Spanish Approach Routes, 20 July 1812
Four days after the Spanish prisoners of war had departed the city to begin their long march to France, Suchet entered Valencia to a surprisingly civil reception. He noted that ‘the inhabitants gave us a far more friendly reception than we could have anticipated’.1 Indeed many of the local magistrates vowed allegiance to King Joseph. Furthermore, the rapid capitulation of Valencia and Suchet’s decision not to allow his troops in the place for four days did save its inhabitants from the customary horrors of the post-siege licentiousness. To that end, it could be argued that Suchet’s tactics at Tarragona had paid off. There were, however, inevitable reprisals from the victors in the form of hundreds of deportations and regrettably some executions (mainly of friars) as well as a heavy financial tribute of some 53 million Francs (over £200,000). In addition, great quantities of the British arms, from Tupper’s shipments, were seized in the city’s vaults. In his despatch to Berthier of 12 January, Suchet had every right to gloat on the swiftness of his achievements which he had realized without the support of the four divisions from the armies of the Centre and Portugal:
At ten o’clock at night on the 11th January, being the day after the Spanish army had laid down their arms, marshal Suchet received a letter from general Montbrun, dated Almanza the 9th of the same month, which was brought to him by an officer of the staff. That general had been detached from the army of Portugal, and was advancing by the road from Madrid to Valencia, with a corps composed of three divisions, including one division of cavalry. He announced, in compliance with the emperor’s orders, the object of his movement was to create a diversion against the Spanish army, and protect the operation of the army of Aragon; that he was about to manoeuvre with a view to cut off or drive back into Alicante the corps of general Mahy and Freyre [Friere], which occupied Alcoy and Concertaïna [Concentaina], that under any circumstance, however, his instructions required him to return to the army of Portugal between the 15th and 20th.2
Suchet considered his force of 30,000 more than enough to tackle the Spanish 3rd Army (formerly the Army of Murcia) consisting largely of Mahy’s corps-sized force that had escaped the encirclement at Valencia and was now concentrating around Alicante. Suchet informed Montbrun that his services were no longer required. Indeed he was very keen that the force should not advance towards the Murcian army at all for fear, so he wrote, that it might entice them to build up their defensive preparations which they had hitherto neglected. Furthermore, he would undoubtedly have been keen that any laurels from operations on the east coast remained his and his alone. Inexplicably, Montbrun chose to ignore Suchet’s demand and instead, in a display of personal ambition, he marched on Alicante driving back Freire from Elche. On 15 January he came up against the fortifications of Santa Barbara and San Fernando which, contrary to Suchet’s assessment, had been much improved in the preceding years. Inside the two forts were the divisions of Juan José Creagh de Lacy, José Obispo, Philip Roche and Luis de Bassecourt, 6,000 regular and well armed troops. Outnumbered and lacking siege artillery, Montbrun quickly realized the futility of trying to capture the town and the palpable danger of outstaying his welcome and withdrew taking out his frustration on the local towns and villages as he went.
This pointless foray had delayed the return of these forces to the Tagus, denying Marmont a vital element of his force at a critical time, and understandably incensed Suchet. Montbrun’s insubordination and moment of madness had in fact given the Spanish cause for hope as their morale recovered with great rapidity following the French withdrawal. Far more significantly, however, had Montbrun returned west on receipt of Suchet’s order the three divisions of the Army of Portugal would have been back in the area of operations on or near the River Tagus by the 22 January; just two days later than Marmont had directed. As it transpired Montbrun’s foray delayed their return until the end of month. When they were en route they began to receive disquieting reports that Wellington’s army had moved against Ciudad Rodrigo. The pace and distances of their marches were increased to no avail. As Charles Oman points out in his history of the war that even if Montbrun had never made his raid on Alicante he would still not have been back in time to prevent the fall of the vital border fortress.3 For Wellington had concluded the siege in a remarkable time of 11 days, taking General Jean Léonard Barrié’s surrender on 19 January.
To make matters worse for the French, this was not the only Napoleonic directive to falter. Soult’s supposed diversionary attack into the underbelly of the Murcian army never got off the ground. By the time Soult had received the order of 19 November, which was reiterated on 6 December, he had already assembled a force to attack and try to capture the fort at Tarifa. When this failed, in rather miserable circumstances in early January 1812, Soult most likely felt compelled to act and despatched his younger brother with the light horse from Sebastiani’s IV Corps to execute a raid into Murcia. He arrived unopposed in front of the city on 25 January and demanded the city’s surrender and a ransom of 60,000 dollars before establishing his small force within the walls, while he took up residence in the archbishop’s palace. Martin La Carrera’s brigade was the nearest Spanish force to the city. Numbering only 800 men it was numerically balanced against the elite French cavalry but it had the advantage of surprise. Dividing his men into three columns, they entered the city by the three gates, and Carrera’s group nearly captured Pierre Soult before the collective resolve of the Spaniards waned and they withdrew having suffered some losses. Carrera died fighting while trying to rally his men, something of an all too familiar story. Nevertheless, it was enough to convince Pierre Soult that an immediate withdrawal back towards Granada was the most prudent option; this was conducted the next day amidst gratuitous plundering en route.
Notwithstanding these failures, neither Montbrun’s nor Soult’s excursions did little to disrupt Suchet’s plans for the next stage of the subjugation of the east coast. His next target was the port and city of Alicante and he set about planning to achieve this unaware that two entirely unconnected events were to thwart the final conquest and deny him complete victory. The first was Napoleon’s plans for his war with Russia and the second was Wellington’s early success in (what was later to be known as) the Salamanca campaign. Napoleon wrote to Berthier on 14 January, unaware that Valencia had already fallen:
My Cousin – prepare the following instructions, which I wish to have sent to Marshal Suchet, as soon as I have approved the draft.
You will tell him that, immediately after the capture of Valencia, I intend the Polish generals and staff officers, as well as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd regiments of the Vistula to return to France. You will point out the shortest road for their return. Marshal Suchet shall retain the government of Valencia, together with the 3rd corps of the army of Spain, which will be organized in the following manner: He has the 114th, 121st, 7th, 116th, 44th, 16th, 117th and 5th light infantry; total 8 regiments. As soon as I hear of the fall of Valencia, I shall order the provisional regiment of Aragon, which is at Pampeluna [Pamplona], to repair to Valencia to complete the numbers of those eight regiments ... these eight regiments will be formed into three divisions in the manner which he thinks best. They will be joined by all the detachments in Aragon. The cavalry will consist of the 4th Hussars and the 13th Cuirassiers. You will desire him to send to me all the companies of the artillery train, all those of the baggage train, and all the companies of the sappers, miners, and artillerymen whom he does not want. ... I suppose that the necessity of occupying several strong posts and of defending the coast will make it requisite to keep some of the officers and men attached to the siege train. Marshal Suchet’s corps will consist, therefore, of between 20,000 and 22,000 men; he will retain the Neapolitan division, which is 1,200 strong.
Palombini’s division, consisting of from 5,000 to 6,000 infantry and 400 cavalry; Severoli’s division of 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry (altogether 11,000 Italian foot and horse, with the artillery which belongs to them), with Reille’s division of 9,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, will form a corps of 20,000 to 21,000 foot and 1,500 horse. This division will proceed to Tortosa, and Reille will take command of lower Catalonia ...
You will divide the territory of Catalonia into two parts; one will include Tortosa, Mequinenza, Lerida, Tarragona, Montserrat, and Barcelona near which place it will end ... You must see the Minister of War in order to obtain from him all the details respecting the army of Catalonia and the different fortresses, to enable you to propose to me the organisation of the army of Catalonia, which will receive all the detachments belonging to the garrison of Barcelona, and will send back all that ought to belong to the army of Valencia …4
The lengthy directive went on to notably reduce and restructure the Army of the North, which was placed under the command of General Marie-François Auguste de Caffarelli du Falga, and to remove certain key units from the armies of Marmont and Soult. A total of 27,000 men were to leave the Iberian theatre and return to France for the impending war with Russia. For Suchet it must have been a crushing blow; he had lost a third of his force and moreover assumed the responsibility to garrison Valencia and Sagunto. He now had three separate areas of responsibility: the frontline in Valencia and the regions of Catalonia and Aragón under the distinct but subordinate commands of Macdonald and Reille respectively. The increased military activity in the former and insurrection and guerrilla activity in the latter must have provided little solace. However, a few days later Suchet received a significant morale boost. Napoleon’s decree of 24 January arrived at his headquarters, creating him Duke of Albufera and granting the revenues attached to the large inland lake area that had witnessed the closing stages of the battle south of Valencia on 26 December.
Suchet, however, had no time for complacency. His original planning had been conducted on the assumption that his force was over 30,000 while that of the defeated Spanish 2nd and 3rd armies was less than one third of that number. Now, a month later, his immediately available force was in fact little more than 9,000 while that of the reorganized Spanish force, under Joseph O’Donnell, was nearer 17,000 (see Appendix I). Furthermore, Napoleon’s subsequent orders were clearly predicated on the assumption that, following the collapse of Valencia, the final push to Alicante and Cartagena was to be a mere formality. The misguided belief that Soult had extended his operations as far to the east as Lorca reinforced that supposition. Thus directed and constrained, Suchet deployed Harispe (supported by Delort’s brigade) to Xátiva with orders to watch the Spanish 3rd Army in and around Alicante, but with the clear qualification not to advance too far south as there were many reports of yellow fever in the province of Murcia.5 Indeed the contagion had reached Alicante and as far north as Alcoy by October 1811 and was a serious concern to both Suchet and Soult. Habert was sent to Gandia, from where he moved south and captured the small port and strong castle at Denía securing, due to Mahy’s carelessness, 66 garrison artillery guns and 40 useful small boats in the process. He was instructed to remain in touch with Harispe and support him if necessary. Habert established a garrison within the fort and fitted out some of the boats as privateers. He would have been unaware, as he set about his work, that this was to be the most southerly French garrison the French were to establish in the east coast campaign.
Meanwhile, Musnier was directed north, initially to Peñiscola, but subsequently to maintain communications with the garrison at Tortosa. The job of capturing Peñiscola (which remained in Spanish hands) therefore fell to Severoli and his force, consisting of five battalions and part of the large siege train from Sagunto. Peñiscola, a cross between Mont Saint-Michel and Gibraltar, supported a Spanish garrison of over 1,000 men, mostly veterans. However, they were commanded by General Garcia Navarro, a man who had lost hope following the fall of Valencia. Severoli distributed his force along the coast and on the hills overlooking the fortress and, following Suchet’s tactics from Valencia, decided to bombard the place and then issue a summons in the hope of an early success. The first battery of 12 heavy mortars was prepared and, on 28 January, it began a slow and relatively ineffectual fire upon the fortifications. On the night of 31 January Lieutenant Colonel Plagniol began work on a long parallel, which ran north to south and culminated on the beach area in front of the isthmus. Work was rapid as the soil was sandy and the structure was made entirely of fascines and gabions. Although the gunners were quick to establish two batteries inside and another two on the heights, the task of besieging the island fortress was going to be both time-consuming and potentially costly, factors that Suchet could ill-afford.
Since Suchet had by-passed and isolated the small island in mid-September the Royal Navy had continued to resupply the Spanish garrison and to provide advice to Navarro who, in turn, expressed his concerns to Freire and Mahy in a series of letters. As it happened, one of these communiqués was captured offshore by the French, who were now patrolling the coast using the fleet of small boats so carelessly left by Mahy at Denía.6 The contents of the captured letter revealed Navarro’s state of mind. Suchet, once apprised of the situation, immediately ordered Severoli to despatch a forceful summons to the garrison. This was received by Navarro on 2 February and he accepted the terms without delay, therein expressing rather lamely that he wished to see Spain ‘united under the protecting authority capable of terminating and repairing her calamities’.7 The following day, the fort was in French hands. Navarro’s capitulation was nothing short of betrayal providing badly needed relief for Suchet’s depleted forces and enabling Severoli to be swiftly re-tasked. Suchet noted that ‘we took possession of Peñiscola, where we found seventy-four pieces of ordnance. This useful conquest cost us only about sixty men killed and wounded by the fire of the place during the works. It completed the subjugation of the province of Valencia, Alicante alone excepted, and rendered secure the Tortosa road, which was our principle communication with Catalonia and Aragon.’8
Suchet began to plan the next phase but soon fell ill, succumbing to a badly healed wound to his shoulder from the battle of Sagunto. He applied for leave to Paris but Napoleon begged him to stay and despatched one of his personal physicians to attend to him. By the end of April 1812, when he emerged from his sick bed, the situation in the Peninsula had swung back in favour of the allies. Wellington had not only captured Ciudad Rodrigo but his army had also taken the more formidable border fortress at Badajoz in early April. However, Suchet’s immediate concern, following his return to health, was one of an administrative rather than military nature. Napoleon had ordered Suchet to extract a breathtaking 200 million reals (about £2 million) in war contributions from the Kingdom of Valencia and he now had to spend considerable time in organisational and clerical work within the territory to ensure this debt was collected. He was also embroiled in a constant struggle with Madrid to avoid having to provide additional forces from his army to stem the tide of allied success in the west. He was quick to point out his special relationship with Paris, the fact that large numbers of reinforcements could only be realistically obtained from Soult’s Army of Andalusia and that from a military perspective the southern provinces should be evacuated before those on the east coast. Furthermore, there were rumours that Wellington was about to open up a new front in Spain and the indications appeared to support an amphibious landing in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, he felt compelled to do something to assist Joseph and he agreed to replace Darmagnac’s division in Requena and Cuenca with three of his own regiments (1st Light, 16th Line and part of the 114th Line) and several companies of the 4th Hussars and Neapolitan Chasseurs. These were placed under the command of General Louis Maupoint. For the time being, Joseph was placated and Suchet returned his attention to Alicante.
Joseph O’Donnell (not to be confused with his brothers, Carlos O’Donnell who commanded a division at Sagunto and Valencia or Henry O’Donnell who was undoubtedly the most capable of the three siblings and was a member of the Regency Council at this time) took advantage of the lull in hostilities to raise and train a force of about 20,000 men. Freire, now O’Donnell’s second in command, had executed a series of raid, firstly on Baza in April, and then, aided by the Royal Navy, on the south coast villages and ports as far west as Almunecar. Soult did nothing to prevent these raids, as he was completely preoccupied with the idea that Wellington was about to invade Andalusia and had concentrated his forces and focus to the north and west. Suchet meanwhile was entirely preoccupied with reports of an invasion force arriving from the sea. Lacking sufficient forces to prosecute operations south of the line currently held by Harispe (at Alcoy) and Habert (at Denía) he established a rapid deployable reserve of 1,500 light infantry supported by 500 cavalry and a horse artillery battery. They were established near Valencia but were to be prepared to move anywhere between Tarragona and Denía to thwart any amphibious landing.
O’Donnell continued to rebuild the combined 2nd and 3rd armies and the incorporation of Roche’s reserve division (see Appendix I) had raised the bar of capability (and expectation) considerably. Philip Keating Roche was an Irishman who started his military career in the Dragoon Guards and was selected to be part of the British military group despatched to assist the authorities in the Asturias at the outbreak of the Peninsular War.9 In 1810 he was sent to Cartagena to coordinate the maritime transport between the port and the Balearic Islands, during which he proposed to Henry Wellesley at Cádiz that he be able to raise and train a Spanish division but with British funding. Charles Vaughan, the Secretary at the British Embassy in Spain, had particular misgivings:
It seems to be most rational to try the experiment of Spanish Regiments with English officers ... the result might be most favourable ... and ultimately advantageous to the Peninsula, but I am sure that the Spanish Government will never consent to it, that the English Government dare not increase their Foreign Corps, and if they are not upon an English Establishment they will dissolve for want of Pay and necessaries.10
However, the concept was deemed to have merit and was subsequently approved by the British and Spanish executives.11 Roche moved with his brigade in 1811 to Alicante, along with many other units of the Murcian Army following the outbreak of yellow fever in and around Cartagena. Wellesley wrote to his brother in April detailing the situation with regard to Roche’s troops:
General Roche’s corps consists at present of about 6000 men, well armed and clothed, and generally in a much better state that the rest of the Spanish army; and the only objection to placing it likewise under the orders of a British General is, that it forms the most efficient part of the army under the command of General Joseph O’Donnell. General Henry O’Donnell has, however, stated to me his opinion that before the end of June the armies of Valencia and Murcia will be much improved as to admit General Roche’s corps being likewise placed under the orders of the General who may be appointed to command British troops, and has expressed his readiness to place that or any other corps of Spanish troops under the orders of the British General.12
With plans well advanced for the arrival of this large multinational expeditionary force Wellington had requested (through his brother and ipso facto the Spanish regency at Cádiz) that O’Donnell satisfy himself with containing Suchet’s force to his front and not to try anything that might upset the way things stood within the region. He also asked that two Spanish divisions be attached to the multinational force and thereby come under the charge of the British commander. One of those divisions was that of Roche.13 O’Donnell cannot have been anything other than disappointed at this decision but as the force had been funded, clothed and equipped by the British government he had little to say in the matter. Indeed the Royal Navy transports had already collected Roche’s troops from Alicante in June and transported them towards the Balearic Islands where the amphibious force was expected to rendezvous. However, due to Lord William Bentinck’s intransigence, the entire schedule for this amphibious force was significantly delayed (see Chapter 6). Rear Admiral Francis Pickmore, commanding the British base at Port Mahon (Minorca), was unable to sustain indefinitely the force of 3,500 men from Palermo and 3,500 from Alicante and ordered both fleets back to their original locations. O’Donnell was astonished but delighted to receive Roche’s force back in Alicante, he had also received word that the British led amphibious force had been delayed and, according to rumour would not now arrive until the autumn. With a minimal French force to his front he decided to attack.
It was a decision which led to castigation from some British historians.14 However, the dynamics behind O’Donnell’s decision are far more complex than the mere desire of ‘preventing the red-coats snatching his laurels’. Following the successful siege at Badajoz, Wellington wrote to his brother outlining his plans for future operations.15 Although there is no direct reference to the employment of O’Donnell’s troops in Andalusia, there was a clear intention that they should be poised to be tasked accordingly. At some stage, although it is not to be found in any published correspondence of Wellington, a direct request was made by Wellington, through his brother, to the Spanish regency for the use of the Army of Murcia in Andalusia, as the two letters of 1 June and 10 June (illustrated chronologically) demonstrate:
I intend to attack Marmont, and expect to be able to march next week. It is possible that the whole army of the south may be thrown upon Hill while I shall be so employed, and Ballesteros should be prepared to execute the old project on Seville; and the army of Murcia to move upon Andujar and Cordova, if not occupied by Suchet [my emphasis]. If Soult should attack Tarifa, Hill shall move upon Cordova and do everything in his power to create a diversion in favour of Gen. Ballesteros, unless it should be necessary to cover my flank, which does not appear probable; and the army of Murcia should in that case likewise get on upon the Guadalquivir [my emphasis].16
I am almost certain that the enemy [Soult] will move into Estremadura, upon Hill, as soon as it is known that I have moved; and I hope that everything will be done by Ballesteros, the army of Murcia [my emphasis], and the troops at Cádiz, to divert the enemy from their intentions upon Hill.17
The Spanish government discussed and approved these proposals, following which they were duly communicated, by the Secretary of War José M. Carvajal, to J. O’Donnell on 8 June.18 O’Donnell, having just lost Roche’s division which had set sail for Minorca, purportedly refused, stating that he could not turn his back on Suchet in Valencia until he was certain that the multinational force had landed in Catalonia and was threatening Suchet’s rear. When, therefore O’Donnell discovered that the arrival of this long-awaited force had misfired and was not going to provide the necessary distraction to prevent Suchet moving west and potentially disrupting Wellington’s main effort, he decided, not unreasonably, to act as the ‘east coast distraction’. Indeed, Napier records that the British liaison officer at Cartagena, Major General Andrew Ross, actually encouraged O’Donnell to attack:
O’Donel [sic] had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after having detached Maupoint’s brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with 2,000 men for Catalonia, leaving general Harispe with not more than 4,000 men beyond the Júcar. General Ross immediately advised O’Donel to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cádiz to succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast.19
Notwithstanding Wellington’s rather ambiguous request to O’Donnell (via the Spanish regency) to maintain the state of affairs to his front, O’Donnell clearly saw this as his duty and had he been successful his exploits would have been received significant approbation. Interestingly, Wellington had warned Ross in the recent past of getting too closely involved with O’Donnell. In May he wrote to General George Cooke, commanding the British troops at Cádiz: ‘I therefore beg to warn Major Gen. Ross of the inexpediency of his attending to the invitations of Gen. O’Donell [sic] of cooperation in expeditions in the field; as he may depend upon it, that they will not answer for any purpose.’20 He was quite adamant that to the Spanish, the employment of British troops was essentially talismanic and a prerequisite to their own success on the field of battle.
The Spanish nation and troops, particularly the common soldiers, entertain an opinion that our soldiers are invincible; and that it is only necessary that they should appear, in order to insure success; and they are so ignorant of the nature of a military operation, that they attribute our refraining from interfering upon many occasions to disinclination to the cause.21
O’Donnell was hoping to dispel that contention. His plan was ambitious and quite broad in scope. By way of a deception operation he arranged for some of the Royal Navy transports to be loaded with Creagh de Lacy’s infantry and to set sail from Alicante to Denía and Cullera at the estuary of the River Júcar. O’Donnell’s main effort was to surround the forward elements of Harispe’s division, at Ibi, Castalla, Biar and Onil and destroy them before his reserve could be deployed from Alcoy. His plan was to advance towards these forward French positions in four separate groups on four separate routes. By way of an additional distraction, General de Bassecourt was called down from his hideouts in the hills around Requena and, once in position north of Biar and Onil, was to occupy Harispe’s main force at Alcoy and cut the road north to Valencia in order to thwart Suchet’s mobile reserve deploying to the area. Harispe’s reserve at Alcoy consisted of the two battalions of the 116th Line, while his forward outposts, numbering about 2,500 infantry and 900 cavalry, were positioned as follows: General Jean Mesclop had positioned the bulk of his brigade at Ibi consisting of three battalions of the 1st Light and about 100 cavalry; while a forward post was established by General Jaques Delort at Castalla consisting of two battalions of the 7th Line and another 100 cavalry and they were supported by the balance of Delort’s cavalry brigade (the 13th Cuirassiers and the 24th Dragoons), quartered at Biar and Onil.
The naval distraction worked perfectly and Suchet, who had just returned from a meeting in Catalonia with General Decaen to discuss options to thwart the amphibious force, was completely taken. He marched personally to the area near Cullera with his mobile reserve and even called north the 14th Line, part of Harispe’s force based at Xátiva. Meanwhile the main body of O’Donnell’s force, numbering about 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry approached the French forward detachments. The right flank was under the command of Roche; that in the centre right under O’Donnell himself and consisted of the brigades of Luis Michelena and the reserve under Conde de Montijo; on the centre left was Fernando Miyares who came under the command of Rafael Sanisteban who commanded the far left with most of the cavalry.22 They set off at last light on 20 July from their respective points some 10 kilometres south of their destinations. The terrain was rugged, particularly for the columns of Roche and Miyares who were on mountain tracks. Communication between the groups was difficult and when the O’Donnell’s main group arrived close to their objective they were fatigued. He was in touch with Miyares and Roche but unaware of the progress of Sanisteban and the bulk of the Spanish cavalry.
As the Spanish appeared, Delort evacuated Castalla and took up a more suitable defensive posture on the flat ground on the road towards Ibi. He sent word to Mesclop (at Ibi) to send reinforcements and to the two cavalry detachments at Biar and Onil to do likewise. O’Donnell witnessed Delort’s withdrawal and now found himself in a predicament: if he waited for the arrival of Sanisteban’s column he knew that the French force would also have received reinforcement. At that moment he received an incorrect report from Roche that all the French cavalry was in front of him at Ibi (about five kilometres to the north-east) and therefore decided to attack Delort’s force. Michelena’s and Miyares’ troops began to move through the village of Castalla supported by the only two guns that had kept pace with the troops during the night march. They were in the process of deploying when, unseen, the Colonel Dubessy’s Dragoons hit Miyares’ infantry in the flank with devastating impact. The shock effect of this action was instantaneous. Miyares’ stunned and panicked infantry frantically tried to redeploy to meet the next cavalry onslaught. To their right Mesclop’s infantry and cavalry were also in the process of deploying. Delort sensed the moment and gave them no time: with the two battalions of the 7th Line, supported by the heavy cavalry, he ordered an all out assault on the ragged Spanish line. The Spanish cavalry, numbering about 200 at this time, fled the field. Dubessy’s dragoons charged a second time and on this occasion they overran Miyares’ line, whose right flank was in the air after the untimely departure of the Spanish horse. The two guns were ridden down having discharged only a single round apiece. Likewise Michelena’s brigade retreated in disorder before the cuirassiers and the 7th Line. The French advance was checked by the (somewhat tardy) arrival of Montijo’s reserve brigade. Their resolve was quickly tested by a mere 30 dragoons from Delort’s personal escort; rather disgracefully the Badajoz Regiment, demoralised at the sight of the previous disaster, panicked and fled. The Cuenca formed square and retreated in good order but the Walloon Guards were cut off, fighting bravely until surrounded and forced to surrender en masse.
Spanish Approach Routes, 20 July 1812
The entire collection of Spanish infantry retired in confusion: from the original force of 10,000 men, more than 3,000 were killed or captured. Santisteban arrived after the fight was over and beat a hasty retreat. To the east, Roche had decided, for whatever reason, not to attack Mesclop’s force as it debouched south-west towards Delort. Instead he exploited their departure and quickly overwhelmed the token French force left in the castle at Ibi (consisting of a few companies of the 44th Line, two guns and a few cuirassiers). Roche’s advance guard under Creagh de Lacy overran the dwellings but could not take the fort as they had no artillery at all. When Mesclop was sighted heading back to succour this beleaguered group, Roche ordered Creagh de Lacy to fall back on the hills where the bulk of his division, arms at rest, had been watching the fight for Ibi instead of following up Mesclop to Castalla as O’Donnell’s instructions had ordered. At much the same time Harispe’s reserves, the two battalions of the 116th Line, finally arrived from Alcoy; but by this time it was late in the morning and they just harassed Roche’s troops for a few kilometres back towards Alicante.
Beaten on both points the Spaniards retreated to Alicante with the loss of three pair of colours, two eight-pounders, with the horses that drew them, three caissons, and more than ten thousand muskets. They had nearly four thousand men killed, wounded or taken; and among the latter four colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, and one hundred and twenty-five officers: their loss equalled the number of French soldiers who had fought against them.23
O’Donnell’s plan had been completely and utterly undone. He had gambled a high stake and lost everything. In the immediate aftermath he tried to heap blame on Sanisteban, claiming that he had stood idlyby as Dubessy’s cavalry had moved from Biar through the pass to Castalla. In fact Sanisteban was waiting for Miyares’ infantry (who were part of his command) and was unaware that they had already marched to the sound of the battle directly at Castalla without waiting. In reality O’Donnell’s plan was too fragmented and his time appreciation was fundamentally flawed. Crucially his army had been destroyed needlessly and was to be out of action again for many months. It was a considerable embarrassment for the Spanish and following the board of enquiry at Cádiz, O’Donnell was fortunate to survive in command. Roche conversely, wrote (on 26 July) his account of the battle to Cádiz and, on the strength of it, received the most glowing approbation:
It appears that the Spanish troops moved forward to attack General D’Harispe’s posts at Castalla and at Ibi; those, which attached to the former, were repulsed with the loss of two thousand men, and two pieces of cannon; those which attached to the latter, under the command of General Roche, conducted themselves remarkably well, and covered the retreat of the troops under General O’Donnell and afterwards effected their own retreat in good order to Alicante.24
Wellesley wrote back to Roche that ‘it afforded me the most sincere satisfaction to learn, that, notwithstanding the disastrous result of the affair of the 21st July, the Corps under your immediate command ... eminently distinguished itself’.25 However, the Spanish reports that overlapped did not quite see things in the same way. It took some time for the news to reach Wellington who had been fighting the greatest battle of his career at Salamanca. At first he found the (French) reports of the action difficult to comprehend and he wrote to Roche on 3 August. ‘I see by the French accounts that the troops under Gen. J. O’Donell met with a check on the 21st inst. They say you were with them. But likewise as there was an expedition at sea off Cullera, I trust that that part of the story is not true’.26 When the facts finally arrived at Wellington’s headquarters a day later he wrote in caustic terms to Roche, ‘It is useless to tell you or Gen. O’Donell what I propose to do, because you cannot aid in my plans. I only request that you may not be defeated again; and to accomplish this object you must not attack the French if success is not quite certain.’27 The destruction of the Valencian and Murcian armies for a second time in a matter of months had provided Suchet badly needed time and space, but he was acutely aware that the struggle for the east coast was poised to become a pan-Mediterranean affair.