Major General George Kitching succeeded Major General Frank Worthington as GOC, 4 Cdn Armd Div, on 29 February 1944. Kitching, on the basis of his previous combat experience determined that the division required extensive combined arms training if it was to assume its planned role as a break-out formation in the liberation of France. Kitching also knew that he had a finite period of time to imprint his ideas on how the division would function under his command. While Kitching embarked upon a comprehensive scheme of education and training for his division, external factors that included waterproofing,1 distinguished visitor visits, and the division’s place on the priority list for training, limited Kitching’s ability to train his division and bring the division’s units up to a high level of readiness before entering Normandy.
After its reorganization in January 1943, the division was given until early September 1943 to train itself to a point where it could conduct a series of division-level exercises in Norfolk. The first two weeks of these exercises were given to squadron operations, followed by regimental level and brigade level exercises. The final division level exercises, Grizzly II and Bridon, were held on 22 October, and 2 November 1943 respectively.2
Grizzly II was designed to practice the division in an advance-to-contact, the crossing of a river obstacle and a frontal assault upon an enemy position. While the exercise reached a successful conclusion, mistakes were plenty.3 In an open letter to all of the officers of 4 Cdn Armd Bde after Grizzly II, Brigadier J.D.B. Smith, the 4 Cdn Armd Bde commander, was very critical of their collective performance. While the efforts of the other ranks drew high praise, Smith was clear in stating that the officers were the ones responsible for not getting food to the men when they should have had it, for getting them lost, for driving them extra hours in the rain and blackout; for the ‘damnable’ business of men not knowing where they were at times; and for most of their discomfort which could have been avoided. Smith went on to state that, although their part in the exercise apparently satisfied a lot of onlookers, ‘you and I know quite honestly that we have done and can do much better.’4 He expected the lessons learned from Grizzly II to be applied in exercise Bridon.
Exercise Bridon pitted the 4 Cdn Armd Div in Canadian Ram tanks against the 9th British Armoured Division (9 Br Armd Div) equipped with the faster British Cromwell tank. Each division represented the forces of a fictitious nation bordering a neutral nation that possessed a mine that both countries desired. In the exercise scenario, negotiations broke down between the two nations, causing both to invade the neutral country in order to obtain the desired mine. On exercise start, the 4 Cdn Armd Div manoeuvred quickly and drove straight to the mine arriving before the British. The Canadians established defensive positions and awaited the British attack.
The 9 Br Armd Div attacked, and over the span of two days, ran into wellprepared anti-tank defences that umpires declared had destroyed many of the British tanks. Some 90 per cent of the British tank kills were claimed by the guns of the 15 Cdn Field Regt. The British force was judged to have been soundly defeated by the Canadians, forcing the early termination of the exercise.5 The 4 Cdn Armd Div was judged to have performed well in its first test as a full division.
Despite this seemingly convincing performance, Brigadier Pat Grieve, who at the time was a lieutenant with the Grenadier Guards, recalled that there was not much tactical realism in these exercises:
It was all this naval formation-type of manoeuvre. I can’t remember any exercise where we worked in support of the infantry. On the final exercise we simply drove to the objective, everyone moving at once.6
Even though Worthington proclaimed that he had complete confidence in his division, the conditions under which it had been evaluated were questionable.7 After these exercises, the 4 Cdn Armd Div moved back to Sussex in November. Unfortunately, Bridon proved to be the last division-level exercise ever conducted by the 4 Cdn Armd Div.
The First Cdn Army training directive No. 18 dated 15 December 1943 warned that 1944 was the last opportunity for all commanders to make their men fighting fit. Individual training was to receive top priority. Collective training was to reach platoon level by January 1944 and to reach company and battalion levels in February and March, except in the case of the 4 Cdn Armd Div, which would continue with brigade and division training in the latter part of January and early February. On 24 December 1943, the division issued training instruction No. 18 which covered tactical training for armour during the period 1 January to 31 March 1944. This training instruction directed that tank-infantry cooperation was to be the subject of study in all units. It also directed that the 4 Cdn Armd Bde would train closely with 10 Cdn Inf Bde. After reviewing the respective war diaries, it does not seem that this portion of the directive was followed.8 By early February, the process of crew conversion from the Ram tanks to the Sherman tanks became the main focus of division training.9
Worthington had established a four-phase training scheme for the brigades. Phase I required the completion of all individual training. This entailed knowing, by heart, all of the individual tasks inherent in a soldier’s position as either a trooper in an armoured regiment or soldier in an infantry battalion. Other requirements included first aid training, use of personal equipment and map reading. Phase II for infantry involved training at the sub unit level. Battle drill was emphasized during this phase. Phase III concentrated on company and battalion tactics, again using battle drill as the basis. Phase IV involved a concentration of the entire division in action.10 Woven throughout these phases was a one-day-a-week officers’ study session where commanding officers would concentrate on the training or professional development of their officers. The fundamental assumption in the training cycle was that the lower level components such as companies and platoons had to get the elements of combat down first before the higher level formations, the battalions and brigades could manoeuvre properly.
The emphasis in training in the armoured regiments was different. Phase I was common across the division. Phase II involved crew drill, crew control and fire orders, vehicle decontamination, march discipline, the digging of weapons pits and the use of binoculars in searching terrain. Phase III involved formation tactics, including formations on roads and cross country, fire positions, orders, crossing obstacles, locating the enemy and dismounted patrols. This phase consisted of a progressive use of training aids and methodologies, which normally started with the use of blackboards and sand or cloth table lessons, advanced to tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) where the crews would walk the ground, and ended with mounted exercises and field fire exercises. The syllabus was designed to have troops and squadrons trained and ready for squadron and regimental exercises by 21 March 1944.11
Saturdays were usually half days of work and, depending on the unit, Sundays had either mandatory or voluntary church parades. Leave was widely available and unit vehicles were typically tasked to take the troops into the local towns on Saturday and Sunday. Dances, movies and sports competitions were regularly scheduled to keep the troops occupied. Extended leave was not restricted until June.12
The routine in the field depended in large part on the type of unit either armoured or infantry and the type of training ‘scheme’ being carried out. The infantry units would have more time to execute their schemes than the armoured units since the armoured units had to devote a portion of their time to vehicle maintenance, while the infantry soldier only had to worry about himself and his personal weapon. The quality of training at the ranges for the armour units was largely dependent upon the weather and ammunition. Numerous entries in the war diaries for March and April indicate that squadron shoots were delayed or restricted by bad weather and by faulty ammunition.13
Any assessment of the training regime and readiness state of the division prior to its entry into theatre must start with an assessment of the impact that external factors, over which Kitching had little or no control, had on his ability to train the division to a standard he felt was acceptable. These external factors can be broadly grouped under three main areas: planning assumptions made in the design of the Overlord plan; planning decisions made at senior headquarters; and administrative decisions. Taken as a whole, these factors had a decidedly negative impacted on the division’s ability to achieve a high state of readiness prior to its entry into battle.
In the administrative category, three factors came into play: VIP visits, the policy of the incremental exchange of Ram tanks for Sherman tanks and, in particular, Sherman Firefly tanks and the reorganization of the armoured reconnaissance regiments and tank troops. The 4 Cdn Armd Div was tasked to perform a number of parades for distinguished visitors. These included King George VI on 9 March, Canadian Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King on 17 May, and General Eisenhower on 29 May. These visits absorbed a considerable amount of staff work, usually entailed rehearsals, which directly took away from training time, and, in some cases, caused the postponement of exercises.14 The typical routine for VIP visits was to notify the division of an impending visit but not to give them the name of who was coming nor a specific visit date. The division was then given twenty-four to forty-eight hours warning.
In the case of the visit of the Canadian Prime Minister, the division was placed on forty-eight-hours notice for a VIP visitor on 24 April. The entire division was to be paraded. The visit was initially scheduled for 13 May and a rehearsal of the march past was carried out on 4 May while the troops were in the training area.15 A full rehearsal was run on 11 May with Simonds as the reviewing officer. The visit was then postponed and then rescheduled and finally executed on 17 May 1944. In this case, at least four training days were lost preparing for this one visit. In another case, one of the armoured regiments, working with 6 Cdn Inf Bde, was recalled from the field so that they could participate in a VIP parade.16
The second administrative issue was the exchange of Ram tanks for Sherman tanks. The war diaries of the armoured regiments recorded receiving continuous allotments of small numbers of Sherman tanks between March and late May, with the regiments receiving their complete complement of Sherman Firefly tanks only in late June. The low numbers of available Sherman tanks with which to practice meant that available resources had to be widely shared and that tactics had to be practised with mixed tank units of Sherman and Ram tanks. Each of these tanks had different performance and operational characteristics, a scenario that hampered realistic training.
In addition to the challenges of limited range time, and mixed tank units, the tank crews now had to become proficient in the 75mm and 17-pdr guns on borrowed Sherman tanks. Each tank had its own idiosyncracies in the mechanical systems and in the accuracy of the main gun. Not having an assigned tank and the limited number of days allotted to the regiments for range practice had a negative impact on gunnery accuracy.
The decline in gunner proficiency was of such concern that, on 1 May 1944, the regimental adjutant of the Foot Guards issued a memorandum on gunnery training describing the quality of range results as ‘not at all satisfactory considering the previous high standard of shooting and the amount of initial training given . . .’17 The memorandum identified the education of the gunner as having been neglected during the ‘. . . long periods that elapse when he is not actually on the range and practising his trade’.18 The memo viewed this problem not only as a gunner issue but also as a crew team training issue and directed that the training of a gunner would be given in his own tank, with his own crew, under the supervision of his own crew commander. As the memo pointed out, bad gunnery was not always the fault of the gunner. The Foot Guards was the only regiment to record taking its entire complement of Sherman and Stuart tanks to the ranges on two occasions, 19 and 25 May, to specifically give their tank crews practice in gunnery.19 Compounding the training problem was the fact that the regiment did not receive its first Sherman Firefly until 11 June.
The third administrative issue was the ordered reorganizations of the armoured reconnaissance regiments and tank troops, which took place during March 1944. The reorganization of the armoured reconnaissance regiments resulted from a decision made by Montgomery that all armoured reconnaissance regiments in 21st Army Group were to organize on the war establishment of an armoured regiment. These regiments would retain their armoured reconnaissance designations but would now possess seventy-eight tanks (sixty-one Sherman, eleven Stuart and six Crusader tanks), and nine Humber scout cars.20
The second reorganization involved the tank troop. The war establishment of the armoured regiments changed from three to four Sherman tanks in each tank troop: three tanks with the 75mm gun and one armed with the 17-pdr.21 This change meant that troop drills had to be modified, relearned and honed until the new required drills and actions became second nature. These changes impacted the SAR more significantly than the armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Bde since the SAR had to first reorganize as a regiment and then learn new tank troop tactics.
There were a number of planning assumptions made in the Overlord plan that had a significant impact on the division’s ability to train. The first decision was the requirement to waterproof all vehicles that were due to land up to D+42.22 The expectation of 21st Army Group planners was an early and deep penetration to Caen on D-Day; consequently, there was an expectation that the 4 Cdn Armd Div would enter the theatre soon (within days) of the invasion. The expectation was that the vehicles of the division would have to land and wade through the surf of the Normandy beaches. These two assumptions – early move in theatre and wading ashore through the surf – drove a requirement to have all division vehicles waterproofed and ready for loading by early June 1944. To achieve this goal, the process of waterproofing vehicles was initiated at the beginning of May 1944.
Waterproofing created a considerable training challenge for the armoured regiments from May onwards. Waterproofed vehicles were severely restricted with respect to how many miles they could be driven once the multi-stage process was begun and could not be driven at all once the process was completed. Some units, such as the Grenadier Guards, decided to move into the training areas to reduce travel mileage on the tanks thereby facilitating more training with their tanks.23 As the waterproofing schedule advanced, the number of vehicles available for tactical training decreased. As May progressed, training for the armoured regiments was confined to maintenance, sports and physical fitness exercises instead of the required practising of infantry-cum-tank tactics.24
If the Overlord plan unfolded as expected, the Allies were to be beyond the beaches and on their way to Falaise by D+2 and the requirement to wade vehicles ashore through high surf or water conditions, as the invading forces were forced to do on D-Day, would have been minimal. Whether one considers the Overlord plan or the events as they actually unfolded, there was no reason to believe that the vehicles of the 4 Cdn Armd Div would have had to wade ashore under D-Day conditions. The reality was that practically all of the vehicles of the division landed dry. The entire waterproofing effort was largely wasted, along with all of the valuable time that could have been used training.
The immediate impact of the waterproofing directive, viewed in hindsight, was that Kitching had only two months (March and April) to train his division, utilizing the entire complement of the division’s vehicles and equipment. The decision to waterproof all vehicles effectively eliminated the possibility of any large-scale training exercise after May 1944. When the waterproof decision is added to the policy of incremental exchange of Ram and Sherman tanks, the ability to train the division as a cohesive unit was non-existent. The division was forced to waterproof the Sherman tanks on which they should have been training almost upon receipt!25
The second planning decision that must be called into question was the consideration for the fight beyond the beaches and the impact that this decision had on training. The priority in training and on training resources was on those units that would be making the initial assault. There is no doubt that this was viewed as the most critical part of the operation and rightly so. But viewed objectively, the fight on the beaches and in the immediate vicinity of the beaches was going to be won or lost on the skill and determination at the sub-unit level, squad, platoon, and company level. These skills could have easily been acquired on the smaller training areas in Britain. The 4 Cdn Armd Div, as a follow-on force, was designated to fight the mobile battle beyond the beaches. This type of warfare required fast-moving, combined arms columns that could manoeuvre and fight at speed. To hone these skills required large training areas. Consequently, the allocation of the large training areas to the assault divisions and the smaller training areas to the follow-on formations, when compared to assigned roles, was questionable.
The focus on the assault formations appears to have led to a conscious decision on the part of 2 Cdn Corps to sacrifice the internal cohesion and effectiveness of 4 Cdn Armd Div. During March there was joint training between the two brigades of the division with both the BCRs and Foot Guards recording training sessions with the infantry regiments in 10 Cdn Inf Bde. From April onwards, however, there is mention of the BCRs working with the Argylls during a week in May but no similar entries found in the war diaries of either the Foot Guards or Grenadier Guards.
In fact, there are more references made of the tanks of 4 Cdn Armd Bde working with 2 Cdn Inf Div than with 10 Cdn Inf Bde units. The Grenadier Guards, for example, reported working with the 4 Cdn Inf Bde in March and the 6 Cdn Inf Bde in April, May and June, with only one entry of a small scale exercise with the Algonquin Regiment during the same March-to-June timeframe.26 The armoured resources of 4 Cdn Armd Bde were being used by 2 Cdn Corps to enhance the combat readiness of 2 Cdn Div, at the expense of the cohesion and fighting effectiveness of the 4 Cdn Armd Div.
In the three months prior to the division going into battle, little realistic combined arms training between the brigades could be done, thereby forcing the training effort into non-optimal activities such as TEWTs, map exercises, range firing and physical fitness exercises. While this training regime was effective in improving the readiness state of the individual soldiers and their sub-units, it did little to provide realistic training for the commanders and staff of the division at any level. Most of all, these training methods failed to expose and condition officers and key decision makers to the uncertainty and chaos inherent in combat: the so-called fog of war.
Had the planning consideration for the battle beyond the beaches been reviewed in earnest, it would have shown that the 4 Cdn Armd Div needed to be a cohesive fighting formation capable of speed, manoeuvrability and the application of firepower on a divisional scale. Consider, for example, an alternative scenario where 4 Cdn Armd Div vehicles were not waterproofed and the invasion unfolded as it did. Once it was recognized that the need for the division in France was delayed, and with the bulk of available Allied combat units in France, the large training areas and the month of June would have been available for the division to carry out large scale divisional level exercises to bring it up to the highest possible level of proficiency with all its assigned equipment immediately prior to moving into theatre. Had the invasion unfolded as planned and the division deployed in France in early June, the division would still have had all the training time and vehicles to train on that were lost in May because of waterproofing. In either case, the overall level of effectiveness would have been greatly enhanced.
The most significant planning mistake was not allowing Kitching to conduct at least one large-scale exercise to hone the skills of both the fighting and support elements of the division. While the training of the individual units was approaching a very high standard, Kitching was particularly critical of the level of combined arms cooperation that was present in the division. Kitching also noted that the brigade and divisional staffs had not been tested on exercises of a long enough duration that would have taxed their resources.27
On taking command Kitching had pleaded with Simonds to be permitted to conduct a series of field exercises, similar to Bridon and Grizzly. Kitching wanted to hone the division’s skills, to impart the lessons learned from his previous experience and to allow him to get to know the abilities of his subordinate commanders. Simonds refused Kitching’s request but it is quite unlikely that Simonds, as a corps commander, would have had the authority to grant such a request. Kitching was told that there would be no large movement of troops and that the only exercises viable within the limited confines of Britain and its training areas were TEWTs and skeleton exercises. As a follow-on formation for the invasion of France, 4 Cdn Armd Div was not high enough on the priority list to gain access to the facilities that could accommodate large-scale exercises.28
In denying Kitching’s request, it would appear that Simonds was forced to yield for administrative and political reasons rather than operational reasons.
Kitching later wrote:
We were not allowed to hold any divisional exercises with everyone participating and I think that was what was needed. Whilst the individual regiments had reached a good standard of training, the essential cooperation between the armour, infantry and artillery had not been practiced to the extent it should have been. Nor had the Brigade and divisional headquarters had enough experience of command and control, on exercise of some duration, that would have taxed their resources and taught them lessons. We rehearsed our communications on Corps map exercises and so improved our battle procedures but it was not possible to create the ‘fog of war’ that engulfs a unit in its first actions.29
The lack of realistic training and the ‘fog of war’ would play significant roles in the performance of the division’s commanders in August 1944.
Another obstacle to training was the operational requirement for 4 Cdn Armd Div to provide a real time reserve for homeland defence. During April 1944, First Cdn Army was tasked to provide a Mobile Infantry Brigade Group (Inf Bde Gp) which was to constitute a real time District Reserve for Sussex. Effective 21 April, 10 Inf Bde was tasked to fill this role, coming under operational command of the British 45th Division.
The Inf Bde Grp was to act as a reserve for the district against any enemy who might land by sea or air in the District. Liaison was required between the assigned units at all times. The immediate response units were required to be on four hours notice to move in daytime and two hours notice to move at night. The infantry battalions of 10 Cdn Inf Bde were rotated through this assignment and duty ran from 1200 hrs of one day until 1200 hrs of the next. Consequently, battalion training had to be scheduled around these assignments.30
Given all of the challenges to the training programme of the division, what was achieved in the training? Kitching implemented a number of changes to address shortcomings that he saw within the division. He began by interviewing and assessing the capabilities of all of his key officers. He initiated an extensive visit programme that saw him visit all 4 Cdn Armd Div units on a rotational basis where he outlined his thoughts on how the division would fight and conveyed the lessons learned from his time in Italy. He personally supervised many cloth model exercises and TEWTs where he would walk the ground with the soldiers to explain what he expected out of the various scenarios being practised.31
Kitching also attempted to provide practical experience to his units by recruiting any veteran visiting England from other theatres to talk to his troops about their experiences. He cross-posted senior officers with battle experience into his armoured regiments and moved officers temporarily from the infantry units to the armoured units and vice versa, in an attempt to have them better understand the operations of the other services. This policy of bringing in officers with previous experience in Italy would prove to be a double-edged sword since the lessons learned from Italy were not always relevant to the actual fighting in Normandy.
Kitching set about introducing as much realism into his staff training as he could. He ordered his staff out of their offices and into tents to give them a better understanding of the working environment they would meet in the field. He instituted a comprehensive series of exercises that tested the ability of the rear echelon units and headquarters units to move at any time while practising march and convoy discipline and transitioning from convoys to harbour areas.32 They also practised the proper transmission of information through the numerous administrative and daily operational reports.33
The Lake Superior Regiment began the practice of firing .303 rifles strapped to their anti-tank guns when working with armoured squadrons as a means of judging their shooting accuracy. This innovation provided realism in the training for both the gunners and the tank crews. The tanks were fired upon while on the move with tracer rounds. The war diarist of the BCR stated that the number of hits on the side armour of the tanks ‘proved the accuracy of the gunners’, and the sound of the bullets hitting the tanks provided the ‘requisite realism’ of combat for the tank crews.34
The policy within both brigades was to have the tanks work with the infantry battalions as much as possible. Every effort was made to get in as much training as the circumstances and availability of equipment and training areas would permit. The SAR was the most active of the armoured regiments during March, conducting weekly sessions with the battalions of 10 Cdn Inf Bde. Each 10 Cdn Inf Bde battalion was assigned a specific SAR squadron to work with on a regular basis as a means of establishing a tighter integration of tank and infantry tactics and familiarity among the respective troops. Developing the same level of combined arms proficiency was attempted within 4 Cdn Armd Bde by assigning a company of the Lake Superior Regiment to each armoured regiment, but the requirement to have the armoured regiments train with the assault divisions meant that the armoured regiments were rarely available for combined arms training with the motor battalion.
On 14 May, the senior officers and COs of the division attended a lecture by Montgomery. Montgomery talked about the past and the present state of the war, the future prospects and tasks immediately confronting the Allies. He stressed the need for what he called ‘offensive eagerness’. He believed that, once on the beaches, success would depend on the Allied ability to concentrate armour and push strong armoured columns rapidly inland to secure important ground or communications centres. These columns would form the firm bases in enemy territory from which to develop offensive action in all directions.35 The speech foreshadowed the intended role for the division and created a sense of anticipation for the upcoming action.
Once into June, the scope and nature of division activities were restricted by waterproofing and the wait for the notice to move into theatre.36 From 6 June (D-Day) onward, all felt that it would only be a short time until the division left for France, and spirits were high. On 8 June the codeword for movement into theatre – CORNELIUS – was issued. All formal training stopped and the men prepared for their move into France. On 11 June, the division was placed on six hours notice to move and on 12 June the division received its initial order for special duty overseas. The advance party received word that it would be moving to the marshalling area on Tuesday, 20 June. This move was postponed but the advanced parties remained on one-hour notice to move.37
Finally, on 23 June Kitching called a meeting of all division COs and informed them that the division would remain in its present area for at least a week. A new date for the move into theatre was given with the advance party moving on 27 June and the main body following on 1 July.38 It would take another five days (to 29 June), however, before the movement orders were rescinded and a twoweek delay finally announced.
These delays threatened the morale of the troops and Kitching responded by ramping up the training cycle as best he could and by talking openly with the troops about their role and what they could expect once in theatre. He described their role as one in which the division would be required to strike deep into enemy territory, seizing an important objective behind his lines with all arms coordination as the key.39 The reaction to these gatherings, as recorded in the war diaries, was uniformly positive with comments like: never before has the morale been so high and never before had there been greater cause for it to be so high. Of note was a meeting Kitching held on 26 June with his senior commanders where he laid down the policy for the taking over of command if he (Kitching) became a casualty.
Since the division could not use its vehicles, unit training focused on hardening activities for the troops, which included route marches, tabloid sports and individual weapons training.40 A new round of maintenance was also required for the division vehicles since the waterproofing on many vehicles had started to dry out. The waterproofing process had to be reapplied on certain parts of every vehicle and the rest of the vehicle carefully checked to ensure that the waterproofing was still in place.
The 4 Cdn Armd Bde received its final allotment of Sherman Firefly tanks in late June. A conscious decision was made not to waterproof these vehicles right away so that they could be used on the ranges. This move allowed the tank crews to gain more experience with the 17-pdr gun. As noted by the war diarist of the Grenadier Guards, ‘our experience with the V Charlies has not been very extensive, every round fired is of tremendous benefit to the crews in showing them the power of their weapon and increasing their confidence in it.’41 On 23 June, 4th Armd Bde received orders to move all of its Sherman Fireflies to the Lydd Ranges where the units conducted range practice from 23–25 June.
In late June, Kitching ordered a combined-arms TEWT be run for all senior officers of the division. Exercise Iroquois was a three day exercise which began on 4 July and involved all senior division officers down to and including squadron and equivalent commanders. The officers were assigned to mixed (infantry, armour, artillery) syndicates and directed to discuss and solve a series of progressive problems associated with an armoured advance against a successful German invasion of England.42 Exercise Iroquois ended at 1700 hrs on 6 July and the consensus from the war diary entries was that it was an excellent learning experience.
The general notes of the Exercise Narrative highlight Kitching’s thoughts on what it would take to succeed in Normandy. The narrative stated that in operations in Italy and in Normandy it was increasingly clear that the Germans were using combined arms battlegroups and against these groups the tank has little chance of success on is own. In order to combat these battlegroups successfully, the Canadians would have to adopt similar tactics. Battlegroups would ‘beat the enemy by superiority in numbers and equipment, offensive spirit, initiative and most important of all – the closest possible co-op between the varied arms in the group.’43
On 11 and 12 July, it was the turn of the junior officers of the division. An Exercise Iroquois-modelled TEWT was run among the regiments of the brigades for troop leaders and platoon commanders. The morning of day one concentrated on the all arms capture and defence of a village. This was followed by a session in coordinating and sighting all arms for the defence of the village. The second day was concerned with the cooperation of infantry and tanks. Again, the learning experience was well received.44
There was a concerted effort by Kitching to try and gain as much insight into the lessons learned from the battles that had already been fought in Normandy.45 On 13 July 1944, 4 Cdn Armd Bde received a lessons-learned report from the operations of 2 Cdn Armd Bde in the Normandy bridgehead.46 Communications, all arms cooperation, the tactical employment of tanks and, in particular, the tactical employment of the Sherman Firefly and methods to counter German tactics were highlighted and discussed. While the memorandum was widely discussed there is no indication from the available records that any procedures were changed within the brigade, based on this information.47 Even if new procedures had been adopted, there was no opportunity to practise them.
On 14 July the code word CORNELIUS was received and on 16 July the advance party proceeded to their marshalling areas. By 20 July, the advance party arrived in theatre. They completed their reconnaissance of the reception area for the division and awaited the arrival of the main body. Between 22 and 27 July, the rest of the division units were loaded on board ships and moved to France. The journey took six days for some units and all of the division’s vehicles landed on docks, dry. They had no need for any of the waterproofing that had so restricted their training.48
The offloading and concentration of division HQ was complete by 1600 hrs 28 July. Orders were received to move the fighting elements forward through Caen to the south of the River Orne with the rest of the division prepared to move the next day. These orders gave the division little time to de-waterproof vehicles or perform any additional maintenance before being moved into their initial positions.
The first division O Group in theatre occurred at 1330 hrs 28 July within which Kitching outlined the Corps plan. The division would relieve the 3 Cdn Inf Div in the line south of Caen. These orders, however, were changed that same evening. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde, which had been initially tasked to relieve 8 Cdn Inf Bde, was now tasked to relieve the 22 Armd Bde of the British 7 Armd Div. This move was completed on July 29.
Division HQ moved off to set up in its newly-assigned area on the outskirts of Vaucelles at 1100 hrs on 29 July, Rear Div HQ was initially established at Thaon but was then ordered by 2 Cdn Corps to a new area at Bitot. Each of these moves involved the relocation of over 2,000 vehicles.49 On 29 July, 4 Cdn Armd Div came under command of 2 Cdn Corps and the first division administrative report (ADREP) was submitted to 2 Cdn Corps. At 0830 hrs, 30 July, the units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde were ordered to take over the positions of 3 Cdn Inf Div, and 4 Cdn Armd Div HQ moved into the area previously occupied by HQ 3 Cdn Div on 30 July.50 The relief was to commence at 2400 hrs 30 July and was to be completed by 0400 hrs 31 Jul.51
After a couple of days, 4 Cdn Armd Bde reverted to the original plan to relieve the 8 Cdn Inf Bde with the takeover designed to be completed by 0500 hrs 31 July. The 7 Cdn Recce Regt was to come under command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde at that time.52 These moves allowed the division to gain some familiarity with the ground south of Caen.
The administrative tail of the division gradually began to sort itself out after the rushed move from the beaches to the area below Caen. The initial staff effort was focused in settling supply and administrative problems, setting up in the designated areas and becoming more accustomed to the new surroundings in France.53 The first 10 Cdn Inf Bde Administrative Instruction was issued on 31 July 44 and outlined the policy and procedures for logistical re-supply in the critical areas of ammunition, fuel and supplies. The timings for the Q returns, including the ADREP, Daily Tank Statistics and the Weekly Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) Return were set with the first two returns due at brigade HQ by 1800 hrs daily.54 With the training over, units deployed and the administrative and support arrangements clarified, Kitching and the 4 Cdn Armd Div units awaited their first action.
Kitching entered Normandy with a division composed of two brigades of vastly differing proficiency in their assigned roles. With the assignment of specific SAR squadrons to specific infantry battalions within 10 Cdn Inf Bde combined arms effectiveness had been established through the familiarity and trust gained from constant sessions of working together. While the Lake Superior Regiment had assigned their infantry companies to support specific armour regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Bde, these units did not have the same number of opportunities to achieve the same level of proficiency as that within 10 Cdn Inf Bde. The result was effective infantry/tank cooperation within the organic units of the brigades but since there was minimal training across the brigades the tactical proficiency did not necessarily translate to effectiveness in combined arms teams composed of units between the brigades.
The truth was that each armoured regiment and infantry battalion had its own peculiarities in how it operated. Training together, across brigades, would have made these known to the different units and key players, allowing the critical element of trust to be built up before going into battle. The reality was that, once a combined arms mix was attempted across the brigades, the effectiveness and familiarity between the arms and the people trying to work together was absent. Since 4 Cdn Armd Bde was absent for much of the available training period, Kitching was forced to try and build cooperation and understanding between the brigades and regiments through TEWTs and map exercises, a less than satisfactory solution.
When the training regime is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the training constraints forced onto the division were significant. The division had to wait for two months before going into battle and during that period it could not train on its vehicles or practise armoured tactics. This was hardly the way to bring an armoured division to peak efficiency before entering combat.
In addition, the division could only talk about implementing the lessons learned that were coming out of Normandy. By the time that the 4 Cdn Armd Div entered Normandy, British and Canadian thinking on armoured doctrine had changed. The 5 Cdn Armd Div and all of the British armoured divisions had reorganized themselves away from the one armoured, one infantry brigade organization into the combined arms battlegroups that Kitching had talked about in Exercise Iroquois. Kitching had little choice but to keep the organization and doctrine that he had trained with even though that doctrine had been proved wanting.
Kitching had no control over the external factors and decisions that shaped the division’s training environment. Kitching, Ganong and Proctor used every method available to them to impart their knowledge and experiences to prepare the men of the division for the upcoming battles. On the eve of their first battle, the members of the division considered themselves to be highly trained and motivated, ready for any of the expected challenges that the Normandy battlefields might bring.
Geoffrey Hayes’ assessment of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment is illustrative of the mood of the entire division when he stated, ‘Indeed, they had good reason to be enthusiastic: they were a well-conditioned, well-practised group of men who felt they had trained hard, some for four years. Few would have been aware of any deficiencies in their training and it is difficult to find evidence to suggest that they were not as well trained as any other Canadian infantry unit.’55 The events to follow would test the division to a man.
Given the constraints that Kitching was forced to deal with in training his division for Normandy, the best that he could have realistically hoped to achieve in his training regime was proficiency at the regiment and battalion level with combined arms proficiency at the troop/platoon level. The events to come revealed that this level of proficiency was indeed achieved and was to prove itself under circumstances that could not have been foreseen in any training exercise. The strength of the division was that it was manned by competent and effective officers and men who were able to assimilate quickly the lessons learned from the battlefield and to make the necessary adjustments to their operating procedures. The division and its leadership would be tested in the most gruelling of circumstances. Some would falter, but the time, effort and sweat invested in training the units of the division would pay dividends in Normandy.