, S.J., written in Italian, where he also proposes some excellent things in Dioptrics. But also a young Swiss, Joh. Oltius,³⁸ who is very erudite in these matters, has published his Physico-Mechanical Thoughts on Vision, in [20] which he partly promises a certain very simple and general instrument for polishing lenses of every kind, and partly says that he has found a way of collecting all the rays coming from all the points of an object, into as many other corresponding points—but only for an object at a certain distance and of a certain shape.

[25] For the rest, what I’ve proposed comes to this: not that all the rays of all the points are gathered again—for as far as we know now, this is impossible in any object, whatever its distance and shape—but that the rays of the points outside the optic axis, as well as the rays of points on the optic axis, are gathered, and therefore, that the apertures of the [IV/231] lenses can be made as large as you wish without loss of distinct vision. But these matters will await Your most acute judgment. Farewell, Most Esteemed Sir, and be well-disposed toward

your faithful admirer,

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,

[5] Doctor of Laws and Councillor of Mainz

Frankfurt, 5 October (new style) 1671

P.S.: If you deem me worthy of a reply, I hope the very noble Jurist Diemerbroeck 39 will be glad to forward it. I think you have seen my New Physical Hypothesis.⁴⁰ If not, I shall send it.

To M. Spinoza

[10] The Very Celebrated Scientist

And Very Profound Philosopher

Par couvert at Amsterdam 41

[IV/231b] LETTER 46 (A)

TO THE MOST ERUDITE AND NOBLE MR. GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ, J.U.D. AND COUNSELOR OF MAINZ, FROM B. D. S.

(Reply to the Preceding)

[25] Most Learned and Noble Sir,

I’ve read the paper you kindly sent me, and I thank you very much for sharing it with me. I regret that I haven’t been able to follow your train of thought adequately, although I believe you explained it clearly [IV/232b] enough. I beg you, therefore, not to decline to reply to me about these few matters:

[1] Do you believe there is any reason why we ought to make the [20] aperture of lenses small, other than that the rays which come from one point do not meet exactly in another point, but in a small space (which we usually call a mechanical point), which is larger or smaller, in proportion to the size of the aperture?

[2] Next, I ask whether the lenses you call “Pandochal”42 correct this [25] fault? that is, whether the mechanical point, or the small space in which the rays coming from the same point meet after refraction, remains the same in size, whether the opening is large or small? For if they do, it will be possible to increase their aperture as much as you like, and hence, they will be far more excellent than any other figures known to me.

[30] Otherwise, I don’t see why you commend them as so far superior to the common lenses. For circular lenses have the same axis everywhere.43 So when we use them, all the points on the object must be considered as lying on the optical axis. Although not all the points on the object are at the same distance, nevertheless, the difference arising from that [IV/233b] is not perceptible when the objects are very remote, because then the rays coming from the same point are considered as if they entered the lens parallel to one another.

[20] Nevertheless, I do believe this: that when we want to take in several objects in one glance (as happens when we use very large convex ocular lenses), your lenses can help to represent all the objects at once more distinctly. But I shall suspend judgment about all these things until you explain your thinking to me more clearly. I earnestly entreat [25] you to do this.

I sent the second copy to Mr. Hudde, as you asked me to. He replies that at the moment he doesn’t have time to examine it, but he hopes that in a week or two he will be free to do so.

Francis Lana’s Prodromus44 has not yet reached me. Neither have [30] the Physico-mechanical thoughts of Johannes Holt. What I regret more is that I have also not been able to see your physical hypothesis. At least it is not for sale here in The Hague. So if you send it to me, you will make me most grateful. And if I can be of service to you in anything at all, I will not fail to show that I am,

Most esteemed sir,

Wholly yours,

B. despinoza

The Hague, 9 November 1671

[IV/234] Mr. Dimerbruck does not live here. So I’m forced to give this to the ordinary carrier. No doubt you know someone here in The Hague who would be willing to take care of our correspondence. I should like to know who that is, so that letters could be taken care of more [5] conveniently and securely. If the Theological-political treatise has not yet reached you, I’ll send a copy, if you don’t mind. Farewell.45

To the Most Noble and Esteemed Gentleman

Mr. Golfried [sic] Wilhelm Leibniz

Doctor of Law and Councillor of Mainz

Sent 8 December 1671

[IV/234] LETTER 47 (OP)

TO THE VERY ACUTE AND RENOWNED PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM J. LUDWIG FABRITIUS

Most Renowned Sir,

[20] His Serene Highness, the Elector Palatine,46 my Most Gracious Lord, has commanded me to write to You, whom I had indeed not known until now, but who has been most highly recommended to his Most Serene Highness, and to ask whether you would be inclined to take up an ordinary⁴⁷ Professorship of Philosophy in his renowned [25] University. You will receive the annual salary ordinary Professors enjoy today. Nowhere else will you find a Prince more favorable to men of outstanding intellect, among whom he judges you are one. You will [IV/235] have the most ample liberty to philosophize,48 which he believes you will not abuse to disturb the publicly established religion.

I could not fail to comply with the command of this wisest of Princes. Therefore, I beg you most earnestly to reply to me as soon as possible, [5] and to give your reply, either to his Serene Highness’s resident in The Hague, Mr. Grotius, or to Mr. Gilles van der Hek, to be forwarded to me in the packet of letters which are usually sent to the court. Or you may use whatever other means seems most convenient.

I add this one thing: that if you come here, you will live pleasantly a [10] life worthy of a Philosopher, unless everything else turns out contrary to our hope and expectation.

Farewell, and Hail, Most Distinguished Sir,

From one who is Most Devoted to you,

J. Ludwig Fabritius

Professor, University of Heidelberg, and

Councillor to the Elector Palatine

Heidelberg, 16 February 1673

LETTER 48 (OP)

TO THE MOST ESTEEMED AND NOBLE GENTLEMAN MR. J. LUDWIG FABRITIUS PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG, AND COUNCILLOR TO THE ELECTOR PALATINE FROM B. D. S.

Reply to the Preceding

Most Esteemed Sir,

If it had ever been my desire to take up a professorship in any faculty, I could have wished only for this one, which his Serene Highness, [IV/236] the Elector Palatine, is offering me, through you, especially because of the freedom of Philosophizing which your Most Gracious Prince is willing to grant, not to mention that I have long wished to live under the Rule of a Prince whose wisdom all admire.

[5] But since it’s never been my intention to teach publicly, I cannot be persuaded to embrace this excellent opportunity, even though I’ve weighed the matter for a long time. For first, I think that if I were willing to devote myself to educating young men, I would stop advancing in Philosophy. Second, I think I don’t know what the limits of [10] that freedom of Philosophizing might have to be, for me not to seem to want to disturb the publicly established religion. In fact, schisms arise not so much from ardent zeal for Religion as from men’s varying affects, or their eagerness to contradict one another. This results in their habit of distorting and condemning everything, even things rightly said. I have experienced these things already, while leading a [15] private and solitary life. How much more would I have to fear them after I rose to an office of this rank.

You see, then, Most Esteemed Sir, that I am not holding back because I hope for a better chance, but from a love of tranquillity, which I believe I can in some manner maintain, provided I abstain from public Lectures. So I most earnestly ask you to entreat his Most Serene Highness, the [20] Elector, to let me deliberate further about this matter, and then that you continue to procure the Most Gracious Prince’s favor toward his most devoted supporter, that you may put under a greater obligation to yourself, Most Esteemed and Noble Sir,

Yours truly,

B. d. S.

The Hague, 30 March 1673

LETTER 48A 49

JARIG JELLES PROFESSION OF THE UNIVERSAL AND CHRISTIAN FAITH CONTAINED IN A LETTER TO N.N.

[Jelles/Spruit, 6] Honorable Friend,

I have more readily granted your earnest request to let you know through a letter my opinion regarding my faith, or Religion, since you declare that the Reason you were urging me to do this was only that some people are trying to convince you that Cartesian Philosophers (among whom you are pleased to count me) cherish a strange opinion, falling into ancient Paganism, and that their Propositions and foundations are contrary to the foundations of the Christian Religion and Piety, etc.

In maintaining my view, I’ll first say that the Cartesian Philosophy touches Religion so little that Descartes’ Propositions are followed, not only by various [Protestant] denominations, but also by the Roman [denomination]. So what I say about Religion must be taken only for my personal opinion, not for that of the Cartesians. Though I’m not inclined to dispute with others, or to silence the slanderers, for me it will be enough to satisfy you and those like you.

It was not my intention to prescribe a universal Creed, or to define the essential, fundamental, and necessary Articles of Belief, but only to tell you my opinion. Nevertheless, I’ll try, to the best of my ability, to fulfill the Conditions required, in Jacob Acontius’ judgment, for a universal Profession, acceptable to all Christians, namely, that it contain [Jelles/Spruit, 8] only what necessarily must be known, what is very true and certain, what is certified and corroborated by testimonies, and finally, what, so far as possible, is expressed in the same words and ways of speaking the Holy Ghost used.

Here, then, is a Profession which seems to me to be of that kind. Read it attentively. Don’t judge it lightly. Be assured that, as I’ve taken a stand for the truth, so I seek to inspire it in you in this Letter.50

[§1] Of God, and his attributes⁵¹

I believe and profess that there is a God, or that God really exists . . . ; that he is unique . . . , eternal . . . , immutable . . . , omnipotent . . . , supremely wise or omniscient . . . , and the source of all good . . . ; that he created the Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and everything in them; that all things are from him, and through him, and to him . . . ; that we also are in him, live in him, and move in him . . . ; that he sustains all his creatures, and each of them in particular, governs them, and works in them . . . ; and finally that he has made all his works good, or in the most perfect way, and that he always works in the most perfect way. . . .

[§2] Of God’s Son and the Holy Ghost⁵²

I believe and profess that there is a Son of God, and that our Lord Jesus Christ, insofar as his flesh or body is concerned, was born from David’s seed, and is the Son of men; . . . [he is] God’s Son, in respect to the sanctifying and life-giving Spirit which resides in him . . . ; and which God has given him without measure.

I believe also that our Lord Jesus Christ, through this Spirit, has risen from the dead . . . ; and offered himself up to God as an innocent sacrifice . . . ; further, that because this Spirit was in him, he was anointed by God, and sent to bring the good news to the poor in spirit, to heal the broken-hearted, to liberate the captives, and give sight to the blind (in intellect), to announce the joyful year of the Lord . . . ; I believe further that, as regards the purpose of his coming into the world, he was born, and came into the world, to be a witness to the Truth . . . , that he is God’s Reason or Intellect, and moreover that he makes holy . . . , makes free . . . , and brings to God.

[I believe that he came into the world] to announce a light to the Jews (to whom God had revealed his will as a law and by letters written on tablets) . . . and to the pagans . . . , the light of truth and of reason, in which God’s will became known most perfectly, as he himself knew it; to seek and make holy . . . what was lost . . . , so that the world would be preserved through him . . . , and he would bring men to God . . . ; to take away our sins, and disrupt the works of the devil, that is, to bring it about that we no longer sin, and that the old man, with his works, is dead in us . . . ; so that he would release those who were under the law and they would be adopted as children.

I believe also that God’s Son, or the holy and life-giving Spirit which dwelled in our Lord Jesus Christ . . . was begotten from eternity out of God’s essence . . . ; that in the beginning of all things he was with God, and was God . . . ; that he is the image of the invisible God, the first born of all creatures . . . ; and as regards his nature or essence, he is God’s reason or his intellect . . . his eternal wisdom . . . the truth . . . the true light . . . which coming into the world enlightens each man. . . .

[§3] Of the duties of men for salvation⁵³

I believe that the whole Christian religion, or everything men are obliged to do to obtain supreme blessedness, is contained in the two commandments of the law: (1) you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind; (2) you shall love your neighbor as yourself . . . [I believe] that rebirth is included in the love of God . . . and that all those who love God and their neighbors in this way will be blessed . . . ; and furthermore, that the law is perfect, as far as the commandments are concerned, the two mentioned being the greatest of them, and all the others being contained in them . . . and that our Savior came into the world to fulfill them . . . that is, to bring it about that men should do and observe what the Law commands.

I believe also that those who love, not God, but the world, and the things in it (that is, vainglory, pleasures, riches, etc.), who hate their neighbors, lie, deceive, or offend in some other way, who live in injustice, greed, idolatry, feasting, drunkenness, whoring, and other vices, will be punished with the most severe punishment . . . [I believe] that they cannot inherit God’s kingdom . . . nor see his majesty, unless they convert. . . .

[§4] On the origin of sins⁵⁴

I believe that men don’t love God and their neighbors because they don’t know God. . . . That the love of God arises only from knowledge of God, and that no one can love God who does not know him is so clearly evident in itself, that those who deny this should be considered irrational. . . .

Further, [I believe] that men are drawn away from the good, and toward the evil, or tempted to commit sinful acts . . . through desires which do not come from the mind or from the intellect, and are contrary to God’s law . . . , desires . . . of which anger, vengeance, the desire for glory, feasting, drunkenness, greed, unchastity or lewdness, are not the least) . . . , and that the evil in the world comes from these desires. . . .

[§5] Of men’s depravity and rebirth⁵⁵

I believe that all men are born without a saving knowledge . . . and further, that they are all, by nature, children of anger, or subject to passions of hate, envy, anger, vengeance, love of glory, greed, etc. . . . and that therefore no one can come into God’s kingdom unless he has been born again through the Spirit. . . .

The nature of men who have not been reborn (that is, of men as they are naturally born), considered in itself, is neither evil nor corrupted—as some Christians believe, and claim that we must believe—because in such a condition man, no less than any other thing, has been produced by God, and God cannot create what is evil or corrupted, since this is inconsistent with his goodness and perfection. . . .

That our first Ancestors, Adam and Eve, before their fall and transgression, were moved, like natural Man, by desires contrary to God’s law, and contrary to the counsel of the Spirit, and unlike those who have been born again, who have acquired control over their desires, is evident from the story of their fall and transgression. . . .

[§6] On justification and salvation⁵⁶

I believe that those who are under the law and guided by the law are still in the darkness of ignorance (as far as what must be known for salvation is concerned) . . . subject to sin, or the passions of hate, envy, anger, vengeance, love of glory, greed, etc. . . . further, that through the law they cannot fulfill the requirements of the law, or do what the law requires . . . and that therefore no man can be justified through the law, or by the works of the law. . . .

I believe that what is impossible through the law, and can in no way be done or achieved through the law, can be brought about and achieved through God’s Son (the eternal wisdom and truth) . . . and that God’s son, insofar as he is in us, and we are in him . . . powerfully and really does in us . . . the willing and acting which are pleasing to God and good.

And that truly free willing and free acting are the rebirth and renewal of the spirit . . . ; the love toward God and toward one’s neighbor which the law requires of us and in which all the commandments are included . . . [are] our redemption and liberation . . . , justification . . . , sanctification . . . , life-giving (that is, spiritual and eternal) . . . , that [our Savior] is the resurrection and the life . . . , the spirit . . . , the Word or the Reason of life . . . , and the supreme salvation. The reason which in the beginning was with God, and was God. . . .

I believe also that God’s Son, the eternal wisdom of God, the truth, etc., is the Savior of the whole world . . . that salvation is in him alone and that no other name is given to men though which they are saved . . . that through him we are able to do everything required for salvation . . . , and without him we can do nothing which concerns our salvation . . . ; that through him we receive forgiveness of sins . . . ; are reconciled with God . . . , freed from sin and made pure and holy by him . . . , blessed with all spiritual and heavenly blessings . . . , and assured that we are children of God . . . ; finally, that through him we are united with one another and with Christ, as Christ is one with God. . . .⁵⁷

[Jelles/Spruit, 226] I trust that with this I’ve done more than you expected and that you’ll therefore consider yourself satisfied with what you asked of me. In return I ask only that you please consider what I’ve said carefully and with circumspection, and then judge what there is in the reports people have given you about my opinions in religion.

If you come across anything in this which might seem false or contrary to Holy Scripture, I ask you to tell me, and also to tell me the reason why it seems so to you, so that I can examine it. Those who consider something to be contrary to Holy Scripture and false if they find it does not agree with their Formularies or Professions of Faith will doubtless judge that much of what is in my letter is of that kind. But I am confident that those who test it according to the truth—which I have shown previously here is the only unmistakable rule or touchstone of truth and falsity, of orthodoxy and unorthodoxy—will judge differently about this, as I expect you to do also.

Here, then, you have my opinion, as far as the Christian Religion is concerned, and with it the proofs and arguments on which it rests. It remains now for you to judge whether those who build on such a foundation, and try to live according to such knowledge, are Christians or not, and what truth there is in the reports some have given you about my opinions.

[Jelles/Spruit, 228] In closing, then, I ask now on my part that you weigh all this carefully and calmly, wish you enlightened eyes of the intellect, and conclude with the assurance that I am, etc.

Your devoted friend,

Jarig Jelles

[Amsterdam, early 1673?]58

LETTER 48B

THREE REPORTS OF SPINOZA’S REPLY TO THE PRECEDING LETTER

[1] [Jan Rieuwertsz the elder] And although some, who misunderstood [Jelles’s] meaning, ascribed a strange opinion to him, nevertheless he considered this more worthy of pity than of anger.59 So he proceeded continually to penetrate more and more into the Love and knowledge of God. In this he grew so much that one finds few men who have risen to such a high level of spiritual Understanding. That slander was the reason why he sent this Profession to a certain Friend living outside the City, so that he would judge from it whether his opinion agreed with the truth of the matter. His Friend sent this Profession back to him with these words: I have read over your Writing with pleasure, and found it to be such that I can change nothing in it.

[2] [Pierre Bayle] [§1] I have just learned a rather curious thing: after [Spinoza] renounced the profession of Judaism, he openly professed the Gospel and frequented the assemblies of the Mennonites or those of the Arminians in Amsterdam.60 He even approved a profession of faith that one of his close friends communicated to him. . . .

[§2] When a certain Jarig Jellis [sic], his close friend, was suspected of various heterodoxies, he believed that to justify himself he ought to publish a profession of his faith. Having prepared it, he sent it to Spinoza and asked him to give him his opinion of it. Spinoza replied that he had read it with pleasure and that he had found nothing in it where he [AHW, 307] could make changes. Sir, and Most Distinguished friend: I have read over the writing you sent me with pleasure, and I have found it such that I could not change anything in it.⁶¹ This profession of faith is in Dutch and was printed in 1684.

[3] [Dr. Hallman] More letters were found than they printed. But they were of no importance. That’s why they were burned. There was one letter, however, which he [Jan Rieuwertsz the younger] had preserved, which was upstairs, among his things. Finally I persuaded him to get it and show it to me. It was on a half sheet, quite short, and written in Dutch. The date was 19 April 1673, from The Hague, and the letter was addressed to Jarig Jelles, who had sent him his Profession of a universal Christian faith and asked his judgment about it.

In this reply Spinoza did not give him any praises, or even much approval, but told him only that he could raise one question about it. For when he claimed on p. 5 62 of the manuscript that man is inclined by nature to evil, but through God’s grace and the spirit of Christ becomes indifferent to evil and good, this was contradictory, because he who has the spirit of Christ in this way, must necessarily be impelled only to the good.

Otherwise, Spinoza referred in this letter to Mr. Kerckring,⁶³ a Doctor, whom he had given an assignment in anatomy. At the end of the letter he wrote this to Jelles: “I shall send you the Known Truth⁶⁴ as soon as Mr. Vallon” (who, Rieuwertsz assured me, was a special friend of Spinoza’s, and who subsequently became a professor in Leiden) “returns my copy to me.”⁶⁵ However, if he should delay too long with it, he would arrange for Mr. Bronckhorst⁶⁶ to get him a copy. The conclusion was: that he remains, with cordial greetings, his devoted servant, B. Spinoza.

[IV/238] LETTER 49 (A)

TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MR. JOHANNES GEORGE GRAEVIUS FROM B. D. S.

[5] Most Distinguished Sir,

I ask you to send me, as soon as you can, that Letter concerning Descartes’ death,67 which I believe you copied long ago. For Mr. de V.⁶⁸ has asked me for it several times. If it were mine, I would not be in any hurry. Farewell, most esteemed sir, and remember your friend, who is,

[10] Yours with all affection and fondness,

Benedictus despinoza

The Hague, 14 December 1673

Mr. Johannes George Graevius

Ordinary Professor of Rhetoric

At Utrecht

[Hague night post]

[IV/238] LETTER 50 (NS)

TO THE MOST WORTHY AND WISE MR. JARIG JELLES FROM B. D. S.

[IV/239b] [Dear Friend],69

[20] As far as Politics is concerned, the difference you ask about, between Hobbes and me, is this: I always preserve natural Right unimpaired, and I maintain that in each State 70 the Supreme Magistrate has no more right over its subjects than it has greater power over them. This is always the case in the state of Nature.

[25] Next, regarding the demonstration I establish in the Appendix of the Geometric demonstrations of Descartes’ Principles, namely that God can only very improperly be called one or unique, I reply that a thing is said to be one or unique only in relation to its existence, but not to [30] its essence. For we don’t conceive things under numbers unless they have first been brought under a common genus.

For example, someone who holds a penny and a dollar in his hand will not think of the number two unless he can call the penny and the dollar by one and the same name, either “coin” or “piece of money.” [IV/240b] For then he can say that he has two coins or two pieces of money, since he calls not only the penny, but also the dollar, by the name “coin” or “piece of money.”

[20] From this it’s evident that nothing is called one or unique unless another thing has been conceived which (as they say) agrees with it. But since the existence of God is his essence, and we can’t form a universal idea concerning his essence, it’s certain that someone who calls God one or unique does not have a true idea of God, or is speaking [25] improperly about him.

As for shape being a negation, and not something positive, it’s manifest that matter as a whole, considered without limitation, can have no shape, and that shape pertains only to finite and determinate bodies. [30] For whoever says that he conceives 71 a shape indicates nothing by this except that he conceives a determinate thing, and how it is determinate. So this determination does not pertain to the thing according to its being, but on the contrary, it is its non-being. Therefore, because the shape is nothing but a determination, and a determination is a negation, as they say, it can’t be anything but a negation.

[IV/241b] I’ve seen in a Bookseller’s window the book the Utrecht Professor 72 wrote against mine, which was published after his death. From the few things I read at that time, I decided it was not worth reading, much [15] less answering. So I left the book lying there, along with its author. I smiled to myself that the most ignorant are generally the boldest and the readiest to write. It seems to me that the . . .73 offer their wares for sale in the same way Shopkeepers do, who always show the worst goods [20] first. They say the Devil is a very cunning fellow. But to me it seems that their mind far surpasses his in craftiness. Fare well.

The Hague, 2 June 1674 74

[IV/241] LETTER 51 (NS)

TO THE MOST ACUTE PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM HUGO BOXEL

Sir,

The reason I’m writing you this letter is that I’d like to know your [IV/242] opinion about apparitions and specters or ghosts 75, and if there are any, what you think about them, and how long they live. Some think they’re immortal; others that they’re mortal. I doubt whether you grant that they exist at all, so I won’t proceed further [with questions about their nature].

But it’s certain that the Ancients believed in them. Modern Theologians [5] and Philosophersstill believe such creatures exist, though they don’t agree about their essence. Some say they’re made of a very thin, fine matter; others that they’re spiritual. But (as I have already begun to say) we disagree greatly with one another, because I doubt whether [10] you grant that they exist—although as you know, there are so many examples and stories in all Antiquity that it would really be hard to deny them or call them in doubt.

One thing is certain: if you acknowledge that they exist, you still don’t believe that some of them are the souls of the dead,76 as the Catholics [15] profess. Here I shall stop, and await your reply. I say nothing about the war, nothing about the rumors, because these are the times we are living through . . . , etc. Farewell,

14 September 1674

[IV/242] LETTER 52 (NS)

TO THE MOST ESTEEMED AND WISE HUGO BOXEL FROM B. D. S.

Reply to the Preceding

Sir,

Yesterday I received your letter, which was very welcome to me, as much [30] because I wanted to hear some news from you as because I see that you [IV/243b] have not completely forgotten me. Some, perhaps, would consider it an evil omen that the reason for your writing to me was specters or spirits.77 But I find in this something more important, because I think that not only [20] true things, but even trifles and imaginations, can be to my advantage.

But let’s set to one side the question whether there are specters, phantasms, and imaginations,78 because you find it extraordinary, not only to deny that there are such things, but even to doubt them—convinced [25] as you are by the great number of stories told about them, both by the ancients and the moderns. The great respect I’ve always had for you, and still have, does not permit me to contradict you, much less to flatter you. The middle course I’ll take is to ask that of the many [30] stories you’ve read about ghosts,79 you choose, please, one or two which are least subject to doubt, and which most clearly prove that there are specters.⁸⁰ For to speak frankly, I’ve never read one credible Author who showed clearly that they exist. To this day I don’t know what they are, and no one has ever been able to tell me.

[IV/244b] It’s certain, however, that in the case of a thing experience has shown us so clearly, we must know what it is. Otherwise it will be very hard to conclude from some story that there are specters.81 What we should rather infer is that there is something, but that no one knows what it is. [20] If the Philosophers want to call those things we don’t know “specters,” I won’t be able to deny them that, because there are infinite things of which I have no knowledge.

Finally, Sir, before I explain myself further in this matter, I ask you to tell me what sort of things these specters or spirits 82 are. Are they [25] children, fools, or madmen? Because from what I’ve heard about them, their actions seem to be those of the brainless, rather than of intelligent men. To interpret them as favorably as possible, they are like nothing more than children’s games or the pastimes of fools.

To make an end of this, I’ll mention one more thing: the desire [30] people commonly have to tell things, not as they are, but as they want them to be. We find this more in stories of spirits and ghosts 83 than in other cases. The main reason for this, I believe, is that stories of this [IV/245b] kind have no other witnesses than the people telling them. So, their inventors can, at their pleasure, add or omit details as seems best to them, without needing to fear that anyone will contradict them. [They [15] invent these things]84 especially to justify the fear which has seized them about their dreams and phantasms, but also to strengthen their boldness, faith and opinion.

Besides this I have found still other reasons which move me to doubt, if not the stories themselves, then at least the details with which [20] they’re told, details which are most useful to the conclusion people try to draw from these stories.

I’ll stop here, until I understand which stories have so convinced you that you think it’s absurd even to doubt them.

[The Hague, 16–20 September 1674]85

LETTER 53 (C)

TO THE MOST ACUTE PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM HUGO BOXEL

Reply to the Preceding

Sir,

[IV/246b] I expected no other answer than the one you have sent me, that is, from a friend, and from one who has different opinions. But that difference doesn’t matter, for friends can disagree about indifferent matters, which has always been permitted without harm to the friendship.86

[20] You want me to say, before you explain yourself, what sort of things ghosts are, whether they are children, fools, or madmen, etc., and [OP: you add] that everything you have heard about them seems to proceed more from fools than from intelligent men. The old saying is true: a preconceived opinion hinders the investigation of the truth.

[25] I say, then, that I believe that there are spirits, for these reasons:

(1) because it makes for the beauty and perfection of the universe that they exist;

(2) that it is probable that the Creator has created them because they are more like him than corporeal creatures are; and

[30] (3) that as there is a body without a spirit, there must also be a spirit without a body. Finally,

(4) that I think that there is no dark body 87 in the upper air, place or space, which does not have its inhabitants, and consequently, that the immeasurable space between us and the stars is not empty, but full of inhabitants, which are spirits. The highest and uppermost are true spirits; [IV/247b] the lowest, in the nearest air, are possibly creatures of a very fine and thin substance, and also invisible.

[20] So I think there are spirits of every kind, except that possibly there are no female spirits.

This reasoning will not convince those who think mistakenly that the world has been made by chance. Apart from these reasons, daily experience shows that there are spirits, of which there are many stories, both ancient and modern, and even nowadays. These stories are told [25] by Plutarch in his Treatise on famous men, and in other parts of his works, by Suetonius in his Lives of the Caesars, by Wierius 88 in his books on ghosts, and also by Lavaterus,⁸⁹ who has treated at length of the matter, which he has drawn from all the writers. As also Cardanus,⁹⁰ so [20] renowned for his learning, in the books on Subtlety and on Variety, and of his own life, where he shows his own experiences and those of the friends and relations to whom spirits appeared. Melanchthon,91 a lover of the truth and an intelligent man, and many others are witnesses of their own experiences.

[IV/248b] A burgermeister from Sc., a learned and wise man who is still alive, [20] told me once that in his mother’s brewery people heard things happening at night like what happened in the day time when they were brewing. He swore to me that this happened several times. I myself have had such things happen to me—and not only once—that I shall never forget. Because of that, and these reasons, I am convinced that there are spirits.

[25] As for devils, who torment wretched men in this life [and afterward],92 that’s another issue—as is everything which concerns witchcraft. I think the stories people tell about these things are fables.

Sir, in the Treatises on Spirits you will find an abundance of details. [30] In addition, if you please, you can also look at Pliny the younger, in bk. 7, in his letter to Sura, and Suetonius in the life of Julius Caesar, ch. 32. Valerius Maximus, bk. 1, ch. 8, §8 and again §7, of the Dies geniales of Alexander ab alexandro.93 I think you have those authors at hand.

I am not speaking about Monks or Clerics, who tell of so many apparitions and visions of souls, spirits and devils, and tell so many [IV/249b] stories about ghosts—or to speak more accurately, fables—that they are boring and one loathes reading them. The Jesuit Thyraeus treats the same things in the book he calls Apparitions of Spirits.94 But these [20] people do this only for their own advantage, and to prove the existence of purgatory, a mine from which they extract so much silver and gold. One does not find this in the authors mentioned above and in others of the present day, who are beyond all partiality, and therefore, so much the more to be believed.

[25] You say at the end of your letter that you cannot commend me to God without smiling.95 But if you remember the conversation we previously had, you will see that one does not need to be frightened about the conclusion I then drew in my letter, etc.

[30] As a reply to your letter,96 where you speak of fools and lunatics, I place here the conclusion of the learned Lavaterus, with which he brings to an end his first book on spirits, which reads as follows: whoever dares to reject so many agreeing witnesses, both ancient and modern, seems to me, in my judgment, not deserving of belief when he affirms anything; as it is a [IV/250b] mark of rashness to immediately believe all those who say they have seen ghosts, so it would also be great impudence to contradict so many credible Historians, ancestors, and others of great authority rashly and without shame, etc.

21 September 1674

[IV/250] LETTER 54 (NS)

TO THE MOST ESTEEMED AND WISE MR. HUGO BOXEL FROM B. D. S.

Reply to the Preceding

Version

Sir,97

Relying on what you say in your letter of the 21st of last month—that friends can disagree in indifferent matters, and still remain friends—I’ll [20] say clearly what I think about the arguments and stories from which you conclude that there are all kinds of spirits, but perhaps none of the feminine kind.

The reason I haven’t replied earlier is that I don’t have at hand the books you cite, and so far haven’t found any of them, except Pliny and Suetonius. But these two will spare me the trouble of looking for the [25] others, because I believe they all display the same extravagance: they love unusual tales and things which make men amazed and astonished. I confess that I myself was not a little astonished, not at the stories they tell, but at the people who tell them. I am amazed that men of intellect and judgment squander and abuse their eloquence to make us believe such trifles.

[IV/251] But let’s leave the Authors and deal with the thing itself. First, I’ll reason a bit about the conclusion you draw. Let’s see whether I, who deny that there are ghosts or spirits, for that reason understand less [5] the Writers who’ve written about this or whether you, who maintain that there are such things, don’t respect these Writers more than they deserve.

On the one hand, you don’t doubt that there are spirits of the male gender; on the other, you doubt that there are spirits of the female gender. This seems to me to be more a whim than a doubt. For if this is your opinion, it would seem to me to be more like the imagination [10] of the common people, who suppose that God is male, not female. I’m surprised that those who’ve seen spirits naked have not cast their eyes on their genitalia. Perhaps they were afraid to do so; perhaps they didn’t know about this difference.

You’ll answer that this is mockery, not reasoning. By this I see that [15] your reasons seem to you so powerful and well-founded that no one (at least in your judgment) can contradict them—unless he mistakenly thought that the world was made by chance. This obliges me, before I investigate the reasons you’ve given, to set out briefly my opinion regarding this proposition: that the world was made by chance.

[20] I reply that, because by chance and necessarily are two contrary things, it’s certain that someone who says the world was produced necessarily from the divine nature also denies completely that the world was made by chance. But someone who says that God could have refrained from creating the world maintains (though in other words) that this [25] was done by chance, because it proceeded from a choice which could have not been made.

Because this opinion and judgment are completely absurd, people commonly grant that God’s will is eternal, and has never been indifferent. Therefore, they must also necessarily grant (NB) that the world [30] is a necessary effect of the divine nature. They may call this will, intellect, or whatever they want to. In the end, though, they arrive at this: they express one and the same thing in different words. For if someone asks them whether the divine will does not differ from the human will, they answer that the one has nothing in common with the other except the name. Besides, generally they grant that God’s will, [IV/252] intellect, essence and nature are one and the same thing. I too, not to confuse the divine nature with the human, ascribe to God no human attributes, such as will, intellect, attention, hearing, etc. I say, then, as I said before: the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature, and [5] was not made by chance.

This, I think, will be enough to persuade you that the opinion of those who say—if there are still some who say this—that the world has been made by chance is completely contrary to mine. On this supposition I proceed to investigate the reasons from which you conclude [10] that there are spirits of any kind whatever. What I can say about this in general is that they seem to be more conjectures than reasons. I can hardly believe that you take them for demonstrative arguments. But whether they are reasons or conjectures, let’s see whether we can regard them as so well-founded.

[15] Your first argument is that it pertains to the beauty and perfection of the Universe that spirits exist. Beauty, Sir, is not so much a quality of the object one sees as an effect of the object on him who sees it. If our eye was longer or shorter, or our constitution was different, the things we now consider beautiful would seem ugly, and those which [20] are now ugly would seem beautiful to us. The most beautiful hand, seen through a microscope, will look terrible. Some things, seen from a distance, are beautiful; when we see them close up, they are ugly. Moreover, things considered in themselves, or in relation to God, are neither beautiful nor ugly.

[25] Whoever says that God has made the world beautiful must maintain one of these two things: namely, either that God made the world for the senses and eyes of men, or that he made the sense organs of men for the world. Now whether you maintain the one or the other, I don’t see why God had to create ghosts or spirits to achieve one of these results.

[30] Perfection and imperfection are terms which do not differ much from beauty and ugliness. To be brief, I ask, what more it contributes to the adornment and perfection of the world that there should be spirits, or all sorts of monsters, like Centaurs, Hydras, Harpies, Satyrs, [IV/253] Griffins, Argusses and more fancies of that kind? Certainly the world would have been well-adorned if God had decorated it as pleases our imagination and fitted it out with things which everyone easily imagines and dreams, but no one can ever understand.

[5] Your second argument is that because spirits are more like God than the other, corporeal creatures, it is also probable that God created them. Truly, I confess I still don’t know in what respect spirits are more like God than other creatures are. I know this: that there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite; so the difference between the [10] greatest, most excellent creature and God is the same as that between the least creature and God. This argument doesn’t accomplish anything for your purposes.

If I had as clear an idea of spirits as I have of a triangle or a circle, I wouldn’t hesitate to maintain that God created them. But because [15] the idea I have of them agrees completely with the ideas I find in my imagination of Harpies, Griffins, Hydras, etc., I can’t consider them as anything other than dreams, which are as unlike God as being is unlike not-being.

Your third argument—that as there is a body without a spirit, so there [20] must also be a spirit without a body—seems to me no less insubstantial. Tell me, I ask you, whether it is not also probable that there are such things as memory, hearing, sight, etc., without bodies, because there are bodies without memory, hearing, sight, etc.? or that there is a sphere without a circle, because there is a circle without a sphere?

[25] Your fourth and last argument [IV/246b/31–247b19] is the same as the first. So I refer you to my reply to that [IV/252/15–253/4]. Here I’ll only note that I don’t know what the high and low places are which you conceive in an infinite matter, unless you think that the earth is the center of the Universe. For if the sun, or Saturn, is the center of the Universe, then the sun, or Saturn, will be the lowest place, not the earth.

[30] Passing over this and the remaining arguments, then, I conclude that these arguments, and others like them, will not be able to persuade anyone that there are ghosts, or spirits of every kind, except those who, closing their ears to their intellect, let themselves be seduced by superstition, which is so hostile to reason that it would rather believe old wives’ tales, only to diminish the notice taken of Philosophers.

[IV/254] As for the stories, I’ve already said in my first letter that I don’t deny them completely; I deny only the conclusion drawn from them. Moreover, I don’t consider them so credible as to prevent me from doubting many of the details they quite often add, more as an embellishment [5] than for the truth of the story, or the better to conclude from it what they wanted to conclude.

I’d hoped that out of so many stories you would have produced at least one or two which one could not in the least doubt, and which clearly showed that there are spirits or ghosts. That Mr. . . .98 wanted [10] to conclude that they exist because he heard in his mother’s brewery things happening at night like those he was used to hearing in the day—this seems to me ridiculous. It would take too long to investigate here all the stories written about these trifles. To be brief, I refer to Julius Caesar, who, as Suetonius witnesses, mocked such things, and [15] nevertheless was successful, according to what Suetonius reports about this Ruler (in his life of Caesar, ch. 59). In the same way anyone who weighs the effects of human imaginings and affects must also laugh at such things, whatever Lavaterus and others who have shared his dreams about this matter say against them.

[The Hague, October 1674]99

[IV/254] LETTER 55 (NS)

TO THE MOST ACUTE PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM HUGO BOXEL

Reply to the Preceding

Sir,100

I’m replying to your letter later than I intended to, because a slight illness has taken away my pleasure in studying and meditating, and prevented me from writing you. Now, thank God, I’m healthy again. [IV/255] In my reply I’ll follow in the footsteps of your letter but pass over your outcry against those who write about spirits.

I say, then, that I think there are no females among them, because I deny that they procreate. [I say nothing about]101 their shape and [5] composition, because this does not concern me.

Something is said to have been made by chance when it does not originate from the agent’s intention. When someone digs up the ground to plant a vineyard, or make a well or a grave, and finds a treasure he never thought of, we say that this happened by chance.102 Someone who acts of his own free will, in such a way that he can either act or [10] not act, is never said to act by chance. For if that were so, men would always act by chance, which would be absurd. The necessary and the free are two contrary things; but not the necessary and what happens by chance. And though the divine will is eternal, it doesn’t follow from [15] that that the world is eternal, because God was able to determine from eternity to make the world at a certain time.

You deny that the divine will has ever been indifferent, a position I reject. And it’s not necessary to examine this as closely as you think. [20] Not all men say that God’s will is necessary (for this involves necessity), because someone who ascribes a will to someone takes that to mean that he acts according to his will, and can refrain from acting. But if we ascribe necessity to him, then he cannot refrain from acting.

Finally, you say that you admit no human attributes in God, in order [25] not to confuse the divine nature with the human. So far, so good. For we cannot conceive in what way God acts, nor in what way he wills, understands, perceives, sees, hears, etc. But if you completely deny these actions, and all our most lofty speculations about God, and say that they are not in God in an eminent and metaphysical way, then [30] I don’t know what sort of God you have, or what you understand by the word “God.”

We must not deny what we don’t grasp. The soul, which is a spirit, and incorporeal, can act only with the help of the most subtle bodies, namely, the humors. And what proportion is there between a body and a spirit? In what way does the soul act with the help of bodies? For [IV/256] without them it is at rest, and if they are agitated, then it acts contrary to what it ought to do. Show me how this happens. You can’t. And I can’t any more than you can. We see and feel, however, that the soul acts. This does not cease to be true, even though we don’t grasp how this action happens.

If you ascribe necessity to God, and deprive him of will or free choice, one might ask oneself whether you aren’t depicting him who is an infinitely perfect being as something monstrous. To achieve your [15] purpose you’ll need other arguments to provide you with a foundation for this, because in my judgment there’s no certainty in the arguments you’ve proposed. And if you persist, there are still other arguments which perhaps will match yours. But let us leave that topic and proceed to others.

For a proof that there are spirits in the world, you want a demonstrative [20] proof, of which there are very few in the world. Apart from those in Mathematics, there are none which are as certain as we would wish. In most cases we have probable conjectures, and are satisfied with this probability. If the arguments by which the things are proven were demonstrations, then the only men we would find to speak against them [25] would be foolish and obstinate. But, dear friend, we are not so lucky. In this world we accept it as not so clear. To a certain extent we proceed by conjecture; and in our reasoning we accept the probable, for lack of demonstrations. This is evident in all the sciences, both divine and human, which are full of questions and disputes. Their multiplicity is [30] the reason we also find so many differences of opinion among everyone.

For this reason there were once, as you know, Philosophers called Skeptics, who doubted everything. These Skeptics disputed for and against, only to arrive, for lack of true reasons, at the probable; and each of them believed what seemed to him most like a proof. The moon is positioned directly under the sun. Therefore, the sun will become dark [IV/257] in a certain part of the earth. And if the sun does not become dark during the day, then the moon is not positioned directly under it. This is a demonstrative proof from the cause to the effect, and from the effect to the cause. There are some proofs of that kind, but very few, [5] which no one can contradict, provided only that he understands them.

As for beauty, there are some things whose parts are proportional to the other parts, and are better in their composition than others, and God has given to the intellect and judgment of man an agreement and harmony with what is well-proportioned, and not with what has no [10] proportion—as in harmonious and unharmonious sounds, in which the hearing can distinguish well the harmonious from the unharmonious, because the one causes pleasure and the other, irritation.

The perfection of a thing is also beautiful, insofar as nothing is lacking to it. There are many examples of this, which I omit, not to [15] be tedious. Let us only look at the world, which is called a whole, or the Universe. If this is true, and it definitely is, then the world is not lacking in or deprived of incorporeal things.

What you say about Centaurs, Hydras, Harpies, etc., is irrelevant here, for we are speaking only about the most universal genera of things, and [20] about their highest degrees, for example, about eternal and temporal, cause and effect, finite and infinite, souled and unsouled, substance and accident, corporeal and spiritual, etc., which comprehend under them countless and varied species.

I say that spirits are like God, because he is also a spirit. You require [25] as clear an idea of spirits as you have of a triangle. This is impossible. Tell me, I beseech you, what idea you have of God, and whether, for your intellect, it is as clear as that of a triangle. I know that you don’t, and have said before that we are not so fortunate that we grasp things through demonstrative proofs, and that for the most part the probable prevails in this world.

[30] Nevertheless, I say that as there is a body without memory, etc., so there is also a memory, etc., without body, and that as there is a circle without a sphere, so there is a sphere without a circle. But this is also to leave the universal genera of things for the particular species, for which this reasoning is not intended.

I say that the sun is the center of the world and that the fixed stars are further from the earth than Saturn, and Saturn further than [IV/258] Jupiter, and Jupiter further than Mars, etc., so that in the endless air, some things are further from, and others nearer to, us. We call these higher or lower, respectively.

It’s not those who maintain that there are spirits who undermine [5] the credibility of Philosophers, but those who deny them. For all the Philosophers, both ancient and those of our time, maintain that they’re convinced there are. Plutarch is a witness of this in his Treatise on the Opinions of the Philosophers,103 and On Socrates’ Spirit.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, also all the Stoics, Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, Empedocles, [10] Maximus Tyrius, Apuleius, and others. Among Philosophers today, no one denies them. Reject, then, so many wise and intelligent eye- and ear-witnesses, so many Philosophers, and so many Historians, who relate these stories. Say that they, along with the common herd, are all fools and chumps. Your answers do not persuade anyone, but indeed are absurd, and generally do not touch the heart of our dispute. And [15] you don’t produce a single proof that establishes your opinion. Caesar does not mock spirits, but omens and foretellings. The same is true of Cicero and Cato. Nevertheless, if he had not mocked Spurina on the day he died,105 his enemies would not have killed him with so many stabwounds. But enough of that for now, etc.

[October/November 1674]¹⁰⁶

[IV/258] LETTER 56 (NS)

TO [MR. HUGO BOXEL] FROM B. D. S.

Answer to the Preceding

Sir,

I hasten to answer your letter, which I received yesterday, because I fear that if I wait longer, I’ll be forced to postpone my reply longer than I would like to. Your illness would have dismayed me, if I had not learned at the same time that you are better again. I hope that you are now completely recovered from it.

[IV/259] It would be evident just from this dispute we are now having—even if reason did not show it—how difficult it is for two people who follow different principles to be able to understand one another, and to agree, in a matter which depends on many other things.

Tell me, I beseech you, whether you have seen or read any Philosophers [5] who think that the world was made by chance—in the sense, that is, in which you understand it, viz. that in creating the world God had one goal, and yet that he went completely outside the goal he had. I don’t know anyone who ever had such a thought.

[15] That the necessary and the free are two contraries seems no less extravagant and contrary to reason. For no one can deny that God knows himself and all other things freely; nevertheless everyone grants, by common agreement, that God cannot fail, or cease, to know himself. So it seems to me that you make no distinction between coercion, or [20] force, and necessity. That a man wants to live, to love, etc., is not a coerced action. But it is necessary. Much more does God will to be, to know and to act [freely, but necessarily].

If, in addition, you reflect that indifference is only ignorance or doubt, and that a will which is always constant and determined in all [25] things is a virtue and a necessary property of the intellect, you’ll see that what I’ve said agrees completely with the truth. If people want to say that God could have failed to will a thing, but could not have failed to understand it, this is to attribute to God different freedoms, one necessary, the other indifferent. Thus they consider God’s will to [30] be different from his essence and from his intellect. So they fall from one absurdity to another.

The attention I required in my preceding letter seemed unnecessary to you. That’s why you did not fix your thoughts on the main point, and why you neglected what was most relevant.

[IV/260] Next, you say that if I deny that the acts of seeing, hearing, attending, willing, etc., are in God—or that those things are in God in an eminent way—you don’t know what kind of God I have. This makes me suspect that you believe there is no greater perfection than that [5] which can be explained by the attributes mentioned. I don’t wonder at this. I believe that if a triangle could speak, it would say in the same way that God is triangular in an eminent way, and that a circle would say that in an eminent way the divine nature is circular. In the same manner, each being would ascribe its own attributes to God, and make itself like God. Everything else would seem deformed to it.

[10] The brevity of a letter and limitations of time don’t permit me to explain my opinion about the divine nature and answer the questions you raise. Besides, making objections is not the same thing as giving arguments. It’s true that in this world we are feeling our way.107 But it’s [15] false that we act on the basis of conjectures in our speculations. In daily life, we must follow what is most probable, but in speculations we are required to follow the truth. Man would die of hunger and thirst if he weren’t willing to eat or drink until he had a perfect proof that the food and drink would be good for him. But in speculation this is irrelevant. [20] On the contrary, we must beware of assuming as true something which is only probable. For once we have granted something false, infinite other false things follow from it.

Next, from the fact that the divine and human sciences are full of disputes and controversies, we can’t conclude that everything treated in [25] them is uncertain. There are a great many people who are such lovers of contradiction that they have mocked geometrical demonstrations themselves. Sextus Empiricus and the other skeptics whom you mention say it is false that the whole is greater than its part,108 and they judge similarly concerning the other axioms.

[30] But leaving this to one side, and granting that when we lack a demonstration, we must be content with probabilities, I say that a probable proof must be such that, although we can have doubts about it, we cannot contradict it. For what can be contradicted is not probable, but improbable. For example, if I say that Peter is alive, because I saw him [IV/261] in good health yesterday, that is indeed probable, in so far as no one can contradict me. But if someone else comes and says that yesterday he saw Peter pass out, and that he believes that afterward Peter died, this makes what I said seem false. That your conjecture concerning [5] ghosts and spirits seems false, and improbable, I have shown so clearly that I find nothing in your reply worth commenting on.

To your question, whether I have as clear an idea of God as I do of a triangle, I answer “yes.” But if you ask me whether I have as clear an image of God as I do of a triangle, I’ll answer “no.” For we can’t [10] imagine God, but we can indeed understand him.

We should also note this here: I don’t say that I know God completely, but only that I know some of his attributes, not all of them, nor even most of them.109 Certainly being ignorant of most of them [15] does not prevent my knowing some. When I began to learn Euclid’s Elements, I understood first that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. I understood this property of the triangle clearly [NS: and distinctly], though I was ignorant of many other properties of the same triangle.

[20] As for ghosts or spirits, I have not yet heard any intelligible property of theirs, but only imaginations which no one can grasp. When you say that ghosts or spirits here below—I follow your style, although I don’t know that matter here below is worth less than that above—consist of a very thin, rarefied and fine substance, you seem to be talking about [25] spiders’ webs, air, or vapors. To say they’re invisible is to say what they are not, not what they are—unless perhaps you mean that they make themselves now visible, now invisible, as they please, and that the imagination will find no difficulty in these things, as also in other impossibilities.

[30] To me the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates is not worth much. I would have been amazed if you had mentioned Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the Atomists, or defenders of invisible particles.110 But it’s no wonder that the people who invented occult qualities, intentional species, substantial forms, and a thousand other trifles [IV/262] contrived ghosts and spirits, and believed old wives’ tales, to lessen the authority of Democritus, whose good reputation they so envied that they had all his books burned,111 which he had published with such great praise. If you’re willing to put your faith in them, what reason do you [5] have for denying the miracles of the Virgin Mary and of all the Saints, which so many famous philosophers, theologians, and historians have described that I can cite a hundred of the latter to one of the former.

Finally, Sir, I have gone on longer than I meant to. I don’t want to trouble you further with these things, which I know you will not [10] grant, because you follow principles completely different from mine.

[The Hague, October/November 1674]112