Following the victory at Vitoria Wellington’s army was fully committed to driving the remnants of King Joseph’s defeated armies across the French border. They crossed the Pyrenees in the last week of June but their withdrawal in no way relieved the burden on the allied commander’s mind. His army, which had advanced nearly 1,000 kilometres in six weeks, was exhausted. Two significant garrison forces were holed up in formidable fortresses at San Sebastian and Pamplona. The whereabouts and intentions of Clausel’s Army of the North were unclear. Wellington’s logistic line of communication with Lisbon was now far too long and unwieldy and he put in motion the contingency plan to relocate the base to Santander. Furthermore, having seemingly defeated the French in Spain, the political will in London was shifting towards a redeployment of the army to throw our whole force as much as possible into cooperation with the Allies in the Netherlands.1 News of Murray’s failure to capture Tarragona was, therefore, a minor disappointment in the greater scheme. However, as more details of the debacle began to filter through to Wellington’s headquarters, he anticipated the episode was about to become a major and very unwelcome distraction, noting in a letter to Bentinck that ‘Sir J. Murray’s misfortune will create the devil of a breeze’.2
As it happened, a letter sent by Hallowell to Pellew on 14 June, started a chain of events which was to lead to Murray’s court martial. Pellew felt obliged to send it back to the Admiralty and Melville, the First Sea Lord, and an individual who was not on the best of terms with Wellington as a result of dwindling naval support in the Atlantic and Bay of Biscay, wasted no time in forwarding a copy to the War Department.
H.M.S. Malta, off the Coll de Balaguer, 14 June, 18133
Sir,
My letter of the 12th instant announced to you the determination which Sir J. Murray had taken of immediately raising the siege of Tarragona and embarking the army. The embarkation accordingly commenced that morning. I am sorry to inform you that as no measures whatever had been previously adopted towards retiring, it took place with great precipitation; and twenty-one pieces of ordnance were, in consequence, abandoned and left behind in their batteries, namely, eleven 24-pounders, five 10-inch mortars, and five 10-inch howitzers, which were spiked, and their carriages burned, by order of the Commander of the Forces, although it was my decided opinion and advice to wait till night, when I promised to embark the whole.
The embarkation continued all night; and after all the troops were on board our boats were employed in bringing off the brigade of artillery, staff horses, mules &c., the whole of which, with everything appearing, were got on board by eleven in the forenoon of yesterday, without the smallest molestation.
When we began to embark, a great part of the cavalry and field artillery were sent to the Coll de Balaguer. Having received information in the night that the enemy had found a pass to come round that fort, and were getting in their rear, I sent the Volcano and gun-boats to protect them and the General himself took a passage in the Volcano.
From the various reports we have had respecting the garrison of Tarragona, it consisted of from 1200 to 1600 men at the time of our arrival; but no report has made it exceed 1600. I have never yet learned that any of the enemy’s moveable force was nearer to us than Villafranca; and there is no ground for believing that the division which had come thither from Barcelona, under De Caen, consisted of more than 5000.
The Strombolo returned from Torredembaria yesterday evening, and Captain Stoddart relates that he saw there a person who had left Villafranca at half-past seven the same morning, by whom he was informed that the French had not then left the place, nor seemed to have any immediate intention of leaving it; that their number was 5000, and that their artillery was composed of two small mountain guns carried upon mules, two field pieces and one howitzer.
Yesterday morning we saw the enemy destroying the batteries and removing the ordnance from there into the garrison; but we could not perceive their numbers to be greater than when we were besieging the town.
As soon as the embarkation was complete at Tarragona I came round to Balaguer in the Malta to assist in embarking the cavalry and artillery sent hither. Before my arrival, however, Captain Adam had embarked all the latter, and Sir J. Murray has since signified his resolution to disembark the whole army here, for which purpose I have, by his desire, ordered all the transports hither, and they are now coming in. Suchet is within a few miles of us.
As our whole forces must be supplied with water from the ships, and knowing as I do, by experience, the indecisiveness of the General’s character, I do not auger any favourable result from his intended operations. We have already been disgraced more than any British army ever was, and I fear every movement made by the present commander will add to its disasters.
Deeming it of the greatest importance that Lord Wellington should be early and certainly acquainted with these deplorable proceedings, I have sent Captain Carroll in the Hyacinth to land at Alicante, and make his way across the country to his Lordship’s head-quarters. I have put Lieutenant Boxer, first Lieutenant of the Malta, in temporary command of the Volcano.
I beg leave to mention that the embarkation of the troops was effected under the immediate direction of Captains Bathurst, Ingelfield, and Carroll, to whose exertions I am much indebted; and it would be unjust if I omitted to represent that every commendation is due to those of Captain Withers and the agents for transports under him, who have been indefatigable in the performance of their laborious duties throughout the whole of the service.
BEN. HALLOWELL
Strangely Wellington did not receive Hallowell’s letter, but a copy was sent by Bathurst to Wellington towards the end of July.4 In the covering note Bathurst observed that ‘it does not appear possible that this business should be permitted to pass over without investigation’. He goes on to suggest that ‘the most satisfactory place for such an investigation is in the Peninsula, under [Wellington’s] auspices and command’.5 The Secretary for War had proposed this plan of action two weeks earlier and had notified Wellington that he had withdrawn Murray from Wellington’s immediate command; he went on to specify that should Bentinck return to Sicily ‘and the army remain in Spain ... it is desirable that Sir J. Murray should not return to command it’.6 Bathurst had effectively handed the problem to Wellington who realized that he had no other option than to convene a court martial. It was the last thing he needed at that time. Although Suchet’s forces seemed to be contained in the east, the siege of San Sebastian was not going well, the cordon at Pamplona was far from watertight and there were disturbing rumours that Soult was planning to attack Wellington across the Pyrenees. He wrote back to Bathurst and objected to the court martial being held intheatre and received the response he had hoped for:
The objection which you allude to, if the Court Martial were composed of the Eastern army is, I think, conclusive. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot help continuing to be of the opinion that the Court Martial had better be composed of your army; but in order to meet your objection as well as I can, I should propose it not assembling until the campaign be closed, and it may take place in a more central place.7
This letter enabled Wellington to put the whole thing out of his mind. The campaign did not, in fact, close until Soult’s forces surrendered on the outskirts of Toulouse following news of Napoleon’s abdication in April 1814. Britain and the Allies had been victorious and after over 20 years of continuous war it appeared that peace might once again prevail. There was much to do. Wellington’s army was broken up with remarkable speed, the Spanish and Portuguese armies were sent home and many British units were sent to America in an attempt to bring a swift end to the American war. Other British and German units marched north to participate in the armies of occupying France and the foreign corps and many second and veteran battalions were disbanded. To make matters worse, the situation in Ireland was anything but peaceful. No sooner had one crisis been solved, another sprang up in its place. Little wonder, therefore, that the subject of Murray’s court martial found itself very much on the back burner. Indeed, there was suggestion that the whole affair should be shelved altogether, after all the war was over and the nation victorious.
In fact the matter had been ruminating behind the scenes during the last few months of 1813 and throughout 1814. As early as July 1813 Wellington found himself backed into a corner on the issue; he warned Murray that his handling of the affair was under investigation and he then passed the responsibility for collecting statements, including those of the respective Spanish commanders, and framing the charges to Frances Seymour Larpent, whom the Judge Advocate General had asked to act as Judge Advocate 8 Originally four separate charges were framed but the fourth, largely drawn from the statement of General Copons, was dropped at Wellington’s suggestion before the first three were submitted for the approbation of the Prince Regent.9 Once approved Larpent requested both Murray and Hallowell to list their respective witnesses, while Larpent set about trying to procure those requested by Wellington – mainly Spanish officers. This list was complete in early 1814 and then submitted to the Spanish government for their approval. The Spanish regency assented but with the caveat that ‘the examination of Spanish officers should take place according to the Spanish forms and regulations’.10 Another few weeks passed in an attempt to clarify these national requirements which turned out to be ‘that officers of the rank of Colonel and upwards were to be questioned by means of written interrogatories, to be submitted to them by the Fiscal of the Military Court, and that through the intervention of the same person they were to return their written answers on honour only, and not on oath’.11 Larpent recommended to Wellington that this was both irregular and illegal but, once consulted, Murray was happy to proceed on this basis. It was now April 1814 and Wellington ordered the formation of a General Court Martial at Tarragona and nominated General Lowry Cole as the president. Cole was deeply unhappy and made strong representations to Wellington about the irregularity of conducting a court martial on a senior British officer, in a foreign garrison, in a foreign country which was no longer at war and upon whose soil no other British troops were stationed. Cole’s point was accepted and the proceedings were ordered to return to England. During mid- to late 1814, numerous attempts were made to procure the attendance of the Spanish witnesses and this necessitated another request to the Spanish government. Whilst this request was being processed the weeks turned to months and it was not until 16 January 1815 that the General Court Martial was finally assembled at Winchester.
It comprised no less than six full generals and nine lieutenant generals. Frances Seymour Larpent acted as Judge Advocate while Murray conducted his own defence. Intriguingly, Vice Admiral Hallowell was to act as prosecution (for the third charge); the very man whose letter to Pellew made the trial a matter of necessity. There were three charges:
1st For landing or continuing on shore when landed, between the 7th and 12th of June, near Tarragona, a large quantity of heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores, when he had good reason to believe that no real benefit would be derived, for ten or twelve days, as to producing the fall of Tarragona by these means; and when he had received information, which he believed, that long before that time, a superior force of the enemy would be near him; and was aware that the siege must then be abandoned, knowing at the same time the great difficulty and dangers attending to such sudden re-embarkation on that coast; such conduct being highly unmilitary, and against the spirit of his instructions.
2d. For neglect of duty and disobedience of the express written orders of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, the Commander of His Majesty’s forces in the Peninsula, by not immediately re-embarking the whole of the forces under his command, after he had determined to raise, and had actually raised, the siege of Tarragona, and returning to Valencia in order to assist the Spanish armies in that province in securing the positions which they might have acquired there.
3d. For neglect of duty in hastily re-embarking the forces under his command, without any previous preparations or arrangements, and thus precipitately and unnecessarily abandoning a considerable quantity of artillery, stores , and ammunition, about the 12th of June, 1813, near Tarragona, when he was so far from being compelled to this degrading measure by the immediate approach of any superior force, or by any other sufficient cause, that by due zeal, firmness, and exertion, the greater part, if not the whole, might have been embarked in safety, Admiral Hallowell, who was at that time on duty at the station, engaging to effect the same, such conduct being highly to the prejudice of the service, and detrimental to the British military character.
In summary, the first charge questions why Murray landed at all, the second why having landed he did not get the whole of his force off when he had decided to raise the siege and the third and final charge questions his timing, rationale and method of lifting the siege and re-embarking the force. The fourth charge and indeed any reference to Murray having abandoned the Spanish was not included and it would be simple to conclude that this was because the war was over and that to publicly humiliate (for there was great public interest in this trial) a senior British officer in the wake of a national triumph was counterproductive. While there may be an element of truth in this assertion, the fact remained that the reason Murray’s abandonment of Copons was not included was simply because the Spanish government had placed so many obstacles with regard to the provision of, and procedure with, Spanish witnesses that it made their inclusion completely impractical. Oman considers Murray’s ‘callous betrayal of the Spanish colleague who had done his best to serve him ‘as his worst offence’.12 A debateable sentiment but one which, as it happened, was irrelevant under the circumstances of the consequent tribunal.
Larpent spent the first day of the trial presenting documentary evidence in the form of a series of letters and reports written by Murray. The first dated 7 June in which he raised his initial concerns to Wellington; the second on 9 June in which he sounded more optimistic, outlining the capture of Fort San Filipe and praising the Royal Navy and some of his foreign troops for their zeal and performance; the third on 14 June explaining that he had lifted the siege and re-embarked the force; and a fourth letter also dated 14 June in which he gives the reasons for his decision. On landing at Alicante on 23 June Murray, having had time to ponder his actions, wrote a very long letter to Wellington; it overlapped with a letter from Wellington, written on 1 July in which he posed 11 questions to Murray; and the final letter dated 15 July in which Murray reiterated much of what he had written on 23 June and, in addition, answered Wellington’s questions – more or less. In addition to Wellington’s Memorandum for Operations on the east coast and Hallowell’s letter to Pellew dated 14 June, this constituted the documentary evidence read out verbatim on what must have been a long and quite tedious opening day. Other than a most inconsequential witness called by Larpent, who added nothing, this constituted the complete evidence for the first and second charges, much to the justifiable incredulity of General Tucker Montressor, one of the board members.
The assembled press and indeed the board members may have considered they were witness and party to a cover-up. However, any expectation that the trial was going to be concluded with alacrity was quickly dispelled when, on the second day, Hallowell began his prosecution based on the third charge: the very charge penned in concert with Hallowell’s letter, written to the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, in which he severely criticised a brother officer, albeit from another service. Hallowell, facing a board entirely composed of senior army officers, many of whom considered his actions dishonourable and vaguely detestable, was not given an easy passage. Neither, it must be stated, was Hallowell’s handling of the prosecution skilfully executed. Indeed there was a waft of superciliousness and ‘I told you so’ about the tone and conduct of Hallowell’s lengthy presentation of documental evidence and in the manner of questioning and cross examination. This not only confirmed attitudes towards both Murray and Hallowell but also played directly into Murray’s hands, who, as a far more accomplished orator and someone decidedly better prepared than his accuser, was able to deflect criticism and masterfully ply the red herring.
Murray made great play of Article 13 of Wellington’s memorandum and it’s worth a reminder of the content of this guidance: ‘It must be understood, however, by the General Officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten, of which the operating armies will be composed; and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position; and that I shall forgive any thing, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed.’13 Wellington realized as early as 3 July 1813 that the clause could be misinterpreted as guidance that the generals were not to be defeated and, ipso facto, that they were not to put themselves in a situation where there might be the remotest possibility that they might be defeated. He wrote to Bathurst on the matter and even suggested alternative wording and stressed that the wording was for the benefit of ‘the Duke del Parque and Gen. Elio, from the knowledge and character of the nation and of these Generals’.14 Wellington was clearly concerned about Murray’s interpretation and he wrote to Larpent from Paris in January 1815 a few days before the start of the court martial:
In regard to Sir John Murray’s trial, I intend to prove the charges framed by my directions against him, in consequence of the orders of the Government, by the production of my Instructions and his Reports, all of which are in the Government Offices.
Sir John Murray contends that one paragraph of my Instructions directed him not to risk an action. I think he is mistaken in my meaning in that paragraph; but whether he has or not, that paragraph did not recall the other instructions for his conduct.
The object of that paragraph was to prevent the Spanish Generals Elio and Duque del Parque, from taking advantage of Sir John Murray’s absence, and the temporary command which they had of the cavalry belonging to Sir John Murray’s and Whittingham’s corps to attack the French. There existed a prevailing opinion among Spanish officers that their failures were to be attributed to the want of good cavalry; and this paragraph in the Instructions was drawn with the view of preventing those officers from attempting to fight a general action when circumstances should have placed a small body of good cavalry at their disposal, more particularly as all the manoeuvres ordered by the Instructions had in view to prevent the necessity of a general action.15
Any suggestion of calling Wellington as a witness was out of the question. For one thing, army commanders-in-chief ordered the convening of such tribunals; their calling to attend was only instigated in extremis. For another, since the end of the war, Wellington’s feet had hardly touched the ground. Having completed his duties in Paris commanding the armies of occupation, he returned home briefly before being sent back to France as His Majesty’s ambassador in August and then, in December 1814, he replaced Lord Castlereagh as Britain’s first plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna. Nevertheless, Murray’s justification for his action lent heavily on Wellington’s directive and Article 13 in particular. Murray’s defence began on the seventh day of the trial (27 January) and opened with a long, emotional and calculated appeal. The report in the Glasgow Herald dated 3 February 1815, encapsulated the thrust of his opening plea:
The defence of Sir J. Murray began by complaining of the prejudice that had been excited in the public mind against him through malice and ignorance; and by expressing a hope that the same would be completely removed by the decision that should now be made respecting his conduct by a tribunal composed of officers on whose character and integrity he placed the utmost reliance. It was to the disapprobation of Admiral Hallowell he owed all the abuse which had been lavished upon him, his suspension from military command; and the situation in which he now appeared of pleading his own cause before a public military tribunal.16
Murray then appealed directly to his accuser asking him why he had not discussed matters before despatching his ‘direct attack’ on his military reputation in his public despatch; a despatch about which the accused was ignorant of its contents; a despatch in which he was condemned before he was heard; a despatch in which he was found guilty before he was judged. It was good, if predictable stuff, but Murray had a point. It was 37 days after Hallowell sent the despatch before he informed his superior officer of his actions, by which time Wellington had been directed by London, on the strength of Hallowell’s report alone, to frame charges. Murray’s delivery was unrelenting and the real villain was unmistakable: the silver bullet hit the target and the senior officers facing Murray shifted uncomfortably, casting accusing glances not at the defendant but at his accuser on the other side of the room. The case for the defence ran for the next six days during which time no less than 14 witnesses were examined and many re-examined by Murray. They were all bit-players: the key witnesses, Hallowell, Whittingham, Clinton, Mackenzie, Frederick Bentinck, Thackeray and Williamson had already formed Larpent’s background evidence to the third charge. The fact that Murray did not call one of these key witnesses in his defence spoke volumes.
The defence dragged on, examining letters, confirming signatures and originality, particularly with regard to troop locations and strengths. The defence case became entirely preoccupied with how many Frenchmen were where, at what date and time, as well the strengths and capabilities of Murray’s troops, the quantity of naval transports and the numbers of Spanish troops in support. The whole thing became bogged down in the trivial detail of numbers, dates and procedures for disembarkation and re-embarkation and the board was given, and discussed, the sources of that information; the reliability and credibility of those sources; who was aware of the information, and when; who was not, why not, and so on. This dialogue, quite inexplicably given the charges, included considerable deliberation on the Spanish strengths and locations, which was largely superfluous. Murray singularly failed to provide any clear unequivocal evidence to dispel the big questions. Why he chose to land in the first place? What prompted him to raise the siege when he did? Why, having made the decision to raise the siege, did he do so in such an unprofessional manner? It is not until Murray’s quartermaster-general is brought to the stand for the second time that anything of substance is revealed. Donkin had already distanced himself from Murray’s actions in a long and detailed letter to Henry Wellesley on 19 June:
I now take the liberty of writing to you concerning the late events before Tarragona, about which a great outcry has been raised by the Rear-Admiral employed, which never would have been raised had the enemy pressed on and destroyed our field train and cavalry, as he might have done, in consequence of our waiting (owing to the advice of some persons in Sir J. Murray’s confidence) three days after he knew of the enemy’s advance. As Quartermaster-General, I have been loaded with my share of censure. This will be fatal to me, though I have had little to say in Sir J. Murray’s councils, should the Marquis of Wellington adopt the same opinions.
I have never been consulted by Sir John Murray, and he decided himself on the 12th of June on immediate embarkation, on my delivering to him a letter from the Spanish General Copons, announcing that De Caen’s column was about nine hours off, he having previously learnt that Suchet’s was at about an equal distance, and both in march towards him from opposite points, making in number 17,000 men. This was the intelligence he received from the Spanish generals and staff, and on this he decided, after having discussed with me the time and distance of march, and the relative strength of the Allies and the enemy. It was not till after he had decided and given his orders to raise the siege that I gave my opinion; but I then did take the liberty of saying that I thought, as I still think, that he had decided well.17
In the letter Donkin made no attempt to shirk his responsibilities, for indeed his role in the business and conduct of the raising of the siege is pivotal, but he nevertheless concluded that ‘I have never influenced any of the late measures – Sir John Murray has commanded, and I have obeyed’.18 At the trial Donkin was, not surprisingly, entirely supportive of Murray’s actions during questioning by Murray himself, although the witness reiterated his point that he was unsighted on Murray’s instructions and plans.19 Cross examination by Hallowell was a far tetchier affair but it was the cross examination by the board which solicited the most telling responses. Under pressure, Donkin insist that lifting the siege was the right thing to do, but he could not explain why the arrangements he had been instructed to make on 9 June were not put into action and his explanation as to why the army remaining on shore on the night of 12 June were at such risk was unconvincing in the extreme.20 Donkin’s premonition that the ‘debacle would be fatal to him’ was playing out before his very eyes. The court was left in no doubt that Donkin shared considerable responsibility for the conduct of the reembarkation and the way the siege was lifted. This undoubtedly had an effect on the board’s findings and even on Donkin’s career. Napier in his history of the war is overly supportive of Donkin and not, uncharacteristically, harsh on Murray. But it should always be remembered that Napier’s work was written to satisfy public consumption as well as being a historical record.21 However, Napier was certainly correct when he stated that the whole affair was not so much about raising the siege but the manner in which it was done. It was Murray’s cavalier attitude to the guns themselves which rankled with so many, including Wellington; the very guns, which Napier properly pointed out, had shaken the bloody ramparts of Badajoz.22
They were of small value, old iron! He attached little importance to the sacrifice of artillery, it was his principle, he had approved of colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired colonel Prevost, if pressed to abandon his battering train before the Fort of Balaguer. Such doctrine might appear strange to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies and the French owed much of their success to the adoption of it.23
On the 13th day, the defence was concluded by Murray and in the process of his summing up he made a very pertinent point: ‘It would be unbecoming to remind you, Mr President, of all that I have suffered are about to end; but I entreat you to recollect, that mine is no common case on which you are about to decide, every future commander is, more or less, interested in your judgment.’24 What followed was a rather farcical attempt by Hallowell to raise a number of questions, redress some of the case by the defence and claim that the name of the Royal Navy had been tarnished by some of Murray’s comments. Larpent danced around Hallowell’s sensitivities while many members of the board voiced their disproval at Hallowell’s attempt to deflect attention towards an entirely unrelated issue. It did Hallowell’s case no good whatsoever. The findings of the court martial were published by Horse Guards on 17 February. On the first two charges a verdict of ‘not guilty’ was returned. With respect to the third charge Murray was found guilty on the aspects of the charge that stated ‘That he unnecessarily abandoned a considerable quantity of Artillery and Stores, which he might have embarked in safety, such conduct being detrimental to the Service’. He was acquitted on the balance of the charge and the announcement went on to clarify this as far as possible:
The Court, under all the circumstances of the Case, considering the conduct of Sir John Murray to have proceeded from a mere error in judgement, is of the opinion, and does adjudge, that, for the part of the Third Charge, of which Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray has been found Guilty, he be admonished in such a manner as His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief may think proper.
His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, to approve and confirm the Finding and Sentence of the Court; but as the Court has only attributed to Sir John Murray a mere error in judgement, the case has not appeared to his Royal Highness to call for any further observation.
The Commander-in-Chief directs that the foregoing Charges preferred against Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, Bart. together with the Findings and Sentence of the Court, and the Prince Regent’s pleasure thereon, shall be entered into the General Order Book, and read at the head of every Regiment in His Majesty’s Service.25
Murray was devastated.