accountability: and bipolar thought, 149–50, 257n3; and claims, 104; and consequentialism, 22, 87–88; and (directed) obligations, 13, 238n21; and divine command theories, 80–81; and equal standing, 22, 106; and fairness, 248n16; and individualism, 134; and individualist restriction, 226; and modern morality, 67, 69, 75–86; and moral right and wrong, 71–72, 75–86; and normativity, 14; and objective versus participant attitudes, 69–70; and obligation, 238n21; and public policy, 229; and relational morality, 12–14, 16, 22–23, 66–67, 86–95, 98–99, 103–4, 115, 149–50; and rescue from rocks example, 215; and rights, 197; and social life, 71, 75–76, 80, 81–82; and standards of right and wrong, 66; and subjective facts, 128–29, 132–33; and suffering, 238n20; and utilitarianism, 86–87. See also claims; expectations or demands; foreseeability; reactive attitudes and emotions
Adams, Robert Merrihew, 149n26, 250n27, 252n51
affection, 65. See also families; friends
After Virtue (MacIntyre), 240n37
agent-neutrality, 38, 39, 51, 52, 135, 242n25, 243n27, 245n51, 268n26
agent-relativity: agent-centeredness versus, 242n25; and antecedent interactions, 106–7, 135–36; and deliberation, 38, 51–52, 136; and (directed) obligations, 17–18, 135–45; and first-order moral issues, 38; and morality as ideal, 135–45; overview, 51; and relational morality, 53, 137–38; and universality, 135; and utilitarianism, 39, 243n27; and virtue theory, 45–46; and voluntarism, 42
aggregation (numbers): and beneficence, 268n31; and circumstances, 232–33; and contractualism, 273n60; and deontological constraints, 262n38; and ex ante considerations, 272n51; and extramoral concerns, 221–33; and first-order moral issues, 215–19; and happiness/suffering, 269n33; and harm, 272n60; and individualist restriction, 186–88; and mutual aid, 268nn28,29; and noncomparative interests, 213–14, 273n72; and presumptive constraints, 230–33; and public officials’ decisions, 274nn74,76; and relational morality, 19, 20, 191–92, 210, 221, 262n38. See also rescue from rocks example; trolley examples
allocation of resources, 192, 227, 228, 274
Alonso, Facundo M., 256n42
amends, 92–94. See also apologies; forgiveness; moral repair
anger, 70–71, 74, 112–13, 248n17. See also reactive attitudes and emotions
Anger and Forgiveness (Nussbaum), 248n17
animals, nonrational, 101–2, 120–21, 258n8. See also nonhumans
Anscombe, G.E.M., 24–25, 31, 38, 41, 47, 240n37, 242n26, 243n33, 244n44, 266n9. See also divine command theories
antecedent interactions: and agent-relativity, 106–7, 135–36; and (directed) obligations, 16, 136, 194, 195–96; and foreseeability, 194; and gratitude, 118, 135–36, 193; and interests and claims, 162–63; and moral wrongs, 258n11; and mutual aid, 209; and personal relationships, 16, 17, 18, 110–11, 125, 253n9; and promissory obligation, 107, 109–10, 114–15; and universality, 111. See also joint commitment; personal relationships
apologies, 13, 89–90, 90–91, 92, 94, 250n39, 261nn34,37
“Are There Any Natural Rights?” (Hart), 236n13, 237n16, 254n11, 258n10, 260n26, 265n6
Aristotelian approaches, 46, 120, 122, 236n8, 242n17, 243n33, 244n44, 254n24
aspirations, 164
assurance interests, 108, 161–62, 165, 169, 175, 181–82, 263n57. See also fidelity
attitudes of agents, 10–11, 78. See also disregard or indifference; intentions; subjective (psychological) facts
“authoritative motivation,” 253n57
authority, 14–15, 31, 33–34, 238n22, 244n39. See also divine command theories; law and legislative authorities; public officials’ decisions; social command theories
autonomy, 8, 161–62, 165, 168–69
aviation disaster example, 171, 173
avoidance and withdrawal, 71, 74, 102–3, 113, 129, 195
backsliding, 242n16
basics needs, 164
Being Realistic about Reasons (Scanlon), 251n42
beneficence, 25, 206, 207, 268n31, 270n44, 273n62. See also charity; gratitude; mutual aid
Berker, Selim, 239n25
biological humans, 3, 150–51. See also species nature
bipolar thought: and accountability, 149–50, 257n3; and animals, 258n8; and convergence of understanding, 257n2; and manifold of moral persons, 119, 120–22, 147, 148–56, 159, 246n61, 255n35, 258n5; and nonhumans, 152; and relational morality, 18, 146–47, 259n16; and universality, 120, 150; and virtues, 254n24. See also deliberation (moral reasoning)
blame: and aggregation, 231; characterized, 70; communicative, 83; and convergence of understanding, 251n47; and criminal law, 99; and (directed) obligations, 71, 84, 253n65; and disregard, 66, 79, 82–83, 84, 94, 249n25; as enforcement, 199; and epistemic conditions, 252n53; and equal standing, 87–88; and expectations or demands, 66, 70–71, 73, 74–75, 248nn9,10; and forgiveness, 90–91; and group norms, 12; impersonal, 100; and individualism, 75–76, 77–79, 132–33; and intentions, 102–3; and interpersonal recognition, 94–95; juridical account of, 253n65; and moral injury, 84, 88–89; and moral right and wrong, 72, 73–74; nonreactive, 102–3, 129; Parfit on, 237n20; reasonable, 73–74; and reasons, 238n23, 249n25; and relational morality, 13, 15, 83, 95–104, 252n53; and rule consequentialism, 249n25; self-, 101; and social command theories, 96, 244n36; and social life, 129; and subjective facts, 128–29; and third parties, 253n57; and utilitarianism, 77–78, 249n21; vicarious, 151, 258n4; and virtues, 79, 249nn2,25. See also accountability; reactive attitudes and emotions; resentment and other forms of blame
Blame (Coates and Tognazzini), 247n8
bodily integrity/trespass, 168–69, 267n14
British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing (Hurka), 260nn27,28, 261nn35, 36
buck-passing theory, 56, 245n57
“‘But It Would Be Wrong’” (Darwall), 246n57
“Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?” (Parfit), 269n31
Case Four (Parfit), 224–25, 228–29, 232, 274nn72,74
Case One (Scanlon), 273nn62,63
Case Seven (Parfit), 225, 274n72. See also public officials’ decisions
catching a flight example, 219
Chaplin, Rosalind, 251n41
charity, 80. See also beneficence; gratitude; mutual aid
child killed by drunk driver example, 196
children and infants, 77, 101–2, 120–21, 150–51, 152, 158, 193–94, 265n2. See also families
circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies): and aggregation, 232–33; and blame, 73–74; and claim duties, 173–74; and dominance model, 30; and miners example, 227; and mutual aid, 208–9; and presumptive constraints, 28, 261n32; and promissory obligation, 6–7, 170–71, 175–76, 236n13, 260n31; and relational morality, 175; and secondary obligations, 28–29. See also aggregation (numbers); directed obligations/duties: conflicts of; epistemic constraints; historical conditionality; presumptive constraints
claim interests: deliberation, 164–70; and justification, 165–70, 259nn22,23; and moral wrongs, 251n43; and resentment, 260n25; and social practices, 259nn23,25; and special standing, 167, 169
claim rights (Hohfeldian): characterized, 2; and claims, 260n30; and deliberation, 172; and (directed) obligations, 157, 172; and gratitude, 2, 9, 20, 192, 201–6; and justification of claims, 259n22; and ownership, 124; and permissibility, 170–71, 201, 260n26; and problem cases, 190, 191; and relational morality, 2–3, 235n2; and secondary claims, 199–200
claims: and accountability, 82, 104; and apologies, 90, 94; and attitudes of agents, 11; and attitudes of claimholders, 98–101; bare, 237n18; and bipolar thought, 149–50, 153–55; and blame, 84; and claimholder’s reflections, 59; conflicts of, 246n65; and consequentialism, 88; constitutive conditions of, 1, 10, 16, 18, 49–50, 51, 53, 58, 60–61, 80, 83, 85, 124; and cosmopolitan morality, 18, 53; and deliberation, 18–19, 147, 165–76, 178, 179, 180–81, 186, 264n59; and (directed) obligations, 6, 8, 19–20, 237n15, 257n58, 264n59; without directed obligations, 257n58; and disregard, 10, 85; fallback, 173–75; and forgiveness, 92; and friendship, 16; and Hohfeldian rights, 260n30; inalienable, 263n52; and interests, 7–8, 10, 18–19, 82, 147, 156–65, 176–89; and interpersonal morality, 66; and interpersonal recognition, 62, 141; and joint commitment, 124; and Malay servant example, 164–65; and manifold of persons, 146, 159–60; and moral nexus, 15–16, 23; and moral wrongs, 251n43, 266n9; and natural goodness, 76–77; and normative interests, 147, 165, 176–89, 237n18; overview, 6–9; and persons, 60–61, 61–62, 107; and presumptive constraints, 51; and property rights, 124; “pure normative,” 251n42; and rational agency, 16; and reactive attitudes, 80; and relational morality, 1, 2, 6–9, 18, 19–22, 49–50, 58–59, 60, 131, 158, 172–73, 178, 198–99; and resentment, 83, 99–100; residual, 173–74, 251n45, 261nn33,37; and retrospective attitudes, 270n40; and rights, 2–3, 8–9, 20, 103, 259n22, 260n30; without rights, 200–210; and Scanlon, 264n58; secondary, 191, 198–200, 251n45, 266n11, 267n14; and social interaction, 103; and sports example, 60–61; third-party, 251n43; and trustees, 102, 257n4; and voluntarism, 58, 96. See also accountability; circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies); claim interests; disregard or indifference; expectations or demands; foreseeability; moral repair; non-identity problem; persons; rights; self-standing obligations; special (privileged) standing
climate change, 86–87, 160, 211–12, 213, 227, 250n38, 269n32. See also global responsibility
Coates, D. Justin, 247n8
coercion, physical (force), 140, 199
collaboration. See joint commitment (collaborative agency)
commands, normative, 238n20. See also divine command theories; social command theories
commune example, 165
communicative blame, 83
compensation, duties of, 175
competition, 113
concept/conception distinction, 36, 242n22
conditionality. See circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies); historical conditionality; presumptive (defeasible) constraints
conflicts: of (directed) obligations, 20, 28–29, 32–33, 62–65, 173, 192, 231–32, 246n65; intergroup, 113, 114; and moral life, 141; and prima facie duties, 173, 174; and well-being, 192, 230–32. See also circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies)
congenital ailment example, 213–14
consequences, 266n9
consequentialism: and accountability, 22, 87–88; and beneficence, 268n31, 270n44; and blame, 249n25; and (directed) obligations, 41, 243n30; and equal standing, 22–23, 116–17; indirect, 158–59; and moral rightness, 270n43; and mutual aid, 206; and relational morality, 263n56; rule, 243n32, 249n25. See also individualist restriction; maximizing; utilitarianism
constitutive conditions: of claims, 82; of concept of the moral, 69; of (directed) obligations, 124; of friendship, 144–45; of groups, 112; of identity as persons, 246n62; of joint commitments, 122–23; of mutual recognition, 139–40; of personal relationships, 139, 144, 145, 254n9; of rationality, 243n29; of reasons, 128, 130, 256n49; of self-concept, 133; and of thought action, 31, 104, 241n14; of virtuous traits, 249n23
constructivism, 126
consumption example, 77
contracts, 2, 50, 193–94, 194–95, 223–33
contractualism: and aggregation, 273n60; and Case Seven, 225; and claims and interests, 19, 178–89; and gratitude, 204–5; and individualist restriction, 186–89, 212–13, 225–26, 265n65; and interests, 262n46; and moral right and wrong, 35, 184–85, 188–89; and mutual recognition, 136; and non-identity problem, 212–13; and principles, 19, 179–89, 198, 204, 223, 226, 262n46, 264n57, 269n32, 270n37; and relational morality, 19, 147, 179, 184, 185–86, 187, 188–89, 208, 224–27, 239n25, 264n57, 269n37, 270n46; and secondary claims, 198–99. See also Frick, Johann; Kumar, Rahul; Parfit, Derek; Scanlon, T. M.
“Contractualism and Justification” (Scanlon), 265n63, 271n48, 272n51, 273n63, 274n76
“Contractualism and Social Risk” (Frick), 236n8, 273nn65–69
“Contractualism and Utilitarianism” (Scanlon), 239n27, 240n34
“Contractualism on Saving the Many” (Kumar), 271n50
conventional wisdom, 22
convergence of understanding, 251n47, 257n1
cooperation, 16, 106, 112–13, 237n18
Cornell, Nicolas, 195–99, 251n43, 266nn9,10
cosmopolitan morality: and bipolar thought, 120; and class of persons, 18–19, 37; and consequentialism, 88; and deliberation, 37–38, 52–54; described, 17; and (directed) obligations, 53–54; and divine command theories, 42–43; and equal standing, 37–38; and individualism, 130; and interpersonal morality, 23, 37, 118; and joint agency, 113; and Kantian ethics, 44; and perfectionism, 46; and relational morality, 17, 52–54, 88–89, 120, 240n32; and utilitarianism, 39; and voluntarism, 42. See also manifold (class) of moral persons; modern morality; universality
cost-benefit analyses, 178
“A Critique of Utilitarianism” (Williams), 240n35, 267n22
Cullity, Garrett, 268n29
culture, 112, 240n32. See also social life, relations, practices, and conventions
Dancy, Jonathan, 241n11, 260n29, 262n42
Darwall, Stephen, 238nn21,23, 244nn36,37, 245n49, 246nn57,59, 252nn52,54, 263n49
debt model, 19–20, 116, 194, 235n1. See also gratitude; promissory obligation the deceased, 259n17
deceit, 135. See also duplicity; misleading statements example
deep structure of realm of impartial morality, 16
defective human beings, 241n12
deliberation (moral reasoning): and agent-relativity, 38, 51–52, 136; and aggregated well-being, 192, 229; and claims and interests, 18–19, 147, 164–76, 165–76, 178, 180–81, 186; and contractualism, 178–89; and cosmopolitan morality, 37–38, 52–54; and (directed) obligations, 1, 50–51, 54–65, 171–75, 176, 179, 245n56; and disregard, 82; and egalitarianism, 117; and equal standing, 37–38, 142, 250n38; and esteem/disesteem, 129, 248nn16,17; and foreseeability, 200; and gouty-toed stranger, 195; and habit, 176–77, 241n9, 245n56; and high-level property, 36–37; and individualist restriction, 226; individual versus public, 228–29; and intentions, 29; and interpersonal morality, 16, 35–37, 172; and joint commitment, 123; and justification, 175–76; and maximizing, 243n29; and moral right and wrong, 56–57; and moral theories, 13, 24–25, 30–37, 39–47, 67, 178–89; and natural history of morality, 113–14; and normativity, 14, 16; overviews, 1, 12, 13, 16, 18–19, 24–25; and permissibility, 19, 176–77; and personal relationships, 136; and persons, 254n23; and plurality of considerations, 241n11; practical reasoning distinguished from, 147; and prima facie duties, 170–72, 174; and relational morality, 16, 25, 47–50, 52–58, 149, 170, 175, 180–81, 186, 201; and responsiveness, 262n40; and rights, 170–71; and self-consciousness, 176–77; and social meanings, 56; and trolley examples, 272n58; unintelligibility of, 24–25, 38; and voluntarism, 34. See also bipolar thought; epistemic constraints; eudaimonistic reflection; intentions; interests; intuition; justification; moral right and wrong; moral theories; presumptive (defeasible) constraints; principles; reasons; rights
demands. See expectations or demands
democratic legitimacy, 34
“Demystifying Promises” (Darwall), 263n49
deonticity: and aggregation, 232; and deliberation, 55, 67, 68, 69, 172–73; and (directed) obligations, 49; and interests, 147; and moral theories, 30–34, 37, 39–47; and practical requirements, 26–27, 29; and prima facie duties, 171–75; and promissory obligations, 29, 51; and reasons, 57, 245n56
dependency and equality, 203–5
descendants (future generations), 19, 160, 210–15, 227, 270n45
determinism, 75
“Directed Duties” (May), 236n12
directed obligations/duties: and agent-relativity, 17–18, 135–45; and anti-individualism, 125–34; and beneficence, 207; and conditionality, 236n13; conflicts of, 20, 28–29, 32–33, 62–65, 173, 192, 231–32, 246n65; constitutive conditions of, 124; and cosmopolitan morality, 18; and deliberation, 13; domain of, 105; and equal standing, 23; extension of, 118; imperfect duties, 19, 20, 155, 201–10; and individualism, 126–27, 134; and interests, 163, 237n15; interpersonal, 21; and joint commitment, 122–23, 256n43; and law conception of ethics, 25; and manifold of persons, 18–19, 110; and moral injury, 11; and moral nexus, 15–16, 23; and moral right and wrong, 67–86; and mutual recognition, 136, 139–40; and nonnormative relations, 106, 107–25; and normativity, 14; to oneself, 155–56, 258nn9,10; overview, 5–6, 34–47; pervasiveness/overridingness of, 247n71; and presumptive constraints, 12, 29–34, 51, 115, 158, 175, 236n13, 245n56; and problem cases, 190, 191; reflexive, 155–56, 204–5; and relational morality, 5–6, 16, 47–54, 58–59, 105–7, 115, 131, 158; and rights, 2, 8–9, 157, 235n2; secondary, 28–29, 89–95, 93, 251n45; and social command theories, 95–96; and social life, 13, 71, 123; Thompson on, 236n12; and universality, 122; and virtue theory (perfectionism), 44–47; and voluntarism, 41–44. See also accountability; agent-relativity; claims; deliberation; nondirected duties; non-identity problem; obligations; personal relationships; practical requirements; prima facie duties; promissory obligation and other duties; rescue from rocks and other examples; self-standing obligations
disabilities, 258n5
disapprobation, 72, 74, 75, 100, 102. See also reactive attitudes and emotions
discretion: and claimholder, 50, 51, 57; and divine command theories, 267n17; and emergency mutual aid, 209; and forgiveness, 90, 91; and gratitude, 193, 202–3, 203–4, 252n51, 267nn16,17; and imperfect duties, 20; and mutual aid, 201, 205–10, 267n21, 268nn24,25; and practical requirements, 27, 49; and relational morality, 49–50, 123; and rights, 201, 202–3, 267n16; and specificity, 267n16; and will theory of rights, 157
diseases, 258n5
disregard or indifference: and antecedent relationships, 251n45; and bipolar thought, 153–54; and blame, 66, 79, 82–83, 84, 94, 249n25; and claim interests, 169; and climate change skepticism, 250n38; and consequentialism, 87, 88; and of expectations demands, 66; and gallery opening example, 182; and gratitude, 204; and impairment of relations, 102–3; and moral injury, 10–11, 13, 170, 195–96; and moral repair, 92–93; and moral right and wrong, 74; and reactive attitudes, 85–86, 185; and relational morality, 82, 85; and rescue from rocks example, 218–19; and rule consequentialism, 249n25; and secondary claims, 199–200; and third parties, 197–99, 253n57
“The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons” (Munoz-Dardé), 271n48, 272n55, 274n76
diversity, 32
divine command theories: and accountability, 80–81; and beneficence, 25; and (directed) obligations, 25; and discretion, 267n17; and gratitude, 250n27, 252n51, 267n17; and moral right and wrong, 41–43; and relational morality, 250n27, 252n51; and sanctions, 252nn49,51; and social relations, 31, 80; and universality, 41–42. See also Anscombe, G.E.M.; commands, normative
The Domain of Reasons (Skorupski), 238n23, 240n4, 244n36, 252n53
dominance model, 3, 31–32, 32–33, 39, 40, 243n29
drunk driver example, 196
duplicity, 135. See also deceit; misleading statements example
duties. See directed obligations/duties; nondirected duties; obligations; prima facie duties
“Duties and Their Direction” (Sreenivasan), 236n14, 237n16, 258n12, 260n26
Effective Altruism, 205–6, 267n21
egalitarianism, 117–18, 142. See also equal standing
emergencies. See circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies)
emotions, 249n24. See also anger and other emotions; reactive attitudes and emotions
Engaging Reason (Raz), 236n8, 240n4, 242n21
enjoyment, 160
entitlement, 6
epistemic constraints, 29, 74, 126–28, 130, 252n53, 256n48, 260n30. See also misleading statements example; subjective (psychological) facts
equality and dependency, 203–5
“equally real,” 37, 46, 53, 60, 63, 64, 88, 110, 116, 131, 143, 148, 231
equal standing: assumption of, 239n32; and blame, 87–88; and consequentialism, 87–88, 116–17; and contractualism, 180–81; and cosmopolitan morality, 37–38; and deliberation, 37–38, 142, 250n38; and (directed) obligations, 23; and divine command theories, 42; and gratitude, 203–5; and interpersonal domain, 125; and interpersonal morality, 21–23, 106, 248n11; and interpersonal recognition, 86; and justification, 176, 179; and manifold of persons, 125; and modern morality, 116; and personal relationships, 117, 254n17, 254n23; in political life, 117; and relational morality, 115, 254nn21,23; and universality, 117; and utilitarianism, 39. See also cosmopolitan morality; dependency and equality; mutual recognition
esteem/disesteem, 43, 75, 129, 248nn16,17
The Ethical Demand (Løgstrup), 237n15
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Williams), 238n22, 241n13, 242n21, 253nn1,2
Ethics without Principles (Dancy), 241n11
eudaimonistic reflection, 144–45
evolution, 116. See also biological humans; natural history of morality
ex ante considerations, 20, 200, 204, 216–23, 225, 272nn51,53, 273n65
exceptions. See circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies)
expectations or demands: and accountability, 70–71, 247n7; and blame, 70–71, 73, 74–75; and (directed) obligations, 118; disregard of, 66; and moral injury, 170; and moral right and wrong, 72–73; and promissory obligation, 73, 107, 108; and reactive attitudes, 13, 80; reasonable, 74; and resentment, 84–85; and social command theories, 96–97. See also ex ante considerations
extra-moral concern for persons, 4, 192, 221–33, 236n9
extraterrestrials examples, 118–19, 159, 160, 161. See also nonhumans
facts, nonnormative, 91–92, 251n42. See also climate change; reasoning, empirical
fairness, 108, 165, 248n16, 268n29
families: and agent-relativity, 135–36; and antecedent interactions, 110–11; and natural history of morality, 112–13; and relational morality, 16; self-standing domain versus, 125; and third-party harm, 197; and voluntarism, 33–34. See also children
Feinberg, Joel, 103, 104, 253n65, 260n30
“fellow creatures” (Mill), 257n59
fellow humanity, 125
“fellow rational beings,” 256n44
fidelity, 118, 163n53, 190, 263n47, 264n58. See also assurance interests
Finite and Infinite Goods (Adams), 252n51
first-order moral issues: and agent relativity, 38; and aggregation, 215–19; and claims, 169; and (directed) obligations, 176, 191, 192–210; and foreseeability, 192–200; and hypothetical cases, 15, 20–21; and imperfect duties, 201–10; and individualist restriction, 186–87; and non-identity problem, 210–15; and reasons versus responsiveness, 237n19; and relational morality, 14–15, 19, 22–23, 54, 190–92; and rights, 191, 201–10; and self-standing requirements, 115; and third-party harm, 195–99, 221–33; and virtues, 138. See also aggregation (numbers); hypothetical cases; intuition; political obligations; promissory obligation and other duties; rescue from rocks and other examples
fittingness, 260n28
Flanagan, Owen, 240n32, 248n17
flat-tire example, 123, 201, 203
flying to Chicago example, 123–24, 255n40, 256n42
Foot, Philippa, 7, 44–45, 46, 47–49, 76–77, 236n8, 245n46, 254n24, 272n58. See also virtue theory (perfectionism)
force (coercion, physical), 140, 199
foreseeability, 7, 19–20, 160, 182, 191, 192–200, 214, 227, 263n48, 266nn7,8
forgiveness, 13, 67, 89, 90–92, 94, 100–101, 250nn40–41, 252n56
Forst, Rainer, 257n58
Foundations of Ethics (Ross), 260n28
Frankfurt, Harry, 241n13
“Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson), 248n9
Freud, Sigmund, 244n39
Frick, Johann, 223–27, 229–30, 236n8, 273n65
Fricker, Miranda, 83–84, 248n17, 251n47
friendship: and agent-relativity, 135–36; and antecedent interactions, 110–11; and claims and directed obligations, 16, 61, 64, 110–11, 136, 193–94; constitutive conditions of, 144–45; and equal standing, 87, 117, 142; and library book return example, 176; and mutual recognition, 140; and natural history of morality, 112; and nonmoral values, 247nn68,69; political membership compared, 247n69; and promissory obligation, 176, 182; and relational morality, 125, 141; and rescue from rocks example, 271n49; and third-party forgiveness, 250n41; and third-party harm, 197. See also personal relationships
future generations (descendents), 19, 160, 210–15, 227, 269n32, 270n45. See also non-identity problem
“Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles” (Parfit), 269nn31,37
gallery reception example, 9–10, 11, 182
games examples, 246n62. See also sports examples
Gardner, John, 251n45
The Gay Science (Nietzsche), 240n36
generosity, 261n34
The Geography of Morals (Flanagan), 240n32, 248n17
Gewirth, Alan, 238n22
Gilbert, Margaret, 122–24, 182–83, 184, 253n6, 255nn37,40,41, 256n42, 263n52
global responsibility, 248n16. See also climate change
goodness of agent’s own life, 18
gouty-toed stranger example, 107, 123, 138,
gratitude: and antecedent interactions, 118, 135–36, 193; and artificial persons, 153; and claim rights, 2, 9, 20, 192, 201–6; and consequentialism, 270n44; and (directed) obligations, 16, 111, 135, 191, 192–200, 193, 201; and discretion, 193, 202–3, 203–4, 252n51, 267nn16,17; and divine command theories, 250n27, 252n51, 267n17; and natural history of morality, 112–13; and prima facie duty, 172, 174; and reasons, 252n51, 267n17; and relational morality, 123, 190, 191, 192–200, 204, 205; and rights, 9, 202–5. See also beneficence; charity; mutual aid
Greene, Joshua, 112–13, 114, 116, 240n36, 254n17
Greenspan, Patricia, 244n36
groups, 12, 112, 113–14. See also accountability; social life, relations, practices, and conventions
guilt, 74, 101. See also reactive attitudes and emotions
handicapped person example, 213–14
happiness, 39, 213, 214, 225, 269n33, 270n44, 273n72
harassment, 153
Hare, R. M., 238n22
harm: and aggregation, 272n60; avoiding, 237n18; moral injury distinguished from, 9–10; noncomparative, 269n37; risks of, 221–22; third-party, 182, 195–99, 221–33, 250n41, 251n43, 253n57. See also moral injury or wrong
Hart, H.L.A., 157, 183, 196, 237n16, 254n11, 258n10
health, physical and mental, 160
Hieronymi, Pamela, 83
high-level, right-making properties, 35, 36–37, 55, 69, 125, 184, 224, 242n22, 263n56. See also “to-be-done”/“not-to-be-done” (right and wrong in generic sense)
highway example, 120
historical conditionality, 36, 240n32
historical interactions. See antecedent interactions; natural history of morality
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcombe, 2. See also claim rights
hostage-taking example, 232
“How I Am Not a Kantian” (Scanlon), 265nn62,63, 273n63, 274n74
Human Morality (Scheffler), 253n57, 262n40
human nature, 120, 248nn16,17. See also species nature
Humean theories, 109–10, 114, 120, 122, 126, 128–29, 133, 253n8. See also individualism; subjective (psychological) facts
Hurka, Thomas, 260nn27,28, 261nn35,36
“A Hybrid Theory of Claim Rights” (Sreenivasan), 259n15, 267n15
hypothetical cases, 15, 20–21, 212–14, 226–27, 238n24, 239n28. See also intuition; miners and other specific examples
Ideal Code, Real World (Hooker), 243n32, 249n25
ideals, 264n57
identity-based accounts: and conflicts of obligation, 65; and maximizing, 243n29; and mistaken objective identity, 242n17; and “must,” 241n13; and perfectionism, 45; and presumptive constraints, 64; and reasons, 30–31, 32–33, 35; and relational morality, 246n62; species nature versus, 244n42; and subjective facts, 133–34, 241nn13,16; tribal, 16, 112, 113; and weakness of will, 241n16. See also roles, social; tribes
ideology, 250n38
imbalances, 193–95, 203, 265n4. See also power and vulnerability
impairment of relationships, 102–3, 251n45
imperfect duties, 19, 20, 155, 201–10. See also gratitude; mutual aid and other imperfect duties
impersonal morality, 64–65, 100, 114
“In Defense of Directed Duties” (Jonker), 263n46
independence, 264n57. See also dependency and equality
indifference. See disregard or indifference
indignation, 15, 70, 74, 77, 78, 99–101, 151. See also reactive attitudes and emotions
individualism: anti-, 125–34; and blame, 75–76, 77–79, 132–33; and forgiveness, 91–92; and manifold of persons, 131–32; and moral repair, 92–94; and presumptive constraints, 133–34; and relational morality, 4, 17, 76–86, 106–7, 125–34, 251n43; and subjective attitudes of agent, 256n53; and universality, 131–32, 134. See also Foot, Philippa; Humean theories; identity-based accounts; subjective facts; virtue theory and other individualistic theories
individualist restriction, 186–89, 212–13, 225–26, 265n65
infants and children, 77, 101–2, 120–21, 150–51, 152, 158, 193–94, 265n2. See also families
information, limited, 29. See also epistemic constraints
injury. See moral injury or wrong
installment payments example, 194–95
intentions, 27–28, 29, 50–51, 102, 246n66, 248n12
interests: assurance, 108, 161–62, 165, 169, 175, 181–82, 263n47 (See also fidelity); characterized, 160; and claims, 7–8, 10, 18–19, 82, 147, 156–65, 176–89; and claims and wrongs, 147, 156–65; and the deceased, 259n17; and deliberation, 18–19, 147, 165–76, 178, 180–81, 186; and deonticity, 47; and (directed) obligations, 163, 237n15; and interpersonal recognition, 163–64; and justification, 163, 165–66, 170, 176–77; and Malay servant example, 164–65; noncomparative, 213–14, 273n72; and non-identity problem, 211–12; nonnormative, 237n18; normative, 147, 165, 176–89, 237n18; of others, 18–19; and phases of life, 156; political, 250n38; and private law, 156–65; and promissory obligation, 175; reasons versus, 186; and reductive accounts, 259n16; and relational morality, 18–19, 21, 23, 158–59, 162–64, 178, 262n43; and runaway trolleys examples, 220; second-order, 168–69, 199; and universality, 23; and vaccine example, 222–23. See also claim interests; equal standing; harm; second-order normative consequences; third-party beneficiaries; virtue theory and other theories; well-being, individual and other interests
“Internal and External Reasons” (Williams), 256n46
interpersonal morality: and accountability, 76; and aggregation, 188; characterized, 3–4; and claimholders, 66; and contractualism, 187, 188; and cosmopolitan morality, 23, 37, 118; and deliberation, 16, 35–37, 172; and (directed) obligations, 12; domain of, 3–4, 36, 125, 235n6, 239n27, 255n24; and equal standing, 106; extension of, 116; and extra-moral requirements, 232, 236n9; and games example, 60; and gratitude, 267n17; and ideals, 264n57; and manifold of persons, 148; and miners example, 274n76; and morality, 242n23; and moral right and wrong, 35–36, 67–76, 72, 185; and moral theories, 35–38; and perfectionism, 78; and personal relationships, 17; and relational morality, 21, 25, 158, 166; and rights, 236n8; Scanlon on, 237n19; and secondary claims, 266n11; and transactional obligation, 54. See also accountability; equal standing; foreseeability; future generations; interpersonal recognition; modern morality; social life, relations, practices, and conventions
interpersonal recognition: and blame, 94–95; and claims, 62, 141; friendship distinguished from, 145; and interpersonal morality, 246n64; and justifiability, 187; mutual recognition versus, 141, 142–43, 257n60; and promissory obligations, 195; and reactive attitudes, 85–86; and relational morality, 18, 163, 195
intuition: and beneficence, 269n31; and consequentialism, 270n43; and joint commitment, 255n40; and moral theories, 239nn28–29; questionable, 196–97; and relational morality, 3, 4, 5, 19, 147, 176–89; and rights, 8. See also hypothetical cases
The Invention of Autonomy (Schneewind), 244n39
inviolability, 166
jettisoning excess cargo example, 107, 108, 111
joint commitment (collaborative agency), 112, 116, 122–24, 126, 130, 141, 255nn37,40,41, 256nn42,43
Jonker, Julian, 263n46
juridical rights, 199
justice, 80, 248n17, 249n23, 254n24, 255n29. See also law and legislative authorities
justification: and claim interests, 165–70, 259nn22,23; comparative, 270n37; and contractualism, 187; directed, 257n61; and interests, 163, 165–66, 170, 176–77; and mutual aid, 208; and normative interests, 165; overview, 176–77; and permissibility, 257n61; and relational morality, 176–89. See also circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies); deliberation; reasons
Kamm, F. M., 220, 235n8, 271n51, 272n57
Kantians, 35, 44, 120, 132, 237n20, 241n14, 244n39, 244n40
kidney donation example, 175
kindness, 16
Kolodny, Niko, 247n68
Korsgaard, Christine M., 238n22, 241n13, 242n16, 244n40
Lacey, Nicola, 252n56
Laoumis, Theano, 267n26
law and legislative authorities: and allocation of resources, 192; and authority, 34; and conflicts of obligations, 63; criminal law model, 98–99, 100–101, 252nn54,56; and (directed) obligations, 25, 59; and Hohfeldian rights, 2; and interests, 156–65; private law model, 93, 98–99, 100–101, 103, 119, 148, 246n62, 252n54, 264n57; and relational morality, 158; and utilitarianism, 41. See also contracts; Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.; public officials’ decisions; rights
liberty rights, 200
library book return example, 176
life, goodness of agent’s own, 18
Life and Action (Thompson), 244n41
Living High and Letting Die (Unger), 268n24
Løgstrup, Knud Eljer, 237n15
love, 64, 65, 110–11, 133, 194, 197, 253n9
“Love as Valuing a Relationship” (Kolodny), 247n68
loyalty, 111
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 240n37
“Making Room for Options” (Greenspan), 244n36
malaria-reducing example, 160, 164, 205, 268n24
Malay servant example, 7–8, 47–54, 161–62, 164–65, 166, 245n46
manifold (class) of moral persons: and agent-relativity, 135–36; and bipolar thought, 120–22, 147, 150, 255n35, 258n5; and claim interests, 166; and claims, 146, 159–60; and (directed) obligations, 18, 110, 122–23; and individualism, 131–32; and interests, 166; and mutual recognition, 140–41, 256n58; and reflexive obligations, 155–56; and relational morality, 3, 16, 17, 18–19, 37, 106, 111–25, 148, 149, 155, 190–91; and Scanlon, 264n57; and social bonds, 113–14, 116; and universality, 148; well-being of, 271n48. See also bipolar thought; interpersonal recognition; mutual recognition; orders of right; persons; strangers; universality
maximizing, 243nn29,30. See also consequentialism
May, Simon Căbulea, 236n12
“Membership and Political Obligation” (Scheffler), 254n22
mentally impaired people, 101–2, 120–21, 150–52
The Method of Ethics (Sidgwick), 249n20
miners example, 223–24, 226–27, 228–29, 232, 274nn72,76
misleading statements example, 196–97, 266n7. See also deceit; duplicity
mobbing, 153
modern morality: and accountability, 67, 69, 75–76; and antecedent relationships, 17; and moral right and wrong, 68–69, 72–73; overviews, 107; and relational morality, 134
“Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe), 24–25, 266n9. See also cosmopolitan morality; equal standing; interpersonal morality; manifold (class) of moral persons; moral right and wrong; persons; self-standing obligations
moral deficiencies versus failings, 3
Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Murphy), 267n23, 268nn23,26
The Moral Demands of Affluence (Cullity), 268n29
Moral Dimensions (Scanlon), 237n19, 248nn10,12, 251n46, 253n61, 256n44, 258n6
moral domain, 16, 255n24. See also manifold (class) of moral persons
“Moral Incapacity” (Williams), 241n13
moral injury or wrong: and aggregation, 228; and antecedent claims, 258n11; and apologies, 90–91; and attitudes of agents, 10–11; bare, 237n18; and blame, 88–89; and claims, 251n43, 266n9; and claims and interests, 156–69; and disregard, 10–11, 13, 170; and foreseeability, 192–200; and forgiveness, 92; harm distinguished from, 9–10; and interests, 147; moral wrong versus, 236n8; and mutual aid, 208; and Pilates class example, 170; and reactive attitudes, 84; and relational morality, 9–11, 85, 251n43; and resentment, 83; and rights, 195–96, 197, 266n9; and secondary claims, 191; and trolley examples, 220–21; and vaccine example, 223. See also disregard or indifference; harm; moral repair
morality, 1–5, 16, 69, 242n23. See also interpersonal morality; modern morality; moral right and wrong; natural history of morality; normativity; social life, relations, practices, and conventions
Morality, Mortality (Kamm), 271n51
The Morality of Freedom (Raz), 235n4, 247n66, 253n5, 259nn14,22
“morality of right and wrong” (Scanlon), 3–4
“the morality system” (Williams), 242n21
“Moral Luck” (Williams), 247n70
moral nexus, 15–16, 23. See also relational morality
moral norms, 14. See also authority; moral right and wrong; normativity; reactive attitudes and emotions; social life, relations, practices, and conventions
“Moral Obligations and Social Commands” (Wolf), 243n35
moral reasoning. See deliberation; moral theories; practical reasoning
moral repair, 67, 89, 92–95, 251nn45,47
moral right and wrong: and accountability, 71–72, 75–76, 76–86, 81, 83; and blame, 72, 73–74; and claims, 105; and consequentialism, 270n43; and contractual moral reasoning, 184–85, 188–89; defined, 105; and deliberation, 56–57; and expectations or demands, 72–73; and hypothetical cases, 20–21; and individualism, 76–81; and individualist restriction, 226; and interpersonal morality, 35–36, 67–76, 72, 185; and modern morality, 68–69, 72–73; and “morality of right and wrong” (Scanlon), 3–4; and moral theories, 34–38; and natural history of morality, 113; and normativity, 14, 68–69, 239n24; and obligation, 247n1; Parfit on, 238n24; and reactive emotions, 75; as reason, 56; and relational morality, 56–57, 81–86, 105, 185–86; and rescue from rocks example, 218–19; wrongs versus, 236n8. See also deliberation (moral reasoning); first-order moral issues; high-level, right-making properties; interpersonal morality; intuition; moral injury or wrong; moral theories; permissibility/impermissibility; reasons; rights; “to-be-done”/“not-to-be-done” (right and wrong in generic sense)
Morals by Agreement (Korsgaard), 238n22
moral standing. See bipolar thought; equal standing; interpersonal recognition; manifold (class) of moral persons; mutual recognition; persons; rights; special (privileged) standing
moral theories: Anscombe on, 242n25; and authority of moral norms, 14–15; and deliberation, 13, 24–25, 30–37, 39–47, 67, 178–89; and deonticity, 30–34, 37, 39–47; historical development of, 244n39; and moral right and wrong, 34–38; and presumptive constraints, 30–35; and relational morality, 12, 126. See also contractualism and other theories; high-level, right-making properties; normativity: metaethics of; Scanlon, T. M. and other theorists
Moral Thinking (Hare), 238n22
Moral Tribes (Greene), 240n36
moral wrong. See moral injury or wrong; moral right and wrong
“More Right Than Wrong” (Dancy), 260n29
mother as third-party beneficiary example, 196
Munoz-Dardé, Véronique, 271n48, 272n55, 274n76
Murphy, Liam B., 267n23, 268nn23,26
“must,” 27, 30, 34, 241nn12,13. See also practical requirements; “to-be-done”/“not-to-be-done” (right and wrong in generic sense)
mutual aid: and aggregation, 268nn28,29; and claim rights, 9; and claims, 19, 20; and discretion, 201, 205–10, 267n21, 268nn24,25; emergency, 208–9; and relational morality, 191, 205, 206, 207–8, 268n26; and rights, 201–2, 205–10. See also beneficence; gratitude; organ donation example
mutual recognition: and agent-relativity, 137; and bipolar thought, 152, 153; and directed obligations, 136, 139–40; and interpersonal morality, 246n64; interpersonal recognition versus, 141, 142–43, 257n60; and manifold of persons, 140–41; and relational morality, 107, 136. See also equal standing; interpersonal recognition
Nagel, Thomas, 37, 148, 238n22, 257n61. See also “equally real”
“nameless virtue,” 261n34
Narevson, Jan, 270n44
natural goodness, 76–77. See also Foot, Philippa
Natural Goodness (Foot), 236n8
natural history of morality, 16, 106, 112–14, 116
naturalistic conceptions of ethics, 120
“The Nature and Value of Rights” (Feinberg), 103, 253n65, 260n30
Necessity, Volition, and Love (Frankfurt), 241n13
Nehamas, Alexander, 247n68
Neuhauser, Fred, 239n30
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 238n20, 240n36
nondirected duties, 158, 236n14, 255n37
nondomination, 264n57. See also power and vulnerability
nonhumans, 152, 271n48. See also animals, nonrational; extraterrestrials examples
non-identity problem, 191, 210–15, 269n37. See also future generations
nonmoral norms, 270n45
nonnaturalistic realism, 238n24, 256n53
nonnormative relations, 106, 107–25
nonreductive realism, 14
normative ethics. See first-order moral issues
normativity: and backsliding, 242n16; bipolar, 246n61; and (directed) obligations and accountability, 14; metaethics of, 14–15; and moral norms, 16; and moral right and wrong, 14, 68–69, 239n24; and Parfit, 237n20, 238n24; pre- or nonmoral, 245n55; and reasons, 15, 240n4; and relational morality, 126, 238n23, 257n3, 264n59; unity of domain of, 255n24. See also accountability; deliberation (moral reasoning); directed obligations/duties; morality; moral theories; self-standing obligations
Normativity (Thomson), 241n12
norms. See normativity
norms, nonmoral, 270n45
“Nowheresville,” 103
“Numbers” (Raz), 254n10, 265n1, 271n46
Nussbaum, Martha, 248n17
obligations, 25, 34–47, 247n1. See also directed obligations/duties; nondirected duties; practical requirements; volitional necessity
“Obligations and Joint Commitment” (Gilbert), 255n37
One Another’s Equals (Waldron), 239n31
O’Neill, Onora, 236n8
On Friendship (Nehamas), 247n68
online donations example, 268n25
On What Matters (Parfit), 237n20, 238n24, 242n18, 243n32, 245n56, 265nn60,65, 269n37, 273nn60,62,70–72, 274n73
opprobrium, 12, 78, 86, 249n21
orders of right, 109, 119–21, 148–49, 159, 246n61, 253n8, 255n35, 257n2, 258n5
organ donation example, 273n62
Otsuka, Michael, 271n51
“ought implies can,” 257n3
“ought to do,” 27, 56, 157, 172, 210, 215, 236n14, 241n12, 257n3, 260n26, 266n11
Owens, David, 237n18, 241n9, 245n56, 252n49, 259nn22,23
“Owing Justifying, and Rejecting” (Kamm), 235n8
pain, freedom from, 160
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 196, 197, 266n8
Parfit, Derek: and aggregation, 273n72, 273nn60,62,70–72; and artificial cases, 215; and beneficence, 268n31; and individualist restriction, 186–87, 212–14, 224–26, 265n65, 270n39, 274n73; and intuition and reasons, 239n29; and moral right and wrong, 34, 35, 188–89, 237n20, 242n18, 270n43; on noncomparative harm, 269n37; on reasons, 238n24, 245n56; and rule consequentialism, 243n32. See also “Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?”; Case Four; Case Seven; “Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles”; On What Matters; Reasons and Persons
participant attitude, 70, 84–85
particularism, 262n42
peremptory normative constraints, 68
perfectionism. See virtue theory
permissibility/impermissibility: and apology, 89–90; and claim rights, 170–71, 201, 260n26; defined, 235n2; and directed justification, 257n61; and equal standing, 22; and ex ante objections, 219–20; and gallery reception example, 162; and intentions or attitudes, 248n12; and justifications, 257n61; and killing, 218; and moral wrongs, 4; and mutual recognition, 140; and physical coercion, 199; and presumptive constraints, 12; and property rights, 2; and sacrifice of basic needs, 164; Scanlon on, 248n12. See also deliberation (moral reasoning); moral right and wrong
personal relationships: and agent-relativity, 137; and antecedent interactions, 16, 18, 110–11, 125; constitutive conditions of, 139, 144, 145, 254n9; and demands and expectations, 70–71; and (directed) obligations, 16, 17, 65, 135–36, 192–95, 202, 254n10; and equal standing, 117, 254n17, 254n23; and eudaimonistic reflection, 144–45; and imbalances, 265n4; impairment of, 102–3, 251n45; and objective attitude, 69–70; and relational morality, 113–14, 141; and thick ties, 192. See also antecedent interactions; friendship and other personal relationships; gratitude; mutual recognition
persons: artificial, 152–53; and biological species, 3, 150–51; and claims, 60–61, 61–62, 107; class of, 18–19; and conflicts of obligations, 63; and deliberation, 254n23; and (directed) obligations, 60–61, 111; extra-moral concern for, 4, 192, 221–33; and interest of claimholders, 163–64; and interpersonal morality, 266n11; and natural history of morality, 116; and normative interests, 165; oneself as, 258n9; and relational morality, 13, 245n53, 246n62. See also equal standing; interpersonal morality; interpersonal recognition; manifold (class) of moral persons; moral domain; mutual recognition
Pickard, Hannah, 252n56
Pilates class example, 72–73, 169
pluralism, 3–44, 32, 224, 226, 229–30, 231, 235n8, 239n25. See also Raz, Joseph
political life, 117, 247n69, 250n38, 254n22
political obligations and rights, 63–64, 199
political rights, 199
The Possibility of Altruism (Nagel), 238n22
power and vulnerability, 237n15, 265n4. See also nondomination
practical reasoning, 147. See also deliberation (moral reasoning); practical requirements
Practical Reasons and Norms (Raz), 245n54
practical requirements, 1, 15, 26–34, 49, 173, 240n3. See also disregard or indifference; individualist restriction; “must”; obligations; presumptive (defeasible) constraints; relational requirements; “to-be-done”/“not-to-be-done” (right and wrong in generic sense)
“Preference and Urgency” (Scanlon), 259n16
presumptive (defeasible) constraints: and accountability, 12; and aggregation, 230–33; and bipolar thought, 149, 153; conflicting, 231; and cost-benefit analyses, 178; and deliberation, 26–47, 60–61, 68, 170, 172–73; and deonticity, 27, 29, 172–73; and (directed) obligations, 12, 29–34, 51, 115, 158, 172–75, 236n13, 245n56; and duties and claims, 172–75; and equal standing, 117–18; and high-level property, 36–37; and identity, 64; and moral right, 35–36; and moral theories, 30–35; overview, 28–29; and practical requirements, 27, 28–29, 240n3; and promissory obligation, 6, 7, 51, 175, 236n13; and reasons, 26–34, 50, 55–56, 172–73; and relational morality, 12, 55, 175; and Scanlon’s contractualism, 184; and sports example, 59–61; and subjective facts, 126–28, 133–34; transactional duties as, 51; unconditional constraints versus, 28–29; and utilitarianism, 39–41, 243n28. See also circumstances (conditionality) (emergencies); obligations; prima facie duties
prima facie duties, 171–72, 174, 260nn27,28,31
principles: and claims and interests, 19; and contractualism, 19, 179–89, 198, 204, 223, 226, 262n46, 264n57, 269n32, 270n37; and ex ante considerations, 20; and miners example, 274n76; and mutual aid, 206–7, 209, 210; and non-identity problem, 211; and organ donation example, 273nn62–63; and particularism, 262nn42–43; and personal relationships, 114; and promissory obligation, 108–10; and relational morality, 109–10, 140–41, 143, 208, 215–21, 262n43, 264n57, 268n29; and rescue from rocks example, 215–21, 271nn46,50, 272n53. See also agent-relativity and other principles; utilitarianism and other moral theories
Private Wrongs (Ripstein), 251n45, 264n57, 266n8
privileged standing. See special (privileged) standing
procreative decisions example, 213–14
promise to meet at airport example, 267n16
promise to meet student example, 55–56, 262n46
“Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism” (Shiffrin), 254n22, 265n4
promissory obligation: and accountability, 81–82; and agent-relativity, 39, 51–52, 135, 243n27; and antecedent interactions, 107, 110–11; and blame, 73–74; and circumstances, 6–7, 170–71, 175–76, 183, 236n13, 260n31; and claim interests, 167, 169; and claims, 59; and coercion, 199; conditionality of, 6–7, 183; and contractualist moral reasoning, 181–82; and cosmopolitan morality, 52–54; and debt model, 194; and deliberation, 28; and deonticity, 29, 51; and directionality, 6, 182–83; and discretion, 267n16; and exceptions, 62, 170–71; and expectations, 73, 107, 108; generalization of, 114–15; and Hohfeldian rights, 259n22; and interests, 175; and intuitive understanding, 15–16; and justification, 180; and moral reasoning, 171–72, 180; nonmoralized account of, 253n6; overview, 5–9; and perfectionism, 45–46; and personal relationships, 136; and prima facie duty, 174, 260nn28,31; reasons versus, 29; and relational morality, 6, 47–54, 109–12, 114–15, 176; and rights, 183; and self-standing obligations, 109–10, 245n55; and social command theories, 96; and social practices, 108–11, 253n6; and special (privileged) standing, 183; and subjective facts, 108, 134; and third-party beneficiaries, 156, 157–58, 181–82, 183, 237n16; and third-party injury, 196; and transactions, 16, 110; and utilitarianism, 39, 40, 243n27. See also assurance interests; contracts; Malay servant and other examples
property rights examples, 2, 124, 171, 173, 174, 202, 203, 261n34
psychological facts. See subjective (psychological) facts
public officials’ decisions, 20, 215, 221–33, 227, 252n56, 274nn74,76. See also law and legislative authorities
Pummer, Theron, 267n21
rain example, 55
rational force, 27
rationality, 16, 31, 241n14, 243n29. See also practical reasoning; will
Rawls, John, 239n28
Raz, Joseph: on aggregation, 271n46; on attitude adjustment, 258n8; and claim interests, 166; and on claims rights, 259n22; and exclusionary reasons, 241n6; on exclusionary reasons, 26, 50; on individual interests, 259n16; on intentions, 247n66; on interest in rights, 165, 166; and interpersonal morality, 236n8, 336n8; and normativity and reasons, 240n4; on personal relationships, 111, 114–15, 192–95, 202, 254n10; on reasons, 55, 240n4, 241n6, 242n21, 245n54; and rights, 235n4, 259nn14,22; on right wrong, 265n1
reactive attitudes and emotions: and accountability, 70–71; adjustment of, 258n8; and claims, 80; and disregard, 85–86, 185; and legal analogies, 98–99, 100–101; and moral injury, 84; and mutual aid, 210; overveiw, 70; and presumptive constraints, 12; and reasons, 15, 74–75, 79, 83, 127, 130, 237n19; and relational morality, 13–14, 248n9; and special standing of claimholders, 99–100; vicarious, 151–52. See also avoidance and withdrawal; expectations or demands; resentment and other attitudes
“realm of rights” (Thomson), 2
The Realm of Rights (Thomson), 260n26
“Reason, Rationality, and Normativity” (Raz), 258n8
Reason and Morality (Gewirth), 238n22
reasoning, empirical, 250n38. See also climate change; facts, nonnormative
reasoning, moral. See deliberation (moral reasoning); moral theories; practical reasoning
reasons: and attitude adjustments, 258n8; and blame, 238n23, 249n25; for blame, 238n23; constitutive conditions of, 128, 130, 256n49; and (directed) obligations, 13, 15, 32, 34, 172, 173, 256n48; and discretion, 27; exclusionary, 26, 50; and gratitude, 252n51, 267n17; and hypothetical cases, 21; impartial, 186; and intuition, 239n29; and morality, 35–36; nonmoral, 215, 242n21, 244n44; and nonnaturalist realism, 256n53; and normativity, 15, 240n4; and presumptive constraints, 26–34, 50, 55–56, 172–73; and prima facie duty, 172; and reactive attitudes, 15, 74–75, 79, 83, 237n19; and relational morality, 16, 256n49; rightness or wrongness as, 56; subjective facts versus, 106, 126–29, 130, 131–32, 133, 256n54; and virtues, 249n23; and voluntarism, 244n37, 250n27. See also dominance model; identity-based accounts; interests; justification
Reasons and Persons (Parfit), 239n29, 240n36, 254n15, 268n31, 270nn39,42,44
Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung (Forst), 257n61
reciprocity, 111
reductive accounts, 16, 158–59, 162, 256n51, 259n16
regret, 27, 219, 223, 261nn33,37
The Rejection of Consequentialism (Scheffler), 242n25
relational morality: overviews of, 1–12, 105; overviews of argument for, 12–23, 66, 104, 115, 126, 146, 190–91. See also accountability; claims; contractualism and other theories; deliberation (moral reasoning); directed obligations/duties; manifold (class) of moral persons; moral right and wrong; universality
relational requirements, 126, 235n6. See also claim rights; claims; directed obligations/duties; self-standing obligations
relations, nonnormative, 106, 107–25
relationships. See personal relationships; social life
remorse, 251n47
“Replies” (Scanlon), 263n56
“Reply to Wenar” (Scanlon), 235n2, 258n12, 263n53, 264n59
rescue from rocks example, 187–88, 215–19, 225–26, 265n64, 270n46, 271nn49,50, 272nn53,54,55, 273n65
resentment: and aggregation, 232; and artificial persons, 152–53; and claim interests, 260n25; described, 99–100; and esteem/ disesteem, 129; and forgiveness, 90; and guilt, 101; and individualism, 132–33; and moral wrongs, 252n53; and mutual aid, 208; and phases of life, 150–51, 156; and Pilates class example, 169–70; and relational morality, 13, 83–84, 187, 250n32; and secondary claims, 199; and utilitarianism, 77–78. See also reactive attitudes and emotions
responsibility. See accountability
responsiveness, 262n40
The Right and the Good (Ross), 260n27–29,31
right and wrong. See moral right and wrong; “to-be-done”/“not-to-be-done” (right and wrong in generic sense)
rights: alienability of, 202; and claims, 2–3, 8–9, 20, 259n22, 260n30; claims without, 200–210; and deliberation, 170–71; and (directed) obligations, 2, 157; and discretion, 201, 202–3, 267n16; and duties to oneself, 258n10; and ex ante determinacy, 200; and first-order moral issues, 191, 201–10; and foreseeability, 192–200; and gratitude, 9, 202–5; inalienable, 202; interest theory of, 157–58, 263n53; and interpersonal morality, 236n8; liberty, 267n14; and moral injury, 195–96, 197, 266n9; political, 199; and promissory obligations, 183; and relational morality, 2–3, 158, 200, 201; and Scanlon, 264n58; and social interaction, 103; and third-party harm, 195–99; will theory of, 157–58, 263nn52,53. See also claim rights; enforceability; equal standing; moral repair
Ripstein, Arthur, 93, 251n45, 264n57, 266n8
roles, social, 61, 262n46. See also artists examples; friends and other roles; identity
Roman private law, 148
romantic partners. See love
Ross, W. D., 171–72, 174, 260n27, 260nn28,29,31
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 75
sacrifice, 111
sanction theory, 252n49
satisfaction, 160
“Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals” (Otsuka), 271n51
Scanlon, T. M.: on aggregation, 270n46, 272n51; and on assurance fidelity, 263n53; and buck-passing theory, 56, 245n57; and consequentialism, 22, 240n34; and deliberation, 186; on disregard, 102, 251n46; and “duties to other people,” 263n56; and equal standing, 179; on “fellow rational beings,” 256n44; on friendship/political membership, 247n69; on impairment, 102–3, 251n46; and individualist restriction, 187–88, 225, 265n65; and interests, 180, 262n46; on justification, 257n4; on morality, 242n21; and moral right and wrong, 3, 34, 35, 185; on mutual recognition, 136, 246n64; and organ donation example, 273nn62,63; on permissibility/ wrongness, 248n12; on promissory obligation, 253n3, 263nn47,53; on public officials’ decisions, 274nn74,76; on “pure normative claims,” 251n42; and reasons and attitudes, 240n4; and reasons and reaction, 237n19; and on reasons principles, 262n44; and relational morality, 147, 179, 184–86, 235nn1,6, 239n27, 259n16, 262n44, 263n56, 264nn57,58; and rescue from rocks example, 265n64, 270n46, 271n48, 272n51; and right and wrong, 242nn18–20; and special standing, 183; and trustees, 258n4; on utilitarianism, 240n34. See also Being Realistic about Reasons; contractualism; “Contractualism and Justification”; “Contractualism and Utilitarianism”; “How I Am Not a Kantian”; Moral Dimensions; “Preference and Urgency”; “Replies”; “Reply to Wenar”; What We Owe Each Other; “Wrongness and Reasons”
“Scanlon on Promissory Obligation” (Gilbert), 263n52
“Scanlon’s Investigations” (Kolodny), 248nn12,13
Scheffler, Samuel, 26, 117–18, 142, 242n25, 253n57, 254nn22,23, 262n40, 269n31, 270n45
Schneewind, Jerome, 244n39
Schroeder, Mark, 256n46
secondary claims, 191, 198–99, 199–200, 266n11
secondary interests, 168–69, 199
secondary obligations, 28–29, 89–95, 93, 251n45
second-order normative consequences, 56–57, 168–69, 251n45
second-person “morality” (Tomasello), 112–13
The Second-Person Standpoint (Darwall), 238n21, 244n36
self-blame, 101
self-concepts, 133
selfhood, 240n32
self-indulgence, moral, 138–39, 143
self-standing obligations: and agent-relativity, 137; and antecedent interactions, 162; and anti-individualism, 115–25; and conflicts of claims, 246n65; and first-order moral issues, 115; and individualism, 130–31; and political membership, 247n69; and promissory obligations, 109–10, 245n55; and relational morality, 17, 106, 162–63; and social practices, 109–10. See also mutual recognition
Shaping the Normative Landscape (Owens), 237n18, 241n9, 245n56, 252n49, 253n5, 259nn20,22,23
“Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations” (Alonso), 256n43
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, 254n22, 265n4
shipwreck example, 175
“Should the Numbers Count” (Taurek), 271nn47,49
Singer, Peter, 116
Skorupski, John, 238n23, 240n4, 244n36, 252n53
sleeping-in example, 266n11
Smith, Adam, 250n32
social command theories, 42–43, 95–97, 100, 243n35, 244n36. See also authority; commands, normative; law; sanctions
social life, relations, practices, and conventions: and basic resources, 211–12; and bipolar thought, 120, 122; and blame, 129, 253n65; and claim interests, 259nn23,25; and claims, 259n23, 260n25; and cosmopolitan morality, 37; and deliberation, 56; and (directed) obligations, 13, 71, 123; and divine command theories, 31, 80; and inclusive domain of persons, 113–14, 116, 137; and interpersonal morality, 21, 35, 37, 60, 67, 72; and Mill, 257n59; and modern morality, 244n39; and morality, 14; and moral theories, 149n25; and obligations, 9, 71; personal relationships versus, 111; and promissory obligation, 108–10, 114–15, 253n6, 259n23; and relational morality, 14, 81–82, 104, 107, 111, 125, 146, 197–98, 208; and rescue from rocks, 216; and responsibility, 69, 266n11; and rights and claims, 103; and universality, 110; and voluntarism, 31, 33–34, 100. See also accountability; culture; groups; interpersonal morality; interpersonal recognition; law and legislative authorities; natural history of morality; promising and other practices; roles, social; social command theories; social ties, thick
social ties, thick, 122, 192, 193–94, 254nn10,22. See also friendship; political life
The Sources of Normativity (Korsgaard), 238n22, 241n13, 242n16, 244n40, 256nn47,52
special (privileged) standing: and accountability, 98–101; and claim interests, 167, 169; and contractualism, 184, 187; and (directed) obligations, 122; and disregard, 82; and joint commitment, 124; and moral wrongs, 166; and promissory obligation, 183; and relational morality, 166–67, 250n41. See also third party, harm of; third-party beneficiaries
species nature, 112, 116, 152, 258n5. See also biological humans; evolution; human nature
sports examples, 59–61, 63, 158
Sreenivasan, Gopal, 236n14, 237n16, 258n12, 259n15, 260n26, 267n15
Stern, Robert, 237n15
strangers, 107, 113–14, 118–19, 139, 193. See also gouty-toed stranger example; nonhumans
Strawson, P. F., 69, 70, 84–85, 99–100, 248n9
subjective (psychological) facts: and accountability, 128–29, 132–33; and bipolar thought, 153; incapacities, 241n13; and individualist accounts, 256n53; and information, 29; and joint projects, 112; and nonnaturalist realism, 256n54; obligations versus, 133; and practical identity, 241nn13,16, 244n42; and presumptive constraints, 126–28, 133–34; and promissory obligation, 108, 134; reasons versus, 106, 126–29, 130, 131–32, 133, 256n54; and relational morality, 106, 128, 129–30; and universality, 131–32. See also attitudes of agents; deliberation (moral reasoning); epistemic constraints; foreseeability; Humean theories; intentions; interests
surgical procedure example, 202
sympathy, 112
System 1 and System 2 processes, 254n14
“Taking It Personally” (Chaplin), 251n41
talents, 155
Taurek, John, 271n49
temporal distance, 160
temptation, 241n16
Theory X, 269n31
third party, harm of, 182, 195–99, 221–33, 250n41, 251n43, 253n57
third-party beneficiaries, 7, 156, 157–58, 162, 181–82, 183, 196, 198, 237n16, 251n43
third-party claims, 251n43
third-party forgiveness, 250n41
Thompson, Michael: and antecedent relationships, 125; and bipolar thought, 119–22, 148, 246n61, 254n24, 255n35, 258n5, 259n16; and (directed) obligations, 236n12; on directed-obligations, 236n12; on Humean conception of moral right, 253n8; on justice, 254nn24,29, 255n29; and natural goodness, 244n41; and on private criminal law, 252n54; and relational morality, 246n61, 254n24; and self-standing order of right, 109–10. See also Life and Action; virtue theory (perfectionism); “What Is It to Wrong Someone?”
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 2, 236n8, 241n12, 260n26, 273n61
thought and action, 31, 104, 241n14. See also deliberation (moral reasoning)
“Three Dogmas about Promising” (Gilbert), 255nn36–40, 256n42
Timmy’s consent example, 183
“to-be-done”/“not-to-be-done” (right and wrong in generic sense), 34–36, 49–50, 55–57, 184–85, 188–89, 226, 231, 237n20, 263n56. See also high-level, right-making properties; moral right and wrong; “must”; practical requirements
“To Blame or to Forgive?” (Lacey and Pickard), 252n56
Tognazzini, Neal A., 247n8
Tomasello, Michael, 112–13, 113–14, 254n17
torts, 2, 93, 164n57, 197, 251n45
transactional obligation, 16, 50–54, 110
transcendental arguments, 16
tribes, 16, 112, 113, 119, 121
trolley examples, 219–21, 226, 272n58, 273n61
The Trolley Problem Mysteries (Kamm), 272nn57,59
trust, 48, 74, 102, 111, 129, 168–69, 245n46
Unger, Peter, 268n24
unity of interpersonal domain, 4, 36
unity of moral realm, 21, 226, 255n24
“unity with fellow creatures” (Mill), 257n59
universality (of morality): and agent-relativity, 135; and antecedent interactions, 111; and bipolar thought, 120, 150; and directed-obligations, 122; and divine command theory, 41–42; and equal standing, 117; and individualism, 131–32, 134; and interests, 23; and manifold of moral persons, 148; and natural history of morality, 113–14; and relational morality, 23, 111, 113–14, 119, 121, 124, 131–32, 134; and social conventions, 110; and subjective facts, 131–32; and utilitarianism, 113–14. See also manifold (class) of moral persons
universalizability, 35
universities example, 152
utilitarianism: and accountability, 86–87;
and agent-relativity, 39, 243n27; and blame, 77–78, 249n21; and cosmopolitan morality, 39; and defeasible constraints, 243n28; and empathy domain, 116; group morality versus, 114; as individualistic, 77; and moral right and wrong, 35, 39–41; and obligations, 39–41; and opprobrium, 249n21; and relational morality, 41; Scanlon on, 240n34; and self-indulgence, 138; and universality, 113–14; Williams on, 267n22. See also consequentialism; Greene, Joshua and other utilitarians
vacation decision example, 28, 29
vaccine for children example, 222–23, 273n65
“The Very Thought of (Wronging) You” (Zylberman), 264n57, 266n13
vices, 27
virtue theory (perfectionism): and accountability, 78, 79, 81; and agent relativity, 45–46; and bipolar thought, 254n24; and blame, 79, 249nn23,25; and claim-rights, 2; and cosmopolitan morality, 46; and (directed) obligations, 44–47; and interests, 46, 138–39; and Malay servant example, 245n46. See also Foot, Philippa; justice and other virtues; Thompson, Michael
volitional necessity, 241n13
voluntarism: and accountability, 81; and attitudes, 246n60; and cosmopolitan morality, 42; and deliberation, 34; and (directed) obligations, 41–44, 58, 96–97, 144n36, 238nn20,21; and gratitude, 252n51, 267n17; hypothetical, 244n35; and practical requirements, 31, 33–34, 238n20; private law model versus, 100; and rationality, 241n14; and reasons, 244n37, 250n27; and relational morality, 25, 58–59, 238n21, 252n51, 258n10. See also Darwall, Stephen; divine command theories; social command theories
voluntary acts, 5, 155–56, 193, 194, 217
vulnerability and power, 237n15, 265n4
Waldron, Jeremy, 239n31
“War and Massacre” (Nagel), 257n61
warning, duties of, 175
well-being, individual, 20, 160, 161–62, 182, 192, 230–32. See also aggregation (numbers); future generations; mutual aid; non-identity problem
“What is Egalitarianism” (Scheffler), 254n23
“What Is It to Wrong Someone?” (Thompson), 236n12, 246n61, 252n54, 253nn7,8, 255nn27–29, 256n45, 258n5, 259n16
“What’s the Point of Blame?” (Fricker), 248n17, 251n47
What We Owe to Each Other (Scanlon), 235nn1,6, 237n19, 240n4, 242n21, 245n57, 246n64, 247nn66,69, 253nn60,3, 256n55, 257nn61,64,4, 258n6, 259n21, 262n44, 263nn47,56, 264n58, 271n46
“Whether and Where to Give” (Pummer), 267n21
“Who Is Wronged?” (Anscombe), 272nn53,54
Why Worry about Future Generations? (Scheffler), 269n31, 270n45
the will, 3, 4, 26, 65, 67–86, 69, 84–85
Williams, Bernard: on authority of the moral, 238n22; and conflicts of duty, 64–65; and (directed) obligations, 105–6, 111, 241n13, 247n70; on intimate relationships, 247n70; and “morality system,” 242n21; on moral self-indulgence, 138–39; and mutual aid, 267n22; and relational morality, 254n17. See also “A Critique of Utilitarianism”; Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; “Internal and External Reasons”; “Moral Incapacity”; “Moral Luck”
withdrawal and avoidance, 71, 74, 102–3, 113, 129, 195
wronging. See moral injury or wrong
“Wronging Future People” (Kumar), 269n37
“Wrongness and Reasons” (Scanlon), 242nn18–20
“Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties” (Cornell), 251n43, 266nn9,10