Suchet’s Retreat from Valencia, June 2013
In the case of having to lift the siege of Tarragona, Wellington’s orders to Murray were unequivocal. He was to return to Valencia and land as far to the north as possible in order to link up with the armies of Elio and Del Parque. Murray’s first task, however, was to recover the forces he had sent to the Col-de-Balaguer. As the fleet sailed south the Invincible ran alongside HMS Malta to deliver a message from Colonel Prevost. It confirmed that Pannetier’s brigade had, the day prior, taken the interior road with his infantry and 200 cavalry.1 As there were no reports of Suchet it could be assumed he was still at Tortosa, although some of his cavalry scouts had been engaged with some of Bentinck’s cavalry south of the pass.2 Murray ordered Hallowell to land three battalions from Mackenzie’s division near the Col-de-Balaguer to assist in the extraction of Prevost’s detachment. They were landed late on 13 June. The next day Suchet came up from the south and reconnoitred the defile and was extremely concerned to see it in the hands of a considerable British force. Out to sea the mass of ships were clearly loaded but this was by no means an indicator of the fate of Tarragona. As Suchet pondered, news arrived informing him that two Spanish armies had attacked Harispe and Habert and were threatening Valencia. His reconnaissance was cut short by the arrival, close offshore, of a frigate and two brigs which shelled the marshal and his entourage.3 Suchet withdrew in some haste and sent word to Pannetier to abandon the encirclement of the Fort San Filipe and to pull back.
In light of Suchet’s apparent timidity, Murray seemingly recovered some of his composure and, in an attempt to make amends for his behaviour at Tarragona, suggested a large-scale landing to isolate and capture Pannetier’s brigade. This apparent change of heart was received with a degree of scepticism and astonishment by Murray’s commanders. On 15 June he landed the rest of Mackenzie’s division, Clinton’s division, some artillery and the balance of the 20th Light Dragoons.4 They moved inland on the road to Vendellòs (called Bandillos in the court martial and associated letters and reports) and through the pass where they were bivouacked but, by the time the cavalry screen arrived, Pannetier’s force had pulled back as ordered.5 Having failed in that endeavour Murray now pondered a couple of other plans which essentially involved disembarking the entire force and moving on Tarragona or embarking it and then disembarking it at Cambrils before marching on Tarragona. Murray presented these to Hallowell for his opinion on the quarter-deck of the Malta. Hallowell’s reply was direct and to the point:
Sir John Murray informed me, that, although we had differed respecting the raising of the siege, he had only obeyed his orders, but that everything he did now was an act of his own, and he wished to submit his ideas to me, and to have my opinion on them. He then made the above proposal, stating, that he knew the enemy had received no reinforcements, and supposing he was going away, they were off their guard; I gave it as my opinion, that, as he was there with his whole force, and his batteries erected, that I did not think him equal to it now, with 5,000 men. Here he asked my advice, I gave it, and he followed it.6
To the north, meanwhile, Maurice Mathieu with only 6,000 men received intelligence that the siege had been lifted and decided to try and push through to Tarragona. In the face of this French advance directly down the coast road, Copons fell back towards Valls. On arrival at Tarragona, Maurice Mathieu was fully briefed by Bertoletti that the Anglo-Sicilian force had sailed south and landed at Col-de-Balaguer. Unaware that Suchet had already withdrawn, he elected to move further south towards the allied force in the hope that he could attack them from the north while Suchet did likewise from the south. In fact, Maurice Mathieu’s action placed his men in fearful danger. His small force was outnumbered nearly four to one. Murray once apprised of the situation sent word to Copons prompting him to fall on Maurice Mathieu’s flank. The Spaniard assumed that Murray would simultaneously attack from the south but, alas, Murray’s communiqué dwelt on an attack on his forces at Col-de-Balageur by both Suchet and Maurice Mathieu in which, Murray concluded, he would therefore be outnumbered. Copons was understandably alarmed at the prospect of Murray being outnumbered, as his force was 25,000 strong, and, not surprisingly, he decided not to attack at all. It was a somewhat farcical situation: Suchet had already withdrawn; Maurice Mathieu had ambled into a dangerous trap; Copons was unsighted, rather alarmed and playing safe; while Murray was static, unsure how to proceed and still harbouring premonitions of forces descending on him in a pincer movement.
Murray was, however, determined to fight and he made the interesting decision of asking his chief engineer to point out which positions his forces should occupy.7 Despite deploying his force for battle Murray elected for a council of war early on 17 June. The majority decision was to re-embark the force. Unfortunately no word of this plan was communicated to the Spanish. They were lucky to escape that night as Maurice Mathieu made his way back towards Tarragona. The loading of the Anglo-Sicilian force began later that day and, at much the same time, a large British fleet appeared. Scott recorded the drama:
On arriving found a Council of War sitting, debating whether to embark or not – everyone hoping for the former. Scarce had it ceased and decided once more to be off, when the America made her number with Lord William; and the Admiral’s response of: “We are all glad to see you.” Although his Lordship’s arrival cannot but be a balm to every one, yet our disgrace had gone so far, that it is out of his power to retrieve the bright character with which we started; and without doubt we must retire to some place to refit, and become once more capable of resisting our enemy. Eleven sail of the Toulon Fleet with Sir E Pellew came in; and on Lord William’s landing with the Admiral, the joy of the Army and of the Sailors was notified by three cheers. It was quite consoling to remark the difference of countenance; the Lord benign, undisturbed and manly, the ci-devant [Murray] morose, wretched and bewildered.8
Hallowell would be subsequently chastised for his impertinence in raising the ‘delighted’ signal but it undoubtedly captured the feelings of the entire force at that juncture.9 Lord William Bentinck had departed Sicily with great reluctance and had arrived to take command of the Anglo-Sicilian army. His vessel had been met and escorted by Pellew’s fleet which had been conducting a diversionary operation towards Rosas. He came ashore and having been fully apprised – publicly and privately in conversations with his brother and Hallowell – of the less than satisfactory situation, he relieved Murray of command, hastened the reembarkation of the force, ordered the fort to be blown up – as he had no intention of garrisoning it – and set sail for Alicante. Scott, seemingly ignorant of Wellington’s memorandum, recalled the disappointment at the final command but he nevertheless set about executing the order with regard to the ‘Fort of St Felippe [which] was dismantled, the guns brought off and blown up about 11 o’clock’. Early on 19 June all was ready but an angry north-easterly wind caused considerable problems for the fleet, driving 14 of the transports onto the sandy estuary of the Ebro. Four of them could not be refloated and had to be burned once their consignments had been reloaded on other ships. All this caused frustrating delays and the fleet arrived back at Alicante in dribs and drabs over the period 22 to 26 June.
Bentinck was less than enamoured by circumstances as he found them. The attack by the Spanish 2nd and 3rd Armies on the French forces left in the region had failed. On paper the Spanish outnumbered the French threefold but in reality the available numbers were nearer double the opposition, with Elio only having a direct hand on about 20,000 of his total force. Wellington’s memorandum had left clear directions as to the employment of these armies once Suchet headed north: ‘the third army of the Duque del Parque should be employed to turn the right of the enemy’s positions in Valencia, while the allied troops under Sir John Murray and General Elio will attack them in front.’ Wellington had chosen Del Parque’s army for the more difficult manoeuvre operation as he considered these troops, after those of Copons, to be the best Spanish troops in all their armies. However, for reasons unknown, Elio had convinced Del Parque to switch roles; their combined advance commencing on 9 June, some days after Suchet’s departure. In the end it was Del Parque’s frontal assault on the bridgeheads along the Júcar that was to misfire. Advancing on two routes, on a wide front and on roads which lacked lateral communication and mutual support, his forces were divided. Harispe pounced on 13 June against the easterly column at Carcagente and routed three Spanish brigades. Del Parque was with the other half of his force but unable to move to support them. His army’s capability was badly affected by the setback and he elected to withdraw and wait for the outcome of Elio’s wide, left-flanking manoeuvre, which was being executed by Villacampa’s division. As it was, this too came to nothing. By the time Villacampa had bypassed Severoli’s Italian division and reached the main Madrid to Valencia road and swung east, intelligence reported that Suchet’s forces were rapidly approaching from the north. Suchet had departed on the night of 17 June after witnessing the destruction of Fort San Filipe and arrived back in Valencia on 25 June. Villacampa delayed overly long and was eventually chased into the interior by Musnier’s division as they debouched into the plains beneath the Sagunto Fort. Of these two actions Suchet was to write:
11th of June, general Harispe reported ... that on quitting St. Philip, according to instructions, to establish himself on the Júcar, he had been followed by all the forces of general Elio and the duke del Parque. General Mesclop, commanding his rearguard upon the high road, was closely pressed by a thousand Spanish horse. Seizing a moment when the enemy’s column had halted in the village of Rogla [Rotgla], which was choked up by it, he suddenly faced about and charged at the head of the hussars of the 4th regiment ... the Spaniards, cut in pieces and overthrown, fled in disorder back to the village of Lanera [Llanera].
13th, the enemy made his appearance there in force ... during this demonstration, the duke del Parque attacked Alcira [Alzira] by the two roads of Carcagente [Carcaixent] and Gandia. General Habert, allowing the principal column of the enemy to come nearly to the suburb, marched against it and charged it, at the head of the 14th of the line and a squadron of hussars, at the moment it was beginning to deploy. The column was thrown into disorder and routed, having nearly four hundred men killed, and losing six hundred and twenty prisoners, with a pair of colours.10
Both Murray and Bentinck wrote to Wellington from Alicante on 23 June: the former outlined events from the failed expedition to Tarragona while the later studiously avoided the subject of the failed siege and concentrated on the state of affairs in Italy and Napoleon’s plans to attack Sicily.11 Bentinck concluded that ‘although I think it possible for the Toulon fleet to get to Sicily, yet I think it difficult; and upon this difficulty, combined with the importance of keeping the Sicilian detachment in Spain, my opinion is founded’.12 It was a sea change from the previous year. Bentinck, keen to kick start operations in Valencia was, however, facing other problems. Murray, when he departed for Tarragona and against Wellington’s unequivocal instruction, had released the mules and carts constituting the force’s land transport. But any hope of salvaging something from the month of June was dealt a terminal blow following his visit, a few days later, to the Spanish units in the field. Del Parque’s demoralised force a particular concern. He wrote to Wellington on 30 June.
The Duque has with him between 11,000 and 12,000 infantry, the greater part of which I saw yesterday, and some of his regiments are extremely fine. The men have the best appearance, but the proportion of officers is very small, and, as I judge from the conversation with the Duque and his staff, not very good ... The artillery consisted of very few pieces, of which some were well animalled, some bad. I only saw a very small proportion of the cavalry ... If your Lordship could see this Spanish Army, I think you would be of the opinion that alone, and not supported by troops in whom they have more confidence than in themselves, they are good for little or nothing.13
Despite this pessimistic view of his Spanish allies, Bentinck discussed future options with both Elio and Del Parque and between them they fashioned a plan. This involved the Anglo-Sicilian force and Del Parque’s army executing a somewhat half-baked wide westerly flanking manoeuvre around Suchet’s line on the Júcar, while Elio held their attention from the south. Suchet, conversely, having repositioned his forces, was poised to resume the offensive and had Del Parque’s battered force firmly in his sights. However, before any forward movements were made, news of the catastrophic defeat of the French at Vitoria reached the east coast commanders and it was all change. Bentinck received the news days before Suchet as the the guerrillas had been intercepting most of the French communiqués since the start of the Vitoria campaign. In fact, Suchet had been growing increasingly anxious throughout June with reports, albeit sporadic, of Joseph’s combined armies withdrawing north-eastwards at an alarming rate. Furthermore, he had received direction but not orders from Joseph on 16 June to fall back towards Saragossa ‘which would simplify communication and enable combined operations’.14 When confirmation of the disaster arrived at his headquarters at Valencia on 3 July, he wasted no time in issuing immediate orders for the force to evacuate the region of Valencia and move north of the Ebro River. The report outlining the disaster at Vitoria had come from Suchet’s commander at Saragossa, General Paris, who informed him that General Bertrand Clausel had fallen back on the city with his Army of the North having failed to link up with Joseph’s combined armies in time for the battle. Clausel announced his intention of remaining at Saragossa and moving in support of either Joseph’s shattered armies or of Suchet’s efforts in Aragón and Catalonia.
Suchet’s Retreat from Valencia, June 2013
On receipt of this declaration, Suchet elected to pull back, join forces with Clausel and then move on Wellington’s right flank. He departed Valencia on 5 July and reached the south bank of the Ebro four days later. The French troops were well-disciplined on the march and received an uninterrupted passage from the locals and guerrillas as their reward. It had been a textbook withdrawal except for one unquestionable error. Suchet had left a single company in Denía, two battalions in Sagunto and another in Peñiscola. This policy only served to reduce the strength of his army at a critical juncture in the campaign; for the end to French occupation in Spain was clearly just a matter of time.15
In Catalonia, following Murray’s departure, Copons had withdrawn back to his mountain hideouts and Decaen had planned, and commenced, an operation to flush them out. When he received the news of Vitoria, Decaen tried to recall General Lamarque, commanding the strike force, but he was already locked in minor skirmishes with Eroles’ division and he did not receive the order to return to Gerona. Copons had been monitoring Lamarque’s advance and had sent an additional brigade to assist Eroles and the French column would have been all but destroyed had Decaen not sent Beurmann’s brigade to the rescue. They arrived just in time, Lamarque had lost 400 men (including 31 of his officers) his musket ammunition was all but spent and that of his artillery expended. Despite Decaen’s visionary handling he was shortly to discover that he had been superseded in command by Suchet who was now to assume command of all the forces on the east coast and Ebro valley. On 9 July Suchet arrived at Tortosa where he received a despatch from Clausel informing him that he had elected to head for the pass at Jaca, cross the Pyrenees and rejoin Joseph’s army. The possibility of a link-up had passed and Suchet sent orders to General Paris at Saragossa to march immediately to Mequinenza and rejoin the main body of Suchet’s army. However, Paris did not receive the order for he had been driven out of Saragossa by Duran’s (irregular) division before it reached him. Paris had decided to follow in Clausel’s footsteps and move back to France via the pass at Jaca. He lost a great many of his men and all his baggage en route. The loss of these 5,000 men was a bitter blow for Suchet – without them he would no longer be able to maintain a position in advance of the River Ebro.
Napoleon’s spring victories at Lützen and Bautzen over the Prussians and Russians had gone a long way to restoring French dominance in central Europe. The consequent armistice lasted longer than envisaged and the diplomatic game over Austria’s allegiance ebbed and flowed until 19 July when the Austrians finally agreed, having satisfied their own aggrandisement, to join the Sixth Coalition. There can be little doubt that Wellington’s momentous victory at Vitoria on 21 June had contributed to that outcome. However, post-Vitoria and until that convention was signed at Reichenbach on 27 June, the situation in Iberia was uncertain.16 The armistice in central Europe essentially freed-up troops for Spain. It also had personal implications for Wellington as the major allies could not agree on a single supreme commander and his name was being proposed as a possible contender. Bathurst warned Wellington, if any such counsel was necessary, that while such a command might appear flattering it was, due to rivalries and factionalism, potentially hazardous to one’s reputation.17 Wellington had no intention of entertaining any notion of leaving Spain at such a critical juncture. There was still much to do. The timing of any invasion of France over the Pyrenees was critical and for this he looked to the main allies in central Europe for the lead. The role and contribution of Bentinck’s force on the east coast was critical to this final campaign. However, here Wellington faced a dilemma for the Anglo-Sicilian element of Bentinck’s force remained dual-tasked and events in Italy, Naples and Sicily were far from certain. The British government were willing to make peace with Marshal Joachim Murat, King of Naples and Napoleon’s brother-in-law, if he gave up Naples in return for territory elsewhere in Italy. Naples would thus be returned to the King of Sicily. However, the Austrians were keen to leave Murat in Naples and this, in tandem with events in central Europe, left the situation relatively volatile and in doubt. Wellington was aware of Bentinck’s concerns and also of the authority vested in him with regard to the Anglo-Sicilian corps. He therefore wrote to Bentinck on 1 July and gave him the option to decide.
I don’t consider Sicily to be in any danger whatever at present, and I believe the fleet at Toulon is not manned and, in some degree, dismantled ... it is very difficult to form an opinion of Murat’s sincerity; but I am quite certain that he will do nothing unless the Emperor of Austria should take a line with the Allies. In that case he will probably conclude with you. If he should conclude with you, I authorize you to embark from Spain all your Anglo-Sicilian corps, and to take them where you please ... you will in that case throw the Spaniards on the defensive, unless you should think them strong enough to pursue the objects of their instructions alone.18
It was a selfless act by Wellington who would have been more aware than at any time of the war of the importance of keeping Suchet out of the game. Another letter he sent to Bentinck that same day alluded to another problem – support from the Royal Navy. The War of 1812 with America that had broken out the previous summer resulted in a redeployment of Royal Navy assets to blockade the east coast of America and to counter and pursue American privateers. These resources came largely from the North Sea Fleet but the corresponding reallocation of tasks stretched the Mediterranean and Channel fleets, the latter having responsibility for the Bay of Biscay and the north coast of Spain. The result was a reduction of naval ships, patrols and influence, thereby endangering the naval supremacy hitherto enjoyed by the allies at a time when that unquestionable dominance needed to be guaranteed. Wellington had received an order from the Secretary of State to release transports from both Lisbon and the Anglo-Sicilian expeditionary force. It could not have come at a more difficult time for Wellington as he tried to relocate his logistic base from Lisbon to Santander and needed naval mobility for the east coast force to maximise its potential effect.