Wittgenstein is still routinely hailed as one of, perhaps the most, important and influential of 20th-century philosophers, and his work continues to generate a great deal of scholarly debate and literature. For example, John Searle, interviewed recently in the magazine New Philosopher, though characterizing his own work as ‘profoundly anti-Wittgensteinian’ nevertheless stated that: “Wittgenstein was the greatest philosopher of the 20th century”.1 Moreover, many of the most prestigious living philosophers, currently working in some of the most highly-respected departments—e.g., Robert Brandom, John McDowell, Crispin Wright, Daniel Dennett, Simon Blackburn, Paul Horwich, Penelope Maddy, Richard Moran, Barry Stroud, Huw Price, and others—explicitly acknowledge their Wittgensteinian sympathies. Yet while substantial numbers of articles and monographs on his philosophy continue to be produced, Wittgenstein’s thought (or Wittgensteinian philosophy, more broadly) often seems absent from philosophical debates where the agenda has been set by various forms of naturalism.
Wittgenstein was centrally concerned with the puzzling nature of the mind, mathematics, morality, and modality. He also developed innovative views about the status and methodology of philosophy and was explicitly opposed to crudely ‘scientistic’ world-views. His later thought has thus often been understood as elaborating a nuanced form of naturalism (e.g., Cavell, 1979, McDowell, 1994, Pears 1995, Crary 2007, McGinn 2013, Macarthur 2015, Livingston 2015),2 appealing as it does to such notions as “form of life”, “primitive reactions”, “natural history”, “general facts of nature”, and “common behavior of mankind”.3 Nevertheless, as indicated above, Wittgenstein’s work is often bypassed from much of the contemporary debates on naturalism and naturalizing projects.4 This is especially the case with those debates in recent analytic philosophy concerned with what Frank Jackson has labelled ‘placement problems’.5 These problems involve questions concerning how or whether various important phenomena—consciousness, ethical and rational norms, moral and aesthetic values, logical and mathematical truths, free will, familiar everyday objects, social institutions and practices etc.—can be explained, somehow or other, as being part of, or supervening on, the one same natural/physical domain that is studied by the natural sciences.
There are a number of possible explanations one might speculatively advance for Wittgenstein’s comparative absence from these discussions:
Whatever the explanation may be, there are very strong reasons for thinking not only that Wittgenstein’s later thought in particular evinces some kind of naturalism, but that it is also a potentially rich and fecund source of insight and challenge for many important contemporary discussions. Among other things, the essays in this volume exemplify what we hope will become a newly prevalent attitude in mainstream philosophy (see, e.g., Maddy 2014)6—that one can draw on, use, and be in dialogue with Wittgenstein without necessarily being a card-carrying ‘Wittgensteinian’. (And, conversely, that one can respond to and criticize aspects of Wittgenstein’s work without being a card-carrying anti-Wittgensteinian.) This volume thus seeks to explore the significance of Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian thought more generally to the ongoing conversation about naturalism. It brings together philosophers who have a direct scholarly interest in Wittgenstein’s work with others who have substantial research interests outside of Wittgenstein scholarship but whose work nevertheless draws on Wittgenstein’s philosophical legacy in important ways. All of the chapters are primarily concerned with addressing questions and topics that are the focus of current philosophical debates and with using Wittgensteinian ideas and insights as needed in order to do so. We hope that this collection of essays will make clear, at both the topical and the methodological level, how Wittgenstein’s work and thought remain relevant to these contemporary philosophical issues and capable of giving fresh impulses to the debates surrounding them.
The collection is divided into four sections, each of which addresses a different aspect of Naturalism and its relation to Wittgenstein’s thought. More detailed descriptions are given below. The first section considers how ‘Naturalism’ could or should be understood. The second section deals with some of the main problematic domains—consciousness, meaning, mathematics—that philosophers have typically sought to naturalize. The third section focuses on the now much-discussed topic of animal minds and their relation to the human mind. The final section is concerned with the naturalistic status and methodology of philosophy itself. The volume casts a fresh, Wittgensteinian light on many classical philosophical issues and brings Wittgensteinian ideas to bear on a number of newer topics that are a focus of current debates—e.g., experimental philosophy, neo-pragmatism, animal cognition/ethics—in which naturalism is playing a central role.
The first essay of the volume deals with the large question as to whether Wittgenstein should be read as a naturalist at all. Paul Snowdon argues that although the later Wittgenstein’s explicitly meta-philosophical statements avow a thoroughly anti-theoretical and negative approach to philosophy, in fact Wittgenstein’s later work provides a number of positive philosophical views that can rightly be labelled ‘naturalistic’. In particular, this label can be illuminatingly applied to the picture Wittgenstein provides of language and of the foundations of meaning and intentionality. Moreover, much of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language is animated by his opposition to the sort of non-naturalistic theorizing about meaning which appeals to something like Frege’s ‘third realm’7—i.e. an ontology of abstract propositions/thoughts to which we are somehow psychologically related.8 However, whilst Snowdon takes the general picture of the nature of language and meaning that the later Wittgenstein provides to be not only naturalistic but broadly correct, his paper concludes by identifying some specific elements and claims within this naturalistic picture which are unpersuasive or overly restrictive.
The essays by David Macarthur and by Dan Hutto & Glenda Satne then take up the questions of how exactly one should develop a Wittgensteinian form of naturalism and what exactly the place and the role of the natural sciences should be within such a worldview.
Macarthur’s paper—like Snowdon’s—begins by recognizing that there is a prima facie tension between the explicitly anti-theoretical methodology that Wittgenstein espouses and the idea that he is nevertheless committed to some form of naturalism. Macarthur also emphasizes how, throughout his life, in both the earlier and later periods, Wittgenstein very clearly stated his opposition to the idea, influentially championed by Quine, that philosophy is continuous with science. It is clear then that Wittgenstein would have no sympathy for the sort of ‘scientific naturalism’ that takes metaphysics to be in the business of providing ‘super’ explanations modeled on the explanations that physics provides. Rather, Macarthur argues, building on important earlier work,9 that we should treat Wittgenstein as a ‘liberal naturalist’—with the emphasis falling on method as opposed to doctrine and human nature rather than nature as such. An important aspect of the method is not to countenance super-natural entities nor admit the explanatory exhaustiveness of the sciences—thus allowing for a liberal plurality of ways of knowing and understanding the world, particularly the human world. Macarthur thus interprets Wittgenstein’s form of naturalism as ‘non-constructive and dialectical’ rather than a substantive metaphysical doctrine. Wittgenstein aims to remind us of certain facts about natural human behavior and the natural history of human beings in order to prevent us from being tempted by the chimerical explanations associated with metaphysical pictures/theories about, paradigmatically, the nature of mind, language, and meaning. Wittgenstein aims to replace the philosophical demand for a substantial theory of mind, meaning and language with an unfamiliar (or rather, unfamiliarly familiar, hence uncanny) description of how we use the terms “mind”, “meaning” and “language”.
However, Hutto & Satne, in their contribution, argue that this kind of Liberal Naturalism is too liberal insofar as it fails to offer any positive account of the relation between the many different possible modes or domains of explanation—i.e. between the different special sciences, or between the ‘scientific image’ and the ‘manifest image’ more generally. Moreover, they argue that the specific version of Liberal Naturalism that we find in John McDowell’s influential writings risks re-introducing the kind of super-natural, platonic entities that Wittgenstein was concerned to reject. Hutto & Satne suggest that the correct philosophical framework to be drawn from the later Wittgenstein is what they call ‘Relaxed Naturalism’,10 a form of Naturalism that insists, contra McDowell, that the nature of meaning and intentionality can and should be illuminated by a synthesis of the various human sciences. Relaxed naturalism thus adopts an integrative approach to explanation that endorses central neo-pragmatist ideas and is akin to the Sydney, as opposed to the Canberra Plan, in adopting “a somewhat more permissive understanding of what it is for some everyday concept to ‘find a place’ in a scientific vision of reality”.11
One of the most important recent influences on how ‘naturalism’ is understood within philosophy is David Lewis’s development of the idea that certain properties are inherently more natural than others, quite independently of our particular human practices of classifying and categorizing things.12 Bill Child’s paper considers the extent to which Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is opposed to such a doctrine of natural properties, and in particular the extent to which Wittgenstein’s (so-called) ‘Private Language Argument’ relies on denying that sensational/phenomenal properties are ‘natural’ in something like Lewis’s sense. Child accepts that any plausible account of our sensations and sensation concepts will have to acknowledge some notion of ‘natural’ phenomenal similarity that goes beyond the subject’s recognitional and classificatory capacities— contra some of Wittgenstein’s more anti-Platonistic statements. However, Child argues that the notion of naturalness alone cannot determine the reference of our sensation/phenomenal concepts—we will still have to appeal to our classificatory practices as a crucial part of the referential story. Thus we arrive at a kind of middle-ground which, Child argues, not only avoids the problems which beset the more extreme versions of both anti-Platonism and the natural properties view, but is also still recognizably a Wittgensteinian position.
Annalisa Coliva’s contribution is concerned not only with how we self-ascribe sensations, but also with our avowals of our own intentions and other propositional attitudes. Coliva explores how Wittgenstein’s remarks on self-knowledge can be developed into an expressivist and constitutivist theory of first-personal psychological self-ascriptions. She shows how such an account is able to respect three of the most distinctive features of our psychological self-ascriptions: groundlessness (our avowals are not based on either inner observation or inference), transparency (for many mental states, being in the state guarantees being in a position to know that one is in that state) and authority (unless we suspect insincerity, a subject’s first-personal avowals are not open to being doubted or challenged by others). Moreover, by emphasizing the continuity between first-personal psychological ascriptions and naturally or instinctively expressive non-linguistic behaviors, such a Wittgensteinian theory can provide a ‘soft-naturalistic’ explanation of these distinctive features of self-knowledge which avoids appealing to any kind of special epistemic access to some mysterious private phenomenal realm.
In contrast to a number of the other papers in this volume, Charles Travis’s contribution discerns a non-naturalistic strand in Wittgenstein’s thought, interpreting the transition from his earlier to his later work as turning back towards Frege by accepting that representational contents cannot be reduced to any kind of concrete, particular elements. Travis traces how Wittgenstein came to realize that the failures of the Tractarian account of judgment and meaning were ultimately due to a failure to respect a fundamental and categorical distinction between the general and the particular. The Tractatus is thus vulnerable to a general Fregean critique of any form of correspondence theory of truth. On Travis’s reading then the later Wittgenstein emerges as an anti-naturalist thinker, one who recognized that ‘naturalism is not the price of objectivity’.13
When asked in 1944 to provide a short description of his work, Wittgenstein claimed that his ‘chief contribution has been in the philosophy of mathematics’.14 And mathematics, along with the mental, has provided one of the perennial problem cases for naturalizing projects in philosophy. Sorin Bangu, in his paper, defends a Wittgensteinian account of mathematical necessity according to which mathematical claims are strictly speaking neither true nor false but rather are statements of rules—rules which govern what it is to count or to calculate correctly. Bangu provides a “genealogical” account of how empirical regularities can be ‘hardened’ so that they come to function as rules and are thus removed from possible empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. Bangu suggests that such an account not only allows for a naturalistic way to avoid Platonist mythologizing of mathematics, but it also offers a new way to answer skepticism about the objectivity of mathematical truth.
Wittgenstein wrote at PI §25 “Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing”. This clearly suggests that he believed our biological heritage had much relevance for our view of philosophy. Yet, while everyone agrees that Wittgenstein rejected the idea that philosophy could actually be one of the natural sciences, the nature of the relation between the activity of philosophy and other kinds of activities whereby we obtain knowledge about the world is much disputed, both quite generally and as it pertains to how we understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This relation is especially acute when it comes to the question of animal minds.
In her “Minding the Gap”, Dorit Bar-on aims to engage what she describes as a long tradition of “continuity skeptics” who have sought to establish on conceptual grounds that the minds of non-human animals (and possibly even of very young humans) are separated from our minds by an unbridgeable gap. This, it is thought, undermines the possibility of an intelligible philosophical explanation of the natural emergence of mind; and it renders futile any search for natural precursors of our own minds in the mental capacities of ‘simpler minds’. Drawing on resources from both everyday life and natural science, Bar-on presents a form of non-reflective communication that we share with non-linguistic and pre-linguistic creatures: expressive communication. She argues against continuity skeptics such as Donald Davidson that proper appreciation of the role expressive capacities play in the lives of creatures possessing them points to a sensible intermediate stage in (what Wittgenstein would describe as) a natural history that could connect us with our pre-human ancestors (as well as connecting adult language users with their younger, preverbal selves). She concludes with some reflections on the implications of the existence of such a natural history for a philosophical understanding of the relationship between human and non-human mindedness.
Julia Tanney’s “Rational Animals” intersects Bar-on’s in several interesting respects. Bar-on draws upon both common sense and considerations from evolutionary biology to make her case against the continuity skeptic. When it comes to how to think about animal minds, Tanney wants to stress the importance of common sense as well. But, unlike Baron, she also brings out how common sense both infuses emerging fields such as dog science and to a certain extent stands in tension with some of the remaining Cartesian dogmas about the mind that those fields have inherited. In focusing on animals who share our homes and thus are participants in some of our most treasured (and intimate) normative practices, her paper asks us to give philosophical weight to what we might think of as the everyday phenomenology of our lives with these creatures. In particular, drawing on Ryle and Wittgenstein, Tanney argues that mental predicates are internally related to the thick descriptions by which we describe the performances that puzzle us. This position, which is as robustly anti-behaviorist as it is anti-Cartesian, invites a re-examination of the similarities and dissimilarities between species of rational animals.
If continuity skepticism as Bar-on depicts it shows a marked, perhaps unwarranted, tendency to downplay the extent to which animals are genuinely minded, Stina Bäckström’s “Expression and Human-Animal Continuity” counters that defenders such as Bar-on and Alice Crary of what Bäckström terms the “continuity view” nevertheless overlook crucial distinctions between animal and paradigmatically human minds. After recasting the central commitments of the continuity view, Bäckström adduces certain key passages in Wittgenstein that form the core of an argument for that view. In particular, these serve to bring out how certain temporal aspects of language together with connections between non-verbal and verbal expression suggest a kind of mentality that goes beyond anything we can reasonably ascribe to creatures without language. Finally, drawing on different lines of thought, one in John McDowell the other in Wittgenstein, Bäckström suggests that the concept of “expression”, a concept central to many continuity view arguments, cannot necessarily do the work required of it.
Benedict Smith’s essay takes on the essential task of attempting to place the subject of Wittgenstein and naturalism into an historical context. Commentators such as Bernard Williams have portrayed Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as ‘exclusively a priori’. Yet this cannot account for the central role he accorded to observing and describing the variety of our practices in the context of everyday life. To provide an alternative view Smith compares Wittgenstein’s practice of philosophy with that of Hume. Humean naturalism is sometimes assumed to have paved the way for scientism. But, in stark contrast, Hume’s work is also cited as inspiration for ‘subject naturalism’ as it has figured in Price’s important work on naturalism. There are of course important differences between Hume and Wittgenstein (and between each of them and Price). But recognizing the elements arguably shared by Hume and Wittgenstein can provide a better way to characterize the latter’s naturalistic approach to understanding the nature of philosophy and ourselves. This helps clarify the role Wittgenstein gave to human practice and experience and demonstrates that his attitude to the method and subject matter of philosophy was not ‘exclusively a priori’.
Eugen Fischer examines how the ‘Warrant Project’ in current experimental philosophy is promoting a new kind of methodological naturalism that he argues is fundamentally consistent with the so-called “therapeutic” thrust of Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophy. While traditional or first-order methodological naturalists seek to address philosophical problems about a topic X (say, the mind, perception, or knowledge) by building on scientific findings about X, Fischer argues that the new meta-philosophical naturalism by contrast invites us to contribute to the resolution of philosophical problems or debates about X by turning to scientific (psychological) findings about the way we think about X—in general or when doing philosophy. Fischer claims that the resources this new naturalism encourages us to use can provide an empirical vindication of key aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and give us an empirically successful diagnostic theory that can guide a ‘therapeutic’ philosophical practice. The paper develops this hypothesis by showing how concepts and findings from psycholinguistic research on routine comprehension processe scan be used to facilitate a ‘diagnostic’ resolution and ‘therapeutic’ treatment of philosophical problems which arise when those processes misfire.
Jonathan Knowles examines some much discussed recent work by Huw Price and Paul Horwich. In different ways, each of these philosophers has portrayed themselves as anti-representationalists and anti-metaphysicians, views that they claim to be inspired by or as having affinities with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. They differ, or would appear to differ, however, with respect to the question of naturalism. As is well known, Price subscribes to a form of naturalism that he terms “subject naturalism”, which purports to break with more traditional, and metaphysical, forms of “object naturalism”. Prices’s outlook is closely tied to a global expressivist view of language he finds in the later Wittgenstein. Horwich, on the other hand, apparently rejects naturalism and instead advocates what he takes as a Wittgenstein inspired rejection of theory in philosophy. In his paper, Knowles examines what these commitments amount to for the respective philosophers, critically evaluates the overall views they articulate, and presents his own assessment of (the interrelationships between) representationalism, metaphysics, naturalism, and science.
Wittgenstein’s attitude to the discipline of philosophy was notoriously ambivalent. He left (or tried to leave) the profession on more than one occasion and was not averse to advising students of the subject to do something “useful” instead. This was partly a result of his understanding of just what philosophy is; put a bit crudely, Wittgenstein saw philosophy as either metaphysics or critique of metaphysics. And once the Western metaphysical tradition had been shown up as so many multifarious illusions, what is left for the philosopher, let alone the profession as a whole, to do? This is the question that Bjørn Ramberg takes up in his contribution. At present, perhaps the single most pressing problem in mainstream metaphysics would appear to be the question of the place of mind in the natural world: work must be done to mark out or make up appropriate space. By contrast, thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Huw Price, and Philip Kitcher, who fall under the umbrella of what Ramberg terms “Philosophy Critical Pragmatic Naturalism” (or PCPN) think the centrality of the “placement problem” itself is highly problematic. Yet Ramberg wonders, what, then, is it that pragmatic naturalists actually do, once the debunking lessons are learned? Once naturalism does its work on representational metaphysics and philosophy of mind, can a pragmatist concern with practice, with the real problems of real human beings, provide disciplinary direction? Or does it amount simply to a wide-open job description for scientifically informed intellectuals-at-large? By comparing the overlapping but distinct responses of Rorty, Price, and Kitcher, Ramberg provides us with at least a partial sketch of a post-Wittgensteinian philosophical landscape deflated of its traditional metaphysical ambitions.
1 www.newphilosopher.com/articles/john-searle-it-upsets-me-when-i-read-the-nonsense-written-by-my-contemporaries/
2 See Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); David Pears, “Wittgenstein’s Naturalism,” The Monist 78:4 (1995): 411–424; Alice Crary, “Wittgenstein and Ethical Naturalism,” in Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, eds. Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 295–319; Marie Mcginn, “Liberal Naturalism: Wittgenstein and McDowell,” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, ed. Matthew C. Haug (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 62–85; David Macarthur, “Liberal Naturalism and Second-Personal Space: A Neo-Pragmatist Response to the ‘Natural Origins of Content’,” Philosophia 43 (2015): 565–578; Paul M. Livingston, “Naturalism, Conventionalism, and Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and the ‘Cratylus’,” Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4:2 (2015): 7–38.
3 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), §19, §23, §241, p. 218, §25, §415, p. 230, and §206.
4 As an important exception, it is worth nothing that the recent recoil from ‘orthodox’ metaphysics has seen a surge of interest in neo-pragmatist and expressivist theorizing in the philosophy of language, a general approach which bears obvious affinities with Wittgenstein’s work—e.g., in a recent volume on pragmatism and expressivism (Price et al. 2013) Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, and Paul Horwich all explicitly avow their indebtedness to Wittgenstein. See Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich, and Michael Williams, Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). See also many of the papers in the recent volume Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, eds., Meaning Without Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
5 Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).
6 Penelope Maddy, The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
7 See Gottlob Frege, “Der Gedanke,” Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1:2 (1918): 58–77.
8 Though compare Charles Travis’s contribution to the present volume, which argues that there is in fact a deep affinity between the later Wittgenstein and the views of Frege in Der Gedanke.
9 See David Macarthur, “Taking the Human Sciences Seriously,” in Naturalism and Normativity, eds. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 123–141 and also Macarthur, “Second-Personal Space”.
10 See Daniel D. Hutto and Glenda Satne, “The Natural Origins of Content,” Philosophia 43:3 (2015): 521–536.
11 Jennan Ismael, “Naturalism on the Sydney Plan,” in Philosophical Methodology, 87.
12 See David Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:4 (1983): 343–377.
13 See section 9 of Travis’s contribution to this volume.
14 See Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 466.
Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Crary, Alice. “Wittgenstein and Ethical Naturalism.” In Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, edited by Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela, 295–319. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
Frege, Gottlob. “Der Gedanke.” Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1:2 (1918): 58–77.
Gross, Steven, Tebben, Nicholas, and Williams, Michael, eds. Meaning Without Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Satne, Glenda. “The Natural Origins of Content.” Philosophia 43:3 (2015): 521–536.
Ismael, Jennan. “Naturalism on the Sydney Plan.” In Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? edited by Matthew C. Haug, 86–103. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013.
Jackson, Frank. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.
Lewis, David. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:4 (1983): 343–377.
Livingston, Paul M. “Naturalism, Conventionalism, and Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and the ‘Cratylus.’” Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4:2 (2015): 7–38.
Macarthur, David. “Liberal Naturalism and Second-Personal Space: A Neo-Pragmatist Response to the ‘Natural Origins of Content.’” Philosophia 43 (2015): 565–578.
———. “Taking the Human Sciences Seriously.” In Naturalism and Normativity, edited by M. De Caro and D. Macarthur, 123–141. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Maddy, Penelope. The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
McDowell, John. Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
McGinn, Marie. “Liberal Naturalism: Wittgenstein and McDowell.” In Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? edited by Matthew C. Haug, 62–85. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013.
Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
Pears, David. “Wittgenstein’s Naturalism.” The Monist 78:4 (1995): 411–424.
Price, Huw, Blackburn, Simon, Brandom, Robert, and Horwich, Paul. Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.