34. The 23 Sp Regt reported itself ready at 1436 hrs. Ops Log 8 August serial 33, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5. Two troops of self propelled artillery were required forward at 1255 hrs to fire the red smoke to indicate targets for the Phase II bombing. This group reported itself ready at 1240 hrs. Ops Log 8 August serial 69, War Diary, Main HQ First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944. Also serial 89 indicates that the 9 AGRA which was to support 4 Cdn Armd Div was not operational until 1553 hrs, almost two hours late. This unit suffered from the bombing and had to be reconstituted from the remnants of other surviving artillery units. Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 319.

35. Phelan initially tried to work his way through the Gaumesnil woods but found the going too difficult. Phelan worked his way along the southwest face of the woods and began engaging the German defenses around Cintheaux. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 263–264.

36. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 66.

37. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

38. Ibid.

39. H-Hour for the advance was set at 0315 hrs. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug.

40. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug.

41. Ops Log 2 Cdn Corps, 8 August, serial 97 & 113, War Diary 2 Cdn Corps, 1–31 August 1944. While there are two references to this attack in the 2 Cdn Corps Ops Log there is no corresponding reference to this order or attack in the Manitoba Dragoon war diary. The two sitreps for 8 August, numbers 21 & 22 are missing from the 4 Cdn Armd Div war diary and could not be found in the war diaries of division units.

42. Outline of Instrs issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 071300B OP TOTALIZER [sic], 7 Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 12.

43. The 1st Cdn Army Ops log records Simonds intent to continue op Totalize with the original plan remaining in force. 4 Cdn and 1 Pol Armd Divs will push straight on tonight. Ops Log: 8 August, serial 128. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, 8 Aug.

44. Ops Log: 8 August 44, serial 108. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, 8 Aug.

45. Ops Log: 8 August serial 135. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

46. It is not clear whether this order replaced the earlier order to attack Bretteville-le-Rabet. Ops Log: 8 August 44 serial 135. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.

47. Douglas Harker, The Dukes (Vancouver: British Columbia Regiment, 1974), 237.

48. Ibid., 237–238.

49. The likely source of this statement would have been Simonds’ O Group at 1630 hrs. Both Kitching and Booth in their respective O Groups would have repeated it. The situation between Simonds’ O Group and Worthington’s had changed considerably with Worthington’s statement showing much more optimism than the actual tactical situation warranted. The rebuilt German defences would have been unknown to the attacking 4 Cdn Armd Div forces.

50. Cassidy, Warpath, 98.

51. This pairing of the Algonquin Regiment with the BCRs was the first time that these two units had worked together since February 1944.

52. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug Stacey has determined that Worthington Force ended up at map reference 143490 about 1.5 miles east of Estrées and not on Hill 140 as is commonly stated. CMHQ Report No. 169, note 3, p. 91.

53. Ibid.

54. Michael Reynolds. Steel Inferno: 1 SS Panzer Corps in Normandy (New York: Sarpendon, 1997), 238.

55. Ops Log, 9 Aug serials 21 and 22. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps-G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

56. B Sqn was sent east to gain and maintain contact with the Poles. D Sqn was sent southwest to gain a greater awareness of the German disposition in advance of the move of the armoured regiments. C Sqn was sent south to try to push as far forward as possible but both C and D Sqns were stopped by German anti-tank positions. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

57. No. 2 Sqn moved to a position between the quarry of Hautmesnil and Bretteville-le-Rabet to assume a counter-attack role. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

58. Between 0808 hrs and 0841 hrs, the BCR reported to Brigade, ‘have run into enemy and lost ten tanks’ and requested artillery support. At 0849, Bde HQ asked for the location of the opposition to which the BCR replied, ‘same as 2 hrs ago, approximately 500 yards southeast.’ The brigade arranged for fire support on the identified location and at 0907 hrs asked if the artillery support was falling on target. No answer came and thereafter there was silence from Worthington Force. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 227.

59. The tragedy was that 4 Cdn Armed Div did not know Worthington’s location. Worthington insisted he was on Pt 195 but they knew from observation he was not there. They fired artillery smoke shells onto the real Pt 195 and asked him to tell them them where he was in relation to the smoke but he said he could not see it. Kitching then thought that he must have swung behind the enemy’s main position towards the town of Potigny. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 196.

60. Roman Jarymowycz, ‘The Quest for Operational Maneuvre in the Normandy Campaign’ (PhD, McGill University, 1997), 219.

61. The Worthington Force fight on 9 August has been recounted in great detail in Stacey’s The Victory Campaign, Dr Reg Roy’s 1944, Canadians in Normandy, and Brian Reid’s, No Holding Back. The most recent and most compelling account, accompanied with aerial photographs of Worthington Force on the ground is Mike Bechthold, ‘Lost in Normandy: The Odyssey of Worthington Force, 9 August 1944’, Canadian Military History, vol. 19, no. 2, Spring 2010, pp. 5–24. Ops Log, 9 Aug 44, serial 61–65, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

62. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug; Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 196.

63. Under command were A Coy Algonquin Regiment, and supporting arms. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

64. Ops Log, 9 Aug 44 serial 66, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

65. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–31 August 1944, 9 Aug.

66. Ops Log 9 August serial 67, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

67. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 102–103.

68. Ibid., 104.

69. At 1600 hrs, Major R.A. Keane was ordered to take over command of the Lake Superior Regiment. Murrell had reportedly been wounded by a blast from an exploding shell. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

70. C Sqn SAR spent the morning mopping up the quarry. B Sqn took over the defences of Cintheaux from C Sqn. A Sqn spent the morning organizing an attack on Langannerie with the Linc & Welld R scheduled for later that day. During the afternoon C Sqn and the Argylls launched an attack on Bretteville-le-Rabet and succeeded in capturing the town. A Sqn with the Linc & Welld R passed through C Sqn and the Argylls, and attacked Langannerie form the east. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 82; War Diary, 29 Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment), 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

71. Ops Log 9 Aug serial 24. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

72. Stanislaw Maczek, Op Podwody do Czolga:Wspomnienia Wojenne 1918–1945. (Waszawa: Ossolineum, 1990), 132–133. See also Maczek, ‘The 1st Polish Armoured Division in Normandy’, 55.

73. The Poles finally provided definitive information on Worthington Force, reporting that the regiment was badly shot up with only seven cruiser tanks, six recce tanks and five A/A tanks left. Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 87.

74. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

75. Summary of GOC’s plan for 10 Aug. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, App. VIII.

76. War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

77. Interview of J.D. Stewart, for Black Yesterdays by Dr Robert Fraser, 4 October 1989.

78. Lt Col Stewart had no real confidence in the ability of the battalion to take Pt 195 and considered the assignment a suicide attack. In his words, he ‘wrote the battalion off and wrote me [Stewart] off.’ Stewart called his plan an Indian style attack: silent, without a word spoken and at night. Ibid. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug. Note: The events of the 9/10 August are mistakenly recorded on the 11 August entry date in the Argyll war diary.

79. C and D companies were arrayed forward, supported by A and B companies. RHQ was slightly to the rear under cover of an orchard. Ibid.

80. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug.

81. At 0500 hrs 10 Aug, the SAR moved forward B Sqn in front RHQ C Sqn in the village of Langannerie and A Sqn to the right. B Sqn sent two troops of tanks to St Hilaire which was occupied by the Alg Regt with the task of guarding the left flank of the position. A reinforcement troop took a wrong turn and was completely knocked out by fire from Quesnay woods. A Sqn was sent to the right flank of the Linc & Welld R. The SAR tanks remained in place in the area of St Hilaire until relieved on the evening of 11 Aug. Ibid., War Diary, South Alberta Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entries 10–11 Aug.

82. 4 Cdn Armd Div SITREP No. 25 from 101200B to 102400B Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 20.

83. At 0906 hrs, the GGFG reported that their forward elements were on Pt 195 but being engaged by the enemy. No. 2 Squadron deployed hull down on the crest of the hill while No. 3 Squadron took up supporting positions in their rear allowing the remnants of the CGG to disengage. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 105.

84. The artillery Forward Observation Officer is quoted as saying that he counted as many as twentyfour self-propelled anti-tank guns. CMHQ Report No. 169, paras 92–96.

85. 4 Cdn Armd Div SITREP No. 24 from 100000B to 101200B Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 19.

86. 501. Baylay, op.cit., 106.

87. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug.

88. During 11 August, the regiment’s carriers were organized into a convoy to run rations into the forward positions and to get casualties out. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders eventually relieved the Lincs that evening and they began their withdrawal on foot at 2200 hrs. War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entries 10–11 Aug.

89. At one point, Maczek proposed a combined attack on the woods using both armoured divisions but Simonds had another plan. Maczek, Op Podwody do Czolga, 133.

90. The 3 Cdn Inf Div attack was divided into two phases: Phase I, seize Quesnay Woods; Phase II, seize general feature La Grange de Mine, Aisy and Soumont-St Quentin. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 10 Aug.

91. There are two Pt 195 on the road south to Falaise, one located at grid 0846, St Hilaire Farm, and one located at Grid 0840 near Ussy.

92. Summary of GOC’s [Kitching] plan up to 102300B. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, App. IX.

93. The execution of the plan was as follows: 4 Cdn Armd Bde less GGFG and Lake Sup R was to remain in its current position with the CGG prepared to move forward to hold Ussy with the GGFG once the town was captured. 10 Cdn Inf Bde with under command GGFG and Lake Sup R was to capture Pt 206, Ussy and Pt 195 (grid 0840). The attack was to be carried out in two phases. In Phase I, the A&SH of C, riding in Priests and supported by the GGFG under the cover of artillery smoke, were to capture Pt 206. H-Hour for this phase was 0100 hrs on 11 August. In Phase II, the GGFG and Lake Sup Regt were to capture Ussy and Pt 195. On completion of this task, the GGFG and Lake Sup R, less one company, were to revert to 4 Cdn Armd Bde control. The armoured brigade was then to firm up the Ussy position. The 18 Cdn Armd C Regt was to sweep west, south and east on the general line Barbery, Meslay, Martigny and the high ground south of Falaise and was to move west to meet up with the Second British Army. Summary of GOC’s [Kitching] instrs up to 111500B. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, App. X.

94. Ops Log 10 August serials 4721& 2305, Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div, 1–31 August 1944 and Ops Log 11 August serial 477, War Diary 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

95. Ops Log, 11 Aug 44, Serials 54 and 56. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 50.

96. The relief began at last light on 11 August and was completed by 0600 hrs on 12 August War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug.

97. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 108

98. The Grenadier Guards withdrew first through the east flank, losing three tanks in the withdrawal. No. 1 Squadron was given the job of smoking off Quesnay Woods to cover the final withdrawal. The Foot Guards reconstituted itself at Gaumesnil and then moved to a concentration area at Cintheaux. The Grenadier Guards lost ten tanks pulling back from the area of Point 195, while the Foot Guards had to use a heavy smoke screen to avoid similar losses. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug.

99. The axis of advance was Barbery, Moulines and Clair Tizon to capture the high ground Pt 195 and Ussy. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 108.

100. Summary of GOC’s instrs up to 121200B, War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, App. XI.

101. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 111.

102. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 289.

103. Ops Log, 8 Aug 44, Serial 37. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, 8 Aug.

104. The Americans were able to call off the bombing in support of Cobra within hours of the attack because of bad weather.

105. Stearns, Letter [Recollections on Time with Montgomery], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria

106. D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 426.

107. Jarymowycz, The Quest for Operational Maneuvre in the Normandy Campaign, 210.

108. Ibid., 210.

109. Amy had only taken over command of No. 1 Sqn some six weeks before Normandy and, given the paucity of armoured training in the division during that time frame, he would have had to rely on the training imparted by the squadron’s previous commander. Amy reports, however, that he inherited a slate of very capable officers and NCOs in charge of well-trained and disciplined tank crews. The squadron was, therefore, capable even though Amy had not had the opportunity to actually test it under his command and direction. Amy, [Recollections on Normandy].

110. Ibid.

111. The grid reference corresponds with an area between Conteville and St Aignan-de-Cramesnil. In addition, the advance was delayed from 1530 hrs to 1554 hrs as an air strike was called in to deal with the reported tanks.

112. Amy’s caution seemed justified in his own mind when he started receiving fire from the Polish front, where he expected the 1st SS Pz Div to be located. Amy had little information on the success or failures of the Phase I attacks or the disposition of the units from these attacks. In addition, he had little information as to what was happening on his flanks and his tank troops were starting to take casualties. Ops Log 8 Aug 44, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

113. A.B. French, Letter [Comments of Draft Chapter VII], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 16 January 1981.

114. Amy stated that he took three very important and fundamental military lessons away from this experience: first, never commit troops to battle who are not well briefed on all aspects of their part of an operation. Second, commanders must ensure that the details involved in facilitating or staging a battle, including the deployment, are closely monitored. The last point that stuck with Amy was the requirement for the commander to be up front, particularly when the momentum of an attack had slowed. Amy believed that more often than not, this action could restore the momentum of the attack. Amy, [Recollections on Normandy].

115. It is possible that the Gaumesnil issue was discussed by Kitching. If Foulkes had agreed to Kitching taking Gaumesnil then his visit to 10 Cdn Inf Bde makes sense since he would have then passed on the task/change of plans to Jefferson. Simonds could have been briefed at 1200 hrs on the change at which point he may have cancelled the Kitching plan and ordered 2 Cdn Inf Bde to take on the task. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 April 1944, 8 Aug.

116. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 April 1944, entry 10 Aug; Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 230.

117. At 2200 hrs, Control reported that interference was ‘very heavy, cannot make out speech of stations’ and at 0045 hrs Booth reported from his command tank that he could not hear ‘control’. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

118. John Timothy Alfred Claydon, ‘Green Flash: Tanks and 4th Canadian Armoured Division, Normandy 1944’ (Masters of Arts, Carleton University), 110–112.

119. The 1st Cdn Army Ops log records Simonds’ intent to continue op Totalize with the original plan remaining in force. 4 Cdn and 1 Polish Armd Divs will push straight on tonight. Ops Log, serial 128, War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, 8 Aug.

120. Wünsche’s battle group was concentrated in Quesnay Woods and had the support of German artillery and anti-tank guns. Meyer states that five Tiger tanks and fifteen Panther tanks were used to attack the force with the Tigers taking up positions on the western flank to shoot in the Panthers attacking from battle group Krause’s firm base on the ridge north of Assy. Reynolds, Steel Inferno, 240.

121. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 176.

122. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 196.

123. Ibid.

124. Crerar’s assessment of the Poles mirrored Kitching’s. The ‘bog-down’ of the 2 Cdn Corps attack, as Crerar saw it, was mainly due to the ‘dog fight’ that developed between the 1st Pol Armd Div and German units in Quesnay Woods. Had the Poles smoked off and contained the enemy there and pushed on with the bulk of their strength, they would have widened the front and increased the depth for a tactically decisive advance. As it was, when darkness came, they had advanced ‘not more than a few hundred yards’. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 290.

125. Kitching, Mud and Green Field, 195.

126. Reid, No Holding Back, 302.

127. Kitching also admitted that on at least two occasions, neither in action, he had seen Booth totally incapacitated, but that Booth had reassured him that he never drank in the field. Kitching added that he was taken aback when Simonds suggested that Booth take command of 3 Cdn Inf Div when he first heard that Keller had been wounded. Donald Graves interview with Kitching 23 May 1998. Reid, No Holding Back, 464, note 4 to Chapter 15.

128. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 195.

129. Reynolds, Steel Inferno, 240.

130. These were A company from the Alg R, a medium machine gun platoon, a troop from the 96th Anti-Tank Battery, a troop of flail tanks and the remaining three-inch mortars from the Algonquins. French, Letter [Comments of Draft Chapter VII], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria; Ops Log 9 Aug serials 54–56, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

131. This group was renamed Battle Lorry Group. As operations progressed in Normandy, the A Echelons of armoured units were provided with five to six Kangaroos (de-turreted Ram tanks) which permitted re-supply to take place either on the run or at least without the necessity of withdrawing very far from the front. This tactic, however, was not the case on the evening of 8 August and the needed re-supply of the tanks had to be conducted under the practiced methods from Britain. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 107; A.B. French, Some Reminiscences of the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment and the Governor General’s Foot Guards (Ottawa: n.p., December 1984), 66.

132. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 107.

133. The other factor that exacerbated the availability of tanks was the sanitization process that a tank had to undergo when a crew member was killed within the tank. The process required the cleaning of the internal part of the tank. According to the required process, the tank could not be returned to service for 24 hours. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 10 Aug.

134. When the GGFG first went into action, one troop, as well as the regimental 2 i/c and the 2i/cs of the squadrons, were left out of battle and these personnel moved with B Echelon. But one troop per squadron LOB was no longer feasible after about fifty-five tanks were lost in the first few weeks of battle. Thereafter, LOB consisted principally of the unwounded survivors of destroyed tanks and personnel returning from hospital. This group was incorporated with new tanks and new crews into the Armoured Delivery Squadron and prepared as replacements for the fighting echelon. French, Some Reminiscences, 68; War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug.

135. The issue of reinforcements and in particular the state of infantry general duty was the subject of two letters from Simonds to Crerar, the first on 7 Aug and the second on 8 Aug. Letters Simonds to Crerar dated 7 Aug 44 and 8 Aug 44 respectively, Tac HQ 2 Cdn Corps. War Diary, AG&QMG Branch, HQ 2 Cdn Corps, 1–31 August 1944, App. 11 & 14.

136. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug.

137. 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 10 Aug.

138. Each commodity had a desired level within the system. The goal was to have five days of rations and 190 miles of fuel available in the system each day. On 8 August, the division reported five days of rations and this level was maintained throughout Totalize. There were 180 miles of POL in the Division supply system on 8 August. The level dropped to a low of 150 miles on 10 August but rebounded to 175 miles for the period 11 to 14 August. ADREPs 8–14 Aug 44. 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

139. ADREPs 8–14 Aug 44. 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

140. ADREPs 8–11 Aug 44. 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

141. Ibid.

142. Casualty and Strength Return, 12 Aug 44. War Diary, HQ 1st Canadian Army – A&Q, 1–31 August 1944, App. 12.

143. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 163.

144. ADREP 11 Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

145. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug.

146. Graham, The Price of Command, 169.

147. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 12 Aug.

148. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 12 Aug.

149. Robert Moncel, Letter [Comments of Draft Chapter VII], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 6 May 1981.

150. Amy, [Recollections on Normandy].

151. According to Meyer every opening phase of a Canadian operation was a complete success and the staff work a mathematical masterpiece but Canadians never followed up their opening success to reach a complete victory. DHIST81/104: Interview Kurt Meyer, Canadian Chaplain’s Report. 3 Sep 50. Jarymowycz, The Quest for Operational Maneuvre in the Normandy Campaign, 218.

152. Meyer, Grenadiers, 158

153. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 290.

Chapter 8: Tractable

1. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 125.

2. Outline of Instructions issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, Op ‘TALLULAH’, 13 Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

3. This change appears to have been arranged at Crerar’s meeting with Montgomery and Dempsey at 12 Corps HQ on 12 August. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, entry 12 Aug and App. 5.

4. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 127.

5. 8 Cdn Inf Bde OO [Operation Order] No. 17 OP Tallulah, dated 14 Aug 44. W.D. 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 Aug 44.

6. Ibid.

7. OP TALLULAH, NOTES OF CORPS COMD’S OUTLINE TALK 131000B hrs 13 Aug 44. W.D. 3 Cdn Inf Div Rear AQ Branch, 1–31 August 1944, App. 10.

8. Ibid.

9. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 234.

10. CMHQ Report No. 169, 131.

11. TRACTABLE became the new code name for the operation although it is not clear why and who decided to change the name.

12. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 235.

13. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug; War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 66.

14. Ops Log, 13 Aug 44, Serial 27. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944, App. 3.

15. Instr of GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 62.

16. Even though the name of the operation was changed from Tallulah to Tractable it is referred to as both in the war diaries with some units not being informed of the change.

17. Outline of Instructions Issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 131230B Aug 44. OP TRACTABLE. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

18. At grid reference 1438, Operation Totalize map, printed by 14 Field Survey Squadron R E Feb 1948.

19. The specific tasks given to 4 Cdn Armd Div were to capture the high ground northeast of Falaise, capture the bridges at Eraines and Damblainville and to be prepared to exploit south and southeast to meet 15th US Corps. Outline of Instructions Issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 131230B Aug 44. OP TRACTABLE. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

20. OP TALLULAH, NOTES OF CORPS COMD’S OUTLINE TALK 131000B hrs 13 Aug 44. W.D. 3 Cdn Inf Div Rear AQ Branch, 1–31 August 1944, App. 10.

21. Ibid.

22. The Regiment was to follow 8 Cdn Inf Bde across the Laison and extend its flank protection to Sassy, and after reconnoitring the wooded areas between Epancy and Damblainville, exploit to both those places. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug.

23. Outline of Instructions issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 131230B Aug 44. OP TRACTABLE. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

24. CMHQ, Report No. 146, para. 79.

25. Outline of Instructions issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 131230B Aug 44. OP TRACTABLE. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

26. A search through the Operational orders for Op Tallulah has revealed that Simonds dictated the objectives for the Division (which was his responsibility to do) but he also mandated the composition and alignment of the brigades, and the tasks for each brigade (which should have been Kitching’s prerogative). Since 8 Cdn Inf Bde was only allotted to Kitching for Phase I there was little latitude to assign it a role other than the capture of the high ground between Pt 103 and Pt 81. See ‘Notes Given Verbally by C of S 2 Cdn Corps to GSO1 Ops First Cdn Army’ at Hq 2 Cdn Corps, 122300B Aug. OP TALLULAH, 13 Aug 44, Ops Log, Main HQ First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944.

27. Granatstein, Bloody Victory, 173.

28. If the disposition of the 3 Inf and 4 Armd Divs is reviewed, TRACTABLE resembles the original Phase II of Totalize where elements of 3 Inf Div are split protecting the left and right flanks of 4 Armd Div axis of advance. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 293.

29. Foster, Meeting of Generals, 368.

30. See the respective war diary entries for 14 August 1944.

31. 8 Cdn Inf Bde OO [Operation Order] No. 17 OP TALLULAH, dated 14 Aug 44. W.D. 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 Aug 44.

32. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 13 Aug.

33. Graves, South Albertas, 120–121.

34. Kampfgruppe Krause was moved from Olendon to Villers-Canivet 6 km northwest of Falaise and parts of Artillerieregiment in support of 85 Inf Div and III/26 were brought in to attack the Clair-Tizon bridgehead. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 184.

35. Ten hours after the assault began a captured German soldier provided details of the captured documents to the Canadians. Based on this captured German’s opinion, had it not been for the captured documents the Canadians would have made a clean break through to Falaise. In a letter to all officers Simonds stated that the captured documents ‘enabled the enemy to make quick adjustments to his dispositions which undoubtedly resulted in casualties to our troops . . . and delayed the capture of FALAISE for over twenty-four hours.’ Simonds Letter, SD 58-1 Main Headquarters 2 Cdn Corps dated 23 August 1944. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps Main, 1–31 August 1944, App. 35. There is conflicting information as to whether any specific German realignment actually occurred as a result of this information. A Canadian Post Op report stated that captured German documents revealed that the Germans were given twelve hours notice of the attack and were able to dispose an additional anti-tank battery of 88mm guns along the forward wooded slope of the river valley directly on the axis of the Canadian attack. Op TRACTABLE AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2 CDN ARMD BDE IN FRANCE 14 to 16 Aug 44, War Diary, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944 App. 7. Probably citing this report, Stacey states that the information allowed the Germans to make ‘quick adjustments’ including the addition of an anti-tank battery above the Laison River on the line of advance. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 238. Hubert Meyer confirms the capture of the documents but suggests that no reinforcements were sent into the projected area of attack. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 184.

36. On the morning of 14 August Kurt Meyer, together with Max Wünsche, scouted the terrain north of Falaise to determine where to set up rear positions to meet the expected Canadian attack. They concentrated the establishment of their rear defensive positions on Hill 159 and along the southern portions of the road St Pierre-sur-Dives. These positions would only be manned when specifically ordered. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 184.

37. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 248. The hand written notes for the operation from 7 Cdn Inf Bde state that the 85 Inf Div had reinforced the 89 Inf Div Bde in positions between Soignelles and the Caen–Falaise road. 7 Cdn Inf Bde Confirmatory Notes OPERATION TALLULAH, War Diary, 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

38. Op TRACTABLE AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2 CDN ARMD BDE IN FRANCE 14 to 16 Aug 44, War Diary, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944 App. 7.

39. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 6, 9 Based on infm up to 2200 hrs 13 Aug 44, War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, App. 6.

40. Ibid.

41. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug.

42. Recall that the 4 Cdn Armd Div was placed on one-hour notice to move after 1200 hrs 12 August to support the 2 Cdn Inf Div operation with three possible courses of action in support: follow 2 Cdn Div, pass through in the area of Ussy and advance with the objective of Falaise; follow the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt across the River Laize and advance on the axis of Sassy, Epancy with the objective of Falaise; or participate in TRACTABLE in conjunction with 3 Cdn Inf Div.

43. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 13 Aug.

44. The 4 Cdn Armd Div Intel Summary for 13 August also noted the presence of at least one and possibly more heavy tank battalions of Tiger tanks. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary No. 7 dated 13 August 1944, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 25.

45. War Diary, South Alberta Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 13 Aug.

46. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 13 Aug.

47. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug.

48. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 216.

49. The regimental history of the Grenadier Guards states that driving into the sun caused the axis of advance to move left because of the two hours advance for daylight savings. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 272. Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 138–9.

50. Op TRACTABLE AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2 CDN ARMD BDE IN FRANCE 14 to 16 Aug 44, War Diary, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944 App. 7.

51. Ops Log 14 August serials 39, 42, 44, 46, 47, War Diary HQ Main 2 Cdn Corps 1–31 August 1944.

52. In a post op report Lt Col J.C. Spragge acting brigade 8 Cdn Inf Bde reported that the enemy had his inferior troops in the forward areas as infantry and his better troops manning 88mm, nebelwerfers and other special equipment. Report Op ‘Tallulah’, War Diary, HQ 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 8; Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 111–113.

53. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 272.

54. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 141.

55. For example, at one point on the drive to the river a composite force of A troop No. 3 Sqn GGFG was working with a mixed force of tanks from the CGG, BCRs and the 2 Cdn Armd Bde. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 113.

56. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 141.

57. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 273.

58. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 142.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 216.

62. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August, entry 14 Aug.

63. Ibid.

64. A version of the events not often cited comes from Lt Ditchburn the engineer recce officer who was travelling in the Tac Hq. In the dust and confusion caused by changing the hollow square formation Tac Bde became separated and headed towards Estrées-la-Campagne and Hill 111. En route they passed the destroyed tanks of the BCR. Booth led the way down Hill 111 in a southsouthwesterly direction when the formation was engaged by anti-tank and machine gun fire. W.O. Rollefson, ed., Green Route Up: 4 Canadian Armoured Division (The Hague: Mouton & Cy, November 1945), 31–2.

65. With Brigadier Booth on the rear deck of the sole surviving tank from headquarters, Chubb and the liaison officer went back for help. They met with a jeep ambulance and transferred Booth to it. While he was being evacuated in the jeep ambulance Booth died. As the crew were placing his body by the side of the road, they came on two more wounded men who needed speedy attention. Booth, dressed in the black coveralls of a tank crewman without the red tabs of a brigadier, lay by the road for some time before his body was collected and identified on the following day. Until that time, Booth was believed to have been wounded and evacuated through medical channels. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 255–6.

66. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

67. A.G. Chubb, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 20 December 1980.

68. Ibid. Foster claims that Montgomery was with Simonds but this is not recorded in the Div war diary. In Foster’s book, Montgomery is quoted as saying, ‘Get rid of him. He’s obviously lost control of the situation. Why, he isn’t even at his own headquarters’, even though Proctor had explained to Simonds and Montgomery that Kitching was forward trying to sort out what was happening with the armoured brigade. Foster, Meeting of Generals, 369–70.

69. The timings tend to conflict between the various accounts. It appears that some of the times were recorded in B time instead of the actual time which represented a one hour difference. John Proctor, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 15 April 1981.

70. The general practice was to replace a commander at any level when a casualty in the midst of an action by someone on the spot rather than bring in a new commander who will not have the immediate feel of the battle. Robert Moncel, Letter [Comments of Draft Chapter VII], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 18 May 1981.

71. Ops Log 14 August. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

72. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 113. A.V.M. Smith, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 8 December 1980.

73. It is possible that this note was taken by Chubb to Scott in which case Scott would not have received it until the next morning. George Kitching, Hand-written Note to Scott [Commander’s Intent for Operations on 15 Aug], undated.

74. War Diary, Governor General’s Foot Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug.

75. Graves, South Albertas, 122.

76. The Argylls handed the town over to the Highland Light Infantry of Canada at 2300 hrs and moved back to Olendon. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entries 14–15 Aug.

77. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 185.

78. SITREP 33 for period 141200B to 142400B. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 26.

79. Copp, Fields of Fire, 230.

80. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 185.

81. Ibid.

82. Meyer makes no mention whether these moves were tied to the information revealed in the captured documentation. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 184.

83. Copp, Fields of Fire, 230.

84. Ops Log, 14 Aug 44, Serial 75. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army-General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 74.

85. Specifically, the 10 Cdn Inf Bde, less the Linc & Welld Regt, was to clear the Olendon– Epancy–Perrières area while the 4 Cdn Armd Bde, with Linc & Welld Regt under command and mounted in Priests, were to take the divisions original objective, the contour feature 160 and Pt 159. The Linc & Welld Regt was to form a firm base on the high ground which would then facilitate the last phase of the operation which was an advance by the Lake Sup Regt passing through the Linc & Welld Regt to take Falaise. Ops Log 15 August serial 9, 42, 60. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army-General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 74.

86. Ops Log 15 August, serial 62. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 74.

87. Ops Log 15 August, serials 1–23. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

88. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

89. Of all of the movement among the regiments, the actions of the GGFG on 15 August has been the most difficult to reconstruct.

90. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

91. This system was used by both Montgomery and Simonds and was known as Phantom. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August, entry 14 Aug.

92. Ops Log 15 August serials 40, 50 & 56. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 Aug, App. 5.

93. War Diary, Algonquin Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

94. The third squadron SAR, C Sqn was operating with the A&SH of C in Perrières.

95. War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug; Canada, Army, CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 148.

96. Ops Log 15 August, serials 56, 59, 60, 62, 68. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

97. Ops Log 15 August, serial 83. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.

98. Priests were used to transport 8 Cdn Inf Bde into the operation. On arrival at their objective the Priests reverted to command of 4 Cdn Armd Div and were used for maintenance of forward troops and the evacuation of casualties. Op Log 15 August serial 98. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

99. Ops Log 15 August serials 102–115. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August, App. 5.

100. This report was submitted by Phantom. Ops Log 15 August serial 89. War Diary, HQ 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

101. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 153.

102. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

103. At 1556 hrs Chubb informed the GGFG that ‘friends are in Jaguar’ or that troops from 3 Cdn Inf Div are in Aubigny located west of Pt 159. This report is almost certainly wrong since 7 Cdn Inf Bde units did not advance that far south. The 2 Cdn Armd Bde was at Pt 168 codenamed Jackal. It is possible that the codewords ‘Jackal’ and ‘Jaguar’ had been mixed up. Ops Log 15 August serial 112. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

104. War Diary, HQ 7 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

105. Ibid.

106. Ops Log 16 August serial 14, 2 Cdn Armd Bde Sitrep 161010B. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

107. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 275. An important note when reviewing the plan is that the objective of 4 Cdn Armd Div Pt 159 is given the code word MERMAID in the operation instruction. IDAHO was not found anywhere in the list of 4 Cdn Armd Div code words. The only reference to IDAHO as the codeword for the final objective of 4 Cdn Armd Div was found in the operation orders for 8 Cdn Inf Bde. 8 Cdn Inf Bde OO No. 17 OP Tallulah dated 14 August 44. War Diary, 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 44.

108. Scott was in considerable discomfort and until early afternoon he had tried to direct the battle from his own command vehicle. His Regiment’s medical officer had been killed and there was no one to tend to his painful foot. He was determined to carry on but his injury became so aggravating that by that afternoon he had to be driven to Kitching’s headquarters where he asked to be relieved of his temporary command. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 275.

109. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

110. Unfortunately for Kitching, Moncel would not arrive until 19 August. The, as of yet unexplained, five day delay in his arrival was to play a critical role in the events to follow and is a crucial element in Kitching’s dismissal. Reflecting on the situation in his book Kitching stated that he had a capable officer in his commander of artillery, Brigadier Lane, and he should have sent him forward to command the brigade on a permanent basis. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 206.

111. Ibid., 200.

112. News from the 3 Cdn Inf Div was also bad. They had advanced to Point 168 in a costly action that afternoon but the assaulting 7th Brigade troops were thrown out of Soulangy before dark. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 186; Copp, Fields of Fire, 231.

113. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entries 15 & 16 Aug.

114. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 158.

115. 4 Cdn Adm Div SITREP 35. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 28.

116. Graham, the Price of Command, 154.

117. Outline of Instructions Issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 131230B Aug 44. OP TRACTABLE. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

118. Rollefson, Green Route Up, 31. For the composition of the 4 Cdn Armd Div formations see Outline of Instructions issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div, 131230B Aug 44 for OP TRACTABLE. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

119. By this time the 4 Cdn Armd Bde group consisted of the CGG, BCR, a sqn from the Lake Sup Regt and the 10 Cdn Inf Bde group consisting of the Linc & Welld R with two squadrons from SAR.

120. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

121. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug.

122. Chubb, in a letter to Dr Roy, stated that Kitching appointed Chubb acting brigade commander until further notice when Kitching found out that Booth was a casualty. Chubb, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], 20 December 1980.

123. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 263

124. There are a number of incidents were the brigade commander became a casualty but the brigade continued to function seamlessly. The case of Brigadier Wyman on 8 August is a case in point. He was wounded by sniper fire but immediately replaced and the brigade continued to function. Moncel, Letter [Reflections on Normandy Campaign], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria.

125. Remember that Kitching had had sessions with his commander discussing the succession plan when commanders become casualties prior to entering Normandy.

126. Robert Moncel, Letter [Reflections on Normandy Campaign], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 2 September 1981.

127. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 187.

128. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 200.

129. The corps commander was usually thinking a number of days in the future with respect to operations, but the dire circumstances with respect to the command of the armoured brigade should have been visible to him immediately. Ibid.

130. The 15 August entry in the narrative portion of the war diary states that the GGFG declared Idaho taken at 1650 hrs and that the claim was reported false at 1730 hrs. There are no entries in the 4 Bde Ops Log that support these timings even if the normal time/bravo time factor is taken into consideration. 4 Cdn Armd Bde War Diary, HQ 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5, Ops Log serials 126.

131. War Diary HQ First Cdn Army Main, 1–31 August, Ops Log 15 August serial 117.

132. Ibid., serial 105.

133. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 August.

134. It is not clear whether the reference to reconnaissance tanks refers to Stuart light tanks of the BCR recce squadron or the tanks of the SAR. War Diary, South Alberta Regiment, 1–31 August, entry 15 August.

135. R.A. Paterson, A Short History, The Tenth Canadian Infantry Bde (October 1945), 26.

136. OP TRACTABLE: AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2 CDN ARMD BDE IN FRANCE 14 TO 16 AUG 44, War Diary HQ 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 7.

137. Stacey believes that a few tanks from the Foot Guards had worked their way forward under cover of smoke and had managed to reach the objective. He also states that withering fire from the line west of Eraines, however, eventually drove them off. CMHQ Report No. 169, para 154.

138. Ops Log 16 August serial 4, War Diary, 2 Cdn Corps Main, 1–31 August 1944.

139. Chubb, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], 20 December 1980.

140. Moncel, Letter [Comments of Draft Chapter VII], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria.

141. Robert Moncel, Letter [Comments on draft Chapter], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 16 September 1981.

142. John Proctor, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 4 May 1981.

143. French, Some Reminiscences, 72.

144. John Proctor, Letter [Recollections on Normandy], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University of Victoria, 9 June 1981.

145. On 15 August, 2nd troop 9 Field squadron built the Division’s first operational bridge by replacing a scissor bridge at Rouvres with a 40-ft Bailey bridge over the Laison River. Rollefson, Green Route Up, 32.

146. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div-AAQMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

147. Claydon, Green Flash, 112–14.

148. The status of the tank strength in the SAR is unknown. Ops Log 16 August 44 serial 42. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.

149. ADREP dated 160420B August. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

150. It is not clear why the name of the operation was changed. A message from G OPS MAIN 4 Cdn Armd Div dated 141145B that was sent to all 4 Div units and 8 Cdn Ind Bde stated ‘op TALLULAH will now be known as op TRACTABLE.’ War Diary, HQ 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

151. The 4 Cdn Armd Div codewords for TRACTABLE were; Rouvres-‘Victoria’, Maizières-‘Albert’, Woods on left – ‘Hudson Bay’, Final objective – ‘Idaho’, Sassy – ‘Florida’. 8 Cdn Inf Bde OO No17. Op ‘Tallulah’ dated 14 August 44. Ibid. The only place that Idaho as a code word showed up in the 4 Cdn Armd Div orders was on the map traces. It was not found in any written order.

152. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 297; Copp, Fields of Fire, 232.

153. Copp, Fields of Fire, 232.

154. Ops Log, 14 Aug 44, Serial 75. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 74.

155. Graves, South Albertas, 133.

156. Copp, Fields of Fire, 232.

157. One of the interesting footnotes to this operation is that the armoured regiments had learned the value of using smoke as a tactic. The Grenadier Guards and BCR successfully used this tactic to bypass German strong points around Epancy and there are numerous other reports of the use of smoke by the other regiments/battalions. In fact, Proctor recorded that he had to ask Corps for an additional allotment of 3,300 rounds of smoke as ‘the program today used up most of ours’. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug.

Chapter 9: Closing the Falaise Gap

1. Copp, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy, A Visitor’s Guide, 140.

2. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 528.

3. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 204.

4. Graves, South Albertas, 137–8.

5. Part II Invasion and Battle of Normandy (6 Jun–22 Aug 44). Canada, Army, Army Headquarters Report No. 50, The Campaign in North-West Europe Information from German Sources (Ottawa: Army Headquarters, 14 October 1952), M 264–265.

6. Memo GOC ‘Operations Following the Capture of Falaise’ dated 15 August 1944. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 11.

7. Ibid.

8. Discussion of this 4 Cdn Armd Div operation has not been found in any previous secondary source. Memo GOC ‘Operations Following the Capture of Falaise’ dated 15 August 1944. Ibid., App. 11.

9. Cassidy, Warpath, 130.

10. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 289.

11. Of these tanks seven had turrets which could only be hand operated. French, Some Reminiscences, 73.

12. Minutes of the Morning Joint Conference 0830 hrs 17 August 1944, War diary, First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944 App. 47.

13. French, Some Reminiscences, 73.

14. This objective was at odds with information in the First Cdn Army war diary which identified the high ground immediately southwest of the town of Trun as the objective of the Division’s advance. The specific grid reference given was 309297 which is south of Trun. A message from the First Cdn Army Liaison officer to 2 Corps at 1130 hrs reported the following expected disposition of the two divisions by evening of 17 August: 4 Cdn Armd Div on the high ground south of Trun and the Polish Armd Div in the area north of Trun. These reports were logged prior to the switch in the Division’s advance from Damblainville to Mourteaux-Couliboeuf and south. Ops Log 17 August serial 57, War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.

15. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 16 Aug.

16. There was a third implied route which ran Falaise–Mandeville–Trun. The intent specified that, if Falaise was taken and the streets clear, the division was to advance through the town down along the Falaise–Trun highway to Trun. If these conditions were not satisfied, then the Division would move north and use Route I as the preferred choice. Notes ‘Op Smash’ War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 20.

17. Rollefson, Green Route Up, 33.

18. Map Trace Op Smash War Diary, the Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, App. 7.

19. Hand written notes of the orders for Op Smash. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, App. 20.

20. Hand written notes of the orders for Op Smash. Ibid., App. 20.

21. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug; War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 16 Aug.

22. If the main attack was successful, the Algonquins were to clear the west side of the River and meet up with the Argylls south at Damblainville. Ops Log 17 August serial 47. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 74.

23. CMHQ Report No. 169, para. 154.

24. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 16 Aug.

25. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entries 15–17 Aug. In his memoirs Kitching only mentions one O Group with Simonds on 16 August at 0900 hrs. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 200.

26. Proctor had assigned officers along the route to control the traffic. These officers were in wireless communications but they had not counted on the use of the road by other units. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug

27. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

28. The Advanced Guard was a combined arms battle group based on A Company of the Lake Superior Regt with B Squadron of the BCR under command. War Diary, the Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

29. Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 192.

30. Pt 118 and Pt 147 are opposite each other with Pt 118 north of the Trun–Vimoutiers Highway and Pt 147 south of the Highway. One explanation for the two points being recorded as ANTARCTIC is that Pt 118 may have been an intermediate objective on the way to Pt 147. Another is that the two hills combined represented the final objective. Op Log 17 August serials 41 & 53. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

31. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

32. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 202.

33. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

34. Ibid.

35. Spencer, History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 115.

36. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Jun.

37. See the war diary entries for the three armoured regiments on 17 August.

38. Major Ed Smith from the Grenadier Guards was ordered to take command of the Foot Guards the following day. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 21.

39. The 2 Cdn Corps war diary records visits by Simonds to 4 Cdn Armd Div HQ and 1 Pol Armd Div HQ at 1030 hrs. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

40. Stanislaw Maczek, ‘The 1st Polish Armoured Division in Normandy’, 65.

41. Ops Log 17 August, serial 27, War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.

42. Ops Log 17 August, serial 141, Ibid.

43. Ops Log 17 August, serial 144, Ibid.

44. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 278.

45. Message GO 144 SITREP 172100B Main First Cdn Army to Third US Army. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944.

46. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

47. Robert John Sauer, ‘Germany’s I SS Panzer Corps: Defensive Armored Operations in France, June–September 1944’ (PhD, Boston College), 400–404.

48. Model saw himself at the head of two Army Groups: Army Group B and Army Group G, of which Army Group B controlled the Armed Forces Command Netherlands, Fifteenth Army, Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army, while Army Group G controlled First Army and Nineteenth Army. Canada, Army, Army Headquarters Report No. 77, The Campaign in Northwest Europe: Information from German Sources Part IV: Higher Direction of Operations from Falaise Debacle to Ardennes Offensive (20 Aug–16 Dec 44) Ottawa: Army Headquarters, 31 March 1958, 3.

49. Notes on Conference with Field Marshal Model 18 Aug 44. AHQ Report No. 50, M274.

50. They had been prohibited from travelling during the day to this date. G1-301 ISUM No. 39 Information to 181300B. Ops Log 18 August serial 112. War Diary, HQ 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

51. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 298.

52. This road would be completely cut on 19 August by American and French divisions.

53. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 298.

54. Ops Log, 17 August, Ops message no.13, G Ops 2 Cdn Corps Main 172225B. War Diary, First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944.

55. There seems to be considerable confusion as to where Antarctic actually was. According to the Canadian Grenadier Guards history Antarctic was Pt 147 on the eastern side of the Trun-Vimoutier road near Le Menil Girard. Antarctic according to the operation order for Op Smash was the high ground south west of Trun at grid reference 3029. Antarctic according to the Lake Superior map traces is Pt 118. There is considerable confusion over the 4 Cdn Armd Bde ops net when the Grenadier Guards declares themselves on Antarctic early in the morning. They are on Pt 147. It is unclear whether the code words were changed or whether there was an error in calling Pt 147 Antarctic. Ops Log 18 August serial 15. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5; Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, map 26.

56. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 August. Ops Log 18 August serial 45, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, App. 5.

57. In this case the Lake Sup Regt war diary states that Antarctic is the heights over looking Trun. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug.

58. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 120.

59. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug.

60. A Coy under command GGFG, B Coy under command CGG and C Coy under command of the BCR.

61. Ops Log 17 August, Appendix to Log – From 2 Cdn Corps, 172315B, 17 Aug 44, War Diary, Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div, 1–31 August 1944.

62. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug.

63. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 279.

64. A Company was deployed on the road to Falaise, B Company on the road to Argentan, C Company on the road to St Lambert-sur-Dives and D Company covered the road to Vimoutiers. Tanks and anti-tank guns were disposed to make strong points within the town and to cover the approaches to the Dives River from the east. War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug. Rogers, History of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 156.

65. War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug.

66. The orders as recorded in the 4 Cdn Armd Div war diary indicate that the entire division was to proceed south to Chambois. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, 18 Aug.

67. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 279.

68. Kitching’s commanding officers had already given orders to his officers to execute his plan for the defence of the Dives River. Graves, South Albertas, 138.

69. It would be safe to assume that Kitching would have informed Simonds of his previous orders to his brigade commanders and that these new orders meant a significantly different deployment for his troops than the one he had already initiated for the defence of the Trun–St Lambert line. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 203.

70. Prof Terry Copp argues that the decision to place 4 Armd Bde in defensive positions along the Trun–Vimoutiers highway instead of committing it to the closing of the gap between Trun and Chambois may have been the result of Ultra intelligence. ‘At 0916 18 August Ultra recipients were informed that 2 SS Pz Corps had been ordered to clear up the situation resulting from the allied penetration northwest of Trun. This was to be accomplished by a concentric attack carried out by 2 SS Pz Corps and two other panzer divisions directed on Trun from both inside and outside the pocket.’ Copp, Fields of Fire, 241.

71. Graves, South Albertas, 143.

72. First Cdn Army Intelligence Summary Number 50, Part II dated 17 August 1944, War Diary First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944.

73. First Cdn Army Intelligence Summary Number 50, Part II dated 18 August 1944, War Diary First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944.

74. Minutes of the Morning Joint Conference 0830 hrs 19 August 1944, War diary, First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944 App. 48.

75. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number [illegible] Based on infm up to 2200 hrs 18 Aug 44. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 Aug 1944, App. 6.

76. Ops Log 19 August, serial 9, War Diary, Main HQ First Canadian Army, 1–31 August 1944.

77. First Cdn Army Intelligence Summary Number 51, Part II dated 19 August 1944, War Diary First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944.

78. Ibid.

79. The 10 Cdn Inf Bde war diary states that the brigade was to seize and hold Chambois. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug.

80. War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1–31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug.

81. This included his Regimental HQ of four tanks, recce troop, B Sqn and 4 M-10 self propelled anti-tank guns Copp, Fields of Fire, 240.

82. Ibid.

83. The 2nd Tactical Air Force claimed 124 tanks destroyed and 96 damaged and 1,159 transport vehicles destroyed with a further 1,724 damaged. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 257. A detailed examination of the impact of fighter and fighter bomber attacks on German vehicles during the Falaise Gap timeframe was conducted by No. 2 Operational Research Section of 21st Army Group. Their report is available in Chapter 3 of Montgomery’s Scientist. Terry Copp, ed., Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe, The Work of No. 2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945. Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament studies, 2000.

84. In 2 Cdn Corps each division was responsible for developing and the control of one two-way traffic circuit between its administration and forward elements. Corps was responsible for the development and control of an additional route to be used primarily for operational moves. Memorandum, Control and Naming of Routes 13 Aug 44 Main Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944, App. 18.

85. Rollefson, Green Route Up, 34.

86. A shuttle system, similar to the one used on Hill 195, was again employed to bring the supplies into St Lambert. The A-1 Echelon brought the supplies to Hill 117. The supplies were then configured into smaller loads, transferred to the decks of the crusader tanks of the SAR antiaircraft troop and taken to the forward positions. A back route was found into St Lambert through farm lanes to Currie’s headquarters where, one by one, each of Currie’s tanks could pull back to refuel and re-ammunition. Graves, South Albertas, 146.

87. Rooster was the codename for St Lambert. Ops Log 19 August, serial 7. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, War Diary, South Alberta Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug.

88. Graves, South Albertas, 146.

89. Wotherspoon claims that he sent the Poles on to Chambois when he realized that any advance beyond St Lambert would result in his forces being cut off by the tide of advancing Germans. There are a couple of messages recorded in the 10 Cdn Inf Bde ops log for 19 August which could be interpreted to support this claim. Serial 12 at 1230 hrs orders the SAR to push on to Chambois, Serial 14 at 1300 hrs Friends on left [Poles] going straight to Cock. 29 Recce making left flank attack to cut road at cock and a message recorded at 1500 hrs which states ‘Liaise with friends and have friends take care of COCK [Chambois]. Remain firm at Rooster [St Lambert].’ Wotherspoon, Gordon Dorwood de Salaberry, ‘Interview for Black Yesterdays by Bill Wiley’ (interview, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada Museum, Hamilton, 25 September 1986).

90. The detachment came from the Linc & Welld Regt, consisting of C Coy plus one platoon from D Coy and C Coy from the A&SH of C. See the war diaries for the Linc & Welld R and A&SH of C entries for 19 August 1944.

91. The fighting in St Lambert-sur-Dives would last three days. The commander of the Canadian forces in the town was Major David Currie. Currie would win the Victoria Cross, the first award of its kind to be won by a Canadian in North-West Europe. The citation for the award was written by Lt Col John Proctor who states that he had to write the narrative a number of times before it was finally accepted. War Diary, the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug. Hayes, The Lincs, 38.

92. The timings of these conversations conflict with the O group timings. It is possible that the telephone conversations were recorded in actual time while the war diary timings are recorded as B time. As already noted there is a one hour difference between the two. Memorandum, Summary of Conversations with Comd 2 Cdn Corps and Chief of Staff 21 Army Grp, dated 19 Aug 44. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army – General Staff, 1–31 August 1944, App. 74.

93. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug; Stacey, Victory Campaign, 260.

94. Hand written orders, Summary GOC’s O Grp subsequent intrs received from Comd 2 Cdn Corps. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1–31 August 1944, App. 23.

95. Ibid.

96. This move was dependent on 6 Cdn Inf Bde relieving 9 Cdn Inf Bde, which was located around Beaumais. War Diary, 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug.

97. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug.

98. Reynolds, Steel Inferno, 273–4.

99. Its commander seemed more interested in the liberation of Paris and did not want to get embroiled in a battle around Chambois from which he could not extricate himself. Ops Log 19 August, serial 109, War Diary, HQ 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

100. The five-day delay in Moncel arriving at 4 Cdn Armd Bde had not been satisfactorily explained. Moncel claimed that he was not aware that he had been pre-selected to take over the brigade if it required a new commander. Moncel also stated that he was told in the morning and by noon he was at the brigade and in his letter to Dr Roy states that the date was 17 August but this is incorrect. Letter Lieutenant General R Moncel to Reg Roy dated 18 May 1981. All references to his taking command state that it happened on 19 August. See W.D. 22 Cdn Armd Reg, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 August. A message dated 16 1320 B from Main HQ First Cdn Army stated that Moncel was to be appointed acting Brigadier with effective date 15 Aug. The appointment was recommended by Kitching and approved by Simonds. 1st Canadian Army, Message [Appointment of Lt Col Moncel to acting Brig], 16 Aug 44. Crerar Papers MG 30, E 157 Vol. 3, File 958C.009 (D178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vols I & II, Higher Command – Canadian Army Period 29 May 44 to 22 Dec 44. The war diary entry for 2 Cdn Corps for 17 August stated that Moncel was to take over command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde and that he was to be replaced by Lt Col Rothschild the BM of 2 Cdn Armd Bde. War Diary, General Staff – 2 Cdn Corps, 1–31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug.

101. Moncel was not happy with the deployment of the Lake Superior Regt and began by moving a company out to each armoured regiment. He also made sure that each armoured regiment had an anti-tank troop and that communications were in good order within the brigade. Moncel, Letter [Comments on Draft Chapter]. Reginald Roy Special Collection, University of Victoria.

102. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug.

103. Since the SAR/Argyll battlegroup was not scheduled to be relieved until 20 August the 10 Cdn Inf Bde portion of this plan would have had to be carried out by the Alg R and those elements of the Linc & Welld R that had been relieved at Trun. This could explain in part why these infantry battalions were not committed to the fight at St Lambert. Ibid.

104. 4 Cdn Armd Div Sitrep 44 for period 191200B to 192400B. Ops Log 19 August, serial 14, War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

105. Cassidy, Warpath, 136.

106. German commanders had gained considerable experience on the Russian Front with breaking out of encirclements. They had developed an effective technique for this complex operation in Russia. The weakest point of the encirclement was selected. The point was then attacked from inside the Pocket by the trapped troops and from outside the Pocket by relief formations. Once a gap was opened, strong forces were used to hold the gap open to allow the trapped forces to escape. Graves, South Albertas, 151.

107. Copp, Fields of Fire, 247.

108. AHQ Report No. 50, M 279; Stacey, Victory Campaign, 262.

109. Meyer, The History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 199–200.

110. Graves, South Albertas, 154–158. Donald Graves provides a detailed account and analysis of the fighting in and around St Lambert and in particular the actions of the SAR in South Albertas. See pp. 128–176.

111. Ops Log 20 August, serial 7, War Diary, 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

112. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug.

113. War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug.

114. Copp, Fields of Fire, 249.

115. Ibid.

116. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug.

117. AHQ Report No. 50, M 282.

118. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 262.

119. Ops Log 21 August, serial 11, War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps-G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

120. The Poles were disposed in three main groups: one group on Hill 240, a mile east of Ecorches; a second group on the dominant feature above Coudehard formed by the hills 252 and 262; and a third, north of Chambois. Ops Log 20 August, serial 21, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

121. War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug; Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 280–81.

122. Ops Log 20 August, serial 65. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

123. Ops Log 20 August serial 40, War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

124. Ops Log 20 August, serial 80, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

125. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug.

126. Their inaction left the remnants of B Sqn SAR to fight it out alone for another night. During the course of that fighting, the Germans infiltrated their position. Lacking infantry support, the squadron commander decided to withdraw by any means possible with his few remaining tanks. This vital position was abandoned until the Hussars and Highland Light Infantry arrived the next morning. Graves, South Albertas, 169.

127. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 204–5.

128. This brigade plus 6 Cdn Armd Regt (1 Cdn Hussars) were then placed under command 10 Cdn Inf Bde. Both orders were effective only until 0800 hrs 21 August. Events would force the extension of these secondments. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug.

129. See the war diaries of 22 and 28 Canadian Armoured Regiments for 20 August.

130. Ops Log 20 August, serials 106, 107 and 137, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

131. Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General’s Foot Guards, 120.

132. The disorganized nature of the fighting that day was reflected in the disposition reported for the regiments. The GGFG were at Pt 239, the CGG at Pt 147 and moving to the Polish position at Pt 262 north with the assistance of the BCR. The regiments of 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 9 Cdn Inf Bde and 2 Cdn Armd Bde were scattered throughout the Trun–Champeaux–Pt 262–Chambois area. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug.

133. 4 Cdn Armd Div SITREP 46 201400B to 202400B, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, App36.

134. The BCR was originally tasked with leading the attack to relieve the Poles at Pt 262. However, their commanding officer Lt Col Parish became lost returning from the brigade orders group. No. 1 Sqn was the lead squadron for the CGG for any possible action received at the orders group. The standard operating procedure within the regiment was to have the OC of the lead squadron at the regimental HQ halftrack when the regimental CO was away at a brigade orders group. On his return Smith explained that the BCR were to attack at first light to relieve the Poles. Since Parish could not be found the task of leading the advance was given to the CGG. At 0633 hrs the CGG were issued a warning order to be prepared to take over the task of leading the advance to relieve the Poles. At 0335 hrs the initial queries for sunray 28CAR were sent. Parish reported on the net at 0707 hrs and was notified of the switch in tasks between the two regiments. Ops Log 21 Aug serials 4–9. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

135. Much of the German transport at this point in the war was by horse. Salvage teams working after the battle pulled over 200 horse carcasses from the Dives River alone. 21 Army Group, The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group, 51; Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 282.

136. At 0815 hrs the harbour area of the GGFG was attacked by a German mobile column proceeding eastwards. B Company LSR were caught preparing breakfast and had to scramble to return fire. The security that harbouring offered was amply illustrated as the GGFG tanks responded very quickly. The fight raged for an hour and a quarter before the attack was repulsed. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), 1–31 August 1944, entry 21 Aug.

137. Ops Log 21 August serial 37, War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Corps – G Branch Main, 1–31 August 1944.

138. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 282–283.

139. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1–31 August 1944, entry 21 Aug.

140. The 3rd Div units assigned to take over St Lambert had not completed that task by nightfall, which forced the SAR to remain in St Lambert another night. The regiment finally started pulling out at 0900 hrs on 22 August. By the time the SAR were officially relieved from their positions around St Lambert, the Regiment estimated that it had captured 7,000 prisoners, had killed 2,000 men and wounded another 3,000. War Diary, South Alberta Regiment, 1–31 August 1944, entry 21 Aug.

141. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 313.

142. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 21 Aug.

143. Notes by Lt Col Proctor. It should be noted that 90 per cent of battle casualties occur in the rifle companies and armoured regiments. When an infantry battalion dropped below 85 per cent the companies were on average operating with less than a hundred men. When the other manpower requirements such as LOB are taken into consideration, a high proportion of which must come from the rifle companies, it was not uncommon for a unit showing a strength of 75 per cent to go into battle with rifle companies averaging thirty-five to forty men. ‘Battle Casualties & Unit Strength When under 85%’, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944. See Appendix 15.

144. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div – AA&QMG, 1–31 August 1944, entry 21 Aug.

145. Blumenson, Battle of the Generals, 263.

146. Ibid., 262.

147. Ibid., 262

148. Flint Whitlock, ‘Imperfect Victory at Falaise’, World War II, Issue 12, No. 1 (1997), 26–33.

149. Martin Blumenson, The Battle of the Generals (New York: Morrow, 1993), 268–9.

150. Minutes of the Morning Joint Conference 0830 hrs 20 August 1944, War diary, First Cdn Army, 1–31 August 1944 App. 25.

151. The Sherbrooke Fusiliers were assigned Pt 259 and reached their objective at 2010 hrs that night. The 1st Hussars were ordered to take over from the SAR in St Lambert by 2000 hrs 20 August. By the morning of 21 August, they were reporting their location as in the general area of Bois de Courcy and did not report themselves in position until 0900 hrs. At 0745 hrs 21 August, the Fort Garry Horse reported themselves on their objective at Pt 258 and reported everything quiet. Ops Log 20 August page 6. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

152. Hayes, The Lincs, 40.

153. Copp, Fields of Fire, 248.

154. Ops Log 20 Aug, page 2, War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

155. Ops Log 20 August, page 5. War Diary, HQ 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1–31 August 1944.

156. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 205.

157. Numbers were taken from the war diary strength returns on 5, 12, 19 and 26 August for both officer and OR strengths from the respective war diaries.

158. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1–31 August 1944, entry 22 Aug.

159. Ibid.

160. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 299.

161. Interview Cpl Stu Johns Canadian Grenadier Guards with the author, 29 August 2004.

Chapter 10: The New Legacy

1. Richard A. Gabriel. Great Captains of Antiquity (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 5.

2. Gabriel, Great Captains of Antiquity, 214–15.

3. Gabriel, Great Captains of Antiquity, 215.

4. Richard E. Simpkin, Human Factors in Mechanized Warfare (New York: Brassey’s Publishers Limited, 1983), xiii.

5. Ibid., xiv

6. James Lucas, Battlegroup! German Kampfgruppe Action of World War Two (London: Arms & Armour, 1993), 7.

7. Jarymowycz, The Quest for Operational Maneuvre in the Normandy Campaign, 219

8. McAndrew, Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily – 1943, 145

9. William J. McAndrew, ‘Operational Art and the Northwest European Theatre’, Canadian Defence Quarterly 21, no. 3 (December 1991), 24.

10. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 275.

11. Ibid.

12. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 208.

13. Message, 1 Cdn Corps Message 96, [Senior Appointments], 021700A Sep 44, Stuart From Burns, Crerar Papers, MG 30 Series E157 Vol. 3, file 958.009 (D 178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vols I & II Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 55 to 22 Dec 44.

14. Memorandum from Crerar to C. of S. CMHQ dated 4 Oct 44. MG 30 Series E157 Vol. 3, file 958.009 (D 178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vols I & II Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 55 to 22 Dec 44.

15. Message Main HQ First Cdn Army to C45 211900B Aug 44, for Stuart from Crerar. [Removal of Kitching, Appointment of Foster], E157 Vol. 3, file 958.009 (D 178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vols I & II Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 55 to 22 Dec 44.

16. Letter GOC-in-C 5-0-3 Tac Hq First Cdn Army, 29 Aug 44, Crerar to Simonds, E157 Vol. 3, file 958.009 (D 178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vols I & II Higher Command – Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 May 55 to 22 Dec 44.

17. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 316.