The Influence of Under-Water Attack on the Tactics at Jutland
In the hundred years and more which intervened between Trafalgar and Jutland not only had steam and long-range guns completely changed the character of naval warfare, but the advent of under-water weapons and the submarine had profoundly influenced tactics.
It is quite impossible for anybody to begin to understand the Battle of Jutland, much less to form a just or reasoned opinion about it, without thoroughly grasping the nature of the various forms of under-water attack and the measures necessary to counter them. The former may be tabulated as follows:
1. Torpedo attacks from heavy ships in the line.
2. Torpedo attacks by light surface craft.
(a) By day.
(b) By night.
3. Torpedo attacks by submarines.
4. Mines dropped by retreating ships in the path of their pursuers.
5. Mines laid in the form of a minefield.
Let us consider each of these in turn, and see how they influenced the movements of the rival fleets.
1. TORPEDO ATTACKS FROM HEAVY SHIPS IN THE LINE:
Battleships and battle-cruisers on both sides were so heavily gunned and such conspicuous targets at anything inside torpedo range, so long as daylight held, that a torpedo duel, naturally, did not commend itself to either side. On the other hand, the torpedo armaments of the capital ships, taken en masse, were formidable and could not be ignored. A few lucky hits underwater might have much reduced the speed of one or two battleships, even though they did not sink them, as actually happened in the case of the Marlborough, although at first the damage did not greatly impede her.
Lame ducks are a serious embarrassment to a Commander-in-Chief. He must either reduce the speed of the whole fleet to their speed, which may force him into a position of great tactical disadvantage, or he must detach ships to protect the laggards, or he must leave them to look after themselves.
The net result of this particular menace, so far as Jutland was concerned, was that neither side tried to get within torpedo range of the opposing battle line, and it was definitely to the advantage of the British Fleet with superior gun power to keep outside that range if possible.
2. TORPEDO ATTACKS BY LIGHT SURFACE CRAFT:
(a) By day:
Destroyers, and to a lesser degree light cruisers, can appreciably influence the tactics of the battle fleet if, by using their speed, they can mass in a position from which to launch a torpedo attack. A day attack may be made from a bow bearing, at comparatively long range, the torpedoes having less distance to run because their quarry is coming to meet them. The light surface craft can also close very rapidly, and this, coupled with the fact that they are not conspicuous targets, makes it very hard for the battleships’ guns to hit them before they release their torpedoes.
In this connection, the non-technical reader should realize that a destroyer flotilla may launch an attack at a distance of 20,000 yards, but may be away and out of sight long before the torpedoes reach their objective.
There are three methods of parrying these daytime attacks: the first is for the battle fleet to hold the enemy craft at arm’s length with their gunfire; the second is to intercept them with our own flotillas and light cruisers before they are able to release their torpedoes with any prospect of hitting; the third is to swing the individual ships of the threatened battle line off their original course and either let the enemy torpedoes expend themselves short, or pass through the intervals between the ships.
It is clearly advantageous to prevent an attack being launched, but this is not always possible with a determined enemy, especially in misty weather. Once torpedoes are running, it is, obviously, stupid for the ships attacked to stand on and offer themselves as a sitting target, so to speak, and the question of turning towards or away from an attack is a highly technical one; but it is sufficient to say here that under the conditions prevailing at the time of the massed German torpedo attack, to cover the second retreat of the High Sea Fleet, it was the accepted principle and invariable practice by the Admirals on both sides to swing their ships away, and there was one occasion when Jellicoe resorted to this manoeuvre.
(b) By night:
Conditions of low visibility may improve the chances of surface torpedo-craft, for surprise is necessarily a great factor in their success; but the less the range of vision the greater their difficulty in finding their quarry, in manoeuvring into a favourable position to attack and in distinguishing friend from foe.
At night, too, the surprise may be mutual, and the guns of a battleship on the alert may make short work of a destroyer sighted at almost point-blank range. At night, too, the interval between firing a torpedo and it reaching its mark is so small that it gives little time for evasive manoeuvres on either side.
The night after Jutland found two huge fleets, each knowing the other was in the vicinity, but neither wishing to risk a meeting. At first sight this would seem to have afforded an ideal opportunity for using torpedo craft. Actually, both Commanders-in-Chief were disinclined to lose their flotillas into the uncertainty of darkness on the “hit or miss principle”; both kept them in company with the battle fleets, although the British flotillas were well clear astern.
A flotilla might easily have spent much precious fuel and achieved nothing; there might easily have been “regrettable incidents” with friends, and, at daylight, when destroyers became vitally necessary for a renewed general engagement, they would probably have been widely scattered and not available at the psychological moment.
3. TORPEDO ATTACKS BY SUBMARINES:
The submarine differs from the destroyer in that it is very much slower, and has much less range of vision; but it is far less conspicuous and it can disappear instantly after firing a torpedo. It is more difficult, therefore, for an under-water craft to attain a favourable position to launch its attack, especially in a fleet action with ships moving at high speed; it has rather to await the opportunity afforded by an unsuspecting quarry coming towards it. Limitation of vision prohibits long-range attacks, while the fact that submerged craft cannot manoeuvre en masse like destroyers, lessens the chances of hitting on the principle of “browning the covey”.
On the other hand, the extreme difficulty of detecting a small object like a periscope, which at the time Jutland was fought was the sole means of locating a submarine’s presence, made them objects of constant alarm to surface ships, especially the deep-draught battle-ship and battle-cruiser. Experience had not yet shown that a mass of ships moving in company at high speed present a very difficult target to a submarine, which, under such conditions, is wont to be more concerned with her own safety than with a carefully planned attack.
Precautions against submarine attack on our side took the form of an anti-submarine screen of destroyers scouting on the bows of the battle fleet and battle-cruisers. This undoubtedly tended to tie certain of the British flotillas to this duty when they might, otherwise, have been free to take up a more aggressive role; but it must be remembered that, whereas the Germans could count on the fact that the British fleet had come too far and too fast to have submarines in company, our command had to bear in mind that we were meeting the enemy more or less in his own waters and within easy range of his submarine bases.
It is easy to be wise after the event and to say that it is now known that there were no submarines in the vicinity at all, and that it should have been obvious that there never could have been any, but it should be noted that there was every reason, before the action, to believe they would be used by the enemy, and this belief was strengthened during the action by categorical reports of submarines sighted continually being made to Jellicoe.6
Measures to counter submarine attack can take the form of a detour, so that it is never in position to fire a torpedo; this necessitates ample warning; alternatively, and more normally, the safest line of action is to charge straight for the submarine and compel it to dive for its own safety.
In actual fact the false reports of submarines, disconcerting as they were, had little influence on the course of events at Jutland, except, as already mentioned, a tendency to keep part of our destroyer flotillas acting on the defensive.
4. MINES DROPPED BY RETREATING SHIPS:
The possibility of running into mines dropped by a retreating enemy fleet had been taken into very full consideration by the British high command, both afloat and at the Admiralty before Jutland. This menace coupled with the torpedo advantage enjoyed by ships ahead over ships astern was regarded as being so serious as to make direct pursuit prohibitive.
Under-water weapons had, therefore, introduced an entirely new element which under such circumstances did much to neutralize the advantages which the more powerful fleet might have secured in olden days.
“Nothing but ample time and superior speed can be an answer, and this means that, unless the meeting of the fleets takes place fairly early in the day, it is most difficult to fight to a finish,” wrote Jellicoe before Jutland. “Time” and “light”, however, were the two things denied him, nor did he have more than a couple of knots superiority in speed, battle fleet for battle fleet.
Again, it is easy to say that the enemy did not, in fact, drop mines to cover his retreat. All that was known at the time was that certain of the enemy capital ships were fitted for mine laying and that he had practised it since the outbreak of war.
5. MINES LAID IN THE FORM OF A MINEFIELD:
German minefields were extensive and were fairly accurately known to our command. They limited the exits and re-entries of the High Sea Fleet to certain channels which were kept swept, and this had a considerable bearing on Jellicoe’s strategy as we shall see in due course. They also precluded our fleet from following the enemy to the German coast the morning after Jutland.
With this brief survey of two vital factors, – weather and under-water attack – to give us a right perspective, we may now proceed to examine the course of the battle and to trace the parts played by the chief personalities.