THE ORIGIN OF THE Battle of Flers-Courcelette, which commenced on 15 September, lay back in the middle of August when Haig sent a memo ordering Rawlinson to prepare plans for an all-out offensive with the aim of capturing the original German Third Line defensive system. Haig considered that the second half of September 1916 would mark the decisive phase of the ‘wearing out battle’ that the Fourth and Fifth Armies had been waging on the Somme. This was the time to amass all the British reserves and strike the tottering Germans.
The general plan of the attack projected for the middle of September will be to establish a defensive flank on the high ground south of the Ancre, norm of the Albert–Bapaume road, and to press the main attack south of the Albert–Bapaume road with the objective of securing the enemy’s last line of prepared defences between Morval and Le Sars, with a view to opening the way for the cavalry.1
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
The trials and tribulations of much of the fighting in August and early September had originated in the pressing need to attain a good start line—one that was not fatally undermined by the presence of German strong points, which could catch the advancing British troops in enfilade in the next attacks. All that agonising, long drawn out struggle had still left some key strong points in the German’s grasp—most evidently in the splintered remnants of High Wood. By the time the British were ready for the next stage the Germans had, of course, significantly strengthened their defensive positions. That the ‘last shall be first’ was now literally true, as the German Third Line, such as it was on 1 July, was now the German First Line.
Although the new obstacles did not have the deep sunk dugouts of the original defences, they were still a formidable obstacle to further progress. In addition, the development of German tactics to encompass placing machine gunners in neighbouring shell holes was particularly effective, and it should be remembered that in many sectors the forward German defences had been reduced to little more than a line of connected shell holes after the recent attentions of the British artillery. Unfortunately the ferocious fighting in August had demonstrated that every string of shell holes left by the crashing shells of the British high explosive barrage was a potential additional line of defence for the Germans. Artillery bombardments had to cover not just the main lines but also all the cratered area that surrounded them—this meant that ever more guns and shells were necessary to attain the same results.
Yet just as the British were encountering the renewed logistical problems that such a huge artillery effort thrust upon them, so there appeared a new weapon of war that offered a slim hope of shattering the deadlock on the Somme. The origins of the tank lie in a number of simultaneous brainwaves by an army desperate for some kind of armoured vehicle that could both burst through barbed wire to clear a way for the infantry and carry guns or machine guns across No Man’s Land.
After a fairly prolonged gestation the results were two variants of a tracked vehicle: the lozenge-shaped Mark I ‘tank’, as the new weapon of war was known—probably in recognition of its outward resemblance to a water tank. The ‘Male’ tank was armed with two 6-pounder guns held in protruding sponsons clamped on to either side, with an additional four machine guns for good measure; the ‘Female’ tank had six machine guns. These machine guns could enfilade German trenches to great effect, while the ‘Male’ tank’s guns could blast away fortified posts. Tracks on the tank enabled it to surmount difficult ground conditions, crush its way through barbed wire, cross trenches and generally surmount obstacles at an overall top speed of just under 4 miles per hour. Yet its abilities should not be over-exaggerated. The tank was armoured, but this was no defence at all against any shell fire, and small arms weapons could cause ‘splashes’ of white hot metal to whirr round inside the tank to painful effect. Wide trenches, deep craters and mud, and tree stumps all brought the tanks sooner or later to a halt. The crew of eight were also severely limited in what they could achieve by the dreadful working environment inside the tank. Visibility was extremely restricted through the narrow slits, which made it difficult to avoid dangerous obstacles or to seek out enemies. Although the tanks looked big the engine filled most of the available space and it made its presence felt in no uncertain terms: the noise was deafening, the heat utterly enervating and its noxious fumes quickly poisoned the atmosphere. After a few hours the crews were good for nothing. Unfortunately, the sheer mechanical unreliability of the tanks meant that this was usually of little importance as the tanks often broke down well before the crew’s health became a problem.
Haig was probably the most effective champion of the tank in the early days in that he not only quickly appreciated its potential but also, unlike so many of the vainglorious buffoons who subsequently made the Tank Corps their career, he had the power to get things done.
I saw Colonel Swinton with Generals Butler and Whigham (the Deputy CIGS) regarding the ‘Tanks’. I was told that 150 would be provided by 31 July. I said that was too late. Fifty were urgently required for 1 June. Swinton is to see what can be done, and will also practise and train ‘tanks’ and crews over obstacles and wire similar to the ground over which the attack will be made. I gave him a trench map as a guide and impressed on him the necessity for thinking over the system of leadership and control of a group of ‘tanks’ with a view to manoeuvring.2
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Already Haig was thinking about how the tanks should be used in action and pondering on some of the command and control problems that would bedevil the tanks in action. It was also apparent that the question of integrating these tanks into the complex mix of artillery and infantry tactics would not be a simple matter. The Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps were themselves short of training and most of the infantry had had little or no opportunity to train alongside them.
I was present at a demonstration in the use of ‘Tanks’. A battalion of infantry and five Tanks operated together. Three lines of trenches were assaulted. The Tanks crossed the several lines with the greatest ease, and one entered a wood, which represented a ‘strong point’ and easily walked over fair sized trees of six inches through! Altogether the demonstration was quite encouraging, but we require to clear our ideas as to the tactical handling of these machines.3
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Some people have claimed that Haig should have withheld the use of this ‘super-weapon’ until there were sufficient numbers to end the war in a single mighty stroke. Such fantasies ignore the natural weft and weave of weapon development. The 1916 Mark I tank was by no means the fully fledged article of war: there were simply too few available, they were mechanically unreliable in the extreme, too slow and cumbersome and with limited powers of both offence and defence. Until weapons have been used in active service conditions it is almost impossible to judge their efficacy in action, to carry out the development work to eradicate technical problems, or to train the crews under the pressures of battle and generally to develop the tanks as effective weapons of war within the total effort. After all, the Battle of the Somme was no skirmish—it was the major Allied effort of 1916, and Britain was very much the junior partner in the coalition with France. As such it was a ‘kitchen sink’ battle—everything was thrown in that might add weight to the battering ram of British arms and thereby finally overthrow the brick wall of German resistance in September 1916.
There was much discussion as to their use—whether we should wait until we had built up a bigger form of them, and had the personnel more highly trained. The main argument in favour of their use was that the Germans did definitely know we had some new instrument, but had not yet found out what it was. If we waited, they would find out and might—we do not know—have found a suitable reply. Also we learn more by one day’s active work with them than from a year’s theorising. When we use them next time we shall have improved by this experience; it is still not too late to make an alteration in design if necessary. Above all, this is a vital battle and we should be in error to throw away anything that might increase our chance of success.4
Brigadier General John Charteris, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
THERE WERE MANY sources of raw data as to the state of German morale both at the front and back at home. One key indicator that all was not well was the recent change in the German High Command. Commanders are not usually replaced while their strategies are bearing fruit and the replacement on 29 August 1916 of the Chief of General Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn by General Paul von Hindenburg and his First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff was a sign that the German plans for 1916 were in ruins. The Verdun offensive had rebounded against them, the Somme was one long nightmare for the German Army, the Russians were once again stirring on the Eastern Front and Romania had joined the Allies on 27 August. Translations of German newspapers exposed a great deal about the country’s internal tensions, while reports from neutral countries, captured orders and briefings revealed the German tactical plans and fears. Letters and diaries provided snapshots of morale and often details of scandals and food riots occurring in Germany that the newspapers did not always report. Even the German corpses revealed their units and helped the Allies draw up an accurate list of which divisions were in the line at any one time. Obviously prisoners were a fertile source of information: by their very age it was plain to see where the Germans had reached in their conscription of young men. Subsequent interrogations showed much about their personal morale and often revealed recent unit movements. There was thus much evidence to delineate the declining state of German morale, but at the same time there is no doubt that Brigadier Charteris had an optimistic approach to the interpretation of intelligence on the state of the German Army. He took all the reports of chaos in Germany, all the depressed letters and despondent prisoners and extrapolated from that the conviction that the Germans must be on the very point of collapse. This therefore was the advice he gave Haig.
On the ground the outlook was a good deal less optimistic. Faced once again with three German lines to overcome before any breakthrough could possibly be achieved, Rawlinson reverted to his usual caution and the proposals that he initially submitted to Haig were once again for a carefully staged approach. He was minded to attack at night, pause for a day or so, move up his artillery, and only then attack again. He considered that the gap between the new First, Second and Third German lines was cumulatively too wide to allow his field artillery to bombard the rear lines without moving forward. In this he was undoubtedly correct as the 18-pounders and 4.5-in howitzers, which made up the bulk of his artillery, only had an effective range of about 6,500 yards and they could not reach such distant targets. In addition, even the medium and heavy batteries that were capable of firing at long range were hampered by the carefully sited rear-slope positions of the German Second and Third Lines. Even with the best observational assistance of the Royal Flying Corps this was a crippling handicap to an accurate barrage.
When it came to the use of tanks, Rawlinson was equally cautious. When he had seen the tanks training in late August he was impressed by their obvious potential but was equally aware of their unresolved problems. He was left with a neatly balanced quandary that he found somewhat difficult to resolve.
The presence of the fifty ‘tanks’ however raises entirely new, but at the same time somewhat problematical, possibilities. Should they prove successful we might lose valuable time and miss an opportunity by confining our operations only to the capture of system (a) [the Combles–Martinpuich line] On the other hand we may, by expecting too much of the ‘tanks’, be tempted to undertake an operation which is beyond our power, and which might cause very heavy losses to the ‘tanks’ themselves and to the infantry engaged in their support. Moreover, if the attack failed, the secret of the ‘tanks’ would be given away once and for all. Setting aside the enormous value of first surprise the chief asset of the ‘tanks’ will be lost when they cease to be an unknown quantity. Till the enemy know exactly what they have to deal with they cannot arrange or prepare an antidote. We must therefore endeavour to keep them a mystery as long as possible.5
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Headquarters, Fourth Army
It is unsurprising that he built this desire to keep the nature of tanks a secret for as long as possible into his overall plan for a night attack aimed only at overwhelming the German front line. He reasoned that having seized their objectives before dawn the tanks could be withdrawn before daylight and hence leave the Germans none the wiser as to their true nature. Sadly, although he had grasped the tanks’ vulnerability to artillery fire he had failed to realise that in the dark, with their already severely restricted visibility, the tanks could not be driven over a rough, obstacle strewn terrain without very quickly coming to grief.
There is no doubt that Haig was considerably under-whelmed by the cautious nature of Rawlinson’s plans. Once again he felt Rawlinson was not aware of the necessity of maximising the potential gains of the attack. Already disgruntled by the overall failure of the August operations Haig was not willing to compromise.
I studied Rawlinson’s proposals for the September attack and for the use of the ‘Tanks’. In my opinion he is not making enough of the situation and the deterioration of the enemy’s troops. I think we should make our attack as strong and as violent as possible, and go as far as possible.6
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
Haig still hoped for a breakthrough battle. He was increasingly aware of the agitation from dissatisfied politicians and the ‘stellenbosched’ generals who had their own reasons for criticising the conduct of operations on the Western Front. And, of course, he was egged on by the encouraging intelligence reports originating from Charteris. Haig was keen to capitalise on the ‘known’ weakness of the German Army by making a vigorous effort to cut the Gordian knot of trench warfare once and for all.
During the two months that the Battle of the Somme has lasted the enemy has suffered repeated defeats and heavy losses, and has undergone many hardships. All this has undoubtedly told on his discipline and morale, and signs of deterioration in his troops are not wanting. The general offensive on all his fronts, which will be continued, has placed a great and prolonged strain on his power of resistance which strain will now be increased by the entry of Romania into the war. The reserves at the enemy’s disposal to meet a renewed attack are very limited and consist mainly of tired troops which have already suffered severely. Moreover, it is not unlikely that he will be compelled to transfer some of his reserves to his Eastern Front. The combined attacks to be launched by the French and British troops during the first week of September, and the counter-attacks by the enemy that are likely to result, will weaken him further and wear down the divisions now opposed to us. On our side several fresh divisions are still available to be thrown into the scale after these combined attacks have been carried out. We shall also have a new weapon of offence (some fifty tanks) which, coming as a surprise to the enemy, are likely to be of considerable moral and material assistance to us. In short, we are approaching a stage in the battle when bold and energetic action may give great—perhaps decisive—results, provided the requisite preparations are made in time and all ranks put forth their utmost efforts.7
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
At this stage in the Somme campaign Rawlinson was not in any position to attempt to contradict or thwart his increasingly impatient commander-in-chief. Any credit he had earned for his bold plan for 14 July had long since evaporated in the arid six weeks that had followed, devoid of any significant success. Yet Haig’s proposals were themselves flawed.
The general officer commanding Fourth Army, while pressing the attack on his whole front, will direct his main efforts to the capture, as quickly as possible, of Morval, Lesboeufs, Flers and Gueudecourt. Then, as soon as the necessary gap in the enemy’s defences in that area has been made, as strong as possible a force of cavalry, supported by other arms, will be passed through to establish a flank guard of all arms on the general line Morval–Le Transloy–Bapaume, and assist rolling up the enemy’s lines of defence to the north-westwards by operating against their flank and rear in cooperation with the attack which will continue to be pressed against their front. All arrangements are to be made with a view to overwhelming the enemy at the outset by a powerful assault, and following up every advantage gained with rapidity and vigour.8
General Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force
These proposals were radical indeed and repeated some of the mistakes made on 1 July. In trying to take all three lines and break through the German defences, Haig was running the risk of diluting the artillery preparation and thereby falling at the first hurdle. He was also intent on committing almost all the available reserves to the initial attack, which left little capacity to respond to unexpected developments, be they good or bad. The plan was also noticeably optimistic as to the chance of getting cavalry forward across the broken ground that would inevitably result from such a battle. Yet Rawlinson had no choice but to back down and he duly conformed to Haig’s intentions. They would indeed attack on a wide front, with each attacking corps using all three divisions on narrow fronts to maximise the impact of the attack. The main thrust, however, would be concentrated on the narrower front centred on Flers.
Once again, the artillery bombardment would be at the very centre of the British plans. Over the previous months the Royal Artillery had gained much experience in both theoretical and practical gunnery. The debate as to the best type of artillery barrages in support of major attacks had been heated. Should they be long and pounding or short hurricane waves of destruction? Should the infantry be covered by creeping barrages of high explosive or shrapnel shell? How close could the infantry get to the back of the barrage before the ‘friendly-fire’ casualties outweighed the advantages? How many guns should be brought up ready to go forward just behind the infantry to extend the support given by the artillery in the event of success?
For the Battle of Flers-Courcelette to be launched on 15 September 1916, there would be approximately one field gun per 10 yards of front, with a medium or heavy gun every 29 yards of front. This was approximately twice the concentration achieved on 1 July. The day of the really heavy bombardment was dawning. In the three day preliminary bombardment some 828,000 shells were fired. The concept of a creeping barrage was now firmly accepted by all, although the attacking corps still made its own arrangements in dividing up its artillery between a creeping barrage moving at 50 yards per minute some 100 yards ahead of the advancing infantry and a stationary barrage continually pounding the objectives. The vital question of counter-battery fire was still not sufficiently well appreciated, but, on the other hand, improvements had been made, with some fifty-six guns and howitzers being specifically assigned to the task with observation supplied by the Royal Flying Corps. Meanwhile, arrangements were made to move as many of the guns as close to the front as possible. This would allow the heavier guns to continue to support the advance for as long as possible, while batteries of field artillery were readied to move forward with special bridges to allow them to cross the trenches as soon as it was feasible after the infantry had taken their objectives. The power of the guns was growing exponentially.
After closely debated discussion it was decided that the tanks would be employed in small groups scattered along the front line with the aim of moving ahead of the attacking troops to suppress identified German strong points. More imaginatively some eighteen tanks were to spearhead the XV Corps assault on the village of Flers, which Rawlinson considered to be the key to the integrity of the new German Second Line defences. Despite this important role assigned to the tanks, there could be no doubt that Rawlinson was not to any great extent pinning his hopes on the success of the tanks. To him they were a potentially useful auxiliary weapon and nothing more.
I do not think the tanks will actually capture anything for you. They are only accessories for the infantry and the latter must work in conformity with them ...I think we had better issue some definite instructions in regard to the employment of tanks with the artillery. Personally, I am strongly in favour of not making any changes in our ordinary method man is absolutely necessary, in order to allow the tanks to work, ...we will place ...chief reliance on the methods which we are practising, looking on the tanks as an auxiliary to help us by every possible means.9
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Headquarters, Fourth Army
Whatever the differences in opinion over tactics there is no doubt that both Haig and Rawlinson were still absolutely wedded to the concept of the primacy of artillery. The tanks were seen as a promising addition to the book of war, not yet deserving any greater status than an addendum. It is therefore particularly ironic that, in their efforts to accommodate the tanks into their plans, they fatally diluted the power of the guns and thereby rendered the infantry appallingly vulnerable if the tanks failed.
Tanks will start movement at a time so calculated that they will reach their objectives five minutes before the infantry. The infantry will advance as usual behind a creeping barrage in which gaps, about 100 yards wide, will be left for the route of the tanks, some minutes before their arrival at these objectives.10
Instructions for the Employment of Tanks, Headquarters Staff, Fourth Army
In these seemingly sensible arrangements the seeds of disaster were planted. In the attack on the most dangerous German strong points, there would be no creeping barrage and if the tanks failed the infantry would be left to their own devices. This was made worse by the natural caution of artillery batteries, who inevitably left the gap wider to avoid possible mistakes and thus exacerbated the already dangerous situation. In assaulting the second objectives it was decided that the infantry and tanks would, wherever possible, advance together under a renewed uniform creeping barrage. The third objectives were far beyond the range of the field artillery, so it was intended that the tanks would be employed to flatten the wire for the infantry and then use their weapons to try to suppress the inevitable German defensive fire. Overall, it was clearly emphasised that if the tanks were held up for any reason, the infantry were not to wait but were to push on regardless; yet if the tanks succeeded and the infantry were checked the tanks must turn back and endeavour to assist them. The infantry were still the primary force on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the old story was being relived as the assault battalions began to move up into the line. The 47th (London) Division was one of the divisions earmarked for the attack and was assigned the particularly dangerous task of taking the dreaded High Wood. The Londoners seemed perfectly sanguine and indeed, like some chivalrous knights from a semi-mythical past, many were delighted that such a post of honour had been granted them in the coming battle.
The postmen from quiet little hamlets, or clerks who had spent their lives hitherto in snug offices, talked about these future regimental mortuaries with the homely names, with astonishing calmness. Rumour set an early date for the grand attack. The Guards and the ANZACs were concentrated in the region, and the Londoners thought it quite natural that they should march with them, so high had risen the esprit de corps of the London Division. But bad weather set in and no orders came. Day followed day and on the fringe of the vortex that would engulf them in turn, the battalion continued serenely to train. Not a detail was overlooked and by long hours of work in common, the officers got to know intimately their men, and the men the officers who were to lead them. Particular attention was given to night work. More than once in pitch darkness and blinding rain, companies were deployed in the broad stubble fields south of Framvilliers to practise keeping in touch and finally dig in as noiselessly as possible. Farewell joy rides were taken to Amiens, a dusty journey by lorry but where to share even briefly the animation and intense throb of life was like imbibing a tonic.11
Lieutenant Etienne de Caux, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
For many of the men a good ‘blow out’ in the local estaminet represented a last chance to enjoy themselves come what may before they went into battle. These were simple pleasures for men with simple tastes.
Most of us turned over the very few francs and centimes we happened to have and spent it. ‘Oeufs’ and ‘pommes de terre’ were on sale. Plus plenty of ‘Plink Plonk’ a cheap red or white wine. The shadows were darkening, particularly when at short notice one late afternoon we were all hustled on parade. The ‘high ups’ were going to give us a dose of moral courage. In one of the largest, recently harvested cornfields, that I remember, we were marched to join up with other regiments in the area. It was called a drum head service and in the far distance from where our company stood at ease, one could see two figures in white. We presumed they were padres and doing their duty.12
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
Unsurprisingly, on the eve of battle, the padres found themselves in unprecedented demand from men determined to improve their chances in this world and the next.
We had some wonderful services on Sunday. To see fifty or sixty men in a dark building, lighted by only a few candles and one acetylene lamp is wonderful! Your cross is on the wall, two candles on the altar, the Union Jack underneath ‘a fair linen cloth’, and the singing very enthusiastic. The men are in great form. A good few are inwardly anxious, but they put a cheery face on it all. Sometimes this is from a highly religious motive, at other times a kind of fatalism, or, resigned dependence on God. ‘What has to be, will be’ they often say.13
Chaplain David Railton, 1/19th Battalion (St Pancras), London Regiment, 141st Brigade, 47th Division
Finally, during the afternoon of 12 September, the Post Office Rifles left their billets at Framvilliers and marched down the long Albert road. They were largely silent.
The great highway was dry and dusty, the morning air fresh. Steadily the long column marched towards the quavering lights ahead. Colonel Whitehead rode at the head of the battalion with the adjutant and myself. At hourly halts he dismounted and spoke to Captain Mitchell, or walked a little distance down the column. The men were silent, but for an occasional snatch of song. The usual unconscious irony, ‘There’s a sneaking feeling round my heart that I’d like to settle down....’ The merry words of the popular ‘Follies’ ditty floating out into the fields bordering the tree-lined highway, were laden with unconscious pathos. Dawn had come as the battalion breasted the last long hill, where the ragged screens of the old French camouflage still lined the road. Down in the hollow the red brick houses of the once prosperous little town, clustered round the remains of the red brick basilica with its shattered tower. Near the railway station a tall, slim factory chimney still defied the Hun. Beyond the valley, towards the rising light, stretched the grey slopes scarred by the white chalk of the old front lines.14
Lieutenant Etienne de Caux, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
Here there were no comfortable billets. After all, this had been part of the battlefield and hard fought over just scant weeks before.
That night we slept rough in some village that was uninhabited—in amidst the ruins—and thought of the comfortable heap of straw in the open cowshed of the farmstead at Framvilliers. The windy or nervous ones said, ‘See all them Red Cross vans going back—that’s where I’d sooner be!’ They expressed what others stifled; for the odds of survival on the Somme inferno were, to say the least, very poor. The utter darkness and devastation of the night’s shake down did not inspire one to think otherwise. Yet, were we not seasoned trench troops?15
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
Thousands upon thousands of troops were moving forward in readiness for the attack during the night of 14 September. Laden like mules they moved forward across the wastelands of the Somme. The march was both exhausting and nerve-racking as every step took them closer to the German guns.
We were laden with all the extras needed for such an attack: pick or a spade, extra ammo, two Mills bombs, one man in every section had a petrol tin of water and the signallers had D3 telephones, wire, liaison shutter for aeroplane contact or signal flags. On the move again, but a shade more slowly at a pace like a pack animal’s. At last we entered a communication trench which brought us to Delville Wood and through it. The trench had been hastily dug and hanging from its sides were telephone wires and above broken branches of trees. For a long time there could be heard, ‘Wire overhead!’ ‘Mind the wire!’ ‘Mind your head!’ and occasional curses as some poor Tommy caught his equipment on a wire and had a struggle to extricate his impedimenta from it. Frequent pauses whilst those leading the column waited for the unfortunate last men to catch up. They never got a breather—only the leading men as they patiently awaited the stragglers. Along with two PH helmets each man carried lachrymatory goggles. These were hastily donned two or three times as Jerry pumped gas shells all around. Some men wept copiously, some sneezed a lot and some coughed. Apparently Jerry heard nothing of these sounds and fired not a shot.16
Lance Corporal Gerald Dennis, 21st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 24th Brigade, 41st Division
As the troops moved forward they became aware of an overall sense of secrecy and mystery that surrounded the new weapon that had been added to the armoury of the British Army for this offensive.
On our way up to the trenches we passed groups of large objects concealed under camouflage netting, but in the dark could not see what they were. Also we noticed that at intervals white tapes had been laid on the ground leading in the direction of the trenches. When we got into position we had the job of filling in the trench at each place where the tapes met it to provide a crossing place for the ‘tanks’. After we got into position, we were told that ‘tanks’, a kind of armoured vehicle, were coming up to lead the attack.17
Sergeant Harold Horne, 1/6th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers, 149th Brigade, 50th Division
Wild rumours had abounded as to what the mysterious shapes cloaked beneath the tarpaulins were. That night, the tanks moved forward the last couple of miles, with the constant drone of low flying aircraft intended to cancel out the tell-tale roar of their infernal engines. The tank crews were tired for they had had little opportunity for rest in the previous 48 hours and the task of moving the tanks forward was somewhat fraught. Although the route had been reconnoitred and a white tape put down to show the intended route, the tanks were cumbersome beasts and moving them over such rough ground was a slow, time-consuming business. The crews had little knowledge of the terrain and often needed guides. One such was Private Gray of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles who was ordered to help the three tanks (C-13, C-14 and C-16) allotted to the attack in the 56th Division sector. Unaccompanied, the journey would normally have taken him about twenty minutes.
Leaving brigade headquarters at eight o’clock we followed a track marked with tape for some little distance, the tanks following one behind the other. The ground over which they had to go was very soft and nothing but a mass of shell holes, some of them very large indeed, and as it was dark the drivers could not see where they were going. Before long they were in difficulties, as one caterpillar might go well down in a shell hole and the other remain on the level, but owing to its capabilities it would not capsize although it required extra power to get it into position, when after a struggle it would be ready to move off again. There being but one guide, if one tank got into difficulties the remainder had to wait until it was able to move on again. This sort of thing kept on occurring till at last the officer in charge, who was in the leading tank, got out and said, ‘I think we should get on much better if you had my torch and walked 5 or 6 yards in front of the leading tank, picking out the most suitable ground for the tanks to take, throwing the light on the track so that the driver may follow’. One of the tanks had broken down and had to be left behind on account of one of its caterpillars having gone wrong. With the aid of the torch we were able to get along much better though the pace was still very slow.18
Rifleman W.J. Gray, 1/9th Battalion (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
As the tanks approached closer to the front line, Private Gray not unnaturally became increasingly apprehensive as he realised the enormous risks they were running.
We were now not far from battalion headquarters and naturally I did not like the idea of continuously showing a light to guide the tanks, so only gave them a flash now and again, whereupon the officer alighted and wanted to know what was the matter. I explained that we were getting close to the line and the light would no doubt attract attention and bring over some ‘whizz-bangs’, which were pretty common in this part of the world, but he replied that we were very late and as they must get the tanks up at any cost they must take the risk. Shortly after we arrived at battalion HQ and considering all things and especially the flashing of the torch I think we were lucky to have done so without mishap.19
Rifleman W.J. Gray, 1/9th Battalion (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
Gray was ordered to push on with one of the tanks to guide it into its actual jumping-off position ready for the assault.
I left headquarters with plenty of wind up as the tank I had now to lead had to be taken practically up to the front line with myself leading and flashing the light, which I was anxious to get rid of, you bet! The tank once more got into difficulties halfway to its position, and the torch had to be brought into use more than ever. A strafe took place while we were trying to get a move on. It may have been only the usual strafe or it may have been brought about by the use of the torch, but whatever was the cause it was none too healthy and I didn’t enjoy it a bit. After a kick and a splutter the tank was ready to move and we were off again. The ground was still very bad and sloshy and the tank pursued its noisy way. The strafe was over and things were now pretty quiet for that part of the line, but Jerry may possibly have heard the noise of the engine, which would travel far. Anyhow, he showed all sorts of lights, and a searchlight was also put up seeking aeroplanes, though none were up. Shortly after the tank found its position and my job was over, for which I was profoundly thankful.20
Rifleman W.J. Gray, 1/9th Battalion (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
All in all along the front out of the forty-nine tanks meant to go into action only thirty-six arrived at their jumping-off stations.
Everything was ready for the big attack. This was no local affair. It was a major Allied thrust. Not only were the three corps of the Fourth Army (III, XV and XIV) involved, but also the Reserve Army, the Canadian Corps and the French Army would be attacking. Ten British divisions would attack with the odds roughly at two to one in their favour. It was the last chance of winning the war in 1916.
FRIDAY 15 SEPTEMBER was a typical, sunny early autumn day. The guns roared and the infantry waited in their assembly trenches for the whistles to blow.
Mostly in shell holes we awaited zero hour. Very little was said—all just busy with their own thoughts. Seconds seemed minutes and minutes seemed hours during this wait. The grey light of dawn was appearing over the German lines and then we had a sight of the first enemy trench to be taken—Tea Support Trench—and could vaguely make out the nature of the broken ground in front of us. The ground sloped away and then rose abruptly and on the top of this ridge was that enemy trench. All around were shell holes reeking of tear gas and fumes. One sudden burst from a German machine gun was a little disturbing. Had we been seen?21
Lance Corporal Gerald Dennis, 21st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 124th Brigade, 41st Division
The minutes ticked by with unbearable slowness. But, at the same time, every minute that passed was irrecoverable for the men sweating in the trenches.
The hour before zero, while crouching in the trench and looking at one’s watch, was an almost unbearable strain. Eventually we heard the hum of machinery coming up behind us, and saw through the mist great toad-like things with caterpillar tracks, a gun projecting forward and at the back a tail with two small wheels, come lumbering over the shell-holed ground at walking pace. One tank followed the tape to the filled in place in the trench where I was and went on towards the German line. A few moments later it was our zero time and we got out of the trench and followed. Once in the open and going forward the tension and fear lessened to some extent and a feeling of excitement took over, helped in this case, I suppose, by curiosity about the tanks.22
Sergeant Harold Home, 1/6th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers, 149th Brigade, 50th Division
One man described his feelings in homely terms, which somehow caught the very essence of his apprehension.
Up to this time my nerves had not been troubling me, but now I began to experience a feeling of—not weirdness, but the kind of feeling just before a tooth extraction—a sort of, ‘I’m not afraid, but I hope it won’t hurt!’ sensation.23
Lance Corporal Charles Morden, 1/7th Battalion, London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
On the left of the assaulting British formations was the Canadian Corps, which formed part of General Gough’s Reserve Army. The Reserve Army only had a subsidiary, supportive role to the Fourth Army attack, but Gough had been forewarned by Haig that if Rawlinson’s efforts were once more thwarted, then the whole emphasis of the offensive might switch over to the Reserve Army front, with the overall intention of capturing the Pozières Ridge as a winter stronghold and a base for renewed attacks in 1917. The Canadians had a difficult ‘nut’ to crack if they were to build on their burgeoning reputation. They were to push out from Pozières towards the village of Courcelette. It is unfortunate to record that there was a vicious practicality about the orders given to the Canadians that provided an easy excuse for men inflamed beyond reason by the terrors and fierce joys of battle.
We were given strict instructions to take no prisoners until our objective had been gained. The reason for this was that so often in British advances, when the Germans had thrown down their arms in surrender and our men had moved through them, at the same time indicating to them to go to our rear where they would be collected as prisoners, the Germans had picked up their rifles again and shot our men in the back, thereby bringing the advance to a halt. No such risks could or would be taken in this important advance.24
Private Lance Cattermole, 21st Battalion (Eastern Ontario), 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, Canadian Expeditionary Force
Immediately in front of the 21st Canadian Battalion was the sugar refinery, just to the north of the main road passing through from Pozières via Courcelette to Bapaume. The Germans had converted the factory into a veritable fortress with several well-concealed machine guns.
My platoon was in the third and last wave in the advance—the waves were 20 yards apart. We crawled over the top of the parapet and lined up on a broad white tape, just discernable in the growing light, immediately in front of the trench and behind the first two waves which were already in position. It was almost zero hour. I looked at my wristwatch and saw we had about three minutes to go. I never heard our officers’ whistles to signal the advance, and I don’t suppose they heard them either because of the terrible crash with which the creeping barrage opened up, exactly at 6.20 a.m. The air over our heads was suddenly filled with the soughing and sighing, whining and screaming of thousands of shells of all calibres, making it impossible to hear anything. We stood up and I looked around behind me; as far as the eye could see, from left to right, there was a sheet of flame from the hundreds of guns lined up, almost wheel to wheel, belching fire and smoke. It was an awe-inspiring sight.25
Private Lance Cattermole, 21st Battalion (Eastern Ontario), 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, Canadian Expeditionary Force
When they went over the top, they entered a veritable inferno of German shell fire raking across the battlefield. Private Cattermole was a lucky man that morning.
I had only taken three paces when an enemy shell fell exactly in front of me. All I saw was a great fountain of loose earth, of which I received a mouthful, and I was flung on my back. I believe it was only a second or two before I struggled to my feet, thinking I was blown to bits! I felt myself all over, and to my amazement I had no injuries whatsoever; I was simply winded. The shell must have been a dud. At this I started to laugh, which I presume was a sign of nervous relief that I was not hit, and I continued my walk forward. An added noise made me look upwards and, through a break in the swirling morning mist, I saw one of our spotter planes, the wings golden in the rays of the rising sun against a blue sky, showing the red, white and blue roundels of the Royal Flying Corps. This gave me a cheerful feeling.26
Private Lance Cattermole, 21st Battalion (Eastern Ontario), 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, Canadian Expeditionary Force
As they approached the refinery the attack stalled under the weight of German fire and the infantry went to ground. It was at this point that one of the attached tanks made a dramatic appearance.
The attack had been held up at this point, and a party of us had to rush up with more ammunition, bullets and grenades, to the 21st Battalion, lying in shell holes in front of the refinery. As we reached them, we saw a ‘landship’, named the Créme de Menthe, pass ahead, and go right up to the walls of the refinery, its guns blazing. It seemed to lean against one of the walls which collapsed, and the monster roared into the fort, while we could see the Germans streaming out of it, offering an excellent target to the riflemen in the shell holes.27
Private Magnus Mclntyre Hood, 24th Battalion (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), 5th Brigade, 2nd Canadian Division
The Créme de Menthe, a ‘male’ tank commanded by Captain Arthur Inglis, was more formally known as C-5 of C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Company. The dramatic appearance of the tanks certainly had a traumatic effect on the already shell-shocked Germans.
A man came running in from the left, shouting, ‘There is a crocodile crawling into our lines!’ The poor wretch was off his head. He had seen a tank for the first time and had imagined this giant of a machine, rearing up and dipping down as it came, to be a monster. It presented a fantastic picture, this Colossus in the dawn light. One moment its front section would disappear into a crater, with the rear section still protruding, the next its yawning mouth would rear up out of the crater, to roll slowly forward with terrifying assurance.28
Feldwebel Weinert, 21th Infantry Regiment, German Army
With the fearsome arrival of the tank the sugar refinery was captured and the Canadian infantry swept into the network of trenches that lay behind and to the east.
We came upon an enemy trench to our left. In keeping with our ‘no prisoners’ order, this trench was being mopped up and the occupants eliminated. The trench was already half full of dead enemy and here and there little columns of steam rose above the cool, morning air, either from hot blood or from the urine I understand is released on the death of any human body. Two Canadians stood over the trench, one in the parapet and the other on the parados, and they exterminated the Germans as they came out of their dugouts. One young German, scruffy, bareheaded, cropped hair and wearing steel rimmed spectacles, ran, screaming with fear, dodging in and out amongst us to avoid being shot, crying out, ‘Nein! Nein!’ He pulled out from his breast pocket a handful of photographs and tried to show them to us—I suppose they were of his wife and children—in an effort to gain our sympathy. It was all of no avail. As the bullets smacked into him he fell to the ground motionless, the pathetic little photographs fluttering to the earth around him.29
Private Lance Cattermole, 21st Battalion (Eastern Ontario), 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, Canadian Expeditionary Force
There were reasons—but no excuses—for this appalling conduct: there was simply no necessity for the murder of this poor soldier. The terrifying pressures of war and the fig leaf of ‘official’ sanction for these barbarous acts had turned ordinary, decent men into beasts.
The 4th and 6th Canadian Brigades held on to their positions perched along the southern border of Courcelette, despite the strenuous German counter-attacks that streamed out of the shattered ruins. At around 1815, the reserve 5th Canadian Brigade arrived and with the help of a renewed artillery barrage it swept forward through the village. Alongside it, elements of the 3rd Canadian Division managed to gain a substantial foothold in the Fabeck Graben Trench. All told the Canadians of Gough’s Reserve Army had done well in extremely difficult circumstances on the flank of the main assault.
Meanwhile, the Fourth Army had a day of mixed fortunes. The III Corps (15th, 50th and 47th Divisions) under the command of Lieutenant General Sir William Pulteney were charged with the dual role of protecting the flanks of both the main thrust towards Flers and the Canadian assault on Courcelette. Their own objectives were the German lines running along the reverse slopes of the ridge running between the villages of Martinpuich and Flers.
On the left the 15th (Scottish) Division surged forward and succeeded in capturing Martinpuich, which allowed it to keep pace with its neighbours in the 2nd Canadian Division. Alongside, the 50th (Northumbrian) Division was faced with severe enfilade fire from the fringes of High Wood. This was, of course, the very reason that so many lives had been expended in vain attempts in previous weeks to capture the wood.
It was as quiet as the grave, there wasn’t a shot fired. And then, just in the twinkling of an eye, it was hell let loose. Every gun fired at the precise second, hundreds of guns. Just about 50 or 60 yards to the right of where we were we saw this tank come forward. Our infantry the 5th Yorks were alongside and behind him. Billy Fielding, he said, ‘A sight for the Gods! A sight for the Gods!’ Which it was! Mr Wilson said, ‘Come on, never mind about the sight for the Gods!’ So we got out, following out, running this wire out. I think the Germans were startled. They opened out with everything they had, but you couldn’t hear a shell, what I mean was it was noise. You didn’t know if it was our shells or their shells, our guns or their guns. There wasn’t a great deal of small arms fire, mainly shell fire you see. We went forward, running the wire out and we were relaying information back to our guns. One time the wire broke and we went back to repair it. I was on my knees, fastening the wire together, tying a reef knot in it, pull it tight, clip the ends short and wrap it in insulation tape. Billy says, ‘Look at them buggers there!’ I just turned to look and here was a fellow with a cinematograph taking photographs of me mending the wire. I turned and looked; I waved my hand at him.30
Signaller George Cole, C Bty, 253rd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, 50th Division
The Northumbrians struggled manfully despite the scything nature of the flanking fire and partially switched the direction of their attack to send parties of bombers into High Wood to help out the struggling 47th Division. They successfully gained their first objective—Hook Trench—but efforts to capture and consolidate the second objective of Starfish Trench were severely compromised. The German bombardment crashed vindictively all around them and eventually the surviving parties were pulled back to try to make good the grip on Hook Trench. The tanks had cooperated and performed valuable services in despatching various German strong points, although their intervention was inevitably somewhat random and unpredictable.
The key to success in the III Corps area was High Wood. Here the 47th (London) Division had been given a daunting task of overrunning that benighted wood, and its task had been made complicated by a blistering clash of opinions over the best means of employing the attached tanks. This controversy enveloped the 50th Division, whose senior staff officers were certainly much exercised at the nature of the plans for their neighbours upon whom they realised their own survival would depend.
On September 15th the attack of the division I was with depended for its success on the subjugation of fire from High Wood. My divisional commander therefore begged that the tanks available should move in single file on our right just outside the wood. He pointed out that the tanks were bound to be stopped by the tree stumps if they attempted to go through the wood. He was overruled with the result that both 47th Division and the 50th Division lost terribly from fire from High Wood, the tanks failing to get into the wood and being quite useless.31
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Karslake, Headquarters, 50th Division
Lieutenant General Sir William Pulteney, the III Corps commander responsible, was guilty of an egregious blunder for which the men of the 47th and 50th Divisions would suffer the consequences. Pulteney had feared that the British and German lines were too close together at High Wood and he thought that any massed creeping barrage would cause the British unacceptable casualties. Therefore, he decided to use his tanks to capture the German front line and to rely on the artillery barrages only for the subsequent objectives. Major General Sir Charles Barter commanding the 47th Division made his views on these proposals more than plain but he was brusquely overruled.
So it was that the 141st Brigade and half of the 140th Brigade of the 47th Division were launched into the unwelcoming maw of High Wood. It was a scene daunting to anyone no matter how brave.
The guns thundered continuously with deafening crescendo. Shrapnel burst over the whole area. Black, acrid smoke from German ‘coal box’ heavy shells did their best to obliterate the early dawn and rising sun. Above all, I think it was the deafening noise of our own forward 18-pounder field guns that thundered with shrieking velocity into the German front and rear lines.32
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 40th Brigade, 47th Division
As the 15th Londons moved forward they found themselves half in and half out of High Wood. Wherever they were, they were as close as makes no difference to a living hell.
That day I saw sights which were passing strange to a man of peace. I saw men in their madness bayonet each other without mercy, without thought. I saw the hot life’s blood of German and Englishmen flow out together, and drench the fair soil of France. I saw men torn to fragments by the near explosion of bombs, and—worse than any sight—I heard the agonised cries and shrieks of men in mortal pain who were giving up their souls to their Maker. The mental picture painted through the medium of the eye may fade, but the cries of those poor, tortured and torn men I can never forget. They are with me always. I would I had been deaf at the time.33
Corporal M.J. Guiton, 15th Battalion (Civil Service Rifles), London Regiment, 141st Brigade, 47th Division
Poor Guiton lost his leg in the mad press of the fighting. In the absence of any creeping barrage sweeping all before them, and in the absence of the promised tanks the infantry found themselves criminally exposed. Crouching down in their jumping-off trenches, the second wave awaited the inevitable orders to attack. They pressed their bodies up against the front of the trench in an effort to avoid the German shells tumbling amongst them, and the liberal spray of machine-gun bullets that sped overhead served only to remind them of what they were about to receive.
The deafening inferno continued: time had ceased. In moving along the tortuous quaking trench to a supposedly better vantage point of protection, I stumbled in rounding a corner, upon Rifleman Rankin. He was slumped against the parados, tin hat all askew, mortal terror shone in his glassy eyes, his left breast was gaping open; deep red blood in profusion soaked his khaki tunic. Shrapnel had killed him. A very short distance away and the six foot corpse of our captain—Captain Mitchell, No. 1 Company—lay full length in the trench with an ominous bloody wound in the forehead. They were not the first soldiers I had seen killed, nor were they to be the last.34
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
For a moment some of the troops had hope of some kind of a reprieve as at last they sighted the tanks manoeuvring behind them.
Someone who had been looking out of the back of the trench cried out, ‘Look boys, what the hell’s this?!!’ I saw for the first time the ‘Tanks’ or as we called them the ‘Caterpillars’. Somehow the feeling of what these would do among the Jerrys lightened the tight and desperate feeling I had at heart. It was with a yell that my crowd went over the top. The yells were soon death screams.35
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
The tanks in which the Londoners had invested so much hope, and for which they had been deprived of a creeping barrage, achieved absolutely nothing amongst the tree stumps. One ditched in a shell hole, another in No Man’s Land, while only one succeeded in moving forward inside the wood and got as far as the German front. The final tank lost its way around the southern border of the wood and in turning east in a desperate effort to find clear ground only ditched itself in the British front line. In the depths of nerve-racked confusion the crew made a dreadful error and opened fire on their own comrades.
As they left the useless tanks behind them the infantry moved deep into the wood.
I was ‘over the top’ amidst the tangled undergrowth, plus many hefty branches strewn in all directions by shell fire which had peppered the wood. I stumbled upon two dead bodies of our ‘kilted soldiers’ slain no doubt in a previous attempt to drive Jerry from High Wood, their bodies so hidden that stretcher bearers had not found them. The deafening roar of the guns had lessened, so that one only heard the more distant thunder rumble of our heavy guns giving Jerry’s supply lines a continuous hammering.36
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
The clatter of the German machine guns went almost unheard amidst the dreadful din, but it was impossible to be unaware of their menacing presence.
Man after man went down to that awful machine-gun fire of the enemy. Within 50 yards of the trench we left, there was but a bare handful left of half a company. I looked behind to see the second half of the company come on, led by the company officer, who as he neared us shouted, ‘Get on damn you!’ Just then he fell dead. Our platoon officer led us on. He had a walking stick in his hand, a revolver in the other and his face was set in a set smile. A big fine looking man he was. Men were falling on all sides, some in their death agonies. The officer’s runner stopped with a terrible scream, crumpled and fell behind a tree stump. The platoon sergeant next collapsed and began crawling back to our lines. In between the groans and cries of the men and the eternal awful fumes of cordite, that 100 yards to Fritz’s line is the most fearful memory I have.37
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
While the fighting was chaotic, one man’s courage and intiative seemed on many occasions to make a difference. For example, Lance Corporal Mclntyre’s quick thinking certainly saved the lives of many of his section.
On we pushed and suddenly we came to a small clearing in the wood, with a near straight trench full of men, and a machine gun blazing down it. The officer was on top exhorting his men to climb out. I dropped on one knee and fired my rifle grenade at the machine gun. My aim proved good, the grenade burst at the point from which the machine gun was spluttering and the firing ceased. Immediately, I fired another grenade for good measure.38
Lance Corporal John Mclntyre, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
It may perhaps have been an illusion, but the effect on morale was considerable and seemed to give the men a renewed sense of purpose. At last they were there on top of the Germans: still not safe but at last there was the promise of shelter in what remained of the German trench and the chance to wreak their vengeance for all the casualties they had suffered.
As we reached the trench a lance corporal laughed and coolly walked back with blood spurting from his trouser leg. Germans were lying all over and at the back of the trench. A group of six of seven had been hit together by a shell and were the bloodiest and most battered humans I had seen. Some of the less severely wounded put their hands up, while their comrades in the trenches behind kept up a machine-gun fire and rifle fire among friend and foe alike.39
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
The fight for High Wood was clearly hanging in the balance. High above pilot Lieutenant Eric Routh was flying on a contact patrol and he could see all was not well.
At High Wood things were not going so well. Just behind the wood a battalion had put out ‘XX’ denoting ‘Held up by machine-gun fire’. This was immediately taken back and dropped at Railway Copse, the Corps artillery station. Returning we found same place had put out ‘OO’ which means barrage wanted but before we could send it, it was taken in. It therefore remained unsent. The first signal would probably get what was required. The tanks in High Wood were not successful. One had gone over both trenches, rather beyond the Boche line and there had stuck. It was very heavily shelled for about ten minutes, probably by a trench mortar, so much so that after smouldering for some time it burst into flames. The other two turned over on their side in our own trenches.40
Lieutenant Eric Routh, 34 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps
On the ground the situation was clearly desperate. Unless something was done soon the whole attack would collapse and once again the Germans would hold on to High Wood to act as a thorn in the British flesh.
When I got clear of the trench, I could only see the officer and about a half-dozen men who were somewhere on my left. The officer waved me over but before I could move a shell landed beside him and he was practically covered with earth and mud—dead. All I could see was his helmet which had been covered with a piece of sacking to keep it from glinting in the sunlight. I had won clear of the wood and was lying on an open piece of ground on a downward slope. On my left the rest of the battalion were having a terrific fight. Shells were crashing into our men from the German batteries, the incessant machine-gun fire made my mouth so dry I could hardly draw breath.41
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
Respite came from an unexpected quarter. Lacking either the assistance of tanks, or of a creeping barrage, it was the shattering detonations of the Stokes mortar shells fired at a phenomenal pace by the 140th Trench Mortar Battery that finally cracked the German resistance. In just a quarter of an hour, 750 shells were fired.
A few men with a comparatively new weapon, a Stokes Trench Mortar machine operated one of these at a pocket of resistance to our left. I could see about eight to ten of these cylinder shells going through the air like a long row of single sausages. Soon afterwards twenty or so Germans came over the open battlefield holding up their hands above their heads. With other men of our company I happened to, as it were, ‘receive’ these prisoners and much regret that from one of them I accepted a proffered gift, thrust into my hand. It was a small box, a snuff box.42
Private Albert Whitehurst, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
By this time Rifleman Cree was totally isolated in a former German trench behind High Wood. The crowded battlefield had to all intents and purpose emptied before his very eyes.
There was not a soul beside me and it was with heartfelt gladness that I saw a group of khaki clad figures through the haze ahead on my right. I went over there, dodging from shell hole to shell hole. In one of them I found a man with a terrible hole in his body. His eyes looked at me so pitifully, but I could do little to help. Our instructions were, ‘Any man stopping to help a fallen comrade is liable to be shot.’ The inhumanity of it all. That lad, who although I could do little for him, made me marvel at his courage. I am sure that by the time I reached the others he would be past all pain and horror.43
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
He made his way to the right towards the blurred figures, hopping from shell hole to shell hole and soon found himself amongst a mixed bag of troops from various other London battalions of the 47th Division.
I found an officer, a sergeant and a dozen men of different companies. How they got there I don’t know. We advanced about 60 yards, when we were enfiladed by snipers and machine guns. The officer gave the order to run back 50 yards and dig for our lives. We started to run the gauntlet two at a time. The officer and myself were last. Just as we made our dash one of the two in front was hit and dropped. We got to him and pulled him into a shell hole. He was hit through the shoulder and was moaning, ‘Don’t leave me’. That officer was a brick. He got hold of the wounded chap and ran with him to where the others were digging in. I was left to make the last dash. I got there but it was awful expecting to get one in the back all the time. As I dropped beside the others, thinking that I was lucky not to have been killed with my back to the enemy. Now, that seems weird, because if I had been killed it would have made little difference how I was facing. We dug ourselves in with anything we could lay our hands on. I had a shovel but it was God knows where by this time.44
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
From their hastily dug ‘trench’, Cree saw the 1/6th Londons begin to move forward to continue the attack through the Starfish Line and on towards the Flers Trench. Cree watched in disbelief at their method of approach.
All of a sudden, the German batteries opened up and the ground all over the slope we were on was churned up with hissing metal. We were amazed to see coming over the ridge a battalion in platoon formation. They nearly all had their rifles slung over their right shoulders. Shells dropped amongst them and they must have lost hundreds by the time they reached our position. As they passed, one said, ‘Cheer up, boys, we’ll see you all right!’ Another beside him had a pipe in his mouth and a bag of bombs or rations on their backs. Mostly the faces were set and white, but not a falter as they went on to hell in front. Later that night they came back and went right back, as our officer would not take responsibility for them. A mere handful, some whimpering and crying like babies. Poor devils they had it rough. They belonged to our own brigade.45
Rifleman Donald Cree, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
The 47th Division had finally captured High Wood and gained a foothold in the Starfish Trench. When the men were eventually withdrawn from the front line a few days later they were all but a shadow of what they had once been. The division had suffered some 4,544 casualties over the period.
On our way back, Major General Barter met the battalion and as our company passed him, he said, ‘Well done, 20th, you have done splendid work, I am proud of you’. He might with reason be proud of us, for the battalion of which I am more than proud to be a member, had done that day what many other battalions on previous occasions had failed to do—namely, had driven the Germans out of the wood and kept them out. We have had to pay the price however.46
Lance Sergeant Reginald Davy, 20th Battalion (Blackheath and Woolwich), London Regiment, 141st Brigade, 47th Division
They may have been proud men, but they had little to celebrate. There were scenes of indescribable pathos as the battalions took stock of those who were unscathed, at least in body, after the horrific battle.
From tea time to well after dark, Major Vince and the adjutant, seated at a deal table out in the open, made a detailed roll call of the battalion. The men, clean-shaven, though haggard still, stood round in their mud-soiled, creased slacks. ‘Rifleman “X”?’, the Major’s voice would call. No reply. ‘Anyone know anything about him?’ ‘Yes, Sir’, answered a voice from the crowd, ‘He went over besides me, I last saw him as we got up to the German trench.’ Then silence. No one else knew anything more. ‘Rifleman “Y”?’ No reply and no one knew anything about him. By the light of guttering candles, question and answer went from the flame-lit table to the dark circle and back. Nor did anyone move until the work was completed. The result gave 63 killed, 50 missing and 185 wounded.47
Lieutenant Etienne de Caux, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
Lieutenant de Caux was the French interpreter attached to the 1/8th Londons and as he watched the roll call he mused that the relationship established between the two traditional enemies had been truly consummated in the fires of war.
A hollow square of jaded muddy figures standing in an orchard open at one side to the after-glint of the sun that set red. Mist begins to float up the valley, but the glint of light on some clouds high up has still the hardness of silver. A strong voice calls one name after another from a roll lit by a fluttering candle shaded by the hand of the one remaining sergeant major. A dark mass of tall trees in the background. There should never, never be anything but brotherly feeling amongst Frenchmen for their English comrades after this war.48
Lieutenant Etienne de Caux, 1/8th Battalion (Post Office Rifles), London Regiment, 140th Brigade, 47th Division
The XV Corps (New Zealand, 41st and 14th Divisions) under the command of Lieutenant General Henry Horne was at the centre of the attack and was to be responsible for the capture of Flers. To assist it in this somewhat daunting task were eighteen tanks of D Company, Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps although only fourteen of these managed to drag themselves even as far as their starting points. The New Zealand Division were on the left of the XV Corps. It was to seize the German lines stretching to the north-west of Flers. As the men advanced they, too, initially suffered from flanking machine-gun fire from High Wood. The tanks were also late coming up into the line and contributed little of value in the initial stages as the New Zealanders closely pursued the creeping barrage and managed to overrun the Switch Line before, after a pause, sweeping on to the outlying trenches of Flers. As they began to encounter stubborn resistance from the Flers Trench, the tanks caught up to lend assistance and a further advance was made to the Flers Support Trench. Here the German resistance stiffened and the attack finally spluttered out of steam.
Adjoining the New Zealanders was the 41st Division. It was to seize Flers itself and then advance on the neighbouring village of Gueude-court. It was allotted ten tanks to assist it, of which no more than seven actually got forward. In many accounts the advance is seen as a walkover—but there is no doubt that to the troops involved it was a tremendous battle. Many of the men of the leading battalions started out in No Man’s Land, sheltering in shell holes. They would advance, clinging as close as possible to the creeping barrage, willing to risk casualties from the occasional shells falling short.
The flames, the shrapnel, the acrid fumes, the clouds of smoke and the uplifting of tons of earth. All these conjured up a vision of awfulness and yet of tragic grandeur. Then a lot of the noise seemed to fade away as we jumped or rather struggled to our feet to get on with the job of going forward. No sooner had we started than the enemy had begun a very useful reply to our guns by dropping a barrage around the Tea Support Trench. The tank wallowed along, not fast enough for the keen troops, so it was left behind us with its gallant section to guard it. We lost some men. The stretcher bearers were doing their best for our first casualties—some were beyond their help. German machine gunners were already successful and our numbers were being gradually thinned. The creeping barrage moved on; and the first objective was captured.49
Lance Corporal Gerald Dennis, 21st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 124th Brigade, 41st Division.
There was a pause to consolidate and to allow the ‘moppers up’ to complete their grim task. Then they lurched forward again.
On again, as the rain of iron from our guns moved slowly forward. Heavy shells continued to sing overhead, more earth was being churned up and smoke slowly drifted in the wind. Although our main aim was to press on, we did look to the right and left now and again to see our troops moving on. An occasional glance revealed one man stumbling head foremost, another blown in the air, another collapsed in a heap, nearby one with blood streaming from his face. Our lines were getting thinner and thinner.50
Lance Corporal Gerald Dennis, 21st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 124th Brigade, 41st Division
Alongside the 124th Brigade to their left, the men of the 122nd Brigade were directly facing Flers and were assisted greatly in this attack by the presence of the tanks. Amongst them was D-17 commanded by Second Lieutenant Stuart Hastie, and which he had named Dinnaken. His second gearsman in the tank was Gunner Reiffer.
We were a male tank and carried two 6-pounder guns with several hundred rounds of ammunition and some Hotchkiss light machine guns with .303 ammunition. Our tank was filled up with stores of all kinds: drums of engine oil, gear oil, iron rations, gas masks, equipment, overalls, revolvers, anti-’bump your head against the roof of the tank’ leather helmets, carrier pigeons in a basket, semaphore signals. We even went into action with ten 2-gallon tins of petrol (flaming red in colour) on the outside of the tank on either side of the exhaust pipes.51
Gunner A, H. R. Reiffer, Tank D-17, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
As the infantry and tanks went over the top, Lieutenant Cecil Lewis was up on contact patrol at the vital moment. From high up in the skies he truly had a grandstand view and could even see the red petrol cans carried on the tanks.
There was this solid grey wool carpet of shell bursts, but it was just as if somebody had taken his finger in the snow and pulled it through the snow and left a sort of ribbon. There were four or five of these ribbons running back toward High Wood. Through these lanes at zero hour we saw the tanks beginning to lumber. They’d been cleared for the tanks to come in file. They came up three or four in file, one behind the other. Of course they were utterly unexpected, the first lot went sailing over the trenches and we thought, ‘Well this is fine!’ Because the whole thing was the year was getting a bit late, ‘If we don’t get through now, we never shall!’ This was the great opportunity and hope was high. We thought, ‘If they can get through the third line defences, we can put the cavalry through and the whole war will become mobile again!’ And so we watched pretty carefully to see how things went. Amongst the grey wool of shell burst these lumbering chaps. One or two of them with red petrol tanks on their back; one even with a little mascot, a little fox terrier running behind the tank. Then one would stop and we had no idea why. Obviously it had been hit, or somebody had thrown a grenade at it, or it had a breakdown. At the end of two hours they had moved about a mile and we thought everything was going well and we came back because our petrol was finished.52
Lieutenant Cecil Lewis, 3 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps
Unfortunately, a somewhat farcical incident soon removed two of the tanks trundling towards Flers. Tank D-9, commanded by Second Lieutenant Victor Huffam, was following Tank D-14, commanded by Second Lieutenant Gordon Court, when they came to grief in embarrassing fashion.
Before he had gone 200–300 yards he attempted to cross a disused support trench. As he crossed it—the tank weighed 28 tons—the parapet crumbled beneath him. His tail end, the backside of the tank, disappeared into the trench. He scrambled out of his tank—quite a job—and he came back to me. Now we had been equipped with very large iron hooks on the stern of our tanks and we had wire hawsers coiled on the roof. Court was a particular friend of mine, so I manoeuvred up behind him and attempted to come alongside of him, to cross in front of him and to try and tow him out. But in manoeuvring alongside of him, my sponson got tangled with his and the two tanks were locked together.53
Second Lieutenant Victor Huffam, Tank D-9, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
There was nothing more they could do but climb on to the roof and watch the rest of the battle. What the infantry thought of this wretched display of bad luck and ineptitude can easily be imagined. Passing close to them D-17 continued up the main road, heading directly into Flers.
There was a terrific amount of noise in the tank made up by the engine, the tracks, and the tumbling about of the drums of oil and various paraphernalia that we had to carry. Our own barrage was going on outside and the German barrage, but really we couldn’t hear a lot of this because of our own noise.54
Gunner A. H. R. Reiffer, Tank D-17, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
His officer, Lieutenant Hastie decided to push on alone in support of the infantry. Ahead of him was the battered village of Flers.
It was up to me to carry on alone. Having crossed the front German line I could see the old road down into Flers which was in a shocking condition having been shelled by both sides. At the other end of this road, about a mile away, which was about the limit of my vision from the tank, I could see the village of Flers, more or less clouded with smoke from the barrage which had come down on top of it and the houses, some of them painted white, some seemed to be all kinds of colours. Across the front of the village, we could see the wire of a trench named Flers Trench and this formed a barricade in front of the village on the British side. We made our way down the remnants of this road with great difficulty. Just as we started off our steering gear was hit and we resorted to steering by putting on the brake on each track alternatively and trying to keep the tank following the line of the Flers-Delville Wood road. When we got down to Flers Trench and passing into the village, there was a great deal of activity from the eaves, under the roofs of the cottages and also from a trench which appeared to be further through the village but which we couldn’t just locate at that point.55
Second Lieutenant Stuart Hastie, Tank D-17, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
The tank was targeted by German machine gunners and the sides were liberally splattered with bullets. The multiple impacts caused slivers of hot steel to whip round the confined interior of the tank.
We were fired on by German machine guns. First of all they were firing on the starboard side and the impact of their bullets was making the inside of the armour plate white hot. And the white hot flakes were coming off and if you happened to be near enough you could have been blinded by them. Fortunately, none of us on the starboard side caught it. But there was a gunner, Gunner Sugden, on the port side who was wounded that way. We went on and Percy Boult was rather upset about this machine gunner and he said, ‘I can spot him, I think, he is up in the rafters!’ He was a pretty good shot and he scored a bull’s eye on the target and brought him down.56
Gunner A. H. R. Reiffer.Tank D-17, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Above them a contact patrol of the RFC sighted D-17 moving through Flers and the observer’s sober message, ‘Tank seen in main street Flers going on with large number of troops following it’ was transmuted and thereafter immortalised by the press as, ‘A tank is walking up the High Street of Flers with the British Army cheering behind’. Whatever the impression may have been from the air, D-17 was soon deep in trouble. Second Lieutenant Hastie could achieve little by crashing around the ruins of Flers without solid infantry support. Although elements of the 122nd Brigade had managed to enter the village, they had naturally gone to ground in the heavy shelling and were invisible from D-17.
Having steered the engine by using the brakes up to this point, the engine was beginning to knock very badly and it looked as if we wouldn’t be fit to carry on very much further. We made our way up the main street, during which time my gunners had several shots at various people who were underneath the eaves or even in the windows of some of the cottages. We went on down through the High Street as far as the first right-angle bend. We turned there and the main road goes for a matter of 200–300 yards and then turns another right angle to the left and proceeds out through towards Gueudecourt. But we did not go past that point. At this point we had to make our minds up what to do. The engine was really in such a shocking condition that it was liable to let us down at any moment. So I had a look round, so far as it was possible to do that in the middle of a village being shelled at that time by both sides. I could see no signs of the British Army coming up behind me. So I slewed the tank round with great difficulty on the brakes and came back to Flers Trench and turned the tank again to face the Germans.57
Second Lieutenant Stuart Hastie, Tank D-17, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Having rejoined the main body of the infantry, Second Lieutenant Hastie tried to find out what was going on and what he should do. It was fairly obvious that D-17 was all but finished.
I got out of the tank and contacted an infantry officer who asked me if I could take the guns out of the tank if the tank was unable to go any further forward and help them meet the counter-attack which they were certain was going to come. I had to explain to him that it was impossible because the guns are fixtures in the tanks and the machine guns are fitted in ball mountings which when you took the machine gun out it could not be mounted on anything else—it had no mounting of its own. By this time the infantry did not show any particular anxiety to go on, they were more concerned with consolidating in Flers Trench. We made up our minds that nothing could be done with the tank except get it back. We eventually turned the tank off the road to the left, pushed it up against a small hillock which gave us a certain amount of cover—and at that moment the engine packed up and did not start again.58
Second Lieutenant Stuart Hastie, Tank D-17, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Shortly afterwards one of their tracks was hit and the tank was finally immobilised and abandoned. Later that day two other tanks (Second Lieutenant Arthur Arnold in D-16 and Second Lieutenant L. C. Bond in D-18) helped break down the German defences around Flers by making a determined approach towards the west face of the village.
A tank appeared on the left front of my company position which I immediately attacked with machine-gun and rifle fire and also, as it came closer, with hand grenades. These unfortunately caused no real damage because the tank only turned slightly to the left but otherwise just carried on. He crossed the trenches in the area of the company on my left, caused us heavy losses with his flanking machine gun fire on trenches which had to a large extent been flattened, without my men being able to do anything against it.59
Leutnant Braunhofer, 5th Bavarian Infantry Division, German Army
The tanks then took up a position from which they were able to provide useful machine-gun support fire for the advance of the New Zealanders towards the northern section of Flers. They were also ideally placed to deal with German counter-attacks.
We were rewarded with the sight of long lines of Germans advancing in open formation, and opened fire with our port-side Vickers guns at 900 yards range. It was impossible to tell just what effect our fire took, but it certainly checked the advance. Dracula cruised about for a while in front of the village and then came under what seemed to be direct fire from a field gun. A difficult matter to judge, but someone was making useful practice against us. One shell in particular seemed to miss us by inches. I had, in the meantime, collected a bullet through my knee, while outside. It was now late afternoon, and as our infantry had been reinforced, I judged it was time to get back.60
Second Lieutenant Arthur Arnold, Tank D-16, D Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
The situation remained chaotic for some time until finally a staff officer, Major Gwyn Gwyn-Jones, came forward to investigate and, after taking personal control, led the various disparate groups forward to finally secure Flers.
Meanwhile, a tragic breakdown in communications led to disaster for the survivors of the 21st King’s Royal Rifle Corps, who were in the fields to the right of the village looking towards Gird Trench. Although it had been intended they should remain there and consolidate their positions, a fatal confusion in the definition of the objectives in their latest orders meant that a further attack was ordered. Their colonel, the Earl of Faversham, led them forward to destruction.
The scanty remains of the two battalions drew intense machine-gun and cannon fire and many fell amidst the growing corn. The Colonel knelt down and as he peered through his binoculars he fell back, killed. Signallers Baker and Gunson were wounded at the same time: the former a nasty wound in the neck. He was made comfortable in a shell hole, which was deepened a little to protect him. A liaison aeroplane appeared above and the Queen’s colonel suggested that a message be attempted. The battalion sign was laid out and the shutter used. The message was acknowledged by the airman on his klaxon horn, though all did not hear the acknowledgement owing to the din. A shell dropped where the regimental sergeant major, police sergeant, pioneer sergeant and corporal lay. Two were wounded and two were killed. Immediately afterwards the signal officer, ‘Tockie’ Turner, was hit in the stomach and was writhing in agony. The intelligence officer was then killed, and the adjutant, Captain Honey, was hit in the eye. Jerry had held his intense fire whilst the men ascended a slight slope and then had mown them down. It was impossible to hold any positions thereabouts and the depleted ranks fell back down to the bottom of the slope amid a knee high hail of machine-gun bullets.61
Lance Corporal Gerald Dennis, 21st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 124th Brigade, 41st Division
The attack on Flers may have been a success but the men of the 41st Division had suffered severe losses in the course of the long day. Alongside them, the 14th Division faced what looked like a dangerous extra complication of straightening out the German ‘pocket’ pressing into the British lines just to the east of Delville Wood. A preliminary operation was ordered to commence at 0515, but in the event the Germans abandoned it without much of a fight. When the main advance came the division would have much more hard fighting before it was able to successfully conform to the general advance made by the XV Corps.
The XIV Corps (Guards, 6th and 56th Divisions) on the right of the Fourth Army was attacking the German front stretching from Ginchy to Combles. The Guards and the 6th Division were to move forward, while the 56th Division moved out to form a defensive right flank to the whole advance. They were allotted fifteen tanks, nine for the Guards Division and three each for the 6th and 56th Divisions.
It was here on the XIV Corps front that the assault tactics broke down in total disarray. After the Royal Artillery had carefully left the 100-yard gaps required for the tanks in its artillery barrage, the infantry found to their horror that the tanks either failed to get forward or lost their way as they set off into No Man’s Land. The results were predictably disastrous. Without a creeping barrage to flay across the German trenches and the shell holes where German machine-gun teams were, the infantry were exposed to deadly fire from all sides. Although the Guards made fair progress, they suffered badly from flanking fire originating in the centre of the line. Here, the unfortunate 6th Division was faced with the German Sydow Höhe Redoubt known to the British, who seemed to have lacked much imagination in these matters, as the Quadrilateral. The preliminary bombardment also seems to have been badly directed and lamentably failed to destroy the trenches. When they were also left without a proper creeping bombardment the British infantry stood naked before their enemies.
The tanks achieved nothing in the chaos and confusion that seems to have enwrapped them. Everything started to go wrong the night before as they moved up. Of the three original tanks one, C-20, commanded by Second Lieutenant George Macpherson broke down while moving forward and had to be left behind. Shortly after, C-19, commanded by Captain Archie Holford-Walker suffered a broken axle on the tail unit. As Holford-Walker was unfortunately not aware that the tank could still be steered without the tail unit (which, indeed, was later discarded from use) he felt obliged to stop for repairs, which effectively excluded him from any part in the battle. This left only one tank to carry forward the hopes of the 6th Division next morning: C-22, commanded by Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.
The progress of this tank has frequently been analysed without much firm agreement emerging as to what actually happened. It has been claimed that Henriques inadvertently opened fire on soldiers of the 9th Norfolks while behind the British lines and then compounded this by moving forward too early, thus arousing German suspicions with the result that they dropped a brief but damaging artillery barrage on the British troops waiting for zero hour. Whatever occurred,62 it was still not Zero Hour when C-22 began moving across No Man’s Land heading towards the Quadrilateral. The Germans seem to have been effectively stupefied by its strange appearance and somehow failed to open fire as C-22 slowly rumbled across to their lines. As Henriques and his crew crossed the German trench his gunners opened up a vicious fire on both sides. Coming to their senses the Germans opened a heavy small arms fire, which included armour piercing rifle ammunition normally used to penetrate the metal shields used by British snipers.
All the time I had the front flaps open, for visibility was far too restricted if they were shut; but after a hail of machine-gun fire, I closed them tightly for the first time. Then the periscope got hit away; then the small prisms got broken one after another; then armour piercing bullets began to penetrate, in spite of the fact that tanks were said to be completely proof against them. Then my driver got hit; then one of my gunners; then I got splinters in the face and legs. Meanwhile the gunners claim to have killed or hit twenty or thirty of the enemy. I could see absolutely nothing. The only thing to do was to open the front flap slightly and peep through. Eventually this got hit so that it was hanging only by a thread, and the enemy could fire in at us at close range.63
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques, Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Just as Second Lieutenant Henriques and his battered crew were discovering that German infantry were not entirely helpless against tanks, the British barrage burst out at 0630. Fortunately, for C-22 at least, the barrage was not directed at the Quadrilateral as it was located within one of the tank ‘lanes’ left in the barrage. But the tank had not the firepower to deal with the Quadrilateral, indeed the garrison seemed to be on the point of overwhelming it and adding its machine guns to the existing bristling defences. As the men of the 6th Division moved forward across No Man’s Land they were met with a hail of fire.
As the infantry were now approaching and as it was impossible to guide the car, and as I now discovered the sides weren’t bulletproof, I decided that to save the tank from being captured I had better withdraw. How we got back, I shall never understand. We dodged shells from the artillery and it was just a preserving hand which saved us. It was like hell in a rough sea made of shell holes. The way we got over the ground was marvellous; every moment we were going to stick, but we didn’t. The sight of thousands of men dying and wounded was ghastly. I hate to think of it all.64
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
The slight inconsistencies in his story are not necessarily serious, but it does seem remarkable that he should retire, seemingly able to see well enough to steer from the field of battle just as the infantry most needed him. The infantry attack, it hardly need be said, was a dreadful failure. The reason for the disaster was not the failure of the tanks—they were, after all, only an adjunct to the artillery and infantry that together still ruled the battlefield. The problem lay in the deliberate weakening of the artillery to allow for the tanks and then the inability to respond swiftly by filling the gaps when it became apparent that the tanks were letting them down.
When the infantry tried again a little later, three more tanks had been optimistically ordered forwards. One, C-12 from the XIV Corps reserve, commanded by Lieutenant Vincent, came up only to ditch at the rendezvous by Guillemont crossroads. A second tank, C-9, commanded by Second Lieutenant Murphy, had originally been assigned to the Guards Division, while the third was C-20, repaired after its breakdown the night before. Second Lieutenant George Macpherson was about to take this tank forward to its destiny when he encountered his friend, the somewhat battered and bedraggled Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.
Just as I was reporting to the brigadier commanding the infantry, I met George, who had got his tank to go. He looked aghast at my bloodstained face, and then with a smile got into his tank and went off to follow up the slowly advancing infantry. It was the last I saw of him. I never heard how his tank fared. I only know he was a great hero off the field of battle and I am sure he must have been one on it.65
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques, Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
The situation was chaotic as the never robust battlefield communications surrendered to the disruptive attentions of German shell fire. In the event the second attack planned for 1330 was cancelled, but the tanks seem to have gone forward anyway.
Our tank commander was Second Lieutenant Macpherson, a fine and likeable young fellow, but he, like all of us, had never been in an actual battlefield or in action before. The briefing and instructions regarding objectives were quite inadequate and there was little or no cooperation between the infantry and the tanks. We reached a point which we believed was our objective and after a while as petrol was getting low, we had to return some distance, where we were joined by the other tank in our section. Both it and ourselves came up against machine-gun fire with armour piercing bullets and while we had quite a few holes I counted upwards of forty in the other tank. I regret to say however that Lieutenant Macpherson, when going back to headquarters to report, was killed by enemy shell fire.66
Gunner William Dawson, Tank C-20, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
His crew never really knew what happened to their officer; for tragically all was not as it seemed. Brigadier Osborne, who commanded the badly mauled 16th Brigade, later explained what had happened to George MacPherson.
I was ordered to space them out evenly over the area attacked and their lines of advance were marked with tapes as far as possible by the divisional Royal Engineers. I was then told to issue the orders for attack. In answer to my protests that I could not make a plan of any worth I was told to get on with it as GHQ had issued orders for the tanks to move in this way. The result as you know was heavy and useless casualties to 1st Buffs and 8th Bedfords. It may interest you to know the true history of the three tanks with 16th Infantry Brigade on 15th September. One went north of the Quadrilateral and wasn’t much use to me. Then the tank which reported a broken tail came back, and while the subaltern in charge was waiting for a minute while I heard another officer’s report, he shot himself and left a paper on which he wrote, ‘My God, I have been a coward’. I concealed the manner of his death to save his parents unnecessary grief. The third tank was absent, lost its way.67
Brigadier Osborne, Headquarters, 16th Brigade, 6th Division
Perhaps Osborne was overly harsh in his judgement of a young officer driven over the brink of despair by the horrors of battle and a sense of responsibility for the failure that manifestly surrounded them. George Macpherson did not die instantly, but was taken back to a casualty clearing station for treatment where he succumbed to his injuries. Certainly Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques could testify to the strain imposed on young and inexperienced officers charged with the responsibility for the success of unreliable tanks.
The nervous strain in this first battle of the tanks for officers and crew alike was ghastly. Of my company, one officer went mad and shot his engine to make it go faster, another shot himself because he thought he had failed to do as well as he ought, two others, including myself, had what I suppose can be called a nervous breakdown.68
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques, Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Lieutenant Henriques’s splinter wounds looked far worse than they actually were, but in the confusion generally prevailing he was evacuated right back and eventually ended up in an ophthalmic hospital in London. He was haunted by feelings that he had not done his duty and had in a sense fled the battlefield.
If only we had been able to reconnoitre, if only we had some kind of training with the infantry, if only there had been some semblance of cooperation with the artillery, if only there had been proper practice over ground that was like the Somme, and if only we had a little more sleep and a little less showing off, what a marvellous story might this Somme battle have been.69
Second Lieutenant Basil Henriques.Tank C-22, C Company, Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps
Eventually he retrained as a tank reconnaissance officer, in which role he returned to the Western Front in 1917. He never commanded a tank in action again.
Their neighbours to their right in the 56th Division were forthright in their condemnation of the contribution of the tanks to their flanking operation. Hopes had been so high before the battle that the tanks’ failure caused a bitter reaction.
We were allotted one of the first tanks to land in France to do some training with our brigade. Everybody was staggered to see this extraordinary monster crawling over the ground. We did what training we could with this one tank, learning to follow it at suitable intervals. We knew it had to make gaps in the enemy barbed wire and a little column of infantry had to follow through the gap. Everybody thought it was a terrific thing until the first battle and then we rather lost our faith. Of the three tanks allotted to my brigade: one broke down before it reached the front line, one broke down in the front line, only one got across the front line and it broke down before it reached the German front line, so that they were a complete failure.70
Major Philip Neame VC, Headquarters, 168th Brigade, 56th Division
This was quite unfair; once again tanks were getting the blame for the tactical decision that had been taken in the Fourth Army to leave 100-yard gaps in the creeping barrage, which the troops depended on for any realistic chance of success. The whole of the 56th Division only had three tanks and as we have seen one failed altogether as Private Gray was leading them up to their jumping-off places the night before. Another one also ditched in the early stages of the attack in Bouleaux Wood but the other, C-16 under the command of Second Lieutenant Eric Purdy, got well forward before it was hit by a shell while firing into the Loop Trench. Although the detail of Neame’s statement is therefore incorrect, the overall gist reflects his experience as a brigade staff officer. Offered a new solution he found that normal methods of working were undermined by measures taken to facilitate a new weapon that proved unreliable and of minimal impact.
In analysing the overall performance of the tanks it is difficult to avoid the use of the word ‘failure’. Although Haig had ordered a large number of tanks as soon as he was aware of their potential, there had been a manifest disappointment in the inability of the hard-pressed British munitions industry to deliver them on time. The officers and crews had not had time to be properly trained; the infantry units that surrounded them in action had usually no chance to train with the tanks. The tanks that went into action were plagued with mechanical failure and their speed was too slow to keep up with the infantry when things were going well; too slow to rush to the point of need when things were going badly. The visibility from within the tanks and the environment of a mechanical hell meant that the efficiency of tank crews in fighting was severely compromised. Where things went well the tanks were a useful adjunct to the overall all-arms battle, but where the tanks failed the artillery could not respond to sudden changes in plan and the infantry were left on their own.
Sensible officers avoided hyperbole and saw the tanks for what they really were. At this stage in the development of the tank, common sense counted for far more than specialist military knowledge in analysing their worth.
Reading about the tanks is amusing. I have been in them and examined them and know exactly what they have done in our area. Of course their virtues are exaggerated, but they are only in their infancy and did well—really well in some places. I would like to see them with double the horsepower; less impotent when they get sideways, and with some contrivance to reduce the noise.71
Chaplain T. Guy Rogers, 2nd Guards Brigade, Guards Division
As one new weapon came into blurred focus the cavalry once again found itself marooned on the sidelines of the war. They never quite seemed to be in the right place, in the right numbers, at the right time. When any fleeting opportunities did appear the cavalry always seemed to be easily thwarted.
We have made good progress, but I don’t think there is much chance of the cavalry being used today. Of course, everyone in high places was very optimistic and they thought that the chance would come. It may still come tomorrow, but today it is getting a bit late for a large forward movement. It would appear that if the cavalry does not get a chance this time it will be the end of them. I suppose that people at home are howling about the expense and so on. Today we used tanks for the first time. They seem to have been very successful in some places, especially towards Flers. We now hold most of the ridge—I shall be very sorry if we don’t get a chance this time, but it may come later when we least expect it.72
Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps
The cavalry officers must have had an inkling of the future as they gazed at the slow, rumbling, stinking tanks that seemed to have stolen their thunder.
The tanks as a whole have been a success, the idea will probably be developed and we shall come back to the steel armour on land once more. This time it will be petrol driven, as opposed to the horses of the old days.73
Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps
The Battle of Flers-Courcelette marked the writing on the wall for the old arme blanche as the world slowly awoke to a new era of mechanised warfare. A thousand years or more of cavalry achievements and tradition were being consigned to the dustbin of history.