4th Canadian Division Order of Battle from General Order 184, 5 September 1940
Armoured forces significantly changed the nature of warfare during the Second World War. Understanding their origins and development during the interwar years is crucial to understanding the outcome of operations during the war. Political imperatives, technological advances, and decisions on doctrine and training that were put in place before the start of hostilities determined in large part the outcome of the early battles. David French stated:
Politicians must bear some of the blame for the defeats that the British army suffered between 1940 and 1942. Their decisions about the priorities to be given to defence and other spending programmes, and the low priority they accorded the army compared to the navy and air force, left the army woefully unprepared in the physical sense for the kind of war it faced after September 1940. But those defeats also stemmed from the army’s own failures to develop appropriate concepts about how to fight the next war.1
The same can be said of the Canadian Government and Canadian Army during this same timeframe.
In Britain, armoured warfare and mechanization2 developed in four fairly distinct periods between 1919 and 1939. From 1919 to 1926, the army demobilized after the First World War and a small group of ‘thinkers’ hypothesized over the nature, tactics and operational concepts of a future mechanized force.3 Actual field trials with an experimental force were conducted on Salisbury Plain from 1927 to 1928. From 1929 to 1933 the results of these trials were codified in army doctrine while trials continued to try to address questions of force structure and equipment. By 1933 the army, like all other British institutions, had to deal with the devastating impact of economic depression, and experimentation was curtailed as financial resources dwindled.4
During the period from 1934 to 1938, the army struggled with moving the development of armoured formations from the brigade level to the division level. The evolution of the Tank Brigade stalled from 1935 to 1937, until a decision was finally made to equip the British cavalry units with light tanks. The resulting Mobile Division was reduced in size and re-designated as the 1st Armoured Division. Despite progressive advances in engine designs, transmissions, turrets, tracks, radios and armaments that increased the combat potential of the tank, the British experienced no significant changes in armoured doctrine or organization from mid-1938 to the outbreak of war in September 1939.5
The clearest example of the dichotomy between the Germans and the British exists in their armoured force manuals of 1940. The German manual of 1940 stated that panzer divisions were especially suited for rapid concentration of considerable fighting power, obtaining quick decisions by breakthroughs and deep penetrations on wide fronts that would disrupt the opponent’s ability to organize and execute an effective defence. The offensive nature of German doctrine is evident. The British manual stated that armoured divisions were designed for exploitation after the enemy’s position had been broken.6 This implied a supporting role for armour rather than the decisive role implied in German doctrine. These two positions represent fundamentally different positions on the purpose of armoured formations.
The difference between the German and British experience in developing armoured warfare was that the Germans had concentrated on the evolution of a combined arms armoured or panzer division while the British had concentrated on the evolution of the tank as a weapon of war.7 The British inability to evolve their doctrine led to a split in the employment of tanks as either an infantry support weapon or as a breakthrough weapon. This indecision manifested itself in the manufacture of different tanks for each role:8 a heavily armoured but slow tank to support the infantry and a more lightly armoured but fast tank known as a cruiser tank to exploit breakthroughs. Even as late as 1942, British operations in the African desert underscored that the British were struggling to rationalize a coherent doctrine for its armoured forces.9
During the interwar period, the Canadian Army suffered from the same doctrinal confusion over the future roles of cavalry and the tank. Doubting the reliability of the current generation of tanks and motor vehicles, Major General James H. MacBrien the Canadian Chief of the General Staff from 1920–27 argued that it ‘was unwise to alter organization and tactical doctrines in anticipation of technological change that might well fall short of expectations’.10 Given the cost of mechanization, the lack of money, and the lack of an identified enemy, this was not an unreasonable position.
While the matériel wellbeing of the army was clearly an issue, the lack of equipment was no excuse for failing to produce an officer corps that was well versed in the art and science of war. This is the opinion expressed by Stephen Harris in Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army (1988). Harris argued that the study of battlefield tactics did not require an army to possess every weapon system expected to be in use in the next war. ‘Critical reading’ of foreign military journals could have provided insights into new technologies and methodologies that with imagination and ingenuity could have been incorporated into training programmes and exercises. Harris has rightly argued, for example, that ‘it was better to simulate new tactics and doctrine by dropping flour bags from airplanes and to designate trucks and automobiles as tanks and armoured cars rather than to ignore air power and armoured warfare altogether.’11 He concluded that the Canadian Army was never ‘so poorly equipped, so starved for funds, that such measures were altogether impossible’.12
Douglas How’s The 8th Hussars: A History of the Regiment (1964) is one of the few regimental histories that provides a glimpse into the Canadian struggle to come to grips with mechanization and armoured warfare. Keltie Kennedy, the Officer Commanding (OC) the Regiment in 1936, stated: ‘Remember our role and our tasks are the same as they were in the days of Genghiz Khan. Our mounts and weapons have changed and our job at present is to learn how best to use them.’13 Kennedy listed their tasks as reconnaissance for information and for protection, distant action including raids, a role in major battles that might embrace seizure of tactical features and rapid intervention in crises, pursuit and covering withdrawals. The Hussars’ Lieutenant E.W. George rendered an interesting insight into the complexity of armoured warfare when reflecting on the time element of tactics: ‘With a speed of 20–50 m.p.h., we will have to learn to have more respect for an enemy which has been reported seen about 100 miles east two hours ago.’14
Of course, letting go of old traditions was never easy as expressed in this final selection from the Hussars’ official history of the Orders issued to the Regiment in July 1936: ‘Dress spurs will not be worn during periods of training when cars are being used.’15 The Hussar regimental history outlines the attempts at experimentation and innovation using automobiles as tanks as suggested by Stephen Harris, but in the end How perhaps said it best when he described the Canadian Army’s development of armoured warfare in the interwar period as the ‘great era of make-believe’.16
The main Canadian source of intellectual debate on military issues was found in the pages of Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ). There was the perception that the armour/mechanized debate was for the most part non-existent in Canada; however, a detailed review of the articles published during the 1930s reveals a limited but healthy debate of the issues surrounding mechanization, tanks and armoured warfare. There is at least one article in each CDQ volume in the 1930s that deals with these topics either directly or indirectly. Canadian officers serious about their professional competence, as Harris suggested, should therefore have been aware of the emerging concepts on mechanization and armoured warfare and the implications they would have on the Canadian Army regardless of the financial constraints or size of the Canadian Army during this period.
The debate that garners the greatest attention in Canada over the use of the tank in combat occurred in a series of articles published in CDQ between 1934 and 1939 by then Major E.L.M. Burns and Captain Guy Simonds, both of whom would briefly command armoured divisions in the coming war. The two could not agree on how to resolve the question over the use of the tank but neither was afraid to criticize current British doctrine or offer alternatives to it. In the end, the intellectual debate viewed tanks as a weapon to be used in cooperation with other arms rather than a weapon that could change the nature of future wars.17 No clear evidence was found to suggest that this intellectual debate was the source of experimentation for the Canadian Army as was the case in Britain.
In 1936, the Canadian Militia was reorganized creating permanent tank battalions. To train and guide the newly formed tank battalions, the Canadian Tank School was created on 1 November 1936 in London, Ontario, under the command of Major Frank Worthington of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). In May 1938, the school moved to Camp Borden and became the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicle School (CAFVS) with the first course conducted 11–23 July 1938. Initial tactical training was rudimentary, since no one really understood how to move tactically with a group of armoured vehicles. This was not a significant problem since the doctrine of the day classified the tank as an infantry support vehicle meant to accompany the infantry in the assault on enemy positions at infantry speed.18
Prior to the start of the Second World War, the common belief was that any tank units provided by Canada in time of war would be equipped with tanks produced in Britain.19 When war broke out in September 1939, Canada possessed a total of only sixteen outdated British Light Mk VI tanks and twelve Carden-Loyd carriers. While four of the six established tank battalions had begun to master some of the basis tenets of armoured warfare through the improvized use of automobiles, progress was slow and uneven.20
The Fort Garry Horse, as late as July 1939, was still conducting its annual training with horses despite being designated the 10th Armoured Regiment.21 The Lord Strathcona’s Horse, another armoured regiment, received its first tank training in 1940 on two-man Renault tanks left over from the First World War. They did not receive any true ‘modern’ tanks until two Ram tanks arrived in the unit in the third week of March 1941.22
The rapid success of German armoured forces in France in May 1940 convinced the Canadian government of the need to create armoured forces as a permanent component of the Canadian Army. General Order 250 formally created the Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) on 13 August 1940 with a headquarters and ‘such other formations and units, which may later be authorized’.23 The formation of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade occurred the same day under the command of Worthington, now promoted to Colonel. Worthington was given broad authority for organizational matters and training standards for the whole CAC and he became the advisor to Ottawa on all matters concerning the equipping and training of armoured units.24
Mobilized in September 1940, the 4th Canadian Division was originally formed as an infantry division and contained in its order of battle, the 10th, 11th and 12th Canadian Infantry Brigades.25
Some regiments, such as the Grenadier Guards and the Foot Guards had long histories as part of the Canadian militia, while others, such as the South Alberta Regiment, were newly formed units. Four of the units – the SAR, the BCR, the Grenadier Guards and the Foot Guards – began the war as infantry regiments.
The start of the war triggered mobilization, with all regiments reporting intakes of new recruits that surpassed their wartime-established strengths.26 These unexpected numbers created considerable logistical problems, particularly in the areas of accommodation, feeding and in outfitting the troops with proper uniforms and weapons.27 Training was rudimentary and concentrated on individual skills, soldier skills and physical training as the units waited for Canadian factories to produce the weapons needed to properly outfit the regiments and provide realistic training. New weapons were discussed but it was to be many months before they were actually seen or handled. The challenge was to keep the men busy. Route marches and sports competitions were stressed since ‘physical exhaustion’ was seen as a ‘useful mental safety valve’.28
4th Canadian Division Order of Battle from General Order 184, 5 September 1940
The history for the division’s future regiments, for 1939–1941, can be summarized in one word – training! Endless weeks and months were spent familiarizing the men with new equipment and tactics. Unit proficiency was tested in progressively more complex exercises as potential leaders who could make the grade and those who could not were weeded out of the formations. Units struggled with coordinating forces in time and space as they sought to perfect battle procedure. While many knew the theory of battle procedure, ‘few had ever actually attempted to move, reconnoitre and issue orders, when time and space were real and urgent factors.’29
Officers studied the ‘Notes from France’ which embodied the practical lessons derived from the fighting in France.30 Selected officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) began rotations to formal training schools and to England and overseas battlefields in order to gain experience, which they then brought back to further educate the troops on new tactics and procedures.31
On 26 January 1942, the decision was made to convert the division to an armoured role, a move that required considerable re-organization and retraining. An armoured division at that time was composed of two armoured brigades and in the restructuring of the division only six of the original nine infantry battalions became armoured regiments. The Lake Superior Regiment was converted to a motorized infantry battalion.The remaining battalions were diverted to other formations.32
Few within the regiments had any clear idea of what the change from an infantry to an armoured regiment really involved. In the case of the Foot Guards, the news of the conversion was met with mixed emotions since the unit had reached a high level of proficiency in infantry training. The conversion meant starting over again with basic level training in armour tactics and drills.33
4th Canadian Armoured Division Order of Battle, January 1942
The problem of training the units of the division in armour tactics represented a considerable challenge since no one in the division had any experience with tanks or tank tactics. Worthington initially trained these units using a mixture of obsolete and in some cases First World War vintage tanks, gradually replacing them with Canadian Ram tanks,34 once the latter became available. The use of the Ram tank allowed for more realistic training.
The conversion of the division from infantry to armour was ‘accomplished’ in only five months. In August and September of 1942 the division crossed to England to complete its training in Aldershot.35 The 4 Cdn Armd Div was not, however, formally mobilized until 7 October 1943, under Mobilization Order No. 91.36
On 6 January 1943, the War Committee of the Cabinet approved the structure of the Canadian Army as two corps with three infantry divisions, each of three brigades, two armoured divisions, each of one infantry and one armoured brigade, and two independent tank brigades.37 The Canadian Army reorganization began on 11 January 1943. Canadian formations would mirror the composition and doctrine of British formations to facilitate more effective cooperation between the armies of the two countries.
The adoption of British War establishments meant that the 4 Cdn Armd Div would be composed of one armoured and one infantry brigade.38 In addition, the divisional artillery was increased with a field regiment to support each brigade. An armoured reconnaissance regiment mounted in tanks replaced the armoured car regiment. An independent machine gun company was added to support the infantry.39 In keeping with this reorganization, the 10 Cdn Inf Bde replaced the 3 Cdn Armd Bde and the South Alberta Regiment became the division armoured reconnaissance unit. The division retained the 4 Cdn Armd Bde as the division’s armour brigade.
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was officially created on 26 April 1943. It had no units under command and only four officers and four other ranks on strength when created. The only brigade unit that was in England at that time was the SAR. The remainder of the brigades’ units would arrive in England between June and September 1943.40 The division was fortunate that most of the units arrived in theatre with 75–100 per cent of their scales of equipment.
The wartime establishment of a 1943–44 armoured division was 724 officers and 14,240 other ranks (OR). The armoured division had a total of 3,414 vehicles. Among these were 246 cruiser tanks, 44 light tanks, 261 armoured tracked carriers, 100 armoured scout cars and 2,098 trucks.41 The armoured division was organized for employment as a single fighting entity under the direct control of a division commander.42 The defined roles of an armoured division were:
• cooperation with the main army in effecting the complete destruction of the enemy, usually by envelopment or by deep penetration through his defences after a gap has been made in his main position by other formations.
• pursuit.
• cooperation with other arms in the defence, usually by counter-attack.
• threatening the enemy and so force him to alter or disclose his disposition.43
An armour division was an all-arms (infantry, artillery and armoured) formation designed to exploit breaches in the enemy defence network by driving deep into the rear areas of the enemy defences and pursuing broken enemy formations.
Each arm or branch within the armoured division had a vital part to play in the execution of the division’s mission and the effective cooperation of these arms was paramount to mission success. The armoured brigade was designed as the striking power of the division and whenever possible the armoured brigade would be employed as a concentrated force attacking over a narrow front of 500–1,000 yards to a depth of 3,000–3,500 yards.44 An armoured brigade consisted of a brigade headquarters, three armoured regiments and a motorized infantry battalion representing a total of 220 cruiser and light tanks and 3,000 all ranks.
4th Cdn Armoured Division Order of Battle, January 1943
The armoured brigade was not designed to attack organized defences and was subject to definite limitations with respect to how and when it could be employed. It required suitable ground over which to operate and, by itself, was not designed to hold ground. While it was possible to use the armoured brigade for operations at night, this was not the norm.45 At night, the armoured regiments typically withdrew into a ‘harbour area’ for rest, replenishment and maintenance but even then they were susceptible to attack by enemy troops. The motor battalion was an integral part of the armoured brigade and was tasked with providing the armoured brigade with immediate infantry support; consequently, the motor battalion was organized for maximum mobility and flexibility.46
The infantry brigade consisted of a brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions and one support group consisting of 3,500 all ranks. The normal roles of the infantry brigade involved, but were not restricted to, such tasks as:
• clearing and covering the advance of the armoured brigade in enclosed or difficult country.
• attacking hastily prepared enemy positions which were covered by obstacles.
• securing a ‘pivot’47 or a series of pivots on which the operations of the armoured brigade would be based.
• mopping up in conjunction with engineers.
• consolidating and holding areas of ground captured by the armour.48
The infantry in an armoured division normally moved in vehicles.49 They possessed a wide range of weapons, could move quickly and could operate dismounted in support of the tanks or carry out all of the typical tasks associated with the infantry particularly at night.
The 1943 to 1944 timeframe witnessed the introduction of a host of new weapons systems that had to be learned and incorporated into Canadian doctrine. The anti-tank regiments of the armoured divisions were provided with the new 17-pounder (pdr) anti-tank guns and each regiment consisted of two 17-pdr batteries and two three-inch M-10 self-propelled batteries. Another change arose from the decision to provide one of the two field regiments in the armoured division with self-propelled 25-pdr guns. This weapon was called ‘Sexton’ and was a 25-pdr gun mounted on a Ram tank chassis. The 23 Cdn Field Regt of the 4 Cdn Armd Div had its full complement of twenty-four vehicles.50
The key equipment issue for the Canadian armoured formations was the Ram tank. By June 1943, enough Ram tanks (1,147) were in the hands of the Canadian Army in England to outfit the complete establishment of Canadian armoured regiments. However, an undated memorandum written in March 1943 identified a total of 113 major and minor modifications required to the tank.51 Increased protection and arming the tank with a 75mm gun were identified as the top priorities. In order to equip the armoured formations with what was considered a battle-worthy tank, Canada either had to produce a new tank or undertake radical modifications to the Ram tank.52
Brigadier Wyman, commander of the 1 Cdn Armd Bde, carried out a detailed comparison of the Ram and American Sherman tank since his unit had used both vehicles. Wyman’s findings, detailed in a report dated 31 May 1943, stated that the Ram II did not meet the requirements of a first-line operational tank and that its disadvantages were far more numerous than its advantages in comparison with the Sherman.53 In November 1943, the decision was made not to employ the Ram as the main Canadian battle tank; the Sherman tank would equip all Canadian tank formations. The Ram tank would, however, retain its role in armour training. Other Ram tanks were converted to specialty roles, such as assault and recovery vehicles for the engineers.54
While the British and Canadian Armies had finally settled on a common organizational structure for their armoured divisions, the Canadian decision to equip all armoured formations with the Sherman M4 fitted with a 75mm gun as their basic battle tank created a considerable problem. The Sherman was inferior, in almost every sense, to German tanks in the field.55 British intelligence had confirmed the existence of the Panzerkampfwagen (Pzkw) VI (Tiger) tank as early as September 1942 and captured tanks were examined after the German Afrika Corps surrendered in Tunisia. The Tiger had 102mm of frontal armour and mounted an 88mm gun. Furthermore, the Pzkw Mk V (Panther) with a high velocity 75mm gun and 100mm of frontal armour was identified in early 1943. The British had also learned that the Germans were using anti-aircraft and antitank guns mounted on a variety of self-propelled chassis to augment their armour forces.56
The armour protection of the Sherman tank was insufficient to stop the shells from any of the guns on these German tanks. The British War Office solution to the ‘tank capability gap’ was to install a 17-pdr gun in a portion of the available Sherman tanks. These tanks were called ‘Fireflys’ and they were initially allocated at fifteen tanks per armoured regiment. Senior Allied commanders were knowingly sending their armoured forces into Europe with inferior tanks and doctrine. The hope, however, was that the considerable quantities of Sherman tanks would eventually overcome the qualitative German advantage. While this assumption was to prove true, it came at a terrible cost in lives and matériel.
At the end of 1943, the 4 Cdn Armd Div was to have 271 cruiser tanks, 63 light tanks, 27 command tanks and 9 recovery tanks. The division actually had on strength 44 Sherman and 266 Ram tanks, four light tanks and no command or recovery tanks. Sherman tanks continued to arrive in the division but always in small numbers. By early February 1944, the process of crew conversion from Ram tanks to the Sherman tank became the main focus of division training.57
An ominous feature of the division’s Sherman tanks was that they were gas powered. German tanks were powered by diesel fuel. The Germans had learned that diesel fuel did not ignite as easily as gasoline. This feature of the Sherman tank meant that they easily caught fire when hit; this fact would come back to haunt many Sherman tank crews in Normandy.
The 4 Cdn Armd Div spent the time from September 1943 to February 1944 absorbing new men and equipment in order to bring the division up to its established strength. Armed with a common doctrine, organization and tanks, the hope was that British and Canadian armoured brigades and divisions would be inter-operable thereby increasing the operational flexibility available to Simonds, Crerar and Montgomery. Events would reveal that British and Canadian armoured units would eventually be equally able to support each other’s operations but only after having gained crucial experience in combat.
The Canadian Army was late entering the armoured warfare arena and Canadian armoured forces had much to learn before they could effectively challenge the Germans on the battlefield. How the forces were initially employed was a reflection in part of the Canadian experiences in the interwar period. German philosophy stressed quality in matériel, boldly used by their commanders who were trying to achieve quick victories. The Anglo-Canadian approach was more measured, where matériel abundance and firepower were designed to save manpower and compensate for any possible shortfall in quality or experience.
As the last Canadian division to enter the theatre, the units of the 4 Cdn Armd Div would be injected into some of the most intensive fighting in Normandy. The men of the division and its commanders would have to learn on the go. In the end, the British Army would lead the way for the Canadian Army in thought, experimentation and organization of armoured warfare but not in success on the battlefield. That honour would be equally shared.