1. Introduction
1. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:137.
2. The Khilafat movement refers to the agitation by the Indian Muslims for the protection and preservation of the Ottoman Empire, whose sultan also held the office of caliph.
3. Debates CA, first session, party II (December 4, 1947): 1258.
4. Rafael, Destination Peace, 89.
5. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
6. Personal interview with Morarji Desai on October 22, 1987, in Mumbai. When he was prime minister, Moshe Dayan, Israel’s foreign minister, paid an incognito visit to India.
7. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 253.
8. L. Panjabi to H. Z. Cynowitz (March 26, 1949), ISA, 2555/5.
9. Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW, 127.
10. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, 12.
11. Olsvanger to Tagore (October 7, 1936), and A. K. Chanda, secretary to Tagore to Olsvanger (October 23, 1936), CZA S25/3583.
12. The Times (London) (November 13, 1959), quoted in Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 160.
13. Eliahu Sasson to S. Divon (December 28, 1950), ISA, 53/6b. Emphasis added.
14. Accepting the UN resolution continues to remain the main bone of contention between the mainstream Fatah and the militant Islamic group Hamas.
15. Eytan to Shiloah (August 11, 1949), ISA, 2441/2.
16. Abba Eban to B. N. Rau (December 8, 1950), ISA, 71/14b.
17. As ahl al-kitab (“Possessors of the Scripture” or “People of the Book”), Islam guarantees certain protections to followers of Judaism, Christianity, and, in the Iranian context, Zoroastrianism. Bernard Lewis offers a sympathetic portrayal in his The Jews of Islam. For a more critical depiction of Dhimmi life, see Ye’or, The Dhimmi and Islam and Dhimmitude.
18. According to the historian Mushirul Hasan, Jazirat-al-Arab included “Constantinople, Jerusalem, Medina and above all Mecca, with its Baitullah, the focal point of daily prayers and the annual Haj.” Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885–1930, 112–113.
19. Young India (April 6, 1921), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 19:530.
20. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Gaya Congress of 1922, see Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 8:542. In subsequent years, the Islamic rationale never figured formally in the pronouncement of Indian nationalists. Even these earlier pronouncements were explained within the context of the need to support the Muslims of India. Thus, in the mid-1920s, support for the Arabs of Palestine was depicted as part of the larger anticolonial and anti-imperial struggle and support for national liberation.
21. UNSCOP Report, 2:42, 2:45.
22. Thus, for some the disintegration of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 vindicated India’s stand against the rationale of Pakistani nationalism and partition along communal lines.
23. “Memorandum on India Before the United Nations, 1950” (September 16, 1950), ISA, 2413/28.
24. Statement of M. R. Masani, Hindustan Times (June 5, 1967). Meaning “messenger,” the expression has the derogatory connotation of being unimportant.
25. The Jan Sangh lawmaker M. L. Sondhi in parliament, Debates LS, series 4, vol. 4 (June 8, 1967), 3937.
26. Iftar is the evening meal for breaking the daily fast during the holy month Ramadan and is normally organized as a community event. In India, various non-Muslim political leaders host Iftar parties for both Muslim and non-Muslim invitees.
2. Mahatma Gandhi and the Jewish National Home
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from a statement given by Mahatma Gandhi to Kallenbach on Zionism in July 1937, CZA, S25/3587. Emphasis added.
1. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:137.
2. Among others, see India, Ministry of External Affairs, India and Palestine, 11; Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 152, 220; Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 153.
3. Congress Marches Ahead, January 1996–December 1997, 199–200. This formulation is inaccurate. Gandhi talked of Arabs and not Palestinians. Also see Foreign Minister Natwar Singh’s speech at Jamia Milia Islamia on October 6, 2004, available online at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/10/06ss02.htm.
4. Shourie, The Only Fatherland.
5. In its obituary for the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, People’s Democracy, the official organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) declared, “in 1938… Mahatma Gandhi denounced the illegal occupation of Arab land. Since then India had always stood behind the Palestinians who were fighting for their freedom.” “Left Salutes Comrade Arafat,” People’s Democracy (November 28, 2004), available online at http://pd.cpim.org/2004/1128/11282004_arafat%20condolence.htm.
6. Jafferlot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, 87.
7. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi.
8. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 12.
9. Ibid., 11.
10. Among others, see Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews; Chatterjee, Gandhi and His Jewish Friends; and Gordon, “Indian Nationalist Ideas About Palestine and Israel,” 221–222.
11. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi.
12. Ibid.
13. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 12.
14. Harijan (May 27, 1939).
15. For detailed discussions on the Khilafat struggle, see Neimeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919–1924; and Minault, The Khilafat Movement.
16. Young India (March 23, 1921), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 19:472.
17. Young India (April 6, 1921) , in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 19:530.
18. Ibid. Emphasis added.
19. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 24.
20. Chatterjee, Gandhi and His Jewish Friends, 164.
21. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:137.
22. Harijan (May 27, 1939), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 69:289. Emphasis added.
23. They include “Gandhi and the Jews,” The Jewish Advocate (Bombay) (December 2, 1938); “Jewish Satyagraha,” The Jewish Advocate; “Mr. Gandhi on the Jewish Problem,” The Jewish Tribune (Bombay) (December 1938); “Open Letter to Mahatma Gandhi,” The Jewish Advocate (December 30, 1938); “Mr. Gandhi and the Jews,” The Jewish Tribune (June 1939); and “We Are Treated as Sub-Human, We Are Asked to Be Super-Human,” Jewish Frontier (New York) (March 1939).
24. At that time, Magnes was the president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
25. Buber and Magnes, Two Letters to Gandhi.
26. Ramana Murti, “Buber’s Dialogue and Gandhi’s Satyagraha,” 605. Emphasis added.
27. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 47.
28. The Jewish Advocate (December 2, 1938): 2.
29. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 3.
30. Moshe Shertok to Herman Kallenbach (July 15, 1936), CZA, S25/3239.
31. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 169.
32. The meeting took place on January 14, 1931, on the eve of Shaukat Ali accompanying the body of his brother Mohammed Ali to Jerusalem for burial. Chaim Weizmann to Lord Passfield (January 14, 1931), CZA, S25/3048.
33. Kupferschmidt, “The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem.”
34. Note of the interview by Selig Brodetsky (October 15, 1931), CZA, S25/3535.
35. Shertok to Kallenbach (July 15, 1936), CZA, S25/3239.
36. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 36.
37. Before he could undertake this trip, Andrews died in 1940.
38. Likewise, Brodetsky met Polak before he and Sokolov met Gandhi in London in October 1931.
39. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 37–55; Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 177–179; Buber and Magnes, Two Letters to Gandhi; The Jewish Advocate (Bombay); Fischer, Gandhi and Stalin, 42.
40. Weizmann to Kallenbach (July 22, 1937), in Weizman, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, series A, 18:182.
41. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 31. A more detailed and annotated account of Olsvanger’s visit and the English translation of his dairy can be found in Ben-David, Indo-Judaic Studies, 14–44.
42. Shertok to Arthur Lourie (September 28, 1936), CZA, S25/3239.
43. Report on the Inter-Asian Conference (April 6, 1947, and April 17, 1947), CZA, S25/7485.
44. Statement given by Mahatma Gandhi to Kallenbach on Zionism in July 1937. Since Kallenbach referred to this statement in his letter to Weizmann (July 2, 1937), it should have come on or before July 2, 1937. For a typed copy of this statement, see CZA, S25/3587.
45. The journal described itself as “the official organ of Bombay Zionist Association and Keren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund) and Keren Kayemeth (Jewish National Fund).”
46. Eliahu Epstein to Arthur Lourie (December 21, 1938), CZA, S25/3587. See also Epstein to Shohet (December 21, 1938), CZA, S25/3587.
47. Eliahu Epstein to Arthur Lourie (December 21, 1938), CZA, S25/3587.
48. Shohet to Epstein (March 24, 1939), CZA, S25/6315.
49. Ibid.
50. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 40.
51. Zangwill, “The Return to Palestine,” 627.
52. Kallenbach to Weizmann (July 4, 1937), CZA, S25/3587.
53. Statement given by Mahatma Gandhi to Kallenbach on Zionism in July 1937. Emphasis added.
54. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:140.
55. This contrasted with the position of the Zionists toward the war. They were caught between the need to fight Nazism in Europe while opposing the White Paper of 1939, which repudiated British commitments to the Balfour Declaration. Hence they adopted a unique posture “to fight the War as if there is no White Paper and to fight the White Paper as if there is no war.”
56. Harijan (June 21, 1942), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 76:216.
57. Resolution adopted at the Haripura annual session of the Congress in February 1938. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 11:427.
58. Jawaharlal Nehru to Olsvanger (September 25, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
59. Young India (April 6, 1921), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 19:530.
60. Young India (May 25, 1921), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 20:129. Emphasis added.
61. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Gaya Congress of 1922, see Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 8:542.
62. Fischer, Gandhi and Stalin, 42. Emphasis added. However, for a different version of what Gandhi told Silverman, see Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 177–179. It should be remembered, however, that Fischer’s work was published while Mahatma was still alive, whereas Jansen’s version came out in 1971, more than two decades after the Mahatma’s death.
63. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 87:262.
64. Ibid., 87:417. Emphasis added.
65. Ibid., 88:48.
66. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:138–139.
67. Harijan, (December 17, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:191–192.
68. Harijan (November 26, 1938), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 68:140.
69. In 1939, communicating with a Muslim friend, he remarked: “My mind goes back to the days of Khilafat agitation… when at a meeting of the Muslim League before 1920 I asked for supreme sacrifice, two or three names were given… but I believed that many would come forward at the right time. And they did. But looking back upon those days I see that I compromised nonviolence. I was satisfied with mere abstention from physical violence.” Harijan (June 17, 1939), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 69:314.
70. One could draw a parallel between the Arab opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine and the current Israeli opposition to the unrestricted Palestinian right of return to their homes.
71. “An Open Letter to Mahatma Gandhi,” The Jewish Advocate (December 30, 1939): 3–4.
72. Shimoni, Gandhi, Satyagraha, and the Jews, 18–19.
73. Theologically, Judaism has more in common with Islam than Christianity. Indeed, both the Judeo-Christian heritage and Judeo-Islamic animosity are of recent origin.
74. Michael Brecher, “Israel and China: A Historic ‘Missed Opportunity,’” 221.
3. The Congress Party and the Yishuv
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from a letter from Immanuel Olsvanger to Selig Brodetsky (December 2, 1937), CZA, S25/3588.
1. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Gaya Congress of 1922, see Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 8:542. According to the historian Mushirul Hasan, Jazirat al-Arab included “Constantinople, Jerusalem, Medina and, above all Mecca with its Baitullah, the focal point of daily prayers and the annual Haj.” Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 112–113.
2. Quoted in Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 113.
3. In December 1924, the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) adopted a resolution on the “Egyptian crisis.” This was the first non-Khilafat Congress Party statement on the Middle East. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Belgaum session, see Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 8:681.
4. Quoted in Dastur, “India and the West Asian Crisis,” 27.
5. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 9:538.
6. Ibid., 11:153.
7. Ibid., 11:260.
8. Ibid, 11:400.
9. Ram Manohar Lohia to Immanuel Olsvanger (October 13, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
10. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 11:427. It should be noted that while the modus operandi of the Jews was questioned, the INC did not pronounce its position on the central issue of the Jewish national home. A similar resolution was adopted by the AICC during its Delhi meeting in September 1938. Ibid., 11:445–446.
11. CWC resolution adopted in Wardha in December 1938. Ibid., 11:497. It is interesting to note that the proposition “in” was used instead of “of.”
12. Ibid., 12:159–160.
13. The Congress motion moved by T. S. Avinashilingam Chettier was adopted by fifty-seven votes in favor and forty-three against. For the complete debate, see India, Legislative Assembly Debates, Official Report, Fifth Legislative Assembly (February 3, 1939), 1:170–200.
14. There was some ambiguity in the adoption of the resolution. The amendment was not put to a vote separately. Even though it also demanded India’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, its rationale was different. Only Qaiyum, a sponsor, referred to the British role in Palestine. Referring to the ambiguous situation, Sir Abdur Rahim, the president of the Assembly, remarked: “The question has arisen whether the Chair can put the amendment to vote. There is no precedent that the Chair can find and the Chair does not know whether any question like this has arisen before.” Ibid., 200.
15. Similarly, there was no direct reference to the Mandate being granted to the British.
16. Ram Manohar Lohia, in his capacity as the secretary of the Foreign Department, wrote in October 1936: “The battles of the persecuted Jews have to be fought out in the different countries where such persecution is practiced in common with other freedom loving colonial and progress forces.” Lohia to Olsvanger (October 13, 1936), CZA, S25/3583. While it took a keen interest in the welfare of the Arabs, the INC was silent on the Jewish problem.
17. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy, 286.
18. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, 762–763.
19. Ibid., 764.
20. There is no evidence to suggest that Arabs sought Zionist cooperation in their fight against the British in Palestine. On the contrary, until the Arab revolt of 1936, the Arab leadership, especially the mufti of Jerusalem, was also cooperating and benefiting from the British.
21. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, 764–765.
22. Nehru, Eighteen Months in India, 1936–1937, 129.
23. Ibid., 130.
24. Ibid., 136–137.
25. Nehru to A. E. Shohet (August 26, 1937), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series I, 8:714.
26. Nehru to Husseini (September 4, 1937), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series I, 8:723.
27. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, 767.
28. Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 2:511.
29. Nehru, Eighteen Months in India, 1936–1937, 136–137.
30. Jawaharlal Nehru to Immanuel Olsvanger (September 25, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
31. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 11:497.
32. Ibid., 12:160.
33. Quoted in Sareen, “Indian Responses to the Holocaust,” 56.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 57.
36. Ibid., 58.
37. Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series I, 9:224ff.
38. Sareen, “Indian Responses to the Holocaust,” 59.
39. Bergmann and Shimoni, “Report on the Inter-Asian Conference” (April 17, 1947). After the war, India served as a transit point for a number of Iraqi and Afghan Jews prior to their emigration to newly formed state of Israel. As prime minister, Nehru was more than accommodative and repeatedly extended their stay in India. It was in this context that Nehru permitted the opening of a Jewish Agency immigration office in Bombay shortly after India recognized Israel in September 1950.
40. Quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru’s letter to Subhas Chandra Bose (April 3, 1939), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series I, 9:537.
41. Nehru, Discovery of India, 422. However, one cannot underestimate or ignore the political rivalry between the two and the challenge that Bose posed to Nehru’s political future. Quoting German sources, one Jewish periodical claimed that Bose had argued that “anti-Semitism must become a part of the Indian freedom movement since the Jews—he alleged—had helped the British to exploit and suppress the Indians.” Report in the Jewish Chronicle (London) reproduced in The Jewish Advocate (Bombay) 12, no. 3 (November 1942): 22.
42. Quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru’s letter to Subhas Chandra Bose (April 3, 1939), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series I, 9:537. Emphasis added.
43. Indeed, during the war the United States closed its borders to Jewish refugees who were fleeing Europe and on occasions contributed to their eventual execution by Nazi Germany. For an opposing argument, however, see Desch, “The Myth of Abandonment: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust Analogy.”
44. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, 1:46. Only Guatemala and Uruguay refused to endorse this recommendation.
45. Agwani, “The Palestine Conflict in Asian Perspective,” 456. “Sympathy for the Jewish victims of Nazism was not lacking among the Asian nations. But the idea of visiting the sins of Nazi Germany upon the Palestinians did not appeal to them.” Ibid., 461. For similar arguments, see Hasan, “To Arafat, in Anguish.”
46. Brecher, The New State of Asia, 126.
47. Agwani, “The Palestine Conflict in Asian Perspective,” 443.
48. For an interesting study on this issue, see Rose, The Gentile Zionists.
49. Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 4.
50. India, Ministry of External Affairs, India and Palestine, 6.
51. Glucklich, “Brahmins and Pharisees,” 14.
52. Quoted in Teslik, Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Special Interests, 36.
53. Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan; Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India, vol. 2: Sectarian Nationalism and Khilafat.
54. A formal resolution to this effect was adopted at the twenty-third session of the Muslim League, held in Delhi in November 1933. For the text see Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan, 2:225–226.
55. A well-known poet during the nationalist struggle, Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913.
56. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, 767.
57. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 12:160.
58. Quoted in Brecher, Israel, the Korean War, and China: Images, Decisions, and Consequences, 39.
59. Brecher, “Israel and China,” 219.
60. For a detailed discussion on the Latin American role, see Glick, Latin America and the Palestine Problem.
61. At that time, Sharett was out of office and was traveling to the continent in his personal capacity. For a recent discussion on the India leg of the tour and his meeting with Prime Minister Nehru, see Caplan, “The 1956 Sinai Campaign Viewed from Asia.”
62. For a most authoritative discussion on the British promise, see Stein, The Balfour Declaration.
63. During World War II, a large number of Jewish refugees fled to India. During the postwar period, there refugees entered from Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the number of Jews in India did not exceed sixty thousand.
64. The only exception being the anti-Jewish violence in Goa along the western coast during the sixteenth century. This happened when Goa was under Portuguese occupation and was a fallout of the Spanish Inquisition.
65. Phrase used in Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 143.
66. Among others, see Gordon, “Indian Nationalist Ideas About Palestine and Israel,” 221–222.
67. Brecher, “Israel and China,” 222. According to Philip Holden, “the British did not ban Nehru’s autobiography in India, but they did proscribe the Hebrew translation in Palestine, fearful of the model it might provide for a very different nationalism.” Holden, “Other Modernities: National Autobiography and Globalization,” 90. See also Nehru to Indira Gandhi (August 12, 1944), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series I, 13:459–461.
68. Stein, The Balfour Declaration, 496–497.
69. Such trends continue still today. Many Muslim leaders see Israel as a threat not just to the Palestinians in the occupied territories but to the wider Islamic world. A dated but accurate picture of this conspiracy-centric attitude toward Israel can be found in Hamid, The Unholy Alliance.
70. The delegation consisted of Jamal al-Husseini (secretary of the Arab Executive headed by the grand mufti himself), Muhammad Murad (the mufti of Haifa), and Ibrahim al-Ansari (one of the sheikhs of al-Aqsa).
71. Porath, “Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem,” 154.
72. Nearly seventy years later, India’s defense minister Pranab Mukherjee recalled the mufti connection: “Commitment to the Palestinian cause has been a bedrock of our foreign policy even before we gained independence. In a cable sent to Mufti of Jerusalem on 4th Sept 1937, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who became our first Prime Minister after independence, had affirmed, ‘The Indian National Congress sends you greetings and assurance of full solidarity in the struggle for Palestine Independence.’” Mukherjee’s inaugural speech (January 30, 2006), at the Eighth Asian Security Conference organized by IDSA. Available online at http://www.idsa.in/speeches_at_idsa/8ASCInaugural.htm.
73. Kupferschmidt, “The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem,” 129.
74. Ibid.
75. For background discussion of the conference, see Gibb, “The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931”; and Kramer, Islam Assembled, 123–141.
76. Kupferschmidt, “The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem,” 123.
77. Similarly, the Congress Party commemorated August 26, 1938, as Palestine Day and held meetings and rallies in different parts of the country. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 153.
78. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Arab Nationalism, 169–181; Shimoni, Satyagraha and the Jews.
79. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 30.
80. Shimoni, Satyagraha and the Jews, 27–28.
81. Nehru to Olsvanger (February 2, 1938; May 5, 1947; June 10, 1954; October 16, 1956; March 23, 1958), CZA, K 11–81/3.
82. Weizmann to Nehru (June 27, 1938; September 13, 1938; November 15, 1947; November 27, 1947). In Weizmann, Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, 18:206, 18:458–459, 23:31–32, 23:42–43.
83. She was a leading INC leader and a renowned poet.
84. Once considered a rival to Jawaharlal Nehru, he served as India’s first home minister until his death in 1950.
85. Ambedkar was the leader of India’s oppressed “untouchables” or Dalit community and played a key role in the drafting of the Indian Constitution.
86. A senior INC leader from the northern state of Uttar Pradesh.
87. A close confidant of Mahatma Gandhi.
88. As early as in 1916, she addressed a Bene-Israel Mitra Mandal meeting in Bombay. India and Israel (Bombay) 4, no. 4 (October 1951): 31.
89. The Jewish Advocate (Bombay) (October 1941): 9; The Jewish Advocate (Bombay) (November 1941): 9.
90. Olsvanger to Tagore (October 7, 1936) and A. K. Chanda, secretary to Tagore, to Olsvanger (October 23, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
91. At the time of his death in 1940, Andrews was reportedly preparing to go to Palestine. Olga Feinberg to Epstein (June 8, 1940), CZA, S25/3591.
92. Epstein to the Jewish Agency (April 4, 1946), CZA, S25/3158. The scholar-philosopher was elected India’s second president in 1962.
93. For details of his activities in India, see CZA, S25/3583.
94. For details, see CZA, S25/3586 and S25/3591.
95. Bhargava, ed., India and West Asia, 93.
96. Olsvanger to Ghaffar Khan (September 29, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
97. Olsvanger to Iqbal (October 1, 1936) and Iqbal’s reply (October 14, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
98. Kallenbach to Weizmann (July 4, 1937), CZA, Z4/17342.
99. Olsvanger to M. Irfan (October 3, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
100. Note of Richard Freund (December 20, 1937), CZA, S25/3586.
101. Weizmann to Vera Weizmann (June 18, 1909), in Weizmann, Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, 5:135–136.
102. Malviya to Olsvanger (October 17, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
103. Guha to Olsvanger (November 2, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
104. For a detailed account of the contacts established during this conference, see CZA, S25/7485.
105. F. H. Kisch to Ms. May (August 23, 1931), CZA, S25/5689. Similar contacts were established with P. K. Dutt, the social secretary to the Indian Round Table Conference in 1931. Note of December 3, 1931, CZA, S25/5689. See also The Jewish Advocate, (Bombay) 9, no. 6 (July 1, 1938): 4.
106. Shanmukham Chetty to Olsvanger (October 30, 1936), CZA, S25/3583.
107. Revenue Minister of Bikaner to Moshe Shertok (January 29, 1938), and Shertok’s reply (March 14, 1938), CZA, S25/7494.
108. Olsvanger to Selig Brodetsky (December 2, 1937), CZA, S25/3588.
109. Gershon Agronsky made this observation following his April 1930 visit to Bombay. Shimoni, Satyagraha and the Jews, 27–28.
110. Olsvanger to Arthur Lourie (September 15, 1939), CZA, Z4/15623.
111. K. M. Panikkar’s memorandum on Hindu-Zionist relations (April 8, 1947), CZA, S25/9029.
112. Report of the Inter-Asian Conference (April 17, 1947), CZA, S25/7485.
113. Eytan’s note (March 3, 1948), CZA, S25/9029. Emphasis added.
114. Brecher, Israel, the Korean War, and China, 39.
115. According to Eytan, he and Golda Meir were planning to visit India in September 1947. Eytan’s note (March 3, 1948), CZA, S25/9029.
116. Moreover, by that time, David Ben-Gurion had overshadowed the architect of the Balfour Declaration.
4. The Islamic Prism: The INC Versus the Muslim League
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from Panikkar, “A Memorandum on Hindu-Zionist Relations” (April 8, 1947), CZA, S25/9029.
1. See Neimeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919–1924; and Minault, The Khilafat Movement.
2. Kumar, ed., The Background of India’s Foreign Policy, 6.
3. Though the caliph is a Sunni institution, even Indian Shias took an active part in the Khilafat struggle. Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885–1930, 138.
4. Spurred by the British promise of an in de pen dent Arab kingdom, the Arabs led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of Sharif Hussein of Mecca.
5. Even if Hindus were seen in India as “People of the Book,” or Dhimmi, they still remain nonbelievers.
6. For the complete text of Mohammed Ali’s presidential address to the Cocanada (now Kakinada) session, see Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 8:184–309.
7. Resolution adopted at the Amritsar session of the INC. Ibid., 7:531.
8. Ibid., 7:581–582.
9. Ibid., 8:415–416.
10. Young India (April 6, 1921), in Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 19:530.
11. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Gandhi, 19:471.
12. Resolution adopted at the Lucknow session of the INC. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 8:478.
13. Resolution adopted at the Gaya session of the INC. Ibid., 8:542.
14. Resolution adopted at the Amritsar session of the INC. Ibid., 8:613. This was also the last Congress Party resolution on the Khilafat issue.
15. For a sympathetic treatment of the issue, see Lewis, The Jews of Islam.
16. Nanda, Gandhi, 373.
17. Chaudhuri, Thy Hand, Great Anarch, 1921–1952, 39. Likewise, Nanda, Gandhi and His Critics, 82, admitted that the Mahatma’s hope that “the Hindus’ spontaneous and altruistic gesture in supporting the cause of the Khilafat would permanently win the gratitude of the Muslim community was not to be realized.”
18. Resolution adopted at the tenth session of the Muslim League in Calcutta, December 1917–January 1918. Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan, 1:442.
19. Ibid., 2:584.
20. Ibid.
21. Presidential address of A. K. Fazlul Haque at the eleventh Muslim League session in Delhi, December 1918. Ibid., 1:497–498. Emphasis added.
22. Resolution adopted at the twelfth Muslim League session at Amritsar, December 1919. Ibid., 1:537.
23. Presidential address of Maulana Hasrat Mohani at the fourteenth Muslim League session in Ahmedabad, December 1921. Ibid., 1:662.
24. Presidential address of Hafiz Hidayat Husain at the twenty-third Muslim League session in Delhi, November 1933. Ibid., 2:223.
25. Given his Westernized lifestyle, Jinnah was not an ideal Muslim, let alone one to be speaking on behalf of the worldwide Muslim population. Describing his complex personality, Rajmohan Gandhi observes: “He seemed on the way to leading India; he founded Pakistan instead. For much of his life he championed Hindu-Muslim unity; later he demanded, obtained, and, for a year, ran a separate Muslim homeland. Neither Sunni nor mainstream Shiite, his family belonged to the small Khoja or Ismaili community led by the Aga Khan; yet Mohammed Ali Jinnah was in the end the leader of India’s Muslims. Anglicized and aloof in manner, incapable of oratory in an Indian tongue, keeping his distance from mosques, opposed to the mixing of religion and politics, he yet became inseparable, in that final phase, from the cry of Islam in danger.” Gandhi, Eight Lives, 123.
26. Presidential address of M. A. Jinnah at the twenty-fifth Muslim League session in Lucknow, October 1937. Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan, 2:272.
27. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League in October 1937, see ibid., 2:277–278.
28. Presidential address of M. A. Jinnah at the twenty-sixth Muslim League session in Patna, December 1938. Ibid., 2:307.
29. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Patna session of the Muslim League in December 1937, see ibid., 2:315–316.
30. For a brief summary of the deliberations, see ibid., 2:316–318.
31. Ibid. Emphasis added.
32. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Lahore session of the League in March 1940, see ibid., 2:346.
33. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Delhi session of the Muslim League in April 1943, see ibid., 2:439–440. Jinnah himself proposed this resolution, which was adopted unanimously.
34. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Karachi session of the League in December 1943, see ibid., 2:489–490.
35. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Delhi council meeting on April 10, 1946, see ibid., 2:525.
36. For the text of the resolution adopted at the Karachi council meeting in December 1947, see ibid., 2:574–575.
37. Shaikh, “Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India.”
38. He had earlier served as president in 1923 and remains the youngest person to hold the leadership of the party.
39. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 152.
40. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 1:232–233; Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 144.
41. While Muslim-majority areas of Bengal province became East Pakistan, the Muslim majority areas in the west became West Pakistan. This geographic anomaly of a large Indian territory between East and West Pakistan continued until 1971, when East Pakistan became the in de pen dent state Bangladesh.
42. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 66.
43. Stein, The Balfour Declaration, 496–497.
44. Later that year, Shaukat Ali also met Stein and Sokolov in London.
45. There are suggestions that Shaukat Ali’s “attitude towards Zionism seems to have been rather tolerant, in so far as he openly supported a solution without violent means for the outstanding questions in Palestine.” Kupferschmidt, “The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem,” 131.
46. Note of the interview by Selig Brodetsky (October 15, 1931), CZA, S25/3535.
47. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, 12.
48. Bergmann and Shimoni, “Report on the Inter-Asian Conference.”
49. For a copy of the memorandum, see CZA, S25/9029. In the following quotations from the memorandum, the emphasis is in the original.
50. Interestingly, this “follow the lead” became the Indian position at the first special session of the UN General Assembly that met shortly after Panikkar’s memorandum.
51. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, 12.
52. This, however, did not prevent Panikkar from meeting and interacting with Israeli officials. He lamented India’s belated recognition and had a day-long rendezvous with his old friend Eliyahu Elath in Basil Liddell Hart’s farmhouse in 1953.
5. India, UNSCOP, and the Partition of Palestine
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from a letter from Vijayalakshmi Pandit to Bajpai (October 8, 1947), NAI, F-46 (1)-AWT/47.
1. India, Constituent Assembly Debates, session II (December 4, 1947), 1:1261. Emphasis added.
2. Among others, see India, India and Palestine; Mehrish, “Recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): An Appraisal of India’s Policy”; and Agwani, “The Great Powers and the Partition of Palestine.”
3. For example, see Khalidi, “Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution.” The notable exception is the recent work by Ginat, “India and the Palestine Question.”
4. For a discussion of the events leading up to this move, see Haron, “The British Decision to Give the Palestine Question to the United Nations”; and Jasse, “Great Britain and Palestine Towards the United Nations.”
5. UNSCOP Report, 2:1.
6. Ministry of External Affairs telegram to Asaf Ali (April 24, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
7. Note by P. A. Menon (May 13, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
8. There are others who argued differently. For example, Prithvi Ram Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 145, maintained that Asaf Ali “adopted a balanced and conciliatory approach to the Palestinian question.”
9. UN General Assembly, First Special Session, A/BUR/P.V./32 (May 2, 1947), 37.
10. Ibid., A/BUR/P.V./30 (April 30, 1947), 12.
11. On April 30, the General Committee overwhelmingly rejected the Egyptian proposal.
12. On May 13, the General Assembly rejected the proposal by fifteen to twenty-six votes, with twelve abstentions and two absentees.
13. For the details concerning the circumstances under which the Arab Higher Committee withdrew and then was persuaded to depose before the committee, see Robinson, Palestine and the United Nations, 130–137.
14. UN General Assembly, First Special Session, A/C.1/P.V.48 (May 7, 1948), 48.
15. For the full text of the statement, see UN General Assembly, A/AC.14/SR.11 (October 11, 1947).
16. Likewise, the Indian delegate unsuccessfully opposed a decision by the UNSCOP to visit the DP camps in Europe prior to the preparation of the final report. Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (July 15, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
17. UN General Assembly, First Special Session, A/C.1/P.V.51 (May 8, 1947), 57–62; Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 6.
18. UN General Assembly, A/BUR/P.V.30 (April 30, 1947), 2–10.
19. “Congress Betrays Arabs,” editorial in The Dawn (May 5, 1947).
20. He also acted as the agency’s liaison to the Special Session as well as to the UNSCOP and subsequently became Israel’s first envoy to the United States.
21. Eliahu Epstein to P. S. Gourgey (January 19, 1948), CZA, Z-6/60. Emphasis added.
22. “Memorandum on India Before the United Nations, 1950” (September 16, 1950), ISA, 2413/28. Emphasis added. Incidentally, at that time Das was a member of the Indian delegation to the UN session.
23. Jawaharlal Nehru to Asaf Ali (May 1, 1947), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 2:494. Emphasis added.
24. Jawaharlal Nehru to Asaf Ali (May 14, 1947), in ibid., 2:497. Emphasis added.
25. Ibid. Notes.
26. Note by P. A. Menon (May 13, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47. Emphasis added. He added that Asaf Ali’s proposal for “the establishment without delay of Independent State of Palestine” went “beyond what was originally contemplated” and hence “committed the Government of India to a view of substance.” Initially, the draft read that Asaf Ali committed the government “to a view of considerable substance.” While signing the note, Menon struck off the word “considerable.”
27. Ministry of External Affairs note (April 9, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
28. Note by H. Weightman (April 10, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
29. Ministry of External Affairs to Asaf Ali (April 18, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
30. They were Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay.
31. Guatemala and Yugoslavia.
32. Note by P. A. Menon (May 13, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
33. Asaf Ali to the Ministry of External Affairs (May 12, 1947), NAI, F.46(1)-AWT/47. Emphasis added.
34. In a detailed report, he remarked: “The feeling that India was definitely for Arab, led the US Delegation to omit India from their original proposal regarding the constitution of the Special Committee.” Report by Asaf Ali on the Special Session to Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs (June 4, 1947), NAI, F.2(21)-UNO-I/47.
35. It adopted a resolution to form an eleven-member Committee that would not include the five big powers by thirteen votes to eleven. As many as twenty-nine countries abstained.
36. Asaf Ali to the Ministry of External Affairs (May 14, 1947), NAI, F.2(16)-UNO-I/47. Emphasis added.
37. Ibid.
38. H. C. Beaumont to S. E. Abbot (May 22, 1947), NAI, F-2(6)-UNO-I/47. Emphasis added.
39. Abdur Rahman to Emil Sandstorm (July 2, 1947), UN General Assembly, A/AC.13/35 (July 14, 1947), 1–2.
40. Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (July 15, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47. Rahman added: “For this reason, he does not seem to be much in favor with strong Arab nationalists.” Even though Rahman met Jamal Husseini, the vice president of the Arab Higher Committee, in Jerusalem, “political matters” did not figure in their deliberations.
41. For the text of Abdur Rahman’s cross examination, see The Jewish Plan for Palestine: Memorandum and Statements Presented by the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 367–380, 392–394, 469–473, 549–553. Rahman, for example, described David Ben-Gurion as an “extremist and aggressive demagogue.” Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (July 15, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
42. Asaf Ali to Foreign Office (May 14, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47. Emphasis added.
43. Jawaharlal Nehru to Abdur Rahman (May 24, 1947), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 2:474–475.
44. Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 11:497.
45. Jawaharlal Nehru to Abdur Rahman (May 24, 1947), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 2:474–475. Emphasis added.
46. Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 9.
47. Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (June 25, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47. Emphasis added.
48. Jawaharlal Nehru to Abdur Rahman (July 10, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
49. Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (August 20, 1947). Ibid. See also Rahman to Nehru (June 25, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
50. Official summary of Abdur Rahman’s reports (September 10, 1947), NAI, F-2(5)-UNO-I/47.
51. Abdur Rahman to the Ministry of External Affairs (August 20, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
52. Ministry of External Affairs to Abdur Rahman (August 23, 1947). Ibid. This was perhaps a reminder, and the telegram was sent in Nehru’s name. In a related development, Rahman was also instructed to withdraw the official memorandum that he had earlier prepared.
53. Prior to his departure for Palestine, Abdur Rahman met Azzam Pasha in New York. The secretary general of the Arab League told him that it would help the Arab cause if the committee were unable to present its report to the General Assembly by September 1, “because then the question would not come up before the United Nations for a fairly long time, during which period he expected things to change materially in favor of the Arabs.” Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (June 25, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
54. For the complete text, see UNSCOP Report, 1:42–46. For the dissenting notes of Guatemala and Uruguay, see ibid., 2:23–24, 2:48–49.
55. Ibid., 1:47.
56. For the complete text, see ibid., 1:47–58.
57. Ministry of External Affairs telegram to Asaf Ali (April 23, 1947), NAI, F.2(16)-UNO-I/47.
58. UNSCOP Report, 1:59.
59. While expressing his sympathy for the “untold misery” of the Jews, Abdur Rahman passionately argued: “The duty of finding suitable places for these [displaced] persons rests on the whole of the world and not only on Palestine.” Ibid., 2:75. On another occasion, he wrote: “While the problem of Jewish immigration is… closely related to the solution of the Palestine question, it cannot be contemplated that Palestine is to be considered in any sense as a means of solving the problem of world Jewry.” Ibid., 1:64.
60. The population distribution of the partition plan is misleading. According to the plan, the Jewish state would include 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs. However, it would also include about “90,000 Bedouins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons.” Since this additional population was not Jewish, at the time of partition the proposed Jewish state would consist of 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs. It was only after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the subsequent emigration of Arabs and immigration of Jews that Israel acquired Jewish demographic predominance.
61. Although Tel Aviv was part of the proposed Jewish state, there was no corresponding Arab city that could have become the capital of the Arab states. Having made Jerusalem an international city, the majority plan did not identify any city as the possible Arab capital.
62. This was not the first time the question of “dual loyalty” was raised to criticize the Zionist endeavors in Palestine. Prior to the Balfour Declaration, opponents of the move, including a section of the Anglo Jewry, feared that special treatment of the Jews in Palestine would question the loyalty of the Jews in the Diaspora and undermine their hard-earned equality in Europe.
63. Report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, 43.
64. For instance, Loy W. Henderson, the director of the Near East in the State Department, drew attention to this problem. His objections were overruled by the electoral considerations of President Harry S. Truman. For the text of his assessment, see Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 117–121.
65. While the Congress Party never expressed its formal opposition to the Declaration, it was a constant theme in Muslim League circles. Mahatma Gandhi, however, was critical of the Balfour position. In his confidential note to Kallenbach in 1937, he observed: “Neither the Mandate nor the Balfour Declaration can… be used in support of sustaining Jewish immigration into Palestine in the teeth of Arab opposition.” In “Statement Given by Mahatma Gandhi to Kallenbach on Zionism in July 1937,” CZA, S25/3587.
66. Speaking at the Special Session, Asaf Ali argued that the language of the Mandate was inconsistent with the spirit of article 22 of the League of Nations charter. Therefore “it was up to the people of Palestine to go up to the International Court of Justice… and lodge an appeal against it and get it reversed. Apparently they did not do it.” UN General Assembly, First Special Session, A/BUT/P.V.30 (April 30, 1947), 11.
67. UNSCOP Report, 2:38.
68. For a recent discussion, see Ben-Dror, “The Arab Struggle Against Partition,” 259–293.
69. UNSCOP Report, 1:13. Emphasis added.
70. Abdur Rahman to Jawaharlal Nehru (July 15, 1947), NAI, F-2(16)-UNO-I/47.
71. The UNSCOP recorded: “In times of crisis, as in 1936–38… pressure has taken the form of intimidation and assassination. At the present time, nonconformity regarding any important question on which the Arab Higher Committee has pronounced a policy is represented as disloyalty to the Arab nation…. In the absence of an elective body to represent divergence of interests, [the Arab community] therefore shows a higher degree of centralization in its political life.” UNSCOP Report, 1:25–26.
72. As a former U.S. State Department official described: “So well organized, in fact, was the Yishuv that all of us who followed the Palestine scene knew, long before the Jewish state came into being, that if the Jews were to secure their state, Weizmann would be the president, Ben-Gurion the prime minister, Shertok the foreign minister, [Eliezer] Kaplan the finance minister, and so on; and this is what came to pass.” Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 33.
73. UNSCOP Report, 1:58. Emphasis added.
74. Ibid., 2:45.
75. Ibid., 2:42, 2:45.
76. For a historical discussion, see Kumaraswamy, “The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan.”
77. Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 1:572n.
78. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 66.
79. The members were Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
80. The members were Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The only non-Islamic member, Colombia, subsequently withdrew from the subcommittee. Horowitz, State in the Making, 262.
81. Citing this reason, Yugoslavia, one of the signatories to the federal plan, abstained during the final vote on the partition plan. Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 104. Moreover, on May 19, 1948, it became one of the first states to recognize Israel.
82. Vijayalakshmi Pandit to Bajpai (October 8, 1947), NAI, F-46 (1)-AWT/47.
83. It was rejected by twelve votes in favor to twenty-nine votes against, with fourteen abstentions.
84. Vijayalakshmi Pandit’s cable to Bajpai (November 27, 1947), NAI, F-46(1)-AWT/47.
85. On November 28, Mrs. Pandit conceded that, afraid of the UN approval of the partition plan, “Arab spokesman for the first time showed anxiety for [a] compromise solution.” Pandit, New York, to Bajpai, New Delhi (November 28, 1947). Ibid.
86. India, Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. 1, session II (December 4, 1947), col. 1261. Emphasis added.
87. Note by Jawaharlal Nehru (April 4, 1948), NAI, F-2(5)-UNO-I/48.
88. Ibid.
89. B. N. Rau to Jawaharlal Nehru (April 5, 1948). Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. B. N. Rau, “Outline of Plan for Palestine” (November 24, 1947). Ibid.
92. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to Indian Delegation, New York (May 7, 1948). Ibid.
93. In instructing its UN delegation, New Delhi maintained: “At this stage we can only give you the general idea which is that partition should be avoided and at the same time largest measure of autonomy be given to the Jewish and Arab parts.” Iyengar to Bajpai (April 6, 1948). Ibid. Likewise, a few weeks later India reiterated its opposition to partition. Indian Delegation, New York, to Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi (April 23, 1948). Ibid.
6. Recognition Without Relations
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from Professor M. S. Agwani’s inaugural remarks at a 1993 conference organized by Jawaharlal Nehru University, in Singh, ed., Postwar Gulf, 3.
1. Misra, India’s Policy of Recognition of States and Governments; Mehrish, India’s Recognition Policy Towards New Nations.
2. Debates CA (August 20, 1948), cols. 380–381. Emphasis added.
3. Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 149.
4. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1:127–128.
5. ISA, 2424/19. Because of its legal implications, India did not even acknowledge Sharett’s cable. External Affairs Ministry note (October 4, 1948), NAI, F.46 (21)-AWT/48.
6. The telegram from Moshe Shertok to Nehru can be found in NAI, F-11(8)-UNO-I/48.
7. Charge d’ affairs to Foreign Office, New Delhi (May 19, 1948), NAI, F-11(8)-UNO-I/48.
8. Note prepared by UN Branch (May 21, 1948), NAI, F-11(8)-UNO-I/48. Emphasis added.
9. Embassy of India in Prague to Foreign Office (April 12, 1948), NAI, F-13(95)-1A/49.
10. Foreign Office to Embassy in Prague (May 21, 1948), NAI, F-13(95)-1A/49.
11. K. P. S. Menon to Indian missions abroad (May 28, 1948), NAI, F-13(95)-1A/49. See also official note (July 8, 1950), NAI, F-22(22)-AWT/50.
12. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1:128.
13. Note (October 4, 1948), NAI, F-46(21)-AWT/48.
14. S. N. Haksar to al-Husseini (March 19, 1949), NAI, F-32(6)-1A/49. Not surprisingly given the prevailing political situation in the region, the letter was addressed to “Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Cairo.”
15. Debates CA (August 20, 1948), cols. 380–381.
16. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1:275.
17. Debates CA (March 9, 1949), col. 1400.
18. Israel had originally applied for membership on November 29, 1948, and in its meeting held on December 17, the UN Security Council rejected the application by five in favor, one against, and five abstentions. On February 24, 1949, a day it signed the Armistice Agreement with Egypt, Israel applied for a second time. It was approved by the UN Security Council in early March 1949 and was admitted on May 11, 1949. Israel and the United Nations, 59–60.
19. The Indian vote was attributed to the Arab factor, and a cable sent from the Indian Embassy in Brussels disclosed that the Arab countries conveyed their satisfaction and happiness at India’s vote against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. Embassy to Foreign Office (May 20, 1949), NAI, F-32(6)-1A/49.
20. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1:363.
21. E. Epstein to M. Shertok and A. Eban (September 28, 1948), Israel Documents, 1:653.
22. E. Elath to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 12, 1949). Israel Documents, Companion, 4:17.
23. Aide’s memoir of the conversation between Abba Eban and Rau (June 23, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:158–159.
24. E. Elath to M. Sharett (September 30, 1949), ISA, 2181/6.
25. E. Elath to M. Sharett (October 14, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:547–548.
26. Debates CA (December 6, 1949), cols. 233–234.
27. For the original invitation, see ISA, 71/14.
28. C. Weizmann to Nehru (November 15, 1947), in Weizman, Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series A, 23:31–32.
29. Both were members of the Indian delegation to the 1947 UN General Assembly session.
30. For Weizmann’s letter to Nehru (December 16, 1947), see Weizman, Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series A, 62; to B. N. Rau (May 23, 1948), see ibid., 126–127; to Churchill (August 6, 1948), see ibid., 201–203; to H. Z. Cynowitz (March 4, 1949), see ibid., 261–262.
31. K. L. Panjabi to H. Z. Cynowitz (March 26, 1949), ISA, 2555/5. Emphasis added.
32. Minutes of the meeting between Y. H. Levin and H. Evatt on September 8, 1949. Israel Documents, 4:447.
33. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 3:117.
34. Debates PP (February 27, 1950), cols. 495–496.
35. Personal conversations with Walter Eytan in Jerusalem in September 1988.
36. Official English summary of Eytan’s communiqué to Israeli missions abroad (June 9, 1950), Israel Documents, Companion, 5:145.
37. Kumaraswamy, “South Asia and People’s Republic of China-Israeli Diplomatic Relations,” 131–152.
38. ISA, 71/14b.
39. Jerusalem Post (September 18, 1950).
40. Even if the new state was recognized, as von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 95–96, observed, such recognition “automatically involves recognition of the Government of that State, for no one could envision recognition of the whole unit without inclusion of its operating agency, its government.”
41. Parakatil, India and the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, 75. The timing of such an interpretation was significant, as the mid-1970s witnessed the height of Israel’s international isolation.
42. Misra, India’s Policy of Recognition, 192. The September 1950 statement was silent on the legal status.
43. Mehrish, India’s Recognition Policy, 80.
44. Debates LS, series VI, vol. 6 (July 26, 1971), 116.
45. Walter Eytan’s “New Delhi Diary,” ISA, 2383/21.
46. India’s recognition of the state of Palestine is a notable exception. But this should be seen in the context of traditional Indian support for the Palestinian cause and its recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975 as “the sole and legitimate representative” of the Palestinians.
47. E. Elath to M. Sharett (October 14, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:548.
48. Walter Eytan to Abba Eban (November 21, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:637.
49. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:169. Emphasis added.
50. Nehru’s letter dated October 1, 1950. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 2:217. Emphasis added.
51. Official translation of ambassador’s interview, which appeared in the September 21, 1950, issue of Al Misri (Cairo). NAI, F.22 (25)-AWT/50.
52. Israel signed the armistice agreements with Egypt (February 24, 1949), Lebanon (March 23, 1949), Jordan (April 3, 1949), and Syria (July 20, 1949), while Iraq and Saudi Arabia expressed their support for any Arab-Israeli armistice agreement.
53. This note of February 27, 1950, was prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs, anticipating supplementary questions on Israel in parliament. NAI, F.23 (2)-AWT/50.
54. Mehrish, India’s Recognition Policy, 106–107.
55. India’s refusal to endorse a separate Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka has inhibited the Tamil militant groups, especially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), from pursuing the option of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).
56. Such conditions were absent in the case of the APG declared on September 22, 1948. Hence, despite supporting the Arabs in the past, India did not consider its request for recognition.
57. Bialer, “The Iranian Connections in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948–1951.”
58. On March 29, 1949.
59. On January 12, 1950, Israel recognized Indonesia, and in response Indonesian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Muhammad Hatta sent a formal note to Moshe Sharett thanking him for the recognition. Israel Documents, 5:95. It is, however, very doubtful that this act alone constitutes recognition or that the government of India was aware of this development at that time.
60. Debates LS, series I, vol. 9, part II (November 20, 1956), col. 594. Interestingly, this statement was made following the Suez war, which resulted in Nehru formally ruling out relations with Israel.
61. Brecher, India and World Politics, 78–79.
62. The resolution 273 (III) adopted by the UN General Assembly on May 11, 1949, explicitly refers to “its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representatives of the Government of Israel before the Ad Hoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions.”
63. The Chinese angle came full circle in January 1992, when New Delhi followed Beijing’s example of normalizing ties with Israel. For a discussion see Kumaraswamy, “South Asia and People’s Republic of China-Israeli Diplomatic Relations.”
64. In the Chinese case, the prime issue was of who represented China. Regarding Israel, the issue was not the nature of the government but the very existence of the state.
65. Debates CA (November 28, 1949), col. 20.
66. Misra, India’s Policy of Recognition, 57–58.
67. The Hindu (Madras) (September 18, 1950).
68. Debates CA (August 20, 1948), 381.
69. See Debates CA (March 4, 1949; March 9, 1949; November 28, 1949; December 6, 1949) and Debates PP (February 27, 1950; March 17, 1950; June 11, 1950; August 4, 1950).
70. For the role played by Prof. Taraknath Das of New York University in securing India’s recognition, see Jerome Unger to Nahum Goldman (October 9, 1950), CZA, Z6/372.
71. E. Elath to M. Sharett (October 14, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:548.
72. Weizmann’s letters to Nehru (November 15, 1947; November 27, 1947; December 16, 1947) and to B. N. Rau (May 23, 1948). Weizman, Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series A, vol. 23. It should, however, be remembered that until that time none of the leading Zionist leaders had established any personal contacts with the Indian nationalists.
73. CZA, K-11, 81/3.
74. In his reply, Nehru wrote, inter alia: “Where rights come into conflict it is not an easy matter to decide…. I confess that I have great deal of sympathy for the Jews, I feel sympathy for the Arabs also in this predicament…. I would like to do all in my power to help the Jewish people in their distress in so far as I can do without injuring other people.” Nehru to Einstein (July 11, 1947). For the complete text of the letter, see Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 3:393–396.
75. Singh, “India and the Crisis,” 75.
76. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:169.
77. Cited in ibid.
78. Quoted in Schechtman, The Mufti and the Fuehrer, 234.
79. For a detailed discussion of the All-Palestine Government, see Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza.”
80. Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, Cairo, to Foreign Minister, New Delhi (September 30, 1948), NAI, F.46(21)-AWT/48.
81. Official note (October 4, 1948), NAI F.46(21)-AWT/48. Indeed, for the same reason, India did not acknowledge Shertok’s May 1948 cable to Nehru for recognition.
82. Suggestions that Pakistan had recognized the Jordanian annexation has been challenged by Silverburg, “Pakistan and the West Bank.”
83. Note by J. S. Mehta (October 4, 1948), NAI, F.46(21)-AWT/48.
84. Schechtman, “India and Israel,” 52.
85. He presided over the World Ulema Conference held in Karachi in February 1952, and in May he led a Palestinian delegation that visited Pakistan. Jbara, Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni, 190.
86. For example, see India, India and Palestine; Agwani, “The Palestine Conflict in Asian Perspective,” 456; Mehrish, India’s Recognition Policy, 80; Parakatil, India and the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, 75; Singh, “India and the Crisis,” 75.
87. Debates LS, series I, vol. 9, part II (November 20, 1956), cols. 594–595.
88. This note was prepared when the Tel Aviv public notary Victor Grunwald made an initial offer in September 1950 to act as India’s honorary consul in Israel. NAI, F.22 (31)-AWT/50.
89. Eytan, The First Ten Years, 130. Citing notes of Nehru’s conversation with Eytan, Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:70, concurs with this assessment.
90. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:170.
91. K. P. S. Menon to Walter Eytan (October 23, 1952), ISA, 2554/12.
92. The Times (London) (November 13, 1959), in Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 160.
93. Note for supplementaries, NAI, F.23(7)-AWT/50. The main question was raised in the parliament on December 11, 1950. However, no supplementary questions were asked.
94. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
95. India, MEA Report 1948–1949, 1–2.
96. Ibid. (1949–1950), 2.
97. Ibid. (1950–1951), 1.
98. For a similar statement on concurrent accreditation see ibid. (1950–1951), 4; ibid. (1951–1952), 2, 3, 4, 10, 12; and ibid. (1962–1963), 2.
99. Ya’acov Shimoni to F. W. Pollack (December 16, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
100. Debates PP (December 11, 1950), col. 793.
101. India, MEA Report 1951–1952, 10. Emphasis added.
102. Debates LS, series I, vol. 9, part II (November 20, 1956), col. 595.
103. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 414–415.
104. ISA Documents, Companion, 14:738.
105. Debates LS, series III, vol. 20 (September 9, 1963), 5019.
106. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi) 15, no. 5 (May 1969): 110.
107. Agwani, “India and the Arab World,” 75. See also India, India and Palestine, 31.
108. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi) 15, no. 5 (May 1969): 110.
109. In 1981, President Zia ul-Haq observed: “Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.” The Economist (December 12, 1981).
110. India’s endorsement of the NAM consensus on Palestine could be cited as the prime example.
111. Rafael, Destination Peace, 89.
112. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
113. Personal interview with Morarji Desai on October 22, 1987, in Mumbai. When he was prime minister, Israel’s foreign minister Moshe Dayan paid an incognito visit to India. See also Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 253.
114. Quoted in Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 161.
115. Quoted in Brecher, “Israel and China,” 223.
116. David Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, to Jawaharlal Nehru (July 28, 1960), Israel Documents, 14:686–687.
117. Jawaharlal Nehru, New Delhi, to David Ben-Gurion (August 9, 1960), Israel Documents, 14:689.
118. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 5:361.
119. In September 1947, for example, the government was confronted with the question of the prolonged stay of Jewish refugees from Afghanistan. Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel (September 27, 1947), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, 4:639–640.
120. Moreover, between 1949 and 1960, about five thousand Bene-Israeli and Iraqi Jews emigrated to Israel from India. Israel Year Book (1961), 378.
121. K. L. Panjabi to H. Z. Cynowitz (March 26, 1949), ISA, 2555/5.
122. Cable to Government of India (December 28, 1950), ISA, 2554/12.
123. The formal designation for ambassadors among members of the British Commonwealth.
124. Kidron to V. K. Krishna Menon (May 24, 1950), ISA, 2554/12.
125. Ya’acov Shimoni to F. W. Pollack (November 6, 1950), ISA, 2554/12.
126. Kidron to V. K. Krishna Menon (November 27, 1950), ISA, 2554/12.
127. Ya’acov Shimoni to F. W. Pollack (January 15, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
128. Ibid.
129. Leilamani Naidu to F. W. Pollack (March 8, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
130. Ya’acov Shimoni to F. W. Pollack (March 4, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
131. ISA, 2554/12.
132. F. W. Pollack to Ya’acov Shimoni (June 15, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
133. Ya’acov Shimoni to F. W. Pollack (June 25, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
134. Ya’acov Shimoni to F. W. Pollack (July 29, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
135. Personal interviews in July and August 1988 in Jerusalem with Israeli consuls who served in Bombay.
136. A copy of the Indian notification can be found in ISA, 2554/12.
137. Note from the Ministry of External Affairs to Pollack (August 31, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
138. Bhansali to Pollack (January 30, 1953), ISA, 2554/12.
139. M. Michael (Bombay) to Asia and Africa Division, Jerusalem (February 19, 1960), summary, Israel Documents, Companion, 14:356. Emphasis added.
140. M. Michael to Minister of Foreign Affairs (October 25, 1960), summary, Israel Documents, Companion, 14:386.
141. Debates RS, vol. 47 (May 5, 1964), col. 1777.
142. Debates LS, series 3, vol. 31 (May 4, 1964), 14014.
143. Personal interviews with Reuven Dafni, who served in Bombay from 1965 to 1969, and the wife of Avshalom Caspi, who served from 1956 to 1959.
144. Brecher, The Foreign Policy Systems of Israel, 386–387; Medzini, “Reflections on Israel’s Asian Policy,” 203.
145. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:170.
146. Shimoni to Pollack (December 16, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
147. Ibid.
148. Cited in Shimoni to Pollack (December 23, 1951), ISA, 2554/12.
149. Unless otherwise stated, the entire account of the activities of Eytan is based on his “New Delhi Diary,” ISA, 2383/21.
150. Accordingly, Eytan sent a detailed reply indicating that it would be advisable to buy rather than rent a house in Israel. Eytan to Avtar Singh (March 20, 1952), ISA, 2554/12.
151. M. Pragai to Walter Eytan (March 10, 1953), Israel Documents, Companion (1953), 8:116. The meeting took place between Pragai and Avtar Singh, with whom Eytan met in New Delhi. Singh had then moved to New York as the first secretary in the Indian mission.
152. Panikkar’s relations with the Zionists could be traced as far back as 1937. Panikkar to Elath (July 1937), CZA, S25/10228. Similarly, C. S. Jha had met with Abba Eban and others during the Lake Success Conference in December 1946. Sasson to Divon (November 14, 1950), ISA, 2413/28. Rao was one of the organizers of the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March– April 1947, which was attended by a ten-member Jewish delegation from Palestine.
153. For example, the Indian High Commission in London was used as a conduit for its proposal to appoint a Trade Commission to India.
154. Alluding to past meetings in Ankara, a senior Israeli diplomat observed in April 1954: “To the extent that politics depend on personnel connections, Mr. Jha’s occupation of a responsible post in New Delhi is bound to have a beneficent influence on Indo-Israeli relations.” Meroz to MAAR (April 20, 1954), ISA, 2413/29.
155. For a first-person account of this meeting, see E. Sasson to S. Divon (July 1, 1951), ISA, 2413/29.
156. Menon to Eytan (October 23, 1952), ISA, 2554/12.
157. Elath wrote a twelve-page report on this day-long meeting. On the nature of the meeting, Elath remarked: “I had heard from several mutual friends that he [Panikkar] had been asking after me and looking for a chance of meeting me again privately, since his official position as Indian Ambassador to Egypt and some other Arab countries… now makes it impossible for him to meet me in public.” Elath to Eytan (September 8, 1953), ISA, 2413/29.
158. Sasson to Divon (June 22, 1951), ISA, 2413/29.
159. Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 166.
160. Six years later, another six-member delegation went to Israel to study the working of the cooperative system. Debates LS, series 2, vol. 43 (April 21, 1960), 12917–12920.
161. Ben-Gurion to Nehru (July 28, 1960) in Aynor, The Role of the Israeli Labor Movement in Establishing Relations with States in Africa and Asia, 44.
162. Personal diaries of Ya’acov Shimoni.
163. Menon to Eytan (September 14, 1954), ISA, 2413/29.
164. For example, the Israeli consul in Bombay hosted a dinner in January 1974 in honor of the four-member Israeli delegation. Among others, the noted physicist M. G. K. Menon was present. News From Israel (Bombay) 21, no. 3 (February 1, 1972): 7.
165. For example, see ibid., 12.
166. For a detailed assessment, see Caplan, “The 1956 Sinai Campaign Viewed from Asia.”
167. Rafael, Destination Peace, 89.
168. For the minutes of this meeting, see CZA, Z6/2344.
169. Official note (August 4, 1953), in India, Ministry of External Affairs, Protocol Hand Book, 193–194.
170. Nehru’s press interviews on September 26, 1946. In Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 1:501.
171. Personal interview with Ya’acov Shimoni in Jerusalem in September 1988.
172. Personal interviews with former Israeli diplomats. The exact date is not available. This most likely had happened in the late 1950s or early 1960s, yet the suggestions were frequently raised during the tenure of Shastri, Indira Gandhi, and Morarji Desai.
173. Rafael, Destination Peace, 87.
174. For a detailed study, see Nachmani, Israel, Turkey, and Greece, 50–55.
7. Domestic Politics
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 58. Truman made this statement in November 1945. Emphasis added.
1. Appadorai, Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy, 119–169.
2. The overwhelmingly religious or nonsecular character of most of the countries of the Middle East, however, rarely evoke interest, let alone criticism, in India.
3. Nehru, Glimpses of World History.
4. Quoted in Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 302. Emphasis added.
5. India, MEA Report 1964–1965, 58–59.
6. Foreign Affairs Report 15, no. 5 (May 1969): 110.
7. Debates RS, vol. 71 (March 26, 1970), col. 28.
8. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 152. Emphasis added.
9. Agwani, “India and the Islamic World,” 6.
10. Varadarajan, “When Jaswant Took Indian Politics to Foreign Shores.”
11. Pradhan “Changing Dynamics of India’s West Asia Policy,” 1.
12. Ibid., 86. Emphasis added.
13. Ibid. Emphasis added.
14. National Commission on Minorities. Available online at http://ncm.nic.in/minority_population.pdf.
15. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 163.
16. Eytan, “New Delhi Diary,” ISA, 2383/21; E. Elath to M. Sharett (October 14, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:547–548.
17. Navari, “Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975): Prophecy and Civilization,” 292. For Toynbee’s later argument disapproving of the divine rights of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, see Toynbee, “Jewish Rights in Palestine.”
18. India, Ministry of External Affairs, India and Palestine, 22–23, 51.
19. “Congress Betrays Arabs,” editorial, The Dawn (May 5, 1947).
20. H. C. Beaumont to S. E. Abbot (May 22, 1947), NAI, F-2(6)-UNO-I/47. Emphasis added.
21. Brecher, The New States of Asia, 130.
22. In subsequent years, Pakistan assumed that stance and argued that it should be considered the true voice of Muslims of the subcontinent, including the Indian Muslims.
23. Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, 219.
24. Maulana Azad was India’s minister for education from August 15, 1947, until his death on February 22, 1958.
25. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 166.
26. Nehru’s note to Secretary, Commonwealth Relations (March 23, 1948), in Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 5:548.
27. Mathai, Reminiscences of the Nehru Age, 221.
28. Agwani, “Ingredients of India’s Arab Policy,” 12.
29. I am grateful to Professor K. R. Singh for highlighting this nuanced difference.
30. E. Sasson to S. Divon (July 1, 1951), ISA, 2413/29.
31. Brecher, Nehru, 571–572.
32. Brecher, The New States of Asia, 130.
33. Brecher, Nehru, 564–565.
34. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:170.
35. Copy of the report from Special Branch Inspector, Patna (July 14, 1948), NAI, F-46(22)-AWT/48.
36. Surjeet Singh, Director of Monitoring Service, Simla, to Secretary Ministry of External Affairs (July 13, 1948), NAI, F-19(119)-1A/48.
37. Debates CA (August 9, 1948), 28.
38. Debates CA (August 20, 1948), 381.
39. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:169.
40. Ibid., 2:169–170. Emphasis added.
41. E. Elath to M. Sharett (October 14, 1949), Israel Documents, 4:547–548.
42. Eytan, “New Delhi Diary,” ISA, 2383/21.
43. This note, dated February 27, 1950, was prepared anticipating supplementary questions on Israel in parliament. NAI, F.23 (2)-AWT/50.
44. The issue was sorted out when Jordan agreed to provide temporary travel documents that were recognized by Riyadh.
45. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 230.
46. Desai, The Story of My Life, 2:257.
47. Dayan, Breakthrough, 29.
48. The Hindustan Times (May 24, 1980). See also Gandhi, The Morarji Papers, 235–236.
49. Janata (New Delhi) 33 (November 5, 1978): 19. Jagjivan Ram expressed his “shock” when Dayan’s visit was disclosed in May 1980.
50. M. L. Sondhi, quoted in Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, 125.
51. Ibid.
52. Dixit, My South Block Years, 311.
53. Pasha, India and OIC, 52–53.
54. Interestingly, on August 24, 2000, weeks after the visit, a lawmaker asked “whether the hon’ble Prime Minister has made a statement during his visit to Israel that diplomatic relations between India and Israel were delayed because of Muslim vote-bank in India.” Since it was the foreign minister who visited and made these remarks, the government responded, saying: “Do not arise as Prime Minister did not visit Israel.” Debates RS, unstarred question (August 24, 2000).
55. Varadarajan, “When Jaswant Took Indian Politics to Foreign Shores.”
56. Noorani, “Palestine and Israel.” Interestingly, in 1969 Noorani had lambasted Indira Gandhi’s government over the Rabat episode.
57. Press conference of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, New York (September 16, 2005), Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi). Available online at http://meaindia.nic.in/pressbriefing/2005/09/16pb01.htm. Similar arguments were put forth by National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan when he announced the brief stopover visit by the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in April 2008.
58. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 160–161.
59. Bagchi, “Shalom,” 18.
60. Statesman (Calcutta) (February 28, 1992).
61. For a brief discussion on Sharon’s visit see Cucciniello and Mitra, “India and Israel Move Closer Together.”
62. Pasha, India and OIC, 42.
63. Interview to Sunday Observer (Bombay) (June 27, 1982).
64. Rafael, Destination Peace, 88–90.
65. Bhagat, “The Drama and Trauma of Gaza.” See also The Hindu (March 29, 2006; June 7, 2005).
66. Menon, “U.S. Politics Impinges on West Asian Situation.”
67. Quoted in Teslik, Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Special Interests, 36.
68. Debates CA, first session, part II (December 4, 1947), 1258.
69. Debates CA (August 20, 1948), 381; Debates CA (March 4, 1949), 1256; Debates CA (March 9, 1949), 1400–1401; Debates CA (November 28, 1949), 20; Debates CA (December 6, 1939), 233–234. Debates PP (February 27, 1950), 495; Debates PP (March 17, 1950), 1730–1731; Debates PP (June 11, 1950), 1270; Debates PP (August 4, 1950), 216–217.
70. Such amendments moved in the Lok Sabha include those proposed by Premjibhai R. Assar (April 9, 1958), M. B. Thakor (March 1959), Assar (March 16, 1959), S. Dwivedy (March 16, 1960), Assar (March 16, 1960), A. B. Vajpayee (August 31, 1960), Aurobindo Ghosh (April 3, 1961), P. Vishwambharam (April 3, 1969), Bal Raj Madhok (April 3, 1969), Digvijai Nath (April 3, 1969), B. S. Sharma (April 7, 1970), Piloo Mody (April 7, 1970), R. K. Amin (April 23, 1973), and Ram Jethmalani (April 17, 1978). In the Rajya Sabha, such motions included those proposed by V. M. Chordia (November 22, 1966) and V. D. Mani (June 23, 1967).
71. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 220–221.
72. Among others, see Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, 11–12, 219; Gordon, “Indian-Israeli Relations: Perspective and Promise,” 28; and M. S. Gokhale, Secretary Foreign Relations committee PSP to Mapai (September 3, 1952); and Prem Bhatin, PSP to Barkatt, Director Political Department of Histadrut (November 20, 1958), both in Aynor et al., The Role of the Israeli Labor Movement in Establishing Relations with States in Africa and Asia, 20, 43–44.
73. Among others, see Janata (September 5, 1954; July 7, 1957; June 25, 1961; July 9, 1967; October 8, 1967).
74. Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 146.
75. Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Party Documents, 1:49.
76. Debates LS, series 1, vol. 10 (December 23, 1953), col. 2992. For a broader discussion of Jan Sangh policy, see Kishore, Jana Sangh and India’s Foreign Policy, 128–131.
77. Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Party Documents, 3:34–35.
78. Ibid., 3:137.
79. Quoted in Schechtman, “India and Israel,” 53.
80. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 305–307.
81. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 221.
82. Karat, “The Bush-Sharon Axis of Evil.” See also Karat’s interview in Front-line 20, no. 5 (March 1–14, 2003). Available online at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2005/stories/20030314007001600.htm.
83. Pasha, India and OIC, 44.
84. Jafferlot, “The Idea Exchange.”
85. Vanaik, “Making India Strong: The BJP-led Government’s Foreign Policy Perspectives,” 333n.
86. “Aggression by Israel Condemned,” People’s Democracy 30, no. 30 (July 23, 2007).
8. International Factors
1. Aide-memoire of conversation (of Abba Eban) with B. N. Rau (June 23, 1949), ISA, 71/14.
2. For the complete text of the memorandum, dated March 1, 1952, see ISA, 2554/12.
3. Eytan to Shiloah (August 11, 1949), ISA, 2441/2.
4. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 181. Emphasis added.
5. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 29–33; Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 11:478, 12:156; Quraishi, Liberal Nationalism of Egypt, 45, 129–130; Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, 284–286; Musa, The Education of Salama Musa, 138; Agwani, “India and the Arab World, 1947–1964,” 54; Singh, “India and WANA,” 625.
6. Among others, see the writings of Jansen, Agwani, Heptulla, and Mudiam.
7. India, Documents of the Gatherings of Nonaligned Countries, 1961–1979, 5.
8. During the prolonged Iran-Iraq war, for example, opposition from a handful of its members prevented the NAM from declaring Iraq the aggressor.
9. Castigating Pakistan for overplaying its Islamic credentials, King Farouq of Egypt is reported to have observed: “Don’t you know that Islam was born on 14 August 1947 [date of Pakistan’s independence]?” Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, 133.
10. Summary by Eliyahu Elath on his meeting with Pandit (May 12, 1949). Israel Documents, Companion, 4:17.
11. Brecher, The New States of Asia, 130.
12. Rafael, Destination Peace, 89.
13. Among others, see Agwani, “India and the Arab World, 1947–1964,” 61; Banerjee, “India and West Asia: Changing Images Reflect Shifts in Regional Balance of Power,” 28, 30; Singh, “India and the Crisis,” 75; Singh, “India and WANA,” 18; and Jain, “Disillusionment with the Arabs: A Shift in Indian Opinion,” 437.
14. They were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.
15. It is essential to remember that even the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which assumed office following the 1998 parliamentary elections, is not committed to making India a religious state like Pakistan. Despite all signs of extremism, the BJP, unlike its Pakistani counterparts, does not seek to mold the legislature or judiciary in conformity with Hindu religious laws.
16. Hamid, The Unholy Alliance, 15. For similar arguments, see Jaffer, “Brahminic-Talmudist Alliance.”
17. For a detailed discussion, see Kramer, Islam Assembled.
18. Shukat Ali, for example, was a moving spirit behind the Jerusalem conference of 1931.
19. Bahadur, “Pakistan as a Factor in Indo-OIC Relations,” 21.
20. For details, see Pirzada, “Pakistan and the OIC,” 14–38.
21. A Pakistani military unit headed by Brigadier (later General and President) Zia ul-Haq was training the Jordanian army during the Black September massacre of the Palestinians in 1970. A few years later, Zia was honored by King Hussein for his “services” to the Hashemite Kingdom. Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? Death of a State, 224n; and Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 27.
22. Eliahu Elath to Walter Eytan (September 8, 1953), ISA, 2413/29.
23. Eliahu Sasson to S. Divon (December 28, 1950), ISA, 53/6b. Emphasis added.
24. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
25. For a detailed discussion, see Abidi, “India’s Policy Towards Muslim States.”
26. Agwani, “India and the Islamic World,” 6.
27. Jansen, Militant Islam, 96.
28. India, MEA Report 1948–1949, 4.
29. Marwah, “India’s Relations with West Asian, North African Countries,” 22.
30. Heikal, The Cairo Document, 277–299.
31. Ibid., 280.
32. Akbar, Nehru, 497.
33. Brecher, India and World Politics, 67–68, 77.
34. Despite its initial opposition to the French undertaking this venture, the shortened route became vital for British interests in India. In the very first year of its operation, British shipping accounted for as much as 71 percent of the total cargo handled by the Suez Canal. This preeminence continued until after World War II, and the gradual decline coincided with waning power of the British Empire. The British share was 62.59 percent in 1946, 47.23 in 1947, 37.63 in 1948, 32.11 in 1954, and 28.33 in 1955. For complete figures between 1869 and 1955, see Farnie, East and West of Suez, 751–752.
35. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 216.
36. Debates LS, series 2, vol. 41 (March 31, 1960), 8909; series 3, vol. 3 (May 16, 1962), 4617.
37. Srivastava, “India-Israel Relations,” 257–258.
38. Driven by the need to evacuate thousands of Indians who were stranded in Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion, India sided with Saddam Hussein and even closed its embassy in Kuwait within days after the invasion. It was only after the successful airlifting of about 150,000 Indians was completed in October 1990 that India became more critical of Iraq. For a discussion see Jayaramu, “India and the Gulf Crisis: Pro-Iraq or Pro-India.”
39. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2005, 254.
40. Until the Kuwait crisis and subsequent UN sanctions, Iraq was India’s principal oil supplier.
41. For a recent discussion, see Feiler, From Boycott to Economic Cooperation.
42. Israel and the United Nations, 166.
43. Quoted in Kimche, “The Arab Boycott of Israel,” 6.
44. Israel joined the West European and Others Group in 2000 and thus became eligible to contest elections to UN Security Council.
45. The Arab boycott has been studied extensively and some of the notable works include: Sarna, Boycott and Blacklist; Teslik, Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Special Interests; Chill, The Arab Boycott of Israel; and Prittie and Nelson, The Economic War Against the Jews. The Arab points of view are available in Iskandar, The Arab Boycott of Israel; and Meo et al., The Arab Boycott of Israel.
46. Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I, 81.
47. Prittie and Nelson, The Economic War Against the Jews, 142; Sarna, Boycott and Blacklist, 185.
48. M. R. Baveja, Cairo, to Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi (April 21, 1948), and Foreign Office to Embassy, Cairo (April 19, 1949), NAI, F-13(70)-1A/49.
49. Debates PP, vol. 6, part 1 (February 20, 1951), 1580; Debates RS, vol. 40 (August 13, 1962), cols. 1319–1320.
50. Sarna, Boycott and Blacklist, 185.
51. FICCI, Report of the Indian Delegation to West Asian Countries, 27. Emphasis added. Arab countries often used the expression “Israeli” as a synonym for “Zionist” or “Jew.”
52. Ibid.
53. India, Documents of the Gatherings of Nonaligned Countries, 1961–1979, 94.
54. Ibid., 111. Chapter 7 deals with the powers of the Security Council in dealing with “threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression” and empowers the council to impose and enforce punitive measures against states violating its recommendations.
55. India, Ministry of External Affairs, http://meaindia.nic.in/foreignrelation/palestine.pdf, p.6.; and Pradhan, “Changing Dynamics of India’s West Asia Policy,” 10.
56. Korey, “India and Israel,” 8. It is rather surprising that none of the Indian writers have mentioned this reported visit.
57. Debates LS, series 4, vol. 33 (November 19, 1969), 36–37; vol. 34 (December 3, 1969); and vol. 37 (March 4, 1970), 166–167.
58. Debates RS, vol. 73 (August 26, 1970), col. 123.
59. India, MEA Report 1969–1970, 56.
60. Debates RS, vol. 71 (March 26, 1970), col. 28.
61. India, Documents of the Gatherings of Nonaligned Countries, 1961–1979, 32.
62. Ibid., 138.
63. Ibid., 186.
64. Debates LS, series 4, vol. 40 (April 22, 1970), 230.
65. International Documents on Palestine 1973, 525.
66. Debates RS, vol. 90 (November 22, 1974), col. 47.
67. Hindustan Times (December 23, 1974).
68. Asian Recorder 21 (March 5–11, 1975): 12475. Until then, the Arab League office in New Delhi was looking after the interests of the PLO.
69. International Documents on Palestine, 1975, 372.
70. For example, see MEA Report 1975–1976, 75.
71. Statement of Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, Debates LS, 7:3 (March 26, 1980), 313–314.
72. Hindustan Times (April 12, 1981).
73. India has consistently supported “the right of the refugees to have an unfettered choice either to return to their homeland or to compensation…. India appreciated the aspirations of the Palestine refugees to return to their homes. India also took the position that the UN was responsible for the partitioning of the country and that the rights of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation which had been clearly recognized in Resolution 194, should be respected.” India, India and Palestine, 51.
74. Ibid. It should be noted that India, especially during Nehru’s time, relied heavily on the authority of the Western historian Arnold Toynbee, known for his anti-Jewish sentiments and writings, to repudiate these claims.
75. India, India and Palestine, 31.
76. Statement of the official spokesperson reported in The Hindu (September 18, 1950).
77. India, India and Palestine, 31.
78. For a detailed and pioneering study, see Harkabi, The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning.
79. Asian Recorder 18 (September 30– October 6, 1972): 11016.
80. When three Western diplomats were killed in Khartoum in March 1973, India characterized it as a “condemnable act of lawlessness.” MEA Report 1972–1973, 33.
81. Debates RS, vol. 71 (March 26, 1970), col. 27. Despite this, India could not prevent its territories from being used for Palestinian acts of violence. According to a study during 1970 and 1984, as many as ten Palestinian acts of terrorism either originated from or happened in India. They were 1970 (1), 1971 (3), 1974 (1), 1976 (1), 1982 (2), 1983 (1), and 1984 (1). Merari and Elad, The International Dimensions of Palestinian Terrorism, 119, 130–142.
82. India, Documents of the Gatherings of Nonaligned Countries, 1961–1979, 203. Emphasis added. However, Israel had different understanding of Idi Amin’s “humanitarian efforts” and thus acted differently.
9. Nehru and the Era of Deterioration, 1947–1964
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from Panikkar, A Memorandum on Hindu-Zionist Relations (April 4, 1947), CZA, S25/7486.
1. Edwards, “Illusions and Reality in Indian Foreign Policy,” 49.
2. Nehru, however, had deputies to assist him. They were A. K. Chanda (August 12, 1952, to May 1, 1957), Syed Mahmud (December 7, 1954 to April 17, 1957), and Lakshmi Menon (April 17, 1957, to April 10, 1962, and April 16, 1962, to May 27, 1964).
3. They are Jawaharlal Nehru (1947–1964), Lal Bahadur Sastri (1964–1966), Indira Gandhi (1966–1977), Morarji Desai (1977–1979), Charan Singh (1979–1980), Indira Gandhi (1980–1984), Rajiv Gandhi (1984–1989), V. P. Singh (1989–1990), Chandra Shekhar (1990–1991), and P. V. Narasimha Rao (1991–1996). Subsequently, India had the following prime ministers: Atal Behari Vajpayee (1996), Deva Gowda (1996–1997), I. K. Gujral (1997–1998), A. B. Vajpayee (1998–2004), and Manmohan Singh (2004–).
4. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 1:344. The Jewish delegation, however, felt “most of the real problems have either not been touched at all, or were touched on slightly and casually and immediately hushed up.” “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference” (April 17, 1947), CZA, S 25/7485, p. 2.
5. The delegation also included the Sanskrit scholar Immanuel Olsvanger, who came to India in 1936 as the official emissary of the Jewish Agency, and Ya’acov Shimoni, who later on joined the foreign ministry and shaped Israel’s Asia policy.
6. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference” (April 17, 1947), CZA, S 25/7485, p. 4.
7. For example, Nehru’s biographer refers to delegates from the “Hebrew University.” Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 1:344.
8. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference,” CZA, S 25/7485, p. 4. Emphasis in the original. In his speech over All-India Radio, Shimoni repeatedly referred to “our country.” For the transcript of Shimoni’s speech, see Asian Relations Conference: Publicity Section (March 1947), CZA, S25/7485.
9. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 45.
10. Kochan, “Israel in the Third World Forums,” 248.
11. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference” (April 17, 1947), CZA, S 25/7485, p. 1.
12. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 191.
13. For example, see Kochan, “Israel in the Third World Forums,” 248.
14. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference” (April 17, 1947), CZA, S 25/7485, p. 4.
15. Ibid.
16. For the complete text of Bergmann’s speech, see Asian Relations: Report of the Proceedings and Documents of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March– April 1947.
17. For the transcript of Shimoni’s speech, see Asian Relations Conference: Publicity Section (March 1947), CZA, S25/7485.
18. According to Shimoni, Nehru was not present when Bergmann spoke. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference,” CZA, S 25/7485, p. 8. However, it is not clear if this was deliberate or due to Nehru’s other responsibilities.
19. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 192. See also Appadorai, “The Asian Relations Conference in Perspective,” 281–282.
20. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference,” CZA, S 25/7485, p. 8.
21. Ibid.
22. Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, 2:511.
23. Ibid.
24. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference,” CZA, S 25/7485, p. 6. This position, however, was not shared by some members of the delegation, who “ascribed it to our being too sensitive.”
25. Ibid., 9.
26. He played a key role in the initial contacts between Israel and the People’s Republic of China. However, these contacts did not blossom into full diplomatic ties.
27. Held at Nehru’s residence, only his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit and daughter Indira Gandhi were present.
28. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference,” CZA, S 25/7485, p. 6.
29. Ibid., 7.
30. Panikkar, “A Memorandum on Hindu-Zionist Relations.”
31. “Report of the Inter-Asian Conference,” CZA, S 25/7485, pp. 8–9; Alfred Bonne, “Supplementary Notes to the Report of the Delegation on the Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi” (April 30, 1947), CZA, S25/7485.
32. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 71.
33. The Zionist Review, quoted in Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 194.
34. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 154.
35. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:169.
36. Cited in Agwani, “The Palestine Conflict in Asian Perspective,” 456. Interestingly, a couple of decades later, India was instrumental in the formation of Bangladesh, whose independence was achieved by an India-backed war rather than through negotiations with Pakistan. Moreover, while an act of war can be unilateral, peace always demands the cooperation of two parties, something that the Arabs were not prepared to offer in 1948.
37. Shiva Rao’s D. O. letter (April 30, 1949), NAI, F-32(6)-1A/49.
38. L. Panjabi to H. Z. Cynowitz (March 26, 1949), ISA, 2555/5.
39. Advisory Opinion (May 28, 1948), ICJ, Reports of Judgment, Advisory Opinion and Orders, 65.
40. Quoted in Appleton, The Eternal Triangle, 19.
41. Israel and the United Nations, 50.
42. Appleton, The Eternal Triangle, 26.
43. For this statement and for a detailed discussion, see Ramakrishna Reddy, India’s Policy in the United Nations, 18–22.
44. This is often referred to as Israel’s “missed opportunity.” For a background discussion, see Shichor, “Hide-and-Seek: Sino-Israeli Relations in Perspective.”
45. The following discussion is based on Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 143–168.
46. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 251.
47. For example, see the speech of Pakistan’s foreign minister, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, “Thanksgiving Day at Lake Success, New York, 27 November 1949,” in Khalidi, ed., From Heaven to Conquest, 709–722.
48. Joint communiqué by the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, Colombo, 1954. In Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 414.
49. UN Resolution 194, adopted on December 11, 1948, was not as unequivocal and categorical on the Palestinian refugees as commonly believed, interpreted, and presented. It declared that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.”
50. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 164.
51. Initially, Nehru was not favorable to the idea. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:232.
52. For the complete text of the joint communiqué issued on December 29, 1954, see India, MEA Report 1954–1955, 55–58.
53. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955–75, 4.
54. They were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.
55. Also excluded were apartheid South Africa and the breakaway Taiwanese republic, which was still a member of the United Nations as well as the Security Council. Questioning the logic of the invitation, Michael Brecher observed: “the Gold Coast was invited even though it was two years away from independence, as was Ghana. As if to underline the inconsistency, both North and South Vietnam were invited, but the two Koreas were not.” Brecher, The New States of Asia, 133.
56. In addition to eight Arab countries, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey attended the Bandung Conference.
57. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, 174–175.
58. Ibid., 175.
59. Israel and the United Nations, 166.
60. Quoted in Feiler, From Boycott to Economic Cooperation, 30.
61. Quoted in Kochan, “Israel in Third World Forums,” 251. Emphasis added.
62. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:232.
63. In his assessment, “For us to be told… that the United States and the United Kingdom will not like the inclusion of China in the Afro-Asian conference is not very helpful. In fact, it is somewhat irritating. There are many things that the United States and the United Kingdom have done which we do not like at all.” In Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:233.
64. Brecher, The New States of Asia, 210–211.
65. Brecher, India and World Politics, 52.
66. Ibid., 79.
67. Ibid., 60.
68. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 259.
69. Cited in ibid., 260.
70. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
71. Cited in Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 260.
72. Jansen identified them as Ceylon, Formosa, the Philippines, and Burma in 1949; India and Thailand in 1950; and Japan in 1952. Jansen, Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism, 203–204. The full-fledged Israeli consulate in India became operational only 1953.
73. Menon also referred to an incident when the Lebanese ambassador to India walked out of an official Indian party in October 1964 because of the presence of an Indian professor who was a member of the Indo-Israel Cultural Society. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
74. Brecher, India and World Politics, 80.
75. David Ben-Gurion’s statement of January 5, 1957, quoted in New Outlook (Tel Aviv) 1, no. 3 (September 1957): 21. This was a radical change in Israel’s stand. On the eve of the Suez crisis, Nehru received “an informal message… from the Prime Minister of Israel to the effect that Israel had made a mistake in leaning on the Western Powers and the Israelis now realized more than ever that they were of Asia and must look to Asia.” Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:277. Gopal did not identify the person, but perhaps he was referring to Moshe Sharett, the former Israeli prime minister who had met Nehru in New Delhi on October 30, 1956.
76. Some of the best documentary works on the crisis include Eayrs, ed., The Commonwealth and Suez; U.S. State Department, The Suez Canal Problem; and India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Suez Canal: Nationalization and After. On the legal aspects, see Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation with Special Reference to International Waterways in the Middle East; Obeita, The International Status of the Suez Canal; and, on India, see Mohan, “India, Pakistan, Suez, and the Commonwealth.”
77. For the complete text of Menon’s statement at the London Conference, see U.S. State Department, The Suez Canal Problem, 159–178.
78. For Nehru’s statement in the parliament, Debates LS, series 1, vol. 7, part 2 (August 8, 1956), cols. 2536–2544.
79. Ibid.
80. U.S. State Department, The Suez Canal Problem, 174–175.
81. For the full text, see http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/181c4bf00c44e5fd85256cef0073c426/38a514ea8dc0d345852560c20072ecb6.
82. Foreign Affairs Record 2, no. 10 (October 1956): 150.
83. Jawaharlal Nehru to Anthony Eden (November 1, 1956), cited in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:286.
84. The Hindu (November 2, 1956).
85. For a detailed discussion, see Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:291–299.
86. Eden, Full Circle, 545; Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:291.
87. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:292.
88. Debates LS, series 1, vol. 9, part 2 (November 20, 1956), col. 592. For a similar statement, see Debates LS, series 2, vol. 3 (July 23, 1957), 4832.
89. “My anger was the greater because the invasion [the Suez crisis] diverted attention from Hungary and I felt that if the world’s attention could be concentrated on Hungary, the Soviet Union might decide not to crush the revolt.” Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 150.
90. Quoted in Selak, “A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba,” 2:711.
91. They are Egypt (100 miles), Saudi Arabia (100 miles), Israel (6.5 miles), and Jordan (3.5 miles).
92. Selak, “A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba,” 2:711.
93. At its northern end, where all four states are contiguous, the breadth of the gulf is just three miles. The territorial zones claimed are six nautical miles each for Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and three nautical miles for Jordan. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law, 2.
94. Debates LS, series 1, vol. 9, part 2 (November 20, 1956), cols. 594–595.
95. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:290.
96. Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 294.
97. The Jerusalem Post (October 29, 1962).
98. Maxwell, India’s China War, 385; Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 297; Mudiam, India and the Middle East, 161–162. This event subsequently got Israel into trouble with China, as Chairman Mao began using this arms supply to justify and impede Sino-Israeli ties.
99. Heikal, The Cairo Documents, 297–298. See also Heptulla, Indo-West Asian Relations, 191.
100. India, MEA Report 1963–1964, 45–48. In the words of Gopal, “India was now prepared to obtain arms from any source. Even with Israel there were talks, which had soon to be ended because of Nasser’s opposition.” As in the case of Maulana Azad’s role regarding nonrelations with Israel, once again Gopal relied on an external source to make this argument, namely Heikal. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 3:224.
101. For example, see Agwani, “India and West Asia,” 169–171.
10. The Years of Hardened Hostility, 1964–1984
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 253.
1. India, Documents of the Gatherings of Nonaligned Countries, 1961–1979, 21.
2.Korey, “India and Israel,” 8.
3. Debates LS, series 3, vol. 44 (August 23, 1965), 1194–1195.
4. MEA Report 1965–1966, 36–37; MEA Report 1966–1967, 31; Debates RS, vol. 54 (November 22, 1965), col. 2127.
5. Debates RS, vol. 54 (November 22, 1965), col. 2127.
6. Personal interviews with Reuven Dafni, who served as Israeli consul during this period, in Jerusalem, 1992. Details, however, are not available.
7. For a background discussion on the bilateral relations, see Kozichi, “Nepal and Israel.”
8. Though the Congress Party was in power, the communists had significant influence in the state of West Bengal, which later on became the bastion of the Indian Left.
9. Debates RS, vol. 55 (March 25, 1966), col. 4546–4547.
10. Debates RS, vol. 56 (May 3, 1966), col. 23.
11. Under a bilateral treaty signed in July 1950, India enjoyed considerable influence and leeway in Nepalese foreign policy, and thus the row could also be interpreted as a discourtesy to the Himalayan kingdom.
12. For the complete text, see Debates LS, series 4, vol. 3 (May 5, 1967), 871–876.
13. Debates LS, series 2, vol. 18 (August 14, 1958), 869–880.
14. In a letter dated November 6, 1956, to the UN Secretary General, India’s ambassador, Arthur Lall, declared, “it is understood the Force [that is, UNEF] may have to function through Egyptian territory. Therefore, there must be Egyptian consent for its establishment.” Eayrs, The Commonwealth and Suez, 360. For a similar statement, see Debates RS, vol. 30 (August 11, 1960), col. 619.
15. Chagla, Roses in December, 425.
16. For the text of the June 5 opposition appeal to the prime minister, see Debates LS, series 4, vol. 4 (June 6, 1967), 3296.
17. Debates LS, series 4, vol. 4 (June 6, 1967), 3315. However, for an equally forceful but opposite argument made by Indira Gandhi, who advised caution on the Czech crisis, see Debates LS, series 4, vol. 20 (August 22, 1968), 459–462.
18. Debates LS, series 4, vol. 7 (July 18, 1967), 12702.
19. A detailed account of the diplomatic efforts leading up to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 242 can be found in Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242.
20. Debates LS, series 4 (June 6, 1967), 3316.
21. For the text of the AICC resolution, see Zaidi and Zaidi, eds., Encyclopedia INC, 19:356–357.
22. During this period, there was a threat of early elections to the Lok Sabha. Kozichi, “Indian Policy Towards the Middle East,” 786.
23. Chagla, Roses in December, 426.
24. Bhargava, India and West Asia.
25. Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent, 308–309.
26. Baxter, The Jana Sangh, 306. Emphasis added.
27. At the time of the war, UNEF had about eight thousand soldiers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, 2.
28. Ibid., 151.
29. Times of India (June 7, 1967).
30. Singh, “India and the Crisis,” 79.
31. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, 151.
32. Ibid., 150.
33. Ibid., 152.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 154.
37. Ibid., 155.
38. Frisch, “Has the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Become Islamic?” 393.
39. Debates LS, 4:32 (August 28, 1969), 251–252.
40. Debates RS, 59 (August 28, 1969), col. 5919.
41. Patriot (August 27, 1969).
42. Times of India (August 29, 1969).
43. The Hindu (Chennai) (September 10, 1969).
44. National Herald (New Delhi) (August 30, 1969).
45. Ibid.
46. Annual Report of the Security Council, 1969, reproduced in Palestine Documents (1970), 475. Emphasis added.
47. A detailed and dispassionate discussion of the OIC can be found in Baba, Organisation of Islamic Conference.
48. Singh, “Oral History: India at the Rabat Islamic Summit (1969),” 106. Some have wrongly argued that since “Zakir Hussein (1977–1969) was then President of India, an official delegation was invited to attend.” Mansingh, India’s Search for Power, 211. Hussein had passed away in May, and on August 24, V. V. Giri took over as the new president of India.
49. Baba, Organisation of Islamic Conference, 65.
50. Noorani, “Rabat: Religion and Diplomacy.”
51. Soz, “The OIC and Indian Muslims,” 125.
52. Mansingh, India’s Search for Power, 212.
53. Dixit, My South Block Years, 300–301. See also Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 240.
54. Debates LS, 4:33 (November 17, 1969), 430.
55. Debates RS, 70 (November 21, 1969), col.810. In his personal recollections more than thirty years later, India’s ambassador in Rabat at that time, Gurbachan Singh, did not admit the existence of a written invitation. See his “Oral History,” 105–120.
56. Quoted in Noorani, “Rabat: Religion and Diplomacy.”
57. Debates LS, 4:33 (November 18, 1969), 135, 146.
58. Quoted in Noorani, “Rabat: Religion and Diplomacy.”
59. For a statement by Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh, see Debates LS, 3:38 (February 22, 1965), 651.
60. Quoted in Bahadur, “Pakistan as a Factor in Indo-OIC Relations,” 21. This was not the first occasion when the subcontinent cast a shadow over international Muslim gatherings. As early as in 1926, the Mecca conference was dominated over the usage of Urdu. While the Arab participants declared Arabic, the language of the Qur’an, as the pan-Islamic one, non-Arab participants primarily from India insisted on speaking in Urdu or English. The same conflict occurred in 1931, when the mufti hosted the General Muslim Congress in 1931. Kupferschmidt, “The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem,” 126–127.
61. Pasha, India and OIC, vi.
62. India, MEA Report 1971–1972, 42–43; MEA Report 1972–1973, 34. Debates RS, vol. 77 (August 14, 1972), col. 32. For a detailed discussion on the Middle East response, see Singh, “Subcontinent and WANA countries,” 101–116.
63. India, MEA Report 1971–1972, 45–50; Debates RS, vol. 77 (July 21, 1971), cols. 1–8.
64. Debates RS, vol. 75 (March 31, 1971), cols. 123–124; Debates RS, vol. 77 (July 28, 1971), col. 8; Debates RS, vol. 77 (August 4, 1971), col. 68.
65. Debates LS, series 5, vol. 14 (April 26, 1972), 227.
66. Debates RS, vol. 76 (November 30, 1973), col. 92; and India, MEA Report 1973–1974, 45.
67. Debates RS, vol. 76 (December 12, 1973), cols. 256–257.
68. For a detailed discussion on the resolution, see Lewis, “The Anti-Zionist Resolution.”
69. India, MEA Report 1975–1976, 76.
70. ADL International Report: India’s Campaign Against Israel.
71. Until the Congress split in the late 1960s, he was a prominent leader of the party and served as deputy prime minister under Indira Gandhi.
72. India, MEA Report 1977–1978, 12. See also Gangal, “Trends in India’s Foreign Policy,” 50–51.
73. India, MEA Report 1977–1978, v.
74. For the text of the resolution adopted at Khartoum Arab League summit meeting on September 1, 1967, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA.
75. Debates LS, series 6, vol. 19 (November 23, 1978), 21; Debates RS, vol. 109 (May 16, 1979), col. 343; and India, MEA Report 1979–1980, 18. The last, however, was prepared after Indira Gandhi became prime minister in January 1980.
76. Times of India (New Delhi) (October 1, 1978).
77. Indeed, this happened when India was ruled by a minority government headed by Charan Singh and Egypt was allowed to participate in the NAM Havana summit.
78. Egypt is a founding member of both these organizations.
79. Dayan, Breakthrough, 26.
80. Desai’s press conference in Bombay on May 16, 1980, Indian Express (New Delhi) (May 17, 1980). Personal interview with Desai in Bombay (October 22, 1987).
81. Times of India (New Delhi) (May 22, 1980).
82. Debates LS, series 7, vol. 4 (June 12, 1980), 12.
83. “Dayan Visit Tarnished India’s Image, Says Narasimha Rao,” Hindustan Times (June 13, 1980).
84. There was also a fundamental transformation in Israel. Just as the Congress Party lost power, in June 1977 the Likud party defeated the Labor Party, which had been in power since the establishment of Israel.
85. Dayan, Breakthrough, 28–29; Personal interview with Desai in Bombay (October 22, 1987).
86. Dayan, Breakthrough, 29. Desai, however, denied ever having made such statements. Personal interview with Desai in Bombay (October 22, 1987). Similarly, Desai’s secret meeting with Foreign Minister R. S. Botha of apartheid-ruled South Africa in Frankfurt in June 1979 led to a huge uproar in India.
87. Statements of Foreign Minister Rao, Debates LS, series 7, vol. 4 (June 12, 1980), 16, 173–174.
88. Rikhye, “Dayan, Desai, and South Africa.”
89. Reddy, “Dayan Paid Secret Visit During Janata Rule: PM,” The Hindu (May 11, 1980).
90. “Dayan Visit Tarnished India’s Image, Says Narasimha Rao,” Hindustan Times (June 13, 1980).
91. Patriot (June 13, 1980); Statesman (June 13, 1980).
92. The Hindustan Times (June 9, 1980).
93. Bahbah, “Israel’s Private Arms Network,” 10; and Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfer to China and Taiwan,” 73–74.
94. Rikhye, “Dayan, Desai, and South Africa.”
95. Weizmann met Desai in London prior to Dayan’s visit. Personal interview with Desai in Bombay (October 22, 1987). Desai’s principal secretary, V. Shankar, visited Israel in June 1979.
96. Taiwan and apartheid-ruled South Africa were the other two countries where Indian passports were declared not valid.
97. Tribune (Chandigarh) (November 10, 1979).
98. For details, see Bhambhri, “Lok Sabha Elections, January 1980.”
99. Janata (New Delhi) 33 (November 5, 1978): 19. He expressed his “shock” when Dayan’s visit was disclosed in May 1980.
100. The Hindustan Times (May 24, 1980). See also Gandhi, The Morarji Papers, 235–236.
101. Sunday Observer (Bombay) (June 27, 1982).
102. Periodic tit-for-tat expulsions of Indian and Pakistan diplomats are an exception.
103. Personal conversations with Israeli diplomats in Jerusalem in July and August 1988.
104. Avimor, ed., Relations Between Israel and Asian and African States, 382.
105. Kumaraswamy, “India, Israel, and the Davis Cup Tie 1987.”
11. Prelude to Normalization
The epigraph to this chapter is taken from N. R. Mohanty, “Jewish Leader Finds Rao Pragmatic,” Times of India (November 23, 1991).
1. Ever since his elevation to general secretary of the ruling Congress Party in 1981, he was groomed as a successor to Indira Gandhi.
2. While Rajiv accompanied his mother during foreign tours, his exposure to international diplomacy was limited. This was in contrast to the experiences of his mother, Indira. During Nehru’s seventeen-year tenure as prime minister, his daughter often accompanied him on foreign tours and took part in many meetings with foreign dignitaries. For example, she was present during the lunch Nehru gave to the Israeli diplomat Walter Eytan in February 1952.
3. For a detailed discussion of his term as prime minister, see Sengupta, Rajiv Gandhi.
4. Kumaraswamy, “The Star and the Dragon.” For a detailed discussion on Sino-Saudi ties, see Shichor, East Wind Over Arabia.
5. ADL International Report: India’s Campaign Against Israel.
6. The Hindu (Madras) (December 30, 1988).
7. Khergamvala, “Covert Contact with Israel,” The Hindu (January 18, 1989). He also highlights internal opposition within India regarding Israel.
8. “Leak to Media by Jewish Leader Aborts Improvement of India-Israel Status,” Middle East Times (July 23–29, 1988); Joseph, “Solarz Gushes Over Thaw in Indo-Israeli Ties,” Pioneer (January 31, 1992).
9. “Jewish Leaders and Solarz Meet Gandhi,” India Abroad (June 17, 1988); Akbar, “New York Diary,” Telegraph (Calcutta) (June 12, 1988).
10. Ha’aretz (July 15, 1988), in FBIS-NES (July 19, 1988): 45; India Today (September 30, 1988): 155.
11. Interestingly, exactly three years later, as prime minister, Rao normalized relations, and Singh became India’s first ambassador to Israel.
12. Hordes, “Is India Rethinking Its Policy on Israel?” 3–5.
13. Khergamvala, “Covert Contact with Israel.”
14. For details of this attack, see Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad.
15. Israeli Foreign Affairs (April 1987): 4.
16. See the text of Pollard’s August 1986 memo to the court, in Henderson, Pollard, 51–78; Indian Express (March 28, 1988); Blitzer, Territory of Lies, 168–169; and Israeli Foreign Affairs (April 1987): 1.
17. Sunday Observer (New Delhi) (January 17, 1988). Emphasis added.
18. For the text of his speech, see Indian Express (October 14–15, 1985).
19. The Islamic Bomb, written by Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney (1981), propagated this idea and was quickly picked up by others.
20. However, a formal agreement to this effect was signed on December 31, 1988, and came into force in January 1993, nearly two years after Gandhi’s assassination.
21. For a detailed discussion, see Kumaraswamy, “India, Israel, and the Davis Cup Tie 1987.”
22. For a first-person account, see Dayan, Breakthrough, 26–29.
23. India eventually lost to Sweden in the finals. India previously had reached the Davis Cup finals in 1974. By refusing to play against the apartheid regime, it forfeited the match to South Africa, which was awarded the title.
24. The following year, however, India refused to play the relegation match, thereby underscoring the limitations of sanctions.
25. Waggonner, The So-Called New Era of Ping-Pong Diplomacy with Communist China.
26. The Hindu (March 28, 1987).
27. The onset of the intifada later that year, however, considerably undermined some of this goodwill toward Israel.
28. For example, in 2007 an Israeli journalist working for the Yediot Ahoronot newspaper visited Syria and reported on the Israeli airstrike on a suspected nuclear plant, in Deir er Zor in eastern Syria.
29. Personal conversations with Israeli diplomats in Jerusalem in August 1988.
30. Personal conversation with Jewish leaders in New Delhi in May 1988.
31. India Today (New Delhi) (October 31, 1989): 163.
32. Ibid.
33. A full-page advertisement in the Jerusalem Post (May 23, 1991). See also “‘Little India’ Thrives Amid Diamond Industry,” Jerusalem Post (May 24, 1991).
34. Quoted in Ward, India’s Pro-Arab Policy, 123.
35. Ibid., 124.
36. An editorial in the Jerusalem Post (March 27, 1988) called it the “Indian rope trick.” My sincere thanks to the late Walter Eytan for bringing this editorial to my notice.
37. This is true for the pro-Arab stance in the United States.
38. Due to the violent situation, elections were postponed in the state of Punjab.
39. It was therefore not surprising that Singh was one of the handful of leaders to criticize Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
40. This happened in the middle of the Lok Sabha elections. The award was formally presented to Arafat in March 1990 by Gandhi’s successor, V. P. Singh.
41. For a background discussion, see Somaratna, “Renewal of Ties Between Sri Lanka and Israel; and Somaratna, “Sri Lanka’s Relations with Israel.”
42. Some even argued that India was compelled to intervene in Sri Lanka because of Colombo’s “security connections” with Israel. Dixit, Assignment Colombo, 327.
43. For the full text of the accord, see ibid., 355–361.
44. “Now in Fiji,” Israeli Foreign Affairs (November 1987): 1, 7; Ha’aretz (November 13, 1986) in FBIS-MEA (November 14, 1986): I/3–4; “Israelis in Fiji,” Israeli Foreign Affairs (August 1988): 1, 4.
45. Interaction with a senior Indian diplomat who served in Fiji during that period in 1991.
46. Among others, see Iqbal Masud, “Strange Bedfellows,” Indian Express (April 20, 1986); Girilal Jain, “An Israel-Pak Alliance,” Times of India (May 1, 1987); and Lawrence Lifschutz, “Pakistan Was Iran-Contra’s Secret Back Door,” Times of India (November 24, 1991).
47. Fighting for a separate Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka, the LTTE is declared as terrorist Organization by a number of countries, including India and the United States, and is proscribed from operating.
48. Ganguly, “India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up,” 43.
49. Interestingly, in late 1988, Hadass’s scheduled visit to India through Bangkok was canceled due to premature media leaks.
50. Pradhan, “India’s Policy Towards the PLO,” 71–72; Pradhan, “Seeking Clarity in Arafat’s Message,” 30–31; and Pradhan, “Changing Dynamics of India’s West Asia Policy,” 17.
12. Normalization and After
1. Normally, such announcements are made by a junior official in charge of the External Publicity Division, who also functions as the official spokesperson of the ministry.
2. More than a decade later, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was the finance minister during this period, recollected those times. “When I became finance minister [in 1991] India was in the midst of the worst possible crisis. Our foreign exchange reserves had literally exhausted. Even to raise a small loan of $500 million, we had to physically send India’s gold reserves to the vaults of the Bank of En gland.” Interview of PM on the Charlie Rose Show (September 21, 2004). Available online at http://pmindia.nic.in/visits/content.asp?id=22.
3. Israeli diplomat Moshe Yegar, who was heading the Asian desk when India recognized Israel. Personal conversation in Jerusalem on August 18, 1997.
4. For example, see Gupta, The Diaspora’s Political Efforts in the United States.
5. Shichor, “Hide and Seek.” See also Kumaraswamy, “China and Israel.”
6. For background discussions, see, among others, Abed, “The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis”; and Adnoni, “The PLO at Crossroads.”
7. Under intense U.S. pressure Saudi Arabia modified its stance; until his death in November 2004, Kuwait refused to host the Palestinian leader. The brief reconciliation efforts by the Palestinian leader Faisal al-Husseini in May 2001 ended in a tragedy when he was confronted by Kuwait lawmakers over his presence in Kuwait. Later that night, Husseini died of a heart attack.
8. However, some conservative critics argued that normalization “was not a precondition” for India’s association with the peace process. Pradhan, “India’s Policy Towards the PLO,” 73.
9. Kumaraswamy, “South Asia and Sino-Israeli Diplomatic Relations.”
10. Inbar, “The Indian-Israeli Entente,” 90.
11. A detailed and provocative discussion can be found in Swamy, “The Secret Friendship Between India and Israel.”
12. Joshi, “Changing Equations,” 113. According to a former official of the R&AW, shortly after its formation in September 1968, the external-intelligence agency, “with the approval of [Prime Minister] Indira Gandhi, had set up a secret liaison relationship with Mossad.” Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW, 127.
13. Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW, 127. Interestingly, this happened just over a year after the June war, when India was vociferously critical of Israel even before the commencement of hostilities.
14. The most senior career diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the equivalent of the permanent undersecretary in the U.S. State Department.
15. J. N. Dixit’s interview to The Week (February 9, 1992): 37.
16. For example, during the June 1967 war, some opposition members of parliament cried that India was acting like “the fourteenth Arab state.”
17. Pradhan, “India’s Policy Towards the PLO,” 69.
18. Shukla, “Talking Too Much,” 40.
19. Pradhan, “India’s Policy Towards the PLO,” 73. See also Dasgupta, “Betrayal of India’s Israel Policy.”
20. He was referring to the INC meeting in the southern city of Tirupati in April 1992. Aiyar, “Chutzpah.” See also Rubinoff, “Normalization of India-Israel relations.”
21. Aiyar, “Panchayati Raj in the Gaza Strip.” See also Aiyar, “The Moral Dimension.”
22. Agwani, “Inaugural Remarks,” 3.
23. Dixit, My South Block Years, 311. Interestingly, Arjun Singh subsequently became one of the senior Indian leaders to make an official visit to Israel.
24. Pasha, India and OIC, 52–53.
25. Pradhan, “India’s Policy Towards the PLO,” 81.
26. “Diplomatic Ties with Israel,” Statesman (New Delhi) (January 31, 1992).
27. Days after the Iraqi invasion, India closed its embassy in Kuwait.
28. Pasha, India and OIC, 42. Emphasis added. This is a typical Indian euphemism; at home refers to Indian Muslims and abroad denotes Arabs.
29. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 253–254.
30. The absence of relations with Israel since June 1967 prevented the Soviet Union from mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
31. For example, see Dasgupta, “Betrayal of India’s Israel Policy,” 767–772.
32. At Khartoum, the Arab League enunciated a policy of “no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace” with Israel.
33. Conscious of the Middle Eastern predicaments, India often expressed its willingness to mediate “should both parties so desire.”
34. Subsequently, domestic compulsions, especially pressures from the left, resulted in India becoming less vocal regarding civilian deaths in Israel. Hence on July 31, 2006, the Lok Sabha unanimously adopted a partisan resolution on the Lebanese crisis. See http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2006/07/31pr02.htm.
35. Interestingly, the position was articulated by the communist leader Sitaram Yechuri, who was part of the official delegation to the UN General Assembly. See “Concern Over Israeli Violations of Palestinian Rights,” People’s Democracy (November 20, 2005).
36. In the wake of the publication of the MacDonald White Paper in 1939 that distanced the British government from the Balfour Declaration, the yishuv leadership evolved a policy in Mandate Palestine that could be summarized as follows: “To fight the War as if there is no White Paper and to fight the White Paper as if there is no War.”
37. Kumaraswamy, “Indo-Israeli Military Ties Enter Next Stage.”
38. Among others, see Ghosh, “The Dubious New Alliance”; Cherian, “A Breach of Trust”; and “Firm Up Support to Palestine,” editorial, The Hindu (May 26, 2005).
39. In November 1995, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh represented India at Rabin’s funeral.
40. In his previous role as scientific adviser to the defense minister, Kalam had visited Israel in 1996. Some suggest that he visited Israel just prior to the May 1998 nuclear tests.
41. The final decision was further delayed by bureaucratic procrastination; the first attaché did not arrive until early 1997.
42. For example, during their official visits to Israel in the summer of 2000, both Home Minister L. K. Advani and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh met Arafat. Israel, which opposed similar moves by other foreign leaders, was accommodating of the Indian requests.
43. During his meeting with the Israeli diplomat Gideon Rafael in New Delhi in 1961, Nehru “paid a few friendly compliments to Israel’s technological and scientific progress and its impressive work of technical assistance. He agreed that India and Israel should intensify their cooperation in these fields, commending the success of Israel’s experts in the development of water resources in the [Rajasthan] desert.” Rafael, Destination Peace, 90.
44. Pasha, India and OIC, 44.
45. According to Rubinoff, “Normalization of India-Israel Relations,” 487, normalization was Rao’s symbolic gesture “to distinguish its foreign policy from previous administrations.”
46. Dixit, My South Block Years; Aiyar, “Chutzpah.”
47. India Today (June 26, 2000).
48. His team included Home Secretary Kamal Pande, Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) Chief B. K. Raghavan, Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director Shyamal Dutta, Border Security Force (BSF) Director-General E. N. Rammohan, and Joint Secretary (Home) Vinay Kumar.
49. Karat, “The Bush-Sharon Axis of Evil.”
50. Among others, see Cherian, “India’s Changing Stand”; and Cherian, “A Breach of Trust.”
51. Srinivasan, “India-Israel Tango Gains Pace.”
52. For a dated discussion, see Kumaraswamy, India and Israel.
53. Lavoy, “India in 2006,” 120.
54. Withington, “Israel and India Partner Up,” 18–19.
55. The Hindu (August 16, 2001).
56. “Nod for Missile Venture with Israel,” The Hindu (July 13, 2007).
57. Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Questions 4481 (May 16, 2007), http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=126094.
58. For example, see Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Entente, 40.
59. For an illuminating overall discussion, see Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon. On the nuclear question, see Mohan, Impossible Allies.
60. For a background discussion on the post– weapons test Indo-U.S. rapprochement, see Talbott, Engaging India.
61. Kumaraswamy, “At What Cost Israel-China Ties?”; Kumaraswamy, “Israel-China Relations and the Phalcon Controversy.”
62. Within days after its nuclear tests, there were fears that Israel would follow the American lead and suspend all military-related deals. Its dependence upon Washington for political support, economic largess, and strategic commitments circumscribe Israel’s ability to pursue an in de pen dent arms-export policy. It even cancelled the visit of Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Amnon-Lipkin Shahak, slated for later that month. Gradually, Israel became more understanding of India’s compulsion to go nuclear and refrained from joining the international chorus against New Delhi. Within a year, Israel proved to be a reliable friend when it quickly responded to Indian demands for small arms and ammunition during the Kargil war. See Menon and Pandey, “Axis of Democracy?”
63. Ministry of External Affairs, http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2003/05/08spc01.htm.
64. See Inbar, “The Indian-Israeli Entente,” 89–104; and Berman, “Israel, India, and Turkey.”
65. It was only in December 2008 that the 1997 Nehru award was formally received by President Mubarak during his state visit to India.
66. Mohan, “India and the Islamic World.”
67. This was only superseded by the visit of U.S. President George W. Bush in March 2006, when the leftist parties, for four years part of the ruling coalition, spearheaded massive protests all over India.
68. Surjeet, “Hamas Leader’s Assassination.”
69. Unlike the decision of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1982 to expel the Israeli consul, this time the government resolved its displeasure quietly, and thus the issue never generated any debate in India. Writing a year later, one commentator observed: “The Palestinian envoy to India, Khalid Sheikh, one of the longest-serving diplomats, was virtually declared persona non grata by the NDA government. He was recalled by Arafat under pressure from New Delhi.” Cherian, “A Breach of Trust.” See also “Israeli Pressure Caused Envoy’s Exit, Says NGO,” Khaleej Times (February 10, 2003).
70. President Abdul Kalam’s address to the joint session of Parliament (June 7, 2004), Office of the President of India, New Delhi.
71. Cherian, “A Breach of Trust.”
13. Conclusion
1. Quoted in Sudarshan, “Sharon’s Stones on Our Heart.”