The Americans had executed a successful breakout of the Normandy bridgehead through the successful execution of Operation Cobra and in late July their forces were swinging south and east into the French countryside. The bulk of the German forces in the west were now dangerously overextended as a result of operations against the Americans in the Mortain area. This situation presented the Allies with the unique opportunity to entrap the remaining forces of the German Fifth Panzer Army, the Seventh Army and Panzer Group Eberbach. With the First Cdn Army and the Second British Army pressing down from the north and west, and the First and Third US Armies sweeping in from the west and south, the major concentration of German forces in Normandy could be encircled. The only potential escape route for the Germans ran through the towns of Falaise in the north and Argentan in the south. The movement of German troops clearly indicated that they were moving east through this gap. It was, therefore, imperative that the Allies close off the escape route as quickly as possible.
Based on this evolving situation, Montgomery issued his directive M 518 on 11 August which stressed the importance of closing what was called the Falaise-Alençon Gap. Montgomery now ordered First Cdn Army to capture Falaise. This action had the highest priority and was to be done quickly. Once Falaise was captured, strong armoured and mobile forces were to secure Argentan. A secure front was to be held between Falaise and the sea, facing eastwards. The 12th Army Group would then swing its right flank forward from the Le Mans area up to Alençon and then on to the general line Sees–Carrouges.1
To capture Falaise, it was necessary for 2 Cdn Corps to advance across the Laison River, and to capture the villages of Olendon, Epancy and Perrières, which dominated the route to the northeast. This move would also seal off the exit towards Jort on the Dives River. It was also of the utmost importance to secure the road and bridges between Falaise and Damblainville. This action would allow 2 Cdn Corps to either capture or dominate Trun and link up with Third US Army.
The 1st British Corps would conform on the northern flank and present a firm front as far as the sea, while Second British Army on the right continued to advance towards Falaise from the west.2 The physical occupation of Falaise was not to be carried out by First Cdn Army, as originally ordered, but by Second British Army.3 This change reflected a more realistic approach based on the disposition of the two armies.
The Canadian gains in Totalize represented a serious threat to the German lines of communications which had to be kept open at all costs in order to allow the six German armoured divisions trapped at Mortain to withdraw. Unfortunately for the Germans, withdrawal of these forces had been left until the last minute based mainly on Hitler’s refusal to accept the failure of the Mortain offensive. In an attempt to buy time, available German forces were cobbled together and were injected into the line to try to shore up the German defences around the northern edge of the Pocket around Falaise.4
The German forces facing 2 Cdn Corps were controlled by I SS Pz Corps and consisted of 85, 89, 271 and 272 Inf Divs, supported by elements of 12 SS Pz Div. The enemy disposition as depicted in Canadian orders for Tractable stated:
It appears that 271 Div is being moved to the east to thicken up def posn on line of LE LAISON RIVER EAST of CAEN–FALAISE. 85 Div is also reported in this area backed up by three battle gps [groups] of 12 SS Div. These battle gps probably consist of a bn of inf and sqn of tks (some Mk I and Mk II Tiger). Enemy def on this front is made up of a lt [light] inf screen backed up by large numbers of 88mms along gen line of river. Behind these SOUTH of river on rev[erse] slope are Nebelwerfers.5
The enemy disposition concluded with the statement, ‘It is Not considered that the enemy def posn is in depth.’6 The expectation was that, once the initial crust of the defensive network was breached, the advance would be lightly opposed.
At 1000 hrs on 13 August, Simonds held a conference with his division commanders on Operation Tallulah. It was obvious to Simonds that Quesnay Wood and the hills south of it represented the shortest route to Falaise. It was also the area easiest to defend. In the formulation of his plan Simonds considered the following:
• Preliminary bombardments warned the Germans of the frontage of an attack and enabled him to bring heavy fire onto the follow-on formations thus preventing a penetration in depth.
• The infantry rate of advance of 100yds in 3 minutes in deep attack provided the Germans with time to react and concentrate their anti-tank guns and heavier weapons on the advancing forces.
• The proper employment of armour was to position it so that the Germans had to drive it out in order to regain their freedom of manoeuvre.
• The existing German gun screen had to be penetrated under cover of darkness or smoke.7
Simonds decided to launch a powerful attack that would sweep around Quesnay Woods and Potigny with the goal of gaining ‘command’ of the important road network that ran through Falaise. The specific intent of the operation was to seize and hold the high ground in the area of Versainville followed by an assault on Falaise.8
Instead of attacking Quesnay Woods and Potigny directly, Simonds decided to neutralize these areas with attacks by heavy bombers during the advance towards the Laison River by the ground forces.9 The intervening ground to the southeast was rolling and bare affording only sparse cover to any defenders. On the other hand, the open fields, baked firm by the August sun, allowed a convenient freedom to deploy.
Simonds decided to use the same general technique as in Totalize, but with significant variations. Two divisions would attack side by side, the 4 Cdn Armd Div on the left, the 3 Cdn Inf Div on the right. Operation Tallulah was renamed Tractable and was to be a massive armoured thrust that would take place in broad daylight after a short but heavy bombardment by all available artillery, supported at strategic moments by medium and heavy bombers.10
Simonds decided to launch Tractable11 in daylight since he believed that the Germans were anticipating another night attack. He felt that this tactic would avoid the confusion that occurred on the night of 7/8 August and would help in the crossing of the Laison River. To screen the attacking force against German anti-tank and artillery fire, Simonds planned to use smoke in front and on either flank of the advancing columns, especially during the first phase. The theory was that the enemy anti-tank gunners could not hit what they could not see.12 The smoke barrage was another lesson learned from Totalize. The armoured divisions took heavy casualties because they were forced to advance in daylight, without the cover of smoke.
In Totalize, the armoured breakthrough in Phase I had not stopped the bypassed German positions from hitting the follow-on infantry. The problem in this operation was to get the infantry forward and have their clearing operations in progress while the tanks were still breaking through. Simonds’ solution was a ‘phalanx type’ formation, consisting of two divisional columns. The columns would storm across the river, each on a front of roughly 800 yards, finally converging on the high ground at Orme des Gresles and Versainville and the low ridge between.13 An armoured brigade would lead each column; a brigade of infantry mounted in ‘Priests’ would follow with another infantry brigade bringing up the rear to clear the area of any remaining German forces.
On the right, 3 Cdn Inf Div, with 2 Cdn Armd Bde under its command, would strike straight to the river’s edge at Montboint, with 9 and 7 Cdn Inf Bdes following in that order.14 The left-hand column would include 4 Cdn Armd Bde, with the 8 Cdn Inf Bde under command for the first phase of the operation. The 10 Cdn Inf Bde would follow.15 On the left, 51 Highland Div of 1st British Corps was to advance from the St Sylvain sector and capture Le Bû-sur-Rouvres, directly to the east, thus protecting the flank of the operation.
Kitching was given command of a sizable force for Phase I of Tractable.16 In addition to the extra infantry brigade, 4 Cdn Armd Div was given control over the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt and was also allotted the 19 Cdn Field Regt from the 2 AGRA. This regiment, with its own self-propelled artillery regiment together with the 23 Cdn Field Regt would provide supporting fire as the armour and infantry pushed steadily further into enemy territory. This tactic redressed the problem of lack of artillery support encountered by 4 Cdn Armd Div in its advance during Phase II of Totalize.17
Tractable was to be carried out in three phases. In Phase I, the attacking forces were to cross the Laison River and seize the high ground area Pt 118 and Pt 103 southeast of Montboint. Phase II involved a push south and southwest to capture the high ground northeast of Falaise with 3 Cdn Inf Div tasked with capturing Pt 170 and Pt 175 (a dominating hill roughly mid-way between Potigny and Falaise) and 4 Cdn Armd Div tasked with capturing the area ring contour 160 located northwest of Versainville, approximately 2.5km northeast of Falaise.18 Phase III involved the capture of the bridges at Eraines and Damblainville preparatory to an advance southward on Trun to link up with the 15th US Corps.19
The method of attack was devised and formally dictated by Simonds. The armoured brigades were to lead each division’s attack and were to advance at a rate of 12 mph. On the right, the 2 Cdn Armd Bde would move down from Estrées-la-Campagne and cross the Laison River near Montboint. Without pausing, it was to swing south to capture its objective Pt 184. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde was to lead the division the 2-mile distance to the Laison River, crossing between Rouvres and Maizières. Once across, the Brigade would swing past Rouvres, Olendon and Epancy, bypassing all opposition, and seize the high ground above Versainville.20
The 8 Cdn Inf Bde with two battalions riding in Priests, half-tracks and carriers was to seize the high ground at Pt 103. The remaining battalion, moving on foot, was to mop up the Laison valley and take care of any bypassed German units. Once Pt 103 was captured, 8 Cdn Inf Bde reverted to control of 3 Cdn Inf Div and was to move and capture the town of Sassy.21
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was to pass through 8 Cdn Inf Bde, capture the village of Olendon, take over Perrières from the Lake Superior Regiment, then press on to Epancy. If required, 10 Cdn Inf Bde was to be prepared to push forward to link up with the armour moving to the final objective at Versainville.
The 18 Cdn Armd C Regt was ordered to reconnoitre in force, protect the division left flank between St Sylvain and Maizières and act as flank liaison with 51 Highland Div.22 Once across the Laison River, the regiment was to provide flank security on the left for the division and was to be prepared to conduct a reconnaissance in force of the wooded area south of Epancy and Perrières while holding one squadron in reserve for the exploitation south and east of Eraines on orders from Kitching.23
Bombers would be used once again to support the ground attack. Between H-Hour minus twenty minutes and H-minus five minutes, medium and fighterbombers were to engage enemy tank, gun and mortar positions up to the Laison valley along the line Montboint–Rouvres–Maizières. Two hours after the start of the operation, heavy bombers were slated to strike Quesnay Wood, Potigny and German defences astride the Falaise road.24
Kitching had little input into the tactical disposition or utilization of his division in Tractable. His division orders mirrored the Corps orders since Simonds had already dictated the brigade order, tasks, and the attack formation for all attacking units. Kitching did however provide his assessment of the tactical situation and stated that he expected the main opposition to be an anti-tank screen along the line of the Laison River held by elements of the German 85th Div and 12 SS Pz Div.25 While Kitching’s flexibility was limited, he was careful to only assign tasks to his brigades allowing his brigade commanders the latitude they needed in deciding which units would accomplish which objectives. The net result of the operational plan was that Kitching was once again forced to enter into a major operation without having much input as to how his brigades were to be employed and with little flexibility to influence the tactical battle once the armoured phalanx crossed the start line.26
The plan itself has received considerable review from historians and has been called everything from a sound plan, imaginative, well-thought-out and one that carried a powerful blow, to a plan few coffee table strategists would use, even in desperation.27 Jack English has called Tractable ‘Totalize in smoke’ since the two operations bore an astounding resemblance to each other in concept.28 Foster, the commander of the 7 Cdn Inf Bde, described Tractable as ‘certainly one of the strangest attack formations anyone ever dreamed up and without a hope in hell of succeeding as planned.’ In Foster’s opinion, what ‘looked good to Guy’s precise engineering mind on paper seldom worked in practice once the human element was added.’29 Among the units of the armoured brigade, it was referred to as an ‘unusual tactical concept’ by the BCRs, ‘slightly unorthodox’ by the Grenadier Guards while the Foot Guards recorded it as an ‘impressive sight’ of ‘parade ground order’.30
Massing the units solved the staff problem of getting hundreds of armoured vehicles to the start line in good order but did little to facilitate the combat effectiveness of the formations once they rolled forward, and particularly when they had to fight. Not anticipating the huge amounts of dust that would be generated by massing the vehicles and the associated control and movement problems over the projected terrain was an extraordinary oversight on the part of 2 Cdn Corps, especially when one considers the problems with visibility created by dust in the execution of Totalize. A smoke screen as a tactical weapon could be designed and executed to blind the enemy. Dust however blinded all equally and added another level of complexity to the execution of the plan.
Other opinions state that Simonds was learning from his past experience, especially the complaints of narrow frontages since he now gave the 4 Cdn Armd Div a divisional front that ran over a mile from Estrées-la-Campagne to Soignolles. While the frontage may have been greater, the phalanx type formation compacted the formations, which negated any possible advantage gained from a wider front and eliminated any thought of tactical manoeuvre. The rationale for the phalanx formation was based on the premise that mass equalled success.
The mirco-management of detail by Simonds is evident in the use of smoke to aid the advance. The use of smoke was designed to help achieve surprise and hide the advancing formations from anti-tank fire. Since smoke would only be provided for thirty minutes, Simonds believed that it was essential to advance in close intervals to get the fighting formations forward as fast as possible. Simonds therefore stipulated an advance of 300 yards per minute, and 15-yard marshalling intervals between tanks. This level of detail was appropriate for a squadron commander to ponder, not the level of detail that Simonds, as a Corps commander, should have even contemplated or ordered.31
On 13 August, Simonds summoned every senior officer to his headquarters and issued verbal orders for the upcoming operation. No written orders were issued. Following his Orders Group at 1000 hrs, Simonds spoke to the assembled commanding officers of every armoured regiment. He made known his extreme displeasure with their performance in Totalize. He stressed his belief that armour must be prepared to go forward during night or day and that any thought of armour requiring infantry protection for harbouring at night or not being able to move at night was to be dismissed immediately. He also stated that with the tremendous importance of the operation there would be cases where armour would be misemployed but this was to be no excuse for a lack of success in the upcoming operation.32
Kitching was appalled by Simonds’ comments and came to the defence of his men in a discussion with Simonds afterward.33 Simonds was essentially ordering his armoured officers to disregard everything that they had been taught with respect to armoured doctrine. The implications of what Simonds was asking and the fact that the armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Div had only been in action for less than a week did not justify the harsh criticism that Simonds had handed out. This event represented the first serious clash between Simonds and Kitching.
On the evening of 13 August, a Canadian officer of 8 Cdn Recce Regt lost his way and was captured by the Germans along with Copy No. 8 of a 2 Cdn Inf Div Instruction which outlined the entire Corps plan. The Germans initiated a number of moves during the night of 13 August but these were focused on eliminating the 2 Cdn Inf Div position near Clair-Tizon. It is important to note that these moves weakened the defensive lines along the projected axis of Tractable and that the units assigned to attack 2 Cdn Inf Div were not recalled after the Germans gained access to the Tractable information.34
The apparent German inaction in response to the Tractable information is understandable since German units could only travel at night and since there were no additional units or formations available to I SS Pz Corps.35 One could conclude that it was too late to recall the attacking units which had already begun to move to their new positions against 2 Cdn Inf Div. This left the Germans with one course of action which was to focus all available resources along the expected axis of advance.36
The German disposition was listed as 85 Inf Div holding the right sector of the 1 SS Pz Corps front along the line of the Laison valley from Ernes to east of the Falaise road, 89 Inf Div in the central sector and 271 Inf Div holding the left portion of the front.37 It was also reported that the Germans had deployed between the main Caen–Falaise road on the west and the town of Maizières on the east as many as ninety 88mm guns in anti-tank positions.38 The battlegroups of the 12 SS Pz Div were held in reserve as a counter-attack force.
The 4 Cdn Armd Div Intelligence Summary based on information up to 2200 hrs 13 August listed the following German disposition:
At least 3 divs are in part on our immediate front. In Quesnay Wood 1047 is III/1054 GR [grenadier] of 85 Inf Div, sp [supported] by tks believed to be 12 SS Pz Div. In the area 1549 is I/1053 GR of 85 Div. PW statements have located elements of a battle gp of 12 SS in this area. Further left in LA BU SUR ROUVRES 1651 are two unknown bns of 980 GR of 272 Inf Div. A def [defensive] line extends NE from there. Away on the RIGHT are the remnants of 89 and 271 Inf Divs, with again tk sp thought to be 12 SS.39
The missing information was the depth of the German defensive line. The report stated, ‘Should the screen be linear, our job will be easy and inexpensive. If it is deeply echeloned, the fight may be costly.’40 The stage was set for the next Canadian offensive.
The battle procedure within 4 Cdn Armd Div for Tractable was deliberate and in concert with what had been practiced in England. Kitching held his final orders group for Tractable at 1230 hrs on 13 August. New maps and aerial photographs were issued to all units, providing subordinate commanders the crucial information they needed to do their own estimates and reconnaissance. Orders groups were given early enough to allow plenty of time for preparation at subordinate levels. At 1800 hrs, Wigle held a conference for the brigade majors and adjutants to discuss the final details for the assembly and forming up of the division and its attached units.41
In less than twenty-four hours, Kitching and his staff officers had once again been called upon to change their operations plans. They did an outstanding job of refocusing the division for its role in Tractable. As mentioned previously, the staff effort had been focused on the advance in support of the drive of 2 Cdn Div in the area of Ussy on the extreme right of the 2 Cdn Corps boundary in accordance with Simonds’ orders of 12 August. Now, in its new role in Tractable, the division would be attacking on the extreme left of the 2 Cdn Corps attack.42
Booth held his orders group at 1600 hrs, 13 August and the commanders of the armoured regiments held their orders groups between 2000 and 2200 hrs. The troops were then given plenty of time to rest. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde advance would happen in three phases:
Phase I. Crossing the Laison River.
Phase II. Firming up and regrouping.
Phase III. Advancing to the high ground northeast of Falaise.
The German situation, as detailed in the Brigade orders group, noted that the 12 SS Pz Div was ‘probably split up into battle groups covering the entire front’.43 The major opposition was expected to come from the 85 and 272 Inf Div and flak units used in the anti-tank role.44
Jefferson held his O Group for 10 Cdn Inf Bde at 2200 hrs. Battalion orders groups occurred generally one hour later. The SAR was to lead the 10 Cdn Inf Bde advance in extended line, followed by the infantry battalions in trucks. The advance for 10 Cdn Inf Bde was to begin at 1300 hrs, one hour after the 2 Cdn Corps H-Hour.45
The division would go into battle with a number of new Commanding Officers. Major R.A. Keane was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and was given command of the Lake Superior Regiment. Major W.T. Cromb, formerly second in command (2 I/C) of the Argylls, took over command of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment, and Major R.A. Bradburn from the SAR was promoted and given command of the Algonquin Regiment. Major Parish had taken over command of the BCR after Worthington’s death.46
Monday, 14 August, was another hot, sunny day. Visibility was good. Booth held a final conference at 0900 hrs 14 August, to clear up any last details of the operation. Simonds visited Kitching at 1000 hrs to ascertain if there were any last minute problems. At 1100 hrs Kitching left for his command post in the area of Cintheaux with both brigade commanders and Brigadier Lane, to await the start of the operation.47
The 4 Cdn Armd Div was lined up on the left of the Corps. Kitching had almost a division and a half under his command but his objectives lay deeper in German territory than those of the 3 Cdn Inf Div. In front were the flail tanks of 1st Lothians from 79 Armd Div, whose task it was to clear the way of mines. Behind were the tanks of Grenadier Guards and Foot Guards who were leading 4 Cdn Armd Bde. Each regiment was formed up in four lines. In the rear were the BCRs and Lake Superior Regiment filling in the rear of the column. In all, about 150 tanks were drawn up in three ranks of about 50 in each rank and only 15 yards between tanks. Each of the two blocks of 150 tanks (4 Cdn Armd Bde and 2 Cdn Armd Bde) represented a solid phalanx of armour 1,000 yards wide and 200 yards deep.48
Unit cohesion began to break down as the smokescreen combined with the tremendous dust cloud created by explosions and the tracks of hundreds of heavy vehicles began to limit the visibility of the drivers. The only visible reference point for drivers within the enormous dust cloud was the sun. The location of the sun deflected the axis 30 degrees east of the designated bearing for the advance which was due south. As a result, most of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde vehicles gravitated left or east of the desired axis of advance.49
In less than an hour, the almost ceremonial array of the original formation had degenerated into a mass of vehicles pouring down the smoke-filled valley against a current of prisoners streaming to the rear. The smoke screen that was put down was not as effective as had been hoped. In some sectors, the tanks were completely blinded by the smoke while in others the phalanx advanced over open ground with little concealment.50 Despite the confusion, the reports from Wigle to 2 Cdn Corps as recorded in the Corps operations log indicate a steady move forward as start lines and report lines were continually crossed on the drive to the Laison River.51
The forward German positions were located approximately 1,500 yards in front of the Laison River. The Germans response to the Canadian attack was immediate with artillery and anti-tank fire but it was not long before the forward German positions were overwhelmed by the mass of the advancing formation. Once past the initial infantry outposts, the advancing formations began to encounter German strong points composed of anti-tank guns, tanks and dug-in infantry arrayed behind minefields. These strong points began to take their toll on the armoured formations.
Once into the Laison valley, the formations began taking fire from the heights beyond the river.52 The leading units of 4 Cdn Armd Bde reached the river around 1430 hrs to find all of the bridges blown. Some units, such as No. 3 Sqn Grenadier Guards, utilized their position on the extreme left of the formation to move unhindered to Ernes where they crossed against light opposition and, once across, provided flank cover for the crossing regiments.53 Others waited for their attached engineering units to erect bridges over the river before proceeding.
Confusion reigned on the banks of the river as units tried to get their vehicles across. Some of the armoured units became impatient and split up, moving along the river to find a viable crossing. By 1530 hrs, the leading armour had reorganized itself as best it could on the south bank beyond Rouvres and begun the advance towards Olendon.54 Many troops and individual tanks had become detached from their squadrons but ingenuity and determination resulted in the creation of improvised battlegroups, which fought their way forward to their assigned objectives.55
The BCR and Lake Superior Regiment arrived at the Laison River while the other regiments were crossing and, rather than wait their turn, they improvised their own bridge made from rubble. Despite being heavily shelled and mortared, they finished the work and continued with the advance. The Lake Superior Regiment pressed on to the high ground north of Perrières.56 In what was called a ‘show of how effectively mechanized infantry can act’, the Lake Superior Regiment sped past the milling tanks, dismounted from their carriers, deployed at the double and, moving with ‘swift assurance’, swept into the attack against a large column of Germans near Sassy. They effectively neutralized the anti-tank and mortar positions and captured 250 prisoners.57
The 8 Cdn Inf Bde reached the river at 1520 hrs and cleared Rouvres, Maizières and both banks of the river while the armoured forces were crossing. The brigade then pushed on to the wooded hill, Pt 103 half way to Olendon. The North Shore Regt continued the advance on Sassy, which fell at 2000 hrs. In accordance with the plan, 8 Cdn Inf Bde now reverted to 3 Cdn Inf Div control.58
Meanwhile 10 Cdn Inf Bde, moving in soft-skinned vehicles and led by the tanks of the SAR, arrived at the river at 1600 hrs. The troops dismounted, crossed the river and advanced to Olendon on foot. The Lincs and Argylls passed through Olendon to enter and consolidate in Perrières. The Algonquin Regiment, supported by elements of 10 Indep M.G. Coy, concentrated in the fields south of Rouvres. The SAR, which had become disorganized in crossing the Laison River, regrouped prior to sending its tanks in support of the leading infantry.
One company of the Lake Superior Regiment penetrated to the high ground directly east of Epancy and took up a position overlooking the road running from Falaise to St Pierre-sur-Dives where they were able to engage retreating German troops.59 Kitching’s firm base was now established. It was now up to the 4 Cdn Armd Bde to drive to the division’s final objective, Pt 159.
The planned air strike on selected targets in the area of Potigny and Quesnay Wood, scheduled for 1400 hrs, proved to be another catastrophic attempt at airto-ground support using heavy bombers. Out of 811 heavy bombers that took off to take part in the attack, 77 aircraft dropped their bombs short, including 44 aircraft from No. 6 (RCAF) Bomber Group. Bombs meant for the Aisy–Ussy– Potigny area crashed down on Canadian troops around St Aignan and the Hautmesnil quarry. The bombs landed 2–5 miles inside the Canadian lines cutting a path of destruction among Canadian and Polish forces.60
At Main Headquarters of the 4 Cdn Armd Div, ‘all Hell seemed to break loose’ when the bombing started. Looking south from their location, it appeared to the staff ‘that the command post had been in the centre of the bombing and fears were expressed that it had been hit’.61 Bombs landed all through the area occupied by Kitching’s Tactical HQ.
The division artillery and 10 Cdn Inf Bde immediately reported that their troops were being bombed and frantic calls went back to Corps to stop the bombing. The 4 Cdn Armd Div HQ area was overrun with troops from 1 Pol Armd Div and 51 Highland Div A echelons rushing north from the bombed areas. Kitching noted that, although there were no casualties among his Tac HQ staff, the radios in the tanks and on the jeeps were badly affected, knocking out communications between Kitching and his brigades. All line communication to the command post had also been cut.62
The bombing was part of a series of events that now combined to destroy the cohesion of the command and control structure within 4 Cdn Armd Div. The cumbersome attack formation, combined with the reduced visibility, marginalized brigade control over the forward armoured formations in the mad dash to get to the Laison River. This situation was compounded by the fact that the Foot Guards reported that two command tanks were ‘out’ with one in a minefield.
A mine had disabled Scott’s tank and he had broken his ankle. Despite his injury, Scott continued to command his regiment from a scout car.63 The bombing further complicated the situation by disrupting the communication between Kitching and his brigade commanders at a crucial moment – approximately 1400 hrs when the regiments of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde were crossing the Laison River. The worst, however, was yet to come!
While his forward units were fighting their way through and over the defences of the Laison River, Booth and the small group of armoured vehicles which constituted his Tac HQ had travelled forward and were not far behind the leading formation. While conducting a forward reconnaissance, Booth’s group came under accurate German fire from a self-propelled anti-tank gun.64 Most of the HQ tanks, including Booth’s tank, were destroyed. Booth was mortally wounded and evacuated and his intelligence officer was killed leaving the Brigade Major, Major A.G. Chubb, essentially in command with no way of communicating the fate of Booth to Kitching or of coordinating any of the activities of the Brigade or its units.65
At 1430 hrs, a message was broadcast over the 4th Brigade net that ‘sunray’ (Booth) was hit but no clarification as to what that meant. The next recorded transmission over the Brigade net was at 1615 hrs where Chubb reported that Booth had been hit and taken away by ambulance. Temporarily out of contact, but for the moment acting as senior officer of the remnants of the brigade’s tactical headquarters, Chubb sent liaison officers out to the regiments and set about trying to rebuild the tactical headquarters. The calls for Scott to report to the Bde Tac HQ, to take over command of the brigade, began at 1622 hrs.
At 1623 hrs, the Brigade operations officer Captain James tried to re-establish the brigade command link. He was eventually able to report that all stations were on net, with each reporting their positions as either at Rouvres or on the Laison River.66 Meanwhile a liaison officer from division HQ arrived with orders for Chubb to report to Div HQ.67
At approximately 1415 hrs, Kitching left his Tac HQ in an attempt to contact 4 Bde HQ. At 1530 hrs Simonds arrived at Kitching’s headquarters looking for Kitching but instead found Proctor. Proctor briefed Simonds on the tactical situation and Simonds chastised him for losing contact with 4 Cdn Armd Bde. By 1530 hrs, the Div HQ had re-established contact with Scott and the Foot Guards but still had no contact with Halpenny and was unaware that Booth was a casualty. When Kitching heard what had happened to Booth, he immediately ordered Chubb to take command of the brigade until further notice.68
Between 1600 and 1630 hrs, Chubb arrived at Main Div HQ and, since Kitching had not yet returned, he reported what had happened to Booth and the Bde HQ to Proctor. Proctor reoriented Chubb, gave his operator all the necessary frequencies and the location for Scott, and Chubb took off to find Scott.69 Unfortunately, reconstituting the Tac HQ was a significant challenge. There were no spare command tanks and getting what they did have into operation would take time. Scott was on the other side of the Laison River in the midst of a raging battle, attempting to reorganize his own regiment which compounded the problem.70 Chubb had to find Scott, which did not happen until the next morning, and Scott now had to reorient himself to the larger task of commanding the brigade.
At 1732 hrs, there was another call to the Foot Guards informing them that Scott was to take over command of the brigade. For the next several hours messages flew back and forth but it was not until late in the evening before Scott was contacted directly and told to communicate with Kitching at his command post near Estrées-la-Campagne at 2100 hrs. There is no evidence, however, that this personal meeting took place. According to the Ops Log, the Bde Tac HQ was still trying to ascertain the location of Scott as late as 2129 hrs.71
Some time late in the afternoon, Major E.M. Smith was summoned to Bde HQ and was told to take three LOB (left out of battle) tanks and go and find the regiments and re-establish communications with the Bde HQ. Smith found the brigade early the next morning which he recalls consisted of a total of fourteen tanks from both the Foot Guards and Grenadier Guards and Scott in his tank. After providing Scott with the proper radio frequencies for the brigade net, Smith proceeded to try and re-establish the brigade headquarters.72
In a hand written note to Scott written in the evening of 14 August, Kitching expressed his confidence in Scott’s ability to ‘fight the brigade’. Kitching ordered Scott to continue the advance during the evening until dark, and regroup the armour for a big effort the following morning. Kitching stated that Jefferson was to capture Olendon, and high ground at grid 182438 (Pt 115), unless already taken by the Lake Superior Regiment on the way to Perrières and Epancy. Kitching stressed the point that Falaise had to be captured on 15 August.73 There is no indication however as to when Scott actually received these orders.
With the thoughts of the fate of Worthington Force still fresh in their minds it is likely that neither Kitching nor Scott relished another armoured advance through the night. Scott held a conference with the commanding officers of the BCR and Grenadier Guards at 1945 hrs during which they decided to advance a further 1,000 yards to the high ground west of Sassy between the villages of Olendon and Pt 115. Scott then ordered the brigade to harbour for the night.74 Scott did not have control of the brigade and considered it too late to push the armour the additional 3 miles to the high ground overlooking Falaise. Scott sensibly concluded that a coordinated attack at daybreak offered the best odds for success on the following day.75
For six critical hours on 14 August there was no effective control of 4 Cdn Armd Bde either from the brigade or from division level. Regardless, the brigade attack continued with three different regiments fighting three separate battles towards their assigned objectives. This is where the training and skill of the officers and men of the division was tested and where the countless hours of investment in training, education and lectures began to pay off. Despite the loss of its senior leadership, the regiments were able to achieve all of the Phase II objectives before they ran out of daylight.
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde fought a more cohesive battle towards its objectives. At 1600 hrs, the Lincs and Argylls crossed the Laison River and began their advance on Olendon, which they succeeded in capturing by last light. The Algonquin Regiment, which had firmed up on Pt 103, was ordered to patrol to Epancy and, if possible, seize the village and firm up there by first light. The Argylls sent their scout platoon to investigate Perrières and reported the town free of the enemy. Companies C and D were sent ahead to occupy the town and the high ground immediately to the northwest of the town. At 0600 hrs 15 August, the rest of the battalion moved in and the position was firmed up.76
The first-day operations of Tractable had ripped a 3-mile gap in the German line with deep penetrations into their defensive zone forcing them to withdraw, where possible, to their rearward defensive positions.77 The sitrep from 4 Cdn Armd Div for the period ending midnight 14 August recorded the following disposition for the units of the division: 4 Cdn Armd Bde had the Foot Guards south of Olendon; the Grenadier Guards was in the area of Pt 103; the BCR, north of Olendon; and the Lake Superior Regiment, east of Olendon with one company southeast of Olendon. The 10 Cdn Inf Bde had the Lincoln & Welland Regiment, the Argylls and two squadrons of the SAR firmed up in Olendon, with one squadron SAR still in Rouvres. The Algonquin Regiment had made the deepest penetration of all 4 Armd Div units and was advancing towards Epancy.78 The division experienced a very successful day given the significant challenges it had to overcome.
The Canadian attack had taken its toll on the German forces around Falaise. Most of the German defensive positions could only be manned as a series of strong points rather than a continuous defensive line. The combat strength of the four divisions (85th, 89th, 271st and 272nd) may have been reduced to 50 per cent of their established strength but ‘their respective headquarters still exercised effective control over their divisions.’79 This effective control facilitated the coordination of a new line of resistance across the Canadian front. On the left, the positions of the 272 Inf Div ran from the western edge of Vieux-Fume via Magny-la-Campagne–Favières, Hill 79, to the western edge of the forest northwest of Vendeuvre. Contact with the right wing of the 85 Inf Div was near Hill 80, half-a-mile southwest of Vendeuvre.80
The 271 Inf Div was able to set up a fairly cohesive main line of resistance from Leffard via Pierrepont to Trepreland and to man it with three battle groups. The artillery went into position with three Abteilungen in the area Noron– St Martin-de-Mieux–Fourneaux-le-Val and with one Abteilung around Rapilly. An anti-tank front was set up in the Noron area along the road from Falaise to Pont d’Ouilly, using the remaining anti-tank guns. A Tigerkompanie of Schwere SS Pz Abteilung 102 with several panzers was also designated for action in this sector.81
The 12 SS Pz Div had pulled back its Panzergruppe to previously explored positions north and northeast of Falaise. The two companies of Panzerja¨gerabteilung 12 were split into several small units, on the northwest slopes of Monts d’Eraines and in the woods southeast of Epancy. They formed the anti-tank element in support of 85 Inf Div, which had established a line of strong points. The panzers of Panzerregiment 12 set up ambush positions on Hill 159.82 The Germans had deployed their artillery and mortars in the woods of Mont d’Eraines. This tactic ensured that their main anti-tank weapons could be brought to bear on the flank of any Canadian advance southwards towards Falaise and would be particularly effective in the open country below Epancy.83
While Tractable was in progress, Crerar received new instructions from Montgomery. First Cdn Army and not Second British Army was to capture Falaise with the least possible delay. According to Montgomery’s new direction, this new task was not to interfere with the larger and more important plan of driving southeast to capture Trun and to link up with the Americans who were now turning north.84
Simonds assigned the additional task of taking Falaise to Kitching. This new requirement forced Kitching to modify the intent of his operations for 15 August. The general outline of his plan was to clear the Olendon–Epancy–Perrières area by first light, followed by an advance by 4 Cdn Armd Bde to Pt 159. These actions were to be followed by a thrust through to Falaise by the Lake Superior Regiment. The SAR was to secure bridges at Eraines and Damblainville.85 These orders were again modified at 1200 hrs to have one squadron of 18 Cdn Armd C Regt, not the SAR, lead the attack on Falaise, while the other two squadrons of the regiment were to capture the bridges at Eraines and Damblainville.86
At 0655 hrs 15 August Scott received orders to get the brigade moving. He was to press on to the final objective and was told that fuel and ammunition would follow. The Lake Superior Regiment moved off immediately to support the Algonquin Regiment attack at Epancy. An hour later the Foot Guards had still not moved, stating that they were waiting for fuel and ammunition, which were in route. Kitching at this point intervened directly, ordering Scott to get moving.87
Just as Scott was about to resume the advance, the supply vehicles from the Grenadier Guards A-echelon arrived. Scott decided to distribute these supplies among the regiments and, as a result, the brigade did not start to advance towards Versainville until approximately 0930 hrs.88 This two-and-a-half hour delay would have a ripple effect on the events of the day. Scott decided to try to control the battle from his tank which was moving in close proximity with the Foot Guards.89 Major Chubb, as control, received his orders from Scott over the command net and then relayed them to the appropriate units.90
In a move designed to ensure the information flow back to Div HQ, Kitching had liaison officers assigned to accompany each regimental headquarters of the armoured regiments. These officers were given the task of reporting information directly back to Div HQ providing a second source of tactical information to Kitching and his command team.91 This tactic represents another example of the learning and improvisation that was happening consistently within the command team as operations progressed.
In advancing south, the Grenadier Guards and BCR battle groups encountered a German anti-tank gun screen north of Epancy. The battle group successfully smoked the area off before continuing the advance without incurring any casualties. D Company of the Algonquin Regiment was assigned the task of taking Epancy which they did early in the morning after hand-to-hand fighting. Half of the town was taken but snipers kept D Company from occupying the rest of the town.92
While the Algonquin attack was in progress, the 4 Cdn Armd Bde was advancing to the west of Epancy. Scott left A Company of Lake Superior Regiment and one squadron of the Foot Guards to assist in the capture of Epancy. These forces were to secure Scott’s left flank as the remainder of his force moved on to Versainville.
Initially, A Company of Lake Superior Regiment only managed to secure a foothold on the western edge of Epancy. Assisted by the Foot Guards, the combined force helped clear out the few remaining pockets of resistance before taking up a position in the orchard nearby. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde reported that they were firm on ‘Toad’ (Epancy) at 1014 hrs.
The town, however, was not firmly in Canadian hands. The Algonquin Regiment was twice forced out before finally taking and clearing the village with a battalion attack during the afternoon. The Algonquin Regiment remained in the town during the night while the Lake Superior Regiment company was withdrawn to Olendon in preparation for their planned advance to Falaise.93
At 0900 hrs, the Lincoln & Welland Regiment with A and B squadrons SAR placed under command were ordered to follow the armoured brigade and be prepared to seize the bridges at Versainville for an advance on Falaise.94 This battle group fought several brisk actions on their way to join the armour, especially at the woods directly west of Epancy where two companies of infantry had to be left behind to deal with the enemy. The Germans held strong positions southwest of the village and, as the column tried to pass Le Val Mauger, another fire-fight ensued before the column could move forward.95
At 1207 hrs, Halpenny conducted a forward reconnaissance for the continued advance south and at 1234 hrs he initiated an all-out attack on the high ground designated Hudson Bay (area between Pt 117 and Pt 129) with the main thrust along the road leading south from Epancy. The attack was initially held up pending confirmation of whether Canadian troops were on the high ground. Halpenny was told that Canadians were indeed in the area and was also told that they needed support quickly. An immediate advance was ordered and the BCRs advanced over the feature moving down the right side with the Grenadier Guards providing covering fire.96
Operating on the left flank of 4 Cdn Armd Bde were the squadrons of 18 Cdn Armd C Regt. A troop was reporting Eraines clear of Germans and not yet occupied by Canadian troops. Another squadron was operating south of Eraines.97 Kitching held one squadron in reserve for exploitation towards Falaise if the opportunity presented itself.
At approximately 1321 hrs, the armour regiments began calling for the resupply of fuel and ammunition. In another example of battlefield innovation, Kitching and Proctor made the decision not to withdraw the regiments but to move the re-supply columns forward. A guide from the BCRs was sent back to bring the echelon forces forward. The re-supply was conducted from Priest armoured carriers, which proved their worth in this function and would now become the primary tool for battlefield re-supply.98
Unfortunately, the process was hurried since the re-supply point was on a bomb line of an incoming tactical air strike. Once re-supplied, the armoured regiments had to withdraw from their forward positions until the air strike was completed.99 The successful completion of this action is indicative of effective command and control of the division’s actions during the day.
At 1455 hrs, 4 Cdn Armd Bde was reported regrouping south of Epancy.100 The 4 Cdn Armd Bde units continued to fight their way slowly up to IDAHO, the 4 Cdn Armd Div codeword for Pt 159. The armoured brigade progressed as far as the northern slope of Pt 159 before it ran into a German anti-tank screen. After suffering severe losses, the BCRs and Grenadier Guards were forced back and waited for the arrival of the Lincs-SAR battle group.101
Halpenny held an impromptu orders group on the battlefield at 1624 hrs with the commanders of the three armoured regiments (BCR, CGG and SAR) and the squadron commander of the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt. Observation of the objective revealed that the approach would be over open and flat terrain with no cover and it was felt that an approach without infantry and artillery support would be disastrous. A plan was worked out between the commanders whereby they would advance after an artillery concentration on the woods to their front and left. The artillery support failed to arrive and the attack was not executed.102 When the Lincs & SAR arrived, the decision was made to consolidate the gains to that point and the Lincs dug in among the tanks at the foot of the slope.
On the right flank of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack, 3 Cdn Inf Div was advancing towards the same general objectives as 4 Cdn Armd Bde. At 1000 hrs, an attack was launched by Canadian Scottish Regiment with the 2 Cdn Armd Bde in support against Pt 168.103 At 1515 hrs, 4 Cdn Armd Div was informed that the 2 Cdn Armd Bde had reached Pt 168 and that the Canadian Scottish Regiment had joined them and was digging in.104 At 1600 hrs, a new plan of attack was initiated by 7 Cdn Inf Bde down the Caen–Falaise highway with the objective of Falaise. The 7 Cdn Recce Regt, followed by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles on the right, would attack down the highway while the 2 Cdn Armd Bde with the Regina Rifles on the left would attack through the Canadian Scottish Regiment to take Pt 159.105 H-Hour for the 7 Cdn Inf Bde attack was 2015 hrs.
In planning this attack, a reduced artillery barrage had to be planned since elements of 4 Cdn Armd Div were reported on Hill 159. The armour and infantry had trouble marrying up for the attack and, once across the start line at St Pierre-Canivet, heavy anti-tank fire cost the attacking regiments ten tanks, causing the attack to stall. The attacking units withdrew to the area of Pt 175.106
A successful second day turned sour for Kitching, who had his Tac HQ at Pt 103 north of Olendon. In the late afternoon, Kitching was at Jefferson’s headquarters. Standing on a jeep, the two officers tried to see what was going on ahead and it appeared to them that the tanks of the armoured regiments were almost on IDAHO. Kitching returned to his headquarters and was, in turn, elated when he received news that IDAHO had been taken.107
At some point late in the day, Scott had decided that he could no longer carry on in command of the brigade. He disappeared off the brigade net around 1600 hrs without seemingly establishing contact with Halpenny. It was on the way back to his headquarters that Kitching met Scott. Kitching had no idea that Scott’s injury was so serious and, indeed, Kitching thought Scott’s injury was very recent.108 Kitching was once again forced to call upon the next senior officer, Halpenny, to take over as acting brigade commander. Halpenny took over command of the brigade at 1800 hrs.
At 1800 hrs, Kitching left for Simonds’ headquarters firmly convinced that his units could hold IDAHO. Simonds was delighted to hear that 4 Cdn Armd Div had captured its objective and, based on this information, Simonds tasked Kitching to get the Lincoln & Welland Regiment into Falaise.109 After he had issued his orders for the next day’s operations, Simonds invited Kitching to stay for dinner. Kitching continued to press Simonds to appoint Moncel to assume command of the armoured brigade as they had agreed. Kitching stated that he now had to appoint Halpenny to command and that this was the brigade’s third commander in two days.110
When he returned to his headquarters later that evening, Kitching learned that 4 Cdn Armd Bde had not captured the ridge at all but ‘had turned back to wait for additional support’.111 He immediately telephoned the news to Simonds, who did not take it at all well. Simonds was extremely disappointed over another example of what he believed to be faulty communication and misinformation.112 Kitching assured Simonds that the division was preparing to attack again the next morning.
Kitching called an O Group to prepare for the capture of IDAHO the following morning. Plans for the renewed attack were developed that night. Under the cover of smoke, the armoured brigade would rush the hill and plunge among the anti-tank guns while they were still ‘blind’. The Argylls, mounted in Priests, would follow immediately behind the tanks while the Algonquin Regiment mopped up on the right and the Linc & Welland Regt mopped up on the left. The brigade O Groups for the attack were carried out at 0500 hrs 16 August.113
Kitching’s plan would be carried out only with the approval of Simonds. During the evening of 15 August events changed. The 9 Cdn Inf Bde was assigned to relieve 10 Cdn Inf Bde. The 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Divs began a slow advance towards Falaise from the west and north.114 The 7 Cdn Inf Bde assumed the task of taking Pt 159 and the 2 Cdn Inf Div was given the task of taking Falaise. Tractable was at an end.
The final sitrep for 15 August from 4 Cdn Armd Div for the period noon to midnight reported that the BCR and Grenadier Guards had reached the objective but were driven out by heavy anti-tank fire. The final disposition of the division units, according to this report, had the Foot Guards, Grenadier Guards and BCR located on the high ground at Pt 175. The Lincoln & Welland Regiment was dug in near Le Val Mauger with one squadron of SAR under command. The Algonquin Regiment was firmed up in Epancy and the Argylls were firmed up in Perrières with one squadron of SAR under command. The remainder of the SAR and the Lake Superior Regiment were in Olendon.115
There were plenty of mistakes made in the development and execution of Tractable. Simonds’ dismissive attitude towards the potential threat posed by the topography and the Laison River to the conduct of the operation was to prove the most costly. The Laison River ran across the front of both divisions about 2 miles beyond the start line. It was narrow and comparatively shallow. In his briefings on the operation, Simonds had assured his subordinate commanders that the Laison River was ‘fordable by tanks at all points’. In fact, the river’s muddy bottom and steep banks formed a major anti-tank obstacle and even Dominik Graham, Simonds’ biographer, referred to this assessment as an error of ‘major consequence’ which delayed the advance for two hours and cost the 2 Cdn Corps ‘a decisive battle’.116 The delay and disorganization resulting from the river crossing robbed the attacking formation of valuable daylight hours within which to prosecute the attack deeper into German territory.
Since the intelligence assessment had stated that the Laison River could be forded at all points, engineering units were not part of Simonds construct for the armoured phalanxes. In a normal armoured attack, the engineering units would have accompanied the forward units to clear obstacles and provide other necessary tasks, such as facilitating river crossings. In an astute move, Kitching decided to insert engineering units into the forward elements of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde phalanx from 8 Field Squadron.117 These units were credited with erecting two scissor crossings, two fascine crossings and locating a useable ford over the river.118 Had these engineering units not been with the forward units, the 4 Cdn Armd Bde advance would have ground to a standstill on the northern bank of the river.
The execution of the Tractable plan was difficult since it directed units of the 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 3 Cdn Inf Div and 4 Cdn Armd Div all towards the same area – the commanding ridge of ground just north of Falaise – with the 3 Cdn Inf Div tasked to capture the northwest portion while the 4 Cdn Armd Div was to capture the northeast portion. The continued advance south to Falaise by all of these forces brought them into closer proximity to each other and at the same time into the strongest parts of the German defences. Montgomery’s continued insistence on the capture of Falaise by the Canadians at this point once again allowed the German defenders to concentrate their reduced resources against a mass of Canadian forces attacking over ground that was very favourable to the defender. This lack of manoeuvre room became a significant problem at approximately 1300 hrs on 15 August in the region of Pt 168 as units from 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 Cdn Armd Bde began converging on the same area as the two 4 Cdn Armd Div battle groups.119
A planning mistake that is rarely discussed, however, is the choice of H-Hour. Waiting until 1200 hours denied the attacking formations a considerable number of daylight hours on 14 August for their advance. Russian and German attacks were usually timed to start at dawn allowing the attacking formations the maximum number of daylight hours possible to exploit the success of the attack. While on the one hand Simonds was ordering the armoured formations to exhibit more aggressiveness, on the other he had significantly reduced the available time they had to accomplish their mission.
A notable feature of the day was the constant bombing and strafing of Allied troops by Allied tactical aircraft. After the planned heavy bombers attacks had been completed, tactical airpower took over and the ops logs of all the attacking units are filled with entries of being attacked by Allied air power. The echelon forces of 4 Cdn Armd Div were attacked on numerous occasions by American P-47 Thunderbolts named as the primary culprits.120
On the afternoon 14 August, 4 Cdn Armd Div achieved a complete breakthrough. However, because of the loss of Booth, the brigade tactical HQ and the communication link back to division HQ, Kitching was unaware of the extent of the breakthrough, the exact location of his units and, consequently, was unable to exploit the success. He took it upon himself to find out and left his Tac HQ to try to determine the true nature of the tactical situation. During the latter part of the afternoon, 4 Div HQ received word that Booth was a casualty but no definite word on the seriousness of his wounds, his location or whether he was still trying to exercise command of the brigade.121 These questions would not be answered until Chubb reported back to Div HQ. When Kitching did find out, he took immediate action by appointing Chubb as acting brigade commander until such time as Scott could be contacted and could take over the brigade. Kitching then contacted Simonds and asked for Moncel.122
There are a number of differing opinions as to the impact Booth’s death had on the success or lack thereof of the division on 14 August. One opinion states that Booth’s fatal injury was a major setback which prevented the 4 Cdn Armd Div from achieving complete success on 14 August,123 while another states that it was actually the loss of the brigade tactical headquarters and not necessarily the loss of Booth himself that prevented success.124 While the impact of these combined circumstances was devastating, the resulting situation was not insurmountable since military training is based on the premise that leadership at all levels may become casualties and training is designed to ensure that junior leaders can fill the vacant ranks of senior leaders to ensure that the organization continues to function. The positive actions of the regimental commanders in continuing their advances towards their assigned objectives is indicative of the effectiveness of the training that had been executed within 4 Cdn Armd Div.125
It was the third circumstance of this incident that proved to be the most devastating and more critical to the outcome of that day. The third circumstance was the fact that Kitching and the 4 Div HQ were unaware that Booth was even a casualty. The lack of communication traffic between the brigade and the division should have been an indication to 4 Div HQ that something was amiss; but, given the confusion that existed that afternoon and the disrupted communication caused by the bombing of the headquarters, their ignorance of the situation can be understood. Kitching simply did not know that there was no one in command or control of the armoured brigade. Had the fate of Booth been conveyed promptly, then Scott may have been in a position to take over before he actually crossed the Laison River; in which case brigade control could have been re-established earlier. Having the vehicles to effectively command the brigade would have been problematic. The fact remains that Kitching didn’t know that there was a leadership problem to solve.
Both Booth and Scott made the critical choice of taking their headquarters forward. Usually the headquarters was located in a spot where it would be relatively safe and where good communications would be possible. The commander was then free to roam the battlefield knowing that the integration of information from both superior and subordinate headquarters and units was secure. The integration and passing of this information was crucial for situational awareness throughout the chain of command. By moving forward as they did both commanders risked becoming casualties or getting involved in actions that were secondary to the main effort.126
This lack of higher direction and coordination was unfortunate because the German defence was stretched to breaking point on 15 August. At 1200 hrs that day, I SS Pz Corps reported to Fifth Panzer Army that the 85 Inf Div was ‘almost annihilated and only had one-and-a-half battalions and two 8.8 cm guns available.’127 In addition, it was reported that 12 SS Pz Div had only fifteen tanks left.
Knowing that Scott was commanding the armoured brigade on 15 August, an obvious question is why Kitching failed to provide more direct control over the armoured brigade on that day. On the surface, Kitching had no reason to believe that Scott could not command the brigade and he was unaware that Scott was injured. Scott could have been criticized for a late start but, after that, events at a macro level went well with the BCR and Grenadier Guards advancing over 3 miles in a few hours of hard fighting.
At around 1630 hrs, the division had elements of three armoured regiments (BCR, Grenadier Guards and SAR), elements of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment and the Lake Superior Regiment, and a squadron from the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt in a position for a combined arms assault on Pt 159. All they needed was artillery support, which was requested but never materialized. Arranging that support was the job of the brigade commander but Scott was on his way to Kitching’s Tac HQ to ask to be relieved. Initiative and drive on the part of the regimental commander had gotten them to the point where success was in their grasp. The coordinating function of the Brigade HQ was needed to complete the task and it was at this point in the day where brigade command and control failed, to the detriment of the operation.
The command of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde was now a significant leadership issue for Kitching. Kitching at one point told Simonds that if Moncel could not be made available, he was going to take direct control of the armoured brigade himself. Simonds rightly discouraged Kitching. Kitching’s suggestion was not a wise one since it would have denied the division the oversight and control function required from the division commander. Kitching’s request, however, is indicative of the sense of frustration he felt towards Simonds who was aloof to the very real command and control difficulties that Kitching was experiencing. According to Kitching, the combination of so many casualties among his senior commanders, the frequent changes of command of the regiments, squadrons and troops, the loss of so many tanks and crews, the breakdown in communications and the inexperience in battle greatly impacted the division’s performance in action. Kitching believed that Simonds did not sufficiently appreciate these factors.128
The command and control framework within the armoured brigade was breaking down because of the excessive number of casualties in senior officers (majors and above) among the armoured regiments. More junior officers were promoted into senior positions but they did not necessarily have the experience and training necessary to replace those who had become casualties.129 With Halpenny now the acting brigade commander, lieutenant colonels commanded none of the armoured regiments in the 4 Cdn Armd Bde. The armoured brigade was now short one brigadier and two lieutenant colonels.
What of the division’s success on 15 August? There seems to be a general acceptance in the current literature of Kitching’s statement that the armoured brigade units ‘had turned back to wait for additional support’ with the added assumption that there was no further advance that day. The evidence would suggest that this is not entirely correct. A series of entries in the war diaries suggests that the division advanced further than has been commonly believed.
At 1713 hrs, the words ‘Idaho has been taken’ were broadcast over the 4 Cdn Armd Bde radio net.130 At 1740 hrs, the ops log for First Cdn Army recorded that Foot Guards and Grenadier Guards were reported on the objective with the Lincoln & Welland Regt passing through and that Kitching was ordered to get patrols and the Lincoln & Welland Regt into Falaise.131 Simonds was advised at 1740 hrs that two armoured regiments were on the objective.132 Kitching left for Simonds’ HQ at 1800 hrs with the belief that his tanks had taken the objective.
At 1826 hrs, the BCR asked whether infantry were on IDAHO and at 1900 hrs the Grenadier Guards reported that they could not proceed further. Unable to advance on their own front, the general impression is that the regiments remained about 1,500 yards north of IDAHO during the night and provided fire support to 3 Cdn Inf Div.133 There is evidence however that the division continued to push south during the evening.
The BCR war diary states that after being re-supplied at 1500 hrs the BCR began a new advance towards the objective that took them on a route through Pt 170 and Pt 168 to Pt 159. According to the BCR war diary, A and B squadrons with C squadron covering, reached Pt 168 at 2100 hrs. Meanwhile, reconnaissance tanks had gone forward to the objective where they identified a Panther tank which was impeding the advance. Unfortunately, due to the terrain, the tanks equipped with 17-pdr guns could not get an effective angle to engage the German tank.134
An entry in the Foot Guards regimental history suggests that there may have been other tanks with the BCRs. The entry states that when the Foot Guards was assisting the 3 Div attack they spotted tanks to their front, which were later identified as belonging to the SAR. Evidence of an attack later in the evening also exists in the book A Short History of the Tenth Canadian Infantry BDE written immediately after the war by members of the brigade. The book states that at last light the Lincolns had gone forward with one squadron of the SARs and captured a section of high ground overlooking Falaise.135
An account of the operation by 2 Cdn Armd Bde provides further detail. When planning the evening attack on Pt 159 scheduled for 2015 hrs the volume of artillery fire for the attack had to be reduced because both of the flanks were reported secured by flanking formations (4 Cdn Armd Bde was on the eastern flank). At 1800 hrs, it was learned that two armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Div were in possession of Pt 159 which meant that the artillery fire plan had to be reduced further since targets could now not be engaged on either flank or on the proposed target area.
The aim of the 2 Cdn Armd Bde attack was changed to a mopping up operation between Pts 168 and 159 and reinforcement of the troops already on Pt 159. On approaching the start line, both the 1st Cdn Hussars and Fort Gary Horse Armd Regt reported that on moving up they had passed through the two armoured regiments that were supposed to be on Pt 159. This now meant that their attack would proceed with inadequate artillery support. The tanks encountered immediate anti-tank fire from the front and both flanks and began taking casualties.136
There is evidence, therefore, to support a conclusion that a combined attack was attempted by 4 Cdn Armd Bde late in the evening, which, as a minimum, advanced beyond Pt 168 and reached the forward slopes of Pt 159. Recce tanks were sent forward and overran southern portions of the feature before retiring.137 A continued advance into the evening of 15 August that captured portions of Pt 159 would then correlate with reports filed in the operations log of 2 Cdn Corps which stated that ‘two armd regts reached high feature 1438 [Pt 159] but encountered enemy A tk guns and dug in,’ but then they were ‘forced to withdraw’.138
One theme remains consistent in the war diaries of the BCR and Grenadier Guards: little to no direction was received from Scott on 15 August. Chubb is very critical of Scott’s actions while acting as the brigade commander, stating that he [Scott] never physically appeared at Brigade HQ to take over command, leaving the headquarters in a vacuum as to his intentions for 15 August.139 Scott further complicated the situation by netting the brigade radio to his scout car, which effectively took the Brigade HQ out of the game.140 These actions meant that Scott had minimal contact with his headquarters and no contact whatsoever with Div HQ.
A commander could only fight a brigade from a scout car when an operating headquarters backed him with good communications to front and rear.141 Scott’s actions meant that this would be the second day in a row and the third time in the span of a week when the brigade units fought in a major operation without effective brigade oversight and control.
The echelon forces of 4 Cdn Armd Div had spent a large portion of the two days of Tractable dodging Allied air attacks. The heavy bomber attack was the first to take its toll. A court of inquiry, on which Proctor was a member, into the bombing of friendly troops later found that the likely cause of the bombing mistake was the road and railway crossing that was used as the target indicator.142 There were two road/railway crossings in close proximity to each other, the first one was 21 seconds from the coast and the second one was 23 seconds from the coast. The master bombardier had put his indicator on the first road/railway crossings. A two-second margin of error proved costly for the division since it lost thirty ammunition vehicles that were loaded and ready to move forward with the advancing formations.
In addition, on the evening of 14 August, the division B-echelon troops, crowded nose-to-tail in anticipation of moving forward to re-supply the fighting echelons, were hit by an infrequent but nonetheless effective air strike from the Luftwaffe. At approximately 2300 hrs, the loaded vehicles of the division’s ammunition company were hit, causing a chain reaction of exploding and destroyed vehicles. For the next several hours the provision of normal maintenance was disrupted as everyone avoided the exploding ammunition.143 This incident, in part, explains why only one of the armoured brigade maintenance columns was able to get through to the fighting echelon the following morning and why it was so late getting there.
The Laison River continued to wreak havoc with the division as the lack of bridges tied up traffic and hampered the movement forward of the rear echelon vehicles.144 Tractable represented the first significant challenge for the division’s engineering units as they worked to build bridges and open up maintenance routes. Along with facilitating the advance by the building of bridges, the engineers also began construction of 7 miles of road from St Sylvain to Rouvres to help alleviate the problems with the maintenance traffic.145
The one event that seems to have caught the Canadians off guard as a whole was the large number of prisoners of war (PWs) that had to be processed. At one point in the advance, prisoners were disarmed and ordered to walk to the rear without formal escort. Transporting them became a serious drain on transportation resources within the division to the point where supplies were offloaded in order to transport prisoners to the rear.146 The problem of dealing with prisoners of war would continue to tax rear echelon planning and resources during the next phase of operations.
A vital lesson learned from an echelon perspective was that of re-supply on the battlefield. As the battles in Normandy became more fluid, topping up fuel and re-arming was done during lulls in the battle. This process forced the echelon vehicles to advance much further forward into the battle zone than was usual. The emphasis on keeping continuous pressure on the retreating Germans forced a greater integration and cooperation between the fighting and rear echelons of the division. The result was a marked improvement in overall combat efficiency. On the battlefield, top-ups rather than fill-ups were more common as it was dangerous for crews to remain exposed outside the tank for long.147
The status of the division at the end of Tractable was not good. An ADREP was not found for 15 August but the one submitted for 0420 hrs 16 August provides an adequate reference point. The division POL state was, not surprisingly, down to 160 miles from 175 miles at the start of the operation and the division had recorded the capture of 680 PWs. The division began the operation with 259 tanks, 133 armoured cars and 133 scout cars and finished with 194 tanks, 71 armoured cars and 128 scout cars.
The fighting strength of the Foot Guards was 8 tanks while the Grenadier Guards were left with 18 tanks.148 The division strength at the beginning of Tractable was recorded as 871 officers and 15,111 other ranks and on the morning of 16 August the division strength was recorded as 821 officers and 14,489 other ranks – a difference of 50 officers and 622 other ranks. A crucial supply note was that 17-pdr sabot ammunition for anti-tank use was still in short supply.149
In a post operation report filed on 16 Aug 1944, J.G. Spragge, the acting brigade commander of 8 Cdn Inf Bde, made a number of important observations on the operation. He claimed that in general the tactics and results of the operation were ‘excellent’. He attributed the delays that occurred to driving difficulties and the bombing and made a number of specific recommendations for future operations. Interestingly, he highlighted the confusion that occurred when the name of the operation was changed at the last moment. When operating under 4 Cdn Armd Div the operation was called Tractable but 3 Cdn Inf Div continued to call the operation Tallulah.150 Confusion was also created when code words of flanking formations were different or known only to that particular formation. For example IDAHO was a 4 Cdn Armd Div code word for Pt 159, which did not show up in the formal list of code words for the operation. It was common practice to allot a number of specific code words for use by each formation but how they were used was not necessarily conveyed to flanking formations.151 This practice impeded mutual cooperation among flanking formations and clouded situational awareness at higher levels in the command chain.
Tractable is commonly viewed as a failure because the Germans were able to once again deny the Allies the objectives they sought.152 The operation succeeded in breaking through the ‘best-organized defensive position left to the Germans in Normandy’.153 In addition, the operation proved that Kitching, the division staff and formations could operate, innovate and succeed under the most complex and challenging conditions warfare could offer. This was the second major operation for the division in a week of continuous action yet despite all of the challenges and setbacks that were thrown at the division’s leadership, they adapted, refocused and continued on.
The key question is not whether Tractable was a successful operation, because it was. The more important question concerning Tractable is: What was the cost to the true operational level requirement of capturing Trun and closing the Falaise Gap by the continued drive to Falaise by the 4 Cdn Armd Div on 15 August? Montgomery’s orders to take Falaise first before exploiting to Trun cost the Canadians and the division two crucial days (15 and 16 August) that could have been used to seal and secure the gap.
The actions of 14 August were necessary to launch the operation, but once over the Laison River and once Perrières was taken on the morning of 15 August, 4 Cdn Armd Div should have been sent straight to Trun alongside the Polish Armd Div, leaving the 2nd and 3rd Infantry divisions and the 2 Cdn Armd Bde to deal with Falaise. Such a move would have sidestepped the strength of the German defences and would have unhinged the northern portion of the German defences. The capture of Falaise may have been delayed but the trade-off was having a strong force barring the escape routes out of the Pocket before the formal German order for retreat had been given. This course of action would have still achieved the desired result for Tractable by severing the lines of communication through Falaise but at a point further east.
The command decisions made by Montgomery and Simonds during Tractable have not received the critical analysis that they deserve since their decisions are directly responsible for the desperate fighting that would happen in the days to come. On 14 August, Montgomery directed First Cdn Army, and by extension 2 Cdn Corps, to take Falaise. According to Montgomery, this new task was not to interfere with the larger and more important task of driving southeast to capture Trun and the link-up with the Americans.154 The imperative of the two tasks: take Falaise as soon as possible and not impede the capture of Trun, and link up with the Americans as the primary task were, however, mutually exclusive. Capturing Falaise as soon as possible implied a maximum effort by 2 Cdn Corps against Falaise. The accomplishment of this task meant that the depth of the Canadian attack had to be extended southwest to take the city. This action would take the 2 Cdn Corps forces in the complete opposite direction of their main task, which was the link-up with the Americans at Trun.
Montgomery compounded the issue by not reinforcing 2 Cdn Corps. Despite giving Crerar a major new responsibility and shifting the direction of the Canadian operations, Montgomery did not reinforce Crerar with one of the three armoured divisions of Second British Army which, in the course of events, were in danger of being pinched out of battle.155 Saddling 2 Cdn Corps with the two tasks with no additional resources meant that Simonds now had to choose where his main effort would be.
Simonds had a number of options: tackle the tasks sequentially by sending everything he had against Falaise in the hopes of a swift victory and then shifting the effort to Trun, or tackle them concurrently by dividing his forces. If he chose the concurrent approach, Simonds had to decide the weight assigned to each effort. He could divide the forces equally against both targets or he could send a majority of troops against one and a reduced force against the other. Simonds had to weigh the tactical values of an early capture of Falaise and a delayed link-up with the Americans against an early link-up with the Americans and a delayed capture of Falaise.
Simonds chose parallel lines of operation with a weighted effort against Falaise which was, in fact, contrary to the stated primary task which was the link-up with the Americans at Trun. The majority of his forces carried the attack towards Falaise while the Polish Armd Div was sent southeast to try and seal the gap. By choosing this option, Simonds gave the Germans in the Pocket the one commodity they were quickly running out of – time.
Simonds compounded the problem by assigning the task of taking Falaise to Kitching and 4 Cdn Armd Div. This decision was fundamentally wrong on two fronts. An armoured division, because of its weaker complement of infantry and because of the increased vulnerability of tanks in confined spaces, was the wrong asset to use to take a town. Capturing a town usually involved infantry-intensive house-to-house fighting and this task was traditionally given to an infantry division.
The second and more important reason was because 4 Cdn Armd Div was one of only two formations that Simonds had that could get to Trun quickly with enough combat power to seal the gap and cause havoc in the German rear areas. Forcing the division to fight on towards Falaise and into the strength of the German anti-tank defences resulted in the serious degradation of the combat power of the division. Had the division captured the heights and then Falaise, its ability to advance to Trun would have been seriously delayed and, more importantly, the division may not have even had the combat strength to be a factor in the next battles.156 Simonds’ decisions on 15 August must be seriously questioned.
The actions of 15 August represented a wasted day of conflict that resulted in far too many needless tank and personnel casualties in 4 Cdn Armd Div. 16 August would become a wasted day to recover and reorient the division after the actions of 15 August. Falaise was a distraction, one could even say an obsession, for Montgomery and therefore, by extension, for Simonds. This distraction delayed the movement of the division into the gap and gave the Germans two more days of respite to utilize the open path to the east.
Tractable, as a plan, did not survive its initial contact with either the enemy or the elements, consequently it tested the training, resolve and initiative of the men at all levels within the division. The casualties among the senior leadership within the armoured brigade forced the leadership role down to the regimental commanders, who proved up to the challenge by continuing the advance with leadership and initiative on the battlefield. They were able to successfully continue the advance using new tactics (smoke) and new re-supply innovations (top ups on the battlefield) to keep their battlegroups moving towards their objectives.
The advance to Pt 159 was achieved by the personal initiative of the commanders of BCR (Parish) and Grenadier Guards (Halpenny). They not only had to deal with effective German defences but had to operate with little or no brigade support and a total lack of situational awareness. Certainly all of the leaders of both the fighting and rear echelons displayed a drive and energy which demonstrated their ability to integrate and implement the lessons learned in previous engagements into a winning formula on the battlefield.
At all levels, the soldiers of the division were tempering the lessons and drills of their training with their actual combat experiences to garner real lessons learned.157 The division was learning how to operate in combat. The mix-ups and separation in Tractable caused by the smokescreen and the Laison River demanded some reorganization south of the river valley. The action had to be completed while combating the Germans in an area that they strongly defended. Considering the fact that the 4 Cdn Armd Div was conducting its second major operation in less than a week and that it had to overcome significant unit reorganization and command issues because of casualties and losses, the units had acquitted themselves well, but, more importantly, they were learning. A statistic that seems to be lost on most who judge the performance of the division as poor was that 15 August 1944 was only day seven of combat operations for 4 Cdn Armd Div.