4th Canadian Armoured Division Staff Organization 1 August 1944
The typical Canadian battlefield general of the Second World War leading troops in action was in his mid-30s at the beginning of the war, with some ten to fifteen years service. He was a Permanent Force (PF) soldier, likely from the artillery or infantry, educated at the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston and the British Army Staff College. At the beginning of the war he was a junior officer (lieutenant or captain) and had risen with extraordinary speed through the ranks as the army expanded.1 The Canadian Army was fortunate that it was almost four years before any of its divisions saw sustained action and five years before all were involved. This allowed for an extended time in training to help the new crop of Canadian generals learn their craft and at the same time weed out those who could not make the grade.2
Kitching belonged to a small cadre of senior officers who had gained experience in Sicily and Italy before landing in Normandy. His military career encompassed service in both the British and Canadian Armies. He was accepted into Sandhurst in January 1929, graduated 35th out of 175 in July of 1930 and was commissioned into the 2nd Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment.3 In the 1930s, he was a platoon and company commander with the British Army, initially in Singapore and later in India where he stated that he participated in a number of extensive manoeuvres involving as many as 20,000 men.4
Kitching resigned his commission in the British Army and emigrated to Canada in 1938. After the outbreak of the war, Kitching joined the Royal Canadian Regiment as a 2nd lieutenant in September 1939. He rose rapidly in rank serving in a number of staff and command positions. In 1940, he attended the British Staff College in Camberley for six months and in 1942, as a lieutenant colonel, he was given command of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment. Kitching was appointed the GSO1 of the 1 Cdn Inf Div in 1942 and participated in the invasion of Sicily. He was promoted to brigadier in 1943 and was given command of the 11 Cdn Inf Bde in Italy.
In February 1944, Kitching was promoted Major General and given command of 4 Cdn Armd Div without any further formal education or training. He did, however, possess a considerable amount of practical experience of combat operations from his time in Sicily and Italy under Simonds’ mentorship.5 By modern standards, Kitching’s rise through the ranks represents a fantastic accomplishment, but in the rapid expansion of the Canadian Army in the Second World War rapid promotion was not uncommon for those identified with higher command potential.
The Canadian Army kept a detailed list of its senior officers, Lieutenant Colonel and above, with notes on their potential for future assignments. The Canadian Army practice was to reward an individual with higher command, based on perceived potential, regardless of their arm of service. For example Crerar wrote, ‘I do not consider that previous armoured experience is essential but it is certainly an important factor [to command armoured divisions].’6 This practice resulted in the selection of officers with infantry and artillery backgrounds to lead armoured divisions.
The report, Recommendations for Promotion Officers, 1 Cdn Corps, dated 14 January 1943, commented upon Lieutenant Colonel Kitching’s performance from 5 June 1942 to 9 January 1943. There is only one remark on Kitching dated 9 January 1943, which stated ‘Good prospect for Bde Comd with more experience’.7 This statement is a reflection of the assessment made on Kitching by Major General H.L.N. Salmon in a letter to the corps commander, 1st Canadian Corps, dated 4 November 1942.8 Kitching’s skill as a staff officer grew under Salmon, and Kitching recalled having learned much under his command.9
Kitching’s strong performance as the GSO1 of 1 Cdn Inf Div in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns brought him to the attention of the senior leadership of the Canadian Army. On 26 September 1943, a special meeting of the senior army leadership considered recommendations and appointments within the army command structure.10 The minutes reflected that Lieutenant General A.G.L. McNaughton, Commander of First Canadian Army, was prepared to accept either Kitching or Lieutenant Colonel B. Hoffmeister to command either the 9 or 11 Cdn Inf Bdes. In a message dated 27 September 1943, McNaughton informed Simonds that Kitching and Hoffmeister had been selected as Infantry Brigadiers in 3 Cdn Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div. Crerar, in a letter on the following day to McNaughton, expressed his desire for a quick decision on who – Kitching or Hoffmeister – would be selected to command 9 Cdn Inf Bde. Crerar wanted the new brigade commander in place before the start of exercise ‘Pirate’, scheduled to begin on 17 October 1943.11
Events in Italy, however, worked to resolve the issue. Simonds was taken ill with jaundice, causing a ripple-down effect in the Canadian command structure. Major General Vokes replaced Simonds as GOC 1 Cdn Div and Hoffmeister was designated to replace Vokes. Therefore, on 29 September 1943, Hoffmeister assumed temporary command of the 2 Cdn Inf Bde.12 Hoffmeister’s appointment and, coincidently, the appointment of Kitching to command 11 Cdn Inf Bde of the 5 Armd Div, was authorized by message on 20 October 1943.13
In January 1944, Simonds asked Kitching if he would consider returning to England to be the Brigadier General Staff (BGS) for 2 Cdn Corps; in effect, recreating the working relationship that they had established during their time in 1 Cdn Div.14 Kitching agreed, which meant that he would have to give up his much coveted brigade command. Simonds made the initial request to have Kitching appointed as his BGS to Crerar by telephone on 16 January 1944, and followed the requested with a letter dated 17 January 1944. Simonds stated,
If I am to go back and take over 2 Corps, it would be of great assistance to me if Kitching could be spared as B.G.S. . . . He knows my formula for the organization and functioning of a HQ. Thinking over the potential B.G.S.’s I know of no one with a better background and training.15
The fact that Kitching was prepared to give up a command to follow Simonds speaks to the deep admiration that Kitching had for Simonds. Kitching’s admiration for Simonds transcended the events in Normandy and continued until their respective deaths.
In an undated letter written to Lieutenant General E.L.M. Burns, 1 Cdn Corps Commander in Italy, Crerar discussed the ‘slate’ of commanders available to command either armoured divisions or armoured brigades. Kitching was third on the list with Brigadier R.A. Wyman at the top. The body of the letter indicated that Wyman, based on his long armoured experience in Italy, was best suited to replace Worthington as GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div. The letter revealed that Simonds was unhappy with Wyman and suggested Kitching.16 The underlying text in this letter is that finding the right individuals to command the two armoured divisions was weighing on the minds of both Crerar and Burns. The other interesting observation is that the decision had been made at the time the letter was written to replace Worthington.
In a follow-up letter from Burns to Crerar, dated 7 February 1944, Kitching was now the top selection for command of an armoured division because of his ‘active experience’ and Brigadier L. Booth was listed at the top of the list for those slated to command an armoured brigade. Later in the letter, in a paragraph interestingly starting with the phrase ‘May I suggest the following solution to the concrete problem . . .,’ Burns recommended Kitching for command of the 4 Cdn Armd Div with Brigadier J.D.B. Smith to remain in command of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde. Burns left the final decision for command of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde to Crerar.17 On 12 February 1944, Crerar informed Burns that official notification had been received appointing Kitching to command 4 Cdn Armd Div.18
Did Kitching have the correct set of competencies to command an armoured division in Normandy? He had no previous armoured training or armoured command experience.19 He was an infantry officer. While it was not uncommon to have armoured divisions commanded by officers from the other branches, a conscious decision was made, based on his proven ability, to appoint Kitching to command 4 Cdn Armd Div.
Simonds must have felt him capable to command; otherwise he would not have recommended the appointment. Even with his unique combination of education and experience, Kitching would have been forced into a steep learning curve on armoured warfare when he took over command of the division. What he did have, however, was a practical sense on how the main elements of the division, armoured, infantry and artillery, and their supporting elements, should work.
While commanding the 11 Cdn Inf Bde, Kitching’s men fought a bitter battle against the veteran German 1st Parachute Division in January 1944 in the Arelli area. Although the attack was repulsed, Kitching professed to have learned a number of important lessons, which he discussed in Mud and Green Fields. He summarized his thoughts as follows: ‘The degree of cooperation between infantry and tanks, particularly in an armoured division, is frequently the measure of success or failure.’20
There is also another interesting passage in his book in which he evaluated Canadian success in battle. Kitching attributed earlier Canadian success to the fact that control of the battle was with the companies and battalions who were fighting it. Unit commanders were told what to do and were given the room in which to do it.21 The fog of war, infantry-tank cooperation and mission-specific orders would become important elements in Kitching’s understanding of battle. The key question was whether he would have the opportunity and time to impart his knowledge, experience and understanding of armoured warfare upon the leaders and men of his division.
Kitching inherited a staff whose members had been with the division since 1943.The GSO1 for 4 Cdn Armd Div when Kitching took over command was Lieutenant Colonel Ed Ganong. Little has been written about Ganong in secondary sources. He had been the CO of the 48th Highlanders of Canada prior to becoming the GSO1 of 4 Cdn Armd Div.22 The 1943 Recommendations for Promotion document stated that Ganong was a good prospect for brigade command with more experience.23 When, as GOC of 4 Cdn Armd Div, Kitching provided recommendations for brigade command, he selected Ganong.
The 27 May 1944 Recommendation for Command submitted by Kitching on Ganong stated that Ganong was a sound and capable officer who had been previously recommended by Worthington for command of a brigade. Ganong had commanded the 10 Cdn Inf Bde satisfactorily in an acting capacity for a period of one month when the division was in Norfolk. Simonds’ additional comments on the recommendation noted that when Ganong took over command of the 48th Highlanders, he (Simonds) was the commander of 1 Cdn Inf Bde. Simonds watched Ganong improve the tactical training and administration of the unit to a high standard of efficiency and it was largely as a result of this successful command that Simonds had recommended Ganong for Staff College.24
Ganong was selected to attend the Senior Staff Course at Minley Manor from 3 December 1942 to 6 May 1943. He was one of only six Canadian officers to attend this course throughout the war.25 Ganong was appointed GSO1 of the 4 Cdn Armd Div on 7 May 1943 and would remain in that position until 3 August 1944 when he was selected to command the 4 Cdn Inf Bde.
Lieutenant Colonel Fred Wigle replaced Ganong as the GSO1 in August 1944 and soon established a system that Kitching described as bringing ‘more life to the general staff’.26 Wigle was young, capable and full of enthusiasm. He was described by his subordinates and peers as a brilliant man, a fearless and inspirational leader who inspired trust from those with whom he worked. Before joining the army Wigle was a successful businessman and athlete who had been captain of the McGill University football and hockey teams.27
Wigle was renowned for his elaborate orders groups; he was known to be quite explicit in what he wanted and rarely invited discussion.28 Wigle would remain GSO1 until 29 January 1945 when he was appointed to command the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Argylls). The regimental history of the Argylls, Black Yesterdays, is replete with concerns expressed by regimental members over the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Dave Stewart as their commanding officer and the fact that Stewart was being replaced by a staff officer from division. These concerns quickly faded once Wigle was in command but one of the noted remarks about his time in command was that ‘his [Wigle’s] orders were complete right down to the last comma’.29 While Wigle’s style was by the book, it is clear that he made an immediate impression on Kitching and the staff as a whole.
Wigle, like Kitching, inherited a cohesive staff that had been through an extensive training programme conducted by Kitching in England. The members of his GSO II and GSO III ops staff joined the division either shortly before or shortly after Kitching took over command. This continuity in part explains the successful transition of staff leadership from Ganong to Wigle during the first week of August 1944.30
Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Proctor was appointed AA&QMG of 4 Cdn Armd Div on 27 August 1943. Like Ganong, very little information exists about this officer. Prior to his appointment to 4 Cdn Armd Div, Proctor had been the 2 Cdn Inf Bde staff captain and then became the AQMG of 2 Cdn Corps.31 After taking command, Kitching soon realized that Proctor was the driving force in his headquarters. Kitching described him as having a good military grounding at RMC, physically strong and a hard worker who knew what was wanted.32 Proctor was promoted to colonel on 13 March 1945 and was appointed commander, First Canadian Army Terminals.33
The senior staff team of Ganong and Proctor would become a formidable combination in the training of the division in the run up to their entry into battle. The Wigle/Proctor tandem would become equally as impressive in the execution of operations in Normandy. Together, these men and their collective abilities nicely complemented those of Kitching, producing a very capable command team.
Supporting Ganong/Wigle and Proctor were the brigade majors of the two brigades. Wigle’s counterpart in 10 Cdn Inf Bde was Major J.G. Armstrong. He joined the Brigade in August 1943 as did the majority of his subordinate staff. Proctor’s counterpart was Major E.W. Cowdry who joined the Brigade on 2 May 1944. The majority of Cowdry’s officers joined the Brigade in 1943.34
Major A.G. Chubb was the brigade major for the 4 Cdn Armd Bde. Chubb joined the Brigade in December 1943. The members of Chubb’s subordinate staff were all with the division by March 1944 and the key senior staff officers remained in place throughout August 1944.35 The majority of the staff at both brigade and division level that trained with the division before entry into theatre would remain with the division during the timeframe examined herein.
On the surface, Kitching was seen to be lucky in having a number of commanders with combat experience posted to the division. The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was commanded by Brigadier Jim Jefferson. Kitching viewed him as a quietspoken man who gave the impression he was slow on the uptake because Jefferson always mulled over a question before replying. According to Kitching, that period of thought and his slow spoken replies fooled many people. Jefferson, who had commanded the Loyal Edmonton Regiment and won a Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in Italy, was promoted to Brigadier to command the 10 Cdn Inf Bde while Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Booth, who had commanded the Three Rivers Regiment in Italy, took over the armoured brigade. Brigadier Herm Lane took over command of the division artillery.36
While the concept of bringing back experienced regimental COs from Italy to command the brigades was viewed as a smart move, the reality was that not all officers could successfully make the transition to higher level command. Booth was viewed as one who did not make the transition. While Booth was viewed as a fearless individual, Chubb later claimed that Booth was a poor brigadier and had no clear understanding of how to use his staff, which made it very difficult to achieve the synergy needed in battle. Chubb also claimed that Booth’s tactical knowledge was very limited as were his ideas for training.37 The other shortcoming was alcohol abuse, for which Kitching counselled him. Many of Booth’s shortcomings would come back to negatively influence the conduct of operations for the division in August 1944.
Brigadier Robert (Bob) Moncel made a successful transition from staff to brigade command. Like Kitching, Moncel had joined the RCR at the outbreak of war as a lieutenant and was promoted to captain one year later. He commanded the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt from 31 January 1943 to 26 August 1943 and was then selected as the GSO1 2 Cdn Corps in August 1943. Moncel remained in that position until he took over command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde on 19 August 1944.38 Simonds had recommended Moncel for command of an armoured brigade on 30 May 1944 and on 8 August Simonds and Kitching agreed that Moncel would take over command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde on a permanent basis if Booth became a casualty.39
Of the four regimental commanders of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde – Lieutenant Colonels D.G. Worthington (British Columbia Regiment (BCR)), M.J. Scott (Governor General’s Foot Guards (GGFG)), W.W. Halpenny (Canadian Grenadier Guards (CGG)) and J.E.V. Murrell (Lake Superior Regiment) – none had previous combat experience. Most of these officers had taken over their regiments in 1943 and had had the time to gain familiarity with and train them in England. Kitching judged Worthington to be the ‘most outstanding regimental commander in the armoured brigade’ stating that he was young, ‘full of energy and quick to seize an opportunity’.40 Of this group, only Halpenny would be in command of his regiment when Kitching was relieved on 21 August.
Lieutenant Colonels Gordon Dorward de Salaberry ‘Swatty’ Wotherspoon (South Alberta Regiment (SAR)), Dave Stewart (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Argylls)), J.Q. McQueen (Lincoln & Welland Regiment (Lincs)), and Don Hay (Algonquin Regiment), were the regimental commanders in 10 Cdn Inf Bde.41 Kitching viewed Jefferson as an experienced, solid brigade commander. Wotherspoon claimed that Jefferson lacked the imagination needed to properly apply combined arms tactics and, as a result, he (Wotherspoon) and Stewart ran the tactics in the brigade. Wotherspoon had taken over command of the SAR in April 1943. Previously he had been a student and then an instructor at the Senior Officers’ School in Oxford where he is reported to have received one of the highest marks ever given a student. As a result, Wotherspoon believed his understanding of combined arms tactics was superior to Jefferson’s even though Jefferson had much more combat experience.42
4th Canadian Armoured Division Staff Organization 1 August 1944
Stewart was recognized as the most competent of the infantry battalion commanders in the division and the Argylls were to gain a reputation as one of the better infantry regiments, well capable of executing the infantry-cum-tank tactics needed in Normandy and beyond. Lieutenant Colonel D. Hay had held temporary command of the Argylls as a major from 10 July 1943 to 23 September 1943 until Stewart took over.43 Hay remained a member of Stewart’s Argylls before moving over to take command of the Algonquin Regiment in March 1944. Lieutenant Colonel J.Q. McQueen took over command of the Lincs on 2 January 1944. He had previously served with the Calgary Highlanders and in 1942 he had been the senior Canadian officer of the First Canadian Special Service Battalion.44
Kitching inherited a division that had a reasonable mix of new and seasoned commanders and staff officers. Some were newly appointed but had recent combat experience in either Sicily or Italy, and others lacked combat experience but had been training with their respective commands for some time. Each would be tested to the maximum of their capabilities in Normandy. It would be up to Kitching to mould these men into a cohesive team that was able to operate effectively in their assigned roles in Normandy and beyond. Kitching had a significant amount of experience to impart in preparing his division for the coming battle. The time available to train the division was to be short and filled with many challenges.