As the preceding pages have shown, there were many reasons why the United States suppressed publication in Japan of material about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The security of the United States, which, it was said, demanded secrecy about the bomb, was one. Fear of criticism of the United States by Japanese was another. The campaign of impressing war guilt on the Japanese was also involved. But above all there was concern about the reputation of the United States. An often-stated reason for suppression was that the material gave the impression that the United States was inhumane or barbaric in using the atomic bomb.
The question of security had been of great importance from the start of the atomic bomb project. The bomb was developed with Great Britain as a junior partner, but the third great ally of the United States, the Soviet Union, was not even told of its existence. At Potsdam in July 1945 when President Truman mentioned to Stalin that the United States had a new weapon, he explained nothing about the nature of that weapon. Stalin showed little interest. There is a debate among historians as to whether he did not understand the importance of what Truman said or, on the contrary, whether he knew only too well what Truman meant, because Soviet spies had long been involved with the projects.
After the war ended, a debate ensued in the United States over the extent to which information about the atomic bomb should be made available to the rest of the world. The opinion prevailed that maximum secrecy should be maintained. It was acknowledged, however, that the United States would not be able to keep its nuclear monopoly forever, and moves were made to arrange, under the auspices of the United Nations, for an international control organ for atomic energy. The United States officially supported these efforts. At the same time, while conventional military forces were reduced, there was a policy of reliance on the relatively cheap atomic weapon, trusting that the United States would remain the only nuclear power for some time.
Even when it was realized that this exclusive ownership could only last a few years, at most, secrecy was advocated for the momentary advantage it gave. As Edwin Teller, the "father of the hydrogen bomb," put it, "For a few short years after the end of World War II, justification for our continued nuclear secrecy seemed substantial. We had an atomic monopoly and in our arrogance we believed that the scientists of other nations would require decades to rediscover our atomic secrets.... Secrecy it was thought, could perform a high service: It could provide security."1
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in more terse sentences, said that the United States should "make every possible effort to maintain this advantage [the atomic bomb monopoly], and to advance more rapidly in scientific warfare than any other nation. To this end it should be our firm policy to provide for ... maintenance of the highest possible degree of secrecy with respect to the atomic bomb and refusal to give these secrets to any other nation or to the United Nations organization."2
As for Japanese atomic bomb material, the possibility that it might contain something detrimental to the security of the United States often lead to protracted checking between different agencies, both within SCAP and within departments and agencies in the United States. A decision on whether such material could be published could take several years, as was the case with the manuscripts of Japanese scientists who had investigated the effects of the bombings. There was, however, a certain confusion as to why Japanese manuscripts should be suppressed. Sometimes, it seemed, they were checked from a purely scientific viewpoint or for "technical accuracy." At other times, the security of the United States was the paramount consideration.
The very first case of material suppressed because of references to the atomic bombings was that of Domei in September 1945. The news agency was closed down for twenty-four hours for having written that Japan might not have lost the war if it had not been for the atomic bomb, and that the atomic bombings were barbaric acts. Two forbidden statements were the prime offenders: one gave an explanation for the war's end that was contrary to the American version and showed not a trace of "war guilt" on the Japanese part, and the second was a judgment on the United States for having used the atomic bombs.
A third reason given for suppressing nonscientific material about the atomic bombings was that it might cause resentment of the United States.
One of the stated purposes of the Occupation was to demilitarize Japan. To do this, the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP undertook special campaigns, during which the Japanese were informed about atrocities that their military had committed during the war. These campaigns included material for publication or broadcast. In addition, many school books, especially in subjects like history, which had been used for militaristic propaganda, were banned for a long period, in some subjects more than a year. Only gradually were they replaced by new ones. Blacklisted books of all kinds were collected from bookshops by special American teams. These books included classical Japanese works that were deemed to contain "emperor worship."3 The work got underway early in the Occupation. At the beginning of October 1945 a SCAP report noted that there was "little consciousness of war guilt when the occupation forces entered Tokyo. . . . there was widespread belief that Japan's defeat was due solely to industrial and scientific inferiority and to the atomic bomb."4
To the Americans, the Domei statement that Japan would not have lost the war had it not been for the atomic bomb must have seemed proof that the Japanese saw their defeat as being caused by something other than their own shortcomings or, as the war guilt campaigns tried to instill, their evil, inhuman acts. (Curiously enough, forty-five years after the end of the war, many Americans and others continue to believe that Japan surrendered only because of the atomic bombings. Some justify the American use the atomic bomb as necessary to save the lives of a great number of American soldiers, varying from a few hundred thousand to one million.)
"Lack of war guilt" could also be expressed in a sentence like "many innocent people were killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki."5 This was deleted, and one can only suppose that it was because, in the eyes of the censors, Japanese should not be allowed to feel they were innocent and that the atomic bomb was used for no reason. Even young Masako Ishida mentioned that defeat made her feel mortified.6 In her case, though, the censor did not pay special attention to what could possibly be labeled as lack of war guilt. Instead, he pointed out that her book as a whole might bring resentment against the United States.
The question of how the Japanese would react toward the Americans was one of the most worrisome and incalculable factors when it became clear that Japan would surrender. It had been taken for granted that if the planned invasion had taken place, it would have been followed by heavy, protracted fighting like that during the invasion of Okinawa in the spring of 1945. It was expected that resistance on the so-called home islands would be even greater. But there was no fighting, just a landing. How would the Americans be received? With hatred or with submissiveness? Most, although not General MacArthur, thought with hatred. The war had been fierce, the Japanese were pictured as fanatics, and now their country would be occupied for the first time in history. Since March, the United States had firebombed their cities to ruins, burning down practically all of Tokyo and most other cities too. In addition, they had destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs. Minister of War Henry Stimson, who had thought much about the possible effects of the atomic bomb, wrote in his diary that he feared that the "bitter-ness which would be caused by such a wanton act [as the pondered atomic bombing of the old capital Kyoto] might make it impossible during the long postwar period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians."7
To have the Japanese think too much about what had happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would possibly lead to resentment of the United States. When Dr. Nagai wrote about the horrors of Nagasaki with its destroyed medical equipment and dead medical personnel, the censors thought that such a book would be a constant reminder of what the Japanese had suffered at the hand of the Allies. Now or in the future, such a book might raise anti-American feelings.
In addition to these reasons, the censors and censoring agencies also suppressed material because it was said to give the impression that the Americans had been inhumane in using the atomic bomb.
The moral question of whether to use the bomb or not was a basic question wrestled with at all levels as the bomb was being developed. There was never any consensus among Americans regarding its use, once it became clear that it would not be ready in time to use against Germany but would be used against Japan. Politicians, scientists, and the military expressed their opposition to a weapon that had such terrible effects. Admiral William Leahy, chief of staff to presidents Roosevelt and Truman, wrote:
My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. . . . [Using the atomic bomb] would take us back in cruelty toward noncombatants to the days of Genghis Khan. It will be a form of pillage and rape of a society done impersonally by one state against another whereas in the Dark Ages it was a result of individual greed and vandalism. These new and terrible instruments of uncivilized warfare represent a modern type of barbarism not worthy of Christian man.8
Secretary of War Stimson, who had said that "the reputation of the United States for fair play and humanitarianism is the world's biggest asset for peace in the coming decades," wrote that the atomic bomb raised issues that "went right down to the bottom facts of human nature, morals and government."9 He had already been concerned during the fire bombings of Japanese cities: "I did not want to have the United States get the reputation for outdoing Hitler in atrocities."10
Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard advocated that Japan be warned before it was atom bombed, giving as his reason that the United States occupied a position as a great humanitarian nation with a fair-play attitude.11
The scientists who had developed the bomb were also concerned about the moral aspects of using it. Edward Teller writes that most of the Los Alamos scientists were "profoundly disturbed by the questionable morality of using the atomic bomb without first warning the Japanese. After Nagasaki, the moral doubts deepened."12 In a special report, the so-called Franck Report, several of the scientists voiced a deep concern and warned that if the United States used the atomic bomb, "this new means of indiscriminate destruction," public support throughout the world would be sacrificed. The report talked about loss of confidence in the United States and the wave of horror and repulsion that would sweep the world.13
Albert Einstein wrote to President Roosevelt that any military advantages of nuclear weapons would be offset by the political and psychological damage to American prestige.14
According to President Truman, on his part the decision to use the atomic bomb was taken without any second thoughts.15 But others continued to be concerned about the moral effects. In the spring of 1945 Stimson wrote that "certain things . . . must be done ... to avoid the risk of grave repercussions on the public in general and on Congress in particular." By this he meant that arrangements must be made for special, "appropriate" publicity about the atomic bomb.16
The Japanese, on the other hand, had no interest in protecting the reputation of the United States. On August 11, 1945, in a dispatch through the Swiss Embassy, which represented Japan, the Japanese government formally protested against the atomic bombings and declared them a crime against international law.17 Radio Tokyo sent out detailed reports describing Hiroshima as a city of death, where sufferers pleaded to be killed. Domei sent overseas dispatches telling how reconstruction workers became ill and how the toll of dead mounted weeks after the bombing. This included special propaganda programs intended for American soldiers. In one such program from Radio Tokyo, two persons named John and Sam discussed "A New Weapon." They tried to refute American charges of Japanese atrocities by belittling them, saying they were difficult to prove and, not the least, comparing them to the atomic bomb.
Sam: Oh, I guess that [the atomic bomb] will make our reputation go up like a ... we have already killed thousands of innocent civilians with them.
John: Say, how come you're talking as though you don't want to win this war?
Sam: I want to be fair. I want to win the war as much as you do, but slaughtering innocent civilians isn't my idea of winning a victory. It's against our principles, constitution, in fact it's against the principles of humanity.
John: Everything is fair in love and war, Sam, and if the atom bombs will bring us a quick victory, why not?
Sam: Oh, I don't think that victory means just hitting below the belt or stabbing a man in the back—real victory.18
However justified the Japanese protests against the atomic bombings seem to be, they were of the same type made by the government for propaganda purposes. Above all, they did not seem to reflect genuine concern for atomic bomb survivors, even less for the future of the world. The Japanese researcher Yukuo Sasamoto accuses both the Japanese and the Americans of using the atomic bombings in an information and propaganda war. The Japanese government, according to his analysis, moved between appeasing the victorious United States, on the one hand, and exploiting the facts about the effects of the bombings to squeeze out better surrender conditions for itself, on the other. For appeasement, the Japanese government did not use the word "atomic bomb" in the official protest, something Sasamoto sees as lenient toward the United States. In any case, it did not help the survivors or defend their human rights. He also sees Japanese cooperation in surveys of atomic bomb damage as only helping the United States in its weapon and defense needs. The results were not used for alleviating illnesses and improving material conditions for the survivors. Sasamoto sees the widespread Japanese dissemination of information about the horrible effects in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the accusations that the United States broke international law by using the atomic bomb, as only a government attempt immediately after the bombings to create a bargaining chip, never made with the intention of supporting the cause of the survivors.19
The reaction of the U.S. administration to the Japanese accusations was to call them propaganda. Even the official Japanese protest against the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was referred only to experts on Japanese propaganda, and they were of the opinion that the Japanese might be trying to "capitalize on the horror of the atomic bombing in an effort to win sympathy from their conquerors." By bringing out allegations "offensive to American humanitarianism," they might be "trying to shorten the occupation and lessen reparations."20
Through the listening post of Magic, which had broken the code of the Japanese foreign ministry, the American government could follow communications between Tokyo and Japanese embassies abroad right until the end of their operation in the middle of September 1945. The Japanese ambassador in Lisbon, Morishima, thought that when it came to the question of war crimes, Japan could expose the United States, since the use of the atomic bomb "inescapably" must be regarded as a crime against humanity. No distinction should be made between victors and vanquished before the law.21 Three days later, on September 13, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu sent a report to the Japanese legations in Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal informing them about Japanese newspaper reports from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was also pointed out that Domei had broadcast the full details abroad. The foreign minister now wanted to know to what extent Domei's reports had been carried by news media in those countries. According to Shigemitsu, the United States had been "raising an uproar" about Japanese mistreatment of prisoners. He thought that Japan "should make every effort to exploit the atomic bomb question in our propaganda." He wanted advice from the Japanese legations abroad on whether this would be desirable.22
The Japanese ambassadors in Stockholm and Berne urged Tokyo to avoid creating an impression that it was conducting a propaganda campaign. But the ambassador to Sweden, Okamoto, had another idea that might allow Japan to accomplish the same goals "unobtrusively." He suggested that announcements should be made for home consumption only, but then be carried by British and Americans news agencies abroad. English and American journalists should also be made to write stories about atomic bomb damage. In this way the world would get a "powerful impression."23 At least one independent reporter, the Australian Wilfred Burchett, was accused by the American military of exactly that—falling prey to Japanese propaganda—when he wrote about the conditions he had personally observed in Hiroshima.
The Japanese ambassador in Portugal reported that the Japanese accounts of the atomic bombs were carried in Portuguese media, but that the reports about Japanese atrocities had overshadowed them. He suggested that the Apostolic Nuncio in Japan be furnished with facts. That "might be rather effective," the ambassador thought.24
There the Magic summaries stop, for the simple reason that communication between the Foreign Ministry and its legations ended. The Occupation authorities had taken over control. Already almost a week earlier Domei had had to stop its transmissions abroad. It was no longer possible for the Japanese government to influence the reporting about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Neither were there many possibilities for the survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to tell their version of the atomic bombings.
For the American Occupation authorities, the risk that the United States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane remained in their minds. Sometimes they tried to balance accounts that gave such an impression by accounts of Japanese atrocities, as reasoned in the case of Dr. Nagai. The United States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan, for its barbarous acts in the war, as General Willoughby categorically explained. As has been shown above, this was a view that permeated the whole Occupation policy.
The censorship of material about Hiroshima and Nagasaki reflected American concerns not only about the security of the United States and of its Occupation troops but also about the moral implications of using nuclear weapons. The concerns did not originate in Japanese propaganda or even among the atomic bomb victims. They had already for some time been aired among American politicians, military, and scientists involved with the manufacture and use of the atomic bomb.