Suchet made good his escape during the night and must have rued his decision to attack. He had lost more than 1,500 men (including prisoners) and these were losses he could ill-afford. He re-established his line on the River Júcar and ordered Claude Pannetier to move his brigade from near Saragossa to Tortosa; Severoli’s division was also moved south and closer to Valencia. These readjustments were designed to assist a northerly withdrawal, if that should be necessary. Suchet was, however, quite clear that the mass of allied ships in Alicante Bay posed a constant threat by way of an amphibious landing in his rear. He noted that ‘in the course of May, preparations for embarkation were made at Alicante ... concerning the real object of which there were a thousand conjectures’.1 The obvious target destination was Tarragona and Suchet was well aware of this and set about planning to combine forces with Decaen to engage any such landing, while at the same time leaving sufficient troops to retain a hold in the region of Valencia.
The day after the battle at Castalla, and many days before Wellington had received Murray’s post-battle despatch, the allied commander-inchief had penned his memorandum for future operations on the east coast of Spain. Determined not to make the same mistakes as beset the final phase of the Salamanca campaign, Wellington planned the opening to the 1813 campaign meticulously. His memorandum is a marvellous example of the painstaking detail he applied to operational staff work:
To Lieut, General Sir John Murray, Bart. 14th April, 1813.2
MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT, ON THE EASTERN COAST OF THE PENINSULA
1. It is obvious that these operations cannot be commenced with advantage, till the allied British and Portuguese army shall take the field in Castile, which is intended in the first days of the month of May.
2. The troops applicable to these operations are the allied British and Sicilian corps, and the Spanish divisions under Major General Whittingham and Major General Roche, under the command of Sir John Murray; that part of the second army under General Elio, composed of regular troops; and the regular troops of the third army under the command of the Duque del Parque.
3. The objects for the operations of the troops on the eastern coast of Spain are first to obtain possession of the open part of the kingdom of Valencia: secondly, to obtain an establishment on the sea coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the army of Catalonia; and eventually, thirdly, to oblige the enemy to retire from the Lower Ebro.
4. Although these objects are noticed in this order, circumstances may render expedient a departure from it, and that the one mentioned in the third instance should precede that mentioned in the second.
5. If Sir John Murray possesses the means of embarking 10,000 infantry and artillery, or more, the first and second objects may be combined with great advantage : that is to say, that the attempt to secure the second object by a brisk attack upon Tarragona with all the British and Sicilian corps, and such part of the division of General Whittingham or General Roche, as can be transported to Tarragona, will necessarily induce Suchet to weaken his force so considerably in Valencia, as to enable General Elio and the Duque del Parque to take possession of a great part, if not of all the open country in that kingdom.
6. The first object will then be attained.
7. The second will be a question of time and means. If Suchet, notwithstanding the junction of the troops of the first army with those under Sir John Murray, should be so strong in Catalonia as to oblige that general to raise the siege, and to embark without accomplishing his object, the first object will at least have been gained without difficulty; and the return of Sir John Murray’s corps into the kingdom of Valencia will secure it.
8. If Sir John Murray should succeed in taking Tarragona, the first and second objects will have been attained, and a foundation will have been laid for the attainment of the third object.
9. Orders have been sent for the Duque del Parque to commence his movement from his position at Jaen, and to proceed to put himself in communication with the second army, either by posting himself at Almanza, or at Yecla.
10. As soon as the corps under the Duke del Parque arrives in communication with General Elio, the allied British and Sicilian corps, and General Whittingham’s division should embark, to the number of at least 10,000 men, or more if possible, and proceed immediately to the attack of Tarragona, in which they should be aided by the first army.
11. The troops remaining in the kingdom of Valencia, that is to say, those under the Duque del Parque and General Elio, and those of General Whittingham’s and General Roche’s divisions, and of the allied British and Sicilian corps which should not embark, should continue on the defensive, and retire, even upon the lines at Alicante, if it should be necessary.
12. But as soon as it shall be found that Suchet begins to weaken his force in the kingdom of Valencia, they are to follow him up, and take possession of as large a part of that kingdom as it may be in their power to do.
13. It must be understood, however, by the General Officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten, of which the operating armies will be composed; and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position; and that I shall forgive any thing, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed.
14. Sir John Murray will take with him to the siege of Tarragona such of the allied British and Sicilian cavalry as he may have horse transports to convey; the remainder, with the cavalry belonging to General Whittingham’s division, will remain with the troops under General Elio and the Duque del Parque.
15. If General Sir John Murray should be obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona, and embark, or, at all events, when he returns to the kingdom of Valencia, he is to land as far to the north as may be in his power, in order to join immediately on the right of the troops under General Elio and the Duque del Parque; and the mules and other equipments belonging to the allied British and Sicilian corps, which must necessarily be left behind at Alicante, are to join that corps at the place of disembarkation.
16. If Tarragona should be taken, it must be garrisoned by a part of the first army under General Copons.
17. In case Sir John Murray should not have the means of embarking 10,000 infantry, at least, the corps of troops to undertake a serious operation on the sea coast in the rear of the enemy’s left, will not be sufficient, and the plan must be altered; and the following measures must be adopted to obtain a sufficient force in rear of his right.
18. First, the regiments, as stated in the margin (Voluntarios de Jaen, of the first division of the second army; the regiment of Alicante, of General Roche’s division; 2nd de Burgos, of General Whittingham’s division) must be detached from the second and third armies, and must be embarked. These, with about the same number recently ordered from Galicia, will augment the army of Catalonia sufficiently to enable them, according to the opinion of General Copons, to take the field against the enemy’s troops now in Catalonia, and to force them to remain in their garrisons.
19. As soon as he shall be joined by these reinforcements, General Copons should make himself master of the open country, particularly between Tarragona and Tortosa, and that place and Lerida.
20. Secondly, the third army of the Duque del Parque should be employed to turn the right of the enemy’s positions in Valencia, while the allied troops under Sir John Murray and General Elio will attack them in front. I imagine that it will be necessary for the Duque del Parque to proceed, in this case, as far as Utiel and Requena, before he will be able to make any impression on the position of the Júcar.
21. In proportion as the allied troops shall gain ground, this operation will be repeated ; the third army continuing to move upon the enemy’s right till it shall come in communication with the first army on the left of the Ebro. With this object in view, General Copons and the Duque del Parque should keep in constant communication.
Note. It would be very desirable that, if practicable, General Copons should get possession of Mequinenza.
22. When the enemy shall have been forced across the Ebro, either by the maritime operations in rear of his left, or by those just described on his right, it will rest with General Sir John Murray to determine, in the first instance, on the line to be pursued, in a view to the local situation of affairs, in respect to the ulterior objects of the operations; whether to establish the Spanish authority in the kingdom of Valencia, by obtaining possession of Murviedro, Peñiscola, and any other fortified posts there may be within that kingdom, or to attack Tortosa or Tarragona, supposing that that place should not have fallen by the maritime operations first proposed.
23. In my opinion, the decision on this point, as far as it depends upon the state of affairs on the eastern coast, will depend much upon the practicability and facility of communicating with the shipping on the coast, without having possession of the maritime posts in Valencia.
24. If that should be practicable, it would be most desirable to attain the second and third objects of the operations, without waiting to obtain possession of the posts within the kingdom of Valencia; respecting which, it is hoped, there would be no doubt, when the operations of the first army should be connected with those of the second and third, and of the troops under Sir John Murray.
25. The divisions composed of irregular troops attached to the second army, and commanded by Generals Duran and Villa Campa, should direct their attention to prevent all communication between the enemy’s main army under the King in person, and that under Suchet.
26. The operations of these divisions should be carried on the left of, and in communication with, the Duque del Parque; and, in proportion as the third army should move towards the Ebro, the operations of these divisions should be pushed forwards likewise.
27. The division of Don Juan Martin must be kept in reserve, nearly in its present situation, and directions shall be sent to Don Juan Martin.
28. General Sir John Murray, having under his command the largest and most efficient body of troops, upon whose movements those of the others will depend essentially, will direct the operations of all the corps of troops referred to in this memorandum, when their operations shall be connected immediately with those of the corps of troops under his command.
29. If General Sir John Murray’s allied British and Sicilian corps, and the whole or part of General Whittingham’s division should embark, General the Duque del Parque will direct the operations ordered in this memorandum to be carried on in the kingdom of Valencia; but, in either case, the General Officers commanding the first, second, and third armies, and General Whittingham, must command each their separate corps.
WELLINGTON
It is an illuminating document. Within the scope of his operational campaign plan, events and actions on the east coast were undoubtedly, in Wellington’s mind, integral to those of his main army. Like Bentinck’s landing of the Anglo-Sicilian force the year before, Murray’s operations were to serve as a strategic distraction to French command, but they were also to act as the catalyst, in conjunction with the advance east from Portugal, for French evacuation of Valencia and, subsequently, Catalonia. The memorandum outlines three objectives: firstly, the occupation of the region of Valencia; secondly, the establishment of a presence on the coast north of the Ebro; and, thus, thirdly, the northerly withdrawal of the French from the lower Ebro. Wellington provides Murray the flexibility to achieve objective two in advance of objective one; but he also caveats that ‘I shall forgive any thing, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed’ (point 13). This, as it happened, was to lay the seeds of failure. The memorandum also provides great specificity as to coalition operations with the Spanish (regular and irregular) forces. Translated copies of the memorandum were sent to General Copons (1st Army in Catalonia), General Elio (2nd Army) and Duque del Parque (3rd Army – amalgamation of old Army of Centre and elements of Army of Estremadura). Of the irregular forces, Duran (in concert with Villacampa) was to prevent communication between Joseph and Suchet whilst El Empecinado was held in reserve for tasking as operations unfolded. Nevertheless, Wellington still held considerable reservations as to the strategic and operational reliability of the collective Spanish forces. In the accompanying letter he outlined those concerns:
In forming a plan of operations for [Spanish] troops in the Peninsula, it is necessary always to bear in mind their inefficiency, notwithstanding their good inclinations, their total want of every thing which could keep them together as armies, and of the necessary equipments of cannon, &c. &c., and their repeated failures in the accomplishment even of the most trifling objects, notwithstanding the personal bravery of the individuals composing the armies. If I had had to form a plan for the operations of half the numbers, real soldiers, well equipped and prepared for the field, it would have been one of a very different description; but such a plan would not suit, and could not be executed by the instruments with which you have to work’.3
Such undeniably harsh and unswerving language was designed to reiterate to Murray that two-thirds of his force comprised foreign troops and that he had to plan and act accordingly. It is worth noting that this letter was written at a time when Wellington was having considerable problems with both the Spanish and Portuguese executives. The key to his strategy for his 1813 campaign was undoubtedly centred on the need for the allied nations to play a fuller part in operations. Yet many of the Spanish units were under strength, badly equipped and, in some cases, on the brink of starvation. Since his elevation to Generalissimo of the Spanish armies he had met a wall of obstruction and non-cooperation. For Wellington it was a case of ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’. His proposals for the reform of the Spanish Army were largely ignored and, instead, he found an increasing amount of bureaucratic obstacles placed in his path. Wellington realized that unless the British purse financed Roche’s and Whittingham’s divisions that they would be unfit for purpose. He wrote to both commanders in early January:
Sir H Wellesley has communicated to me your letters of the 25th, 29th, and 30th ult. (Roche 31st); and as he has been so kind as to leave it to me, in a great measure, the decision on the application of the pecuniary funds applied by Great Britain for the support of the cause of Spain, I am anxious that you should be made acquainted with the principles on which I am desirous that they should be disposed of in future. The corps of troops under your command in the Peninsula is one of those which I am desirous should be paid out of those funds.4
The letters went on at some length explaining and outlining how this was to be achieved; however, before that advice could be implemented both Roche and Whittingham had reason to write to Wellesley at Cádiz complaining of a lack of provisions for their men. Wellington was furious and he wrote immediately to General Elio ‘as these troops are, and have been for some time regularly paid, an advantage which I am sorry to observe has not for some time been enjoyed by other troops in the Spanish army, these wants ought not to exist’.5 Wellington then wrote again to both officers and to General Campbell at Cádiz and made it clear that if the situation persisted, Whittingham’s troops (at the very least) were to move back to Majorca but he added, by way of a undisguised stick, that they should ensure that the pay given to their men should be ‘laid out on the subsistence’. That aside, the situation with regard to Roche’s division remained contentious and was not helped by the fact that Wellington had ordered in his capacity as Generalissimo some of the cavalry under Elio’s command to move to the Guadalquivir, or by Elio’s persistent meddling with the units in both Whittingham’s and Roche’s divisions.6 Furthermore, Roche was not helping matters and was clearly trying to play both sides off against the middle; he even wrote to Wellesley arguing the case for an independent status for his command. Wellington wrote to Roche in increasingly caustic terms:
1 March: The division of troops under the command of Gen. Whittingham belongs to the army of Majorca; that under your command belongs to the 3rd army; but it is for the present detached from that army, for the purpose of co-operating with the British and Sicilian corps at Alicante. I don’t propose to make any alteration in this arrangement.7
12 March: You command a division of Spanish troops, which is an integral part of what is called the 2nd army [see footnote], and which must remain so till I give orders to the contrary. If you dislike your situation, or make any further difficulties about obeying the orders you receive, or fail to carry on the service, you must either resign your command, or, in the latter case, I shall recommend to the government that another officer be appointed to it.8
The lack of subsequent correspondence on the matter would indicate that Roche, judiciously, got back in line. Wellington did not forget the matter and he wrote in May to Murray in May stating that ‘between ourselves, Roche has given me a great deal of trouble by his interminable disputes with General Elio, and the orders I have given him ought to have put an end to it’.9 If that was not enough to occupy Wellington’s mind he also had to resolve a difference of opinion over the supreme command of the Anglo-Sicilian force. In December 1812 Bentinck had written to Bathurst asking for clarification on the matter and added that, if he should personally deploy to Spain, with whom he should be accountable to with regard to the security of Sicily and, what would happen in the event of Wellington being unable to continue in command through ‘sickness or casualty’. The first was a fair question, the second exposed Bentinck’s rather naked military and political ambition. Bathurst’s response was swift:
In replying to the first of these queries, I have to request that in case your Lordship should have assumed, or shall assume, the Command of the Army of Alicante you will be pleased to communicate fully with Lord Wellington upon the affairs of Sicily, and of the Mediterranean in general, and having done so, you will be guided by his opinion as to the withdrawing of the troops, or any part of them from the Eastern Coast of the Peninsula – you will therefore understand that in the case of such an emergency as your question supposes the direction and responsibility in regard to the troops now at Alicante will rest with the Marquess of Wellington.
In answer to your Lordship’s second question I have to state that His Majesty’s Government consider your Lordship’s Military Command in the Peninsula to be subordinate to Lord Wellington’s general authority – but to be distinct from and independent of the other general officers serving in Spain and Portugal. If therefore, any misfortune should deprive the allies of Lord Wellington’s services your Lordship will continue to exercise your own separate command in the east of Spain ... in case your Lordship should not be able to assume in person in command of the Army at Alicante, it is desirable that you should furnish to Lord Wellington the fullest information regarding Sicily, in order that he may be able to judge correctly as to the necessity of sending back the troops from Spain.10
In short, Bentinck’s force in Spain was now under Wellington’s immediate command for re-tasking; his suggestion that he might become commander-in-chief in Iberia had been killed stone dead; and worst of all he now had to include Wellington in his day-to-day business and reports regarding Sicily and the Italian venture. Such was the volatility of that region that even before Bentinck had received Bathurst’s letter a new crisis had erupted in Sicily, prompting Bentinck to write to Murray and warn him that he was poised to withdraw elements of his force. This included the flank companies of the 10th, 21st, 31st, 62nd, 75th and the 3rd, 7th and 8th KGL along with the entire battalion of the 6th KGL. These were some of Murray’s best troops and he tried to hush up their possible removal but soon discovered that it was common knowledge across his force.11 Wellington, when appraised, was pragmatic about the possibility of troop withdrawals and he wrote to Murray in early April:
The Sec. of State did not advert to the possible call of all the troops from Sicily on the ground of a counter-revolution in the government, or of consequent internal disturbances; but the object of his orders is, that I should send troops back, if there should exist any real necessity for that measure. My judgement must be guided, in deciding on this question, by the report of Lord W. Bentinck of the circumstances of the case, and his opinion of them; and I have no hesitation in desiring that the troops called for by Lord W. Bentinck may be sent forthwith, according to his directions.12
This arrangement for withdrawing troops from the east coast at a critical juncture was far from ideal, but it is difficult to know how it could otherwise have been arranged given the uncertain nature of future operations in eastern Spain, the volatile situation in Sicily and the unfavourable state of affairs in Italy. As it turned out, it was the right decision by both Wellington and Bentinck. At Palermo in March 1813, King Ferdinand, at the insistence and cunning of Queen Maria Carolina, instigated a proclamation to return to the ancien régime within the kingdom. This looked likely to trigger civil war in Sicily and Bentinck calculated, quite rightly, that a strong show of force would be enough to bring the errant monarch, his queen and his followers to their senses. The arrival of these troops from Alicante and the threat of more to follow worked and Bentinck had no need to recall any more troops from the Anglo-Sicilian force in Spain. By way of compensation for Murray’s loss, Wellington agreed to send the 2/67th from Cartagena and tried, but failed, to get additional infantry reinforcements from Cádiz.13 He also firmly reiterated his position with regard to feeding the Spanish troops: ‘I have invariably set my face against it, and have never consented to it or done it, even for a day, in any instance.’14 In respect of the artillery, he was somewhat incredulous at Murray’s supposed requirements:15
Of all your wants that of artillery-men appears most extraordinary. Besides the artillery-men who came with the corps from Sicily, which, as the corps came to carry on a siege, I conclude cannot be inconsiderable in number, you have two companies of British and two of Portuguese artillery belonging to this army; I believe the very same men, in the same numbers, that took Badajoz for us last spring. It would, however, be desirable, now that communication is quite secure, send me a regular return of your force. I cannot let you have the artillerymen at Cartagena [P. Campbell’s Company], as I have nothing else to take care of our stores, etc., there; but if 4 companies, besides those belonging to Sicily, are not enough, I will try and send more from this army.16
Wellington’s meticulous planning for the 1813 campaign was conducted amidst considerable secrecy and an overriding resolve to avoid a repetition of the errors of the previous year. He was determined to entrust his allies with a vital component of the impending operation and the contribution of the operation on the east coast was, unlike the previous year, an essential part of that plan. Wellington’s main thrust was to be against the French armies of the Centre, Portugal and South but in order for that to be successful, he needed to be absolutely sure that Suchet’s army was unable to break away and move west. The plan he had formulated for Murray’s force was one which depended on the welljudged use of naval power and resources. The Royal Navy had brought the force to the east coast and it now played a major role in maintaining it and in facilitating plans for future operations. The commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, had tasked Rear Admiral Benjamin Hallowell with the responsibility for the naval group and the 65 transport vessels which remained on station in Alicante Bay in direct support to operations on the coast. This direct command relationship between Murray and Hallowell explains why Wellington is somewhat vague over the capacity of the transport fleet in his memorandum. However, direct and sustained naval support to operations in the peninsula was now under threat. The British Cabinet’s decision to maintain the peninsula as the primary theatre of British effort was strained further in June 1812 by the unwelcome war with the United States, but once the scale of Napoleon’s disaster in Russia became known they began to question whether a war on the periphery of the Continent was worthwhile when it was clear that the main spoils lay at the heart of Europe. Before the year was out, Royal Navy support to the peninsula had begun to decline but, for now, Hallowell’s force on the east coast remained on station and on task.17