CHAPTER ONE. FRANCE
1. The size and composition of an escadre was dependent on the theater of operations and its assigned tasks.
2. Earlier coastal submarines had been competitive designs by the private shipbuilders to meet specified staff requirements.
3. Squadron designation had a first letter denoting type: A = Avion (aircraft), H = Hydravion (seaplane/floatplane); and a second letter denoting primary mission: C = Chasse (fighter), B = Bombardement (bomber), S = Surveillance (reconnaissance).
4. Trunnion height was a consideration; the early models of the 138-mm gun carried by the contre-torpilleurs were only 40 calibers long.
5. The Italian Zaras were equally impressive, but their designed displacement was well above treaty limits.
CHAPTER THREE. GREAT BRITAIN
1. These figures should be regarded as approximate. The naval estimates are quoted from David K. Brown, Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design 1923–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 18; total spending comes from Peter Howlett, “New Light through Old Windows: A New Perspective on the British Economy in the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 28, no. 2 (April 1993): 362. The 1939 figure of £254 million is approximately £60 billion in 2008 pounds, calculated as a share of gross domestic product, and not much higher than the United Kingdom’s 2005 military expenditures of £42.8 billion.
2. John Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War Two (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 81.
3. Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945: The Offensive (London: HMSO, 1961), 436.
4. I. C. B. Dear, The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1060; and Michael M. Postan, Britsh War Production (London: HMSO, 1952), 292–302. Major ships exclude landing craft, torpedo boats, and smaller auxiliary vessels.
5. Mass Observation 1940 report on British attitudes to World War II. Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex.
6. Joseph Schull, Far Distant Ships (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1950), 429.
1. Erminio Bagnasco and Enrico Cernuschi, Le navi da guerra italiane 1940–1945 (Parma: Albertelli, 2005), 350.
2. W. H. Beehler, The History of the Italian-Turkish War (Annapolis, MD: The Advertiser-Republican, 1913), 107.
3. John Gooch, Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42.
4. MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 88 and 94.
5. Ibid., 30.
6. Raymond de Belot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 41.
7. Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (London: Chatham Publishing, 1998), 48.
8. Quoted in G. H. Bennett and R. Bennett, Hitler’s Admirals (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 111.
9. Ibid.
10. de Belot, Struggle for the Mediterranean, 271.
11. Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome, Ministero della Marina, Direttive e norme per l’impiego della squadra nel conflitto attuale, January 1942, Part 1, 15.
12. Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 63–64.
13. John Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War Two (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 318.
14. Angelo Iachino, Tramonto di una grande marina (Verona: Alberto Mondadori, 1966), 62–63.
15. Giuliano Colliva. “Questioni di tiro . . . e altre. Le artiglierie navali italiane nella Guerra nel Mediterraneo.” Bollettino d’archivio dell’Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, Anno XVII, September 2003.
16. “Direttive e Norme,” January 1942, Part 1, 10.
17. Brian Lavery, Churchill’s Navy (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2006), 54.
18. Samuel Eliot Morison, Operations in North African Wars October 1942–June 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).
19. James Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), xviii.
CHAPTER FIVE. JAPAN
1. Much of this essay draws upon a major work by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
2. The IGHQ established in 1937 was the third such institution in the history of the navy. The first had been established at the outset of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and abolished after the war. The second IGHQ was constituted during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905, but was also subsequently abolished.
3. Arthur Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Vol. 1, Strategic Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 285–292.
4. Chihaya Masataka, Nihon kaigun no senryaku hassō [Strategic concepts of the Japanese navy] (Tokyo: Purejidentosha, 1990), 105–106.
5. The U.S. Navy was not able to solve JN-25 before 1941 but was reading some of one version by that year; by the spring of 1942, its progress on JN-25 was so dramatic that it was able to achieve one of the great intelligence coups of World War II: the decryption of Japanese messages in JN-25 that led to the ambush of the Japanese strike force heading toward Midway. See Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II (New York: Touchstone Press, Simon and Schuster, 2000), 16–17; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 422–423; and Michael Barnhart, “Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War: ‘The Best Case Analysis,’” in Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment between the Two World Wars, ed. Ernest A. May (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 447.
6. A brilliant approach to the problem of synthesizing and sharing of aviation technology among the various Japanese aircraft companies and with the government, the system is explained in Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 27–28.
7. The term logistics is used here in its twofold sense: first the concern for materiel—weapons, ordnance, equipment, fuel, stores, and provisions—and second, the procedures—planning, allocation, transport, construction, and transfer techniques—involved in providing all these things to a navy’s warships at sea or to the navy’s land bases overseas.
8. Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949).
CHAPTER 6. USA
1. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 77–149.
2. Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War Two (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1959), 54 and 65–66.
3. Ibid., 19.
4. John T. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 8–22.
5. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department, 64.
6. Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 493.
7. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1945 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), 206–207.
8. Thomas C. Hone and Trent Hone, Battle Line: The United States Navy: 1919–1939 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 66.
9. Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 697–698, 701.
10. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department, 276.
11. Ibid., 119.
12. F.T.P. 143, War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934, p. 87, Naval Historical Center, World War 2 Command File, Box 108.
13. The phrase “attack effectively first” was introduced by Wayne Hughes, who called it the “tactical maxim of all naval battles.” See Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 25.
14. Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, iiv.
15. I. C. B. Dear and Michael Richard Daniel Foot, Oxford Companion to World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 66.
16. Timothy S. Wolters, Managing a Sea of Information: Shipboard Command and Control in the United States Navy, 1899–1945 (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), 187.
17. Hone and Hone, Battle Line, 1.
18. C.I.C. Bulletin, February 1945, National Archives, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Record Group 38, Box 1694.
19. Buford Rowland and William B. Boyd, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 223.
20. Ibid., 168–171.
21. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), 106–107.
22. Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1992 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 181.
23. Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), v.
24. Thomas C. Hone with Trent C. Hone, “The Pacific Naval War as One Coherent Campaign, 1941–1945,” International Journal of Naval History 2, no. 2 (August 2003), http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume2_number2_Aug03/wip_hone_pacwar_aug03.htm.
CHAPTER 7. USSR
1. “U.S.S.R. Navy,” Division of Naval Intelligence Report OP-16, PA-5, Serial No. 40-43, Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 30 November 1943; available online at the Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=90, accessed 4 November 2008, 10.
2. Bradley F. Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 77; and R. C. S. Garwood, “The Russians as Naval Allies 1941–45,” in The Soviet Navy, ed. M. G. Saunders (New York: Praeger, 1958), 81–82.
3. “U.S.S.R. Navy,” 10–11.
4. Robert W. Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 8; Jak P. Mallmann Showell, German Naval Code Breakers (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 24–25; and Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin, 62, 182.
5. There is a useful appendix listing landing operations and the forces involved in A.V. Basov, ed., Boevoi put’ Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo flota (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1988), 546–552.
6. Kemp Tolley, Caviar and Commissars: The Experiences of a U.S. Naval Officer in Stalin’s Russia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 261, 264.
7. V. Iu. Gribovskii, writing in I. D. Spasskii, ed., Istoriia otechestvennogo sudostroeniia (St. Petersburg: Sudostroenie, 1996), 4:137.
8. Ibid.
9. Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 101, 107, 115. See also Jürgen Rohwer, Allied Submarine Attacks of World War Two: European Theatre of Operations 1939–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
10. Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents, 25.
11. Russkii arkhiv/Velikaia Otechestvennaia (Moscow: Terra, 1999), series 5, vol. 3: Stavka Verkhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniia: Dokumenty i materially 1943 god, 221.
12. A. S. Kiselev, ed., Admiral Kuznetsov: Moskva v zhizni i sud’be flotovodtsa: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 2000), 175–177.
13. R. C. S. Garwood, “The Russians as Naval Allies 1941–45,” 77.
14. Iu. L. Korshunov and A. A. Strokov, Torpedy VMF SSSR (St. Petersburg: Gangut, 1994), 18.
15. Philip Vian, Action This Day: A War Memoir (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1960), 66.
16. A. V. Platonov, “Sovetskie torpednye katera v bor’be s morskimi perebozkami protivnika,” Gangut, no. 47 (2008): 88.