Introduction
1. Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, Every Man A Tiger (New York: G.P. Putmam’s Sons, 1999), 234.
2. Alistair Irwin, ‘The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield’, Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December 1996), 227.
3. Eliot Cohen, A. and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1990), 246.
4. Williamson Murray, ‘Armoured Warfare: The British, French, and German experience’, in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. See also Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Harold, Winton, ‘Tanks, Votes, and Budgets: The Politics of Mechanization and Armoured Warfare in Britain, 1919–1939’ in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941, ed. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, 74–107 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
5. C. Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: Collins, 1952), 477. Other sources supporting these views include C. D’Este, Decisions in Normandy (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994); Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, Department of the Army, 1961).
6. John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 2.
7. Foulkes was the GOC of the 2 Cdn Inf Div from 11 Jan 44 to 9 Nov 44. C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III, the Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 1944–1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 276.
8. Tony Foster, Meeting of Generals (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 366.
9. David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919– 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 273.
10. Ibid., 246.
11. Ibid., 272.
12. Buckley, British Armour, 67–68.
13. J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 169–170.
14. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 276.
15. Ibid.
16. Paul Douglas Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 321. Kitching’s dismissal was used by the Somali Inquiry as an example of replacing ineffective commanders. Page 10 of 15. Somalia Commission, ‘Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Defining Leadership’, Government of Canada, www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol2/v2c15e.htm (accessed 09/25/2006).
17. John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), 313.
18. Ibid., 306.
19. Ibid., 307.
20. While Kitching was a young Major General at 33 years old, he had considerably more military experience than the average Canadian general from his previous service with the British Army, his continuous employment with Simonds as his General Staff Officer 1 (GSO1) in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns and in his brief time as commander of the 11 Cdn Inf Bde. The ‘youth without knowledge’ moniker for Kitching is therefore misleading. Ibid., 308.
21. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire the Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 267.
22. Ibid., 266
23. Ibid., 236
24. Ibid., 236
25. Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (Viking, 2009), 467.
26. Message Crerar to Stuart [Kitching Dismissal], 211900B August 44. Crerar Papers MG30 E 157 Vol. 3 File 958C.009 (D178 ) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3, HQ First CDN ARMY. Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44.
27. During discussions with Kitching on a 1990 tour of the Normandy battles, I learned that the manuscript for his memoirs was actually much larger and that Kitching had a number of difficulties with the original publisher. Given Kitching’s close association with Simonds that lasted until their deaths I believe Kitching would never have criticized Simonds in any way had there been further discussions of these battles.
28. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major General George Kitching (St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 1993), 206.
29. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 2–3.
30. Ibid., 232
31. Canada, Department of National Defence, Command (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996), 1–4.
32. Ibid., 1–6
33. Kevin L. Smith, ‘The Bold and the Restless: Leadership and Staff Experience’, Marine Corps Gazette 90 (May 2006), 59.
34. Specialists held designated appointments in general staff branches by virtue of their expertise in specific subject areas such as medicine, law or religion. Canada, DND, Command, 5–7.
35. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 186.
36. For example, Capt Clarence Campbell would become Commissioner of the National Hockey League, Major Mike Dare would become a future Vice-Chief of Defence Staff and Captain Clarence Shepard would become the Chairman of Gulf Oil Canada. Ibid.
37. The other four fundamental factors are moral influence, weather, terrain and command. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 63–65.
38. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1984), 13.
39. The ingredients of doctrine include ‘the nature of weapons technology, the influence of formative experiences, organizational and institutional interests, ideology, national culture and the political/ strategic situation.’ Doctrine also analyzes recent conflicts in order to learn from them. Both the British and Canadian armies would struggle with armoured doctrine throughout the war. John Gooch, ‘Military Doctrine and Military History’ in The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine: Papers Presented at a Conference Sponsored by the Director General of Development and Doctrine (Camberley, The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997), 6.
40. John Marteinson and Michael McNorgan, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History (Kitchener: The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association, 2000), 85–86.
41. Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944 from Dunkirk to D-Day (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 8.
42. Great Britain, War Office, The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components: Military Training Pamphlet No. 41, Part 1, The Tactical Handling of Armoured Divisions, 1943 (Ottawa: The War Office, July 1943).
43. Buckley, British Armour, 72.
44. Ibid, 81.
45. B.L. Montgomery, Eighth Army: Some Brief Notes for Senior Officers on the Conduct of Battle (London: Great Britain, War Office, 1942).
46. Great Britain, 21st Army Group, Notes on the Employment of Tanks in Support of Infantry in Battle (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Officer, February 1944).
47. Buckley, British Armour, 58
48. Terry Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), ix.
49. Ibid., 14.
50. Ibid., 24.
51. Ibid., 24.
52. Information was restricted to those books or sources that would have been reasonably available to British and Canadian officers during the interwar period up to 1944 when Kitching took the Division into France.
53. General Sir Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship, the Lees Knowles Lectures Delivered at Trinity College Cambridge, in 1939 (London: The Times Publishing Company, Limited, 1941), 11.
54. Major General F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command (Harrisburg: Military service Publishing Co., 1936), 21–35.
55. James Jay Carafano, After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 267.
56. Donald Graves, South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War (Toronto: Robin Bass Studio, 1998), 14.
57. For example, Reginald Roy commented in his book 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984) on the lack of source document information when discussing the performance of the 4 Cdn Armd Div. He specifically cites 15 August 1944. He concluded that as a result of the lack of the wireless logs of Headquarters, 4 Cdn Armd Div, and the general lack of communication between the armoured regiments and brigade headquarters itself during that day, it was virtually impossible to provide an accurate accounting of the movements and actions of the three armoured regiments of the brigade during the day. Reginald Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1984), 275.
58. The book was found in the Governor General’s Foot Guard Museum in Ottawa.
59. Dean F. Oliver, ‘In the Shadow of the Corps: Historiography, Generalship and Harry Crerar’ in Warrior Chiefs, eds. Bernd Hornd and Stephen Harris (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 91.
60. Paul Dickson, ‘The Limits of Professionalism: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Canadian Army, 1914–1944’ (PhD, University of Guelph).
61. These generals are Guy Simonds, Kenneth Stuart, Maurice Pope, Bert Hoffmeister, Bruce Mathews, E.L.M. Burns, Harry Crerar and A.G.L. McNaughton. Kitching is mentioned but not discussed in this book. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993)
62. Douglas E. Delaney. The Soldiers General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005)
Chapter 1: The Division Command Environment
1. R.R. Crabbe, ‘The Nature of Command’ in The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience, Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau (eds), (New York: Klumer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), 11.
2. Commission, Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Defining Leadership, 2
3. Yoji Koda, ‘A Commander’s Dilemma: Admiral Yamamoto’, Naval War College Review XLVI, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), 63.
4. B.L. Montgomery, High Command in War (Germany: 21 Army Group, June 1945), 21.
5. DND, Command, 4–10.
6. An example of an interaction would be placing a company of the motor battalion with one of the armoured squadrons to form an ad hoc battlegroup. Alberts and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 33–40.
7. Ibid., 36.
8. Great Britain, War Office, The Infantry Division in Battle:1950 (London: War Office Publications, 1950), 20.
9. Canada, DND, Command, 4–15.
10. Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery, The Path to Leadership (London: Collins Publishing, 1961), 27.
11. Normally attended by the GSO1, AA&QMG, CRA, CRE CR Sigs and representatives of staff branches as required. Canada, Army, The Armoured Division in Battle: 1952 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1953), 25.
12. War Office, the Infantry Division in Battle:1950, 10.
13. Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command, 18.
14. Letter Simonds to Dempsey, ‘Command Situation in 3 Canadian Division’, 27 July 1944. Crerar Papers MG30 E 157 Vol. 3 File 958C.009 (D178) GOC-in-C file 5-0-3 Vols I & II Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44.
15. General Harry Crerar, Letter GOC-in C 5-0-3 [Dismissal of Commanding Officers], 29 August 1944. Crerar Papers MG30 E 157 Vol. 3 File 958C.009 D178. Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May44 to 22 Dec 44.
16. Alberts and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 32.
17. DND, Command, GL-3.
18. Alberts and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 47.
19. Great Britain, War Office, The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components: Military Training Pamphlet No. 41, Part 1, the Tactical Handling of Armoured Divisions, 1943, 32.
20. Alberts and Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, 35.
21. Canadian Army, The Armoured Division in Battle: 1952, 29.
22. William J. McAndrew, ‘Fire Or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily – 1943’, Military Affairs (July 1987), 141.
23. Canadian Army, The Armoured Division in Battle:1952, 26.
24. ‘No officer whose daily life is spent in considering details or who has no time for quiet thought and reflection, can make a sound plan of battle on a high level or conduct large-scale operations efficiently. It is for this reason that the plan must always be made by the commander and NOT by his staff.’ Montgomery, Eighth Army: Some Brief Notes for Senior Officers on the Conduct of Battle, 16.
25. John R. Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army, 1944–1945: Formation Organization, Staff Technique and Administration ([s.l.]: The Regimental Historian, 1996), 57–58.
26. Ibid., 58
27. Ibid.
28. Canadian Army, The Armoured Division in Battle: 1952, 25–28.
29. Montgomery, High Command in War, 8.
30. War Office, Infantry Brigade Headquarters Standing Orders (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, October 1940), Annex A.
31. Canadian Army, The Armoured Division in Battle: 1952, 13.
32. Ibid., 24.
33. C.P. Stacey, ‘The Staff Officer: A Footnote to Canadian Military History’, Canadian Defence Quarterly 20, No. 1, Special Issue No. 2 (August 1990), 26.
34. English, A Study of Failure in High Command, 101.
35. Canada. Department of National Defence, Operational Staff Procedures Volume 2: Staff Duties in the Field (Ottawa: Government of Canada, National Defence, 1995), 1-1-1.DND, Command, 5–3.
36. Smith, The Bold and the Restless, 59.
37. Stacey, The Staff Officer, 21.
38. Smith, Op cit, 59.
39. English, Op cit, 90.
40. The three ships were the City of Venus, St Essylt and Devis. Simonds initially remained on board the Hilary after the troops landed to take advantage of the communications equipment. Kitching was able to acquire an armoured command vehicle and three 3-ton lorries that were then converted into an operations room. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 147–152.
41. Peter Thunholm, ‘Planning Under A Time Pressure: An Attempt Toward a Prescriptive Model of Military Tactical Decision Making’, in How Professionals Make Decisions, eds. Henry Montgomery, Raanan Lipshitz and Berndt Brehmer (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2005), 46.
42. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 153.
43. Sitreps included the following information: The main features of the enemy situation, Location of own units and brigades, including their HQ (as of what time), Information concerning adjacent formations including common boundaries (as of what time), The result of current operations, Weather and visibility. Fighting efficiency of own forces. The general situation described from right to left (War Diary, 4th Canadian Armoured Division-General Staff, 1–30 June 1944, App. 37, sec. 3).
44. For example, A represented day’s rations held; B, miles in Petrol Oil Lubricants (POL) held in 1st and 2nd line; C, ammunition expenditure in total rounds in previous 24 hours, and G represented the battle-worthiness of the fighting vehicles subdivided by tanks, armoured cars and scout cars. Item F identified those units that had fallen below 85 per cent of their war establishment strength (War Diary, 4th Canadian Armoured Division-Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5).
45. Broken down as follows: 13, daily; eight, weekly; 12, monthly; and 12, quarterly or as required.
46. Memorandum, Amended Schedule of A/Q Returns dated 22 Jun 44 (War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div-AA&QMG, 1–30 May 1944, App. 12).
47. Thunholm, Planning Under Time Pressure, 44.
48. Canada, Army, The Armoured Division in Battle: 1952, 23.
49. Ibid., 23–4.
50. Canada, Army, GOC1-1-3, Aide Memoire for Orders (London: Adv H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, 27 Nov 1942), introduction.
51. Montgomery, Some Brief Notes for Senior Officers on the Conduct of Battle, 6.
52. Thunholm, Planning Under Time Pressure, 43–5.
Chapter 2: The Key Players
1. Granatstein, The Generals, 8.
2. Ibid., 52.
3. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 31.
4. Ibid., preface.
5. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, Chapters 8–11.
6. General Harry Crerar, Letter Crerar to Burns [Appointments Division Command], undated. Crerar Papers MG30 E 157 Vol. 3 File 958C.009 D185 GOC-in-C File 6-1-1 Appointments Divisional Comds Period 20 Oct 43 to 11 Mar 45.
7. Ibid.
8. The exact wording states, ‘The undermentioned officers are good prospects for Brigade Commanders, but require more experience:’ Major General H.L.N. Salmon, Letter Salmon to Corps Commander 1 Cdn Corps, Recommendation for Promotion, dated 4 Nov 42 (MG 30 E 157 Vol. 5).
9. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 129.
10. The committee included Lieutenant Generals McNaughton, Crerar, Sansom and Maj-Gen Montague, Canada, Army, Minutes Of Special Meeting Held At H.Q. First Cdn Army On Sunday
26 Sep 43 (London: HQ First Cdn Army, [1943]). Crerar Papers MG30 E 157 File 988.009 (D23) Report on Officers Feb 42 to Sep 43.
11. General Harry Crerar, Main HQ 1 Cdn Corps [Change of Employment], dated 28 Sep 43. Crerar Papers, MG30 E157 file 988.009 (D23) Report on Officers Feb 42 to Sep 43.
12. Douglas E. Delaney, The Soldiers General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 71.
13. Brigadier D.G. Cunningham would eventually be appointed to command 9 Cdn Inf Bde. Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton, Message 2589 27 Sep 43 [Recommendations for Promotion to Brigadier], Crerar Papers, MG30 E157 file 988.009 (D23) Report on Officers Feb 42 to Sep 43.
14. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 174.
15. Letter Crerar to Burns [Division Appointments], undated.
16. Ibid.
17. E.L.M. Burns, Letter Burns to Crerar [Division Appointments], 7 Feb 44. Crerar Papers, MG30 E157 Vol. 5 file 958C.009 (D185) GOC-in-C File 6-1-1 Appointments-Divisional Comds Period 20 Oct 43 to 11 Mar 45.
18. Lt Gen Harry Crerar, Letter Crerar to Burns [Division Appointments], 12 Feb 44. Crerar Papers, MG30 E157 Vol. 5 file 958C.009 (D185) GOC-in-C File 6-1-1 Appointments-Divisional Comds Period 20 Oct 43 to 11 Mar 45.
19. By comparison, all of the five US armoured division commanders in Normandy had either previous armoured or cavalry experience. They were 2nd US Armd Div-MGen Edward H. Brooks, 3rd US Armd Div Leroy H. Watson, 4th Armd Div J.S. Wood, 5th US Armd Div Lunsford E. Oliver and 6th US Armd Div Robert W. Grow.
20. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 174.
21. Ibid., 151.
22. Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 96, Situation of the Canadian Military Forces in the United Kingdom, Spring, 1943. Part 1: Recent Changes in Command Staffs, para. 28.
23. Canada, Army, Recommendations for Promotions.
24. George Kitching, Memorandum 4AD/6-1-15, Recommendation for Comd-Bde Lt-Col J.E. Ganong, 27 May 44. Crerar Papers, E157, Vol. 3, File 958C.009 (D178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vol. I & II, Higher Command – Canadian Army overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44.
25. Kim Beattie. Dileas: The History of the 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1929–1956 (Toronto: The 48th Highlander of Canada, 1957), 177.
26. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 186.
27. Robert L. Fraser, Black Yesterdays: The Argyll’s War (Hamilton: Argyll Regimental Foundation, 1996), 354.
28. An interesting sidebar has emerged as to when Wigle actually took over as GSO1. Stacey notes that Wigle took over as the GSO1 on 3 August 1944, with the departure of Lt Col Ganong to command the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Kitching states that Wigle was posted to the Division in July. It is interesting to note that Wigle does not appear on any of the HQ 4 Cdn Armd Div strength returns for the month of August 1944, nor does any officer in the Division HQ appear as the GSO1. Wigle’s signature on 4 Cdn Armd Div correspondence does, however, appear as GSO1 on the operation orders for Totalize. Stacey, Victory Campaign, App. G, 666.
29. Fraser, Black Yesterdays, 404.
30. Field Return of Officers 5 Aug 44, War Diary, Headquarters Squadron, 4 Cdn Armd Div, August 1944.Wigle was killed on 14 April 45 when his tactical headquarters was attacked by Germans in the town of Friesoythe. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 558.
31. Foster, Meeting of Generals, 380.
32. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 180. Proctor was promoted to Colonel on 13 March 45 and was appointed Commander, First Canadian Army Terminals. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 668.
33. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 668.
34. Field Return of Officers, 3 June 44, War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, June 1944, App. 8.
35. Weekly Field Return of Officers 19 Aug 44, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, August 44, App. 4.
36. Ibid., 180.
37. A.G. Chubb, Letter Chubb to Roy, Dr Reginald Roy, Special Collections, University of Victoria, MacPherson Library, 23 Nov 1980.
38. He had been the GSO III, 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, then the Brigade Major of the unit and by 1943, the GSO II, HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div, Lt Gen G.G. Simonds, Memorandum, Recommendation for Command of an Armoured Brigade, CP, E157, Vol. 3, File 958C.009 (D178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vols I & II, Higher Command – Canadian Army overseas Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44, 30 May 44.
39. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 195.
40. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 187.
41. Ibid.
42. Bill Wiley and Robert L. Fraser, transcript of interview of Brigadier Gordon Dorward de Salaberry Wotherspoon for Black Yesterdays, 25 September 1986, n.p.
43. H.M. Jackson, ed. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise’s) 1928–1953. (Hamilton: The Regiment, 1953), 323.
44. Together the First Canadian Special Service Battalion and two American battalions were known as the First Special Service Force. Hayes, The Lincs, 16.
Chapter 3: The Formation of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division
1. French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 12.
2. Mechanization is defined as the substitution of mechanical power for human or animal power, mostly in the form of transportation. Armoured warfare, on the other hand, signified the development of army units in which the tank was the central element and around which the other arms (infantry, artillery, engineers) were organized. Harold Winton R., ‘Tanks, Votes and Budgets: The Politics of Mechanization and Armoured Warfare in Britain, 1919–1939’ in The Challenges of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941, eds. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 74.
3. The two most recognized ‘thinkers’ in Britain were Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Sir Basil Liddell-Hart whose debate on armoured warfare lasted for most of the interwar period. J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military thought and Armoured forces, 1903–1939 (1995), Robert Larson’s, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare 1918–1940 and Williamson Murray’s chapter ‘Armored warfare: The British, French and German experiences’ in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (1996), effectively cover the evolution of British armoured forces and their doctrine during the interwar period.
4. Winton, Tanks, Votes and Budgets, 76.
5. Harold R. Winton. To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine, 1927–1938 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 224.
6. R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1970), 21–22.
7. In the German Army of the Second World War the German soldiers, NCOs and officers were all trained to understand the value of combination of tanks, infantry artillery and engineers. This not only allowed individual divisions to employ combined arms battle groups (Kampfgruppen) but also allowed panzer divisions to do this in concert with non-motorized infantry divisions. This doctrine and its practice had been stressed as the basic German armoured doctrine before the war. R.L. DiNardo, Germany’s Panzer Arm (Wesport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 64. The extent of the influence of British armoured theory on German armoured development is discussed in Azar Gat, British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm: Revising the Revisionists (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000).
8. This duality led to the development of different types of tanks: infantry tanks and cruiser tanks. The cruiser tank was fast and mobile with moderate protection while the infantry tank was slow, heavily armoured and designed to withstand punishment as it escorted infantry units to their objectives. This two-tracked organizational structure for armoured formations was one of the initial organizational controversies within the British army concerning armoured forces. Place, Military Training in the British Army, 80–81.
9. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, 238–240.
10. Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860–1939. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988),199.
11. Ibid., 193.
12. Ibid.
13. Douglas How, the 8th Hussars: A History of the Regiment (Sussex: Maritime Publishing Co. Ltd, 1964), 97.
14. Ibid., 98.
15. Ibid., 96.
16. Ibid., 98.
17. The Canadian Defence Quarterly ceased publication at the outbreak of war in 1939. James H. Lutz, ‘Canadian Military Thought, 1923–1939: A Profile Drawn from the Pages of the Old Canadian Defence Quarterly’, Canadian Defence Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1979), 47.
18. Marteinson, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 74.
19. Canada, Army, Army Headquarters Report No. 38, Tank Production in Canada (Ottawa, 27 July 1950) para. 1.
20. Marteinson, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 78.
21. John Marteinson and G.T. Service, The Gate: A History of the Fort Garry Horse (Calgary: The Regiment, 1971), 57.
22. J.M. McAvity, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians): A Record of Achievement (Toronto: Brigdens Ltd, 1947), 25.
23. Marteinson, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 80.
24. Canada, Army, Army Headquarters Report No. 57, A Summary of Major Changes in Army Organization 1939–1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Military Headquarters, 1952), para. 23–24.
25. Ibid., 23. See also Order of Battle 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, n.p.
26. For example the Grenadier Guards recorded an intake of 633 men over 46 days in June and July 1940. Fortescue A. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1760–1964. (Montreal: Gazette Printing, 1965), 242.
27. George Stanley. In the Face of Danger: The History of the Lake Superior Regiment (Port Arthur: The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, 1960), 53.
28. Ibid., 79.
29. G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: From Tilly-La-Campagne to the Kusten Canal (Markham: Paperjack Ltd, 1948), 39.
30. Ibid., 19.
31. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 75.
32. AHQ, Report No. 57, para. 25. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corp, 92.
33. G.T. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards (Ottawa: The Regiment, 1948), 64.
34. In 1940 the Montreal Locomotive Works designed a tank based on the turret from an American M3 Lee with a cast steel hull. By June 1941 the first Ram prototype was completed and by the end of 1941 tanks were being shipped to Canadian units in England. These tanks were used by the 4 and 5 Cdn Armd Divs until they were replaced by Sherman tanks. Most of the tanks were used for training in Canada and Britain and many were converted to special tanks. Canada, Army, Army Headquarters Report No. 38, Tank Production in Canada (Ottawa, 27 July 1950) para. 14–29.
35. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 92.
36. Canada, Army. Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 113, Situation of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas Winter, 1943–44: Part 1: Progress in Equipment (Feb 1942–Dec 1943) (Ottawa: Canadian Military Headquarters, 25 January 1944), para. 11.
37. Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 110, Situation of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, Autumn, 1943. Part II: Growth of the Canadian Army Overseas, October 1942–October 1943 (Ottawa: Canadian Military Headquarters, [1943]).
38. The interesting dynamic that continued with the restructuring of armoured forces throughout the war was that armour steadily lost predominance as the war progressed. The unit ratio of armour to infantry to artillery shifted from 6:2:2 in 1939 to 4:4:4 in 1945. Place, Military Training, 97.
39. Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 9.
40. The Algonquin Regt arrived on Atlantic Transit Convoy 49 on 18 Jun 1943; 1 Battalion Lincoln and Welland Regt, on AT 55 on 22 July 43; the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada and the 23 Cdn Field Regt on AT Convoy 56 on 28 July 1943. The last unit to arrive was the New Brunswick Rangers on AT 64 on 19 September 1943. CMHQ, Report No. 110, para. 17.
41. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 335–336. By comparison an American armoured division had 564 officers and 10,052 enlisted men. The division was equipped with 83 light tanks and 168 medium tanks. Steven J. Zaloga, US Armored Divisions: The European Theater of Operations, 1944–45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 18–19.
42. War Office, MTP No. 41, Part 1, 4.
43. Ibid., 5
44. Great Britain, War Office, The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components: Military Training Pamphlet No. 41, Part 3, the Motor Battalion (London: The War Office, June 1943), 29.
45. War Office, MTP No. 41, Part 1, 7–10.
46. Terry Copp and Mike Bechthold, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy: A Visitor’s Guide (Kitchener: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2004), 147.
47. A pivot was a piece of ground from which further operations could be launched in any direction. A ‘bound’ was a move by the attacking force between two tactically significant features on the way to the assigned objective.
48. War Office, MTP No. 41, Part 1, 10.
49. Ibid., 9.
50. CMHQ, Report No. 113, para. 42 &46.
51. CMHQ, Report No. 113, para. 60.
52. The tank question was the focus of a meeting on 3 June 1943 at HQ First Cdn Army. The initial decision was to modify 600 of the available tanks with a 75mm gun and reserve these vehicles for one armoured division. Of the remaining vehicles, a hundred would be rearmed with a 75mm gun but all of these would be reserved for training purposes. CMHQ, Report No. 113, para. 61.
53. CMHQ, Report No. 113, para. 64.
54. Ibid., 65.
55. The Sherman was considered to be a much easier vehicle to maintain and repair than the listed German tanks.
56. Terry Copp and Robert Vogel, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise (Alma: Maple Leaf Route, 1983), 24.
57. CHHQ, Report No. 113, para. 77.
Chapter 4: Preparation for Battle
1. Waterproofing involved a three-step process of protecting vehicles against the corrosion involved in wading the vehicles ashore through salt water. Once the waterproofing process was complete, vehicles were restricted in how far and how fast they could travel. After stage ‘A’ vehicles could be driven 200 miles, after Stage ‘B’ they could move 10 miles and after stage ‘B2’ they could not be driven. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–30 June 1944, App. 5.
2. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 124.
3. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 125.
4. Letter 4 CAB/4-5-1 dated 26 Oct 43. War Diary, 28 Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment), 1–30 March 1944.
5. Robert A. Spencer, History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment: Royal Canadian Artillery 1941–1945 (London: Elsevier, 1945), 49–50.
6. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 124.
7. As the Allies began to encounter more fixed German positions in Africa and Italy the reports from the field now put greater emphasis on closer cooperation between the arms, both in planning and in battle. The naval type of manouevre displayed in exercise Bridon was typical of the armoured thinking between the wars on how armoured formations would operate. Graves, South Albertas, 83, 86.
8. The war diaries of both brigades were reviewed from December 1943 to February 1944. The training in March of 1944 changed completely under Kitching.
9. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 124–125.
10. Special Instructions from Major General Worthington to Brigadier Gostling dated 10 May 43.
11. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–30 March 1944, App. 2.
12. Training Instruction No. 9 TP Trg: Feb–Mar 44, dated 4 Feb 44. War Diary, 29 Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment), 1–29 February 1944, App. IV.
13. In the GGFG, there was a practice of having a gasless day every Saturday while in garrison. On these days all vehicle movement was prohibited except for Regimental HQ vehicles. It is not known whether this was a regimental practice or was mandated for all units within 4 Cdn Armd Div. It is only mentioned in the GGFG war diary. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–30 March 1944.
14. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–30 March 1944.
15. War Diary, Algonquin Regiment, 1–30 May 1944, entry 16 May.
16. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–30 May 1944, entry 4 May.
17. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–30 May 1944, entry 4 May.
18. Memo Gunnery Training dated 1 May 44. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–30 May 1944, App. 5.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Graves, South Albertas, 87.
22. Unit Circular Letter dated 20 Mar 44.War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–30 March 1944.
23. 21 Army Group, The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe; 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (Germany: 21st Army Group, 1945), 6.
24. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–30 May 1944
25. Hardening exercises usually involved physical fitness such as route marches, speed marches and sports days.
26. Monthly Summary, War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 April 1944.
27. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–30 May 1944, entry 3 May, Attachments were as follows: GGFG – Fusilier Mont Royal, CGG – Camerons of Canada, BCR – South Saskatchewan Regt. The training was to be progressive and began with lectures by the commanders where each would explain the characteristics and mechanisms of their particular service. This would progress to a tank squadron operating with a rifle company. The foundation portion of the training was focused on the communication and indication of targets between the two elements. This was considered the key to successful cooperation between the two. Tactics would develop the quick drills between the infantry platoon and tank troop in support to destroy enemy MG, an antitank position. Infantry and tanks in the attack, cooperation in defence and tactical move from assembly areas to form up points were also stressed and practiced. Memorandum, 6th Brigade Training Instruction dated 27 April 1944. Canada, Army, Army Headquarters Report No. 66, Training of 1st Canadian Army (Less 3 Cdn Inf Div & 2 Cdn Armd Bde), Dec 43–May 44 (Ottawa: Army Headquarters, 12 Jan 1954), para. 5.
28. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 180.
29. Graves, South Albertas, 87.
30. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 180–181.
31. The Bde Grp was to consist of an Inf Bde HQ, 3 Inf Bns, one Fd Regt, one anti-tank bty and one LAA bty, one Fd Coy, one MG Coy, one Inf Bde Coy RCASC, one Fd Amb, one Sec Provost. On 7 June, 10 Cdn Inf Bde was relieved of its responsibility of District Reserve in support of 45 (Br) Div in part because the brigade could no longer field the vehicles necessary, due to waterproofing, to respond in the time needed. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–30 June 1944, App. 1.
32. The Exercises were called Screen I & II and Exercise Firm Base.
33. The practice in armoured divisions was to call a 20-minute halt at the even clock hour. The units experienced problems transitioning from convoys into their harbour areas. The procedures for defence of the harbour areas were practised with fundamental problems appearing there also. Sentries were not properly briefed, sentries were talking and smoking, some were not armed and, in other cases, sentries were not posted at all. A critical observation overall was that sleep organization was lacking in most participating units. Exercise Rolem I Notes noticed by Umpire. War Diary, 4th Canadian Armoured Division-Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster, 1–30 March 1944, App. 4.
34. For example see the details of exercises Rolem, Nite, Last I &II and Jill in the 4 Cdn Armd Div AA&QMG war diaries for the March to May 1944 period.
35. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–30 March 1944, entry 10 Mar 44.
36. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–30 June 1944, App. 2.
37. Waterproofing was essentially complete by 11 June for the fighting echelons and the soft skinned vehicles shortly thereafter.
38. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–30 June 1944, entry 11 Jun
39. In a meeting on the morning of 24 June Montgomery decided that the requirement was for more infantry divisions in Normandy. The 4 Cdn Armd Div would now be the last Canadian division to be transported into the theatre for the Normandy operations. Canada, Army, Canadian Military Headquarters Report No. 162, Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part II: Canadian Operations in Jul. (Ottawa: Canadian Military Headquarters, [8 Nov 1946]), 7.
40. On 14 June, for example, Kitching addressed the CCG and spoke to the men from the traditional platform, his jeep. He emphasized the fact that 2 Cdn Corps, though highly trained, lacked battle experience and that we ‘must not therefore rush into our first action too hard and bloody our nose. We must feel out the enemy for a fortnight and learn his methods, after we would be ready for anything.’ War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1 to 30 June, 1944, entry 14 Jun.
41. The units of 4 Cdn Armd Bde were directed to carry out a series of 25-mile route marches during the period 29 June to 15 July. One way that the units tried to maximize the training value was by combining activities. For example, the GGFG carried out a series of two-day exercises that combined marches with tactical exercises. Points that were emphasized were use of ground, patrols, searching for speculative fire, fire orders and map and compass work. In this case, the squadron that arrived first on a pre-designated objective was to set up a defensive position that the other squadrons were then required to attack. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–31 July 1944, App. 7.
42. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1 to 30 June, 1944, entry 25 Jun.
43. Problem I involved an advance guard which was given the task of seizing an intermediate objective high ground and forming a firm base from which another battle group would advance on the final objective of the armoured brigade. Problem II involved a situation where the advance guard was held up by an anti-tank screen of four or five guns supported by panzer grenadiers. In Problem III, the rear guard was successfully dealt with but reconnaissance elements, on moving forward, found the road strongly held. In Problem IV, the advance continued and the force reached the intermediate objective. At the same time, information was received that the enemy had withdrawn from an adjacent point. GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div ordered the establishment of a firm base on the high ground. Memo 4 CAB/4-5-1 EXERCISE IROQUOIS, 1 Jul 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 July 1944, App. 9.
44. Memo 4 CAB/4-5-1 EXERCISE IROQUOIS, 1 Jul 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 July 1944, App. 9.
45. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 Jul 44, entry 12 Jul 44.
46. On 14 July, Kitching asked the 2 i/c of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers, Major J. Cave, who was convalescing in England, to address his officers on his experiences in Normandy. In addition, Kitching asked the CO of the 12th Manitoba Dragoons if he would outline his lessons learned. Lt Col J.A. Roberts provided Kitching with a memorandum dated 27 July 44 entitled ‘Lessons Learned Whilst Acting In An Inf Role’. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 July 1944.
47. 2 Cdn Armd Bde Report on Op Overlord dated 26 Jun 44, War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944.
48. There was little that could be done to implement the recommendations beyond making the officers and NCOs of the armoured regiments aware of what had been learned. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–31 July 1944, entry 17 Jul.
49. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 July 1944, Monthly Summary.
50. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 July 1944.
51. The area was not laid out to the liking of the armoured division staff. Not all the vehicles could be properly dug in which hindered the initial set up and functioning of A Branch. Ibid.
52. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 July 1944, entry 30 Jul.
53. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 July 1944.
54. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 July 1944, entry 31 Jul.
55. The combat elements were to replenish ammunition from A echelon when required. A echelon was then to replenish from designated ammunition points. Vehicles were to be topped up after every move with A echelon replenishing F echelon vehicles. Units were to carry two days of ration reserves which were not to be consumed except in an emergency or when authorized by brigade HQ. Memo 10 CIB/5-8-2 10 Cdn Inf Bde Adm Inst No. 1 dated 31 Jul 44. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 July 1944, App. 6.
56. Hayes, the Lincs, 20.
Chapter 5: Normandy
1. 21 Army Group, The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group, 3.
2. The best place to build air installations was the ground south of Caen and the terrain was excellent also for offensive efforts by the Allied mechanized forces. Within that territory the Allies would have sufficient ports to sustain their force, airfields to provide close air supports, room to hold the organizations servicing the armies, and space in which to manoeuvre. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 76–81.
3. The First Cdn Army, under Crerar, was to become operational at some point during this buildup. The plan was to have First Cdn Army cover the British left flank, then drive for Le Havre. The Third US Army, under Lieutenant General Patton, was to clear Brittany, seize St Nazaire and Nantes on the Loire River and cover the First US Army right flank on the march to Paris. Ibid., 71, 81
4. The Allied deception plan was known as Fortitude. The plan was designed to make the Germans think that the Normandy landings were a diversion to the real landings, which would occur at the Pas de Calais. In order to do this a fictitious Army was built in England under the command of Patton, complete with dummy tanks, planes and trucks and mock radio traffic. Part of the Fortitude plan was to convince the Germans that the Pas de Calais was the real invasion site. The success of the plan kept the divisions of the Fifteenth Army at the Pas de Calais area. For a detailed examination of ‘Fortitude’ see Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Plan. London: St Emin’s Press, 1999.
5. Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command, 31.
6. Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise, 6.
7. Great Britain, Air Ministry, Air Support: The Second World War 1939–1945 Royal Air Force (London: The Ministry, 1955), 159; Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise, 9.
8. It is within this stalemate that the debate over Montgomery’s plan began. His supporters contend that the essence of the Allied strategy throughout July was to try and draw off the German armour from west to east so that the American First and the newly created Third Army could break out in the area of St Lô. Montgomery’s critics insist that the general’s pre-invasion master plan is a fiction and that the failure to take Caen and increase the lodgement area resulted in a makeshift campaign to make up for Montgomery’s earlier failings. Robert A. Miller, August 1944. (Novato: Presidio, 1988), 8.
9. Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise, 8.
10. By D-Day there were ten Panzer or Panzer-Grenadier divisions in place in Normandy, of which only one (2 Pz Div) was up to strength and fully trained. The remainder suffered from some form of equipment, training or manpower shortages. The 21 Pz Div was up to strength and had time to train but it was equipped with modified captured, and mainly obsolete French armoured vehicles instead of panther tanks which reduced the combat power of the division. The 9, 11 and 116 Pz Div had recently arrived from the Russian Front and needed time to rest refit and reconstitute. The 1 and 2 SS PZ Div had received replacements but were short of transport and the 17 Pz Div was partially motorized and lacking in equipment. The Pz Lehr and 12 SS Pz Div had achieved a high state of readiness but were lacking certain components of their establishments. Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc, 2000), 105–106. The order of combat efficiency, most to least, for these units has been listed as 2 Pz Div, 9 SS Pz Div, 12 SS Pz Div, Pz Lehr Div, 11 Pz Div, 2 SS Pz Div, 21 Pz Div, 9 Pz Div, 17 SS Pz Gren Div,116 Pz Div, 10 SS Pz Div, 1 SS Pz Div.von Schweppenburg, Freiherr Geyr, ‘Panzer-Type Divisions (Western Front)’ in The German Army at D-Day: Fighting the Invasion, ed. David C. Isby (London: Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Limited, 2004), 96.
11. Wherever possible, the Heer tried to deploy in three distinct lines or belts. Advance positions were placed on forward terrain features to deny the enemy observation and to force him to deploy unnecessarily early. Next was a line of battle outposts sited to act as a buffer in front of a defended area as well as to deceive the enemy as to the site of the main defensive belt. Finally, the main belt or line was defended primarily by means of the schematically planned fire of all arms. Any part of the main defensive line that was evacuated had to be ‘regained by immediate or deliberate counter-attack’. Graves, South Albertas, 98–99.
12. Copp, Maple Leaf Route, 44.
13. Meyer, Grenadiers, 153.
14. HMS Roberts, Mauritius and Enterprise. Copp, Maple Leaf Route, 40–42.
15. The actual numbers vary between texts but generally range from 200 to 300 tanks. Graves, 97.
16. Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1994), 157.
17. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 203.
18. In late July at the time of the American breakthrough, there were six Panzer divisions (645 tanks) facing the Second Army and only two divisions (190 tanks) facing the Americans. Miller, August 1944, 26.
19. Copp, Fields of Fire, 187.
20. Martin Blumenson, The Duel for France, 1944: The Men and Battles that Changed the Fate of Europe (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2000), 198–199.
21. Field Marshal von Kluge took over command from Rundstedt on 2 July 44. Ibid., 199.
22. J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Bloody Victory (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Denny’s, 1984), 164.
23. Fluid combat operations forced German commanders to rely on their radio communication as the method of transmitting reports and orders instead of phone lines. This situation meant that German communication traffic was easier to intercept. Intelligence information gained through ULTRA gave accurate and timely warning of all the decisions and movements made by the Germans during the month of August. The intelligence obtained was described as ‘prompt and copious’ with all major German decisions disclosed with little delay. F.H. Hinsley and others, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume III Part II (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 239, 254.
24. ‘I spent three hours with General Keller when we took over from his division . . . We were also able to see plainly from the raised railway embankment the ruined hamlet of Tilly-la-Campagne occupied by soldiers of the 1st SS Division. Rod Keller’s 9th Brigade had failed to capture Tilly and his advice to me at the time was to leave it alone and try somewhere else.’ Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 190.
25. The Lincs were at Bourguébus, Algonquin Regiment at Hubert-Folie, Argylls at Bras and the SAR was deployed on the reverse slope between Bras and Cormelles. Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 146, Operations of First Canadian Army in North-West Europe, 31 Jul–1 Oct 44, Preliminary Report (Ottawa: Canadian Military Headquarters, 1947), para. 19.
26. CMHQ Report No. 162, para. 185
27. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 4 Aug.
28. Ned Amy, [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 10 Feb 1981.
29. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 4 Aug.
30. 4 Cdn Armd Div Provisional Operational Standing Orders Sec 2 Protection. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–30 June 1944, App. 37.
31. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 208.
32. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 21.
33. War Diary, The Lincoln & Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 1 Aug.
34. War Diary, 29 Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment), 1–31 August 1944, entry 1 Aug.
35. Ibid.
36. The 5th and 6th companies of SS Pz Gren Regt 1 of 1 SS Pz Div were defending the town. The rest of SS Pz Regt 1 and the 7th and 10th Company of SS Pz Regt 1, as well as elements of 2 Company SS Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 1 of 1 SS Pz Div, were in support. Graves, South Albertas, 105.
37. Hayes, The Lincs, 26–7. See also R. Rogers, History of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment (The Regiment, 1954), 136.
38. Rogers, History of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 136.
39. Hayes, The Lincs, 27–28.
40. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 2 Aug.
41. War Diary, The Lincoln & Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 3 Aug.
42. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 44, entry 4 Aug.
43. Wotherspoon stated that McQueen became unsettled by the death of his soldiers and would not get out of his foxhole fearing for his own death. Interview with G.D. Wotherspoon by Bill Wiley on September 25 1986, n.p.
44. McQueen was officially removed from command on 13 August. War Diary, Lincoln & Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 13 Aug.
45. Ibid.
46. When Wigle actually became part of the staff is a bit confusing. Stacey states 3 August (App. G, p. 666 Victory Campaign). Kitching stated that it was before the end of July 44, Mud and Green Fields, 186. Wigle does not show in any of the HQ 4 Armd Div strength returns in August 44. Neither is any officer designated as the GSO1. However, Ganong leaving on 3 August is duly noted. Field Return of Officers, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944.
47. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 192.
48. The information originated from the Br 53rd Inf Div which had reported that German units facing them west of the Orne River had withdrawn. David O Keefe, ‘Pushing Their Necks Out’ Ultra, the Black Watch, and Command Relations’, Canadian Military History, vol. 15, no. 1, Winter 2006, 34; War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 5 Aug.
49. The 4 Cdn Armd Div war diary reports these attacks on 3 August vice 5 August. Ibid., entry 5 Aug.
50. The 15 Cdn Field Regt fired 2,400 rounds of 25-pdr to extricate the patrol. Graves, South Albertas, 107.
51. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entry 5 Aug; War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 5 Aug.
52. Graves, South Albertas, 107.
53. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entry 5 Aug.
54. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 5 Aug. The 2 Cdn Inf Div also carried out a series of similar attacks in response to the same intelligence information against St André and May-sur-Orne.
55. On 3 August a conference was held at HQ 1 Br Corps to discuss the assistance that could be given to the British 49 Div on the 4 Cdn Armd Div left flank. It was decided to place one armoured regiment under command of 49 Br Div as an immediate counter-attack force, and the remainder of 4 Cdn Armd Bde was to be on call if necessary. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 3 Aug.
56. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 5 Aug.
57. Montgomery, High Command in War, para. 34.
58. 4th Canadian Armoured Division ADM INSTR NO 3 dated 30 Jul 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div AA&QMG, 1–31 July 1944, App. 3.
59. There are numerous other references of making changes to make operations work better such as optimizing trenches for vehicles, the set-up of charts in ops vehicles etc, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944.
60. Cassidy, Warpath: From Tilly-La-Campagne to the Kusten Canal, 96
Chapter 6: The Plan
1. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 207, 210.
2. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 263.
3. The 2 Cdn Corps already had under command the 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Divs, 2 Cdn Armd Bde and the 4 Cdn Armd Div.
4. The additional resources were 1 Pol Armd Div and the British 51 (H) Div. While the 51 (H) Div had already had combat experience, the 1 Pol Armd Div was just as inexperienced as the 4 Cdn Armd Div. Brian Reid provides a detailed analysis of Simonds appreciation and plan in Chapter Four of his book. Brian A. Reid, No Holding Back Operation Totalize Normandy, August 1944 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2005), 62–83.
5. Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 146, para. 34.
6. For an explanation of ‘tank country’ see William Murphy, ‘What is Tank Country?’ Canadian Military History 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), 69–70.
7. The work was to be completed by the two SS Pz divs in reserve and elements of the 21st Pz Div.Britain, Army of the Rhine, British Army of the Rhine Battlefield Tour: Operation Totalize: 2nd Canadian Corps Operations Astride the Caen–Falaise Road, 7–8 August 1944 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Officer, n.d.), 5.
8. G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery Volume II, 1919–1967 (Beauceville: Imprimère L’Eclaireur, 1972), 312–313.
9. Simonds had come up with the idea of converting American M7 105mm self-propelled guns called Priests which were being taken out of service into armoured personnel carriers. The M7 was based on a Sherman tank chassis. The actual conversion entailed removing the gun, seats and ammunition storage and welding armoured plates over the openings. By 6 August, 76 vehicles had been converted to the new Kangaroos which could now carry a section of infantry. Reid, No Holding Back, 84–90.
10. CMHQ Report No. 146, para. 45.
11. 2 Cdn Corps Operation Instruction Number Four, Operation Totalize Dated 5 August 44. Copy 52 War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.
12. Graves, South Albertas, 101.
13. Ibid.
14. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 36.
15. CMHQ Report No. 146, para. 47; also CMHQ Report No 169, Amendment No. 4, para. 21.
16. Miller, August 1944, 75.
17. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 210.
18. Doctrine stated that tanks usually harboured at night. None of the armoured units in the 4 Cdn Armd Div had trained in operating tanks at night in combat conditions and a specific recommendation of Exercise SPARTAN was that night movements of armoured formations be kept to a minimum. Ex SPARTAN ran from 27 Feb to 12 Mar 1943 and was the largest Canadian manoeuvre ever conducted in England Reid, No Holding Back, 91.
19. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 269.
20. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 278.
21. Nigel Hamilton. Monty: Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944 (London: Sceptre, 1987), 358; Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 211.
22. D-Day represents the day the operation is to begin and H-Hour refers to the specific hour on D-Day that the operation is to commence. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 211.
23. This was General Wade Haislip’s XV Corps. D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 441.
24. The 89th Infantry Division was activated in Norway in March 1944, left Norway on 12 June and arrived in the Rouen area around 10 July 1944. It had two regiments, numbered 1055 and 1056. The regiments were identified between May-sur-Orne and Tilly on the night of 5/6 August. Canadian intelligence listed the strength of the division as 10,550 men, 2,650 horses, 900 vehicles, 18 75mm anti-tank guns, 12 88mm anti-tank guns. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 4 Part II, 7 Aug 44, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 15.
25. Letter GOC 8-3, Simonds to Crerar, Operation ‘Totalize’ dated 6 August 1944, Crerar Papers, MG30 File E 157 Vol. 2.
26. Initially, 9 SS Pz Div, 21 Pz Div and the 503 Heavy Tank Bn left. On the nights of 4/5/6 August the 1 SS Pz Div slipped out of the German line and joined them. BAOR, British Army of the Rhine Battlefield Tour.
27. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) summary for the week ending 6 August, stated that the Germans had managed to withdraw four panzer divisions (12 SS, 1 SS, 10 SS and Panzer Lehr) from the line and a fifth (116 Panzer) was due to be withdrawn during the night of 5 to 6 August. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 132–4.
28. Letter GOC 8-3, Simonds to Crerar, Operation ‘Totalize’ dated 6 August 1944.
29. Marshall Stearns, Letter [Recollections on time with Montgomery], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 23 March 1981.
30. The estimated strength of the 1 SS Pz Div was 4 battalions of infantry with 600 per battalion, 20 Panther tanks, 45 Mark IVs panzers, 35 assault guns, 40 field artillery guns and 30 anti-tank guns over 50mm. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 4 Part II, 7 Aug 44, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 15.
31. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 200.
32. Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command, 10.
33. Colonel H. Neitzel, ‘Activity of the 89 Infantry Division’ July 1946, Manuscript B 102. Copy provided by Professor Copp.
34. CMHQ Report No. 146, para. 26.
35. Meyer states that the division had 39 Panzer IVs, one company of panzerja¨ger IVs, one panzer grenadier battalion, the division and corps escort companies, three artillery battalions and a nebelwerfer artillery battalion. Hubert Meyer, The History of the 12th SS Panzer Division (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1992), 171. The estimated strength of the 12 SS Pz Div from Allied intelligence was 3½ battalions at 600 men each, 35 Panther tanks, 45 Mark IV panzers, 30 assault guns, 30 field artillery guns, and 55 anti-tank guns over 50mm. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 4 Part II, 7 Aug 44, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 15.
36. A common claim in many texts is that the 88mm anti-tank gun caused most of the Allied tank casualties when in fact the 75mm anti-tank gun was proven to have inflicted more casualties. The 88mm gun was not considered a good anti-tank weapon because its high profile made it hard to hide or dig in, made it susceptible to artillery fire and its weight made it difficult to move. Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 152–155. See also Terry Copp, ‘Report No. 12, No. 2 Operational Research Section: Analysis of 75mm Sherman Tank Casualties Suffered between 6th June and 10th July 1944’, Canadian Military History, No. 1 (Winter 1999), 73–77.
37. Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise, 89. Kurt Meyer claims that not a single gun from the Flak Corps operated against enemy tanks from the beginning of the invasion to the Falaise Pocket. Meyer, Grenadiers, 165. The assigned roles to the Flak Corps were air defence, indirect fire support to the ground units and anti tank but only if enemy tanks had broken through and were threatening the Flak units. III Flak Korps claimed 462 aircraft shot down, 92 tanks destroyed and 14 armoured cars destroyed. Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 153–155.
38. English’s book The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, examines this change in detail. For the most recent examination of the plan see chapter 4 of Brian Reid’s book No Holding Back.
39. Outline of Instrs issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 071300B Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 12.
40. Perhaps this was a conscious decision since Quesnay Woods was an infantry objective and would have required a considerable realignment of forces and phases. Simonds’ decision to ignore Quesnay Woods must be viewed as a significant oversight in his appreciation of the terrain.
41. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 101.
42. Dominik Graham, The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 150.
43. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 193.
44. At 1100 hrs 4 August, Kitching attended Crerar’s conference on Totalize. After this conference Kitching discussed his division’s role in the forthcoming operation with Simonds. At 1800 hrs, Kitching held a conference and discussed the outline of Totalize with his brigade commanders, CRA, CRE, OC Div Sigs, OC 18 Cdn Armd C Regt, GSO1 and AA&QMG. Another Totalize conference was held at 1100 hrs 5 August. Kitching had another meeting with Simonds that day after lunch. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944.
45. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August, 6 Aug.
46. German armoured doctrine allowed a frontage of 1,500 yards for a deliberate attack by an armoured division. Roger Edwards, Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939–1945 (London: Brockhampton Press, 1998), 69. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 271.
47. This statement by Simonds is at odds with intelligence information he received on 6 Aug. In fact, that division had been withdrawn on the nights of 4/5 and 5/6 August and was in action against the Americans on the seventh.
48. The second portion of Kitching’s statement is probably closer to the truth. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 193.
49. ‘B’ time was one hour ahead of the time in England. All operational times were in B.
50. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 194.
51. By this time both the 7th and 11th British armoured divisions had reorganized into two balanced armoured/infantry brigades rather than the infantry/armoured brigades established in doctrine. Buckley, British Armour, 40.
52. Each of the 4 Cdn Armd Div brigades had a squadron from the 18 Manitoba Dragoons trailing the brigade columns. Their role was one of liaison between neighbouring formations and of gathering information and intelligence for Kitching. They were tasked with passing through the broken German line and gathering all available information about the rearward German positions in order to facilitate the drive south. Outline of Instrs GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 071300B Aug 44, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 12.
53. In total, units were to carry three days rations, and three days reserve rations with all tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and half-tracks carrying extra ammunition loads. The rationale for the extra supplies was to ensure that the attacking forces could maintain the momentum of the attack deep into German territory without being hampered by having to wait for the rear echelons to provide further supplies. 4 Cdn Armd Div Adm Order No. 1: Op Totalize dated 7 August 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, App. 2.
54. 2 Cdn Corps Adm Order Number 4 Op Totalize 5 Aug 44 copy 152, War Diary, AG &QMG Branch, HQ 2 Cdn Corps, 1–31 August 1944, App. 6.
55. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 192.
56. Reid specifically cites Reginald Roy, John English and the authors of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps History for falling into the ‘same trap’ of accepting Kitching’s comments and calls them unfortunately mistaken.
57. Reid, No Holding Back, 252.
58. Ibid., 254.
59. Outline of Instrs GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 071300B Aug 44, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 Aug, App. 12.
60. Reid, No Holding Back, 256.
61. There are four noted meetings between Kitching and Simonds on Totalize between 3 August and the ‘final’ discussion at 2115 hrs 5 August. At 1500 hrs 3 August, Kitching attended a conference at HQ 2 Cdn Corps to discuss the outline plan for Operation Totalize. At 1100 hrs 4 August, Kitching attended Crerar’s conference on Totalize. After this conference Kitching discussed his division’s role in the forthcoming operation with Simonds. At 1800 hrs, Kitching held a conference and discussed the outline of Totalize with his brigade commanders, CRA, CRE, OC Div Sigs, OC 18 Cdn Armd C Regt, GSO1 and AA&QMG. Another Totalize conference was held at 1100 hrs 5 August. Kitching had another meeting with Simonds that day after lunch. On the morning of 6 August, Kitching, the brigade commanders, CRA, CRE, OC Signals, Wigle and Proctor attended Simonds’ conference for Totalize. Kitching held his O Group in the late afternoon where he issued his final instructions for Totalize. At 1000 hrs 7 August, another conference was held at Corps HQ with GOC1 Polish Armd Div (1 Pol Armd Div) Major General Stanislaw Maczek, Kitching and Simonds. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944.
62. John F. Wallace, Dragons of Steel: Canadian Armour in the Two World Wars (Burnstown: General Store Pub House, 1994), 232.
63. Ibid.
64. Reid, No Holding Back, 257.
65. 4 Cdn Armd Div Sitrep Number 17, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 13.
66. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 6 Aug.
67. Amendment No. 3. to para. 118, CMHQ Report No. 169.
68. Montgomery stipulated that the attack was to be launched as early as possible ‘and in any case not later than 8 August.’ Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 211.
69. Reid, No Holding Back, 257–260. The same charges have not been levied against 10 Cdn Inf Bde commanders. Jefferson’s O Group was at 1000 hrs 7 August, the same time that Kitching was meeting with Simonds. War Diary 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 Aug.
70. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 7 Aug.
71. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 7 Aug.
72. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 159–160. Also recounted in Amy, [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria.
73. The regiment was guided forward solely by provosts on duty at key points. Ibid.
74. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, App. 14. The orders as expressed in the Lake Superior Regt war diary are identical. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, App. 6. Also reproduced in Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, App. XI.
75. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, App. 14; Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 518.
76. According to Canadian doctrine the tasks of an advanced guard were close reconnaissance, protection of the main columns and to drive back the enemy covering force. When the enemy was encountered in strength the formation was to form pivots on which the remainder of the armoured division could manoeuvre. These actions were designed to provide the divisional commander time to form and to execute his own plan without interference. War Office, MTP No. 41, Part 1 1943, 29–30.
77. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, App. 14.
78. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug.
79. A copy of Booth’s orders has not been found but there is evidence that Kitching sat in on Booth’s orders group. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 7 Aug.
80. Outline of Instrs GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 071300B Aug 44, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 12.
81. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, App. 6; Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 518.
82. Ibid., 517–518.
83. Ibid., 518.
84. Ibid.
85. Amy, [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria.
Chapter 7: Totalize
1. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 49.
2. Op Totalize AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2CDN ARMD BDE IN FRANCE 5 to 8 AUG 44. War Diary, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.
3. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 49.
4. By first light, Caillouet, the quarry and Gaumesnil were still in German hands. The northern half of Fontenay le Marion and Rocquancourt, which had been reported in Canadian hands at 0700 hrs on 8 August, were not completely cleared. The latter was only cleared shortly after noon. May-sur-Orne had not fallen. In the 51 (H) Div sector ‘the 154 and the 33rd Armd Bde had captured Cramesnil, St Aignan-de-Cramesnil and Garcelles-Secqueville with the woods to the south of St Aignan still to be cleared. Lorguichon was captured by the 152 (H) Bde but the Germans still firmly held Tilly la Campagne.’ The first attempt to take Tilly la Campagne and La Hogue was repulsed. Resistance finally crumbled in Tilly when a squadron of tanks from the 148th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps appeared around 0700 hrs. ‘Section II, Attack on Areas By-Passed by Armoured Columns’, BAOR, Battlefield Tour: Operation Totalize.
5. Spencer. History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 96–8.
6. Reid, No Holding Back, 260.
7. Granatstein, Bloody Victory, 170; English, the Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 274.
8. Reid, No Holding Back, 221. See also CMHQ Report No. 146 para. 56.
9. 89 Inf Div was able to launch counter-attacks and inflict ‘hy [heavy] losses’ against 51st Div at Tilly la Campagne forcing a temporary withdrawal. Ops Log 8 August serial 28, War Diary, Main HQ First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944. CMHQ Report No. 146, para. 55. Copp, Fields of Fire, 202.
10. Meyer, the History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 171.
11. CMHQ Report No. 146, para. 56.
12. Colonel H. Neitzel, ‘Activity of the 89 Infantry Division’ July 1946, Manuscript B 102.
13. A Kampfgruppe or Battlegroup can be defined as the bringing together of miscellaneous and often disparate military units to undertake a specific and local operation. Kampfgruppe Waldmüller consisted of two panzergrenadier battalions with about twenty tanks, including eight to ten Tiger tanks from the 101 SS Heavy Tank Bn. This concept was also used to build new formations from the remnants of others that had been essentially rendered non-effective. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 221.
14. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 274.
15. Meyer, Grenadiers, 158. The task given to the Poles was to seize the areas of Hill 170 and 159 north of Falaise. The attack was to be carried out in 2 phases: Phase I the Armd Bde would seize area south of Estrées-la-Campagne and Hill 140 upon relief by the Inf Bde, the Armd Bde would attack south and seize Hills 170 and 159 north of Falaise. Major General Stanislaw Maczek, ‘The 1st Polish Armoured Division in Normandy’, Canadian Military History, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2006, 51.
16. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 274.
17. Meyer, The History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 172.
18. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 262.
19. 4 Cdn Armd Div Sitrep 20 for period 072400B to 081200B.War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 17.
20. Nicholson. The Gunners of Canada, 317.
21. Spencer. History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 96–8.
22. The 15th Fd Reg was to set up near Rocquancourt and the 23rd S.P. was deployed near Verrières. Ibid., 100. CMHQ, ‘Report No. 169 Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe 1944, Part III: Canadian Operations, 1–23 Aug, para. 63; Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 317.
23. Granatstein, The Generals, 169.
24. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug.
25. Over 65 were killed and 250 wounded, including Major General Keller. More than 50 vehicles, five heavy guns and many tons of ammunition were destroyed. One of the reasons why there were so many casualties was because the Allied troops were moving in vehicles or out in the open while the German troops, being on the defensive, were in trenches or in the basements of buildings. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 194. The impact on 4 Cdn Armd Div was that the communication vehicles for 9 AGRA which was to support the 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack were destroyed leaving Halpenny force without immediate call on this artillery support.
26. Graves, South Albertas, 112; CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 70. Maczek reported that his division was held up because of the narrow frontage and the areas left unclear by the Phase I attacks. Ops Log, 8 Aug serials 95 & 103, War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.
27. 2 Cdn Corps Operation Instruction No. 4 Operation Totalize. BAOR, Battlefield Tour, App. D & E.
28. Ops Log 8 August serials 287, 299, 305, War Diary 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944. D.J. Goodspeed. Battle Royal: A History of the Royal Regiment of Canada 1862–1962. (Toronto: The Royal Regiment of Canada Association, 1962), 443.
29. Ops Log 8 August serial 72 & 75. War Diary HQ 2 Cdn Corps Main, 1–31 August 1944. There is no mention of 10 Cdn Inf Bde attacking Gaumesnil in any of the 4 Cdn Armd Div war diaries including the units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde. Since Kitching spent much of the morning at 2 Cdn Inf Div HQ it is possible that something was worked out between Kitching and Foulkes where Kitching would take on the task which was subsequently not approved by Simonds. An as of yet unexplained entry in the Corps ops log at 1530 hrs from 3 Cdn Inf Div states, ‘proposed plan of 9 Cdn Inf Bde and 4 Cdn Armd Div does not meet with approval of our sunray or of BIG BIG SUNRAY.’ See Corps Ops Log 8 August serial 78. The 4 Cdn Inf Bde ops log only records a statement that Brigadier Ganong ordered R Regt C to proceed to Gaumesnil but there is no time reference. War Diary, 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944 entry, 8 Aug.
30. Ops Log 8 August serials 320, War Diary 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.
31. Amy was frustrated by the confusion caused by the regimental O group and the move forward where he lost his first tank to a minefield. Amy stated that it ‘seemed incongruous at that time, that an Armoured Division attack was about to be launched on a Squadron-Company group frontage with the entire division lined up in full sight behind it.’ Amy, [Recollections on Normandy], Graves, South Albertas, 112.
32. According to one source the Germans brought as many as 60–80 anti-tank guns to bear against the narrow frontage of the armoured divisions. Canada, Army, Publication RB/01/P Part 2: Realities of Battle Operations in Normandy (Kingston: Government of Canada, National Defence, Canadian Forces Land Forces Command and Staff College, 1991), 7. Another source states that the Germans had approximately ninety 88mm guns in the anti-tank role. Op TOTALIZE AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2CDN ARMD BDE IN FRANCE 5–8 AUG 44. War Diary, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.
33. Spencer, History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 102.