PART I: The Truth About Jutland
1 House of Commons, 29 October 1919.
2 House of Commons, 11 April 1923.
3 The words ‘report’, ‘narrative’ and ‘record’ were used indiscriminately when referring to my Official Record. It was a ‘record’ and not a ‘report’, which latter word implies comment.
4 It will be noted that the Record has now “almost reached completion”, whereas on 29 October 1919 it had “been completed”.
5 House of Commons, 15 December 1920.
6 Between 15.35 hours and 22.00 hours on 31 May, thirty reports of enemy submarines were made by our ships. Of these two were reported as seen on the surface, two were reported as being sighted breaking the surface and two were believed to have been rammed, although not actually seen at the moment. Of the remainder, some stated that a periscope had been sighted, one remarking that the alleged periscope was undoubtedly a dummy. Beatty in his report states, at about 16.00 hours: “It would appear at this time that we were passing through a screen of enemy submarines.”
7 See Appendix for details.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 The “Long Forties” extend for some 110 miles from the coast of Aberdeenshire.
11 The figures at the end of a message indicate the time of origin of that message, or in other words the actual time, expressed in the four-figure notation, at which the message was written. The instructions contained in this message were, therefore, actually given by the Commander-in-Chief at 19.30 hours. The time of origin gives little indication of the time of receipt of the message by the person to whom it is addressed. This depends partly on the method used to transmit the message. In the case of cipher messages sent by Wireless Telegraphy it depends to even a greater extent on the time taken to decipher the message. It is clear, therefore, that instructions contained in any signal message, by whatever method it is transmitted, cannot be acted on by the recipient until, at least, some minutes after the time at which the actual instructions were given. The delay in the case of visual messages, sent in plain language, should be very small as compared with that of cipher messages sent by wireless. No time of origin is appended to signals made by Flags, in this case the time of receipt of the instructions should be practically identical with the time the signal is hoisted.
12 See the chapter “Under-Water Attack”.
13 Official History of the War – Naval Operations, Vol. III, p.315.
14 The seaplane-carrier Campania, attached to the fleet at Scapa Flow, was some hours late in leaving, owing to a misapprehension as to the time the battle fleet was sailing. She could not have overtaken the fleet in time for her machines to be of any use for reconnaissance purposes; so, at 04.21 hours, she was ordered by Jellicoe to return to harbour. This obviated the necessity of detaching destroyers to act as a screen for this ship alone.
15 Official History of the War – Naval Operations, Vol. III, p.376.
16 “I observed a salvo pitch abreast ‘Q’ turret of Queen Mary (this was the first time I had seen Queen Mary hit) and almost instantaneously there was a terrific upheaval and a dense cloud of smoke. This could not altogether be avoided as Tiger was close up (about 2 cables) from Queen Mary. As Tiger passed through the cloud there was a heavy fall of material on her decks, but no sign whatever could be seen of the Queen Mary. She must have sunk instantaneously.” (Extract from Report of Captain of HMS Tiger.)
17 A few examples will illustrate the necessity of continuous reports being received if any tangible result is to be obtained by striking an average. At 15.38hours the Falmouth reported her position, and at the same time reported that Galatea bore N.N.E. 2 miles from her. But at 15.35 hours the Galatea in a report gave her own position, which was over 8 miles from that reported by Falmouth.
The Lion reported her position at 15.35 hours and again at 15.50 hours. The distance between these reported positions was 1½ miles, whereas the ship actually travelled 6.2 miles in the fifteen minutes’ interval between these reports.
The positions of Southampton given in the signals made from that ship at 16.30 hours and at 16.38 hours indicated that she travelled 8 miles in eight minutes. A wireless message from the Admiralty which was sent at 17.00 hours gave the position, course and speed of the enemy battle fleet at 16.09 hours; and a second message, sent at 17.45 hours, gave the position, course and speed of the enemy main force at 16.30 hours. The position of the enemy given in these messages from the Admiralty was some 17 miles to the westward of that deduced from the Southampton’s message and some 8 miles to the westward of that deduced from a message from the Lion at 16.45 hours.
In each case it is estimated that the enemy was sighted at a distance of about 10 miles. It will be seen, therefore, that the position of the enemy differed by about 9 miles, according to which reckoning was taken as correct, Lion’s or Southampton’s. As a fact, the positions given in the Admiralty messages were approximately correct, but only one was received in time to be of use. Greater reliance would naturally, at this date, have been placed on positions given by ships in actual contact with the enemy than on positions obtained by directional wireless on shore, then in its infancy. Reciprocal directional wireless between ships did not then exist.
18 Investigations made in 1919 led to the belief that, as stated previously, both the Iron Duke and the Lion were somewhat out in their reckoning. It was therefore decided to locate, and fix the position of, the wreck of the Invincible; this wreck being a definite point in the battle area. Ascertaining the position of this wreck would once and for all determine the exact geographical position of the action, and would enable the position of any other ship to be deduced with considerable accuracy at any stage of the action. The wreck was, therefore, searched for, located, and the position fixed.
19 The next day the two halves had subsided, and no sign of the wreck was visible on the surface of the water.
20 An element of mystery has always been made about this turn, though why the battle-cruisers should not turn through 360°, if so desired, is not clear. They were not in action. No possible danger of any collision would be involved. With the firm belief that submarines were about, evidenced by a wireless report made by Beatty at 18.54 hours, one minute before the turn was commenced, that one had been sighted, it would naturally be undesirable to reduce speed to any great extent. To get within visual touch of the battle fleet without delay would have necessitated a very large reduction in the speed, unless course was also altered. What more natural, therefore, than to turn and, having turned nearly 180° before realizing that there was no necessity to continue any farther to the northward, to resume the original course as quickly as possible? The quickest method of doing this, having turned nearly 180°, would obviously be to continue the turn through 360°. This matter is not one which can be swept aside as of no importance, if accuracy in plotting the ship’s tracks is required. The Lion, having turned through 360°, was, after about eleven minutes, in the same position as when the turn was commenced, whereas if she had made any other form of turn the position would not have been the same.
Referring to Battle of Jutland – Official Despatches (Comd. 1068), we find, in Plate 10, Track of Lion, which is signed by the Vice-Admiral commanding battle-cruiser fleet himself, this turn shown as a circle. Again, in Plate 31, showing the track of the New Zealand, it is conspicuously shown. In the report of the Captain of the Lion it is stated that “ship continued to circle to starboard”, and in the report from New Zealand we find, “commenced to circle to starboard” and “gradually circling round to starboard”. In the Official History, Sir J. Corbett, who had, besides the above evidence, the evidence of the ships’ logs at his disposal, states definitely that the turn was made. It is common knowledge that a good deal of discussion among those concerned took place on this point shortly after the battle, and also at other, more recent, times.
In view of this overwhelming weight of evidence it is difficult to understand the reason for showing this turn on Chart 8a – Official Despatches – as a turn to starboard followed by a turn to port. This chart, which is also signed by Admiral Beatty, is stated to be of a date 17 July 1916. It is, however, of little value as evidence owing to the obvious errors it contains. The geographical positions of the Lion do not agree with those given in her cipher messages reporting the position of the enemy, and the ranges of the enemy are at variance with those given in the gunnery records of the battle-cruisers. The position of the Lion at 19.15 hours, for example, is shown as about 5,000 yards on the starboard bow of the Iron Duke, that is, nearer the enemy, whereas, in reality, she was about 8,000 yards on the Iron Duke’s port bow, or farther from the enemy.
21 The three submarines sent to positions in the Horns Reef Passage did not, as it transpired, act as a menace to the safe return of the High Seas Fleet by this route. Their stations were assigned to them before it was known that the present operation was being undertaken. Their instructions were to lie on the bottom until 2 June. The sudden change in the situation was not transmitted to them before leaving Harwich, at 19.00 hours on 30 May, although there seems no reason why this should not have been done. They, therefore, carried out their original orders and remained quietly below the surface, thereby missing a good opportunity of inflicting severe damage on the retreating enemy.
22 The possibility of the enemy crossing astern of the fleet and, although detected, not being reported would not, of course, occur to anyone.
23 See Appendix for details.
24 In this connection it should be noted that, during the hours of darkness, even the enemy capital ships would be using their secondary armament, rather than their more ponderous turret guns. There would, therefore, be little to distinguish between the firing of battleships and light cruisers so far as flash and glare were concerned.
25 The Warspite had fallen out and was on her way back to harbour.
26 Official Despatches, p.474.
27 Official History, Vol. III, pp.413, 415.
28 The World Crisis, Vol. II, p. 87.
29 Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, p.106, Note 1.
30 Ibid, p.113, Note 6.
31 Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, p.34.
32 Ibid, p.24.
33 The Battle of Jutland, p.134.
34 Battleships in Action, Vol. II, p.135
35 Ibid, p.136.
36 The World Crisis (1916-1918), p.122.
37 House of Commons, 14 March 1927.
38 The World Crisis (1916-1918), p.123.
39 Ibid, p.125.
40 Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, p.21.
41 The Fighting Forces, January 1927, p.556.
42 Ibid, p.20.
43 Royal United Services Institute Journal, No.485, p.34.
44 The World Crisis (1916-1918), p.130.
45 Ibid, p.132.
46 Ibid, p.129.
47 The Battle of Jutland, p.139.
48 The Navy in Battle, p.338.
49 Battleships in Action, Vol. II, p.150.
50 Ibid, Vol. II, p.152.
51 Ibid, p.157.
52 Ibid, Vol. II, p.191.
53 German Official History, Vol. V, pp.283-4.
54 The Battle of Jutland, p.184.
55 Ibid, p.292.
56 Ibid, p.188.
57 Ibid, p.262.
58 Battleships in Action, Vol. II, p.159.
59 The World Crisis (1916-1918), p.152.
60 Official Despatches, pp.459-62:
6.23. Course of Fleet S.E. by E.
6.26. Speed 14 knots.
6.33. Speed 17 knots.
6.44. Course of Fleet S.E.
6.54. Course of Fleet South.
7.5. Alter Course 3 points to starboard.
i.e. between 6.23 and 7.5 the course of the battle fleet was altered 90 degrees towards the enemy.
61 The Battle of Jutland, p.187.
62 Ibid, p.41.
63 Vide Chapter II, p.32.
64 The World Crisis (1916-1918), p.153.
65 Narrative of the Battle of Jutland, pp.68-9.
66 Ibid, p.73.
67 Ibid, p.72.
68 Ibid, p.74.
69 Ibid, p.76.
70 Naval Operations, Vol. III, pp.413-5.
71 Battle of Jutland, p.221.
72 Ibid, p.222.
73 The Times, 19 February 1920.
74 If it had been it would, or should, have been equally received by Beatty, but he makes no allusion to it.
75 Battle of Jutland, p.220.
76 Ibid, p.223.
77 Battleships in Action, Vol. II, pp.164-5.
78 Ibid, Vol. II, p.165.
79 The Battle of Jutland, pp.235-6.
80 The World Crisis (1916-1918).
81 Ibid, pp.156-7.
82 Ibid, p.157.
83 Ibid, p.161.
84 German Official History.
1 Mahon, Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution, Vol. I, p.57.
2 The distance from the bow of the leading ship to the bow of the last ship would be 23 times 500 yards, but the length of the last ship has to be added to this. Moreover, a line of ships is always a little longer than the exact mathematical length.
3 Corbett, Julian, The Official History of the War – Naval Operations (Longmans & Co., London), Vol. III, p.323.
4 Official Despatches, p.443.
5 Ibid, p.444. Flag signals from Lion were always difficult to see at a distance owing to clear view being interfered with by her fore control position.
6 Corbett, p.331.
7 Ibid, p.328.
8 Ibid, p.336.
9 Ibid, p.334.
10 Ibid, p.336.
11 Ibid, p.337.
12 Ibid, p.338.
13 Ibid, p.340.
14 Ibid; see plans 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.
15 Official Despatches, p.449.
16 Ibid, pp.445-6.
17 Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, The Grand Fleet (Cassell, London), p.329.
18 Corbett, p.353.
19 Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, p.353.
20 Corbett, p.355.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid, p.356.
23 Ibid, p.361.
24 Ibid, Frontispiece.
25 Ibid, p.372.
26 Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, pp.310-3; Brassey’s Naval Annual 1913.
27 Commander Georg von Hase, Kiel and Jutland, p.125.
28 Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, p.361.
29 Corbett, plans.
30 Ibid, p.383.
31 Ibid, footnote.
32 Ibid, p.395. This is not borne out by the German Official History.
33 A similar incident happened to me in the 1906 manoeuvres when trying to break through Admiral Sir Assheton Curzon-Howe’s fleet. I was fortunate enough to intercept the challenge and reply which enabled me to steam for a whole hour in company with the enemy’s fleet until I got an opportunity of breaking through.
34 Corbett, p.403.
35 Ibid, p.402.
36 Ibid, pp.401-2.
37 Ibid, p.410.
38 Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, p.385.
39 Corbett, p.414.
40 Ibid, p.397.
41 Ibid, p.398.
42 In reality the battleship Nassau.
43 Ibid, p.399.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid, p.342.
46 Ibid, p.405.
47 Ibid, p.414.
48 Admiralty Narrative, p.42.
49 Corbett, plan No.41.
50 Official Despatches, p.195.
51 Ibid, p.67.
52 Ibid, p.134; Admiralty Narrative, p.107.
53 Official Despatches, p.141.
54 Admiralty Narrative, p.107, footnote.
55 Ibid, p.22.
56 Ibid, p.106, footnote 2, and p.113, footnotes 3 and 6.
57 Admiral Scheer’s High Sea Fleet, p.144.
58 Corbett, p.334.
59 Ibid, p.331 footnote 2.
60 Ibid, p.340.
61 Official Despatches, 1608-1745.
62 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol III, p.125.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, p.129.
65 It was well known that the fighting top of Lion was apt to obscure signals.
66 Admiralty Narrative, p.46, diagram.
67 Winston Churchill, Vol III, p.124.
68 Letter to The Times, February 1927.
69 Winston Churchill, Vol II, p.124. Also see postscript to this Chapter.
70 Winston Churchill, Vol III, p.122.
71 Ibid, p.125.
72 Ibid, p.129.
73 Ibid, p.133.
74 As there was plenty of time in hand, there was no reason why the battle cruisers should not have been turned in succession. The fact that this was done is merely recorded here.
75 Winston Churchill, Vol III, p.142.
76 In an article in the Fortnightly, Admiral Scheer clearly states the fact that he would have fought if he could have placed his fleet in a position of advantage, but not otherwise.
77 Winston Churchill, Vol III, p.141.
78 Ibid, p.148.
79 Ibid, p.151.
80 The Invincible, ahead of our battlefleet, was believed by Admiral Scheer to be leading our line of battleships, which again headed him away from his own ports.
81 Winston Churchill, Vol III, p.147.
82 Ibid, p.136.
83 Ibid, p.149.
84 Ibid, p.136.
85 See the preface to Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol III.
86 Winston Churchill, Vol III, p.136.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid, p.151.
89 Ibid, p.152.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid, p.153.
92 There can be no ambiguity as regards the plotting of these diagrams as Admiral Scheer would have had no alternative but to run away as soon as he found that our fleet was following him. Every advantage lies with the fleet which is being chased during a stern chase. Moreover, though steering a safe course away from our fleet, they would at 8.40 p.m. have been only five miles further from the Horn Reef than they actually were at the time.
93 Winston Churchill, Vol II, p.87.
94 This gives the British ships one knot speed over the Germans, after the Blücher had fallen out.