‘We want Hitler to be destroyed, but as long as he exists, we are interested in exploiting that for the good of Palestine.’
David Ben-Gurion, 1937
In 1896 in Berlin, Theodor Herzl noted, ‘Everything tends, in fact, to one and the same conclusion, which is clearly enunciated in that classic Berlin phrase, ‘Juden Raus!’ (Jews Out!)’ He was also adamant, ‘Oppression and persecution cannot exterminate us. No nation on earth has survived such struggles and sufferings as we have gone through’. These two statements would come together in the greatest ever onslaught against the Jewish people in Germany. Hitler would seek to remove the Jews, not only from Berlin, but from every continent on earth. He became the leader of a political movement that emerged; the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP). In general, the Arab community tended to side with Hitler and men like al-Husseini sought him out to assist their cause in Palestine. Khalil al-Sakakini was an Orthodox Christian, born in Jerusalem, a teacher, poet and Arab pan-Nationalist. On the appointment of Samuel as High Commissioner, he had resigned because Samuel was a Jew. He hated Zionism because, in his opinion, ‘it endeavours to build its independent existence on the ruins of others’ and he had supported the Arab attacks on Jews even calling those involved ‘heroes’. His hope was that Hitler would succeed and that a weakened post-war Britain would allow Palestine to be liberated from them. His son had carried out a poll in Palestine for the Americans (in 1941) and the results were very clear; 88% of Palestinian Arabs were pro-Germany and 9% pro-British. This reflected the views that were spreading throughout Palestine through men like al-Sakakini.
Arabs seeking out Hitler’s help to prevent a Jewish State would be disappointed. As al-Sakakini wrote, ‘Up until now we have received no help from either Italy or Germany. All we have heard from them is fine words.’ They did not fully grasp Hitler’s understanding of the Jewish State. He believed:
‘The Jewish State has never been delimited in space. It has been spread all over the world, without any frontiers whatsoever, and has always been constituted from the membership of one race exclusively. That is why the Jews have always formed a State within the State. … That is why the Jewish State, which ought to be a vital organization to serve the purpose of preserving or increasing the race, has absolutely no territorial boundaries.’
He did not offer much help because his whole premise was that the Jews should not exist anywhere. However, this did not prevent him from giving his views of a Jewish State, if it ever existed:
‘When the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe that the new national consciousness of the Jews will be satisfied by the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, the Jews thereby adopt another means to dupe the simple-minded Gentile. They have not the slightest intention of building up a Jewish State in Palestine so as to live in it. What they really are aiming at is to establish a central organization for their international swindling and cheating. As a sovereign State, this cannot be controlled by any of the other States. Therefore it can serve as a refuge for swindlers who have been found out and at the same time a high-school for the training of other swindlers.’
He would go on to write that he would ‘rather wipe out the Jewish State which is now in existence’, meaning Jews wherever they existed. With Hitler there was no place on earth that he would allow Jews to be beyond his reach; his megalomaniacal drive for world domination had built within it this principle, such was his hatred for the Jews. There was a paradox in the Nazi position as was seen in the negotiations between Nazis and Zionists in Germany in the very early days. The Haavara Agreement of 25 August 1933 was agreed between the Nazis and Jewish groups, including the Jewish Agency to help facilitate the immigration of Jews to Palestine. It allowed the Jewish immigrants to gain control of some of their assets and get them to Palestine, using Hanotea, a citrus fruit company in Haifa, and allowed them to overcome British bans on immigration under a special visa arrangement. This allowed the Nazis ‘to get rid of their Jews’ and the Zionist groups in Palestine to get people and finance into the country. The arrangement was not popular with all Zionists such as the Revisionists and Jabotinsky who wanted a boycott of the fascist regime. Chaim Arlosoroff, a key figure in Ben-Gurion’s Mapai Party and involved in the negotiations, was assassinated in June 1933, with good evidence that Jabotinsky’s party was behind it, one of his men being identified by the victim’s wife. Although arrested he was released and the crime remained ‘unsolved’. Many, who wish to attack this action by the Jews in Germany, would claim it was ‘collaboration’ with the Nazis which is to distort the truth. The issue was one of rescue of those who would perish if not taken out of Nazi hands. The Nazis would have eventually taken all the finances of the Jews anyway and here it was expedient to use it for the good of the Jewish people.
Hitler’s actions to deal with Jews continued with legislation on 7 April 1933, when laws were enacted to prevent anyone of ‘non-Aryan descent’ allowed into public service. This at a stroke removed thousands of Jews from any source of livelihood and alongside this the Nazi agitation provoking the boycott of Jewish business had a major effect on the Jews of Germany. The legal implications of the Nazi laws were taken up by a considerable number of non-government businesses, who also applied the rules in their own spheres of influence, again adding to the problems for Jews. The measures created 60,000 Jews who now sought to escape the persecution and move elsewhere. In Britain more than 3,000 Jews had arrived, many ‘destitute’ and seeking help and the government responded in a typical bureaucratic way and set up a committee to deal with it.1 The ambassador from Berlin sent the Cabinet a telegram informing them of the plight of the German Jews, in which he painted a picture of successful Jews as the reason it was ‘natural’ for the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis.2 This was shared with the High Commissioner in Palestine, but the Cabinet decided not to make it public, ‘for the sake of the Jews in Berlin’.3 At this stage, the full impact of how the Nazis would progress and their plan for wider Europe were not yet understood and for many refugees Palestine was not yet their first thought. This movement of Jews away from Germany suited Hitler as he had written in Mein Kampf that ‘No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the nation’. The actions against Jews were not just in words and between January 1929 and September 1932, fifty synagogues had been vandalised with 128 Jewish cemeteries desecrated and many attacks on Jews in the streets, especially when entering or leaving synagogues.
Many ordinary Germans, at first neutral, were now being caught up in the constant slogan chanting, bill posting, leafleting and flag waving against the Jews. The Protocols of The Elders of Zion, was widely distributed to fan the flames of hate. This book had its origins in the French Revolution, being composed by Hermann Goedsche, a German anti-Semite who worked for the Prussian secret police. The Times over 16-18 August 1921 had run a full article detailing the history of the book showing it to be a forgery and discrediting it. The Nazi election’s ‘on 12 November 1933, in which opposition parties were banned, (98% in their favour - in a contested election in March that year they received less than 50%) was proclaimed as a great victory. The election however, increased the pressure on Jews as it now gave ‘legitimacy’ to the Nazis and their approval of anti-Jewish actions brought even greater acts of intimidation and murder against the Jewish people. Goering, the Minister of the Interior, said, ‘I refuse to turn police into a guard for Jewish stores … The nation is aroused. For years past we told the people: ‘You can settle accounts with the traitors’. We stand by our word’. The slogan ‘Kauft nicht beim Juden’ (Don’t buy from the Jew) became the cry throughout main German cities and Nazi Storm Troopers were placed outside Jewish premises with placards, ‘Deutsche kaufen nicht aus Jüdischen Geschäften’ (Germans don’t buy from Jewish Shops). The presence of these troops with their placards terrified the Jewish population. The boycotts were eventually framed in official Nazi policy, when Julian Streicher, the editor of Der Sturmer and an extreme anti-Semite, who had always argued for it, became chair of the party’s Boycott Committee. Hitler himself would declare that the boycott was necessary and Goebbels, Propaganda Minister, concerned about reports from abroad, issued a formal statement to the foreign press stating that ‘the boycott will be carried out, by the organisations concerned, with a most rigid discipline and without violation of any law. Nobody will be physically endangered by this boycott’. This was a lie. 15 September 1935 saw one of the greatest anti-Semitic laws of Nazi Germany brought to the Statute Book – the Nuremberg Laws for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour. In November the British Cabinet agonised over whether there should be a boycott of the Olympic games over the Jewish persecutions but decided it was better to ‘keep out of it’, again ‘for the sake of the Jews’.4 There was no question of the direction that was being taken; the Jewish people were beginning to see the writing on the wall; not only was there a need to escape Germany but more and more a Jewish Homeland was becoming a necessity.
By March 7 1936 Hitler had moved into the Rhineland defying the Treaty of Versailles. In Palestine, although initially reluctant, the Grand Mufti decided to back the Arab revolt and a General Strike was called in April 1936. The situation was extremely dangerous and the British were searching for military and political solutions. The military response was brutal with arrests, torture and deaths of many Arabs. The Nazis’ activities in Germany resulted in many joining refugees from Russia, Poland and Europe that saw 60,000 Jews immigrating into Palestine that year. They were coming into a very difficult situation. The bloody consequences of the Arab revolt were evident, a British soldier describing the aftermath of an attack on Jews in Tiberius, wrote, ‘They had left behind one of the worst sights I have ever saw in my life. The place is strewn with the bodies of men, women and children. The naked bodies of the women exposed the evidence that the knives had been used in the most ghastly way’. By 9 May of that year Italians had taken control of Ethiopia and the clouds of war hung heavily over the whole of Europe. The British focus was beginning to shift accordingly. In 1937 Britain poured more troops into Palestine and instituted military courts to deal with the violence. In September Wauchope had been worn out without much success and William Battershill took charge on a temporary basis. Meanwhile Hitler was considering his options for war at the Hossbach Conference, where the military reviewed the world and various scenarios that might develop. The Zionists also looked at Hitler and tried to understand his plans so that they themselves might develop a strategy to support Britain and at the same time gain advantages towards the Jewish Homeland. Indeed, the British government also realised that they were essential to them in the fight against the Arab revolt and accepted that they and Zionists were standing together against a common enemy. So began joint enterprises between the British and para-military Jewish forces not only against Arabs but the Agency’s leaders also promised they would attempt to prevent attacks by Etzel against Arab civilians. The Jewish Agency was heavily involved in controlling events and their leaders recognised that this was good preparations for a future army in the Jewish State.
In 1938 Hitler once more flaunted his power and marched into Austria breaking the Versailles Treaty without any interference from the allies. The Jews of Germany and Austria were becoming more alarmed. There was a need to provide a strong support for the Jewish plight which was becoming obvious to anyone who wanted to see. Yet the British government was still in a state of paralysis towards Hitler. Britain also wanted to close the doors to Jewish immigration into Palestine and another Commission led by Sir John Woodhead was still offering partition as a solution as he laid out in great detail the plans.5 A new permanent High Commissioner arrived, Harold MacMichael, a civil servant who had come from his post as Governor of Tanganyika. The concerns of the officials in Jerusalem and Amman about the German situation were now being expressed to London.6 They believed that if there was conflict in Europe the Arabs would do all they could to embarrass the British in Palestine. There was even the suggestion that the Arabs should be given an independent State ‘to keep them friendly’ in the hope that they would not go against Britain in the next war. With the dark storms gathering over Europe and the reign of terror in Palestine, the British did what they always did, when they did not know what else to do in Palestine: they called a conference in London - one that they knew would achieve nothing. Even agreeing who was to be invited was fraught with difficulty, with Britain objecting that five Arab ‘extremists’ should be reconsidered and called on king Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia to intervene to get a better balance of Arab views.7 Ben-Gurion noted that, ‘The Arabs see themselves as victors, and they really have won – first they practice terror and then they are invited to negotiate with the government’, a lesson that would have a bitter outcome in later days. For the Zionists, they asked the government to allow 20,00 adults and 10,000 child refugees to enter Palestine, otherwise they would withdraw, but the government refused to do anything until after the conference discussed immigration, rightly noting that the Zionists would not carry out their threat.8
Whilst the manoeuvring around the conference was raging Prime Minister Chamberlain had much larger concerns and went off to meet Hitler in September 1938. This resulted in the Munich Agreement, in which Chamberlain was completely deceived by Hitler and returned to England to assure the world that there would be ‘peace for our time’, convinced that there would be no war and that Hitler would not make any further moves into other territory. He would be disappointed – on 15 October, German troops occupied the Sudetenland and the Czech government resigned. Germany also began to demonstrate that its anti-Jewish policy was continuing. On 27 October 1938, Reinhard Heydrich, second-in-command of the SS, expelled about 17,000 Jews of Polish origin, including over 2,000 children. The appeasement of Hitler allowed continued assaults on the Jews of Germany and between November 9 and 10 1938, Kristallnacht saw Jewish homes, hospitals, synagogues and schools attacked and destroyed and over 100 Jews killed. Many disappeared and were tortured and murdered in subsequent days. 25,000 Jewish men were taken and sent to Dachau, Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen concentration camps; many of them were tortured and killed by the SS. On January 30, 1939, Hitler made clear threats to the Jews during a Reichstag speech – the world now knew, if it cared, that the Jews were in grave danger and needed a place of safety.
With this horror as a background, the London Conference started on 7 February 1939 and the Cabinet minutes clearly show that they were ready to set proposals and adjust them to any Arab objections, the matter was clearly an attempt to get the Arabs on the side of the British.9 However, the next day the Cabinet was told that there were difficulties with the Arab delegation as they could not agree a unity within their group and no progress had been made with them.10 By 22 February, the reports to the Cabinet11 said that the Jewish delegation ‘had shown themselves ready to make quite considerable concessions’ whilst on the Arab side ‘discussions had been very difficult’. They had made three demands: ‘recognition of an independent Arab Palestine State, complete stoppage of all immigration, complete stoppage of land sales to Jews’, the first being the most important. Neighbouring Arab states present at the talks did not want Britain to leave Palestine for at least twenty years. There was confusion as to whether the demand was for an Arab or Palestinian State; the consensus was the latter. It was remarkable that the discussion on stopping immigration took no regard of the events in Europe and German actions and the mass displacement of Jews. The question of the State was clarified12 and it was agreed that what was being asked was an Arab State with an Arab majority.
This was the Cabinet meeting when the British government killed the Balfour agreement and betrayed the Jewish people. The decisions led to a plan on an independent State that would have an Arab majority. Despite caution that the State should only come into being with an agreed British presence remaining to safeguard the minority Jews, the Cabinet ploughed on with its intentions. Furthermore it was argued that if an independent State was declared with British oversight, experienced had showed that at some point the State would divide from Britain, with or without its agreement. The sentiment was agreed that a, ‘great difference to the Moslem world if we were able to make a public declaration that our ultimate goal was an Independent Palestine State’ and the need to keep the Arabs happy. The feeling was that the Jews were in a weak position and they could be encouraged to believe that they would start as a minority but immigration would make them the majority. This was cynical as at the same time they agreed to restrict immigration to very small numbers. Once more the effect of Nazi aggression was ignored. On 2 March 1939, another Cabinet meeting13 heard that there was a dispute over promises given in 1915 that the Arabs could have an Independent State. The government had to review past statements to argue that this was not so. Sir Maurice Bunsen in July 1915 had confirmed no such commitment was given and McMahon, who had written the original letter, later confirmed explicitly that no such promise was made:
‘12th March, 1922
With reference to our conversation on Friday (10th) I write you these few lines to place on record the fact that in my letter of the 25th October, 1915, to the Sherif of Mecca, it was my intention to exclude Palestine from independent Arabia, and I hoped that I had so worded the letter as to make this sufficiently clear for all practical purposes. My reasons for restricting myself to specific mention of Damascus, Hama, Horns and Aleppo in that connection in my letter were (1) that these were places to which the Arabs attached vital importance, and (2) that there was no place I could think of at the time of sufficient importance for purposes of definition further south of the above. It was as fully my intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the more northern coastal tracts of Syria. I did not make use of the Jordan to define the limits of the southern area because I thought it might possibly be considered desirable at some later stage of negotiations to endeavour to find some more suitable frontier line east of the Jordan and between that river and the Hejaz Railway. At that moment, moreover, any detailed definitions did not seem called for. I may mention that I have no recollection of ever hearing anything from the Sherif of Mecca, by letter or message, to make me suppose that he did not also understand Palestine to be excluded from independent Arabia. I trust that I have made my intention clear.
Sir H. McMahon’14
There had also been a leak from the Conference in Egypt, which had threatened to derail the talks and had caused bombings in Palestine. However, the belief was that the talks would continue and the proposed policy on an independent State should be pursued. By March 8 the Cabinet15 now understood the talks were moving to deadlock and that whilst constitutional items might reach agreement there was still no agreement on immigration. For the first time, explicit mention was made of the plight of Jews in Germany and limits of around 20,000 immigrants per year might be made acceptable to the Arabs for five years but after that they wanted a veto on any further immigration which the Zionists rejected. They themselves were in dispute with one another over the proposals and one member of the Cabinet rightly predicted negative reactions from the Jewish population in the USA as well as violence in Palestine. It was agreed that a White Paper be produced which apparently did not seem to matter what the Conference finally did or did not agree – the British wanted out of Palestine.
On March 15 the final feedback to the Cabinet16 was not positive, whilst the Jewish delegation had moved on, accepting a Palestine State, they had insisted it must be Federal and that they should be allowed to control immigration into those areas. There were also extreme divisions on land transfers which would restrict the places for immigrants to settle. The Arabs of course did not agree. Furthermore because of the lack of progress the Jewish delegation had become ‘embittered’ because the Arabs appeared to be given dominance in the proposals that would mean the realisation of a Jewish Home would be betrayed. Weizmann had given an ominous warning that the British proposals were ‘a betrayal of the Jews, and they would result in worse bloodshed in Palestine than ever before’, the responsibility for this he said rested on British shoulders. For the Arabs it was reported that there had been a lot of agreement but on a few points, despite all the concessions made, they were unhappy and would probably reject the proposals. The intention was therefore to proceed unilaterally with a White Paper if the parties would not agree. Both delegations would eventually reject the proposals of the British.
On the same day the reality of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy became home to roost – Germany took control of Czechoslovakia and this despite concessions the Czech government made to appease Hitler, by banning the Communist Party and suspending all Jewish teachers in ethnic-German majority schools. The invasion had always been Hitler’s plan even whilst talking to Chamberlain who had stated in considering Palestine’s future, ‘If we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs’.17 This was in effect done and on 26 April, when the Cabinet was informed18 that the consideration of sending Jewish immigrants to British Guiana rather than Palestine had been discussed but had ran into difficulties with the colony’s government. It was also told that because of Egyptian pressure the word ‘Federal’ was being dropped from the White Paper, which would be shown to the Egyptians, Saudis and Iraqis first for their approval and then it would be shown to the two sides in Palestine. It was recognised that violence was likely in Palestine and therefore great concern was expressed that the White Paper should be delayed or postponed indefinitely. A decision on the matter was postponed until May and then the Cabinet agreed19 in principle all that had already been discussed with a few more concessions to the Arab lobby in order to keep the surrounding Arab states on board. The Jews were hardly referred to – the matter appeared to be a fait accompli.
The Nazis signed a ‘Pact of Steel’ with Italy on May 22, which had the potential of expanding Hitler’s wish to pursue Jews wherever he could find them. German appointed Reich Protector, Konstantin von Neurath, a German diplomat, issued a long list of anti-Jewish orders in Czechoslovakia on 21 June 1939. They were the same as those in Germany, designed to destroy the economic viability of the Jewish population and confiscate all Jewish property. The continued drumbeats of war were echoing throughout Europe and Polish and Romanian Jews were becoming concerned and making plans to leave their countries. On 19 July, the Cabinet were informed20 that the United Nations Permanent Mandates Committee was unhappy with the proposed White Paper as it broke the mandate the British had been given. This, if followed through, would have been a severe blow to Britain after all its efforts to placate the Arab peoples and it was to be challenged by a reply and also by diplomatic lobbying of the dissenting countries.
The issue of immigration in Palestine was also a problem, with British patrols stopping illegals from Germany, Romania, Hungary and Poland, along with others who had destroyed their papers. These could not be returned to their own countries and a solution was needed urgently as the situation was inflaming Arab opinion that Britain was reneging on its commitments. The idea of concentrating them in ‘camps’ and preventing them entering Palestine was floated and was referred to the government’s Palestine Committee. The full impact of events that were pressing the Jews into such desperation was not considered. The potential for further Nazi aggression against the Jews was seen on 23 August, when the Nazis signed a pact with the Soviets. This sent waves of anxiety across British minds and on 25 August, Britain signed a Mutual Assistance Treaty that guaranteed Poland’s borders. This was a foolish pact as Britain was never fully ready for a full-scale war with Germany. The realisation was that Hitler would invade Poland and so on 31 August, the British fleet was mobilised and civilians were evacuated from London. On 1 September, the Nazis invaded Poland and by 3 September, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand declared war on Germany. This was one of the most serious situations for the Jewish people as Poland would become the major country where Jews would be shipped to from Nazi conquered countries; the Lublin Plan. Indeed, in October, the first Czech Jews were deported to concentration camps in Poland and by 1942, seventy-five percent of Czechoslovakian Jews had been deported. The majority of them would perish.
Despite the events that were happening Britain still proceeded to issue its White Paper on Palestine which appeared on 9 November.21 It was basically all that had been previously discussed and stated on Palestine, ‘It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are shared’. The Zionist ‘Federal’ did not appear and the British intention to rid itself of the mandate and withdraw was made clear:
‘The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. The proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.’
It ended with a, no doubt sincerely meant, pious plea:
‘Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty’s Government, to cooperate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.’
By December the cabinet was told that there was no way any constitutional change could proceed at that time and that land sales and immigration was being dealt with despite criticism from America. The naïve statement that there would be no problem with immigration was unbelievable in the maelstrom that was the Second World War which was displacing masses of people including a great number of Jews fleeing the Nazi tide.
In Palestine the White paper did not go down well with the Jewish community. Etzel was carrying out bombings and attacks against Arab civilians, there were demonstration and protests, often violently put down. A lengthy discussion by the Cabinet on a memorandum from the High Commissioner,22 showed Britain’s difficulties in dealing with Jewish armed groups. They had to consider upsetting the Arabs, inflaming Jewish resistance and hampering the war effort, with a military who wanted heavy handed action and a government who wanted a middle road - it was the latter who won out. The war against Hitler took priority and the military proceeded with caution but still did uncover caches of arms and munitions, often hidden in homes and stations of Jewish police officers.23 Discussions in London, far away from the reality of Palestine, did not deter Ben-Gurion who did not abide with the immigration rules and conducted an ‘immigration rebellion’. Both the needs of the Jewish hopes for Palestine and the European madness, necessitated allowing fleeing Jews into the country. He was adamant in his actions, ‘We will bring thousands of young people from Germany, Austria and other countries and confront the English with the necessity of either shooting the refugees or sending them back’. Indeed the High Commissioner told the Cabinet24 that an agreement to let in 25,000 in the year could not be certain to be adhered to as illegal immigration was adding to the numbers entering. The British also had the issue of land sales to deal with as they wanted them tightly controlled but land was necessary for incoming immigrants and the reality on the ground was that Arabs were still willing to sell land to Jews. When they decided to try and implement a policy on the matter, Weizmann sent an urgent telegram to Churchill, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, and advised him to stop the policy as it would cause difficulties with both Arabs and Jews.25 The Arab revolt was also coming to an end in late 1939 as the contentment with British plans was understood. There was the usual dispute about figures as if that was the most important point of the tragedy that should have been avoided. According to official British figures the army and police killed more than 2,000 Arabs in actions, 108 were hanged, and 961 died in gang and terrorist related activity. Arab sources insisted that 5,032 deaths had occurred, 3,832 who had been killed by the British with 1,200 killed in other acts of terrorism. The figures were horrific, but they would be dwarfed by events under the jackboots of Hitler’s troops. In 1940, the notorious Auschwitz concentration camp was opened – this was the German’s most industrialised killing centre and in Poland the Warsaw ghetto was walled in with 400,000 Jews now contained, the Nazis were now set on a course of extermination of Jews.
The outbreak of war had seen Britain turn Palestine into a giant manufacturing plant for war materials and thus helping the very high unemployment figures reduce. Chamberlain had given the nod to Ben-Gurion that the White Paper would never last and he believed that that was true and therefore he decided to support the British in their war. The Zionists believed that the ending of the war and the realisation of its effect on the Jewish people would result in a Jewish State. Winston Churchill remained a great friend to the Zionist cause and he was on the verge of becoming Prime Minister. The Haganah continued their military training and when arrested were tried and received punitive sentences but these were revoked by Field Marshall Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who thought them ridiculous. Indeed, they were allowed to build up a special elite force, the Palmach, in full cooperation with the British. 134,000 Jews wanted to join the British army with 30,000 finally enlisting. Etzel stopped its campaign of terror and some went to support the British operations overseas. Palestine was bombed from the air in June 1940 and the advance of Hitler seemed to threaten Egypt, which in turn could mean the occupation of Palestine by the Nazis. The action at El Alamein by the British stopped that advance. An Etzel leader, Avraham Stern, refused to accept the decision of the military groups to support the British and in September 1940 formed Lehi (Hebrew acronym for ‘Fighters for the Freedom of Israel’), which was given the nickname the Stern Gang. This group would carry out attacks and conduct a propaganda campaign against the British. Despite this fly in the ointment, in general things were such that Britain was reasonably content with the situation. The Arab revolt had ended, and many thousands of Jews were in the army, cooperating in the fight against the Nazis. However, the gathering of black clouds was beginning over the country and once more terror would stalk its streets and even spread to England itself.