[Normalization] is a welcome decision, particularly because this issue had become an unnecessary irritant in our domestic discussion of foreign policy. Had India established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1950, it would have been far better. In its absence, all kinds of speculations were made about the benefits that could have accrued to India had it established full diplomatic relations with Israel long ago.
—M. S. Agwani
6 Recognition Without Relations
The traditional pro-Arab position and opposition to the partition plan inhibited India from immediately recognizing the Jewish state. At the same time, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru could not ignore Israel’s existence and its recognition by the international community and United Nations. Even when India eventually recognized Israel in September 1950, it was not followed by the logical next step of normalization of relations. If recognition took more than two years to materialize, diplomatic relations had to wait for over four decades. The prolonged absence of formal ties resulted in speculations about the nature of Indian recognition. The Indian leadership, especially Nehru, wanted to establish normal ties with Israel. Had it happened in September 1950 or soon afterward, subsequent Indo-Israeli relations would not have been so controversial, partisan, and agonizing.
Before looking at the absence of ties, it is essential to answer the central question: why did India recognize Israel? We must also answer a set of related questions: How do we square India’s pro-Arab stance with the recognition of Israel? Was it a fundamental shift that marked a reconciliation with the Jewish claims in Palestine, or was it merely an aberration in India’s overall Middle East policy? Was Nehru keen on the normalization of relations? How does one explain the peculiar policy of recognition without relations?
While the issue of the recognition of Israel has been frequently commented upon, there is no unanimity among scholars.1 Traditional understanding on this issue has been overtaken by later developments and fresh evidence. When was the request made? Within hours of its establishment on the Sabbath eve of May 14, 1948, Israel sought recognition from the international community. Prime Minister Nehru offered two different dates as to when Israel made a request to India. Speaking at the Constituent Assembly in August 1948, he declared: “A telegram was received in the middle of June 1948 from Monsieur Moshe Shertok [later Sharett], Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, containing a request for recognition of the Jewish State.”2 Some still consider this to be accurate.3 The mid-June date gives an impression that India was not high on Israel’s list of priorities and that its delayed request was an expression of its displeasure over India’s opposition to the partition plan.
The publication in 1985 of Nehru’s Letters to Chief Ministers offered a new and earlier date. On May 20, 1948, in his fortnightly letter to the heads of Indian states, the Indian premier acknowledged that the government had received a formal request from Israel for recognition.4 This is closer to the actual date. Israeli documents indicate that Shertok wrote to Nehru (who was also serving as India’s minister of external affairs) for recognition. The cable was sent on Monday, May 17—the second workday after the declaration of Israeli independence.5 It was received by the Indian foreign office on the following day.6 Despite the Indian opposition to the partition plan, Israel was quick to seek formal recognition from New Delhi.
On May 19, Eliahu Epstein, the Washington representative of Israel’s provisional government, met the Indian chargé d’affairs and handed over a letter notifying the proclamation of the state of Israel. He felt that because of “interruption of cable communication between Israel and other countries,” an official communication might not have reached New Delhi.7 On May 21, within a week of the establishment of Israel, the Indian Foreign Ministry prepared a note on recognition and highlighted the UN angle: “the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendations of the Security Council. Israel’s application will therefore be considered first by the Security Council. As we are not a member of the Security Council, it is not necessary at this stage to formulate our views on this question.”8 Without a request for recognition, there was no need to discuss Israel’s possible membership in the United Nations.
In short, Sharett sends a cable on May 17, which reaches New Delhi on May 18. The following day, Israel’s envoy in Washington communicates with the Indian embassy. On May 20, the prime minister refers to the Israeli request in his letter to the chief ministers, and on May 21, the Indian foreign office prepares a note regarding Israel’s possible admission to the United Nations. Thus Nehru’s statement to the Constituent Assembly of having received a request in June was a mix-up.
Awaiting the Indian move, Israeli missions in different parts of the world regularly sent official circulars and reports to their Indian counterparts. Because of the obvious diplomatic implications, the latter did not know how to respond. Thus in April 1949, the Indian embassy in Prague sought clarifications from New Delhi:
This embassy has been receiving many such letters [from the Israeli Legation in Prague] from time to time. We shall be pleased to know what our attitude should be in such cases. So far, we have not acknowledged or replied to any communication from the Legation of Israel, nor has the Ambassador returned the cards of the Minister. The situation is not without its difficulties as almost every other foreign establishment here, apart from Egypt, is in official relations with the Legation, these countries having accorded recognition to… Israel. What we wish to know is whether our acknowledging such communications or accepting calls or invitations from the Mission will be tantamount to any recognition.9
The ministry responded by saying that under international law “recognition would be implied in acts like acknowledging communications, accepting calls or invitations etc., from a diplomatic representative of Israel.” Because India had not granted recognition, it instructed the Prague mission that “all such communications should be quietly ignored.”10 Similar queries soon poured in from other Indian missions. On May 28, Foreign Secretary K. P. S. Menon issued a clarification to all Indian missions abroad. Declaring that India had “so far scrupulously avoided recognizing” Israel, he conceded that Israel’s recent admission to the United Nations had “altered” the situation and that the question of recognition was being “reconsidered.” In the meantime, Menon advised the missions to immediately inform the ministry of “any approaches” made by Israeli missions “without… any assurances being conveyed to them.”11
India took as many as twenty-eight months to reciprocate the Israeli request for recognition. During this period between May 1948 and September 1950, there were a number of definite and incontrovertible signs indicating India’s movement toward recognition.
Ginger Steps
Writing to state chief ministers in May 1948, within days after the establishment of the state of Israel, Nehru remarked: “We propose to take no action in this matter [that is, recognition] at present. India can play no effective part in this conflict at the present stage either diplomatically or otherwise. We can only watch events for the time being, hoping that an opportunity may come when we might use our influence in the interest of peace and mediation.”12
While acknowledging the Israeli request, he opted to defer decision on the matter. A note prepared in October following the formation of the All-Palestine Government (APG) rationalized the official stand: “in May this year, when the State of Israel was proclaimed in Palestine, her Foreign Minister Mr. Shertok also sent a similar telegram. It was decided that time not to take any action on the telegram and the said telegram was not even acknowledged in the view of possible political complications.”13 Interestingly, its silence on the request for recognition from the APG was accompanied by its preparedness to communicate with Hajj Amin al-Husseini not as the head of the APG but as grand mufti of Jerusalem. In March 1949, India’s chargé d’affairs in Cairo acknowledged the mufti’s telegram, wherein he expressed his “gratitude and appreciation of the [Indian] Government’s refusal to recognize Israel.”14
Remaining cautious regarding the issue, in August 1948 Nehru informed the Constituent Assembly that “a new State [of Israel] was formed and we had to wait.”15 Expressing similar caution, in February 1949 he observed that the recognition of Israel would be “guided not only by idealistic considerations but also a realistic appraisal of the situation.”16 A month later, he reiterated that Israel “is undoubtedly a State which is functioning as such; and the honorable member’s [H. V. Kamath] opinion about it having come to stay may be correct.”17 Meanwhile, on May 11, 1949, Israel’s application for membership came before the UN General Assembly.18 In tune with its earlier position, India voted against the motion, which was endorsed by the majority in the UN General Assembly.19 New Delhi could not ignore Israel’s eventual admission into the United Nations, and on June 3, 1949, Nehru conceded: “We shall have to consider our future policy in regard to it [Israel’s UN membership].”20 Through these public pronouncements and internal debates, Nehru conveyed a wait-and-see approach toward recognizing Israel.
This domestic caution was accompanied by a friendlier stance internationally. By September 1948, weeks after the second Arab-Israeli ceasefire came into force, Israeli diplomats felt that a favorable Indian decision was a foregone conclusion and only the timing remained uncertain. As Nehru was gathering domestic support for recognition, India exhibited a friendlier and sympathetic attitude toward Israel. On September 28, 1948, India’s ambassador in Washington, B. N. Rau, met his Israeli counterpart and referred to normalization.21 Interestingly, the envoy talked about “normalization” when India was still nearly two years away from recognition. The following May, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, who succeeded Rau in Washington, told her Israeli counterpart Elath that India would recognize the Jewish state at an appropriate time. She estimated that this “may happen soon after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.”22 The next month, Rau, who had moved to the United Nations, dealt at length with the existing commonalities between India and Israel and noted that there was no conflict of interest between the two states.23 In her meeting with Ambassador Elath in September, Mrs. Pandit observed that India was slowly moving toward recognizing Israel and that the decision could not be delayed further.24
In October 1949, Elath had a lengthy conversation with Nehru when the Indian prime minister visited the United States. Summing up this meeting, the Israeli ambassador cabled:
Nehru listened attentively, obviously disturbed by mention [of] Turkey’s recognition. In reply after announcing complete frankness he explained India’s attitude [toward] Israel. People never anti-Semitic, Hitler made them friends of Jews. Many Indians admired in past Zionist and now most sympathetic [to] Israel…. He had to choose slow, long, way towards recognition [in] order [to] justify it objectively and minimize internal opposition…. He arrived [at the] conclusion recognition cannot be postponed much longer…. To my question whether he could mention possible date [of] recognition he replied [he] would deal matter immediately on return India early November and we could expect recognition before January [1950].25
Nehru was equally optimistic. Upon returning home, he declared that the recognition of Israel “cannot obviously be indefinitely deferred.”26 While recognition was not forthcoming immediately, India exhibited some diplomatic niceties. In January 1950, Rau invited Ambassador Aubrey S. Eban (later Abba Eban) to an official function in New York marking the ushering in of the Indian republic.27
Its waffling on recognition did not inhibit India from approaching Israel for technical assistance. On November 15, 1947, as the UN General Assembly was debating the partition plan, Chaim Weizmann (the future president of Israel) offered technical assistance to India, which Nehru accepted.28 The Zionist leader was acting on the suggestions made by K. M. Panikkar and Shiva Rao, who were active in the Asian Relations Conference held earlier that year.29 Following a series of discussions between the two sides,30 in March 1949, India sought agricultural assistance from Israel. Since it had not recognized the Jewish state, the Ministry of Agriculture asked H. Z. Cynowitz, the representative of the Jewish Agency in India, to take up the request “with your people in Palestine.”31 Despite the curious wording, Israel viewed this request as a sign of Indian friendliness. The request “for a loan of agricultural experts showed that no real hostility existed.”32 In later years, reflecting similar sentiments, Nehru’s biographer S. Gopal observed, “despite basic differences with Israel, Nehru sent some experts to that country to study the working of the cooperative movement.”33
The most promising statement on recognition came in February 1950, when Prime Minister Nehru told the Provisional Parliament: “The fact that the State of Israel exists is of course recognized by the Government of India. But formal recognition involving an exchange of diplomatic mission has to be considered in connection with a number of factors.”34 These public statements, confidential remarks, and diplomatic gestures clearly indicate the thinking of the government and its willingness to recognize Israel. They also underscore the delicacy with which Nehru approached the issue.
The inordinate Indian delay, however, irritated Israeli officials. Walter Eytan, who aspired to be Israel’s first ambassador to India,35 summed up the general feeling that prevailed in the diplomatic community.
Two years after the establishment of the State of Israel, India remains one of the few non-Arab, non-Muslim countries which have not recognized her. Israel had always attributed a special value to India’s recognition, due to her prestigious status in Asia. During the past two years, considerable efforts have been invested in making contacts with high-ranking Indian personalities but despite many promises and demonstrations of friendship, India has not yet taken this step. Now that 60 countries have recognized Israel, recognition by an additional one is no longer a burning issue and Israel has ceased trying to persuade vacillating countries, including India. Moreover, belated recognition is of lesser political and moral weight than that accorded close to the state’s establishment.36
This sour note was valid even four decades later, when India followed—not preceded—China in normalizing ties with Israel.37
Meanwhile, after months of waiting, by mid-September 1950 India began negotiating with Israel over the timing of recognition. Both sides agreed that a formal and simultaneous announcement would be made declaring that India’s recognition would come into force on September 18, 1950. A communication to this effect was sent to the Israeli embassy in Washington.38 On September 17, Nehru, in his capacity as foreign minister, sent a cable to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, which read: “In conveying to Your Excellency the decision of the Government of India to accord recognition to the Government of Israel as from September 18 of this year, I send the greetings of the Government and people of India to the Government and people of Israel.”39 A crisp official communiqué issued in New Delhi declared: “The Government of India have decided to accord recognition to the Government of Israel.” Interestingly, the Indian “government” chose to recognize the Israeli “government.”40 By then, Israel had conducted its first Knesset election; India was still two years away from its first Lok Sabha elections. Given the circumstances surrounding Israel’s formation, an explicit and unambiguous reference to the state of Israel would have been more appropriate. Exploiting this ambiguity, some Indian scholars suggested that India’s recognition was temporary and could be withdrawn at any time.41
There was something amiss in the whole exercise. Neither the formal communiqué to Israel nor the official statement released in New Delhi referred to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Because of the delays and controversies surrounding recognition, the absence of any reference to diplomatic ties assumed greater significance. In hindsight, it is obvious that just as he was moving toward recognition, Nehru was also facing counterpressures from those opposed to such a move. Thus the absence of any direct reference to the establishment of relations was apparently a compromise. Because recognition was not followed by diplomatic ties, a number of controversies arose over the legal status of recognition. Was it de facto or de jure? According to K. P. Misra, India generally extends recognition without any reference to its de facto or de jure status.42 In his February 1950 statement cited above, Nehru clearly stated that “formal recognition involving an exchange of diplomatic mission” would have to consider a number of factors. Not only was there no exchange of diplomatic missions, but India even refused to treat the Israeli Consulate in Bombay (Mumbai) as a diplomatic mission. Hence, some innovatively argued that “in the case India has accorded only de facto recognition… that has not been followed by full diplomatic intercourse or the conferment of diplomatic immunities upon their representatives.”43
A careful analysis would dispel any doubts about Indian recognition and indicate that it was de facto as well as de jure in nature. Primarily, Nehru’s February 1950 statement indicated that India had accepted Israel’s de facto status even before its formal recognition. On a number of subsequent occasions, India maintained that its declaration was de jure. For example, in July 1971, the government informed the Lok Sabha: “India extended de jure recognition to Israel in September 1950.”44 An official report prepared by Israel’s senior diplomat, Walter Eytan, offers interesting insights into the whole controversy. In early 1952, he visited India and met all the leading Indian figures, including Prime Minister Nehru. Upon his return to Israel, he submitted a long report called New Delhi Diary, where he observed:
Miss [Leilamani] Naidu [who was dealing with Israel in the Ministry of External Affairs] also told me of the argument they had had in the Ministry at the time they recognized Israel—whether it should be de jure or de facto. The Secretary General [G. S. Bajpai], on being appraised of this problem, had consulted all their legal authorities and had come to the conclusion that he couldn’t see what difference there was between de facto and de jure recognition; so they recognized us pure and simple.45
Thus, despite the perceived ambiguity, prolonged nonrelations could not be used to question the validity or the legal status of India’s recognition.
If one looks beyond the legal tangle, why did India take more than two years to accord recognition?
Why Procrastination?
The most obvious explanation is the wait-and-watch attitude that countries normally adopt when deciding on recognition. Countries need to satisfy themselves that the newborn entity is stable, cohesive, and, above all, is prepared to assume and play its role in the community of nations. Like the rest of the world, India adopts a cautious approach regarding recognition and has normally followed rather than led the international community. Its stances on the recognition of Algeria, East Germany, or the PLO reflect this trend.46 Indeed, delayed recognition of Israel was accompanied by its indifferent stance toward the APG proclaimed by the Palestinian leadership in September 1948.
With regard to Israel, however, there are a number of additional reasons. As discussed elsewhere, domestic public opinion, especially of the Muslims, played a considerable role. The second reason has to be found in the Arab factor. India was afraid that any hasty move would antagonize the Arabs and jeopardize its larger interests in the Middle East. The issue of recognizing Israel figured in India’s deliberations with the Arab countries. Following his meeting with Prime Minister Nehru in Washington in October 1949, Elath cabled: “He [Nehru] recently discussed Israel with Arab and Muslim envoys [in] New Delhi, emphasizing necessity [of ] reconciliation [with] realities and preparing them for our inevitable recognition by India.”47 According to another senior Israeli diplomat, the Iraqi delegation “brought strong pressure [on] the chief delegate [of ] India to activate against Indian recognition [of ] Israel.”48
Nehru’s biographer Gopal admits the Arab influence on India’s approach toward Israel. According to him, “on the question of Israel’s admission to the United Nations, his [Nehru’s] first reaction was to abstain. Later, as part of the policy of co-operation with the Islamic States, he ordered the Indian delegation to vote against.”49 Less than two weeks after recognizing Israel, Nehru frankly admitted the Arab factor and informed the chief ministers, “We would have done this [recognition of Israel] long ago, because Israel is a fact. We refrained because of our desire not to offend the sentiments of our friends in the Arab countries.”50 Similarly, its ambassador in Cairo also attributed the delay to Arab pressures. Speaking to the Egyptian media soon after recognition, he remarked:
For some time now announcements were being made that India did intend to recognize Israel and that it was only a question of time. India’s intentions were made known well in advance to the Arab diplomats in New Delhi and to the Governments in the Middle East through Cairo. Some of these Governments requested India to postpone her decision but India felt that any further postponement would not serve any useful purpose.51
Moreover, by the time India had recognized Israel, all the neighboring Arab states, including Egypt, had signed the armistice agreement with the Jewish state.52 This move could be interpreted as the Arab acquiescence, if not tacit recognition, of Israel.
A note prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs in February 1950 even linked recognition to the question of hajj and added a host of preconditions such as the resolution of the refugee problems, boundaries, and the Jerusalem question.53 Indian apprehension over Saudi displeasure and the possible repercussions upon hajj pilgrimages underscore the religious dimension. Fears over Pakistan and its moves among Arab and Islamic countries came to haunt India for the next four decades and contributed to the prolonged absence of formal ties with Israel.
If the above were the reasons for the delay, what influenced, if not compelled, the September 1950 decision?
Reasons for Recognition
From the available records, one can identify nine possible explanations for Indian recognition. Legally, India is committed to the Declaratory Theory of Recognition and, as one scholar concluded, in its position, “recognition registers but does not create a situation.”54 It scrupulously avoided creating a situation whereby its recognition alone would constitute a reality. Even in the case of Bangladesh, in whose formation it played the pivotal role, recognition did not come until December 1971.55
Second, it accords recognition to a newly formed state as soon the latter fulfills basic attributes of a state and expresses and exhibits its willingness to honor international commitments. Like many other states, India had misgivings over Israel’s survival. However, Israel not only survived as a sovereign entity but showed its ability and willingness to shoulder responsibility as a member of the international community. India could not ignore this.56
Third, Israel had become a reality and was recognized by a large number of states. Long before the Indian move, two other states that had endorsed the federal plan, Iran and Yugoslavia, recognized the Jewish state. While Yugoslavia recognized Israel on May 19, 1948, within days of its establishment, Iranian recognition was obtained on March 15, 1950.57 Moreover, during the crucial UN vote on partition, Yugoslavia abstained. Turkey, another major Islamic country, had recognized Israel well before India.58 Even Indonesia was not indifferent, and its prime minister and foreign minister, Muhammad Hatta, sent a formal communication to Shertok acknowledging Israel’s recognition of his country.59 India could not have remained indifferent to the growing international accommodations toward Israel.
Fourth, in May 1949 Israel joined the United Nations. Explaining the link between recognition and UN membership, Nehru told the Indian parliament: “our policy [is] to recognize any country that was an independent functioning country represented in the United Nations.”60 Similarly, his close confidant V. K. Krishna Menon argued, “I have always taken the view that whatever country is recognized by the UN should be recognized by us.”61 Though Israel’s admission was conditional,62 it came against the background of similar membership requests being rejected by the UN Security Council. The cold-war rivalry blocked the memberships of countries such as Albania and Jordan, whereas Israel was recognized by the rival blocs. Even though he voted against Israel’s entry into the United Nations, Nehru could not ignore the prevailing international view on Israel.
Fifth, Indian recognition was also influenced by its policy regarding the People’s Republic of China. In its view, the political orientation of the regime in Beijing should not be an impediment to recognition.63 As one of the first countries to recognize the new, communist China and ignore the breakaway Taiwanese republic, Nehru came under pressure, especially from lawmakers. Even though the Chinese and Israeli situations were different,64 questions were asked about him adopting “various criteria” regarding recognition.65 There were suggestions that a different stance regarding recognizing Israel “would have placed India in a paradoxical situation.”66 At least at the popular level, India would not be able to campaign for international recognition of communist China while denying the same privilege to the Jewish state.
Sixth, India appeared to be genuinely interested in playing a mediatory role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Explaining the decision to recognize Israel, the official spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs observed: “continuing non-recognition is not only inconsistent with the overall relations but even limits the effectiveness of the Government of India’s role as a possible intermediary between Israel and the Arab states.”67 Nehru felt the need to establish some balance in India’s Middle East policy, especially vis-à-vis Israel.
Seventh, recognition enjoyed significant support inside the country and was often raised in the Constituent Assembly debates. The issue first came up in August 1948, when the socialist member of the Assembly H. V. Kamath questioned India’s policy toward Israel.68 Since then, it figured in every session of the Constituent Assembly and forced Nehru to articulate his stand.69 Such debates provide an insight into the slow but gradual Indian advance toward recognition. Though relatively small in number, a few prominent Indians living abroad were also active in this direction.70 Likewise, senior Indian diplomats such as K. M. Panikkar were favorably inclined toward recognition long before the official move.
Eighth, Israel carried out effective lobbying for recognition. Such efforts were made both directly by Israeli diplomats posted in Washington and New York and by U.S. officials sympathetic toward Israel. Israel established and maintained regular personal contacts with senior Indian diplomats in the United States and the United Nations; they included Asaf Ali, B. N. Rau, Shiv Rao, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, and Krishna Menon. The pro-India U.S. congressman Emanuel Celler played a role in this campaign and was present at the Nehru-Elath meeting in October 1949 in New York. According to Elath, Nehru “arrived [at the] conclusion [that] recognition cannot be postponed much longer. Here he turned [to] Celler saying it would be unwise to grant Israel recognition during his [Nehru’s] stay [in the United States] because this [is] liable [to be] interpreted as American pressure.”71 Weizmann was in periodic correspondence with B. N. Rau, and following the establishment of Israel, he approached Rau for the same purpose.72 Toward the same end, the Sanskrit scholar Immanuel Olsvanger, who had visited India in 1936, revived his old contacts in India.73 Even before the formation of Israel, the renowned scientist Albert Einstein sought Nehru’s support for the Jewish cause.74 Given this worldwide, star-studded lobbying, India could only delay and not deny recognition.
Finally, the growing political contacts between Pakistan and leading Arab countries contributed to India recognizing Israel.75 The erstwhile INC support for Arabs or Palestinians did not pay immediate political dividends. According to Gopal: “the vote cast by Farouk’s Egypt against India on the Hyderabad issue in the United Nations disposed him [Nehru] towards accepting the fact of Israel and recognizing her.”76 Even while opposing Israel’s admission to the United Nations, in May 1949, more than a year before recognition, Nehru remarked: “It is about time that we made some of these Arab countries feel that we are not going to follow them in everything in spite of what they do.”77 However, as we will see, even for Nehru this was easier said than done.
If India accorded a belated recognition to Israel, it was even more cautious toward the Gaza-based APG. On September 22, 1948, a few months after the formation of Israel, the Arab Higher Committee met in the Gaza and proclaimed an “All-Palestine Government” under the leadership of Ahmad Hilmi Pasha. On the same day, a twelve-member cabinet was formed with Pasha as prime minister and assumed control of “all Palestine, within the frontiers such as were established at the moment when the British Mandate ended.”78 At a Congress of Arabs held on October 1, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, was unanimously elected “President.”79 A day earlier, “Prime Minister” Ahmed Hilmi informed India of the formation of an “independent” Palestinian state and conveyed an “earnest desire of the All-Palestine Government to establish relations of cordiality and cooperation with your country.”80 New Delhi viewed both his request and his claims with skepticism and decided “not to take any action on the telegram, and the said telegram [was not to be] acknowledged in view of possible political implications.”81
Because New Delhi did not recognize the Gaza entity, it is sufficient to look at some of the possible explanations. Even though it opposed the partition plan, India did not support the Arab proposal for a unitary Palestine. The APG in Gaza reiterated the unitary proposal and sought to annul the state of Israel. Thus the APG ran counter to the UN position vis-à-vis Palestine. Its recognition by India might have been construed as going against the prevailing international consensus. Other than a handful of Arab states, no major power inside or outside the Middle East had recognized the APG. Great Britain is an exception, and it tacitly recognized the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank.82 Second, though backed by Egypt and other members of the Arab League, the APG did not exercise control over vast areas of Mandate Palestine. The Gaza Strip was under the military control of Egypt, and the APG had very little freedom of movement—let alone sovereignty—in that tiny piece of land. The much larger eastern Palestine (or later on, the West Bank) came under the control of King Abdullah of Transjordan (later Jordan), who had no intention of relinquishing control. Granting sovereignty to the mufti-led APG was out of question. Reflecting this reality, India felt that the claim of the APG “for recognition are no stronger than that of the Government of South Korea posing as the national government of all Korea. Realistic approach would suggest our ignoring this claim.”83
Third, the APG soon became a major political embarrassment for the Arab League, as some of its members sought to expel Transjordan, one of the founding members, over its occupation of the West Bank. The Jericho Conference of December 1948 accentuated internal divisions among the Palestinians and the unpopularity of the mufti-led government. The APG did not survive, and before long key cabinet members left the mufti and joined hands with King Abdullah. Thus a hasty recognition of the APG would have placed New Delhi at loggerheads with Amman. And finally, there was a Pakistani dimension. Despite past Indian support, the Palestinian leadership, especially the mufti, drew closer to Pakistan and became its staunch supporter over the Kashmir dispute.84 Ever since his February 1951 visit to Karachi to preside over the World Muslim Conference, the mufti had been frequenting Pakistan.85 If one adds the traditional wait-and-see position adopted by India, nonrecognition of the APG was both logical and inevitable.
If India was so diligent and cautious toward recognizing Israel and not recognizing the APG, how does one explain its quick recognition of the state of Palestine, proclaimed on November 15, 1988? Indian recognition came despite the entity lacking the most fundamental characteristic of statehood: control over territory. This lack of sovereignty did not inhibit India or many other Third World countries from recognizing the Palestinian state and treating it as a sovereign entity. This was long before Yasser Arafat returned to the Gaza Strip in 1994 to establish the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Given the extent of Israeli control, even the PNA could not be seen as a sovereign entity. But Indian recognition of the state of Palestine in 1988 was merely a political gesture that should be placed within the context of its pro-Palestinian policy.
Notwithstanding delays and ambiguities, its recognition of the Jewish state was a major development in India’s Middle East policy. This came against the backdrop of traditional Indian sympathy for the Arabs, its unfriendliness toward the Jewish demand for a homeland in Palestine, its opposition to the partition plan, and its vote against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. Its decision to recognize Israel, however, was complicated in the long run by the absence of formal ties between the two countries.
For more than four decades, the absence of normalization or recognition without relations remained the hallmark of India’s Israel policy.
Nonrelations as a Policy
States rarely establish formal ties with all the countries of the world. The establishment of relations and the opening of residential missions are decided by political, economic, strategic, or cultural considerations vis-à-vis the recognized state. Conversely, the fewer shared interests, the greater the chances of nonrelations. If this was the rationale, the prolonged absence of formal ties with Israel would not be controversial. India’s initial willingness to seek normal ties with Israel and its subsequent backtracking make the case rather unique. New Delhi’s original intention to establish a residence mission in Israel did not receive adequate attention in the scholarly literature. And because of the absence of formal ties, recognition itself was often treated as a not-so-significant development.86
Nehru admitted that normalization was a logical step after recognition. Speaking in the context of relations with Spain in 1956 he told lawmakers, “a logical consequence of [recognition] was to exchange diplomatic mission, subject of course, to our having the personnel.”87 This appears to be the general Indian position on recognition and is true for Israel. A number of official statements support this understanding. An official note prepared on April 4, 1951, revealed a favorable disposition toward normalization: “In order to ensure that we obtain a clear picture of the Middle East, it is necessary for us to open a mission in Israel as soon as possible.”88 During his March 1952 visit to New Delhi, Eytan got a distinct impression that normalization was around the corner. According to him,
Before Israel’s representative [that is, Eytan] left New Delhi, he was informed that the Prime Minister [Nehru] had approved the proposal…. A draft budget for the Indian legation was being prepared, though the formal decision to establish diplomatic relations still remained to be confirmed by the Cabinet. This was to be done as soon as the new Government was set up following the elections [that is, to the first Lok Sabha] a few weeks later.89
Eytan further learned that the Indian government was working on the budget for its mission in Israel. The message was obvious: normalization was a foregone conclusion and Nehru just needed ratification from his cabinet. But it did not happen.
The view that India was committed to establishing a resident mission in Israel was shared by Nehru’s biographer Gopal, who observed: “In March 1952 Nehru informed the Israeli government [through the visiting Foreign Ministry Director General Walter Eytan] that there was no major objection to the exchange of diplomatic representatives, but it might be better to wait for the formation of a new government after the elections [to the first Lok Sabha that were then underway].”90 Similarly, in December 1952, India’s ambassador in Moscow, K. P. S. Menon, informed Eytan: “I am very sorry that the exchange of Missions between India and Israel had not yet taken place. I hope and trust that it is now only a matter of few weeks. I shall do all I can from this end, as I am really keen that we should establish a Mission in Israel without further delay.”91 Angry over Nehru’s broken promise, in 1959 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion lamented: “I cannot understand how Mr. Nehru fits his behavior to Israel with [Mahatma] Gandhi’s philosophy of universal friendship. Mr. Nehru gave definite promises to the Director-General of our Foreign Ministry eight years ago that he would soon establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but so far he has not kept his word.”92 Normalization would not materialize until January 1992.
Budgetary considerations seemed the primary reason for the initial absence of diplomatic exchanges. An official note prepared in December 1950 declared: “Owing to reasons of financial stringency, the case of Israel has presumably to wait for more propitious times.”93 This appeared logical. At that time, the absence of diplomatic relations was the rule and not the exception. As Krishna Menon told Michael Brecher, “We don’t send Ambassadors to a lot of countries.”94 In 1947, for example, India’s resident missions in the Middle East were confined to Cairo, Tehran, and Istanbul. Cairo had the only resident Indian mission in the entire Arab world!95
The Indian Foreign Office needed to reduce its diplomatic budget through a number of administrative measures, including postponing new missions or concurrent accreditations. In early 1950, the ministry observed: “In view of the imperative need for all possible economies on expenditure, the proposal for establishing consular representation at Mehshed and Koramshahr [Iran], Basra [Iraq], Bahrain and Muscat [Oman] have been kept in abeyance.”96 Another report suggested that “as a measure of economy, the Heads of Mission in certain countries were concurrently accredited.”97 As a result, even in the mid-1950s, India’s ambassador in Cairo was concurrently accredited to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.98 Taking cognizance of this trend, at one time Israel even suggested the concurrent accreditation to Israel of India’s ambassador to Turkey.99
Some of Nehru’s statements vindicate the nonpolitical thinking taking place during this phase. A couple of months after recognition, he ruled out diplomatic exchanges with Israel due to “financial and other reasons” and added that his government was “anxious to avoid additional commitments abroad at present.”100 Two years later, India declared: “Owing mainly to the existing financial stringency it has not been found possible to establish missions in these countries [Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen] so far.”101 While it opened embassies and consular offices in other parts of the Middle East, Israel remained an exception. As time went by, it became obvious that the budgetary issue was merely one of the reasons for the Indian hesitance and not the prime one. Over time, Nehru’s reference to “other factors” in his December 1950 statement gained greater importance than before.
A formal and officially negative attitude concerning normalization was noticeable during the Suez Crisis of 1956. By then, three powerful forces came to influence India’s policy toward Israel: (1) anticolonialist Afro-Asian solidarity, formally consecrated at Bandung in April 1955; (2) Israel’s increasing identification with the imperial powers, as manifested by its coordinated aggression against Egypt during the Suez crisis; and (3) the growing personal friendship between Nehru and the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Speaking in the Lok Sabha days after the Israeli invasion of Egypt, Nehru declared that “in view of the existing passion,” diplomatic exchanges were not possible.102 A couple of years later, at a press conference in New Delhi, Nehru maintained: “This attitude [toward Israel] was adopted after a careful consideration of the balance of factors. It is not a matter of high principles, but it is based on how we could best serve and be helpful in the area…. After careful thought, we felt that while recognizing Israel as an entity, we need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel.”103 Gradually, “the time is not ripe” became the standard Indian mantra on the normalization of relations with Israel.
Over the years, India began discovering new reasons to prolong the absence of formal ties. In December 1960, the prime minister informed the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of India’s parliament) that India did not have a diplomatic mission in Israel because “the whole position is very much entangled in important and rather dangerous international issues.”104 In September 1963, India felt that “there is not enough consular work to justify a post.”105 On May 27, 1969, following the June war, Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh offered a new rationale. Speaking at a meeting of Indian envoys in the Middle East, he felt that India “had not established diplomatic relations with Israel because Israel had followed wrong policies against Arabs particularly the Palestinians. It was persisting with this policy and until there was a revision of this policy it would be difficult for India to revise her policy. One could also fully justify India’s policy in this regard from the point of view of national interests.”106 Elaborating on this logic, some recalled differences with Israel over key issues. In their assessment, the official communiqué of September 17, 1950, underscored that recognition “did not mean that it had endorsed the Israeli position regarding its boundaries.”107
At times, India sought to justify its nonrelations through a secular logic and its refusal to accept the notion that religion could become the basis for nationality.108 This was aimed at countering Pakistan’s efforts in the Middle East and at forging closer ties with secular Arab nationalism; while India is secular like most Arab states, Pakistan is closer to Israel in terms of its ideological and religious focus!109 In the light of later developments, India linked normalization to demands for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 position, an endorsement of the right of self-determination of the Palestinians, and the support of a “just and honorable settlement” of the Palestinian problem.110
In hindsight, many Indian leaders, including Nehru, admitted that diplomatic exchanges should have occurred soon after recognition. Recalling his meeting with the Indian prime minister in 1961, the Israeli diplomat Gideon Rafael observed:
After this minuet of preliminaries Nehru took over. India had recognized Israel in 1950 he said and indeed should have at that time established diplomatic relations. The sentiments in India towards Israel were good. Many people were keenly interested in its achievements…. The trouble was that there was a strong Arab reaction to the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries.111
This view was shared by others. Nehru’s close confidant Krishna Menon told Michael Brecher that if India “had sent an ambassador at that time [that is, soon after recognition] there would have been no difficulties.”112 Morarji Desai, who was prime minister from 1977 to 1979, reflected similar sentiments.113
Bitter over India’s posture, the veteran Israeli diplomat Ya’acov Shimoni observed that in the initial years, “our policy was to ask for an exchange of ambassadors on every possible occasion… but we have some pride left…. We were tired of being told, ‘Please do not worry us’ and being put off repeatedly.”114 Reflecting Israel’s disappointments, Ben-Gurion remarked: “Nehru too claims allegiance to neutrality…. He is not even neutral in regard to Israel and the Arabs, for he has close ties and normal relations with the Arab countries—but he has stubbornly refused to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and in his frequent visits to the Middle East he has on every occasion—and not by accident—overlooked Israel.”115
Interestingly, in 1960 the Indian lawmaker and former minister Rajkumari Amrit Kaur visited Israel and met Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The latter explored the idea of inviting Nehru to Israel and extended a formal invitation on July 28, 1960.116 Within a fortnight, Nehru expressed his inability, saying, “it is not easy for me to go abroad frequently,” and chose to add the following: “it occurs to me that in the circumstances existing today, it will not be advisable for me to pay such a visit. Instead of improving international relations, it might have the opposite effect.”117 Such an attitude did not prevent Nehru from visiting the Gaza Strip during his visit to Egypt in May 1960.118
Consular Relations
While the establishment of diplomatic ties was bogged down in political controversies and supposed economic constraints, New Delhi was more flexible regarding the Israeli request for opening a representative office in India. The latter falls into two distinct categories, namely, an immigration office and a consular office. Even before the establishment of the Jewish state, India functioned as a major sanctuary for Jewish refugees. It offered refuge to the beleaguered Jews of Iraq, Afghanistan, and, to lesser extent, Europe. From India, these refugees eventually emigrated to Mandate Palestine and later Israel.119 A large number of Jews from Europe took refuge in India during the late 1930s and 1940s, and Nehru actively sought their employment and absorption. Some of the Jewish refugees from Europe married prominent Indian figures, such as B. K. Nehru, Shiva Rao, and M. N. Roy.120
Facilitating the emigration of Jewish refugees, especially from Afghanistan and Iraq, became a priority for Israel, and at least since early 1949 the Jewish Agency kept a representative in Bombay.121 A formal immigration office was established in the city shortly after India’s recognition of Israel; Aryeh Gance was appointed as the representative.122 This port city in western India is geographically closer to Israel than elsewhere in India and had a significant Jewish presence. A few months later, Gance was promoted to director of the Palestine Office of the Jewish Agency. As the urgency of refugee immigration gradually diminished, a separate consulate was established in Bombay, and immigration became part of the consular function. Separate representation by the Jewish Agency became redundant.
Israel’s consular presence in India was much more complicated. Consular duties are normally confined to matters relating to trade, shipping, notary functions, issuance of passports and visas, and the registration of the births, marriages, and death of its nationals. In short, it has only commercial and functional duties, with no scope for diplomatic activities or responsibilities. However, even to secure this limited foothold in India, Israel had to invest considerable effort, time, persuasion, and diplomatic capital. The formal approach in this direction began as early as in May 1950, over five months before recognition. In a communication addressed to the Indian high commissioner in London,123 it informed New Delhi of its decision to appoint F. W. Pollack as “Trade Commissioner of South East Asia.”124 It appears that there was some diplomatic misunderstanding between the two sides, and the matter did not proceed further. India’s hesitation to recognize Israel largely contributed to its reluctance to acknowledge, let alone respond, to the Israeli move.
Israel revived the matter following the September 1950 recognition. Interpreting the earlier Indian silence, a senior Israeli official observed that if Israel did not “assume that the High Commissioner failed to inform his government, we would be compelled to presume that the Indian Government does not consider the term ‘South East Asia’ to include India in a way [that would] require the Indian Government to take cognizance.”125 Thus, in November 1950 Pollack’s title was changed to “Trade Commissioner for Israel in South East Asia including India.” As per the prevailing practice of coordinating through the Indian mission in London, Israel communicated Pollack’s new designation through Krishna Menon.126 This channel was not proving effective. Irritated over delays and difficulties in using London as the conduit, Israel “abandoned the procedure and started communicating directly with New Delhi.”127 India’s recognition the previous September also emboldened this approach. Accordingly, on December 28, 1950, the Israeli Foreign Ministry sent a cable to its Indian counterpart informing the appointment of Pollack as “Trade Commissioner for India and South Asia.”128 After prolonged negotiations, correspondence, and clarifications, an official Indian notification to this effect was issued on March 1, 1951.129
Around this time, the economic division in the Israeli Foreign Office wanted to terminate Pollack’s appointment as trade commissioner. Meager trade prospects made his continuation an unviable proposition. Ya’acov Shimoni, who was handling the Asia desk, was in favor of continuing the arrangement, because it had been secured after prolonged effort.130 Israel settled for a compromise. To consolidate its foothold in India, especially as the latter was not moving on the issue of resident missions, Israel decided to concurrently appoint Pollack as its consular agent.
Because of the previous delays and inaction, a cable regarding Pollack’s nomination was sent directly to Prime Minister Nehru, who was also India’s foreign minister. This change of strategy had the desired effect, and on March 8, New Delhi responded favorably: “The President of India is pleased to recognize provisionally the appointment of Mr. F. W. Pollack as Consular Agent of Israel at Bombay.” A formal gazette notification to this effect was issued on the same day.131 Pollack, however, was unhappy with this new arrangement, and said that it was “not my intention to make official use the title Consular Agent which is much lower than that of Trade Commissioner for South East Asia.”132 Concurring with this assessment, Shimoni consoled him, saying that Israel viewed this “simply as a functional and technical arrangement, at least until we [that is, Israel] establish our legation in India.”133 While trying to persuade Pollack to formally submit the letter of his nomination, Shimoni cautioned that he was “accredited to the Government of India and not to the Government of Bombay [later on Maharashtra] and the sphere of your jurisdiction, I assume, in contrast to that of most of the foreign consuls at Bombay—[you are accredited to] the whole of India, and not Bombay only.”134 As subsequent events proved, Shimoni clearly misread the Indian situation. Pollack’s successors were officially confined to the state of Maharashtra and could travel to other parts of India only as “private” foreign nationals.135 Meanwhile, a formal notification regarding Pollack was issued on September 28, 1951. Issued in the name of President Rajendra Prasad, it bore the signature of Prime Minister Nehru.136
The whole arrangement took a different turn when the government of India enquired about the legal status of Pollack. Was he “an honorary or decarriere officer”?137 Since Pollack was not a regular career diplomat, in January 1953 he was designated as the honorary consul of India. Simultaneously, effective January 1, 1953, the status of the Consular Agency of Israel was raised to the level of consulate, and Pollack was named honorary consul.138 Within months, a regular arrangement was made, and on June 1, 1953, Gabriel Doron became Israel’s first career diplomat to assume office in India. Between then and 1992, when full relations were established, sixteen Israeli officials headed the mission in Bombay.
This consular arrangement faced a number of problems. No evidence is currently available in the public domain in India regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the consulate. India often emphasized the Israeli presence in Bombay. But the Israelis contended that their emissary was accredited to the Government of India and hence its jurisdiction extended to the whole of the country. Israeli documents share this narrow interpretation. Following his interaction with the officials in New Delhi, in February 1960, Israeli Consul Michael Michael observed that Indian officials had advised him “to be satisfied with being on Indian soil, to keep a low profile and to refrain from attempting to win over public opinion…. [Mirza Rashid A.] Baig, Head of the Protocol in the Ministry of External Affairs, advised Michael to visit New Delhi as seldom as possible, and not to maintain contacts with heads of missions, apart from consulates.”139 In another report sent in October of that year, he maintained that due to Arab pressure, “the Indians interpret the ‘status quo’ in relations as limiting the Israeli consulate to activity in the narrow consular field. In contrast, Michael has asserted that the consulate is Israel’s representative mission in the full meaning of the word, and its duty is to behave like any embassy in India.”140
These internal tensions between the two sides exploded openly just before Nehru’s death and firmly established some new ground rules. In April 1964, Consul Peretz Gordon decided to organize Independence Day celebrations in New Delhi. Until then, such celebrations had been held in Bombay, where the Israeli Consulate was located. The Indian government was not prepared to accept this deviation and demanded the cancellation of the function, which was scheduled for April 15, 1964. When the consul did not respond to this request, the Indian government had the reservations at the state-run Ashok Hotel cancelled. The issue rocked the Indian parliament. Many friends of Israel were furious over the government’s treatment and accused Nehru of being “discourteous.”
Heads of the Israeli Consulate in Bombay (now Mumbai), 1950–1992
F. W. Pollacka | 1951–1953 |
Gabriel Doron | 1953–1956 |
Avshalom Caspi | 1956–1959 |
Michael Michael | 1959–1962 |
Arieh Ilan | 1962–1963 |
Peretz Gordon | 1964–1965 |
Reuven Dafni | 1965–1969 |
Ya’acov Morris | 1969–1971 |
Yair Aran | 1971–1973 |
Yehoshua Trigor | 1973–1976 |
Shlomo Armon | 1976–1979 |
Yosef Hassinb | 1979–1982 |
Immanuel Seric | 1982–1984 |
Oded Ben-Hurd | 1985–1987 |
Amos Radian | 1987–1989 |
Giora Becher | 1989–1992 |
aInitially, he was appointed trade commissioner of Israel for Southeast Asia, and following Nehru’s reservations over India not being part of Southeast Asia, on June 7, 1951, his designation was changed to consular agent for India. On October 20, 1952, he was made honorary consul and continued in this position until June 1, 1953, when a regular diplomat from the Foreign Ministry replaced him.
bFollowing a controversial media interview in June 1982, he was declared persona non grata.
cThis position was downgraded to vice consul and continued until the mid-1980s.
dBen-Hur and Radian were technical staff who were temporarily in charge of the mission because of the Indian refusal to authorize a regular staff.
Source: Avimor, ed., Relations Between Israel and Asian and African States, 6:382.
Justifying the move, Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh told the parliament that such a function would not have been permitted anywhere in the capital.141 During the debate, the lawmaker H. V. Kamath pointedly raised a vital legal question: Is it a fact that the Consul General of Israel is accredited to the entire territory of the Republic of India?”142 This critical issue had never been clarified by the Indian government. As subsequent developments indicated, India behaved as if the consul was accredited not to the entire territory of India but only to the state of Maharashtra, whose provincial capital was Bombay. As mentioned above, while Israeli consuls were allowed to travel beyond Maharashtra, they could only do so as foreign nationals, not as consuls. According to various Israelis who had served in Bombay, until the early 1970s there were no visible restrictions on their movements, except to sensitive border areas. They had easy access to India’s minister of external affairs and often met the Indian prime ministers.143 Their official movements, however, were restricted to Maharashtra. In 1982, India even expelled the Israeli consul for a controversial media interview. It was only in 1989 that the consular jurisdiction was formally extended to the southern Indian state of Kerala, which has historic links to and a significant presence of Jewish people.
Diplomatic Contacts
Meanwhile, by late 1951 Israel was troubled by the absence of formal ties with India. Even a year after recognition, New Delhi was not taking any steps in that direction. Concerned by this, some within the Israeli foreign office proposed opening a legation in New Delhi without insisting on “reciprocity.” Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett did not favor such an idea.144 As it happened with China, he insisted on the propriety of mutuality. Though Israel was small and new, he was not prepared to forgo diplomatic protocols in favor of pragmatism. Gopal admitted that “the Israeli insistence on reciprocity created a deadlock.”145 Alternatively, it was felt that the Indian envoy in Turkey could be concurrently appointed as “Minister to Tel Aviv.”146 Either way, Israel was extremely keen to have some form of residential representation as soon as possible.
In the light of the similarities it found with India, formalization of relations was of paramount importance to Israel. Therefore, in an attempt to clarify the Indian stand and facilitate normalization, it sought to establish contacts at “the highest possible levels” and decided to depute the Foreign Ministry’s director general to India. There were some misgivings as to how Prime Minister Nehru would receive and respond to such a proposal. Israel broached the idea with the Indian ambassador in New York, B. N. Rau, who in turn conveyed it to New Delhi. Rau quickly secured the necessary clearance, with late February 1952 as the suitable meeting time.147 Things began to move swiftly. Israel made a formal request for Walter Eytan’s visit with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who was then the acting foreign minister, writing to his Indian counterpart. Nehru quickly extended an official invitation.148 Eytan reached New Delhi on February 28 and spent a full week in India before leaving for home on March 7. For logistical reasons, he made a long stopover in Karachi both into and out of New Delhi. A closer look at his thirteen-page “New Delhi Diary” clearly indicates that the exchange of diplomatic missions was a foregone conclusion.149
During his stay, Eytan met a host of diplomats, public figures, and others, including President Rajendra Prasad, Nehru’s daughter and future prime minister Indira Gandhi, Foreign Ministry Secretary-General G. S. Bajpai, Foreign Secretary K. P. S. Menon Sr., Commonwealth Secretary R. K. Nehru, Nehru’s sister and India’s ambassador in Washington Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Minister of Rehabilitation A. P. Jain, and the secretary of the Food and Agriculture Ministry and the secretary of the Indian Council of World Affairs, A. Appadorai. In short, the Israeli visitor met all those who mattered in the Indian capital. The culmination of his visit was a lunch with the prime minister on March 4, 1952, where Nehru explicitly referred to the domestic Muslim factor as a major concern but added that as soon as the newly elected government assumed office, the issue of normalization would be put before the cabinet and a positive decision would be available in about two months’ time.
Walter Eytan was satisfied that the Indian bureaucracy was favorably disposed toward full diplomatic ties with Israel. R. K. Nehru, the Commonwealth secretary and a distant cousin of the prime minister, was the sole exception. During the visit, there were discussions about the level of diplomatic representation, and Prime Minister Nehru felt that the opening of legations should be reciprocal. Furthermore, an official in the ministry was asked to prepare the budget and other financial details for a resident Indian mission in Tel Aviv.150 In March 1953, an Israeli diplomat updated Eytan on the normalization front: “(1) The decision to establish relations with Israel is still valid; (2) India’s Muslim minority has nothing to do with the delay in the establishment of relations; (3) The main factor is rather the Kashmir dispute. India needs the support of Arab states at the UN and fears it will jeopardize its chances for such support by establishing a diplomatic representation in Israel.”151
These developments clearly indicate that Nehru favored normalization and made a commitment as such to Eytan. Under his explicit instructions, the ministry worked out the budgetary provisions of an Indian mission in Israel. Dispelling early Israeli misgivings, Nehru insisted on reciprocity and dismissed suggestions of a nonresident Indian envoy to Israel. However, subsequent events belied not only Israeli expectations but also Nehru’s firm commitments to Eytan.
Because of the absence of formal diplomatic ties with New Delhi, Israel began cultivating diplomatic contacts with India in a number of countries. Such contacts were usually maintained in Washington, New York, London, and in non-Western capitals such as Ankara and Rangoon. What were the motives? First and foremost, such contacts are part of normal diplomatic courtesies. Posted away from home, it was natural for Indian and Israeli diplomats to be friendly and cordial toward one another. In the earlier days, India was considerably admired by the Israeli elite and a number of Indian diplomats were favorably disposed toward Israel. Moreover, some of the Indians who were in close contact with the Zionists in the pre-1947 years had become ambassadors, and thus their contacts were strengthened. They included Panikkar, Rau, and Shiva Rao.152 As the discussions between Rau and Eban in Washington and C. S. Jha and Eliahu Sasson in Ankara portrayed, both sides shared a genuine feeling of warmth. Indian missions abroad, at times, served as a conduit for Israel to convey various messages, proposals, and offers to the government of India.153
In some cases, diplomatic contacts with India in third countries proved helpful to Israel when the diplomat in question was posted back to New Delhi (as in the case of C. S. Jha)154 or posted elsewhere (as with Panikkar). They were used for direct access to Indian leaders, including the prime minister. In a hitherto unknown meeting, an Israeli diplomat had a personal meeting with Nehru’s senior cabinet colleague Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, when the latter was visiting Turkey. In June 1951, Indian Minister C. S. Jha took the initiative and organized a lengthy meeting between Azad and the Israeli diplomat Eliyahu Sasson. During this meeting, Azad did not object to the normalization of relations with Israel.155 Likewise, personal contacts enabled Israel to explore and push for diplomatic ties. The observations of K. P. S. Menon, a secretary in the foreign ministry, a few months after Eytan’s visit testifies to this. Lamenting on the situation, Menon informed Eytan that he was “very sorry that the exchange of Missions between India and Israel has not yet taken place…. I shall do all I can from this end, as I am really keen that we should establish a Mission in Israel without further delay.”156
Indian diplomats proved to be a source of information for Israel regarding the Middle East. Such contacts filled Israel’s information gaps regarding Arab countries and inter-Arab rivalry. One such lengthy rendezvous took place at the British countryside residence of the veteran historian Captain Basil Liddell Hart on September 6, 1953. He hosted Israel’s ambassador in London, Elath, and India’s ambassador in Cairo, Panikkar.157 Similarly, Jha briefed his Israeli counterpart in Ankara about the activities and discussions surrounding the visit of Arab League Secretary General Azzam Pasha to Turkey in June 1951.158 Such meetings also enhanced India’s understanding of the Middle East and Israel’s experiences with its Western allies. In the absence of official Indian documents, it is impossible to quantify and substantiate the benefits accrued to India through its diplomatic contacts with Israel in third countries.
Such extensive contacts, especially during the Nehru years, indicate the level of warmth between the two countries. These contacts were regular and periodic; they include interactions between Abba Eban and B. N. Rau in New York, Eliahu Elath and Vijayalakshmi Pandit in Washington and later in London, and Eliahu Sasson Sr. and C. S. Jha in Ankara. Moreover, personal contacts between Elath and Panikkar and Eytan and K. P. S. Menon Sr. continued even when they were no longer posted in the same capitals. Indian delegates to the United Nations such as Shiva Rao, Kitty Shiva Rao, Amiya Chakraborthy, and Sucheta Kripalani maintained contacts with Israeli personalities. There was also a surprisingly long meeting between Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh and his Israeli counterpart Abba Eban in October 1969. The meeting, which took place in New York, came shortly after the Rabat fiasco, when India unsuccessfully tried to attend the Islamic summit.159
Besides these connections, there were a number of bilateral visits even when both countries lacked formal ties. Most of these visits in the pre-1992 period are shrouded in secrecy, and a comprehensive list is impossible to compile. In March 1953, when Nehru was contemplating normalization, four senior state-government officials were sent “to study the Israeli cooperative system of agriculture and marketing.”160 In 1960, the Indian lawmaker and Nehru’s former cabinet colleague Amrit Kaur visited Israel; as a sequel to this visit, Ben-Gurion extended a formal but rebuffed invitation to Nehru.161 During this period, one of important visitors from India was Homi Bhabha, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.162 A few planned visits did not materialize: for example, upon his transfer from New Delhi to Moscow, Menon was unable to stop in Israel in 1954 to meet his old friend Eytan.163
Similarly, a number of Israeli leaders and officials visited India. Until the mid-1970s, when Indian visas became difficult for Israeli passport holders, a number of Israeli scientists came to India to participate in various international meetings. They were often used as a meeting point for scientists from both countries.164 Israeli scientists came to India as part of various UN-sponsored programs. The Israeli labor federation Histadrut sponsored a number of visits to India, often at the invitation of the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), a trade union affiliated with the Congress Party.165 In subsequent years, things deteriorated, and India refused to grant visas to Israeli nationals, including athletes, thereby preventing Israeli participation in a number of international meetings and events organized and hosted by India.
At the political level, a number of official and semiofficial visits took place during the nonrelations years. Among the notable visitors to India were Eytan (1952); Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett (1956); Labor Minister Yigal Alon (1964); Minister of Development Mordechai Bentov (1959); Ruth Dayan, the wife of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (1968); and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan (1977). The visit of Sharett took place in the midst of the Suez crisis, and despite his strong opposition to Ben-Gurion’s adventure, the Israeli leader was forced to defend his government’s actions when he met Prime Minister Nehru on October 30.166 In late 1961, Foreign Ministry Director General Gideon Rafael, a successor of Eytan, met Nehru in New Delhi, during which the Indian prime minister reluctantly admitted that relations should have been established immediately after recognition.167 Contacts also existed between India and international Jewry, notably the meeting between Nehru and Chairman of the World Zionist Organization Nahum Goldman in June 1957 in New Delhi. Coming shortly after the Suez crisis and severe Indian criticism of Israel, Goldman was trying to fathom, if not modify, India’s position on normalization.168
In the end, such diverse contacts and diplomatic maneuvers were interesting but not fruitful. For over four decades, Israel was unable to make progress on the normalization front. At one time, Israel even contemplated shifting its consulate from Bombay to New Delhi. Such a move appeared logical in the wake of the Indian shift regarding diplomatic representation. In August 1953, it decided that effective September 15, “officers stationed elsewhere than at the headquarters of the Government of India will not be deemed to be members of the Diplomatic Mission, and will no longer be included in the Diplomatic List.”169 Transferring the consulate to New Delhi in accordance with the new regulations had drawbacks. In the early 1950s, Israel was still hoping for a reciprocal move from India on normalization. Speaking about diplomatic ties, Nehru highlighted the reciprocal nature of relations and clearly declared:
Yes. If we send an Ambassador to Washington or Nanking, they may also send an Ambassador to New Delhi. The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informally indicated to the Government of India that the Australian Government will be happy to raise the status of the Australian High Commissioner here to that of Minister. Naturally it means that our representative in Australia will also become a Minister.170
It was obvious that India favored reciprocal relations, and thus Israel would not be able to shift its consulate to New Delhi without the latter opening a resident mission in Israel, something Nehru had been resisting since the mid-1950s.
This dilemma perhaps explains why Israel explored the possibility of the Indian ambassador in Turkey being concurrently accredited to Israel. Such a move might have enabled Israel to have a consulate in New Delhi endowed with full diplomatic status. Others had a different view. They felt that a consulate in New Delhi, being of a lower representation, would attract undue attention, given that the Arab states had full-fledged embassies in the Indian capital.171 However, by the time Israel was contemplating a consulate in New Delhi without any reciprocal arrangement, India’s position on normalization had hardened, and any change in the status quo became remote.172
Following his visit to New Delhi to attend an annual conference of the World Health Organization in 1961, the Israeli diplomat Gideon Rafael remarked: “Besides regular meetings with leading representatives of India at the United Nations, sporadic friendly talks with Mrs. Pandit, Nehru’s sister, and agitated and exasperating meetings with Krishna Menon, the Prime Minister’s confidant, no official dialogue of consequence between the two countries had taken place in the intervening years [that is, since the early 1950s].”173 This was true for most of the four decades since India’s recognition of Israel.
If one looks at the Israeli experience, its diplomatic initiatives proved successful only in five major areas, and India does not figure in any of them. First, those countries with a sizeable Christian population and a better understanding of the Judeo-Christian heritage were quick to recognize Israel and normalize relations. Countries from Europe and Latin America fall into this category. Second, countries with a sizable Jewish population and thus Jewish influence recognized Israel rather early. The United States and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, could be cited as examples. Third, countries with a hostile or unfriendly attitude toward the Arabs looked to Israel as a possible ally; non-Arab countries in the Middle East such as Iran and Turkey are the notable examples. Fourth, those seeking closer ties with the United States looked to Israel and its supporters in the United States as potential allies. The attitude of Turkey toward Israel amply exhibits this calculation.174 And finally, Israel’s technical-assistance program proved helpful for a number of newly independent countries in Africa who were either apprehensive of Western assistance or did not receive adequate attention in the West.
India came under a different category. Its politico-economic situation was relatively better than a number of newly independent countries of that time. Thus the need for Israeli assistance was limited. To complicate matters further, a sizeable domestic Muslim population brought India closer to the Arab perception of the Middle East and its problems. Thus, for a long time, nonrelations dominated India’s Israel policy.