The Night
At 9.1 p.m. the battle fleet was turned to south and subsequently assumed night-cruising formation. At 9.27 the destroyer flotillas were ordered to take station 5 miles astern of the battle fleet.
The course of the battle fleet was signalled to Beatty, and at 9.30 p.m. the battle-cruisers, then about 12 miles on the starboard bow of the Iron Duke, also altered course to south. The Marlborough, being now unable to maintain the speed of the fleet, 17 knots, owing to her damage, had dropped somewhat astern with her sub-division.
Jellicoe, in his despatch, states: “I rejected at once the idea of a night action between the heavy ships as leading to possible disaster owing, first, to the presence of torpedo craft in such large numbers, and, secondly, to the impossibility of distinguishing between our own and enemy vessels. Further, the result of a night action under modern conditions must always be very largely a matter of pure chance.… I therefore decided to steer to the southward, where I should be in position to renew the engagement at daylight, and should also be favourably placed to intercept the enemy should he make for his base by steering for Heligoland or towards the Ems and thence along the North German coast”
Beatty, in his despatch, states: “I assumed that the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established ourselves between him and his base.… In view of the gathering darkness and for other reasons, viz. (a) our distance from the battle fleet; (b) the damaged condition of the battle-cruisers; (c) the enemy being concentrated; (d) the enemy being accompanied by numerous destroyers; (e) our strategical position being such that it appeared certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it proper or desirable to close the enemy battle fleet during the dark hours.”
JELLICOE’S STRATEGY
We see that both Jellicoe and Beatty decided against a night action between capital ships and also that they both considered the position strategically good for intercepting the enemy.
DIAGRAM 9: MAY 31 TO JUNE 1
There were three routes which had to be considered: the northern one by Horns Reef; the southern one near the Frisian Coast and an intermediate one approaching Heligoland from the westward.
Beatty placed his battle-cruisers well ahead to ensure that the enemy could not pass round the southern flank of the battle fleet, which it would have to do if either of the southern channels was to be used.
The destroyer flotillas, being stationed astern, not only acted as a security for the battle fleet against attack by light craft from astern, but also as a menace to the enemy battle fleet if it attempted to cross astern. By massing them astern, Jellicoe also minimized the chance of “regrettable incidents” with our own battleships; likewise they were in a convenient position for rejoining when the fleet turned to the northward at daylight.
All the three routes could not be guarded against with any certainty. The disposition certainly made the two southern routes as secure as possible, but even with the destroyers astern, the three submarines which had left Harwich on the evening of 30th May in position near the Horns Reef Passage before daylight on 1st June,21 and the additional precaution of sending the Abdiel to lay mines in that passage, there was an off chance that the enemy might cross astern without being detected and brought to action by our battle fleet at daylight. The chance was a small one, but it existed.22
The remote possibility of the enemy turning to the northward after dark, and making for the Skagerrak, does not appear to have been considered, neither does Scheer mention this possible alternative. Such a course could only have been successful if the movement was undetected until too late to allow our ships to overtake him.
SCHEER EDGES TOWARDS HOME
The enemy battle fleet, which had altered course to the southward at about 8 p.m., began hauling over to the westward at about 8.30 p.m., when attacked by the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, resuming their southerly course at about 8.50 p.m.
This general direction was maintained until about 9.40 p.m., except on two occasions when they hauled to the westward, for a few minutes, owing to having sighted our ships.
After 9.30 p.m. the German battle squadrons proceeded in the order: First Squadron, Fleet Flagship, Third Squadron, Second Squadron, the Westfalen leading the line.23 Before this time the Second Squadron was in the van.
At about 9.5 p.m. some ships believed to be enemy battle-cruisers were sighted by the light cruisers Royalist and Caroline, and also by the Castor and some of the Eleventh Flotilla. Some doubt existed as to the identity of these vessels.
The Vice-Admiral commanding Second Battle Squadron, in his report, states: “About 9 p.m. I negatived an attack with whitehead torpedoes ordered by Caroline as I was certain that the vessels seen on our starboard beam were our own battle-cruisers … shortly afterwards I told Caroline to attack if he was quite certain they were enemy ships as he was in a better position to see them than I was, but I do not know whether an attack was made. If they were enemy ships and no attack was made, the fault is mine, and not that of Caroline.”
This incident, occurring as it did at dusk, but before darkness had actually set in, indicates that Jellicoe was correct in saying it would be impossible to distinguish our own ships from the enemy ships during the night. Another incident further emphasizes this point.
At about 10 p.m., when on the starboard quarter of the battle fleet, three or more cruisers were sighted on the starboard bow of the Castor. These ships belonged to the Second Scouting Group. According to the report from the Castor, these ships challenged her by making the first two signs of the secret challenge of the day. When about 2,500 yards away the two leading ships switched on searchlights and opened fire on the Castor, who returned the fire. Two of the eight destroyers following the Castor fired torpedoes, but others believed that, in spite of the gunfire, the ships opposed to them were our own ships, so they decided not to fire their torpedoes.
The Castor’s report continues: “It is unfortunate that this element of doubt existed in the minds of the Captains of the destroyers as to whether the ships were enemy, as a good opportunity of firing torpedoes was lost.”
INDISCREET SIGNALLING
In regard to this element of doubt, which would naturally be caused if a strange ship was seen to make the secret challenge of the day, or even part of it, correctly, the Castor’s report states: “I would mention that some ship ahead of the Second Battle Squadron at about 9 p.m. made the signal by searchlight: ‘Please give me the Challenges and Replies for the day, as I have lost mine.’ I did not see a reply made, but evidently the signal was taken in by one of our ships, and the Captain of the Manners informs me he saw the reply being made. It is possible that this was one of the enemy’s ships asking, and may account for Castor being challenged by at any rate part of the correct challenge for the day.”
No enemy ship was “ahead” of the Second Battle Squadron between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m., but a possible explanation of this matter can be found by a perusal of the signals given in Appendix II of the Official Despatches. We find, at 9.32 p.m., some time before the Castor was challenged, the following signal made by flashing-lamp from the Vice-Admiral commanding Battle-Cruiser Fleet to the Princess Royal: “Please give me challenge and reply now in force as they have been lost.” And appended to this is the note: “(Challenge and reply passed as requested).”
At the time this visual signal was made from the Lion to the Princess Royal the Lion had just turned to a south course; the Princess Royal was astern of Lion; the enemy was bearing about north, the Second Squadron being about 4 miles away and the other enemy battle squadrons about 6 or 7 miles. The Castor was also about 7 miles distant from Lion, and if this was the signal read by the Manners there is no reason why it should not have been read by the enemy.
At 10.20 p.m. the Second Light Cruiser Squadron came into action with enemy ships, and the German light cruiser Frauenlob was sunk. As usual the Southampton sent a report of the enemy’s position to the Commander-in-Chief, but, owing to her wireless having been shot away, the information did not reach Jellicoe until about an hour later. The flashes of the guns were seen in the Iron Duke, but were taken to mean that an enemy destroyer attack was being driven off. Shortly after this the Castor and the Eleventh Flotilla were again in action for a few minutes, and at 11 p.m. the Fourth Flotilla was in action with enemy cruisers.
BRITISH DESTROYER ATTACKS
The best example of the difficulty of distinguishing ships in the dark, however, occurred during this action when the destroyer Spitfire, after firing two torpedoes, one of which probably hit the enemy light cruiser Elbing, turned to the westward, firing on the enemy ships to distract their concentration of fire on the Tipperary, already badly damaged.
The Spitfire then attempted to return to the Tipperary, and observing what she thought to be a cruiser with her searchlights trained on the Tipperary, opened fire on her. This enemy ship was not a cruiser but the Westfalen leading the enemy battle fleet line. The Spitfire then cut through the enemy line astern of the Westfalen.
In the Spitfire’s report it now states: “I then closed Tipperary but immediately came in sight of two enemy cruisers close to, steering to southeastward. The nearer or more southern one altered course to ram me apparently, I therefore put my helm hard-a-port and the two ships rammed each other, port bow to port bow.”
It was no cruiser, however, that the Spitfire rammed but the dreadnought battleship Nassau. At the moment of impact the Nassau fired at the Spitfire, but owing to the proximity of the ships the guns could not be depressed sufficiently, and all but two of the shots passed over her. The Spitfire was telescoped for a considerable portion of her length; her bridge, searchlight platform and upper works being demolished. She succeeded, however, in reaching home.
At 11.25 p.m. the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla came into action with the enemy. A large ship, probably the Westfalen, was sighted from the flotilla leader Broke. Fire was immediately opened on the Broke as she was turning away under full helm. A shell struck her lower bridge, killing all hands there and jamming the helm. In consequence, the Broke continued to turn, and struck the Sparrowhawk, her next astern. The Sparrowhawk while still locked with Broke was rammed, right aft, by another destroyer, and 5 feet of her stern was cut off.
WHY THE ENEMY ESCAPED
It is desirable now to deal, in some detail, with the information, or lack of information, received by Jellicoe. It has been often assumed, and, in fact, stated, that Jellicoe should have known that the enemy would return by the Horns Reef, and the mere fact that a large enemy fleet was able to cross astern of our battle fleet, and escape into protected waters, without being brought to action by our capital ships, certainly requires explanation and cannot be dismissed as being merely “the fortunes of war”.
No report of the whereabouts of the enemy fleet having reached Jellicoe since nightfall, at 10.46 p.m. he signalled asking the Castor if she was engaging enemy destroyers, and a message from the Castor, which crossed his signal, informed him that enemy cruisers were being engaged. The message reporting the Southampton’s action did not reach Jellicoe until 11.38 p.m.
Messages received from the Admiralty did not make the situation any clearer. One of these, received in the Iron Duke at 10.23 p.m., gave the geographical position of the enemy battle fleet at 9 p.m., but this position was obviously incorrect, and Jellicoe had to ignore it. At 10.41 p.m. a further message sent from the Admiralty informed him that the enemy was believed to be returning to its base, as its course was S.S.E.¾E. This message was not received in the Iron Duke until after 11 p.m., and the information did not fit in with that of the Southampton’s message received at 11.38 p.m., or with one from the Birmingham received at 11.30 p.m. Both these latter messages made it look as if the enemy was still to the westward, making to the southward.
Actually the message sent from the Admiralty, at 10.41 p.m., was a summary of two or three enemy messages, which had been intercepted. One of these, which was made by Scheer shortly after 9 p.m., asked for an airship reconnaissance near Horns Reef at daylight. Here was a definite indication of Scheer’s intended route home.
Such information, if given to Jellicoe, must have entirely altered his plans during the night; but this vital information, which could have reached him before 9.30 p.m., was withheld. Apparently it was deemed sufficient to send him a brief summary, about one and a half hours later, stating the course and speed of the enemy, but omitting all reference to the all-important fact, a plain indication that Scheer intended returning by the Horns Reef Passage.
Information received direct from a ship actually sighting the enemy would obviously carry more weight than intercepted messages, forwarded from the Admiralty after a considerable time had elapsed. Further, implicit reliance would not, in 1916, have been placed on the accuracy of positions obtained by directional wireless, then in its infancy. In any case, there was no information as yet to justify any change in the belief that the actions taking place were only between light forces.24
In the heat and turmoil of night actions, while destroyers are under heavy fire, being separated from their leaders, experiencing collisions and other distracting incidents, it is to be expected that individual Captains of destroyers would have little time to think of sending messages reporting the enemy. It would naturally appear to them that what they saw, their leaders also saw. We have noted also that, even the destroyers, in some cases, mistook battleships for cruisers. It does, however, appear that one of the leaders of the flotillas should have sent some information to Jellicoe. It was done by the leader of the Twelfth Flotilla later, as we shall see, under equally difficult circumstances. In this connection, in referring to the sighting of some ships by the Thirteenth Flotilla at 2.35 a.m., Beatty, in his report, states:
“Some of the strange vessels were sighted by Champion and Obdurate, who took them to be some of our own light cruisers. This is impossible, and it is very much to be regretted that Champion did not take steps to identify them. If, as is probable, they were the enemy, an excellent opportunity was missed for an attack in the early morning light. More important still, a portion of the enemy might have been definitely located.”
A BAD FAILURE
What applies to destroyers does not, however, apply to battleships. We have seen before that when reports came in by wireless, to the Commander-in-Chief, the geographical position of the ship making the report could not be implicitly relied on.
Jellicoe could not, himself, visualize the position, relative to the Iron Duke, of the Birmingham when that ship made an important signal, at 11.30 p.m., giving information of enemy battle-cruisers. The position given by the Birmingham, in this message, was not correct and, if treated as even approximately correct, would have led Jellicoe to suppose that the enemy was well to the westward, which agreed with his appreciation. The Birmingham, which had lost touch with her squadron, was, in fact, close to the Fifth Battle Squadron, on their starboard quarter, but Jellicoe could not know this. The Fifth Battle Squadron – now consisting of three ships25 – was some miles astern of the main fleet, and the damaged Marlborough, with her subdivision, was 3 miles to the eastward of the Barham – that is, farther from the enemy.
Jellicoe had not yet been informed that the Marlborough had dropped a long way astern. He was also unaware of the exact position of the Fifth Battle Squadron relative to the Iron Duke, but he could visualize, with approximate accuracy, the position, relative to the Iron Duke, of this squadron; and any information from this authoritative source would have been invaluable to him.
Referring to the published reports of the Commanding Officers, we find that from the Valiant states: “At 10.39 p.m. observed heavy firing on starboard quarter … this appeared to be a night attack by one of our light cruisers and four of our destroyers on a column of enemy ships.”
Again, at 11.35 p.m., the report continues: “Observed heavy night action on starboard quarter. From the evidence we surmised that there appeared on this occasion to be two German cruisers with at least two funnels and a crane amidships, apparently steering to the eastward at high speed.”
The only German ships which answered to this description were the Westfalen class of battleships, and this fact would, or should, have been known to all those concerned.
In the report from the Malaya, the rear ship of the Fifth Battle Squadron, we find: “11.40 p.m. 3 points abaft starboard beam observed what appeared to be an attack by our destroyers on some enemy big ships steering the same way as ours, two of which used searchlights. One of our destroyers with three funnels (appearance of Termagant class) was set on fire, but not before she had hit the second ship. This was seen by the column of smoke, and also the explosion was distinctly heard and felt. The leading ship of the enemy, which was seen by the flash of the explosion, had two masts, two funnels, and a conspicuous crane (apparently Westfalen class).”
At this time the Malaya was just under 4 miles distant from the van of the enemy battle fleet. The Valiant was in the line ahead of the Malaya, and ahead of the Valiant was the Barham leading her squadron.
It will be noticed that no mention is made, in the written report from the Valiant, of actually distinguishing a battleship. No mention is made of these occurrences in the Barham’s letter of proceedings, beyond the statement that “during the night there appeared to be constant attacks by torpedo craft on ships”.
It is obvious, from the written reports of the Malaya and Valiant, that the van of the enemy battle fleet was actually seen, at this time, from these ships. The wealth of detail contained in the Malaya’s report removes all doubt on this point, and it is a matter of some surprise that so little is noted as having been seen from the Barham.
WHAT OUR ADMIRALS KNEW
Information that enemy battleships had been sighted at this time, and in this position, must have made Jellicoe alter his appreciation of the general situation. The invaluable information was, however, not sent, and we therefore lost the opportunity to secure the immediate fruits of victory, for which all had striven. Had definite reports of sighting enemy battleships been sent from the Malaya and Valiant, there can be little question that the German fleet would have been brought to action at daylight.
Beatty’s criticism, already quoted – in regard to the failure of the Champion to identify strange vessels and thus definitely locate a portion of the enemy – applies with additional force to the present case, in which enemy vessels were identified, and located, but to no purpose, as no action was taken.
It is clear, from the evidence available, that firing was heard, and flashes of guns were seen, in the Iron Duke, and other battleships; but, as Jellicoe says in his despatch, what was seen made it “evident that our destroyer flotillas and light cruiser squadrons were in action”. There was nothing to indicate to Jellicoe that the enemy battleships or battle-cruisers were in action.
The Vice-Admiral commanding the First Battle Squadron in the Marlborough – which ship was only 7 miles from the van of the enemy fleet at 11.40 p.m., whereas the Iron Duke was 11 miles distant from it – in his report makes no mention of the probability of capital ships being engaged. His appreciation was, therefore, presumably similar to that of Jellicoe.
But more important still: the appreciation made by the Rear-Admiral commanding the Fifth Battle Squadron in the Barham was also the same. He says: “Destroyers appeared to be attacking the cruisers.”
No mention is made in any of the reports from the battle-cruisers that any firing was heard, or flashes seen, from those ships. This is peculiar, because at about 10.30 p.m. the battle-cruisers were no farther from the action then being waged, than was the Iron Duke, and in the signal log of the Princess Royal the following remark is inserted under 10.5 p.m.: “Opened fire on cruisers on S. beam. 10.20 p.m. ceased fire.”26 This can only refer to other ships firing, because none of our battle-cruisers had fired a gun for nearly two hours. By 11.40 p.m. the battle-cruisers were some miles farther off than the Iron Duke.
In the absence of any information from any of his light forces, some 10 miles astern, or from the Fifth Battle Squadron, known to be astern, Jellicoe could not have known, or even suspected, that the enemy battle fleet was crossing astern. It would have appeared to him next to impossible that such a movement could take place without someone in the ships astern detecting it. If detected, he would naturally expect to be given information.
We see, therefore, that, up to midnight, Jellicoe had no reason whatever to suppose that the enemy was crossing astern of our battle fleet.
WHAT THE GERMAN C.-IN-C. KNEW
Scheer, however, was perhaps not equally ignorant as to the position of our battle fleet. The German Admiralty had intercepted Jellicoe’s wireless message, made at 9.15 p.m., ordering destroyer flotillas to take station 5 miles astern of our battle fleet. There is some doubt whether this information was transmitted to Scheer by his Admiralty. The Official History states that it was transmitted, but the Germans deny this.
If Scheer had the information, he would have realized that when his light cruisers and the van of his battle fleet ran foul of our destroyers, our battle fleet would be some miles to the southward.
He could not know, though, that our Fifth Battle Squadron and the Marlborough’s sub-division were so far astern of the main fleet. It is believed that Scheer never wavered from his original intention of steering direct for Horns Reef, as soon as darkness set in.
At 0.10 a.m. the armoured cruiser Black Prince, which had lost touch with the main fleet some hours before, was steaming to the southward to again get into touch, when she closed the rear of the First Squadron of the enemy battle fleet and was sunk at point-blank range. Ten minutes before this occurrence the Marlborough and her sub-division had crossed ahead of the enemy at a distance of only 4 miles from the leading ship, the Westfalen. If the enemy battle fleet had not been delayed by our destroyer attacks or if, owing to her damage, the Marlborough’s speed had been reduced a little more than it was, the enemy battle fleet would have fairly met the Marlborough’s sub-division at about midnight. There would have been terrible losses, but, we hope, not before reliable information had reached Jellicoe.
At 1.48 a.m. Jellicoe received information that enemy submarines were being sent out from German ports. At 1.55 a.m., owing to the Marlborough’s speed being still further reduced, the Vice-Admiral commanding the First Battle Squadron decided to shift his flag to the Revenge. This was accomplished at 2.30 a.m.
LAST CONTACT
At 1.43 a.m. the Obedient, belonging to the Twelfth Destroyer Flotilla, sighted six enemy battleships to the south-westward. These proved to be the Second Squadron of the enemy battle fleet, and immediately the British destroyers were sighted they turned away.
On receiving the report from the Obedient, Faulknor, leading the flotilla, ordered an attack, and proceeded to a favourable position for delivering it. At 2.6 a.m. the Faulknor followed by three destroyers commenced to deliver her attack, under heavy fire from the enemy. The Onslaught was badly hit, receiving severe damage and many casualties, including her Captain and First Lieutenant. All destroyers fired their torpedoes, and the German battleship Pommern was hit and sunk.
During this time two reports were made by the Faulknor to the Commander-in-Chief. At 1.52 a.m.: “Enemy’s battleships in sight. My position 10 miles astern of First Battle squadron.” And again at 2.12 a.m.: “Course of enemy S.S.W.”
Both these signals were made by wireless, but they were not received in the Iron Duke, neither did any other ship except the Marksman, who was in close proximity to the Faulknor, intercept this important information. There was a great deal of interference, at this time, from German wireless, but it is most improbable that this interference would have prevented any other ship receiving the Faulknor’s message if her wireless had been in perfect adjustment. It can only be concluded, therefore, that her wireless had been thrown out of adjustment in the action.
Thus the only messages which were sufficiently reliable, and definite, to justify Jellicoe in altering his appreciation failed to reach him. If these messages, which gave a definite relative position, instead of a geographical position of doubtful accuracy, had reached him and no delay, however small, had occurred in deciphering them, considering them and acting on the information, it would have been just possible, if the speed of the enemy battle fleet was not increased, for the Grand Fleet, by proceeding at full speed, to bring Scheer to action before he reached his protected waters. There would, however, not have been time to collect all our scattered destroyer flotillas or, possibly, some of the light cruisers. The battle-cruisers also, being farther to the south-west, might have been unable to arrive in time to take up station in advance of the battle fleet.
On the other hand, we know that the enemy battle-cruisers were unfit for action on the morning of 1st June, as a result of the fighting the day before.