The tottering Ottoman Empire decided that it would break its neutrality and attacked Russia, aligning itself with Germany. In Palestine, the Arab population was agitating against the Empire’s rule and Britain was doing all it could to support the Arabs in their endeavours to wrest Syria/Palestine from the Turks. Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi, who was a Hashemite Arab leader, declared himself King of Arabia. Expediently, Britain recognised his kingship as she needed the Arabs as an ally. The war was a dilemma for Jews throughout the world, who, despite the persecutions, in the main remained loyal to their respective countries. Actual numbers are often disputed as to how many were involved on each side. It is thought that 350,000 Jews fought with the Russian army, 100,000 with Austrian army and 30,000 with the German army. The latter were humiliated as they had to take an oath of allegiance in public. About 35,000 Jews fought for the French, 40,000 for the British Empire and 250,000 in the USA forces. Once more, looking at Jewish deaths in the First World War is difficult, with many sources giving vastly different figures but a realistic estimate of the eleven million military deaths in total, 180,000 were Jewish from all sides in the conflict.
Behind the scenes, a secret deal was being carved out by Britain and France in terms of the future of the Middle East, as both parties considered the ending of the war and the defeat of the Ottomans. In January 1915, the British government was presented with a paper marked ‘secret’ and titled ‘ The Future of Palestine’.1 It recognised that there were twelve million Jews scattered across the world who, with the outbreak of war, believed that there could be a fulfilment of hope and desire that they had ‘held with unshakable tenacity for eighteen hundred years, for the restoration of the Jews to the land to which they are attached by ties almost as ancient as history itself’. However, the time was felt not to be right for the fulfilment of such aspirations because of the population mix in Palestine. The British government cautioned that to rush the matter at this time could set back a Jewish State for centuries and that the way forward was a country where Jews could live under the British Empire and after a time be allowed self-government, with the ‘sacred sites’ given to the control of an international commission. The plan was not altruistic and the benefits to Britain were spelt out in terms of the prestige but more importantly, the belief that the British would do a better job in developing a country that was desolate – after all they had the experience of the British Empire. They also considered the feelings of Protestants throughout the world who would have sympathy for restoring Jews to their homeland in line with the ‘fulfilment of prophesies’ regarding the ‘Hebrew’. There would also be strategic military benefits to Britain along with the ‘lasting gratitude’ from Jews in America and other lands to see their people freed from ‘many centuries of suffering’. The ideas of annexation to France, Egypt, Turkey or an international body were discussed and dismissed and under British suzerainty a Jewish centre could develop in Palestine. It ended with a flourish of praise for the Jews;
‘For fifteen centuries the race produced in Palestine a constant succession of great men – statesmen and prophets, judges and soldiers. If a body be again given in which its soul can lodge. It may again enrich the world. Till full scope is granted, as Macaulay said in the House of Commons, “Let us not presume to say that there is no genius among the countrymen of Isaiah, no heroism among the descendants of the Maccabees”
Such lofty thoughts interlaced with self-interest were one thing, but the continuing journey of the Jewish people would meet with opposition and realpolitik. One such matter was Arabs and their desire for their own territory and Sir Maurice Bunsen in July 1915 gave assurances to them that they would be supported by Britain to gain territory, but Palestine was excluded.2 It was therefore on 19 May 1916, that the Sykes–Picot Agreement (officially the Asia Minor Agreement) was signed, which Russia acknowledged. This would effectively give control to Britain over most of the area that the Jewish People hoped to have as their own. This was moving the responsibility for the realisation of a Jewish State into the hands of the British government. The question of the Jewish homeland was a conundrum for the British and they sought ideas as to a solution. Lord George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, wrote a paper for the Cabinet, which outlined his thoughts. Two questions had been raised; what was the meaning of the phrase ‘a National Home for the Jewish Race in Palestine’ and the British obligation therein and if the policy was adopted what were ‘the chances of a successful realisation’?3 He did not give a very hopeful answer to the questions as he felt the idea was ‘incapacitated’ by the conditions of the country. He gave the figures for the Jews throughout the world as twelve million with 3,250,000 in Europe, six million in Russia, two million in the USA and 250,000 in Britain, with 125,000 in Palestine. However, Curzon goes on to say that ‘there is no such place as Palestine’ because of the way the Ottomans had cut the country up. The population of the area Palestine before the war was between 600,000 and 700,000 with the bulk of Jews living in Jerusalem and they were living in a place of ‘abject debasement’. He described it as a poor land with no natural resources living on agriculture and livestock farming. Curzon saw the dream of a Jewish homeland as impossible because of these conditions. He questioned the government’s proposals for the idea and outlined his own proposals:
‘In reality is not the maximum policy that we can possibly hope to realise one which, if the Turks are defeated and turned out of Palestine, will -
Set up some form of European administration (it cannot be Jewish administration) in that country.
Devise a machinery for safeguarding and securing order both in Christian and in Jewish Holy Places.
Similarly guarantee the integrity of the Mosque of Omar and vest it in some Moslem body.
Secure to the Jews (but not to Jews alone) equal civil and religious rights and the other elements in the population.
Arrange as far as possible for the land purchase and settlement of returning Jews.’4
‘If this [his proposals] is Zionism’ then there was no reason for everyone not to be a Zionist but his ideas fell far short of the object of true Zionists, who still saw a full Jewish State the only way to guarantee the secure protection of the Jewish people. One such was Lucien Wolf, a Jewish English journalist, who wrote to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, promoting the support of the British government for Jews going to Palestine after the war.5 It was realised within government that the French might not cooperate with any British policy towards the Jews but Lloyd George maintained that after the war, Britain would have conquered Palestine and France would live with it.6
In Britain, the hopes of such a Jewish homeland coming out of the horror of the conflict stilled burned in many Jewish hearts. One man, Chaim Weizmann – a bio-chemist and a leader of the Zionist movement – developed an important chemical additive for gunpowder for the British government. He was a good friend of the former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1917, Arthur Balfour. On 2 November 1917, Balfour wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, which gave great hope to the Jewish people on their journey home:
‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object. It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’
This became known as the Balfour Declaration, which Lloyd George admitted was in response to Weizmann’s help to the government. The declaration was not accepted by all Jews, as some felt that any allegiance to a Jewish State would call into question their commitment to their national country and thus increase anti-Semitism. However, a Foreign Office document confirmed that the vast majority of Jews across the world held a hope of a State in Palestine.7 Indeed, the USA and France had confirmed their agreement with Balfour, the French calling it ‘Un Foyer Nationale [A National Home]”.8
Making such a statement was one thing but bringing it about was another with the volatile situation in the Middle East and the Arab populations across the area. Under General Allenby, head of the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force, who had entered Jerusalem on foot to honour the city after the Turks fled in December 1917, T E Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) had been sent to work on intelligence with the Arabs and became involved in the actual military actions against the Ottomans. He was concerned that the outcome of the war would result in an Arab national State, and was extremely unhappy that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was not going to facilitate that ambition. Sir Mark Sykes, in a separate report to the government, indicated the issues that working with the Arabs would bring about, including possible violent responses, internal and external.9 In a report, the government adviser, Professor Oman from Oxford, concluded that the ambition of the Arabs for their State and the fact that the French would have their own plans, would not allow a Jewish State. Oman also noted that ‘Tribal disintegration has always been the curse of the Arabs’.10 Sykes similarly pointed out these issues and therefore the conflict between Jewish and Arab ambitions was clearly known to the British government. On 4 April 1918, the British confirmed to the Sherif of Mecca (who became King Hussain of Jordan) that Balfour was going to be implemented.11 Even William Ormbsby-Gore (Lord Harlech), an extremely strong supporter of the Zionist aims, indicated, ‘Our pledge to assist the formation of the Jewish National Home does not involve the creation – at any rate in the immediate future – of an autonomous Jewish State’.12 Balfour himself had clearly stated at a dinner on 7 February 1918 of a desire, ‘to give the Jews their rightful place in the world; a great nation without a home is not right’. He was further asked to clarify if that meant ‘ultimate Jewish sovereignty in Palestine’. His response was carefully made to distinguish his own views from government, ‘My personal hope is that the Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish State’.13
Others were still pressing for the Jewish State to be created. On 26 February 1918, Balfour received a letter with ‘Extremely Urgent and Important’ written across the top in pen. It was from Baron Gustave de Coriolis, who declared that a group of Jewish bankers, including the Rothschilds in Paris, were prepared to act as an intermediary to end the war by approaching Prussia to set up an Empire of Middle Europe under the Emperor of Austria.14 The letter makes clear that Britain now had the Middle East in her hands and could control events there and could now assist the Jews to ‘recover their national existence they have been deprived of for so many centuries’. Coriolis argues that there were 2.8 million Jews in Europe who would be on the side of Britain and the idea appears to be that a national Jewish State would be governed by the Empire. Notes on the file indicate that Gustave had offered his services before as intermediary and had been refused. Nothing seems to have been done by Balfour in response to the letter and there were no indications that the Rothschilds knew anything of the contents.
On 2 March 1918, Balfour wrote to General Allenby informing him that a ‘Zionist Mission’ to the area to explore the establishment of ‘National Home for the Jewish people’ would be taking place. The letter is very clear that the Mission has his and the government’s full support and he is to help in every way possible to give ‘concrete form to this Declaration’ and bears the hand-written note ‘Palestine for the Jews’. The Mission was led by Chaim Weizmann and Lord Harlech, ‘the Political Officer’ and Balfour gave his high endorsement of Weizmann stating clearly their long term relationship and there is no doubting Balfour’s enthusiasm for the project. Despite this encouragement to assist the Zionist Mission, British officials were working against the Balfour Declaration and some generals were even asking for it to be cancelled. The war was now reaching the end game but whilst the war ‘ended’ on 11 November 1919, the legal end to the war came at the end of the various treaties on 23 August 1923. The war had come to an end and four empires had disappeared, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian and the seeds of the ending of the British Empire were sown in the new world that was emerging after the terrible carnage. Captain Leo Amery, writing to Balfour in October 1918, suggested the Empire should be renamed, ‘United Nations of the British Commonwealth’ because nations like ‘Zionist Palestine, if it happens’ would be more comfortable with such an entity rather than the United States.15
When the Ottoman Empire capitulated on 30 October 1918 and General Allenby, had based himself in Jerusalem, the way was being made open for British control of Palestine. The post-war Paris conference in 1919 had its problems in respect to the Middle East. The agreed delegations from the different countries did not include the Arab group, the Hedjaz, whose king Feisal fought against the Ottomans with T.E. Lawrence. Eric Drummond, 7th Earl of Perth, the British politician and diplomat, who would become Secretary-General of the League of Nations, writing to Balfour from Paris in January 1919, informed him that ‘Lawrence, who has just been to see me, says that Feisal is furious’. This was the first pointer to problems that would arise over the question of a Jewish State. Lord Curzon also wrote to Balfour in January after a visit from Major-General Sir Arthur Wigram Money, the Chief Administrator of Palestine, who had concerns about the promised Jewish State and that ‘A Jewish Government in any form would mean an Arab rising’.16 Curzon indicated that he shared the views expressed and added he had long ‘felt that the pretensions of Weizmann & Company are extravagant and ought to be checked’.17 In a puzzling reply to Curzon Balfour wrote:
‘As far as I know Weizmann has never put forward a claim for the Government [Balfour had underlined this in pen] of Palestine. Such a claim is in my opinion certainly inadmissible and personally I do not think we should go further than the original declaration which I made Lord Rothschild’.18
The statement was puzzling because he had written to Allenby in Jerusalem about the Zionist Mission regarding a ‘National Home for the Jewish people’. How could there be a National Home without a government? Harlech wrote to Eric Drummond19 from the Conference that Weizmann had applied to place before it his request that Britain be given mandatory power over Palestine and that there was concern that Balfour should advise. Drummond made a note that Britain should stand apart from the matter and let Weizmann take his own course to which Balfour had add in pen ‘yes’. The eventual proposals turned out to be a clear declaration:
‘The Zionist Organization respectfully submits the following draft resolutions for the consideration of the Peace Conference:
1.The High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.
2.The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the Schedule annexed hereto.
3.The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.
4.(Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.)’
There were additional provisions securing the rights of government of the new State and defining its boundaries, also included were the justifications for the claims. The submission ended:
‘In every part of the world on the Day of Atonement the Jews pray that “all nations may be united by a common bond, so that the will of God may reign supreme throughout the world.” In the fulfilment of this prayer, the Jews hope that they will be able to take an honourable place in the new community of nations. It is their purpose to establish in Palestine a government dedicated to social and national justice; a government that shall be guided, like the community of old, by that justice and equality which is expressed in the great precept of our Lawgiver: “There shall be but one law for you and the stranger in the land”.’
The document was signed by Rothschild, to whom Balfour had written his declaration, on ‘behalf of the Zionist Organization, Nahum Sokolow [a Polish-born Jew and a multilinguistic journalist, prominent in Zionism], and Chaim Weizmann’. The letter from Drummond was passed to Balfour who appeared to be annoyed with it, noting in pen at the top of the letter, ‘When did I talk about a Jewish government?’ Drummond also noted, ‘This hardly requires an answer.’ However, an answer was sent to Harlech, indicating he should tell Weizmann to do whatever he wished as the British government wanted no responsibility in the matter. He also had received a letter from Paris to the effect that Lawrence was conducting behind the scene lobbying for the Arabs at the Conference and that there were difficulties with the French as to what territory thy would have influence over and there was concern that British action be taken to deal with it. The atmosphere for the Jewish people’s journey to their State was proving very difficult and Balfour seemed to be playing a strange game. In February 1919, he met a Jewish delegation in his hotel in Paris20 which included Sokolow who had signed the Zionist document laid before the Conference. They thanked Balfour for his statement and for his efforts on their behalf and in his reply, he expressed his ‘personal sympathies’ and advised them that ‘no movement such as theirs could achieve fulfilment without encountering many difficulties’ and confirmed that they had many supporters in England and America, even among non-Jews. He went on to say that he ‘felt convinced that their movement would succeed. He made no mention of any misunderstanding between his and their understanding of ‘government’ of the new State which Balfour was confident they would achieve.
The evidence would suggest that whilst Balfour was sympathetic to the Zionist cause, he was in difficulty with what he could actually do. Philip Henry Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian, secretary to Lloyd George made Balfour aware in February 1919 of the rising conflicts between ambitions from Arabs, Catholics and Jews in Palestine. Lloyd George had sent a letter to Kerr21 regarding a letter received by Lord Edmund Talbot, a prominent British politician and Catholic, from Cardinal Bourne in Jerusalem. The letter echoed some of the Catholic anti-Semitism of earlier years headed boldly, ‘Zionism’. He wrote that the Balfour statement was ‘very vague’ and could be ‘interpreted in different ways’, which indeed confirmed the actions and statements of Balfour which were indeed confusing. The Cardinal demanded an immediate declaration from the British government that the Jewish minority in Palestine would not govern the majority. He criticised the Zionist organisation ‘asserting themselves’ and beginning to nominate nominees for political posts, claiming he had been approached by both Christians and Moslems. He was also critical of Sir Mark Sykes for supporting them and denied they had the support of the Pope and that the whole movement was contrary to Christian sentiment and tradition. He was happy to have Jews come and dwell there and inadvertently gives the Jews acknowledgement that the land was formerly theirs by writing, ‘they should never again dominate and rule the country’ as that would be ‘an outrage to Christianity and its Divine Founder’. Lloyd George expressed his own concerns, ‘If the Zionists claim that the Jews are to have domination of the Holy Land under a British Protectorate, then they are certainly putting their claims too high’. It was suggested that Balfour should clarify the position in a public statement. Lloyd George also expressed the Arab concerns that they were to be removed to make way for Jews and he felt it all would be a bad start for the British as they assumed government of the area and the letter from the Cardinal ‘is a revelation to me of the reason why the Catholics hate the Jews so badly’. Harlech was involved in deciding a response and wrote that, ‘Cardinal Bourne’s letter “reveals a complete misunderstanding of our commitments in regard to Zionism’. He felt a declaration would cause greater difficulties and in that probably reflected Balfour, in that it was better to leave matters vague and therefore no one could then hold the government down to any specific agreement. He wanted to wait for the end of the conference and a mandate given to the British over Palestine. He understood that Weizmann and Feisal had reached an understanding about Syria and Palestine and there was the possibility of disturbance throughout the Arab world. He wanted assurances to be given to the Catholics over the ‘Holy Places’ and political equality. He then gave his view that many Catholics ‘have deep seated anti-Semitic prejudices’ and that the ‘Jews now living are equally responsible with the Jews 1900 years ago for the crucifixion’. He confirmed he had spoken to Weizmann and pointed out the difficulties before their movement and again reiterated his belief that a public statement should not be made.
He enclosed a memorandum which rejected the Cardinal’s core points and stated that Sokolov and Sykes had spoken with Cardinal Gasperi and had made clear the position two years previously. Contrary to Bourne’s claims that German Jewish finance was involved, he stated that the money was coming from America and Britain. He also made clear that the British government would assist ‘those Jews who wished to return to the land of their ancestors’ and that all rights would be safeguarded. The British government, he declared, never contemplated any inequality between groups in Palestine but ‘is anxious to facilitate the creation of a National Home for a race, that has been persecuted in so many lands, where they can live in security and can develop freely their own culture and civilisation’. He makes clear that there would be no discrimination and that the land was under-developed and many areas sparsely populated and that the future situation regarding the Jews would depend on how many took up the opportunity to live there. Once more, there is the acknowledgement that ‘anti-Semitism still exists among many elements of Palestine as well as of other countries as a discredit to Christian civilisation’. The memorandum ends with the hope that the future will once more see the unity of people revived and that there would be redemption of the land ‘regarded as Holy by Jew and Christian alike’. Such sentiments gave hope that the Jewish people would see a successful end to their journey and an end to their suffering over the centuries.
Balfour himself also took up his pen to write to Lloyd George and urge that no statement should be made. His view was that the government ‘rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination’ because any consultation of the present population of Palestine would give an ‘anti-Jewish verdict’. The justification for this was that Palestine was ‘absolutely exceptional’ and that ‘we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance’. He confirmed to the Prime Minister that ‘we conceive the Jews to have a historic claim to a home in their ancient land’. The opposition to the Jews from Roman Catholics to the Jewish Zionists was ‘very little to their credit’ and that the opposition was not so much about the Holy Places – these could be safeguarded by the League of Nations – but more about the ‘hatred of the Jews’. He acknowledged that the attitude of the Jews in the matter was not always attractive but ‘the balance of wrongdoing seems to me on the whole to be greatly on the Christian side’; he himself was an evangelical Christian.
There was obvious confusion even within government and Edward Montagu of the India office contacted Balfour expressing considerable alarm at the reports he was hearing about the Zionists and Balfour’s apparent support for ‘reconstituting Palestine as the Jewish national home’. He referred to an announcement Balfour made that contained the words, ‘establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people’. He argued that there was a difference between the two phrases ‘reconstituting the country as’ and ‘establishing in the country’. He expressed his ‘hatred’ of the Balfour Declaration and that Balfour had gone beyond it. He had heard from Sir Louis Mallet that the scheme for the future government of Palestine being proposed by London was the same as his and not Balfour’s. He demanded to know where Balfour stood on the matter. Balfour’s response was a polite rebuke to Montagu and he accused him of semantics in the whole matter and he saw no difference in the phrases quoted. He also believed that most English Jews were Zionists and that they had support from Britain and America. Montagu did not get the clarification he wanted. His response came back obviously annoyed with Balfour and declaring that, if the reports he was hearing were accurate, that Balfour did support a Jewish homeland, then Moslems would be upset. He asked Balfour to ‘refrain from voting me an incorrigible nuisance’ and looked to the future official government declaration. Balfour was also under fire from the League of British Jews in London. They objected to a term he used in a book on Zionism which said that, ‘Jews are homeless’ and declared that Jews had homes in many countries. The Jewish people so often caused themselves problems and frustrated the movement to a national home.
Curzon once more wrote to Balfour22 expressing concern that Weizmann had gone beyond what was agreed and that the ‘ambitions of the Zionists were exceeding all bounds’. He had obtained a copy of a secret meeting which listed a number of intentions of a Zionist government which were very extreme in his view and made him ‘shudder’. They included control of all immigration, observed Jewish holidays, control of land and water rights, nationalisation of public land and any surplus private land exceeding a certain size, control of public works, supervision of education and the use of Hebrew as the language in all schools. He foresaw trouble with the Vatican and had reached the view that if the report was the way forward, he wished the mandate would fall on someone other than the British. On 19 March 1919, James de Rothschild had also written to Lloyd George indicating that about £2m would be need to reconstruct Haifa and other places in Palestine and asking for a declaration on the Zionist ambitions in the country. The situation was beginning to cause great pressures within the government. Balfour wrote to Herbert Samuel, who was Jewish but atheist in outlook, to inform him of his concerns that the Zionist cause was being damaged and that their activity was alienating elements of the population in Palestine because of their interference. Writing to Samuel was surprising as he was even more extreme than men like Weizmann, who he believed had made demands that were too modest’, and even suggested that perhaps the Temple may be rebuilt, as a symbol of Jewish unity. On 27 March 1919, Samuel’s reply was polite but firm, pointing out that he would speak with Zionists leaders but also making the case that British administration in Palestine was discriminating against Jews, especially in Jaffa. He repeatedly stressed that the administration did not seem to have heard of Balfour’s declaration and the removal of the Jaffa government would help ease the situation. Chaim Weizmann also responded to Balfour in a friendlier but still firm tone. He pointed out that the journey to a Jewish Home had been a long one and now it was in sight it was no surprise Jews talked with enthusiasm, but he acknowledged the needs of ‘non-Jewish elements’ and he would always seek to protect them. He pointed to the French attempts at both anti-British and anti-Jewish comments in the press to undermine the events in Palestine. He told Balfour that he and Feisal had reached an understanding over the proposals put before the Peace Conference and quotes his response from a letter he had received:
‘We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best in so far as we are concerned, to help them through, we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.’23
This was an important endorsement coming from the chief Arab leader, who himself was expecting a great deal from the British for Arab land in Syria. Weizmann reminded Balfour that Lawrence and Sykes all were in support of the aims of the Jewish people for a homeland and that there was agitation from Damascus and Egypt that were not only anti-Jew but anti-British. The politics of the Jewish homeland were one thing, but the British government had a number of issues on their plate and the persecution and killing of Jews continued especially in Russia and Ukraine. The journey home for the Jews was still a bloody and frustrating one.