On June 6 1944, the Allies launched the largest amphibious operation in recorded history, codenamed Overlord. The invasion plan consisted of two phases: during the first phase, codenamed Operation Neptune, the Allies made good their assault. In the second phase, the Allies were to penetrate inland 12 miles to take Caen, Bayeux, Isigny, Carentan and airfields in the vicinity.1 Canadian and British forces were then to exploit south to seize Falaise, 20 miles south of Caen. Anchoring their left on Falaise, the British and Canadians were to pivot, swing eastward and sweep the ground between Falaise and Argentan, 15 miles to the south, and also between Argentan and Alençon, 25 miles farther south. These actions would put them in position for a drive to the Seine River.2 The ultimate objective would not be Berlin, which was deemed too far for the Western Allies, but the Ruhr, the industrial heartland of Germany.3
The German defence of the invasion was fierce and effective and they had uncommitted reserves available from the German Fifteenth Army that could be thrown against the Allies.4 Allied air superiority and naval gunfire support made the concentration of large German forces impossible. German tactics turned to concealment and dispersion where armour was placed in ‘penny packets’ to provide immediate support to the infantry at no more than squadron strength.5
The outcome of the Normandy invasion remained in doubt for the first fortyfive days of operations. Progress off the beaches was slower than expected across the entire front. In the later half of June operations were directed towards the capture of Caen. By early July, St Lô remained in German hands. The Germans had evacuated part of Caen on the night of 9 July but the Second British Army had not been able to cross the Orne River. The German Army still controlled the eastern suburbs of Caen.6
By 11 July, the Allied bridgehead was still desperately small and extended roughly 65 miles from the Cherbourg coast, where the US line reached the sea at the western extremity of the front to just east of Caen. In some places, the bridgehead was less than 10 miles deep, and nowhere did it extend for more than 20 miles. At this point in time, the Allies had expected to control an area ten times the actual size of the bridgehead. The lodgement was so small that the some of the airfields within the bridgehead were still within German artillery range and were essentially unusable.7 Only the capture of Cherbourg was accomplished on schedule.
The failure to capture Caen dramatically altered the design of the Allied campaign. Instead of provoking the Germans into costly counter-attacks as originally planned, British and Canadians forces were now obliged to go over to the attack themselves against well prepared and fortified German defensive zones. Montgomery’s plan was to contain the bulk of the German forces in the Caen area so that the Americans could break out and sweep south and west to break the stalemate.8 The Canadians played a significant role in the series of operations designed to first take Caen (Windsor and Charnwood) and then in the drive southwards to Falaise in operation Atlantic (the Canadian phase of Goodwood) and in Spring (the 2 Cdn Corps attack to take Verrières Ridge).
The Allies had expected high losses on the beaches but the planners had expected the casualty rates to fall as mobile operations became the norm after the breakout from the bridgehead. The opposite in fact happened. In June alone, the US suffered 40,000 casualties, while the British and Canadians suffered 38,000. Progress had been slow, the fighting remained difficult and gains became measured in yards and thousands of dead. As a result, considerable anguish and dissent developed within the senior Allied leadership. The need for a successful breakout became more and more imperative and the capture of Falaise, the original target of D+2, became the symbol for that success.9
The Germans had ten panzer or panzer grenadier divisions in Normandy at the time of the invasion and they concentrated their strength, particularly their panzer divisions (Pz Div), against the British-Canadian forces, who were trying to take the vital area in and around Caen.10 German success was based on two factors: sound defensive tactics and superior weapons. German defensive doctrine was simple but effective. The object was ‘to destroy the enemy by fire’ with the available firepower deployed in depth. The terrain south of Caen offered the Germans an ideal defensive position with easily concealed locations offering good fields of fire.11
2nd Canadian Corps
On the afternoon of 11 July 1944, the 2nd Canadian Corps Headquarters became operational in France under the command of Lieutenant General Simonds. The corps assumed responsibility for 8,000 yards of front in the Caen sector. Simonds came under a great deal of pressure from the time his Corps headquarters became operational. After the capture of Caen, Montgomery wanted to break out of the bridgehead and reach the heights between Falaise and Caen. On 18 July, Montgomery launched what was the most ambitious operation of the campaign to date code-named Goodwood. This operation was to be the largest British armoured attack in history.12
8th British Corps with three armoured divisions and the 2 Cdn Corps with two infantry divisions and a tank brigade were launched in an attempt to break out of the area around Caen and into the open country around Falaise. The operation was supported by heavy bombers from the 8th US Air Force and the 2nd Tactical Air Force. Opposing these superior forces were the 272nd Infantry Division (without a single tank or heavy anti-tank gun), the badly shattered 21st Panzer Division, the remnants of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 12th SS Panzer Division’s two battle groups stood in reserve near Potigny.13
The tactics employed in Goodwood were quite different from any previous British attack. Heavy bombers were to lay bomb-carpets on either side of the planned breakthrough area. But they would leave a 3-mile gap which would be attacked by medium bombers dropping bombs that were designed not to make large craters. Everything in the plan depended on the bombardment. The Allies assumed that the German defence back to its gun-line would be destroyed. Over 4,500 Allied aircraft would participate on the first day of the attack. A huge concentration of artillery of some 500 guns – some used on specified targets, others laying down a walking barrage in front of the advancing troops – and the fire of warships would all be used to ensure the success of the operation.14
Following the air bombardment, the three British armoured divisions crossed the Orne east of Caen and attacked. The assault went well at first but faltered on the fortified villages along the Bourguébus Ridge south of the city. The impact of the long reach of the German anti-tank guns and German defences proved devastating. Goodwood ended on 20 July. While Goodwood succeeded in pushing the German defensive lines back by some 7 miles, there were extraordinarily high losses amongst the attacking units. The armoured divisions lost 36 per cent of their tank establishment (over 200 tanks) and the casualties in the infantry divisions were just as severe.15
Goodwood foreshadowed many of the planning elements that Simonds would employ in his August operations: heavy bombers, massed armour, and phased attacks. These elements were not successful for Montgomery in July and would be less so for Simonds in August; yet Simonds decided to employ these tactics, and maintain them essentially intact, for his upcoming operations. The one important lesson that should have been learned was that trying to breach defences in depth with armoured divisions alone was not a successful tactic.
An important element of the Normandy battles was the fact that the German Army (Heer) had used France and the Low Counties as training areas where new divisions were formed, brought to strength and, when judged battle-ready, shipped to Russia. As a result, German commanders were very familiar with the terrain of the Normandy area. Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, for example, stated, ‘. . . I know the terrain [Normandy] in great detail as I was stationed here in the autumn of 1943 with my old reconnaissance battalion and carried out numerous exercises over it. I know, therefore, that the heights near Potigny control the terrain and that the Laison sector is a natural tank obstacle.’16 The Canadians would eventually learn these same lessons but at a terrific cost in casualties.
The Allies had greater success in the American sector. The First US Army launched Operation Cobra on 25 July and after a week of heavy fighting, broke through the German left wing and began to exploit its success into the heart of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas. On 1 August, General Omar Bradley took command of the 12th Army Group, handing the First US Army over to Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges. Simultaneously, the Third US Army, under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, entered the battle on the right of the First US Army and assumed responsibility for the main exploitation task.17
Montgomery was convinced that the Germans would respond rationally to an American breakthrough in the west by staging an orderly withdrawal to the east while holding the hinge position in front of Caen. In his directive of 27 July (M515), Montgomery insisted that anything the Anglo-Canadian forces did elsewhere had to have the underlying objective of facilitating the breakout operations of the American forces to the west of St Lô .18 The goal was the rapid capture of the whole Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas and their vital ports.19
The American breakout to the east represented a considerable danger to the German position in Normandy. If left unchecked or allowed to gather momentum the breakout could force the withdrawal of German forces from France. With France lost, the Allied threat to Germany would become immediate. There were two possible German options to deal with the American breakout, one cautious and one bold. The cautious and expected course of action was to terminate the conflict in Normandy and, through a series of delaying actions, withdraw, initially to the Seine River, but eventually further east into stronger defensive positions established at other natural river lines along the Somme– Marne–Saône River line and the Albert Canal–Meuse River line. This action would entail the withdrawal of Army Group G from southern France.20
The second possible option was much bolder and carried considerable risk: stop the Allied breakout and stabilize the front once again in Normandy. Keeping the fight in Normandy represented the best option for the Germans, but selecting this course of action meant moving German panzer forces, thereby exposing them to the very real threat posed by Allied tactical airpower. Hitler decided to try to recreate the conditions of static warfare that favoured German tactics and weapons. He ordered Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge to close the gap in the left portion of the German defences, anchoring the left flank once more, this time at Avranches.21
On 3 August, von Kluge began moving his panzer divisions away from the Caen area to counter-attack the American forces that had broken out. The intent of the German attack was to cut the advancing American forces off from their supply lines. The plan required seriously weakening the German defensive strength around Caen. Von Kluge initially protested that any shift of armour from the British and Canadian sector would fatally weaken his defences south of Caen and expose his panzers to the waiting Allied air force.22 Hitler remained adamant.
During the nights of 6/7 August, four German armoured divisions attacked in the Mortain area. At first, they made good progress but, forewarned by ULTRA decrypts, the Americans had ample time to prepare for the attack and eventually stopped it.23 Over a period of two days, the Americans destroyed much of the German armour remaining in Normandy and with it any hope the Germans had of a coherent, systematic withdrawal out of Normandy.
Into the Line
The 4 Cdn Armd Div relief of the 3 Cdn Inf Div was complete at 0430 hrs on 31 July.24 The disposition of the division’s units was somewhat scattered, with the infantry of the 10 Cdn Inf Bde forward at Cormelles and Bourguébus25 and 4 Cdn Armd Bde deployed along the left flank of the 2 Cdn Corps. The Lake Superior Regiment was located between Four and Soliers and the Grenadier Guards occupied Grentheville. The other armoured regiments were deployed in reserve positions: the BCR at Mondeville, and the Foot Guards near Grentheville.26
Moving into their allotted positions, the soldiers of the division traversed the battlefield over which Goodwood was fought. The battlefield had not changed and the carnage in both human life and tank casualties was clearly visible. Many of the entries in the war diaries of the various units of 4 Cdn Armd Div commented on the carnage and on burned victims still in the tanks. The battlefield was evidence of the vulnerability of the Sherman tank and the killing power of the German anti-tank guns. The reaction by the tank crews was to seek added protection. This led to the practice of welding spare tank tracks to the sides of the tanks in an attempt to thicken the armour protection.27
The more lasting effect, however, was psychological. The images imprinted the need for caution vice bravado on the part of a number of key leaders of the division. In particular, Major Ned Amy, whose squadron would lead the division in Totalize, stated that after viewing the battlefield he made a mental note to never put his squadron in the position where the same could happen to it.28
During the first seven days of August, the division, for the most part, entered a period of static operations. Divisional orders required a state of readiness called a ‘stand to’ which was ordered from dusk to dawn. A ‘stand to’ represented a state of preparedness by the units whereby a proportion, usually two-thirds of each unit, was awake to guard against infiltration or attack. The corresponding ‘standdown’ was ordered after sun up, and all who did not have duties to perform would be allowed to get a few hours sleep.29 Listening posts and patrols were established and guards and sentries posted. In the armoured units, guard tanks were designated and at least one gunner and one loader were on duty in each guard tank. When tanks were in harbour, other than the guard tank, at least one member of the crew was to remain in the turret of the tank while the remainder of the crew could sleep close to their tank ready to take their post on short notice.30
Kitching’s O Group was held at 1100 hrs each day to outline operations for the next day. Brigade and regimental O Groups followed with regimental O Groups typically recorded at around 1800 hrs each day. If an operation was planned, more meetings would occur, particularly between the CO of the unit conducting the attack, known as the supported commander, and the CO providing support in the attack – the supporting commander. It was up to the supported commander to develop the concept of operations for the attack with the supporting commander providing expertise on how best to employ his forces; for example how best to employ tanks in support of a proposed infantry attack.
During this period, the 10 Cdn Inf Bde fought a series of actions designed to: keep the Germans engaged, prevent them from moving forces to meet the Americans and to acquire important ground prior to the forthcoming operation towards Falaise. The first target was Tilly-la-Campagne. Tilly was located on a small rise on Bourguébus Ridge. The approach to the village was over flat open grain fields that rose gently to the hamlet. The terrain provided little to no cover to advancing infantry.
Tilly consisted of eight houses, each turned into a fortress. The Germans had strengthened the basements of the houses to withstand heavy pressure from above and then dynamited the walls so that they collapsed inward creating a pyramid over the basements. The basements were prepared with weapon slits to cover any and all approaches. The village had the highest tactical importance since the high ground upon which the village was located gave it observation and control over a vast area. Two previous attacks to take the village had failed.31
The initial 10 Cdn Inf Bde task was a one company diversionary frontal attack from Bourguébus to support a Calgary Highlanders attack on the night of 31 July/1 August.32 When this attack failed Simonds ordered Kitching to seize the objective the following night. The Lincoln & Welland Regiment was tasked to take the village with support from A Sqn SAR.
The brigade plan called for a brief barrage after which A and B companies from the Lincs were to proceed out of Bourguébus and take up positions between La Hogue and Tilly where they could intercept any German tanks which might try to counter-attack. D Coy was to seize Point 63 and C Coy was to pass through D into the town, with D following up.33 The tanks from SAR were to support from northwest of Bourguébus. If the infantry attack proceeded according to plan, the tanks were to protect the infantry against counter-attacks and to provide a mobile counter-attack force. Conversely, if the attack bogged down and did not succeed by first light, the tanks were to provide direct fire to help the Lincs onto the objective.34
Brigadier Jefferson and McQueen, the CO of the Lincs, listed the German strength as uncertain.35 On the night of 1/2 August, nine companies of SS panzer grenadiers with six anti-tank guns, twenty tanks and twenty-two artillery pieces were located in and around Tilly. This meant that a force of over 500 Germans in well-prepared and supported positions opposed the assaulting Canadian companies.36
The attack began at 2345 hrs and came under immediate machine gun and mortar fire. The advance became disorganized when the commander of B Coy was killed. An attempt was made to reorganize the companies and resume the attack at 0200 hrs. These orders were not received by all of the sub-units and only two platoons proceeded to attack. They were stopped about 800 yards out of Bourguébus. At 0545 hrs, McQueen informed Bde HQ that the attack had failed. The attack cost the Lincs fifty-eight casualties, with twelve fatalities.37
At 1030 hrs 2 August, Kitching visited 10 Cdn Inf Bde HQ. Kitching, Jefferson and McQueen conducted an after action review to try and determine what went wrong.38 A number of shortfalls were recorded in the performance of the troops. McQueen noted that he had received his orders late, that the orders were sketchy and this prevented proper battle procedure within the regiment. The troops were hesitant about returning fire for fear of causing friendly casualties. They became strung out along the line of advance as the head of the columns advanced; and those behind slowed down causing the advancing formation to disintegrate into a series of small advancing detachments, destroying any hope of cohesion or coordination. The men were also over-burdened with excess equipment. These issues were fundamental mistakes in infantry tactics and battle procedure that should have been stressed and addressed in the training of the regiment.39
The decision was made to withdraw the Lincs from the line and replace the unit with the Argylls. A harassing fire programme was ordered to keep the defenders of Tilly occupied during the relief.40 Jefferson conducted a further after action review with the officers of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment on 3 August. His principal criticism was that ‘insufficient determination had been shown in attacking what should have been a two-company objective.’41 Jefferson followed this after action review with a discussion of the lessons learned from the Tilly attack with all of the other brigade units on 4 August.42
This battle was the first test of the leadership within 10 Cdn Inf Bde and there were mixed results. McQueen had been found wanting. Wotherspoon claimed that McQueen had cracked under the pressure of combat and recommended to Jefferson that McQueen be relieved immediately.43 It is not clear whether Wotherspoon’s recommendation went any higher than Jefferson. If it did reach Kitching, it would appear that he was not prepared to remove McQueen after this engagement.44
Wotherspoon was also critical of Jefferson’s plan for the employment of the SAR armour and recommended a number of modifications to Jefferson’s plan after the Brigade O Group. Wotherspoon stated that he had just completed a forward reconnaissance prior to Jefferson’s O Group and was cognizant of the German positions in and around Tilly. The content of Jefferson’s orders led Wotherspoon to question whether Jefferson had personally gone forward to conduct a reconnaissance. Jefferson’s initial plan had the armour crossing open terrain without the cover of smoke. Wotherspoon argued with Jefferson and got the fireplan changed to address his concerns.45
At the beginning of August, Lieutenant Colonel Ganong was promoted and moved to command the 4 Cdn Inf Bde and Lieutenant Colonel F. Wigle took over the position of GSO1.46 Kitching would have had to weigh the impact of losing Ganong against denying him his promotion to Brigadier and the command of 4 Cdn Inf Bde. Accepting this move was a gamble on Kitching’s part since there is no indication that Kitching knew or had worked previously with Wigle. Wigle, however, became a very effective operations officer and, as Kitching states, brought more life to the general staff. The decision seems to have paid off since Kitching remarked on how happy he was with the staff work of his division in preparing for Totalize.47
Losing the operations officer that Kitching had trained with for the past five months, on the eve of his first major battle must have been disconcerting for Kitching. Since the dynamic between a commander and his key staff members was personality-driven and required a working relationship based on trust, commanders normally selected the officers that they wanted to fill the key staff positions within their headquarters, particularly a position as important as the GSO1. Consequently, when important moves of key staff officers were contemplated there was usually consultation with the affected commander. Kitching made no mention of this in his memoirs with respect to the loss of Ganong or of having been previously consulted in having Wigle assigned as Ganong’s replacement. The McQueen and Ganong incidents were the first in a number of key personnel-related issues with which Kitching had to contend.
On 5 August reports began circulating that the Germans were withdrawing from the Tilly defensive line. At about 1530 hrs, word was received from 5 Cdn Inf Bde that the Germans had withdrawn and they were no longer in contact.48 Kitching ordered the Argylls to send out a fighting patrol, in platoon strength, to determine whether the Germans were still in Tilly; if so, in what strength?
The initial assessment was that the Germans may have decided to begin an ordered withdrawal to the Seine. While the Argyll patrol was out, a battalion pursuit group was formed consisting of the Algonquin Regiment and two squadrons from the SAR with a complement of supporting arms. If Tilly was found empty, the pursuit group was to pass through to re-establish contact with the Germans.49
The Argyll patrol left at 1630 hrs and entered Tilly at approximately 1700 hrs. The Germans had waited until the patrol was within close range and then pinned them down with accurate fire. Stewart ordered artillery fire to help extricate the patrol. The patrol returned at 1800 hrs, losing seven men, but returned with three prisoners from the 1 SS Pz Div.50
Simonds decided that the action reports were inconclusive and believed that the resistance was coming from a rear guard force that was trying to gain time for the main force to withdraw. Simonds ordered another attack. Subsequently Kitching ordered Jefferson to capture the village. Jefferson ordered the Argylls to attack Tilly at 1900 hrs, ‘not using more than 2 companies’ with two troops of tanks, a troop of 17-pdr anti-tank guns and divisional artillery in support.51
Wotherspoon did not like the brigade plan and suggested that an armoured feint should be made west of Tilly to distract the defenders. He also requested a smoke barrage to cover the main attack.52 The armoured feint was to begin at 2145 hrs with the main attack at 2300 hrs. The Argylls made a determined effort to take Tilly. The forward elements entered the town but, when it became obvious that further progress was not possible, the commanders decided to withdraw. There was now no doubt that Tilly was still held in force. This attack cost another twenty-four casualties and four tanks were knocked out.53
Kitching also ordered 4 Cdn Armd Bde to seize La Hogue. At 1400 the Lake Superior Regiment received initial orders to take and, if possible, hold the village. The intelligence provided to Kitching and the attacking force from 2 Cdn Corps was that the majority of the German forces had departed the town leaving only a small force. The attack went in at 1930 hrs and was halted by heavy fire 150 yards from the town with the loss of six killed and fifteen wounded.54 It was now clear that the German defensive line was still being held in force. Kitching and his brigade commanders began to question the accuracy of corps intelligence reports.
During the 1–5 August timeframe, the armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Bde were maintained in a counter-attack role and saw little action. The Grenadier Guards had moved to the area of Giberville to come under command of the 49 Inf Div, and the BCR was tasked to support the 147 Br Inf Bde.55 The only significant activity on the part of the armoured regiments occurred on 5 August when B Sqn from the BCRs went on a ‘recce in force’ in the area of Four-Soliers. The Sqn passed through the positions of the Lake Superior Regiment and pushed forward in an attempt to provoke a German counter-attack. The intent was to draw the Germans forward onto the remaining tanks of the BCRs who were set to ambush the counter-attack. The Germans, however, did not respond. The same tactic was planned for the following night but Kitching cancelled the operation at the last minute.56
The command decisions for Kitching at this point were rather clear-cut. Choosing the 10 Cdn Inf Bde to carry out the attacks on Tilly was a straightforward decision for Kitching since the regiments of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde were being employed elsewhere and infantry were the logical choice to carry out the assigned attacks. The nature of the unfolding operations forced Kitching to divide his attention between the conduct of current 10 Cdn Inf Bde operations and in the planning of future division operations.
The 4 Cdn Armd Div units were placed into the line south of Caen to acclimatize the men to the routine and conditions of combat. The key to these actions, as espoused by both Montgomery and Simonds, was to ensure that the tasks assigned were of such a nature that they would lead to success. Failure could lead to serious issues of morale.57 The 4 Cdn Armd Div attacks were of limited value beyond confirming the existence of a firmly held defensive German line. The attacks cost the division a significant number of casualties for the intelligence gained and while there may have been an expectation that the setbacks may have negatively impacted morale, there is clear indication that the opposite effect happened. The war diaries convey an eagerness to take the Germans on again. The units felt that the lessons they had learned, and were learning daily, would serve them well in their next encounter.
While the effectiveness of the Tilly and La Hogue attacks as an introduction into battle can be debated, the time in this static environment allowed Proctor, Wigle and the brigade staffs to iron out their staff procedures. Upon moving into the Normandy bridgehead, the maintenance procedures for the division were reorganized. The units were divided into four maintenance groups, 10 Cdn Inf Bde Group, 4 Cdn Armd Bde Group, Div Tps & Arty Group and Adm Group. Rations and petrol for forward troops would be deposited at a point selected by division and notified to units through their respective brigade maintenance groups. This new policy went into effect 30 July 1944.58
The static period proved to be anything but static for the 15 Cdn Artillery Regt which was supporting 4 Cdn Armd Div. The unit fired over 25,000 rounds of 25-pdr ammunition during this timeframe. This operational tempo challenged the division’s supply system to keep the guns stocked since the guns were firing in excess of their daily-allotted rounds. Since transport and ammunition were the main issues Proctor devised a system of overloading the available supply vehicles in order to keep the guns supplied.59
G.L. Cassidy, a member of the Algonquin Regiment, in his book Warpath, best summarized this period when he wrote:
The task of learning the battle noises, and accustoming ourselves to patrols and to administration under fire had been successfully carried out. We had learned as well how important a small thing like water becomes . . . We had learned too the value of discipline, particularly in regard to movement in daylight.60
The members of the division as a whole were learning the important lessons of actual combat and how these lessons differed at times with what had been learned in training. This period also provided Kitching with a first look at commanders under combat conditions. The true test of his subordinate commanders would come, however, during the intense combat of Operation Totalize.