The minority report… is acceptable neither to Jews nor Arabs. For us to advocate Minority report would please no one and lead us nowhere.
—Vijayalakshmi Pandit, leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations
5 India, UNSCOP, and the Partition of Palestine
Speaking before the Constituent Assembly of India on December 4, 1947, just days after the UN General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared: “After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution of the problem. Any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict.”1 He was referring not to partition but to the ill-fated federal solution that India had advocated as a member of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). In the wake of decades of violence following the partition of Palestine, many Indian scholars now engage in uncritical adulation of the federal plan and present it as a missed opportunity.2
If the Indian proposal was widely hailed within the country, why did it evoke a dismal response elsewhere? Why did both Arabs and Jews refuse to consider Nehru’s “only real solution”? Why did the rivals join hands and outright reject the Indian formula? Why is it barely discussed not only by the United Nations but also by scholars of the partition plan?3 What was this magic Indian solution for Palestine? What about it evoked nearly universal neglect and dismissal? Was the Indian solution a realistic option in 1947, or was Nehru advocating a course that he himself had rejected for the Indian subcontinent?
The UN Special Session
Before examining the Indian proposal, it is essential to remember certain parallel developments in Palestine and India. The period from April to September 1947 was critical for both. As the Palestinian issue came up before the United Nations, India was preparing for independence. Despite being a dominion of the British Empire, it was a founding member of the United Nations, and Nehru had formed an interim government in September 1946. The United Nations began to discuss the Palestine problem in April 1947; India gained independence on August 15, 1947, when the final deliberations of the UNSCOP were underway. The UN report was submitted exactly two weeks later. The developments in the subcontinent shaped and influenced India’s position in the United Nations.
By then, the contours of India’s position on the Palestine question were firmly in place. Despite internal contradictions and gradual modifications in subsequent years, Mahatma Gandhi’s famous statement about Palestine belonging to the Arabs largely reflected the prevailing consensus. At the same time, INC leaders were aware that any solution to the problem should not ignore Jewish interests and aspirations. How could Jewish aspirations be satisfied without diluting the Arab character of Palestine? How does one reconcile the irreconcilable?
As World War II ended, it was obvious that Great Britain was trying to administer an inherently contradictory and unworkable Mandate in Palestine. Its promises to Sharif Hussein of Mecca (enshrined in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence) could not be squared with its pledges to the Zionists under the Balfour Declaration. For over two decades, it unsuccessfully tried to reconcile these two. Even the once-friendly Zionists turned against them. Revisionist groups such as Irgun, headed by Menachem Begin, launched a full-fledged terror campaign. The economic cost of winning World War II and its dependence upon the Marshall Plan compelled Britain to reassess its overseas commitments. The decision to withdraw from India further diminished the importance of Palestine to the declining empire. London had to admit failure and cut its losses. But it still needed a face-saving formula.4
On April 2, 1947, Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, formally requested that the UN secretary-general “summon as soon as possible” a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting “a special committee” to decide the “future government in Palestine.”5 The United Nations sought the views of its member states, and on April 11 the interim Indian government gave its formal consent. Having secured the necessary affirmative response, Secretary-General Trygve Lie summoned the first Special Session of the UN General Assembly, which met in New York City on April 28. The session continued until May 15, when it established the eleven-member UNSCOP. Because of the urgency of the situation, Nehru nominated Asaf Ali, his ambassador in Washington, as India’s representative to the First Special Session of the United Nations.
Asaf Ali and the UN Drama
On the eve of the first Special Session, Asaf Ali was given a list of instructions:
(1) To endeavor to obtain… India’s membership on the Fact Finding Committee;… (2) to be most careful not to commit the Government of India to any views of substance without prior reference;… (3) to support the Egyptian proposal for inclusion in the agenda an item relating to the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of Palestine’s independence; [and] (4) to avoid raising issues which might affect relations between India and any other country.6
It is obvious that India was angling for membership in the proposed committee even before the commencement of the Special Session. Asaf Ali was accordingly advised that it was “for the sponsors of the resolution to make out a case for the termination of the Mandate and to indicate how the vacuum thus created will be filled.”7 Because of the generally pro-Arab postures that the Congress Party had adopted in the past, Nehru did not want Asaf Ali to make statements that would prejudice India’s role regarding the future of Palestine. Unfortunately, Nehru’s misgivings were not far off the mark.
Asaf Ali played an active role at various stages of the deliberations and in tune with the position of the INC adopted an overtly pro-Arab position.8 As the United Nations was deliberating the Palestinian problem, India was being partitioned along communal lines. As a leading Muslim member of the Congress Party, Asaf Ali was unable to accept the notion that religion “can convert people into a nation” and strongly repudiated any exclusive linkage between religion and nation.9 This reflected the prevailing view of the INC regarding the demands of the Muslim League for Pakistan. Of course, even as Asaf Ali was rejecting a religious basis for statehood as “untenable,” the subcontinent was being partitioned along those very same lines!
As advised by Nehru, Asaf Ali supported the Arab proposal that called for “termination of the Mandate and proclamation of the independence of Palestine” as the agenda of the proposed UN committee. Overruling suggestions from New Delhi to let the sponsors “make out a case,” he argued vehemently in favor of the Arab proposal.10 Both the General Committee11 and the UN General Assembly12 felt that the Arab proposal was incompatible with the original British request that led to the Special Session and rejected the suggestion. Asaf Ali, however, succeeded in inviting the Arab Higher Committee, headed by the mufti of Jerusalem, to testify before the General Committee.13 Ali felt that if the views of the representatives of the people of Palestine, whether Arab or Jews, were not heeded by the United Nations, then “we shall certainly be prejudicing the entire case.”14
Asaf Ali supported the Arab countries in rejecting any connection between the Palestine question and the displaced-person (DP) camps in Europe. It should be remembered that the opposition to such a linkage remained a constant theme in India’s interventions, both in the Special Session and in subsequent UN deliberations. For example, speaking before the General Assembly shortly after the UNSCOP report was submitted, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the leader of the Indian delegation, maintained that the problem of the displaced Jews in Europe was
not the concern of this Committee [the UNSCOP] and should not therefore be mixed up with the issue of Palestine…. In fact a great deal of the uneasiness that exists today in the minds of the Arab population in Palestine and in other Arab countries is due to the fact that vigorous attempts have been and are still being made to view the Palestine question as mainly one of finding a home for the large number of displaced Jews. It is a clear duty of this Committee to say unequivocally that while the United Nations have a very grave responsibility in regard to the displaced persons of Central Europe, the Committee feels most strongly that this should not be mixed up with the question of the future government of Palestine.15
Naturally, Asaf Ali voted against a Panama-Guatemala resolution that called for a visit by the UNSCOP to the DP camps in Europe.16 However, a resolution to this effect was adopted by the committee, by an overwhelming majority of thirty-six votes in favor to eight against, with fourteen abstentions.
The second major contribution of the Indian representative pertains to the composition of the proposed committee. Asaf Ali concurred with the U.S. position that permanent members of the Security Council should be excluded from the committee. Much to the annoyance of some, he pointed out that with the sole exception of China, other great powers had strong political and economic interests in the Middle East and would be unable to perform their tasks objectively.17
The Indian representative offered explicit support to the Jews when he endorsed the motion for inviting the Jewish Agency for Palestine to testify before the General Committee. He felt that, as with the Arab Higher Committee, the views of the Jews and their representatives should be heard: “we are playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark…. Where are the great representatives of the Jewish people who are also interested in this problem?”18 This “Prince of Denmark” remark drew widespread domestic criticism, especially from the Muslim League. In India, the Congress Party and Muslim League were not only fighting over the status of Muslims, in the about-to-be-divided India but also over who would represent Indian Muslims. The Muslim League perceived, projected, and promoted itself as the sole representative of the Muslims of the subcontinent. It was not prepared to accept that the Congress Party could represent the legitimate interests of the Muslims. If they could do so, there would be no rationale for a Muslim League—let alone a separate Muslim state. Nehru once again pushed back against this notion by appointing a Muslim to represent India at this crucial UN debate, which had strong Islamic undercurrents and overtones. Asaf Ali’s “Prince of Denmark” remark thus complicated the situation.
In a letter to the Arab Executive Committee in Palestine, a functionary of the Muslim League observed: “Asaf Ali was not representing the Muslims of India. He was selected by Pandit Nehru, the Congress leader, and the Muslim League had no hand in his appointment. The statement of Mr. Asaf Ali runs contrary to the sentiments of 100,000,000 Muslims in India who stand and always will stand by their Arab brethren of the Middle East on the Palestine issue.” The Dawn, a Karachi-based daily founded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, reminded its readers that Asaf Ali’s remark “should go a long way towards disillusioning those few people in the Arab world who might have set some store by the professions of the Hindu Congress about its support of the Arab cause…. Mr. Asaf Ali does not represent Muslim India and is acting contrary to Muslim India’s views.”19 In other words, Asaf Ali’s invitation to the Jewish Agency to testify before the committee became an anti-Muslim act, even though the Indian envoy had earlier made similar suggestions regarding the Arab Higher Committee!
The Zionists were equally upset over Asaf Ali’s overtly pro-Arab stand. Eliahu Epstein, the head of the Jewish Agency office in Washington, offered a scathing assessment.20 Writing in January 1948, after the UN approval of the partition plan, he commented:
The [Indian] Ambassador here [in Washington], Mr. Asaf Ali, was the worst opponent we had at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in April last year. Besides that, while the Arabs fight us openly, he has been engaged in intrigues and double crosses, and has confused many of our people by his hypocrisy and machinations. Although he was not a member of the Indian delegation at the last session, there is no reason to believe that he has made an about face or that his character has improved.21
Likewise, Taraknath Das, a U.S.-based academic and active champion of the Zionist cause, felt that Asaf Ali “was so pro-Arab that he earned the title, Indian Attorney for the Arab League.”22
Normally, one could dismiss these observations as partisan, motivated, and even prejudiced. Unfortunately for Asaf Ali, even Nehru was unhappy with his performance. During the session, Nehru was disappointed at Ali’s hostile responses when Britain expressed its hesitation to honor any UN recommendation that went against its imperial interests. Ali’s stance violated Nehru’s April instructions to avoid controversy. The envoy’s rebuke of the empire came when Nehru was pursuing delicate negotiations with London over the transfer of power. Nehru was quick and candid: “I do not have [a] full report of what you [Asaf Ali] said but I would suggest your avoiding raising issues which might affect relations between India and any other country. As we have informed you in our brief, we support [the] Arab cause. Nevertheless we should avoid as far as possible needless controversy.”23
On May 14, as the Special Session was coming to a close, Nehru complimented Asaf Ali for shouldering additional responsibilities at the United Nations. At the same time, he did not hide his concerns:
I have a feeling… that perhaps fewer commitments might have been made on our behalf in regard to certain matters. It pays often enough not to give too frequent expression of our views. Though you balanced your observations, when there are many observations they are apt to irritate one party or the other needlessly as they appear to have done sometimes. There have been a few adverse comments here [in New Delhi] on what you have said and a general feeling that it would have been better not to say so much.24
According to Nehru’s biographer, “certain matters” pertained to Asaf Ali’s support for the Arab proposal for granting immediate independence to Palestine.25
Others were even more categorical. An official note prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs, also headed by Nehru, was blunt:
It is clear, both from the telegrams and from press reports, that from the very beginning Mr. Asaf Ali had taken a very active part in the discussions…. His part in the proceedings appears, however, to have gone rather beyond his instructions, which were [that he] be most careful in the expression of views, as well as to leave it to the sponsors of the resolutions to make out a case for the termination of the Mandate and to indicate how the vacuum thus created will be filled.26
In a word, Asaf Ali’s overenthusiastic pronouncements and observations at the Special Session were not appreciated by the Indian government.
India was concerned over the possible negative fallout from Asaf Ali’s performance. On April 9, days before it had formally communicated its support for convening a Special Session on Palestine, India outlined its priorities: “In view of the Indian interest in this problem, we should presumably try for membership of this committee.”27 Another Indian official was rather cautious: “It is possible that Muslim opinion in India might regard us as taking our duties too lightly if we do not try; on the other hand one’s natural inclination would be to avoid being too closely embroiled in a problem of the size and ugliness of Palestine.”28 Thus, the official communication to Asaf Ali regarding his nomination for the Special Session advised him to work toward securing India’s membership in the proposed committee.29 Partly because of this desire, he was counseled to be cautious, lest he jeopardized India’s chances.
Unfortunately for India, the pro-Arab stance adopted by Asaf Ali adversely affected its chances. It did not figure in the initial list of seven countries proposed by the United States30 or in the two more names added by Chile.31 New Delhi was aware that “without the support of the USA, India will stand little chance of being included in the fact-finding committee.”32 Reacting to India’s exclusion from the American list, Asaf Ali cabled New Delhi: “It appears from informal conversations that India was omitted from the United States’… list because of statements of Congress and [Muslim] League leaders in India and [because of] the attitude of [the] Indian delegation here [in New York] indicated that we were not ‘neutral’ but favored Arabs.”33 He repeated this observation a few days later when he sent a detailed report to New Delhi.34 As they were seen as a party to the Palestinian problem, the Arab countries were excluded from the proposed committee, and thus pro-Arab India was the closest thing that they could have gotten in the UNSCOP.
Fortune favored India, though. To better represent the geographical distribution of UN members, the Political Committee decided to increase the number of nations composing the proposed committee to eleven. This brightened India’s chances.35 Since all nine names proposed by the United States and Chile were unanimously accepted, it was decided that the remaining two members would be elected from the Asian and South Pacific region. India was nominated by Iran, who appeared in the U.S. list. It defeated Siam (now Thailand) by thirty-four votes to seven; Australia narrowly defeated the Philippines by twenty-one to twenty votes, with India voting for the winner. Following the election, Asaf Ali regretted the contest with Siam, “who while hoping for our election did not wish to withdraw. We remained in the contest at urgent requests of Arabs.”36 India thus became a member of the eleven-member UNSCOP. This twist of being “elected” and not “nominated by consensus” rarely figures in Indian discussions concerning the UNSCOP. The drama indicates both the Indian desperation to join the committee and the international reservations over its neutrality on the Palestine issue.
As the committee was expected to begin its deliberations soon, Asaf Ali suggested that a nominee “be chosen immediately.”37 India swiftly nominated Abdur Rahman as its representative to the UNSCOP. Unlike Asaf Ali, he clashed with Nehru over his “UN personality” and solutions to the Palestine question.
Abdur Rahman and UNSCOP
The selection of Rahman for the important task of UNSCOP representative is both interesting and intriguing. Once again, the Islamic prism through which India viewed the problem of Palestine influenced his candidacy. The Foreign Office was more forthcoming and candid than the political leadership. In its assessment, it was “necessary to find, at a very short notice, a suitable Indian Muslim with wide legal knowledge” for the job.38 Since the problem was primarily political, it is unclear why it preferred someone with “legal knowledge.” The other criterion of a “suitable Indian Muslim” was definitely aimed at the unfolding domestic situation and the impending partition. Instead of seeking a suitable person knowledgeable on the Middle East, it sought an “Indian Muslim.” Was it because Muslims better understood and could articulate the Palestinian problem? Was it because the problem was Islamic rather than political? Or, by sending a Muslim to the UNSCOP on the eve of India’s partition, was Nehru conveying a powerful message to the Muslim constituency of the Congress Party? In the absence of additional records, one can only speculate.
The selection of Sir Abdur Rahman raised an additional problem. He was a judge at the Punjab High Court. Though it was still part of India, Lahore, where the High Court was located, had a Muslim majority and was to eventually become part of Pakistan. India’s partition greatly influenced Rahman’s views and figured prominently in his interactions with the Indian government, even leading to a mild confrontation with Nehru.
In line with the Indian position at the Special Session, Rahman demanded the participation of Palestinian Arabs in the UNSCOP deliberations. He vehemently argued that the task would be unsatisfactory “unless the Arab case is explained to us by those who have studied the problem and are vitally interested therein.” The Arab Higher Committee, whose cooperation India sought at the Special Session, however, chose to boycott the UNSCOP proceedings in Palestine. Rahman still did not give up and suggested that the views of the neighboring Arab countries should be heard before the UNSCOP finalized its recommendations. In a letter to the committee chairman, Emil Sandstorm, he stated: “in all probability, without the help of these countries in the first World War, the question which we are called upon to consider might never have arisen.”39 The committee accepted his suggestion and held a special session in Beirut. There was a notable absentee: Transjordan. Thus, before heading to the Beirut meeting, Rahman proceeded to Amman and lunched with Emir Abdullah. In his assessment, Abdullah was prepared to accept a partition plan if it meant significant territorial gains favoring Transjordan.40 During the deliberations, Rahman was less friendly toward the Zionists than Asaf Ali. While cross-examining the Jewish Agency testimonies before the committee as well as in his dissent note, Rahman exhibited a strong prejudice against Zionism and some of its principal figures.41
Was the stance taken by Abdur Rahman his own, or was he representing the views of the government of India?
Within hours of the formation of the UNSCOP, Asaf Ali reminded New Delhi of the prevailing consensus in New York that nominees to the committee should be “persons of high character and standing in public life [and] preferably with grasp of international affairs and free from interference by nominating governments.” He also reported that both the United States and Great Britain “are in favor of a declaration that members of the Special Committee will act on behalf of the United Nations as a whole and will not (repeat not) be subject to direction by their government.”42 Iran took this sentiment seriously, and its representative, Nasrollah Entezam, told the session that the Iranian representative to the UNSCOP would be given complete freedom and would not receive any instructions from Tehran regarding his functions and recommendations. This, however, was not the case with India. Nehru actively intervened, diluted, modified, and even dictated the views of his nominee. The federal plan was Nehru’s brainchild. Rahman merely acted as midwife.
When elected to the UNSCOP in May 1947, India was formalizing its independence, and Nehru was presiding over the interim government. Personally approving the nomination, on May 24, Nehru reminded Rahman of his role in the UNSCOP: “How to reconcile the two [Arab and Jewish] claims is the problem before us. I do not venture to express an opinion except vaguely to say that perhaps an autonomous Jewish area within an independent Palestine might lead to a solution…. The general attitude of India must necessarily be friendly to both parties but clearly indicating that an agreement must have Arab approval.”43 This largely reflected the prevailing thinking in the Congress Party over the future of Palestine. On the eve of World War II, it called for the establishment of a “free democratic state in Palestine with adequate protection of Jewish rights.”44 The need to seek an accommodation between Arab and Jewish rights dominated Rahman’s functions in the UNSCOP.
Nehru did not forget the controversies surrounding Asaf Ali’s role at the Special Session and was determined to avoid same mistakes. Therefore, he advised Rahman:
We [India] should proceed, especially in this fact-finding committee, in a judicial manner as far as possible. It might be desirable not to say too much and to make any particular commitments at this stage…. You will function as the representative of India on this committee and will naturally refer to us any particular matters that you think should be cleared up. But you will also be a representative of the United Nations Organization, free to suggest what you consider fit and proper from the larger viewpoint of that Organization as well as of the Arabs and the Jews.45
The message was clear. As India’s representative, Rahman should seek New Delhi’s prior consent on any substantive matter and should refrain from adopting positions that might jeopardize India’s interests. This was very different from the free hand that Iran gave to its UNSCOP representative.
Rahman’s performance was also severely undermined and affected by events back home. The issue of India’s partition figured prominently both in the testimonies and in his private conservations with other members of the committee. Reflecting on his Indian counterpart, the Guatemalan delegate Jorge Garcia-Granados remarked: “Throughout the following days, when we finally came to debate the merits of partitioning Palestine, Sir Abdur (as I was to learn later) labored under great strain, worrying as to the safety of his family in the post-partition riots in India.”46 The impending division of India also raised certain doubts in Rahman’s mind concerning his legal status. He felt that he was an international personality and not India’s representative. In his very first report on the activities of the committee, he informed Nehru that some of his colleagues had enquired “as to what the legal position of India would be after the division.” He was confident that his position would not be compromised, because “I was nominated by the United Nations although on the recommendation of the Indian government, at a time when India was a member of the United Nations.”47
Nehru was in no mood for such far-fetched claims. He strongly refuted Rahman’s assertions that the impending partition would affect the status of India in the United Nations and, therefore, Rahman’s locus standi in the committee. On July 10, he informed Rahman that the partition of India
does not affect the international status of India as a continuing entity, and all our old obligations continue…. Your position on the Palestine Special Committee is not affected in any way. I might point out that it is not quite correct to say that you were nominated by the United Nations. India was chosen as one of the countries to be represented on the Special Committee. The nomination of the representative from India was done by the Government of India and not by the United Nations.48
The matter, however, did not end with this categorical response from Nehru.
On August 10, less than a week before India’s partition, Rahman observed that some committee members felt that following the division of the subcontinent and formation of two independent states India “would not continue to be a member of the United Nations, and I would consequently not be entitled to represent India on this Committee.” Therefore, Rahman suggested that he would present his views “in a sealed cover with the Chairman of the Committee on the 14th August [the day of the formation of Pakistan], to ask him not to open it until the report of the Committee was ready.”49 His doubts over India’s membership were misplaced. While Pakistan was admitted to the United Nations on September 30, 1947, India, being a founding member of the world body, emerged as the legal successor to British India. There was no legal impediment to either India’s continued membership in the United Nations or the continuation of Rahman in the committee.
Within days, another problem arose. This time Rahman and New Delhi differed over the future of Palestine. He prepared two sets of reports. In his initial proposal, dated August 14, 1947, the very eve of India’s independence, he made a strong case for a unitary Palestine. He felt that both the binational solution and the cantonal option were undemocratic and cumbersome. In his view, there were only two realistic solutions to Palestine: partition or a unitary state. He rejected the federal option as “unworkable as the desire to federate is lacking at present.”50 Outlining his proposal, Rahman cabled:
Palestine should in accordance to promises given by British and French Governments be constituted into a democratic unitary Palestinian State and although Jewish ethnic, cultural, religious, educational and linguistic rights be reserved by constitution either unalterable or alternatively by a three-fourths majority. Yet there is no reason to deprive the majority of their legitimate right according to principle of self-determination to form a Government in which Jews should be allowed a share of one-third in all Government offices and posts proportionate to their present population.
On the question of aliya, the primary Zionist agenda, Rahman was prepared to accept immigration based on “religious and domestic but not political reasons.”51
Rahman’s August 14 unitary plan and his decision to place his recommendations in “sealed cover” rang alarms in New Delhi. On August 23, a week after India’s partition, he was instructed to abandon his proposal and opt for a “middle course between what may be theoretically just and what is factually practicable.” Disagreeing with Rahman’s views, India expressed support for a federal Palestine, and Rahman was explicitly instructed not to pursue “a democratic unitary Palestinian State.”52
Thus, in proposing a solution for Palestine, Rahman followed the broad parameters and guidelines set by the Indian government, especially Prime Minister Nehru. What, then, was the Indian plan?
Federal Palestine
As per the deadline set by the first Special Session, the UNSCOP submitted its report on September 1, 1947.53 Most of its recommendations were unanimous or near unanimous. On issues such as the termination of the Mandate, the granting of independence to Palestine, transitional arrangements under the United Nations, the safeguarding of holy places, the plight of Jewish displaced persons in Europe, and the protection of minorities and economic unity, the committee members were unanimous. Guatemala and Uruguay refused to endorse the majority recommendation that declared that “any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution for the Jewish problem in general.”54 On the core issue of the future political status of Palestine, the UNSCOP was divided. A seven-member majority consisting of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay opted for a partition of Palestine, while India, Iran, and Yugoslavia put forward a federal plan. Australia refused to endorse either plan.
The majority plan recommended that Palestine be partitioned into independent Arab and Jewish states with an economic union between the two. The city of Jerusalem and its environs would be placed under an international corpus separatum. Justifying partition, the majority members argued: “The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claim to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide the most realistic and practical settlement, and is the most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part of the claims and national aspirations of both parties.”55 Viewing the problem in Palestine as “a clash between two intense nationalisms,” the plan rejected the maximalist demands of both the Arabs and the Jews. It recognized that any worthwhile, viable, and realistic solution would have to be one of compromise.56 The partition plan has been too widely discussed, examined, and criticized to be repeated here. Instead, we will look at the federal plan, which was largely ignored by the international community.
As early as April 23, 1947, when the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly was in progress, New Delhi felt that any solution to the Palestine problem “must lie on the lines of the Arab state with the inclusion of an autonomous Jewish area.”57 This was in tune with the traditional Congress Party’s position vis-à-vis Palestine, especially since 1939. The federal plan more or less reflected this stand. Even though Iran (an Islamic country) and Yugoslavia (which had a sizable Muslim population) endorsed it, the federal plan was primarily Indian in origin. Though hand delivered by Rahman, it was Nehruvian by design.
The principal Indian opposition to the majority plan revolved around the unworkable nature of partition. Its envoy argued that the plan aimed at “a union under artificial arrangements designed to achieve essential economic and social unity after first creating political and geographical disunity by partition, [hence the plan was] impractical, unworkable and could not possibly provide for two reasonably viable states.”58 In his dissent note, Rahman elaborated his reasons for rejecting the majority suggestions. His arguments can be broadly summarized as follows:
• Palestine was a predominantly Arab country, and any resolution of the conflict should not be to the disadvantage of the native Arabs;
• Palestine was not a solution for the Jewish problem;59
• it was not possible to create two viable states in Palestine;
• it was not possible to create a Jewish state without a very large Arab minority;60
• Palestine was too small to bear the burden of two governments;
• the Jewish state would be surrounded by hostile Arab states, which would only increase the possibility of war;
• the likelihood of Arab-Jewish cooperation would become remote;
• the division of Palestine would make the transportation of goods impossible, since commerce was already handicapped by Palestine’s artificial borders with its Arab neighbors;
• the proposed distribution of land and resources between the two states under the partition plan were inequitable and strongly biased against the Arabs;61
• partition would create problems for Jews everywhere since they would be accused of practicing dual loyalties;62
• enforcement of the partition plan would require the use of force, since Arab-Jewish relations would deteriorate; and
• partition was against the principle of self-determination.
Critiques of partition were not new. The Woodhead Commission set up in 1938 to examine the division of Palestine was unsuccessful. Likewise commenting on partition, in 1946 the twelve-member Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry observed: “Partition has an appeal at first sight as giving a prospect of early independence and self-government to Jews and Arabs, but in our view no partition would have any chance unless it was basically acceptable to Jews and Arabs, and there is no sign of that today. We are accordingly unable to recommend partition as the solution.”63 Even within the U.S. State Department, there were differences over the feasibility of the majority plan of the UNSCOP.64
Abdur Rahman also used his dissenting note to challenge some of the positions held by the great powers vis-à-vis Palestine. He argued, inter alia, that the Balfour Declaration should not have been made;65 that the mandate was incompatible and inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations;66 that where the Mandate was found to be inconsistent with the Covenant, the latter would prevail; and that no nation had the right to create a Mandate over Palestine and impose its will without the consent of the inhabitants.
Rahman was challenging the basic premises of imperialism. At the time of the Balfour Declaration or when the Mandate and Covenant of the League were drafted, the “world” or “international community’” was either European or Eurocentric. Voices and rights of the “rest” did not matter to those who decided the destiny of humanity.
The partition plan received widespread attention both because it was endorsed by the majority members of the UNSCOP and because of its subsequent acceptance by a majority of the UN members. It was therefore closely examined, praised, or demonized. In contrast, the minority plan received no attention, and it has largely been left to the Indians to venerate its virtues. It is too tempting to believe that the federal plan was foolproof, flawless, and could have eliminated all the ills of erstwhile Palestine. The federal plan was not a remedy in 1947. It is not so six decades later. That it received meager attention should be seen as an indication of its relevance, or otherwise.
The main features of the federal plan were:
• Palestine would be a federal and independent state;
• while the Mandate would be terminated soon, there would be a transition administration whose tenure would not exceed three years;
• federal Palestine would consist of Arab and Jewish states;
• each state would enjoy internal autonomy excluding “national defense, foreign relations, immigration, currency, taxation for federal purposes, foreign and inter-state waterways, transport and communication, copyrights and patent”;67
• the federal state would have a bicameral legislature; and
• the constitution would safeguard, among other things, the equality of all citizens with regard to political, civil, and religious rights of the individual and linguistic, religious, ethnic, and cultural rights of the people as a whole.
To ensure a smooth and functional transition, a three-year interim administration would be established toward preparing the necessary groundwork for federal Palestine.
Why Did the Indian Plan Fail?
The fundamental disadvantage of the federal plan was that it was rejected by both contending parties. This marked the only occasion when the Arabs and Jews were on the same side of the debate. A strong segment of the Zionist leadership was aspiring for the transformation of the whole of Palestine into a Jewish state. There were others who were prepared to settle for less. Even though the partition plan fell short of their expectations, mainstream Zionists recognized it as the best possible solution. Despite their disappointment over smaller territorial limits and the exclusion of Jerusalem, they saw the partition plan as the sign of international recognition of Jewish claims to Palestine. While the Arabs vehemently opposed it, the majority plan at least had the support of the Zionists.68
The Indian plan disappointed both parties. It offered only civic and religious rights to the Jews; they were aspiring for political rights and sovereignty. It placed aliya under joint federal control and thus restricted its scope. Irrespective of their ideological orientation, everyone in the yishuv, from the revisionists to the binationalists, was unanimous on unrestricted Jewish immigration. Aliya was the cardinal principle, indeed the raison d’être of Zionism. It was therefore unrealistic to expect the Zionists to subject this core issue to an Arab veto.
If the Jews opposed the Indian plan because it gave them too little, the Arabs rejected it because it gave too much to the Jews who emigrated to Palestine. Both inside and outside Palestine, the Arabs demanded immediate and complete independence, and they did not look kindly at Indian suggestions of autonomy for the Jews as the precondition. While they were demanding a unitary Arab state, the Indian plan called for greater and even unacceptable internal autonomy for the Jews. Both sides were quick to reject the Indian plan, and it was never discussed by the United Nations.
Second, the Indian plan was unrealistic. The UNSCOP unequivocally recognized that Arab-Jewish cooperation was impossible. The committee conceded that in Palestine “government service, the Potash Company and the Oil Refinery are almost the only places where Arabs and Jews meet as co-workers in the same organizations.”69 During much of the Mandate period, they largely operated independently of each another. Both communities maintained well-defined and clearly demarcated spheres of political, social, and economic activities. On July 15, a bewildered Rahman wrote to Nehru that “even the Communists in this country are divided into two parties, one Jewish and the other Arab.”70 While partition meant a severing of even the minimal contacts between the two communities, the federal plan rested on continued cooperation between two noninteracting communities. Given this state of affairs, the federal plan required a superhuman effort—if not divine intervention—to bring about mutual trust and cooperation between the two communities.
Third, the plan suffered from a number of operational difficulties. While proposing the constitution of a federal state, Rahman stipulated a number of conditions. They were aimed at safeguarding the rights and privileges of the Jewish minority in a predominantly Arab federation. These provisions encroached upon the proposed sovereignty of federal Palestine. Internal communal tensions between the two nations demanded active involvement of a third party (as with the Mandate) for its implementation. Otherwise, it would not be possible to protect the rights of the Jewish minority, and this in turn would have challenged the notion of independence.
Fourth, the success of the plan was predicated on tolerance and democracy. It is highly debatable whether in 1948 the Palestinian community could have maintained a democratic character within a federal arrangement. The members of the UNSCOP had serious reservations about the Palestinian leadership. They were skeptical about the structure and functioning of the Arab Higher Committee headed by the mufti, even though it represented a large section of the Arabs of Palestine. The UNSCOP did not hesitate to recognize the intimidation tactics used by the Arab Committee in preventing Arabs from testifying before the committee in Jerusalem.71 This becomes far more complicated if one compares the mufti-dominated Arab community to the well-organized yishuv.72 The federal state visualized by India would thus comprise a centralized and nondemocratic Arab unit and a decentralized, institutionalized, and functioning Jewish unit. One could not have found a worse systemic mismatch.
Fifth, the federal plan exposed India’s own hypocrisy. The Indian representative signed the UNSCOP report on August 31, 1947, and by then the subcontinent was partitioned along communal lines. Nehru was advocating a solution for Palestine that he was not prepared to accept for India, where the conditions were far better. Hindu-Muslim relations in India were not as poisoned or insurmountable as Arab-Jewish relations were in Palestine. This was true even taking into account the communal bloodshed that followed partition. Even after the formation of the Islamic state of Pakistan, a substantial number of Muslims chose to remain in India. No such similarities existed in Palestine. Though a significant number of Palestinians remained in areas that became Israel, there was no Palestinian leadership, organized or unorganized, that was prepared to give partition a chance. The Indian government, through its UNSCOP representative, was aware of the intercommunity tension, animosity, and noncooperation in Palestine. Despite this, it chose to advocate a path that was rejected by Nehru and the Congress Party for the subcontinent.
Sixth, the federal plan highlighted contradictions between Rahman’s public pronouncements and his private actions. Both in his minority report and in his dissenting note to the majority plan, he followed the traditional INC opposition to religion-based nationalism. He was highly critical of religion entering the political realm, especially in the nation-state discourse. In his report, he observed: “it is important to avoid an acceleration of the separatism which now characterizes the relations of Arabs and Jews in the Near East, and to avoid laying the foundations of a dangerous irredentism there, which would be the inevitable consequence of partition in what ever form.”73 He was more forceful in his dissenting note, stating that if the Jewish demand for statehood in Palestine was conceded, Jews elsewhere would be charged with “double loyalty.” Upholding the principle of self-determination, he argued that it would be difficult to “refuse the majority, the right of forming the government.”74 On the religious side, he contended: “it is impossible to forget that the Jews as a whole, are not a nation but only a community which follows a particular religion…. Moreover the so-called nationalism is of too recent a growth to be any value… there is no reason why political considerations should be mixed up with religious considerations and why political rights in a state should be confused with religious rights.”75 His views reflected the prevailing INC position toward similar demands made by Islamic separatism in the subcontinent and spearheaded by Jinnah. In short, democracy was the rule of the majority, and church and state are distinct and separate spheres.
What Rahman did subsequently was rather ironic. Despite vehemently rejecting any links between religion and statecraft, shortly after the submission of the UNSCOP report, he emigrated to Pakistan, a state formed on the basis of the same arguments put forth by the Zionists.76 He eventually retired as a judge of Pakistan’s Federal Court.77 Describing the prevailing mood among Muslims immediately after World War II toward communal divisions, one scholar aptly remarked: partition, “the only means of real freedom to the Indian Muslims,… was anathema to Muslims elsewhere.”78 In rejecting the majority proposal for Palestine but still emigrating to Pakistan himself, Rahman reflected the prevailing dilemma facing the Muslim League: partition was justifiable in India but was sacrilege in the Islamic land of Palestine!
These shortcomings aside, the Indian plan failed mainly on the political front. It failed to secure the support and endorsement of the international community, especially the two principal parties, the Arabs and Jews.
The Partition of Palestine
Following the submission of the UNSCOP report, the international focus shifted back to New York. For the next twelve weeks, the fate of Palestine was the main agenda of the annual session of the General Assembly. After a general debate, two subcommittees were established. The first subcommittee was asked to draft a viable partition plan.79 The second subcommittee, composed largely of Islamic countries, was asked to produce a scheme for a unitary Palestine.80 The federal plan so vociferously proposed by Nehru was not even considered by the United Nations and was quietly consigned to the archives.81
The Arab leaderships in Palestine and in the region were opposed to any dilution of their demand for a unitary Palestine. This contributed to the international indifference toward the Indian proposal. The entire drama also underscored the inability, unwillingness, or failure of Indian diplomacy in convincing the Arabs of the validity and advantages of the federal plan. A well-argued plan was rendered futile. On October 8, more than six weeks before the UN vote, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the leader of the Indian delegation to the 1947 UN session, warned New Delhi: “The majority report satisfied [the] Jews. It is naturally opposed by [the] Arabs. The minority report, on the other hand, is acceptable neither to Jews nor Arabs. For us to advocate Minority report would please no one and lead us nowhere.”82 Even this last-minute advice went unheeded.
Things moved rather rapidly at the United Nations. The reports of the two subcommittees were submitted on November 19 and 11, respectively. After a lengthy debate, on November 24 the ad hoc committee rejected the unitary-state proposal.83 The following day, the committee approved the majority partition plan by twenty-five votes to thirteen, with nineteen abstentions. It also altered the territorial limits in favor of the Jewish state. In a last-minute effort, the Arab states unsuccessfully sought to refer the entire question to the International Court of Justice. As the date for the final vote neared, it was unclear if the partition plan would secure the necessary two-thirds majority. This raised some hopes among the Indian delegation. Mrs. Pandit, who had been unenthusiastic about the federal plan in early October, revised her position and advised: “It is probable that the special committee will be re-convened immediately and set to work on the federal solution, which has increasing support. Canada, Netherlands and Belgium yesterday [November 26] expressed preference for such solution, though they would vote for partition, in the absence of another alternative.”84 Indian optimism was supported by Arab rethinking on the issue. For the first time, the Arab states were prepared to consider the Indian proposal for a federal Palestine.85
Commenting on the last-minute volte face of the Arab countries, Nehru lamented before the Constituent Assembly:
[The Arab states were] so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure of at any rate preventing partition or preventing two-third majority in favor of partition, that they did not accept our suggestion. When, during the last few days, partition somehow suddenly became inevitable and it was realized that the Indian solution was probably the best… a last-minute attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution not by us but by those who wanted a unitary state. It was then too late.86
The rejection of the unitary plan and approval of the partition plan by the ad hoc committee had forced the Arabs to rethink. By then it was too late. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, recommending the partition of Palestine. Both at the ad hoc committee and in the General Assembly, India was the most prominent non-Islamic country to vote against partition.
Even this UN endorsement did not diminish Indian zeal. The post-vote violence in Palestine offered another opportunity. Between November 1947 and May 1948, when the British were to complete their withdrawal from Mandate Palestine, New Delhi made another unsuccessful attempt to bridge the gap between the Arabs and the Zionists. This time, the task fell on the shoulders of Sir B. N. Rau, an adviser to India’s Constituent Assembly and a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations. He drafted a proposal that Nehru described as “a halfway house between partition and some kind of federation.”87 Rau had outlined his plan just a few days before the UN endorsement of the partition plan and had “shown this note to Weizmann… who had been attracted to it.”88 As violence intensified in Palestine, Rau’s ideas gathered momentum and eventually resulted in the convening of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly in April 1948. According to Rau, the violence following the partition vote meant “each side must yield a little ground [and] they may be in a mood to consider a via media.”89
Afraid of its rejection, Rau was against giving a name to his proposal until all the details were finalized.90 Moving away from the federal proposal, this plan called for separate cabinets for Arab and Jewish regions headed by a separate prime minister. For a specific number of years, Palestine as a whole would be governed by a single executive head appointed by the newly formed UN Trusteeship Council. Given the importance that Zionism attached to aliya, Rau suggested “regulated immigration without materially disturbing the existing proportions of the two communities.”91 It soon became clear that the Rau plan had no real chance of being considered by the United Nations. Not prepared to face yet another diplomatic embarrassment, New Delhi advised its UN delegation not to present the plan. Instead, it was advised to “persuade the Committee to adopt the cardinal principle of co-operation between Arabs and Jews.”92
Meanwhile, the British decision to pull out by May 15, 1948, irrespective of the consequences, intensified the Arab-Jewish violence in Palestine. In a bid to restore peace and order, on April 16, 1948, the United Nations convened another Special Session of the General Assembly. In a sudden reversal of its earlier policy, the United States proposed a “suspension” of the partition resolution and placing Palestine under a temporary trusteeship. India saw this as an opportunity to bypass the partition resolution, found a common cause with the United States, and actively supported the suspension of Resolution 181.93 It was included in a twelve-member subcommittee set up by the United Nations to formulate a provisional post-Mandate regime for Palestine.
As the second Special Session was bogged down in endless debates and procedural wrangling, on May 14, hours before the final British soldiers left Mandate Palestine, the yishuv leaders met in Tel Aviv and declared the formation of the State of Israel. Within minutes of this development, U.S. President Harry S. Truman accorded de facto recognition to the Jewish state. This was soon followed by others. As a result, the UN efforts to secure trusteeship became meaningless, and the Special Session abruptly ended on May 15.
Thus India’s election to the UNSCOP provided the first opportunity for its leadership to articulate the position of the nationalists regarding the Palestine question in the international arena. The pro-Arab position adopted by the Congress Party during the freedom struggle gained substance at the United Nations. Even though its nominee initially favored the Arab demand for a unitary Palestine, Nehru advised him to modify this stand and recommended a “middle path.” If the majority members of the UNSCOP viewed partition as a compromise between the extremist demands of Arabs and Jews, Nehru saw a federal Palestine as a compromise between partition and a unitary Palestine. While providing greater civic and social rights, it sought to preserve the Arab character of Palestine.
The contrast between the partition and federal plans is stark. The former sought political separation and economic cooperation between the Arab and Jewish communities; the Indian plan aspired to achieve cooperation and accommodation between the warring communities. While one granted political rights and sovereignty to both nations, the other bestowed religious and civil rights upon the minorities. The former was swayed by the historic suffering of the Jewish people; the latter was preoccupied with the historic rights of native inhabitants. Both the partition plan and the federal plan have their own shares of limitations and shortcomings. The partition plan succeeded mainly because it enjoyed the support and endorsement of at least one of the contending parties. India’s federal plan failed because even the Arabs discarded it. Rejected by both parties, India’s plan was never discussed at the United Nations and was quietly buried by the international community.