1. I am indebted to Mr. James Morrison for this characterization of Boyd.
2. The obituary in the New York Times appeared on 12 March 1997. See also the “One Week” column by James Fallows entitled “A Priceless Original,” U.S. News and World Report, 24 March 1997, p. 9, and “Col. John Boyd: Requiem for a Warrior,” in Defense Week, 24 March 1997, p. 20. The best short published overview of Boyd’s life, career, and accomplishments is Franklin C. Spinney, “Genghis John,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1997, pp. 42–47.
3. General Krulak’s letter was published in Inside the Pentagon, 13 March 1997, p. 5.
4. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 91.
5. John R. Boyd, Capt., USAF, Aerial Attack Study, 50, 10-6e, revised 11 Aug. 1964 (147 pp.). The original version was completed in Feb. 1960 and classified. The revised version was declassified and is available from the Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (call number M-U 43947-5).
6. Gen. Wilbur Creech, USAF (ret.), former head of the Tactical Air Command, has maintained that he beat Boyd in an air-to-air encounter but that both promised they would not disclose the fact. There is no way to corroborate this claim.
7. James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 14.
8. Ibid., p. 20. The insight is Burton’s. The contention that the record will stand is mine.
9. Bill Minutaglio, “Tales of the Fighter Mafia,” Dallas Life Magazine, 3 May 1987, p. 12.
10. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 37.
11. “The Winds of Reform,” Time, 7 March 1983, and “A Survey of Defense Technology: The Software Revolution,” Economist, 10 June 1995.
12. See for instance, Joseph J. Romm, “The Gospel According to Sun Tzu,” Forbes, 9 Dec. 1991, pp. 154–162; J. L. Bower and T. M. Hout, “Fast Cycle Capability for Competitive Power,” Harvard Business Review, Nov.-Dec. 1988 (6), pp. 110–118; George Stalk, “Time: The Next Source of Competitive Advantage,” Harvard Business Review, July-Aug. 1988, pp. 15–20; Stephan H. Haeckel and Richard I. Nolan, “Managing by Wire,” Harvard Business Review, Sept.-Oct. 1993, pp. 122–132, esp. p. 128. Also see Chester W. Richards, “Riding the Tiger: What Do You Really Do with OODA Loops?” The Handbook of Business Strategy, 1995, reproduced along with many other Boyd-related pieces on the Web site www.belisarius.com.
13. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 10.
14. Ray Leopold recounted the story, interview with the author in Phoenix, Ariz., 20 May 1994.
15. Boyd, interview with the author, 9 Dec. 1993.
16. “The Windmills of Your Mind” was Boyd’s favorite song. Composed by Michel LeGrand, it was the theme to the 1968 movie The Thomas Crown Affair.
17. John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” unpublished essay, 3 Sept. 1976, p. 1. I am grateful to Mr. Barry Watts for the ideas relating to the singularity of implication in these three concepts. Both he and I originally saw a different set of emphases but were repeatedly told by Boyd that they all dealt with the same thing.
18. Boyd, interview with the author, 14 Nov. 1994.
19. General Loh, interview with the author, 1 Nov. 1994. The phone number was 354-7634.
1. Unless otherwise noted, Boyd’s quotations and dialogue are taken from the U.S. Air Force Oral History Interview, Col. John R. Boyd, Corona Ace, K239.0512-1066. As these references are frequent, specific page numbers are not given, but the material is available from the USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
2. I am indebted to Robert Coram for this information and insight.
3. Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and Complex (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1994), p. xiii.
4. USA Weekend, 19–21 July 1996, p. 5.
5. Boyd related the incident in a set of discussions with the author in Oct. 1993. It is also discussed in a special profile on Boyd by Jim Booth, “John Boyd: An American Patriot,” Erie Daily Times, 4 July 1994 (Boyd’s comments on this event are cited on p. 7A). Here is an instance in which Boyd’s memory failed him. In his oral history interview and elsewhere he refers to the “Eleven General Orders” being in effect, yet the injunction for an officer to tend to the welfare of his men is a part of the “Principles of Leadership.” I am indebted to Lt. Gen. Van Riper for pointing this out. Whether the rest of the story is accurate, I do not know.
6. Boyd’s college roommate Robert Busch related this story in an interview with the author, 20 March 1997.
7. Booth, “John Boyd: An American Patriot,” p. 6A.
8. Col. Everest Riccioni, USAF (ret.), interview with the author in Los Angeles, Oct. 1994.
9. Boyd, interview with the author, 6 Nov. 1994.
1. This information is contained in data supplied by the Tactical Fighter Division, Directorate of Operations, Headquarters, USAF, 19 May 1982, cited in Walter Kross, Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in the Tactical Air Forces (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 97.
2. See James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 33 ff., citing comments made by Myers, Sprey, and Riccioni.
3. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Ibid., p. 47.
5. James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 11.
6. U.S. Air Force pilot Roland Parks, interview with the author in Montgomery, Ala. Parks confirmed that when he was shot down and became a POW in the Korean War, he was well inside Chinese airspace. Many of his fellow POWs were pilots who had been shot down over China, not North Korea.
7. Charles D. Bright (ed.), Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 221–222.
8. Ron Catton, “Reflections,” Memorial Service for Col. John R. Boyd, USAF (ret.), 20 March 1997, Main Chapel, Arlington National Cemetery.
9. Interviews with Vernon Spradling, Ron Catton, and others who witnessed these exploits and have confirmed them independently of each other.
10. Ron Catton, interview with the author at the Cosmos Club, Washington, D.C., 20 March 1997.
11. Capt. John R. Boyd, “Air Combat Maneuvering,” Fighter Weapons School Newsletter, June 1957.
12. Vernon Spradling, interview with the author in Las Vegas, Nev., 1 July 1993.
13. Boyd, interview with the author, 12 Sept. 1994.
14. Spradling, interview.
15. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 12.
16. Maj. Barry Watts, USAF, “Fire, Movement, and Tactics,” Top Gun (Navy Fighter Weapons School Journal), Winter 1979–1980, p. 9, cited in Burton, Pentagon Wars, pp. 12–13. (See note 5 under chapter 1 for bibliographic data on Aerial Attack Study.)
17. This version of events comes from the USAF Oral History Interview, Col. John R. Boyd, Corona Ace, K239.0512-1066, pp. 50–53. These are Boyd’s recollections, but I have no reason to doubt them, given corroboration from Vern Spradling about the general course of events.
18. Dugan and McPeak’s presence in the audience was revealed the day I introduced John Boyd to General McPeak in the spring of 1993 at the Air War College, where Boyd was visiting and General McPeak was speaking. McPeak said, “John, it is a real privilege to meet you. I have known of your work for years and have seen you before, but we had never formally met until now.” Then he related the story, which I later confirmed with General Dugan. McPeak was one of the few senior leaders in the Air Force who valued Boyd’s ideas and said so publicly. See Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, “Flexibility and Airpower,” Air Force Update for Senior Air Force Leaders, June 1993, pp. 1–6 (speech presented at the Air Mobility Command Dining-In, Scott AFB, Ill., 12 June 1993).
1. Boyd, interview with the author, 19 Sept. 1994.
2. Chuck Cooper, telephone interview with the author, 6 Oct. 1999. I am indebted to Mr. Cooper for these insights and Georgia Tech yearbook materials from those years as well.
3. Vernon Spradling, interview with the author, 1 July 1993.
4. James Fallows, “A Priceless Original,” U.S. News and World Report, 24 March 1997, p. 9.
5. Thomas P. Christie, interview with the author, 7 Nov. 1995.
6. James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 75. The work on energy maneuverability did not end here. Boyd and Christie kept refining the concepts they had developed and published extensively within the Air Force on their findings and their implications. These works included, among others, “Expanded Maneuverability Theory,” USAF Fighter Weapons Newsletter, Dec. 1969, pp. 1–33; “Introducing Handling and Agility into Energy Maneuverability,” unpublished manuscript, 30 Aug. 1970; and John R. Boyd, Thomas P. Christie, and Robert E. Drabant, “Maximum Maneuver Concept,” unpublished manuscript, June 1972 (43 pp.).
7. Thomas P. Christie, USAF Oral History Program interview with Jack Neufeld, 3 Oct. 1973, p. 13.
8. Boyd, interview with the author, 22 April 1995.
9. First Lt. John F. Gulick, “Remember the Name,” Eglin Eagle, 30 Sept. 1966, p. 8.
1. James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 29. Stevenson comments further, “If Boyd, Sprey and Riccioni were to get credit for painting the Lightweight Fighter, Myers prepared the pigments, stretched the canvas, and was instrumental in creating an audience for a private showing.”
2. Winston Churchill, cited in Steven F. Hayward, Churchill on Leadership: Executive Success in the Face of Adversity (Rocklin, Calif.: Prima Publishing, 1997), p. 29.
3. For the saga of the TFX, see Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).
4. Robert D. Goartz, “An Analysis of Air-to-Air Missile Capability in Southeast Asia” (Montgomery, Ala.: Maxwell AFB, June 1968), pp. 1–2.
5. Ibid., p. 59.
6. I am indebted to Mr. Barry Watts for these insights regarding the complexities of air-to-air combat.
7. Charles D. Bright (ed.), Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 211–212.
8. Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox, p. 22.
9. Ibid.
10. J. P. McConnell, “Air Superiority,” Memorandum to all Major Commands, Department of the Air Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, 3 May 1965. Cited in Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox, pp. 26–27.
11. Bright, Historical Dictionary, p. 53.
12. See Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993), for the coevolution of the U.S. Air Force and strategic bombing as its core mission.
13. See Col. Mike Worden, The Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998).
14. See, among others, Eliot Cohen, “The Mystique of Air Power,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1994), pp. 109–124, and James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Project Air Force), 1994. The cheerleading for airpower and its decisiveness is to be found in USAF historian Richard Hallion’s Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), especially pp. 188–200. An antidote to that school of thought is Grant T. Hammond, “Myths of the Gulf War: Some Lessons Not to Learn,” Air Power Journal, Fall 1998, pp. 6–18.
15. Robert A. Pape, Jr., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 318.
16. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 1233–1234.
17. Jeff Ethell, F-15 Eagle (London: Ian Allen, 1981), pp. 13–14.
18. Roy S. Dickey, “The Advocacy of the F-15,” Professional Study 4893, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1973, p. 21.
19. E-mail communication with Barry Watts, Northrop-Grumman Analysis Center, 5 May 2000.
20. Col. Everest E. Riccioni, “An Evaluation of Lt. Col. John R. Boyd’s Creative, Professional Contributions to the USAF,” cited in Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox, p. 351 (Appendix A).
21. As explained by Jeff Ethell in F-15 Eagle, there was a great deal of infatuation with the turbofan or bypass engine, “which pumps a great deal of cold air out of the first compressor stages without heating it in the combustion chamber. In other words, it is passed out around the side of the engine. High bypass engines are seen on most airliners today because they are very economical on fuel for long range flying. The problem with high bypass engines for fighters, however, comes from their heavier weight and an afterburner that consumes more than the usual turbojet afterburner. Not mentioned at the time was the still unsolved tendency of afterburning fan engines to suffer severe stall/stagnation and overheating problems, particularly when manoeuvring” (p. 14).
22. Riccioni, “An Evaluation of Lt. Col. John R. Boyd.”
23. Michael J. Getting, F-15 Eagle (New York: Arco, 1983), pp. 5–6.
24. Capt. David R. King and Capt. Donald S. Massey, “History of the F-15 Program: A Silver Anniversary First Flight Remembrance,” Air Force Journal of Logistics, Winter 1997, p. 10.
25. Lt. Col. Jerauld R. Gentry, “Evolution of the F-16 Multinational Fighter,” Industrial College of the Armed Forces, ICAF Student Research Report 163.
26. Riccioni quoted in James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 43.
1. James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 10.
2. James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 77.
3. Roger Franklin, The Defender: The Story of General Dynamics (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 238.
4. Myers may have been the first person to use the word “stealth” in describing the ideal characteristics of a fighter, in a document entitled “F-X Review” in Oct. 1969. He later promoted the concept under Project Harvey in a plan for an ultralightweight fighter. The first stealth plane, the F-117, was operational in 1982 but not made public until 1989.
5. Harry Hillaker, interview with the author, 17 April 1997. Unless otherwise noted, comments made by Hillaker in this chapter are from this interview.
6. John J. Fialka, interview with the author, 28 Oct. 1996.
7. Bill Minutaglio, “Tales of the Fighter Mafia,” Dallas Life Magazine, 3 May 1987, p. 10.
8. Ibid. p. 29.
9. Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox, pp. 100, 103.
10. Ibid., p. 97.
11. Memorandum, Riccioni to Gen. D. Smith, 29 March 1970, cited in Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox, p. 97.
12. James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 102.
13. Ibid., p. 103.
14. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 17.
15. Lt. Col. Jerauld R. Gentry, USAF, “Evolution of the F-16 Multinational Fighter,” Student Research Report 163, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, June 1976, p. 23.
16. Ibid., Riccioni interview cited on p. 28.
17. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
18. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 19.
19. Gentry, “Evolution of the F-16,” p. 46.
20. There are many sources on this aspect of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. One of the earlier ones is the concise overview of the development of these programs and operations found in “The Electronic Battlefield: Counterguerrilla Surveillance and Detection,” chapter 7 of Michael T. Klare, War without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), pp. 165–202. More detailed information can be found in U.S. Senate, Investigation into Electronic Battlefield Program, Armed Services Committee, Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee, Hearings, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1971, and Lt. Col. John N. Dick, Jr., USAF Oral History Program, interview with Gen. John D. Lavelle, 12–24 April 1974.
21. Doug Richardson, F-16 Fighting Falcon (New York: Arco, 1983), p. 7.
22. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 19.
23. Boyd, interview with the author, 17 Nov. 1994.
24. James R. Schlesinger, “Some Ruminations on the Office of Secretary of Defense,” address delivered in Louisville, Ky., fall 1983, cited in Richard A. Stubbing with Richard A. Mendel, The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of America’s Defense Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 325.
25. Bill Gunston and Mike Spick, Modern Air Combat: The Aircraft, Tactics, and Weapons Employed in Aerial Warfare Today (New York: Crescent Books, 1983), p. 190.
26. Fallows, National Defense, p. 106.
27. Dennis Smith, “The Roots and Future of Modern-Day Military Reform,” Air University Review, Sept.-Oct. 1985, p. 38.
28. Harry Hillaker, “Tribute to John Boyd,” Code One 12, no. 1 (July 1997), p. 15.
29. The most comprehensive assessment of the initial foreign sale to the European Participating Governments, called the sale of the century, is that of Ingemar Dorfer, Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16 (New York, Praeger, 1983). For additional information on some of the later sales, see also Grant T. Hammond, Countertrade, Offsets, and Barter in International Political Economy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990).
30. Minutaglio, “Tales of the Fighter Mafia,” p. 10.
1. Among many other sources, see Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982); James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman (eds.), Making Defense Reform Work (New York: Brassey’s, 1990); James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981); Gary Hart and William S. Lind, America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1986); Franklin C. Spinney, Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); and Richard Stubbing, The Defense Game (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).
2. The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, “An Interim Report to the President,” 28 Feb. 1986, p. 5.
3. Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), p. 202.
4. Ibid., p. 175.
5. This statement is by Boyd. The quotation, cited in numerous books and articles critical of defense spending, is usually attributed to an anonymous source or at best associated with “an Air Force colonel” or “a colonel in the Pentagon.” It was one of Boyd’s most successful public relations gambits.
6. “Military Reform Caucus Oral History Seminar,” 27 June 1992, draft transcript, Center for Legislative Archives and Historical Office, U.S. House of Representatives, pp. 4–5.
7. The document is entitled “Development Planning Interim Report,” sent from Col. John R. Boyd to AF/RDQ on 9 Aug. 1974. My copy came from Ray Leopold’s files. This was not the first effort to change procurement and acquisition. In a paper entitled “System Acquisition Evaluation,” dated 22 Feb. 1971, Boyd tried to change the in-house system advocacy to a more objective set of analytical reviews.
8. Michael R. Gordon, “Budget Crunch Gives Shot in the Arm to Growing Military Reform Movement,” National Journal, 5 Sept. 1981, p. 1573. “Military Reform Caucus Oral History Seminar,” pp. 55–57, makes the same point about Boyd’s central role.
9. These famous phrases came from a single speech delivered by President Reagan. See “Excerpts from the President’s Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals,” New York Times, 9 March 1983. For more on this entire period and the Reagan approach, see Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
10. Serge Herzog, Defense Reform and Technology: Tactical Aircraft (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), pp. 3–4.
11. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
12. Walter Kross, Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in the Tactical Air Forces (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 84.
13. James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 6. Despite the subtitle, this detailed study includes a great deal of information on the military reform movement in general and the F-15 and F-16 in general.
14. James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 100.
15. Among the more strident examples, see Fred Reed’s article “The Reformers,” in the Outlook section of the Washington Post, 11 Oct. 1987, and the numerous exchanges between Col. Alan L. Gropman and William S. Lind in the Fire/Counter Fire section of Air University Review from 1982 to 1984, with such pointed titles as “Winnowing Fact from Opinion” (Gropman) and “Analysis by Hyperbole: A Response” (Lind).
16. See Jeffrey Record, “The Military Reform Caucus,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 1983, pp. 125–129.
17. Among a host of books on the subject, see Gordon Adams, Controlling Weapons Costs: Can the Pentagon Reforms Work? (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1983); Jeffrey C. Barlow (ed.), Reforming the Military (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981); Asa A. Clark (ed.), The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence (New York: Hill & Wang, 1985); Arthur T. Hadley, Straw Giant, Triumph and Failure: America’s Armed Forces (New York: Random House, 1984); Jeffrey Record, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends (New York: Pergamon Brassey’s, 1984) and Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas (New York: Pergamon Brassey’s, 1988); Richard Stubbing, The Defense Game (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); in addition to the other works by Adams, Burton, Crackel, Fallows, Fitzgerald, Hart and Lind, Herzog, Rasor, Smith, Spinney, and Stevenson cited elsewhere in this chapter. Note that the criticism flows from the Heritage Foundation, defense industry officials, congressional staffers, and former military officers, besides the more liberal critics who would prefer greater expenditures on social programs as well as greater efforts in arms control and disarmament.
18. The opening salvos were articles by Gary Hart, “The Case for Military Reform,” Wall Street Journal, 23 Jan. 1981, and “What’s Wrong with the Military?” New York Times Magazine, 14 Feb. 1982. They were largely the work of his principal staff assistant on defense, William S. Lind. Newt Gingrich contributed a later article entitled “Think Now, Buy Later,” Washington Post, 21 April 1981.
19. See James Fallows, “The Muscle-Bound Super Power: The State of America’s Defense,” Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1979, pp. 59–78. Fallows also published other pieces, one near the end of the military reform movement entitled “The Spend-Up,” Atlantic Monthly, July 1986, pp. 27–33.
20. Theodore J. Crackel, “Reforming Military Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 12 Dec. 1983.
21. Tom Amlie was a radar expert who had worked for the Navy at China Lake and supplied many critics with information about radar performance. He wrote a controversial article, “Radar: Shield or Target?,” that appeared in the IEEE Spectrum in April 1982. Ernie Fitzgerald, who endeared himself to the DOD and President Nixon as a whistleblower on the C-5A transport plane, lost his job, and was reinstated after a celebrated court case, later wrote about his experiences and the problems in the Pentagon. See A. Ernest Fitzgerald, The Pentagonists: An Insider’s View of Waste, Mismanagement, and Fraud in Defense Spending (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989). Dina Rasor was a frequent and vociferous critic in numerous pieces, including Dina Rasor, Pentagon Underground (New York: Times Books, 1985). More pointed is a collection of articles she edited in a volume entitled More Bucks, Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Fund for Constitutional Government, April 1983). Andrew Cockburn, a journalist, wrote many pieces on various aspects of the reform movement. He first drew the wrath of the DOD for his book The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1983) and remains critical of the defense establishment to this day as a writer for Vanity Fair.
22. See James G. Burton, “Case Study: The Navy Runs Aground,” in Pentagon Wars, pp. 213–232. Also see James Stevenson’s new book on the A-12, The Five-Billion-Dollar Misunderstanding (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
23. Burton, Pentagon Wars, p. 66.
24. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). The Churchill quotation appears on p. 10.
25. Walter Isaacson et al., “The Winds of Reform: Runaway Weapons Costs Prompt a New Look at Military Planning,” Time, 7 March 1983.
26. Among these assessments see, for example, T. N. Dupuy, “The Pied Pipers of Maneuver-Style Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal International 119, no. 3 (Nov. 1981), pp. 73–78; James M. Lindsay, “Congress and Defense Policy, 1961–1986,” Armed Forces and Society 13 (Spring 1987), pp. 371–400; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Appraisal,” Orbis, Summer 1983, pp. 285–300; Thomas McNaugher, “Weapons Procurement: The Futility of Reform,” International Security 12 (Fall 1987), pp. 63–104.
1. John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” unpublished essay, 3 Sept. 1976, pp. 12–13.
2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Pierre Sprey, interview with the author, 30 June 1993.
4. For information on the A-10 and the Army’s Apache helicopter, see Ray Bonds, Modern Weapons (New York: Crescent Books, 1985).
5. Maj. Gen. Jack N. Merritt, Commandant, Army War College, quoted in Washington Post, 4 Jan. 1981, and cited in James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 53.
6. John Boyd, quoted by Henry Eason, “New Theory Shoots Down Old War Ideas,” Atlanta Constitution, 22 March 1981.
7. There are numerous translations of Sun Tzu. The best is by Ralph D. Sawyer, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). Others are by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, 1963), James Clavell (Delacorte Press, 1983, and Delta, 1988), Yuan Shibing (Sterling Publishing, 1987), and Thomas F. Cleary (Shambhala, 1988). Boyd used the Griffith translation originally but read all the others for the nuances in translation and emphasis.
8. Ch’i suggests “unique,” “rare,” “surprising,” and “novel” as well as “unorthodox.” The concepts Sun Tzu had in mind in discussing successful tactics and strategies can be characterized under the term “cheng” as: fixed, form, knowledge, logic and reason, control, space. Under “ch’i” the related concepts are: flexible, formlessness, secrecy, spontaneity and emotion, spirit, time.
9. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 67–68. The excerpt is from a commentary by “the noteworthy contemporary soldier General Foy,” which Chandler describes as a “rather romanticized picture.”
10. Ibid., pp. 363–364.
11. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, originally published in 1832, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, originally translated by Capt. G. H. Mendell and Lt. W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; reprinted by Greenwood Press in 1971 and 1975).
12. Clausewitz, On War, vol. 8, ch. 4, p. 595.
13. Jomini’s theory of lines of operation and flanking maneuvers is found in chapter 7 of his Treatise on Grand Military Operations: Or a Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the Modern System, vol. 1, translated from the French by Col. S. B. Holabird (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865). Additional commentary can be found in Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, “Jomini,” pp. 77–92 in: Edward Meade Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948).
14. Observations on these theorists are summarized in Emil Schalk, Summary of the Art of War (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862).
15. See Capt. Andre Laffargue, “The Attack in Trench Warfare: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander,” translated for Infantry Journal by an officer of the Infantry (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Infantry Association, 1916). For a description of tactics associated with Gen. Oskar von Hutier, see Paddy Griffith, Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), p. 100. See also Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Storm Troop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (New York: Praeger, 1989). John English, in A Perspective on Infantry (New York: Praeger, 1981), maintains that “Hutier tactics” should be credited to Ludendorff.
16. Gen. Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck and T. E. Lawrence are the two most famous early proponents and practitioners of guerrilla warfare in their century, eclipsed more recently by Mao Tse Tung and Nguyen Vo Giap. On Lettow-Vorbeck, see Brian Gardner, On to Kilimanjaro: The Bizarre Story of the First World War in East Africa (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith Co., 1963). Lawrence’s exploits are chronicled in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1935) and Revolt in the Desert (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1927).
17. Quotations are from Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 195, 192, 337, 338.
1. See J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923), and his Lectures on F.S.R. II (London: Sifton Praed & Co., 1931), which are commentaries on volume 2 of the British Field Service Regulations and Fuller’s views on how mechanized war will change infantry tactics. Heinz Guderian, Achtung-Panzer: The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics, and Operational Potential, translated by Christopher Duffy (London: Arms and Armour, 1992), was first published in 1937. Guderian later wrote his memoirs, Panzer Leader (Washington, D.C.: Zenger, 1979; reprint of the original 1952 edition, translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon). See also Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg (New York: Stein & Day, 1976), and Charles DeGaulle, The Army of the Future (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1941; originally published in French in 1934).
2. Technically, there was no doctrine called blitzkrieg. It was merely the name for the style of warfare the Germans perfected and demonstrated in 1939–1940. For a cautionary note about reading more into blitzkrieg than may have been in German doctrine, see Daniel J. Hughes, “The Abuses of German Military History,” Military Review 66, no. 12 (Dec. 1986), pp. 66–75, and his entry under “Blitzkrieg” in Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1996), pp. 155–162.
3. The quotations in this section are from John R. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” pp. 67–68, which is part of the Aug. 1987 version of the larger unpublished briefing “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” Not being academically trained, Boyd did not properly cite selections he referred to from others. Where possible, I have tried to do so; however, the number of citations from Marx and Lenin and the voluminous writings of each have made this difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, the quotations used in this chapter are all from “Patterns of Conflict” rather than the original sources.
4. “Nebenpunkt” is a word Boyd coined after conferring with others who were German. It was to emphasize the opposite of “schwerpunkt,” the focus of main effort, to create a concept to use in tandem with it.
5. The two Blumentritt works Boyd relied on are available as copies of the originals in the Pentagon library: Gunther Blumentritt, “Experience Gained from the History of War on the Subject of Command Technique,” 27 Jan. 1947, 13 pages, no translator listed, prepared by the Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, and “Operations in Darkness and Smoke,” 1952, 26 pages, translated by A. Schroeder and identified as a draft translation from the German done by the Historical Division, European Command, Foreign Military Studies Branch. All the Blumentritt quotations are from those works.
6. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” p. 87. Emphasis is Boyd’s.
7. There is a large literature on maneuver warfare. The relevant articles are too numerous to cite. Among some of the more prominent books are William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991); and Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (ed.), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993).
8. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 9–12.
9. James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 51–55.
1. John R. Boyd, “The Strategic Game of ? and ?,” part of the June 1987 version of the larger unpublished briefing, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” All the “Strategic Game” excerpts in this chapter are from this version of the briefing.
2. Unless otherwise noted, Boyd’s papers do not contain and I did not find complete citations for the sources of these quotations.
3. Ilya Prigogene and Isabelle Stenger, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), p. 127.
4. Alexander Atkinson, Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1981), ch. 4.
5. Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The Rise of Neobiological Civilization (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Publishing, 1994), p. 1.
6. John R. Boyd, “An Organic Design for Command and Control,” part of the May 1987 version of the larger unpublished briefing, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” All the “Organic Design” excerpts in this chapter are from this version of the briefing.
7. John R. Boyd, “The Conceptual Spiral,” part of the Aug. 1992 version of the larger unpublished briefing, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” All the “Conceptual Spiral” excerpts in this chapter are from this version of the briefing. (“The Conceptual Spiral” was not part of the most widely disseminated version of “A Discourse,” dated Aug. 1987.)
1. Fred Reed, “The Reformers,” Washington Post, 11 Oct. 1987.
2. Jim Morrison, phone interview with the author.
3. Boyd, conversation with the author, n.d.
4. Boyd’s list of sources is reprinted in Appendix A of James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 257–265.
5. John R. Boyd, “Revelation,” part of the Aug. 1987 version of the larger unpublished briefing, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.”
6. Jack Matson, a professor in the engineering school at Penn State University, passes out buttons with a picture of Tyrannosaurus rex in a red circle with a slash across it. The motto is “Innovate—or Die!” That’s Boyd’s kind of guy.
7. Boca Raton News, Sunday, 7 Feb. 1993.
8. Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Thursday, 10 June 1993.
9. Tim Weiner, “CIA Admits Failing to Sift Tainted Data,” New York Times, 1 Nov. 1995.
10. Jeff Ethell, “Lessons from Desert Storm’s Air War,” Aerospace America, May 1991, pp. 16–18; Joseph J. Romm, “The Gospel According to Sun Tzu,” Forbes, 9 Dec. 1991, pp. 154–162; Peter Cary, “The Fight to Change How America Fights,” U.S. News and World Report, 6 May 1991, pp. 30–31. Joseph J. Romm, The Once and Future Superpower: How to Restore America’s Economic, Energy, and Environmental Security (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1992). U.S. News and World Report, Triumph without Victory: The History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Random House, Times Books, 1993). John Fialka, “A Very Old General May Hit the Beaches with the Marines,” Wall Street Journal, 9 Jan. 1991; Fred Kaplan, “The American Military: The Force Was with Them,” Boston Globe, 17 March 1991. James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993); James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993). Maj. David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis,” master’s thesis, School of Advanced Aerospace Studies (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Feb. 1995).
1. John Fialka, War by Other Means: Economic Espionage in America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 197.
2. See Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, May 1997).
3. U.S. Marine Corps, “FMFM-1: Warfighting,” Quantico, Va., 6 March 1989.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 112.
5. Ibid., pp. 106–107.
6. Col. Everest E. Riccioni, “An Evaluation of Lt. Col. John R. Boyd’s Creative, Professional Contributions to the USAF,” memo cited in James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 351 (Appendix A).
7. Gen. Al Gray, USMC (ret.), interview with the author, at Gray’s home in Alexandria, Va., n.d.
8. James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 4.
9. There is a silly but probably lasting monument to Boyd at Air University. In front of the Air Force Doctrine Center and the JAG School buildings, a U-shaped road connects with another road to form a circle around a static display of a B-52 bomber. Though Boyd had little use for USAF doctrine and nothing to do with bombers, someone at the Doctrine Center persuaded the Civil Engineers to make a sign and designate the road the OODA Loop. It is the only permanent recognition of Boyd or any of his accomplishments at Maxwell AFB.
10. Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure, America’s Armed Forces (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 165–166.
11. Colin S. Gray, “Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945–1991,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, The Making of Modern Strategy: Rulers, States, and Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 592–598.