A ‘Possible but Unlikely Evacuation’: Dunkirk
1940
For almost two years, Park had helped to prepare an air defence for Britain, but his first test as an operational commander had nothing to do with that defence. On 10 May 1940, three weeks after his arrival at the Uxbridge headquarters of 11 Group, the Germans launched an invasion of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Within two more weeks, Park found himself improvising protection for Allied armies besieged in and around Dunkirk and trying to cover their retreat to England.
During the first eight months of the war, one of Dowding’s major headaches, fully shared with Park, had been the despatch of home defence fighters to France to help resist just such an invasion. Dowding and Park were concerned about supply as well as policy because the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires was no more than two of each per day at the end of 1939, and over the first four months of 1940 output averaged only six fighters per day. However, as long as France, Belgium and the Netherlands remained unconquered, England lay beyond the range of the MesserSchmitt Bf 109 and Park agreed with Dowding that unescorted bomber raids could be defeated. But neither had any illusions concerning the losses which Fighter Command would suffer if German fighters were based on the coasts closest to England.
Six British fighter squadrons were already in France on 10 May and within a few days of the invasion Dowding had lost the equivalent of six more squadrons from home defence; another four squadrons were fighting over France each day and returning, if they could, to English bases each evening. the pressure for still more assistance, wrote Dowding, was ‘relentless and inexorable’ and on 15 May he obtained permission to appear before the War Cabinet and ask for it to be checked. Later that day, he wrote to Park:
We had a notable victory on the ‘Home Front’ this morning and the orders to send more Hurricanes were cancelled. Appeals for help will doubtless be renewed, however, with increasing insistence and I do not know how this morning’s work will stand the test of time; but I will never relax my efforts to prevent the dissipation of the Home fighter forces.
Dowding’s suspicion that the impact of his appeal would not last proved well founded. Park asked him on the 17th if in future whole squadrons could be sent abroad. This, he said, would avoid the present situation whereby fourteen flights of different squadrons were operating as composite squadrons at home and overseas under leaders who knew only half the pilots and airmen they commanded. Although Dowding sympathized, the crisis was so grave that he could do little. This fragmentation of squadrons made Park’s task harder during the desperate days that followed.
A meeting at the War Office on 19 May discussed the problem of the ‘possible but unlikely evacuation of a very large force in hazardous circumstances’ through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Unlikely as the need may have seemed then, plans were made to effect a withdrawal, which was just as well because they were implemented as soon as formulated. Sholto Douglas minuted Newall that day on the difficulties of covering an embarkation. It had already been seen, he wrote, what comparatively few German bombers could do in daylight to render a base practically untenable. But the moon was rising and would soon be full: weather conditions throughout the twenty-four hours would be such that bombers could easily recognize a port of embarkation.
Dunkirk was farther from English bases than Calais or Boulogne and therefore more difficult to cover by short-range fighters, but when those ports fell on 25 and 26 May, Dunkirk became the only hope of escape. Already hampered by the fragmentation of his squadrons, Park’s difficult task was now made even harder.
On 23 May, he had learned of a new hazard to British fighters: British destroyers. They were firing indiscriminately at all aircraft and the Admiralty informed Dowding that ‘our destroyers fire at any aircraft that comes within range whether they make our recognition signals or not.’ Park was distressed by this disregard for measures of cooperation worked out with the Admiralty over the past year, but worse followed. He received three Admiralty messages via Dowding during the evening of the 23rd complaining that fighter defences over Boulogne were inadequate – this after two fighters had been shot down and two damaged by Royal Navy ships earlier in the day. British bombers were also prevented from attacking German land targets by fire from British destroyers.
By 26 May the Allied armies had disintegrated or fallen back so rapidly in the face of a powerful German advance that Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay, Flag Officer Commanding Dover, was ordered to implement Operation Dynamo ‘with a view to lifting up to 45,000 of the BEF [British Expeditionary Force] within two days, at the end of which it was probable that evacuation would be terminated by enemy action.’ Ramsay was in charge of the embarkation of troops and Park had tactical control of the fighter cover. Coordination between fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft was handled at Hawkinge, conveniently close to Ramsay’s base at Dover and with good communications to Park’s headquarters at Uxbridge.
Park explained to his controllers and staff officers on 26 May the system he intended to use. Both flying and ground personnel would be given short periods of heavy duty, he said, followed by long release in surroundings of reasonable comfort. The available force would be divided into two parts, to work mornings and afternoons, proceeding direct from their permanent bases on their first patrol and landing at a forward aerodrome to re-arm, refuel and have lunch or tea. They would, if possible, return to their permanent base after their second patrol and unless the crisis was very great they would then be released for the day.
For his efforts to protect the embarkation, Park was assigned sixteen squadrons (some 200 aircraft, including – for the first time in operations over Europe – Spitfires) out of Dowding’s home defence force, now whittled down to thirty-six squadrons. The remaining twenty were used as a reserve to keep up the strength of Park’s force and to protect vital targets in the Midlands and the North and also coastal shipping and the fleet. Although only three fighter squadrons were never engaged over Dunkirk, Park was short of men and machines for the task on hand. The area to be protected lay at least fifty miles from his nearest bases; fighters operating outside their planned defensive system could receive no help from radar and were obliged to rely on wasteful, exhausting standing patrols; and the limited fuel capacity of his aircraft permitted only forty minutes at most on the actual patrol lines. Even when resistance in Calais and Boulogne ended, Park was unable to cover Dunkirk properly because the area defended by the Allied troops had a perimeter extending for ten miles and the shipping employed in the rescue operation was liable to attack anywhere on the Channel crossing.
Consequently, although his fighters were present on patrol lines throughout 27 May (the first full day of withdrawal), they were heavily outnumbered. They could not prevent the Luftwaffe from reducing the town of Dunkirk to rubble, but they prevented its concentration on the targets that mattered most: the harbour moles and ships. Despite the damage done, the port never became untenable. At 2 a.m. on the 28th, Newall informed Dowding that that day was ‘likely to be the most critical ever experienced by the British Army.’ An hour later, he ordered him to ensure the protection of Dunkirk and its beaches from first light until darkness by continuous fighter patrols in strength. It proved impossible to obey this order, however, because the twin demands of continuity and strength could not both be met. Experience had already shown that weak patrols were ineffective and neither the aircraft nor the pilots were available for constant patrols, as long as Dowding conserved men and machines to counter the even graver danger of an invasion of England.
It was only after urgent and repeated requests that Park secured Dowding’s permission to employ squadrons two at a time and abandon attempts at continuous coverage. Unlike many senior officers, Park had kept in flying practice and was therefore able to pilot his own Hurricane over Dunkirk. His observations, and conversations with his pilots, convinced him that stronger patrols, even at longer intervals, would prove more useful. Aircraft losses were reduced, there were more successful combats and bomber formations were broken up, thus reducing the effect of their attacks.
From 28 May, Park was allowed to use his squadrons as he thought fit. He employed as many as four at a time on the 29th, even though this meant leaving longer intervals between patrols. Three out of five large raids in the afternoon were intercepted, but the other two caused serious damage. Estimates of the victories achieved by these large formations were, however, exaggerated and it may be that pairs of squadrons would have done as well and also permitted more frequent patrols. Attempts to synchronize the presence of fighters and the movement of ships failed.
Richard Peirse, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, found time to write to Dowding on 30 May. Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air, had asked Balfour, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, to visit some fighter stations on the 29th and would like to hear how Dowding intended to mitigate the conditions of fatigue which Balfour had observed. Dowding replied as politely as he could. Most of Balfour’s criticisms, he said, covered matters which were the subject of anxious discussion between Park and himself. They arose from the need to fight a battle over Dunkirk while at the same time maintaining other units in readiness to meet a possible attack on England. He had already arranged with Park to take advantage of a lull in the air fighting to let the most heavily engaged units take some leave. He also wanted to get the scattered squadrons back to their home bases as soon as possible. There the matter rested, but it illustrates the gulf between Dowding and Park on the one hand, and Sinclair and Balfour on the other, a gulf that widened as the year advanced.
Rain and low cloud hindered all aircraft on 30 May, but during the next two days Allied troops were heavily bombed. These attacks, as well as German command of the Dunkirk roads by shore-based gunfire, obliged the British to suspend daylight evacuation on 2 June. From then until the operation ended on the morning of the 4th, evacuation was restricted to dawn and dusk each day and Park was able to concentrate his forces much more effectively during those periods. The last Hurricane to fly over Dunkirk was Park’s. The extreme danger now facing Britain did not alarm him: he felt, in fact, strangely exhilarated, as did so many Britons at that time. The Germans, he thought, must soon attempt an invasion somewhere in south-east England, and the defensive system which he had worked so hard to help perfect in theory would now be his to direct in practice. Below him was an empty sea and German-held beaches. The British Expeditionary Force had left behind 68,000 men (40,000 of them taken prisoner) and over 200 ships of all sizes had been sunk. But 340,000 Allied troops had been rescued, a figure to compare with ‘up to 45,000’ hoped for when the operation had begun.1
Without the courage of numerous seamen, amateur as well as professional, who crossed the Channel time and time again in over a thousand vessels to carry soldiers to safety, there could have been no ‘miracle’ at Dunkirk. The courage of many soldiers ashore, especially units of the French First Army holding the perimeter’s bridgehead, was equally vital. So, too, was the fact that the German advance was halted for three days, partly to allow recovery from the effects on men and machines of heavy fighting, partly to preserve precious tanks for the next phase of the battle against France and partly because Hitler was persuaded by Göring to entrust the major assault to the Luftwaffe. Its attack was as much an improvisation as the RAF’s defence: close-support units were disordered by days of headlong advance and both air and ground crews were exhausted. Moreover, the Luftwaffe’s medium bombers were now operating at extreme range from their German bases. Many of them were withdrawn from the assault to prepare for the next stage of the French campaign even before the evacuation ended. The generally cloudy weather on most of the nine days of the evacuation, together with the huge pillars of smoke rising from burning oil tanks and warehouses in Dunkirk, also hindered the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, essential to the operation’s success was the part played by Park’s fighter pilots, assisted by the crews of Bomber and Coastal Commands, in denying the Luftwaffe supremacy over the target.
Sadly, the RAF’s efforts were much criticized at the time. Vice-Admiral Ramsay submitted a report to the Admiralty as early as 18 June, exactly two weeks after the operation was concluded.
Rightly or wrongly [he wrote] full air protection was expected, but instead for hours on end the ships off shore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs and machine-gun bullets. ... In their reports the COs of many ships, while giving credit to the RAF personnel for gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships, at the same time express their sense of disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air protection during the height of this operation.
Ramsay had nothing to say about British destroyers firing on British aircraft nor, in his haste to report to the Admiralty, did he have time to contact Dowding or Park to see if he was presenting the facts fairly. Many combats had taken place out of sight of soldiers and seamen who could hardly be expected to appreciate the fact that, although they were still being bombed, the attack was less heavy than it would otherwise have been. His hasty strictures coloured Admiralty opinion about the RAF’s powers and determination throughout the war and played a part in some tense situations encountered by Park in Malta and Egypt.
The Admiralty published Ramsay’s report in July 1947. Ramsay was dead by then and the Admiralty, although admitting that some parts of his report were ‘necessarily distorted’, refused to correct them on the grounds that they represented naval feeling at the time, ‘when many of the true facts about the general RAF operations were not known to the Flag Officer, Dover.’
More than a quarter of Britain’s fighter force had been lost over France even before the evacuation began. When it ended, Dowding had only 331 Spitfires and Hurricanes available for operations and all his squadrons were disorganized. One hundred and six fighters were lost over Dunkirk and 80 pilots, in exchange for perhaps 130 enemy aircraft. During the whole French campaign, 453 fighters were destroyed or abandoned and 435 pilots, many of them experienced regulars or men trained in peacetime, failed to return. Although Luftwaffe casualties were heavier, the German recovery was helped by the release of 400 aircrew prisoners after France surrendered towards the end of June 1940.
Park himself came out of the disaster of the retreat from France with his reputation enhanced. His readiness to visit the scenes of fighting and the aerodromes in Kent from which his men flew attracted favourable notice throughout Fighter Command and he was quick to congratulate ground crews as well as pilots on their efforts. Many of his pilots had little experience in handling high-speed monoplanes, let alone in using them effectively as weapons of war. All of them, whether they admitted it or not, had been alarmed by the odds they faced in the air and upset by the bitter criticism received on the ground from seamen and soldiers. Park expressed, loudly and clearly, complete confidence in them. He had shown that he was able to keep his fighters efficiently employed, improvising at short notice a constant shuttle of patrols. He had acted quickly, sensibly and calmly in a situation for which there were no precedents. It was at this time that he formulated a basic principle for the conduct of the Battle of Britain: that it was better to spoil the aim of many German aircraft than to shoot down a few of them.2
The Dunkirk evacuation did not end Fighter Command’s commitment across the Channel. Air Marshal Arthur Barrati, head of the British air forces in France, advised the Air Ministry on 4 June that France was rallying and that German losses were perhaps greater than had been supposed. It was essential, he thought, that a great many fighters be sent to France as soon as possible. Barratt enclosed with his letter one signed on 3 June by General Vuillemin, commander of the French air forces. Vuillemin went farther even than Barratt in his appeal for help: he wanted the support of at least half the fighters presently based in England. Churchill signalled Reynaud, the French Prime Minister, on 5 June: ‘You don’t seem to understand at all that British fighter aviation has been worn to a shred and frightfully mixed up [by the demands of Dunkirk].’ Nevertheless, he still had hopes of using British fighters to help the French to rally. As late as 8 June he informed Reynaud that ‘We are giving you all the support we can in this great battle short of ruining the capacity of this country to continue the war.’ On the 12th, however, Douglas told Barrati that the game was practically up and that he must prepare to withdraw.
Park’s offensive spirit and self-confidence were unimpaired by the disasters in Europe. On 20 June, for example, he asked Dowding for permission to modify some Hurricanes to carry small bombs and to use them and Blenheims in night raids on enemy aerodromes. Permission was refused. On the 30th he wrote to Brooke-Popham, who was acting as chairman of a committee collecting information of tactical value arising out of the recent air fighting. When Brooke-Popham could spare the time to visit Uxbridge, Park promised to explain ‘the system I evolved for operating a large number of fighter squadrons over France, and at the same time protecting the south of England. . . . These two roles were not easy to reconcile, but we managed the task.’
On 22 July he submitted to Dowding a report on operations over France between 10 May and 4 June. A copy was sent to the Air Ministry, but Dowding added a chilling disclaimer: ‘The report is of interest, although I cannot endorse all the opinions expressed.’ Surprised and annoyed, Park asked for details of his criticisms. Douglas Evill, now Dowding’s Senior Air Staff Officer, replied that Dowding did not wish to correspond with Park on this subject, but would be glad to discuss it some time at Bentley Priory. More urgent concerns prevented such a discussion and Park never learned what Dowding thought was wrong with his report.
The report covered one problem which pressed harder during the Battle of Britain: the problem of radio frequencies. It was impossible to group all Park’s squadrons on a common frequency and there was rarely time to change incoming squadrons over to the frequency of their new sector. Trouble was caused when squadrons on different frequencies had to work together because R/T control was impossible. Park urged that R/T silence be maintained by all pilots except for important information and that R/T communication from the ground also be kept to a minimum, both to prevent the enemy from overhearing and to avoid blocking essential communication between aircraft in the air. Devoted efforts by unsung technicians throughout the summer of 1940 eased these problems and went far towards ensuring that the experience so dearly bought over Dunkirk was later used to thwart an invasion of England.3