Once the present Muslim policy of a separate Islamic state in India (popularly known as Pakistan) is realized, which it will be in the course of the next two years, Hindu opinion on the question of Palestine will find its natural and untrammeled expression.

—Historian and diplomat K. M. Panikkar

9     Nehru and the Era of Deterioration, 1947–1964

Panikkar’s prognosis, which he made in April 1947, was quickly proved wrong, either because of misreading or wishful thinking. Within months of his observation, India not only opposed a Jewish homeland in Palestine but also had voted against the UN partition plan. Jawaharlal Nehru did not radically alter India’s policy toward the Middle East. If he was the chief foreign-policy spokesperson for the Congress Party during the nationalist phase, he laid the foundation of free India’s policy. Earlier, Nehru had to compete with Mahatma Gandhi’s towering personality; now he emerged as the uncrowned monarch on foreign-policy issues. As such, much of India’s foreign policy was designed and institutionalized by him. No account of India’s external policy or relations would be complete without understanding and recognizing the Nehruvian model. As Michael Edwards observes: “No other democratic Prime Minister has ever had such a free hand in the formulation and execution of his country’s foreign policy.”¹ For his entire seventeen-year tenure as prime minister, he was also India’s foreign minister and personally nurtured the ministry.² His influence was so overwhelming that even the non-INC governments that came to power long after his death could only change the style and not the substance of India’s foreign policy. “Continuity and change,” the perennial Indian mantra, is primarily a reaffirmation of Nehru’s vital contributions.

India’s policy toward Israel is primarily a study of nonrelations or the absence of normalization. For over four decades, the changing international political situations, the Eurocentric cold war, compulsions of interests, and domestic electoral calculations meant that the absence of normalization was prominent in India’s Israel policy. Nonrelations did not mean that the two countries were not interacting with each other. At least in the early years, both countries were cooperating internationally. Slowly, they drifted apart, and India soon emerged as the principal non-Arab and non-Islamic country to castigate Israel for its policies and practices.

Between the formation of Israel in 1948 and the normalization of relations in January 1992, India had seven prime ministers.³ With the exception of the Janata government (1977–1979) and two coalition governments from 1989 to 1991, the Congress Party ruled India for much of this period. Of these, the longest, the Nehru era (1947–1964), was the defining period for Indo-Israeli relations. Most critical decisions regarding Israel were taken during Nehru’s reign. It was under his leadership that India advocated the federal plan, voted against the partition plan, and grudgingly recognized the Jewish state. Nehru played a crucial role in the Organization of the Afro-Asian movement that eventually culminated in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. As will be discussed, Nehru backed Israel’s exclusion from this bloc of newly independent countries, which in turn signaled and consolidated Israel’s isolation from the Third World. The Nehru years witnessed two major conflicts, namely the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Sino-Indian war of 1962. These crises both highlighted India’s policy toward Israel and underscored some of its weaknesses. We begin with Nehru’s decision to invite the yishuv to the first Asian conference, which offered a brief window of opportunity.

Asian Relations Conference, 1947

Convened on the eve of India’s independence, the Asian Relations Conference provided the first opportunity for leaders of the newly independent and near-independent countries of the continent to meet and understand one another. Nonofficial in character, the Congress Party organized the conference in New Delhi. Nehru, heading the interim government since September 1946, was its moving spirit. The preparatory work began in April 1946. Formally inaugurated on March 23, 1947, the conference ended on April 2 with a valedictory address given by Nehru. The primary purpose of the conference was to promote greater understanding of Asia (Egypt was the only non-Asian invitee). As a result, “not only controversial issues involving these countries, but even matters like defense and security which concerned powers outside Asia were excluded from the agenda, which listed only such innocuous subjects as national freedom movements, migration and racial problems, economic development and the status of women.”⁴

The conference offered an opportunity for the yishuv to interact with India’s nationalist leadership as well as those from other Asian countries. Hugo Bergmann, a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, headed a ten-member “Jewish Delegation from Palestine.”⁵ The delegation felt that they represented only the Jewish community in Palestine and not the whole of Palestine. In spite of “our constant efforts to call ourselves, ‘Jewish Palestine Delegation,’ and to maintain that we represent only the Jewish part of Palestine, we were considered, sometimes consciously and sometimes implicitly, as a delegation of Palestine as a whole”⁶ or as a “Hebrew University Delegation.”⁷ Some members of the delegation felt it was an “endeavor not to mention and not to refer to Jewish Palestine.”⁸

There was a near total absence of Arabs at the conference. Out of the thirty-two countries that were invited, twenty-eight countries and a few observers attended the New Delhi meeting. While the Arab League was represented by an observer, six Arab countries (Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen) “did not accept individual invitations.”⁹ The Jewish delegation felt that this was due to the “request and pressure” from the Indian Muslim League, which boycotted the conference.¹⁰ The Egyptian delegation linked Arab nonattendance to the participation of the Jewish delegation.¹¹ One observer could not hold back his sarcasm and remarked that the conference had “delegates from seven Arab countries numbered six in all—five from Egypt and one observer from the Arab League representing the other six countries.”¹²

The yishuv saw the invitation and participation as a official recognition of the Jewish nation as a legitimate member of the Asian family of nations.¹³ Reflecting this optimism, the Jewish delegation felt that “the most important and positive aspect of our participation is… the mere fact that we have taken part. This participation in itself has established Jewish Palestine as part of the Asian continent and as a member of the family of nations of Asia.”¹⁴ The conference provided an opportunity for the yishuv to establish formal and, at times, first contacts with various Asian persons who were to become the future leaders of their respective countries. While personal contacts were important and useful, there were doubts if sympathetic statements could be converted into political support for Zionism. In these interactions

we met outspoken sympathy for our case…. It need not be pointed out… that this sympathy may be considered, in most cases, a matter of politeness and conversational manners and that even in cases where it has been sincere and real, it need not commit not only the Government of the countries concerned, but even the personalities themselves who expressed it, in a political sense.¹⁵

Bergmann reminded the conference that Jews were an

old Asian people… settling down in our old-new homeland…. This lesson Europe was unable to teach us. We do not want to be ungrateful to Europe. We have learned many important lessons there. We learned to appreciate logical reasoning and methodical thinking…. But one thing we could not learn in Europe: the mutual cooperation of groups of men belonging to different races and creeds.

He hoped that Palestine, “notwithstanding present difficulties, will not go the European way of ‘solving,’ so to speak, problems by dispossessing population.”¹⁶ In a radio broadcast, Ya’acov Shimoni referred to the “hopes of an ancient people driven from his native Asiatic country 1,800 years ago.”¹⁷

Bergmann’s speech at the conference, however, was challenged by the Arabs. While the observer from Arab League spoke of the Jewish community in Palestine taking advantage of the “British bayonets,” an Egyptian delegate rejected the idea that “British rule [was] to be replaced by that of European Zionists.” A drama quickly unfolded. According to the report prepared by the Jewish delegation, “Dr. Bergmann, quite reasonably, asked for the floor to exercise his right of rebuttal, but Nehru, who was presiding, refused his request and after a brief, angry exchange with [Nehru],¹⁸ Dr. Bergmann and his delegation walked out. Some of the Indian delegates hurried after them and persuaded them to return.”¹⁹ Eventually, Bergmann “ascended the dais amid a storm of applause and under a second storm of applause approached the Observer of the Arab League and shook hands with him.”²⁰ In his closing speech, “Pandit Nehru expressed regret that Professor Bergmann should have been hurt by him, and apologized.”²¹

However, Nehru did not miss the opportunity to reiterate the position of the Congress Party. Expressing sympathy for the prolonged suffering of the Jewish people, he stated: “the people of India, necessarily for various reasons into which I shall not go, have always said that Palestine is essentially an Arab country and no decision can be made without the consent of the Arabs.”²² He still hoped that following the withdrawal of the “the third party,” the issue would “be settled in cooperation between them and not by any appeal to or reliance upon any outsiders.”²³ Bergmann and his delegation were not happy with Nehru’s overall attitude during the conference. In the words of one, “most [of] us had the feeling that during the whole Conference that Pandit Nehru was not very keen to greet us or meet us in the Hall or Lounge, the Dining Room or wherever he happened to meet us in public.”²⁴

At the same time, according to Shimoni, who drafted the main report, there were some “positive” outcomes.²⁵ The Bergmann incident “aroused a special interest in our affairs, bringing them into the limelight and giving them a publicity they might never have attained otherwise.” Partly to assuage their feelings, all delegates “endeavored to be even more polite and sympathetic, at least formally.” The controversy also “brought us into contact with more people,” and this resulted in David Hacohen²⁶ being “elected Chairman for two days of the Economic Round Table Group.” Above all, Shimoni was certain that the dinner invitation with Nehru “was an outcome of this incident.”²⁷ During this meeting, Nehru agreed to extend the stay of the Afghan Jewish refugees in India for six more months.²⁸ The conference enabled the delegation to meet a number of officials, nonofficial leaders, business figures, and members of the Jewish community in India. Their meeting with Mahatma Gandhi “lasted only ten minutes.”²⁹ The anger and disappointment of the Zionists over his 1938 statement explains its brevity.

Once the conference ended, the delegation traveled to different parts of India and met a number of persons. The most important meeting took place in the princely state of Bikaner. Its prime minister, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, put forth some interesting ideas. He strongly felt that following the partition of the subcontinent, public opinion in India, especially among the Hindu population, would change in favor of the Zionists. He therefore urged the Zionist leadership to make up for their prolonged neglect of India.³⁰ In the wake of its interactions with various Indian leaders during and after the conference, the Jewish delegation offered a number of suggestions to the Jewish Agency for Palestine:³¹ to establish a Jewish Palestine unit of the Asian Relations Organization, to send a permanent political representative of the Jewish Agency to India, to create a desk for India and Asia at the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, to induce the Palestinian press to act as stringers for the Indian press, to explore the possibility of establishing an economic-liaison office in Bombay, to consider establishing a chair for Judaism at the University of Banaras (that is, Banaras Hindu University), and to use pro-Indian U.S. politicians “who are at the same time pro-Zionists… for our cause.” As one delegate lamented, India “is a great chance that has been neglected far too long.”

Some of these suggestions eventually materialized, and an aliya office was opened in Bombay shortly after India’s recognition. The Israeli unit of the Asian Relations Organization functioned until June 1955, when the Bandung Conference formally ended the parent Organization.³² While some in the yishuv were happy over their participation, others were concerned over Nehru’s remarks about the Arab character of Palestine and felt the need to do more “to bring home to Asiatic people the realities of Palestine—that the Holy Land is inseparable from the people of Israel.”³³

The overall effects of the Asian Relations Conference, however, were negative. The New Delhi meeting was the first and last occasion when a delegation from the yishuv/Israel was invited to such a political gathering. Despite its stated objective of seeking interstate cooperation by avoiding controversial issues, the conference could not avoid heated arguments over the Palestine question. Even the nearly total absence of Arab countries did not prevent Jewish-Arab discord from coming into the open. Tension between the two sides set the stage for future acts. Bergmann’s declaration against “dispossessing population” was not vindicated by subsequent events surrounding the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Jewish-Israeli exclusivism in Palestine ran counter to Nehru’s vision of a partitioned but genuinely multiracial, multireligious, and multicultural India. Summing up the outcome, one Indian academic observed: “even as the Jewish spokesman made the solemn declaration before the Conference, the Zionist movement irrevocably committed itself to an exclusive Jewish State, snuffing out all hopes of genuine multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural co-existence and cooperation in Palestine. The Zionists [therefore] were excluded from all subsequent Asian conferences.”³⁴ Thus the Asian Relations Conference, though important, did not result in mutual appreciation of each others’ concerns and anxieties. India failed to appreciate the underlying causes for the particularistic Jewish nationalism. For its part, the yishuv/Israeli leadership failed to alleviate New Delhi’s concerns over imperialism. These differences influenced India’s subsequent stand at the United Nations, especially over Israel’s membership.

UN Membership

From the beginning Israel was keen to join the United Nations, especially as its creation was recommended by that world body. In March 1949, the rival cold-war blocs both endorsed its request for membership. The Soviet Union, which opposed Jordan’s membership, was favorably inclined toward the Israeli request. At the same time, the world body expressed concerns over Israel’s policies toward sensitive issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, the assassination of UN mediator Count Bernadotte, and Israel’s ability and willingness to shoulder and live up to its international commitments. For Israel, membership thus was of critical importance. Major powers including the United States and the Soviet Union had already granted recognition. UN admission, it hoped, would signal international disapproval of the Arab refusal to come to terms with its existence and a rejection of their efforts to isolate and strangle the newly formed state.

What was India’s response? Keeping with its “consistent” attitude on the entire question, New Delhi voted against the Israeli request. On May 11, 1949, with a margin of thirty-seven votes to twelve, with nine abstentions, the United Nations admitted Israel as a member. According to Nehru’s biographer S. Gopal, India was originally planning to abstain but then reversed its position and voted against Israeli admission.³⁵ Speaking on the occasion, India’s ambassador in New York, M. C. Setalvad, argued that his country “could not recognize a state which had been achieved through the use of force and not through negotiations.”³⁶

Not everyone was happy with Nehru’s decision, and there were voices of dissent within the Indian establishment. Shiva Rao, who was active during the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, was one. In 1949, he was part of the Indian delegation to the General Assembly session and, even before the final vote, he registered his disagreement. In a note dated April 30, he declared:

As I have told the PM, I think we are making a great mistake in continuing our opposition to Israel’s coming into the UN. On general principles we are not maintaining such an attitude toward any other state. We believe in every state coming into the UN. Also it does not seem to me right that we should seek Israel’s help in matters of primary value and significance to us and yet maintain this hostile attitude.³⁷

Rao was referring to Nehru seeking technical agricultural assistance from Israel.³⁸

The legal and political implications of the Indian position require some explanation. During this period, the major powers had vetoed the UN membership of states that were seen to be closer to the rival bloc. For example, the Soviet Union vetoed the applications of Ireland, Portugal, and Jordan; the United States and United Kingdom opposed the membership of Albania. In a verdict delivered in May 1948, International Court of Justice in the Hague ruled that a member state voting on the application of a state for admission to the United Nations “is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by Paragraph 1 (of the Article 4 of the UN Charter).³⁹ Similarly, a legal memorandum prepared by the UN Secretariat concluded that “a member could properly vote to accept a representative of a government which it did not recognize or with which it had no diplomatic relations and that such a vote did not imply recognition or a readiness to assume diplomatic relations.”⁴⁰ The converse was also true: “there is no suggestion that recognition binds the recognizing state to vote for the admission of the candidates.”⁴¹ Therefore, its nonrecognition of the Jewish state could not legally bind India to oppose Israel’s membership application.

On the political front, India had always emphasized the universal character of the United Nations. During the San Francisco Conference in 1945, some countries sought to restrict the membership of the new body by adding certain preconditions and requirements. India, still a British dominion, forcefully argued in favor of universal UN membership.⁴² Elaborating on this aspect in 1949, one senior Indian diplomat felt that “refusing admission to peace-loving and sovereign states on grounds which had nothing to do with the merits of their application would be disastrous both for the Organization’s prestige and authority.”⁴³ Despite these earlier positions and declarations, India chose to vote against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. Principles were given up in favor of pragmatism and political calculations. This approach became more pronounced during the Bandung conference.

The Bandung Boycott, 1955

The first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955 was a major milestone for Israel, albeit for all the wrong reasons. This meeting legitimized its political exclusion from the emerging bloc of Third World countries. The conference recognized Arab veto power over Israel’s participation in various regional organizations. From then on, organizers of such gatherings were forced to choose between one Israel and many Arab countries. At the bilateral level, Israel “lost” China to the Arab countries and had to wait for over three decades to establish ties with Beijing.⁴⁴ On the Indian front, Nehru was coming under the influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president. As Israel gradually came to realize, Bandung marked the beginning of its isolation from Asia, compelling it to consolidate the Eurocentric outlook of the yishuv period.

The immediate background for Bandung can be traced to the Colombo Conference held in April 1954. Hosted by Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), the conference was attended by the prime ministers of Burma (now Myanmar), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The leaders discussed the prevailing regional and international situation and the need for greater cooperation among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. As they deliberated their future course of action, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan introduced a resolution on Palestine that declared the establishment of the state of Israel as a violation of international law. It condemned Israel’s “aggressive policies” toward its neighbors and expressed grave concern over the plight of Palestinian refugees.⁴⁵

By that time, India had already recognized Israel and was in principle committed to establishing diplomatic ties. Thus Nehru was unable to endorse Pakistan’s position that the creation of Israel was a violation of international law.⁴⁶ Burma and its leader U Nu had good relations with Israel. Sri Lanka had recognized the Jewish state and Indonesian leaders had acknowledged Israel’s recognition of their country’s independence from the Dutch. Pakistan, which had sided with the Arabs during the partition vote in 1947, was vociferous in its opposition.⁴⁷ Eventually, all five leaders agreed to include the following passage in their joint communiqué issued on May 2, 1954:

In considering the situation in the Middle East the Prime Ministers indicated grave concern over the sufferings of Arab refugees in Palestine. They urged the United Nations to bring about and expedite the rehabilitation of these refugees in their original homes. The Prime Ministers expressed deep sympathy with the Arabs of Palestine in their sufferings and affirmed their desire to see a just and early settlement of the Palestine problem.⁴⁸

The absence of any reference to Israel and the unconditional demand for the return of the Arab refugees was a harbinger of bad news for Israel.⁴⁹ Even though the final wording fell far short of its expectations, Nehru’s opposition provided an opportunity for Pakistan to present itself as a vigorous champion of the Arabs and set the tone for future Indo-Pakistani confrontations over Israel.⁵⁰

That opportunity came a few months later, when Indonesia floated the idea of holding an Afro-Asian conference.⁵¹ In December 1954, the same five prime ministers met at Bogor, Indonesia, to work on the agenda for the Bandung Conference. The conference aimed “to promote goodwill and cooperation” among Afro-Asian nations.⁵² They felt that the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa “should become better acquainted with one another’s point of view” and agreed to invite “all countries in Asia and Africa, which have independent governments.” However, the issue of inviting the People’s Republic of China caused some anxious moments. India was adamant that any Afro-Asian meeting would be incomplete without China, whereas a number of countries were not friendly toward communist China. Out of the twenty-six countries that eventually attended the Bandung Conference, as many as eighteen had not recognized the communist takeover in Beijing.⁵³ Therefore, to allay their concerns, the Bogor communiqué contained a rider:

The Prime Ministers wished to point out that acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its view of the status of any other country. It implied only that the country invited was in general agreement with the purposes of the Conference. They had also bear in mind the principle that the form of government and the way of life of any one country should in no way be subject to interference by any other. Any view expressed at the [forthcoming Bandung] Conference by one or more participating country would not be binding on or be regarded as accepted by any other, unless the latter so desired.

In short, recognition or nonrecognition of one country by the other was irrelevant. The primary purpose was to promote a meaningful dialogue among member states of Asia and Africa.

Despite such an accommodative position regarding the participants, the Bogor meeting decided to exclude Israel from the Bandung Conference. As the operative part stated “with minor variations and modification of this basic principle,” it decided to invite twenty-four independent states of Asia and Africa. As many as eight Arab countries were invited, and the communiqué extended its support for the people of Tunisia and Morocco in their struggle for “national independence and their legitimate right to self-determination.”⁵⁴ But Israel was excluded from Bandung,⁵⁵ and out of the twenty-nine participants, as many as twelve were Muslim-majority states.⁵⁶

During the Bogor deliberations, Nehru concurred with his Burmese counterpart that “Israel ought to be invited, but pointed out that if she were present the Arab states would stay away, which would mean that almost the whole of West Asia would be absent. The conference would therefore be so unbalanced that India would have to reconsider whether her own attendance would be worth while.”⁵⁷ According to G. H. Jansen, while Ceylon wanted to take up the issue with Arab states, “Indonesia said this was pointless since their view was known and the Arab League had recently issued a warning on this very point.” In the end, Burma, which at one time had threatened to boycott the conference over Israel’s exclusion, fell into line with the emerging consensus.⁵⁸ The first Afro-Asian meeting aimed at promoting dialogue among the newly independent states would begin without Israel.

There were two primary reasons for Israel’s exclusion: the Arab determination to block Israel and Pakistan’s attempt to outmaneuver India. New Delhi yielded to both pressures. By early 1950, the Arab League resolved that the Arab states would refrain from hosting any international conference in which Israel could participate.⁵⁹ In May 1951, it went a step further and decided that “participation in regional conferences organized on the initiative of one country or by an international Organization could not be attended if Israel were also invited.”⁶⁰ In a bid to reiterate its determination, in December 1954, only a few days before the Bogor meeting, the Arab League declared that the Arab states would not “participate in any regional conference where Israel is represented. The Arab states do not have any doubt that Israel will not be invited to this conference [Bandung] and will not participate therein.”⁶¹ This Arab ultimatum worked. This hamstrung India, which was uncomfortable about Israel’s exclusion. In the words of S. Gopal, Nehru’s close confidant V. K. Krishna Menon “was for an invitation to Israel with an explanation to the Arab states that the presence of Israel committed them to nothing; Nehru, wishing to avoid dissension even on the question of the composition of the conference, agreed with reluctance that an invitation to Israel should be extended only if the Arab countries agreed to it.”⁶² Nehru was even prepared to antagonize Sir Anthony Eden over China, but he meekly accepted Arab dictates over Israel.⁶³

Speaking to Michael Brecher a year after the Bandung Conference, Nehru admitted:

Conditions were and still are that the Arab nations and Israel don’t sit together. They do sit at the United Nations, but apart from that, they just don’t sit. And one is offered this choice of having one or the other. It is not logical, my answer, but there it is. When the proposal was made for Israel to be invited… it transpired that if that were done the Arab countries would not attend…. Our outlook on this matter was based on some logical approach. Our sympathies are with the Arab nations in regard to this problem. We felt that logically Israel should be invited but when we saw that the consequences of that invitation would be that many others would not be able to come, then we agreed. Our approach, obviously, if I may add, is that it is good for people who are opponents to meet.⁶⁴

Devoid of diplomatic niceties, the choice was between one Israel and many Arab states, and Nehru opted for the latter.

Krishna Menon went a step further and attributed Nehru’s buckling under Arab pressure to Pakistan. In his long interview to Brecher shortly after Nehru’s death, Menon disclosed that the leaders of Burma

said, “we won’t come without Israel.” We said our position is the same but we have got to carry the Arabs with us. We will do what ever the Congress agrees but we will vote for an invitation to Israel. And we were three to two, Ceylon, Burma and India for, and Pakistan and Indonesia against; but Pakistan was the leader. They made propaganda against us… and issued leaflets terming us a pro-Jewish country.⁶⁵

In his opinion, even “Indonesia might have been persuaded at that time, but Pakistan made use of our attitude to Israel’s presence at Bandung in propaganda with the Arabs.”⁶⁶ Had he maintained normal relations with Israel as had U Nu, perhaps Nehru would have been more determined and forceful. Israel’s exclusion turned Bandung into an anti-Israeli forum. By refusing to negotiate with Israel, the Arab states, led by non-Arab Pakistan, challenged the core of the partition resolution of the United Nations and merely settled for demanding the right of the refugees to return to their homes.

For many, however, Bandung presented “a front of Asian unity.” Menon reflected the general Indian euphoria when he remarked:

Bandung was like Geneva and Locarno [1925]. These are old expressions now; people don’t even know where Locarno is, whether it is in Italy or in Switzerland, but still Locarno is a spirit…. Bandung had become a world-known name. If you ask a lot of Canadians where is Bandung they wouldn’t know, but probably they would know it is in Asia, or even in Indonesia. At any rate there is a Bandung spirit.⁶⁷

In other words, its importance “was in what it began rather than what it did.”⁶⁸ And Israel was not a part of it. Seeds were sown for its exclusion from the emerging Afro-Asian bloc, the forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement. Bandung institutionalized the process of the exclusion of Israel, not only from regional political gatherings but also nonpolitical forums devoted to sports, scientific cooperation, and so on.

Israel was aware of the fallout. Following the Bogor decision, it approached a number of countries to reverse the move. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett wrote to his Indonesian counterpart expressing his “astonishment and regret.”⁶⁹ According to Krishna Menon, an Israeli ambassador met Prime Minister Nehru at Bandung “coming through Burma.”⁷⁰ The Israeli media perceived the whole episode as an indication of their country’s political isolation.⁷¹ The episode was partly due to the absence of relations between Israel and countries in Asia. By 1955, only seven Asian countries had recognized Israel, and out of these, five had Israeli legations, and the first Israeli embassy in Asia was established in Rangoon in 1957, after Bandung.⁷² In April 1955, none of the Asian countries had a resident mission in Israel.

For India, the whole episode underscored Pakistan’s role in shaping its Israel policy. At Bandung, it formally acknowledged and bowed to Pakistani dictates. It was the Pakistani factor that precluded Nehru from normalizing ties with Israel. Despite all his commitments to dialogue, independence, and the moral high ground, when it came to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nehru often fought with Pakistan and succumbed to its political pressures. Menon was rather candid and conceded to Brecher that the Arabs “wouldn’t come to dinner” with the Israelis and would not sit with Israel anywhere except in the United Nations.⁷³ For him, Pakistan only “makes anti-Israeli speeches.” This made things difficult for Nehru. India could not be indifferent to Pakistan as other states could, because the Russians “can afford to have somebody in Israel because they are a big power. We have got Pakistan on our borders, and the West supports Pakistan, and we cannot go and create more enemies than we have at the present moment.”⁷⁴ As the years went by, Pakistan began to occupy a prime place in India’s Israel policy. Its defiance of the West over issues such as the recognition of communist China, the Suez crisis, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan could not be imitated vis-à-vis Pakistan over Israel.

Bandung symbolized both Israel’s exclusion from the emerging group of newly independent states and underscored its isolation from Asia. Major countries such as India and China started moving away from Israel, and the smaller ones, such as Burma, were unable to withstand the pressures exerted upon them. For both India and China, the Arab world offered better political opportunities, especially over the issues that were critical for them at the United Nations, namely the Kashmir dispute for India and UN membership for China.

It is difficult to say whether this bitter experience pushed Israel closer to Europe, but post-Bandung, Israel turned its back on Asia. In the wake of the Sinai war and adverse Asian reactions, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was unapologetic about his priorities. In terms of Israel’s interest, “the friendship of one European nation [namely, France] which we have secured from July [1956] until the present [January 1957] is worth more than the opinions prevailing at this time among the Asiatic people.”⁷⁵ Its isolation in the Middle East did not allow Israel to be indifferent toward the Asian countries, but in the post-Bandung years, its interest in the continent decreased considerably. Any lingering doubts about India’s Israel policy were settled during the Suez crisis, which broke out a few months later.

The Suez Crisis, 1956

The crisis following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in mid-1956 provides a number of insights into India’s Israel policy. It highlighted the depth of India’s closeness to Egypt. Simultaneously, it underscored Nehru’s disengagement from his earlier commitment to normalize relations with Israel. The causes and consequences of the war are too widely known to need fresh elaboration.⁷⁶ The general Indian position regarding the crisis leading up to the war can be summarized as follows:

1. India did not question Egypt’s right to nationalize the Suez Canal, even though it had reservations over how President Nasser handled the situation. Speaking at the London Conference on September 20, 1956, Krishna Menon, India’s defense minister, felt that nationalization “was an act which was within the competence of the Egyptian government…. We would like to have seen that nationalization carried out in the normal way of international expropriation, where there is adequate notice, and the way of taking over is less dramatic and does not lead to these consequences.”⁷⁷

2. India believed that a failure to find a peaceful solution to the crisis could lead to a military confrontation. On August 8, Prime Minister Nehru told the Lok Sabha that he would be failing in his duty “if I do not say that threats to settle this dispute or to enforce their [that is, British and French] views in this matter by display or use of force, is the wrong way.”⁷⁸

3. India had serious economic and strategic interests in the canal and was concerned over its unhindered operation.

4. India declared that it would “decline participation in any arrangements for war preparations or sanctions or any steps which challenge the sovereign rights of Egypt.”⁷⁹

5. During the London Conference, Krishna Menon spelled out a six-point formula as the basis for a settlement.⁸⁰ Even after the failure of two rounds of the London Conference, New Delhi played a significant role in the adoption of Resolution 118 by the UN Security Council, which demanded “free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert, both political and technical aspects.”⁸¹

However, once the conflict began on October 29, 1956, with the Israeli offensive, India was swift and unequivocal in declaring its indignation over the “flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and… all the principles laid down by the Bandung Conference.”⁸² Having endorsed Israel’s exclusion from that Afro-Asian meeting, Nehru now demanded Israel’s adherence to the spirit of Bandung!

Nehru’s position hardened further following the entry of Britain and France in the war, and he sent a blunt message to Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Britain. Depicting it as “a clear aggression and a violation of the United Nations Charter,” he argued that for many countries of Asia and beyond, “this is a reversion to a previous and unfortunate period of history when decisions were imposed by force of arms by Western Powers on Asian countries. We had thought that these methods were out-of-date and would not possibly be used in the modern age.”⁸³ In a similar tone, he told his citizens that, though they were well into the twentieth century, “we are going back to the predatory methods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But there is a difference now. There are self-respecting, independent nations in Asia and Africa which are not going to tolerate this kind of incursion by colonial Powers.”⁸⁴ In short, Nehru was categorical in his condemnation of the aggression against Egypt, a fellow member of the Afro-Asian bloc.

This unequivocal stand over the Suez crisis unfortunately boomeranged on Nehru when he abandoned his opposition to external aggression against Hungary.⁸⁵ Far from condemning the Soviet invasion, he seemed to justify the developments in eastern Europe. Accused of adopting double standards, he was strongly criticized both within and outside his country.⁸⁶ After a long deliberation on November 5, 1956, Nehru expressed his public sympathy for the people of Hungary. By then, Menon had depicted the developments in Hungary as the “domestic affairs” of a sovereign country.⁸⁷ Not prepared to abandon his partisanship, on November 20, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that many countries felt “relief that it happened in Hungary so that attention might be diverted from Egypt to Hungary.”⁸⁸ As Escott Reid, the Canadian high commissioner in India during this turbulent period reminds us, the converse was also equally true.⁸⁹

The Suez crisis assumed strategic importance for Israel, because of India’s stance regarding the freedom of navigation. Even while endorsing the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment, India’s position crucially differed from that of Israel. In the United Nations, New Delhi declared that a legal controversy existed over the right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, pronounced the entire gulf an “inland sea,” and claimed its waters were Egyptian “territorial waters.” Krishna Menon argued that “various states have held that the gulfs and bays indenting their territories with mouths wider than that of the Gulf of Aqaba as territorial.”⁹⁰ This position regarding the Gulf of Aqaba became relevant in 1967, when India endorsed the Egyptian closure of the gulf to Israeli shipping, a move that precipitated the June war.

India’s stance on the Gulf of Aqaba was political and disregarded reality. In its eagerness to support Egypt, it overlooked a number of crucial but uncomfortable geographical facts: (1) The Gulf of Aqaba has a multilateral shore, and even if Israel were to be excluded, the gulf has three other independent littoral states;⁹¹ (2) the examples cited by Menon to justify the Gulf of Aqaba as territorial waters were fundamentally different, because the other examples wash the shores of only one sovereign state;⁹² (3) the Gulf of Aqaba is the only sea outlet for Jordan, and thus declaring it as Egyptian territorial waters was harmful to the Hashemite Kingdom; and (4) the area claimed as territorial zones by the four littoral states far exceeded the total breadth of the gulf.⁹³ Taking these facts into consideration, India’s future arguments during the 1967 crisis become weaker.

At another level, the Suez crisis marked a clear deterioration of Indo-Israeli relations. Soon after the tripartite aggression, Nehru formally ruled out the normalization of relations.⁹⁴ His strong support for Nasser brought some benefits, and the Egyptian leader overwhelmingly supported India’s inclusion in the newly formed United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was deployed along the Egyptian-Israeli border. This was in sharp contrast to Nasser’s refusal to allow Pakistani participation in the UNEF. The only consolation for Israel was Nehru’s unsuccessful attempts to stop Nasser from deporting Jewish persons from Egypt.⁹⁵

This overt unfriendliness toward Israel, however, did not prevent Nehru from seeking its help in times of crisis.

The Sino-Indian War, 1962

The complexities of India’s Israel policy came to forefront during the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The conflict along the Himalayas clearly exposed India’s military weaknesses and the political naiveté of Nehru’s China policy, and, above all, it shook his faith in nonalignment. The war came just a year after the Belgrade Conference, which heralded the NAM. While India had unequivocally joined the chorus against Israel during the Suez crisis, Egypt stayed neutral during the Sino-Indian war. President Nasser chose not to condemn China, although Nehru had hoped he would. Nasser felt a neutral stance was essential if Egypt planned “to mediate” between India and China.⁹⁶

Military defeat, political isolation, and the abandonment of a friend resulted in Nehru seeking military help from Israel. Following the outbreak of the border war, he made a universal appeal for assistance and personally wrote to various international leaders, including Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.⁹⁷ His negative attitude toward normalization and his high-profile criticism of Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956 were temporarily forgotten, and he explicitly sought military aid from Israel. Sharing India’s concerns, the Israeli premier extended political support and supplied certain quantities of small arms.⁹⁸ According to the veteran Arab journalist and Nasser’s confidant Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Nehru stopped his “dealings” with Israel as soon as the Egyptian leader raised objections.⁹⁹

India was rather coy in acknowledging Israeli assistance; however, it was more than willing to remember and recognize the “understanding attitude” of the Arab states.¹⁰⁰ Such a duality is true also of the Indian intelligentsia, who justified and rationalized Nasser’s neutrality but ignored Nehru seeking military help from Israel in times of crisis.¹⁰¹ This Indian duality is neither new nor an aberration. In the late 1940s, India sought agricultural assistance from Israel even while opposing Israel’s membership in the United Nations. In later years, it obtained help from Israel during military conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 but was not prepared to admit them publicly.

Thus India was not averse to approaching Israel for security assistance, and Nehru himself established this precedent. At the same time, driven by other interests in the Middle East, it was unwilling to recognize such help in public. It was only after normalization that India gradually began admitting military-security help from Israel, and even this was slow and reluctant. But the absence of formal relations and lack of progress in that direction overshadowed the occasional bonhomie between the two states. So when Nehru passed away on May 27, 1964, normalization became an even more remote possibility, and India’s unfriendliness gradually turned into hostility. Normalization became possible only when powerful and far-reaching international changes occurred. Those, however, were not immediately forthcoming.