South-East Asia Command: Paper Battles
1945 – 1951
In 1945 and 1946 Park was required to submit two despatches on air operations in South-East Asia during his time in command. He was also required to comment on the despatches written by or for Mountbatten and the army commanders and to accept or reject their comments on his own despatches. Although it made sense to have the commanders commit their stories to paper while they were still fresh in their minds and could be subjected to the scrutiny of their peers and those who were directly involved, old wounds were inevitably opened and some bitter inter-service exchanges provoked before mutually acceptable texts were produced. Park entered vigorously into these exchanges, despite his uncertain health and many personal or family worries in the immediate postwar years.
Park’s first despatch was requested by Air Commodore T.N. McEvoy, Director of Staff Duties at the Air Ministry, ‘to counter-balance the one by General Giffard [C-in-C, 11th Army Group] which was unsatisfactory from the air standpoint.’ Assisted by his historical officer, Wing Commander K.H.R. Collard, Park had by August 1945 drafted a despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from 1 June 1944 to the occupation of Rangoon on 2 May 1945. He had not arrived in South-East Asia until the end of February, but no suggestion is recorded that either Peirse or Garrod, the officers who had preceded him, were to be asked for their views on the early period. Three copies were sent to the Air Ministry in November and on 1 December a ‘brief review’ (fourteen pages) was circulated to thirty-eight addresses within the Air Ministry and to five commands.
The ejection of the Japanese from Burma had been made possible, in Park’s view, by air power – both air supply and direct support of land forces. Air supply depended on good ground organization. Unfortunately, this had not been appreciated by the army authorities, whose attitude had been consistently parsimonious and compared poorly with that of the Americans. They had understood more clearly than British commanders that once air superiority had been achieved, the availability of airfields and transport aircraft governed the maintenance and supply of forces in the fields. The Japanese had failed to appreciate the importance of the air supply organization and had used their fighters only against forward troops. As for direct support, the Hurricane proved very effective. Visual control posts had lent extra flexibility and accuracy to air operations planned with ground forces, but the ‘cab rank’ (standing patrols) system had been wasteful. Given the meagre ground intelligence, regular and detailed photo-reconnaissance had been essential and the effort devoted to the support of guerrillas and clandestine operations had been justified.
On 29 March 1946, the War Office, having obtained a comment on Park’s despatch from Giffard and Leese, submitted a critique to the Air Ministry. Throughout the despatch, it said, there was a tendency to attribute the basic success of the Burma campaign to air superiority. However, in the army’s view the turning-point had been the defeat of the Japanese at Imphal by the Fourteenth Army. In order to conduct operations after Imphal, Leese had been convinced that he had to remain at Barrackpore (Calcutta), in close touch with Stratemeyer of Eastern Air Command. Both Leese and Giffard believed that Mountbatten had been wrong to take Park to Kandy instead of coming to Calcutta with Leese.
The value of air supply was appreciated, continued the War Office, and it therefore regretted that Park should set out for posterity ‘a series of small faults on the Army side of air supply.’ There was much to learn in dealing with a problem never previously visualized, let alone tackled. The comparison with the Americans was unfair because they worked from bases established months before and lavishly equipped; the British had had to make do from hastily built bases stocked as best as possible. Numerous changes to Park’s text were suggested, four of which had particular substance. One, that the prime cause of Japan’s defeat in Burma had been the victory of the British infantry; air supply and support had not been, in the army’s opinion, the prime cause. Eventually and reluctantly, Park accepted this. Two, although Park had said, justly, that without air supply the campaign could not have been successful, it was equally true that without ‘horrific efforts’ by the army to provide airfields, fuel and bomb dumps, air supply could never have been exploited. Park accepted that point more willingly. Three, he had given the impression that the construction of the Ledo Road (the line of communication for Stilwell’s Chinese-American forces) had been an army decision. The War Office insisted that it had been a political decision, made before the value of air supply had been proved. Although the road had been begun by the British, American engineers had continued and completed it and it had been entirely under American control. Park accepted that correction without reserve. And four, although ‘cab rank’ may have been uneconomical from the RAF’s viewpoint, it had been quicker and more effective from the army’s. Park recognized the argument, though he disagreed with it.
The War Office critique was sent to Park who replied to McEvoy from his sickbed in Singapore on 23 April: ‘for the sake of pleasing the War Office I have agreed to eleven of the twenty-one suggested amendments,’ he wrote; he would not agree to the others because ‘they concern matters of principle which I am not altogether surprised that General Leese does not agree with.’ The air had been subjected to more interference from the higher army command in Burma than elsewhere, he continued, even though it had played a more vital part there than in any other campaign of the entire war. That had been Leese’s doing. Leese had insisted on keeping his headquarters at Calcutta against the express wish of Mountbatten and the other Cs-in-C; he had not been satisfied to state what he needed from air support but had interfered frequently in the method of executing air operations; he had tried to lay down a rate of effort for squadrons even though he was ignorant of the practicalities involved; he had once issued a strategic bombing directive without reference to Park despite the existence of an inter-service bombing target committee; he had ordered the withdrawal of a tactical group from Burma to India on his own initiative; and he had complained direct to the War Office that his operations were being hampered by shortage of air supply – a view not shared by other army commanders. After the capture of Rangoon, Park reminded McEvoy, Leese had been dismissed because of his failure to cooperate with the air, the navy or GHQ India.
By judicious rewording, McEvoy gradually whittled down the points on which Park refused to budge until he reached a stage where he suggested that Tedder himself might press Park to compromise. On reflection, however, he admitted that Park was concerned to protect the RAF from unfair blame and there was no good reason why his differences with Leese should not be officially recorded. He minuted G.S. Whittuck, a senior Air Ministry official, in November 1946 to say that the RAF was not bound to accept all proposed amendments to its despatches. ‘I think Park has gone far enough in the emasculation of his despatch to cover up General Leese’s many offences against the Royal Air Force . . . and I think we ought to inform the War Office that we cannot ask him to go further.’ But Whittuck (a civil servant who had to deal frequently with his opposite numbers in the War Office) persuaded McEvoy to ask Park to give way yet again and Park – by now weary of the whole affair and preparing for an important mission in Argentina – did so.1
Park’s second despatch, on air operations in South-East Asia from 3 May to 12 September 1945, suffered similar emasculation. He completed it in August 1946 and copies were circulated early in November. As in his first despatch, Park stressed the importance of air supply, not only during hostilities but after the Japanese surrender, when enemy-held territories had to be reoccupied and the relief and liberation of ex-prisoners begun. He dealt in detail with casualty evacuation, operations with clandestine forces, the excellent work of the RAF Regiment in guarding airfields, the need for greater squadron mobility, differences of opinion with the army and – not least – the effect of Tiger Force, Britain’s proposed contribution to the Pacific War, on ACSEA.
The War Office submitted its critique to the Air Ministry in March 1947, noting ‘with some surprise the paucity of references in this despatch to the part played by the ground forces and the fact that many of such references are of a disparaging kind.’ It asked for the deletion of a comment that army demands were considered excessive by Mountbatten and his naval and air commanders: the comment was ‘unnecessary in an Air Despatch whether true or not.’ Similarly, Park’s reference to ‘the strong disinclination of the Army to accept responsibility for breakdowns in air supply’ should be cut. ‘Whether true or not, this statement is thought to be unnecessary.’ The War Office also wanted Park to cut: ‘Army for army, the Japanese could no doubt have held their own’ and ‘Our army advanced on the wings of our air force in Burma.’ The despatch was written in ‘a rather journalistic style’ it complained, and verbatim extracts from signals sent ‘in the heat of battle’ ought to be omitted – those which mentioned ‘little swine’, ‘dead bodies’ and ‘stink’. Despatches, so the War Office believed, should be tastefully composed and non-controversial.
Slim defended the army’s insistence on an amphibious landing in southern Burma to support the advance on Rangoon from the north. The operation had necessarily been planned weeks before, he said, when it had been thought that the Japanese might make a suicide stand in the city. Slim had also wanted to split the defending forces and it would have been wrong, in his view, to risk a failure merely because subsequent operations might have had to be delayed. It was true, as Park complained, that airfields had not been prepared quickly by army engineers, but Slim had simply not had enough engineers for all the tasks required of them. Roads, railways and bridges competed with airfields for labour. Park’s claim that air forces had isolated the Japanese Army in Burma was also true, but only in regard to sea transport from the end of 1943; the Siam Railway had continued to move Japanese troops throughout 1944 and while Allied air action had made troop movements into and about Burma difficult, it had never stopped them altogether.
McEvoy sent Park copies of the comments made on his despatch, emphasizing his belief that although the Air Ministry should do its best to meet objections, for the sake of inter-service harmony, it should stand firm on matters of principle and that the original despatch must be kept whatever changes were made in the version to be published. Park replied that he had, in fact, paid high tribute to the army in this despatch and therefore took the strongest exception to the War Office’s reference to ‘disparaging’ remarks. When dealing with air supply, he had mentioned only one or two of the numerous difficulties he had experienced in dealing with the supply branch at Leese’s headquarters. As for the ‘paucity of references’ to the ground forces, he was dealing with the period after the fall of Rangoon when there had been no major land operations in Burma.
In answer to Slim, Park pointed out that the army had not given airfield construction nearly as high a priority as was customary between 1942 and 1944 in the Mediterranean theatre. The air forces had proved effective in isolating Burma from adequate supplies and reinforcements from Siam and Japan. In his efforts not to overstress the part played by the air forces, Slim had publicly thanked his Quartermaster Major-General in June 1945 for the success of the air supply and transport system in Burma. That incident, said Park, was typical of the deprecatory attitude of the army’s high command in SEAC. On the other hand, from corps headquarters down, the army had been outspoken in its praise of air force efforts in Burma. As for the distasteful remarks, they all came from army signals, but Park agreed to cut them if it would please the War Office.
More seriously, he emphasized the fact that great quantities of stores and supplies stockpiled in many places in Burma had either simply been left behind or again airlifted forward as a direct result of inflexible army planning. Park had written that the unexpected collapse of Japan had led to a most confused military situation in several countries. The War Office bridled at the word ‘confused’, but such was the situation, Park repeated, and no reflection whatever on the army, ‘which seems to be super-sensitive to any remarks except of open praise.’ The War Office wanted to cut his comment that the award of the humble Defence Medal (intended for those who completed at least three years’ wartime service in the United Kingdom) was both inappropriate and inadequate for those who had served in India and Ceylon. It was true, Park said, that most of them had been far from the firing line, but they had endured prolonged separation from families and friends in conditions of acute physical discomfort. The War Office admitted that his reference was accurate – but it was also ‘controversial’. Park replied that his words recorded the disappointment of a majority of RAF personnel in those countries, a disappointment that had contributed to the subsequent unrest. Finally, the War Office objected to Park’s description of narrow roads choked for miles with slow-moving army transport. As usual, the accuracy of his point was not disputed; it was the fact of ‘unnecessary general criticism’ to which the War Office objected. But he regarded his criticisms as containing lessons for the future and refused to withdraw them.
McEvoy was much exercised during June 1947 in discussions with a host of Air Ministry officials as to how far Park could, or should, be pressed to accept War Office amendments. Mountbatten’s opinion would have to prevail in some cases; in other cases, rewriting might disguise the differences. Whittuck replied to the War Office’s critique, summarizing Park’s argu-ments and pointing out that he had accepted as many as fifty-four of the suggested amendments and seven more with only slight changes; he was unable to accept the remaining fourteen. The War Office replied on 15 August, expressing appreciation of Park’s willingness to permit so many changes to his text.2
The War Office sent a despatch by Leese to the Air Ministry for comment in February 1947. Park was among those invited to read it and in May sent McEvoy nine pages of comment. He was by then retired and had no need to concern himself this closely with Leese’s despatch. Neither Vincent nor Bandon, still serving and both longer in the East than Park, took it so seriously when it was referred to them. Moreover, Park had been deeply involved in Argentina during recent months in work that was important, taxing and unfamiliar.
Like other commentators, Park noticed that although Leese praised the air supply squadrons he rarely mentioned the work of close support squadrons in his many long accounts of land battles. Even air supply was relegated to the administrative section of his despatch. He actually placed air transport second to mule transport as a means of obtaining mobility for his troops in Burma, even though he admitted that about ninety per cent of all the army’s supplies were carried by air into Burma.
Leese’s claim that a joint decision had been made to carry out a seaborne assault on Rangoon was not true, wrote Park: the decision had been made by Leese alone, without consulting the air, the navy or even Mountbatten. That high-handed action was the more surprising because Leese had shortly before declared that he did not consider such an assault necessary and so Park and the navy commander had made their plans accordingly. Leese had expected that supplies brought in by sea would adequately supplement those airlifted, and that was why more than half the transport squadrons had been withdrawn in June and sent to rest and refit prior to moving to China. No one expected it to take so long to restore Rangoon port to full working order, nor had Mountbatten and Park expected that the army would retain such large forces there. Those were the reasons, said Park, why the air had been unable to meet army demands in June 1945.
Park had provided the Air Ministry with a great deal of ammunition wrote McEvoy, though his comments had been ‘slightly toned down for the sake of inter-service harmony.’ There was general agreement with Park’s view that Mountbatten should not have permitted Leese to establish his headquarters in Calcutta, leaving only a liaison staff in Kandy, because thereafter the whole chain of command in SEAC was distorted. That was the root cause of most troubles. Whittuck sent to the War Office in August 1947 a list of forty points for amendment in Leese’s despatch. Six months passed before a reply came but, when it did, Leese had agreed ‘to the most important’ of the amendments suggested.3
Mountbatten’s despatch was made to run a fierce gauntlet. The buffeting began in February 1946 when Mr J.C. Nerney, of the Air Ministry’s historical branch, arrived in Singapore for a conference with ACSEA’s historical officers. He told Park how keen he was to see adequate recognition given to the air forces’ work in the East and Park agreed to support him. Nerney later met Mountbatten, who said he felt strongly that, in the first draft of his despatch, ‘the air action is not accorded the prominence which the campaign justified.’ Nerney had therefore arranged for the officer preparing the despatch to establish and maintain liaison with Park’s historical section.
In June 1946 Stanley Vincent, formerly head of 221 Group, commented that little credit was given in Mountbatten’s draft to the work of his old group. The Japanese left Imphal, he said, not because they were beaten by a superior army but because they were short of ammunition, medical supplies and food as a result of ceaseless air attacks. From Imphal to Rangoon, scarcely a single Japanese position had been captured by the army before it was flattened by aircraft. The field commanders knew this and were suitably grateful; they also appreciated regular reconnaissance and rapid casualty evacuation. The Earl of Bandon made the same points in respect of his old group (224) and its relations with 15 Corps: they had been with them all the way, but their efforts were barely mentioned. Other senior commanders confirmed by their detailed criticism the misgivings which Mountbatten himself had expressed.
George Pirie, Park’s former deputy and his successor in Singapore, was appalled at the lack of appreciation shown for the RAF’s work after VJ Day. In Hong Kong, the RAF had played a major part in restoring public services. Air operations in the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere should also be considered. Not least, Mountbatten’s despatch should appreciate the grave situation caused by the abrupt end of Lend-Lease. Many American aircraft had been grounded through lack of spares and this had seriously affected airlift operations. The failure to discuss the operations which had been mounted to find, release, succour and transport ex-prisoners particularly distressed Pirie because those operations, in Park’s words, were among ‘the greatest mercy missions of the war’. The difficulties resulting from the enormous distances between India and the liberated territories were ignored; by March 1946, equipment shortages and delays in moving supplies forward from India were so acute that morale as well as efficiency suffered.
Almost a year later, in September 1947, Mountbatten sent Vincent a copy of the second version of his despatch, rewritten from start to finish ‘in conformity with my own personal ideas and wishes’. The result did not impress Vincent, who thought it lacked the breadth and balanced view which one expected from a Supreme Commander. The Air Ministry agreed. There was no summary of the overall effects of air superiority, wrote Group Captain F.G. Brockman, and since Mountbatten had been offered ample information on that subject, it must be taken that the omission was deliberate. The omission of tributes to forces or their commanders, remarked Brockman, contrasted sharply with Mountbatten’s frequent references to himself.
Despite Air Ministry protests, Mountbatten refused to accept amendments, but in April 1949 he personally composed a tribute to the RAF, one that was as brief as possible. Throughout 1945, he wrote, it was ‘under the bold leadership of ACM Park’. Some other names were also mentioned – again, as briefly as possible. He insisted that his despatch be published before all others, but it was not ready for publication until February 1951. Only then, in the following April, could six other despatches appear, all of which had been gathering dust for years: two by Giffard, the two by Park and one each by Peirse and Leese.4