On the morning of 16 August, the area known as the Falaise Pocket was 35 miles deep and approximately 12 miles wide. Elements of twenty-one German divisions, comprising approximately 200,000 men, were in danger of encirclement but Field Marshal von Kluge had finally given the approval for a formal retreat to the Seine.1 The Germans concluded that they needed three nights to get the westernmost forces across the Orne River and one more night to complete the withdrawal behind the Dives River. The outcome of the operation to rescue the remaining German forces in Normandy depended, therefore, on their ability to keep the shoulders of the Gap open for four days.2
Despite the late order to withdraw, many German troops had already left the area. Senior German officers had seen what was coming and had been quietly evacuating troops to the east for some time. Earlier, von Kluge had authorized the withdrawal of ‘administrative troops and motorized transport’. German commanders stretched the interpretation of this directive to include complete formations or units. The 12 SS Pz Div, for example, retained only its headquarters and a battle group of 500 men inside the Pocket. Echelon personnel and non-combatworthy troops (gunners without guns, tankers without tanks) – a total according to Hubert Meyer of nearly 12,000 men – were sent to safety well before permission to retreat was granted. Other German formations did the same.3 Despite the terrible pounding by Allied aircraft, nearly 55,000 Germans, many without their transport, managed to escape from the Pocket in the first three days of the withdrawal.4
Field Marshal von Kluge directed the Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army to withdraw without delay to the sector of the Dives and the line Morteaux–Trun–Gacé–Laigle. The withdrawal was to be carried out under the overall command of the Seventh Army. Pz Grp Eberbach was to cover the withdrawal to Argentan and Gacé and, after the fulfilment of these orders, was to disband. Once extracted from the Pocket, Seventh Army was to take over control of the sector from the sea to Laigle inclusive and Eberbach was to assume command of Fifth Panzer Army and control the sector from Laigle to Paris. All the troops in these areas were to be brought under command of the Army in their respective zone.5
On the morning of 16 August, Simonds changed the tasks of his divisions. There was to be no set-piece plan of attack; in fact, there were to be no further ‘formal’ or detailed plans issued. Instead, he stated that he would now operate by telling his divisional commanders what he intended to do and what action he wanted them to take. Simonds’ intent for 2 Cdn Corps on 16 August was as follows:
• With two infantry divisions, form a firm base enclosing Falaise until relieved by British Second Army.
• With two armoured divisions, exploit to capture Trun and the high ground dominating it in the southwest and northeast.
• Prepare to advance in a northeast direction on Lisieux.6
The 2 Cdn Inf Div was given the assignment of taking Falaise. The division would then hold the town and thrust further down the road to Argentan or move east behind the armour. The 3 Cdn Inf Div was to widen its front to take over the area currently held by the 4 Cdn Armd Div and was to be prepared to advance on the axis Sassy–St Pierre-sur-Dives–Lisieux when ordered. The 2 Cdn Armd Bde was to go into Corps reserve.7
The 4 Cdn Armd Div was to advance on the axis Eraines–Pt 250–Pt 252 and position itself to dominate the high ground at Moutabard. The division was to recce in the direction of Trun and make contact with the Polish Armd Div in Trun. 4 Cdn Armd Div was to be prepared to advance northeast from Moutabard when ordered. The Polish Armd Div was to advance on the axis Maizières–Jort–Pt 259 and was to position itself to dominate the area from Pt 226 to Pt 258 and Trun. This move would establish a blocking position for any possible German escape.8 This strategy by Simonds was designed to set up a doublelayered defensive line along the Dives River with the 4 Cdn Armd Div to the west of the river and the 1 Pol Armd Div to the east of the River.
These new orders revised the intentions outlined by Simonds the previous evening as well as the more recent plans by Kitching later that same evening to seize Versainville and Falaise. The 4 Cdn Armd Div was still oriented physically and mentally to take Falaise and much planning had been undertaken during the evening and early hours of 16 August towards the anticipated attack on the town. The new orders were now directing the armoured division away from Falaise and south, into the centre of the Gap, to close the German escape route and to deny them the bridges, river crossings and road junctions necessary for their escape. Once this task was accomplished, the Germans would be forced to move in small groups and their ability to conduct a controlled and fighting withdrawal would be severely hampered.9
The day of 16 August was used to rebuild the division. Halpenny concentrated on organizing his brigade headquarters before the next attack.10 Proctor ordered all repaired, LOB tanks and tanks in the 25 Armd Delivery Regt to report to the armoured brigade in an attempt to rebuild the armour strength of the regiments. The Grenadier Guards, whose tank strength had been reduced to twenty-three Sherman tanks, were grateful for the chance to obtain replacements but only ten were available. The Foot Guards could obtain only enough tanks and crews to operate with two squadrons of twelve tanks each.11 The 4 Cdn Armd Bde had a fighting strength of just seventy-two tanks to begin the next series of operations: one-third the tank strength it should have had.12
Now that the area north of the Laison River was in Allied hands, Rear HQ had to cope with the inevitable job of dealing with the division’s dead. The B Echelon troops were tasked to provide work parties to clear the bodies from the tanks and to bury the dead of Worthington Force. Late in the evening of 16 August, the echelons crossed the Laison River and harboured near Rouvres. In the early hours of 17 August, the A echelon moved forward to provide an immediate delivery of the day’s rations prior to the advance south.13
At 1700 hrs 16 August the division’s orders changed again! Kitching issued orders for a new operation called ‘Smash’. Operation Smash was the one operation where Kitching had a modicum of latitude to plan and execute how he wanted to achieve his objective, yet details of the operation have been poorly described and understood. The intention of Op Smash was for 4 Cdn Armd Bde to capture Trun and firm up on the high ground north and northeast of the town. The ops logs of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde refer to the objective as ‘Antarctic’ which, according to the map traces found in the war diaries, was Pt 147 near Louvières-en-Auge.14
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde would seize a bridgehead over the Ante and Train Rivers. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde would pass through and advance on the main division objective – Trun.15 Kitching specified two routes for the advance: Route I (codenamed Irish) through Damblainville and Route II (codenamed Japan) through Morteaux-Couliboeuf.16 There would be three phases to the attack. The first phase was the capture of the dominating, partly-wooded hill overlooking Damblainville; the second was the seizure of the village itself; and the third was the securing of yet another dominating feature located 1,800m south of the river.
A reconnaissance of the Dives River for crossings by 9 Field Sqn engineers resulted in a recommendation that the Damblainville crossing be used since a bridge was found intact and a reconnaissance beyond the town found no Germans for at least another mile. The decision was made to go with Route I. The division would advance straight south to cut the main Falaise–Trun road and then southeast to Trun.17
The axis of advance to Antarctic for the Advance Guard was through Damblainville to Ners then southeast along the Falaise–Trun road to Fontaineles-Bassets where the Advance Guard would cross the Dives River above Trun and advance to Pt 147.18 No specific axis of advance was identified for Route II beyond Coulibouef. The orders stipulated that the route would either be crosscountry or through Trun to the final objectives. The route was to be picked by the commander of the Advance Guard.19
The final objectives for the three armoured regiments lay northeast of Trun along the Trun–Vimoutiers road. The BCR was assigned Pt 147 on the south side of the highway and the Foot Guards and Grenadier Guards were assigned the high ground between Louvières-en-Auge and Hordouseaux on the north side of the highway. The infantry of 10 Cdn Inf Bde were tasked to follow behind the armoured regiments (but no specific objectives were found in the available sources).20
Waiting for the outcome of the 2 Cdn Inf Div attack on Falaise delayed the deployment of 4 Cdn Armd Div in preparation for Op Smash. If 2 Cdn Inf Div captured Falaise early enough, 4 Cdn Armd Div was to use the road network through Falaise to facilitate its attack towards Trun. The only 4 Cdn Armd Div units that were authorized to move were those tasked with securing the river crossing for the two proposed Op Smash routes.
The Argylls were directed to move at once from Perrières to the high wooded hill north of Damblainville and to be ready to press on into the village and cross the Ante.21 Mounted in armoured half-tracks and accompanied by C Sqn SAR, the battalion moved southeast from Perrières at 1800 hours and reached their hill without being opposed. Patrols reported Damblainville to be undefended, although enemy tanks were passing through it.
Jefferson had also sent a small mobile force from the Algonquin Regiment from Tassily to capture the single-track bridge across the Dives at Couliboeuf, in accordance with Kitching’s plan, to ensure that route II was available should the attack to the south of Damblainville fail.22 The Algonquins found the bridge intact and seized it unopposed.23 Once it was clear that the Falaise route was not possible, the division began to move towards Route I.
The current narratives of the Normandy campaign fail to appreciate the significant amount of change that the senior leadership of 4 Cdn Armd Div had to deal with on 16 and 17 August. The number of O Groups as recorded in the Lake Superior Regiment War Diary highlights this fact. The first brigade O Group occurred at 0030 hrs 16 August with orders for the renewed attack to take Falaise. Keane conducted his own O Group and the companies of the battalion reported themselves ready in position for the anticipated attack by early morning.
The next Brigade O Group was at 1400 hrs and detailed Simonds’ new intent, which was the move south and the link-up with the Americans. The objective for the division was now to dominate the high ground from Pt 241 to Pt 252 at Moutabard along the Falaise–Argentan road. Associated with these orders was the task of linking up with the Pol Armd Div at Trun.
Kitching held his third division O Group in less than twenty hours at 1700 hrs where the details of Op Smash were briefed and the task of capturing the bridgehead at Damblainville and the alternative bridge at Couliboeuf were outlined.24 At 2000 hrs, Keane was once again called to a Brigade O Group where Op Smash was briefed. Keane’s O Group for this third change in orders took place at 0330 hrs 17 August.25
Advanced units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde started moving at 0100 hrs with the rest of the brigade moving at 0600 hrs. The armoured brigade began its move at 0900 hrs. Difficulty in moving forward developed early as elements of 3 Cdn Inf Div and other formations cut into the route designated exclusively for the armoured division.26 The traffic congestion backed up the division columns and provided easy targets for German artillery and the Luftwaffe which made a rare but successful daylight attack.
At 0730 hrs, the combined force of Argylls and SAR descended quickly on Damblainville and captured the town without much trouble. The town, riverbank and bridge over the Ante River were all seized and consolidated within an hour. Around noon, A and C Squadrons of the SAR and the Algonquins moved through the town toward the next objective.
The leading infantry managed to advance about 1,000 yards south of the bridge before they were pinned down by accurate German machine gun, artillery and anti-tank fire. Accurate mortar and artillery also fell on the town. Elements in the column behind the town tried to deploy off the road and disperse but the town provided little room for manoeuvre and casualties mounted. The Algonquin Regiment was ordered to firm up in Damblainville alongside the Argylls.27
The advanced guard of the armoured brigade passed through and tried several times to push on to the heights.28 The Germans let the personnel carriers move freely but as soon as the tanks moved they came under immediate German fire.29 It was now clear to Kitching that the Germans were determined to resist any attempt to move on Trun from the Damblainville bridgehead and that any advance in that direction would require a major attack.
At 1130 hrs, Kitching issued a warning order to change the axis of advance to Route II and at 1203 hrs, the Grenadier Guards were ordered to move to ‘Japan and proceed to Antarctic’.30 The 4 Cdn Armd Bde would lead the attack. Changing the direction of an armoured division’s attack while part of the division is engaged in battle is a formidable assignment. This task was made even harder by the lack of good roads in the area. The change to Route II was a true test of the leadership, flexibility and resourcefulness of the combat troops and those of Wigle, Proctor and the division’s transport.31
Fortunately, the armoured regiments had not been committed at Damblainville but were grouped behind the hill north of the city. The tactical situation meant that the Grenadier Guards and Foot Guards would have to proceed without their normal complement of supporting infantry from the Lake Superior Regiment, since the latter had already been committed at Damblainville. There was a large risk to the armoured regiments, particularly with the approach of night, but Kitching was prepared to accept the risk.32
The division unscrambled itself and moved to the new bridge, ‘if not in an orderly fashion, at least in control’.33 Wigle passed new instructions to the armoured brigade and then proceeded to the bridge at Couliboeuf where he personally briefed the regiment commanders on the general situation as they passed through. Major M.R. Ware (GSO II) and Captain J.A. Berthiaume (GSO III Ops) controlled the disengagement at Damblainville and the re-routing of the armoured brigade to Couliboeuf. The vanguard was ordered to keep the Germans engaged at Damblainville while the remainder of the forces were withdrawn and re-routed through Couliboeuf to Pt 118 above Trun.34 The Damblainville position would be taken over by 9 Cdn Inf Bde.
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered to disengage at Damblainville, follow the armour across the river and protect the division’s right flank (i.e. the northern bank of the Dives River) from Morteaux-Couliboeuf to the area Fontaine-les-Bassets. The infantry brigade was able to disengage under cover of artillery fire from the 15 Cdn Field Regt.35 The proposed disposition of the infantry brigade had the Lincs on Pt 65, Argylls on Pt 64 and Algonquins Pt 78, which placed the infantry brigade astride the high ground to Trun along the route of the Dives River.36 The Lincoln & Welland Regiment was subsequently ordered to Pt 104, located approximately 4.5 miles northwest of Trun.
By 1600 hours, the Grenadier Guards were across the bridge, followed closely by the Foot Guards. Once across the river, the tanks fanned out to the south and southeast. By early evening, the Grenadier Guards had captured Pt 118 on the outskirts of Trun but, having no infantry, the regiment arranged their tanks in an all-round defence with all possible personnel in front on foot patrols.
The remainder of the brigade also made good progress. The Foot Guards consolidated on the hill 1.5 miles northwest of Le Marais-la-Chapelle, while the BCR harboured in Les Moutiers-en-Auge for the night.37 Another regimental commander was lost when the commanding officer of the Foot Guards, Major H.F. Baker, who had just taken over command the previous day, was seriously wounded when conducting a forward reconnaissance. Command of the regiment went to Captain G.T. Baylay.38
The tactical gamble to send the armoured regiments without infantry support had succeeded. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde was now established in the German rear area without their knowledge. The divisions’ echelon forces were able to retain contact with the regiments and were able to come forward on demand to resupply the tanks.
Once Kitching made the decision to switch from Route I to Route II, the issue of the axis of advance had to be decided upon. Using Route II meant that the division would be on the opposite side of the Dives River from that originally planned and in the area of operations allocated to the Pol Armd Div. The 4 Cdn Armd Div war diary records a ‘hasty’ conference with Simonds at this point.
Most of the current narratives state that the conference was to seek Simonds’ approval for the switch to Couliboeuf.39 Since this route was already part of the approved Op Smash plan, the more likely scenario is that Kitching was trying to establish the new boundaries between the two divisions and to decide whether new objectives had to be identified for his armoured regiments. The Pol Armd Div had been ordered to take Norrey-en-Auge and Hills 159 and 259. The two divisions would now be travelling beside each other with no physical boundaries between them as before. In addition, the 4 Cdn Armd Div objectives were initially deeper in enemy territory. This situation changed at 1750 hrs, however, when Simonds ordered the Pol Armd Div to capture Chambois.40
The 4 Cdn Armd Div would no longer have the benefit of travelling over a main highway. The axis of advance had the Dives River on the right and the Pol Armd Div on the left. The frontage provided about 2,000 yards of manoeuvre room but the Canadian armour would now have to travel over secondary roads through terrain that had plenty of woods, rolling hills and hamlets which provided excellent concealment for the Germans along the line of advance. Flanking the advance route were the hills on the western side of the Dives, which were still in German hands. In addition, the tanks would have to traverse two additional water obstacles that bisected the line of advance.
By the afternoon of 17 August, Montgomery was quite unhappy with the rate of the advance and at 1445 hrs new orders were issued to First Cdn Army.
By direction C-in-C [Montgomery] 1 Pol Armd Div has been ordered to thrust on Chambois. Essential to push on greatest possible speed regardless of losses in order to close the gap. 4 Cdn Armd Div continuing thrust on Trun.41
This is the first reference to any move of 2 Cdn Corps units to Chambois. As late as 1837 hrs, 4 Cdn Armd Div was reporting that it intended to establish a firm base in the area Norrey-en-Auge to Mandeville.42 At 1945 hrs, Simonds issued specific orders for 4 Cdn Armd Div to capture Trun that night.43 In order to facilitate the task, 3 Cdn Inf Div was ordered to relieve the units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde, still in the Morteaux-Couliboeuf area. This move would allow 4 Cdn Armd Div to concentrate and re-form itself.
The 4 Cdn Armd Bde Operations Log for 17 August revealed a much firmer control of the brigade by Halpenny. The rapid advance, however, had carried the armoured regiments beyond radio range of the armoured brigade headquarters.44 Communications were further hampered by the hills and valleys of the Trun area. The division had been ordered to capture Trun and was also ordered to send one armoured regiment to cut the Trun–Vimoutiers road.45 Kitching ordered Trun captured during the night and ordered 4 Cdn Armd Bde to execute the attack.46 Without infantry, however, the attack could not proceed so the armoured regiments waited for the arrival of the Lake Superior Regiment.
On the German side, 277 and 271 Inf Div and elements of 12 SS Pz Div were quickly disintegrating. The 85 Inf Div was being pushed out of the Pocket by the Allied advance, which meant that the remaining elements of 12 SS Pz Div had to withstand the brunt of the Canadian and Polish advance. The fate of the German armies depended on their ability to hold open the 4.5-mile stretch between Trun and Chambois. Elements of 21 Pz Div, Kampfgruppen Luck and Rauch, were subordinated to 12 SS Pz Div and had orders to launch counter-attacks with the aim of holding open an east-west passage through the road crossing at Trun. Kampfgruppe Luck would bear the brunt of the 4 Cdn Armd Div attack against Trun.47
On 18 August, Field Marshal Model relieved von Kluge and took over command of the German forces in the West.48 Model formulated a plan for the extraction of the remaining Germans forces. His first task was to re-establish a coherent front. The 2 SS Pz Corps with the remnants of 2, 19, and 21 Pz Div along with 12 SS Pz Div was to hold the northern portion of the escape corridor in an attempt to prevent the 2 Cdn Corps from advancing over the Dives River and was ordered to recapture the ground already lost in the Morteaux-Couliboeuf area. The southern wall of the corridor was to be held by the 47 Pz Corps with the 2 and 116 Pz Divs.49 The 2 SS Pz Corps was ordered to position itself near Vimoutiers as soon as possible. The orders were for the armoured formations to get away first, leaving the infantry divisions to the last.50
Inside the Pocket, the remnants of the once powerful Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army were trying to extricate themselves as best they could.51 The major road along the valley of the Dives led through Trun, St Lambert-sur-Dives and Chambois. To the south, the highway from Falaise, southeastward to Argentan, was under constant shellfire.52 Numerous smaller roads were in between. German tanks and half-tracked vehicles were not road-bound and could use the open fields to escape. Model’s problem was compounded by the fact that the skies were clear, the Allied air forces were on the prowl and he had run out of time.53
Simonds’ intent for operations on 18 August was to link up with the Americans and hold the Dives River line.54 At first light, No. 1 and No. 3 Squadrons of the Grenadier Guards moved southeast to occupy the area around Pt 147 and reported themselves on Antarctic, their objective, at 0741 hrs.55 They made their presence known to the unsuspecting retreating German columns by engaging targets. At 1000 hrs, radio contact was re-established with brigade HQ. The BCR reported gaining contact with the Grenadier Guards at 1019 hrs but the BCR arrived short of fuel, ammunition and water. At 1045 hrs, an immediate request was sent for re-supply and their A echelon came forward and successfully resupplied the regiment.56
The Lake Superior Regiment’s C Coy and the BCR reached Antarctic with little opposition and then pushed boldly into Trun but were forced to withdraw temporarily when American aircraft bombed the town. Trun remained lightly held until the arrival of elements of 10 Cdn Inf Bde.57 In the meantime, the remaining armour swept eastwards and by 1200 hrs, occupied the dominating feature northwest of Le Ménil Girard. On arrival, the Foot Guards found the objective occupied by a motor battalion of the 1 Pol Armd Div. Liaison was established with the Pol Armd Div and the regiment deployed in fire positions commanding the Falaise–Trun and Trun–Vimoutiers roads.58
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde had made slow progress through the wooded hills southeast of Morteaux the previous evening. The Algonquin Regiment, with the support of B Sqn SAR, took their initial objective of Le Marais-la-Chapelle at 0700 hrs against light opposition. By 1000 hrs, the remainder of the brigade had established positions on the east side of the Dives River from Morteaux-Couliboeuf to Le Marais-la-Chapelle.59
In less than twelve hours, the division had executed an improvised advance over complex terrain into the heart of the gap. By early morning, the infantry of the Lake Superior Regiment had married up with their respective armoured regiments.60 The stage was now set for Kitching to solidify the division’s gains.
Late in the evening of 17 August, Kitching received instructions ordering him to get into position in the area Trun–Le Marais-la-Chapelle–Louvières-en-Auge.61 At 1000 hrs 18 August, Kitching held his O Group outlining his plan to firm up the occupation of the east bank of the Dives River from Morteaux-Couliboeuf to Trun. The three infantry battalions of the 10 Cdn Inf Bde would hold the east bank of the river with the armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Bde arrayed in depth behind the infantry on the high ground to the east in a counterattack role. Trun was to be occupied by the Lake Superior Regiment and one armoured regiment. The artillery was to concentrate in the area Montreuil-la-Cambe–Louvières-en-Auge.62
At 1400 hrs, a combined force from the Grenadier Guards and Lake Superior Regiment attacked south from their position on Pt 147 to cut off the approach to Trun from the southeast. The attack succeeded and the infantry went to ground while the tanks advanced to Trun from the south where they met members of the Argylls who informed them that they were in Trun. The Grenadier Guard tanks repositioned themselves on the rising ground 1,000 yards from the Trun crossroads and began to engage targets of opportunity across and up the valley.63 The BCR consolidated a strong position south of Hordouseaux.
The Lincoln & Welland Regiment advanced to relieve the Grenadier Guards in Trun with under command A Sqn SAR and supporting troops. The main column moved off at 1300 hrs and proceeded through Montreuil-la-Cambe, Louvières-en-Auge and into Trun. By 1500 hrs, the battalion, with the support of tanks and anti-tank guns, had turned the town into a Canadian strong point.64 German columns continued to head to the town, unaware that it was in Canadian hands and by evening more than 500 prisoners had been captured.
The 4 Cdn Armd Bde had now established itself in Trun astride the main road to Vimoutiers as directed by Simonds. This disposition strategically placed the brigade in a position to deal with any Germans who might attempt to escape northeast through Trun and any of the secondary roads to Vimoutiers.65 The 4 Cdn Armd Div was now arrayed in accordance with the disposition identified in Op Smash.
The operations on 17 and 18 August demonstrated the flexibility, professional competence and growing maturity of Kitching, his staff and the formations within 4 Cdn Armd Div. The professional manner in which the division switched to Route II once Kitching realized that further attempts to advance through Damblainville would be costly is a testament to the leaders and training of the staff members who were able to orchestrate the switch in such a manner that the armoured brigade could still continue the attack late into the day.
The 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack was not simply a mad dash for ground but a coherent advance where the echelon forces were able to advance and conduct resupply when called upon. The success of the advance is even more impressive when one considers that the armoured brigade and all three armoured regiments were commanded by people whose time in command was measured in days at best! This successful advance is indicative of a division that was being effectively commanded and controlled at all levels.
While the division was executing Kitching’s plans for the occupation of the Morteaux-Couliboeuf to Trun area Simonds summoned his four division commanders to an O Group at Kitching’s headquarters. Earlier in the day, Crerar had ordered Simonds to seal off the front from Trun to Chambois and, anticipating that the German forces in the Pocket would soon be destroyed, Simonds was also to carry out active reconnaissance to the northeast in the direction of Vimoutiers. Simonds’ plan was for 2 Cdn Div to mop up Falaise, for 3 Cdn Inf Div to take over the east bank of the Dives River from Morteaux-Couliboeuf to Trun, while 4 Cdn Armd Div advanced southeast from Trun on Chambois. The 1 Pol Armd Div was to advance southwest from the area of Les Champeaux to Chambois and link up with the US forces.66
Kitching was to carry out his part of this operation the next day, 19 August, as soon as the division had cleared the enemy from the area north and northwest of Trun. To undertake this clearing task, Simonds ordered that 4 Cdn Armd Bde and the Algonquin Regiment, which were moving in accordance with Kitching’s plan, ‘to deploy in an area about 2 miles north of it,’ on the axis Trun–Vimoutiers and away from the Trun–St Lambert line.67 Simonds’ orders entailed, as Kitching later recalled, changes to the orders Kitching had already issued to the two brigades that morning and a significant redeployment of his forces away from the Dives River line and the anticipated German breakout point.68
This constant change in plans was frustrating Kitching and he knew this situation was having a detrimental effect on his division. Two days earlier, the division plan had been changed three times in the span of twenty-four hours. Once again, he had to countermand orders that he had already issued. He wrote in his memoirs that changes in a plan become more exhausting as they go down the chain of command and, as a result, his men must have wondered why he couldn’t make up his mind.69
Opinions vary as to whether the splitting of the division was to counter an anticipated German attack from outside the Trun–Vimoutiers area or whether this was Simonds’ attempt to pre-position the division for the drive to Lisieux as per the direction he issued on 16 August.70 These new moves on the part of the units of the armoured brigade were achieved with little enemy opposition but the disposition of the division’s units was of great concern to Kitching. The greater part of his division, including the three armoured regiments of the armoured brigade, the Lake Superior Regiment and Algonquin Regiment were sent off to the northeast away from the Trun–St Lambert–Moissy line. This left the three remaining units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde (the Lincs, Argylls and SAR) to carry out Simonds’ orders to occupy the line of the Dives River south of Trun, a distance of some 4.5 miles.71
Moving 4 Cdn Armd Bde away from the Trun–Chambois line was accepting a considerable amount of operational risk. Simonds had to make critical assumptions about the combat capability of the German forces left in the Pocket in accepting this risk. Simonds must have felt confident, given his assessment of the tactical situation, in the risk involved in having the Dives River line held by minimum forces. The role of clearing the area north of the Trun–Vimoutiers road could have been assigned to 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 Cdn Armd Bde which would have allowed Kitching to use the entire resources of his division to seal the Dives River line.
Given the evolving tactical situation and the requirement to close all possible escape routes, it is odd that Simonds seemed to have placed a higher priority on clearing the Trun–Vimoutiers area over firmly sealing the Dives River line on 18 August. A consolidated and coordinated thrust by 4 Cdn Armd Div to Chambois on 18 August represented a course of action with a high probability of success in taking the town and cutting off the main roads and bridges along the Dives River. Simonds’ orders of 18 August caused many routes to remain open and available to the Germans.
Simonds’ actions suggest two possible conclusions: he thought that the majority of the German units had escaped and those left in the Pocket presented a marginal threat; or he felt that he had more time to accomplish the two tasks of clearing the area around Trun before he had to seal off the Dives River line. Simonds’ intent for operations on 19 August issued at 2140 hrs on 18 August would suggest the first conclusion is more probable.
On 17 Aug, 2 Pz, 2 SS Pz, Pz Lehr, 26 Pz and 116 Pz divisions were reported east of the Dives. 9 and 10 SS Pz were still in the gap and 1 SS Pz and 12 SS Pz were reported as ‘no evidence’ as to their location.72 The 17 August Intelligence Report concluded that ‘The enemy clearly intends to get out. He knows he is almost encircled and is trying to save what he can and take it over the SEINE.’ The intelligence picture for 18 August is indicative of the uncertainty of the German strength in the Pocket.
The mystery of the bag continues today. Is he out? Is he in? If he is in, why is the bag so small in size? What has been passing NORTH of the BOIS DE GOUFFERN? If he is out, why is there a bag at all or why a gap?
The Germans were described as ‘beaten troops fleeing the field’. A captured soldier from 9 SS Pz Div provided a detailed report of the escape plan and order of march for the escaping formations which proved to be completely accurate. His information allowed Canadian intelligence to identify all of the known German panzer divisions. A detailed review of the evidence surrounding 12 SS Pz Div concluded that the division as a fighting formation – ‘no longer exists’.73 The minutes of the Daily Joint Conference for 19 August indicated that three panzer divisions (1 SS, 9 SS, and 10 SS Pz Divs) were ‘still in the bag’.74
Insight into the mood at that time is provided by the 4 Cdn Armd Div Intelligence Summary for 2200 hrs 18 August which stated:
On both sides the pace has accelerated greatly during the past few days. As the enemy conc more and more on getting his armour out through the narrowing gap, so it becomes more difficult for him to maintain a steady withdrawal. As our pressure increased, time became the all important factor, and speed the enemy to order of the day. Today the speed has turned to haste, frantic haste, and the picture is one of disorganization.75
Simonds ordered 2 Cdn Corps to hold its present position and reorganize for the advance northeast.76
The Canadian intelligence report for 19 August was very dismissive of the combat capability of the forces remaining in the Pocket. It stated that for the Germans the battle for Normandy was lost and concluded that German intentions after ‘this decisive defeat’ were more political than military.77 Desperate food, ammunition and fuel shortages were highlighted. Even though panzer divisions were noted in the area of Vimoutiers it was concluded that even if they had fuel or the spirit to attack it was doubtful that they would.78 This intelligence information served poorly the Canadian commanders by establishing a false sense of security – dismissing the potential danger that still existed within the Pocket.
Since Simonds had specifically tasked 4 Cdn Armd Bde to move northeast in the direction of Vimoutiers, Kitching only had the units of the depleted 10 Cdn Inf Bde to advance southeast towards Chambois. This new task placed an additional burden on his already stretched resources.79 The SAR, less one squadron and plus one company from the Argylls, was given the task of taking Chambois.
Wotherspoon assigned the lead to Major D.V. Currie of C Squadron. At 1500 hrs, a depleted B Coy Argylls of approximately fifty-five men came under command of Currie. Rather than waiting for the next day, the combined group was ordered to seize and hold Chambois before last light.80 Currie’s squadron at this point was down to fifteen tanks. The battle group got underway at 1800 hrs and reached St Lambert-sur-Dives at dusk. Reports indicated that the town was strongly held by anti-tank guns and infantry. Currie was told, therefore, to wait until first light before clearing it. Wotherspoon decided to support Currie by moving to Hill 117 with the remaining assets of the regiment.81
By mid-afternoon of 18 August, Trun was secure and the units of 4 Cdn Armd Div were on or approaching all of their new objectives, but the Pol Armd Div had not yet captured Chambois. When Simonds met his division commanders for the second time that day at 1500 hrs, Maczek reported that the Koszutski battle group had ended up at Les Champeaux, 10 km north of Chambois. It was short of ammunition and fuel and Maczek had sent one of his infantry battalions to assist it. The Pol Armd Div recce regiment had reached the edge of Chambois but could not enter the town, which was under constant Allied air attack.82
By the end of the day, a strong blocking position had been established at Trun but the Argentan–Chambois–Vimoutiers highway (D113–D16) was still open, as were the secondary roads and lanes through St Lambert and Moissy. German units continued to pour through this gap in the Allied line but not without consequence. The weather was clear and, during the daylight hours, these roads were ravaged by the Allied tactical air force.83
The 4 Cdn Armd Div engineers were charged with opening up the long lines of communications and were specifically tasked with opening up three routes: two maintenance routes into the area along the line Les Moutiers-en-Auge across to Le Ménil Girard and one return route.84 The engineers were kept busy trying to clear the death and destruction along the many paths and roads to facilitate the movement of vehicles and maintenance columns.85 Despite the confused and scattered nature of the forces, the echelon forces were able to meet the calls for re-supply from the division’s fighting units. Re-supplying St Lambert became a difficult problem, given the nature of the fighting in and around the area but a system of back roads was found to keep the supplies moving into the town.86
The heaviest fighting on 19 August occurred in 10 Cdn Inf Bde’s sector where the Germans were attempting to break out en masse. By early morning, it was evident that the main German escape effort would be along the Dives River line Trun–St Lambert–Chambois. At 0635 hrs the 10 Cdn Inf Bde ops log reported a message from the SAR stating ‘attacking ROOSTER now’ as Currie’s composite force attacked the village of St Lambert. The force was able to clear one half of the town but was unable to go further because of the superior number of Germans. Currie decided to consolidate his gains and establish his lines near the centre of town.87
At noon, the SAR was ordered to push on to Chambois. At 1300 hrs, the SAR contacted the Polish forces to their left and coordinated a plan in which the Pol Armd Div would continue to Chambois while the SAR conducted a left flank attack to cut the road to Chambois by taking Pt 124. Wotherspoon sent B Sqn SAR to accomplish this task. The squadron would then be in a position to either support the Pol Armd Div at Chambois or interdict the Chambois–Mont Ormel road.88 An order from division to 10 Cdn Inf Bde stated that the SAR had to complete the attack today and, if necessary, another company was to be sent to help out in the attack. A subsequent message at 1500 hrs ordered the SAR to remain firm in St Lambert and let the Pol Armd Div deal with Chambois.89
Throughout the day, German infantry kept surging forward between Trun and Chambois. Currie asked for infantry reinforcements to help cope with the large number of prisoners that were coming into his PW cages. At 1400 hrs, a composite force of two companies of soldiers was sent from Trun to St Lambertsur-Dives to reinforce Currie’s force.90 The detachment reached St Lambert on foot and was integrated into the defences by 2200 hrs. Even with the additional reinforcements, Currie was forced to give up part of the village to tighten his defences.91
A telling indication of how the senior Canadian leadership was controlling the tactical battle exists in a summary of conversations between Simonds and the Chief of Staff, First Cdn Army, Brigadier C.C. Mann. The summary records the discussions between Mann and Simonds between 1040 and 1140 hrs 19 August. During the course of these conversations, Simonds stated that he was about to leave for a meeting with his divisional commanders but he did not have a clear idea as to how he should operate ‘during today and in the immediate future’. Mann endeavoured to obtain direction from Crerar or Montgomery. Mann stated that he had not been in touch with Montgomery but that, in his opinion, the instructions would direct 2 Cdn Corps to continue to close the Gap and keep it closed until Second British Army was able to take over the task.92 This evidence would suggest that Simonds was having difficulty deciding whether he would tackle his two tasks (closing the gap and pursuit) sequentially and concentrate his forces accordingly or whether he would deal with them concurrently and divide his forces according to the traits of the divisions (i.e., armoured division for the pursuit and the infantry divisions for the defence of the Dives River line).
Simonds conferred with his four divisional commanders at Kitching’s main headquarters east of Morteaux-Couliboeuf at 1100 hrs on 19 August. His orders stated that the encirclement must be complete – no Germans were to escape. Once this was complete, the Corps would face east and pursue the retreating Germans. These orders would suggest that Simonds was planning to deal with his two tasks sequentially. In order to complete the encirclement, 2 Cdn Inf Div was to take over the north portion of the 3 Cdn Div area along the line of the Dives River. This would allow the 3 Cdn Inf Div to strengthen its line and close all escape routes. The 4 Cdn Armd Div was to concentrate upon the area between Trun and Moissy on the Dives while the Pol Armd Div would be responsible for the area from Moissy to Chambois and Hill 262, a commanding height northeast of Chambois.93
The details of the 4 Cdn Armd Div orders demand closer scrutiny. The 9 Cdn Inf Bde was to relieve 10 Cdn Inf Bde in Trun during the night 19/20 August and in St Lambert-sur-Dives on 20 August. 8 Cdn Inf Bde was to relieve 4 Cdn Armd Bde and 10 Cdn Inf Bde at Pt 258, Hordouseaux and Pt 259 during 20 August. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde was to remain in its current area until relieved by 8 Cdn Inf Bde which was to occur during daylight 20 August. Incredibly, Simonds ordered the 4 Cdn Armd Bde to ‘stand down’, since he believed that the brigade would not be required for further operations before first light 21 August.94
Simonds’ orders for 10 Cdn Inf Bde are more interesting. The brigade units in St Lambert and Chambois were to concentrate in the area of Hordouseaux. The brigade was to provide two scout platoons mounted in carriers under command of A Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt for a reconnaissance in force during 20 August along the projected division centreline Hordouseaux–Le Champeaux–Le [blank] La Fauvetière–Vimoutiers. 10 Cdn Inf Bde was to have one battalion on wheels at ‘Instant readiness from 201000B hrs to take over corps localities when captured by 18 Cdn Armd C Regt.’ The remaining two battalions were placed on two hours notice to move to take over the captured areas along the centre line to Vimoutiers. The SAR once withdrawn from the Dives River line was to concentrate and stand down until first light 21 August.95
Based on Simonds’ orders for 20 August, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, on relief, was to stand down and 10 Cdn Inf Bde, on relief and concentration, was to support a reconnaissance in force by the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt and, if required, launch an advance to take over captured positions. This action by 10 Cdn Inf Bde would happen without the support of any of the division’s armour regiments since they had all been stood down.
These orders can only lead to one conclusion: Simonds believed that the threat from the German forces left in the Pocket was minimal. Otherwise his orders for standing down the armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Div on 20 August do not make sense! His apparent intent was to extract the units of 4 Cdn Armd Div from their battles and reform the division to spearhead the drive to the Seine. Unfortunately Simonds’ plan was derailed by the slow execution of the planned reliefs of 4 Cdn Armd Div units, and the German intent to rescue as many of their trapped forces as possible. The fog of war would require that Kitching and his men improvise once again to meet the demands of a volatile, ever changing and complex tactical situation.
At 1130 hrs 19 August, 9 Cdn Inf Bde was informed that it was to relieve 10 Cdn Inf Bde in Trun on the night of 19/20 August and St Lambert on 20 August.96 The 5 Cdn Inf Bde would relieve the 8 Cdn Inf Bde, which would then relieve 4 Cdn Armd Bde on 20 August. The delay in getting more infantry into the critical area of the defensive line along the Dives River meant that Jefferson’s meagre forces would have to withstand the onslaught of the remaining Germans trying to escape.
As the intensity of the German breakout became apparent, Simonds finally realized the seriousness of the 10 Cdn Inf Bde position and began placing formations under Kitching’s command in an attempt to thicken up the defences along the Trun–St Lambert–Chambois corridor. The 2 Cdn Armd Bde was placed under command of 4 Cdn Armd Div at 1300 hrs and two regiments were ordered to augment 10 Cdn Inf Bde defences in the Chambois–Trun area.97
In addition, A Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt was detached and placed under Kitching’s command. While this squadron was under Kitching’s command, it came with an assigned mission to recce the area from Trun to Vimoutiers. Kitching was left to deal with the unfolding tactical situation and what he desperately needed was infantry to fill gaps in his lines.
As the Pol Armd Div pushed east and south to cut the road running northeast from Chambois and to seize Chambois itself, it quickly became apparent that the series of hills that dominated the highway would also have to be captured if the line that blocked the German retreat was to be made secure. By 1030 hrs, the Koszutski battle group in the Les Champeaux area had been re-supplied and soon after midday it set out for Pt 262 north. The Zgorzelski battle group secured Point 137 near Coudehard by midday, and the 24 Lancers then moved south towards Frénée.
At about the same time, the 1 Pol Armd Regt with the 9 Inf battalion and a company of anti-tank guns advanced towards the main Chambois–Vimoutiers road at Pt 262 north and Pt 252 located five km northeast of Chambois. By 1700 hrs, this force had established itself on the north and east sides of the feature. While Pt 262 north and Coudehard became Polish strongholds, no one occupied Pt 262 south. It was through this Coudehard–Pt 137 corridor on the west side of Mont Ormel that many of the Germans (particularly 1 and 12 SS Pz Div personnel) who emerged from the St Lambert and Moissy crossings would eventually pass. The Polish position on Mont Ormel became a major impediment to the German breakout.98
At 1930 hrs, the Polish 10th Dragoons, a motorized infantry battalion, moved off Pt 137, entered Chambois and shortly thereafter linked up with the American 2nd Battalion 359th Infantry Regiment. Despite the link-up, the defensive ring was far from closed. There were no Allied troops physically blocking the 3-mile stretch along the Dives River between Magny and Moissy. The vehicle crossings at Magny, St Lambert and Moissy, although heavily shelled, were still open. This situation was further exacerbated when part of the French 2 Armd Div, which had advanced to Frénée and the Chambois–Vimoutiers road by early evening, withdrew south of the Dives as darkness fell.99
Moncel finally arrived around noon 19 August to take over the armoured brigade, five days after Kitching initially asked for him!100 When he arrived at Bde HQ, he found that Chubb had the headquarters organized and after discussing the tactical situation with Halpenny, Moncel took over the brigade. Halpenny returned to his regiment and Moncel set out to visit the units.101
Kitching held an O Group at 1800 hrs to outline the operations for the following day. Based on Simonds’ direction, Kitching was to orchestrate and control two entirely different types of battles in diverging directions: a defensive battle conducted by Jefferson and his reduced 10 Cdn Inf Bde along the Trun– Chambois road and an offensive battle on the part of Moncel and 4 Cdn Armd Bde in a northeasterly direction. Neither action supported the other.
The armoured brigade was to advance to a position on the high ground overlooking Vimoutiers. The operation was to be done in two phases. In Phase I, the Foot Guards with under command A Coy Lake Superior Regiment were to advance to Pt 261 and be there by first light. They were then to capture the high ground astride the main road east of Les Champeaux. On completion of this task, the BCR battle group, with its infantry and anti-tank battery, would pass through and capture Pt 240. The Grenadier Guards would join the BCR on Pt 240 and firm up this position. The Brigade would then start Phase II.102
In Phase II, the Foot Guards would pass through the firm base established in Phase I to capture Pt 227. The 10 Cdn Inf Bde would then pass through and establish a bridgehead over the Vie River. The Foot Guards and BCR were to move at 0600 hrs 20 August with the Grenadier Guards on one hour’s notice from 0600 hrs. The operation, however, was dependent on the timely relief of both regiments.103
The 4 Cdn Armd Div sitrep for the period ending at midnight 19 August reported that, while reconnaissance elements had reached within 300m northwest of Chambois by 1930 hrs, the formal advance to Chambois by the SAR battle group was delayed by the heavy fighting for control of St Lambert-sur-Dives. The Lincoln & Welland Regiment remained firmed up at Trun and the Algonquin Regiment was in the area of Horduseaux with one company in the village. The Argylls were in St Lambert with C Sqn SAR. The regiments of the armoured brigade, each with one company of the Lake Superior Regiment in support, were firmed up in the area of Pt 259 and were refitting.104
Kitching was faced with a growing problem. First and foremost, the division had to seal the existing gap between Trun and Chambois. This task had been given to the SAR-Argyll battle group but the fighting was extremely heavy in and around St Lambert and German infiltration continued. The expected reinforcements would not be arriving in time and, given the requirement to launch the advance towards Vimoutiers the following morning, Kitching had no more resources within his division to commit to the Dives Line. In addition, he now had to prepare for the expected attempts by the Germans to break through to the trapped forces inside the Pocket from the east.
The second task assigned to the division was the re-establishment of communications with the Pol Armd Div so that they could be supplied with ammunition, fuel and food. Hanging over all of this was the need to prepare for the pursuit of the Germans once the current battle was over.105 Attempting to accomplish these tasks simultaneously with the forces at hand was almost impossible.
The leadership environment for Kitching was made worse by the fact that Simonds was not only telling Kitching what he wanted done but also which units from 4 Cdn Armd Div were to execute his orders. At times, the Simonds taskings conflicted with orders already issued by Kitching to his units. Simonds, as the Corps commander, was operating at Kitching’s level of command. Kitching was trying to win the immediate fight and stop the remaining German forces from getting out of the Gap while Simonds was orchestrating the future battle space by trying to pre-position the division for the drive to the Seine. The two goals were incompatible and one had to suffer. What Kitching needed was more infantry but the promised infantry brigades from 3 Cdn Div would arrive a day late.
In the early morning hours of 19/20 August, the remnants of Seventh German Army, with the 2nd Parachute Corps and Panzer Group Eberbach leading, began the breakout attempt.106 The internal attack would begin with two columns of paratroopers attacking across the Dives Rivers at Magny and St Lambert, supported by the remaining elements of the 12 SS Pz Div. The 1 SS and 116 Pz Div would break through near Chambois while the rest of the German forces – 10 SS and 2 SS Pz Div and elements of three infantry divisions – were to form a third wave, securing the flanks and the rear as they withdrew. If all went well, the concentric attack would open the Chambois–Vimoutiers road so that both vehicles and men could escape.107 The breakout bid started at 2230 hrs on 19 August.
Waves of German infantry began moving against the Allied defensive line focused on St Lambert, Trun and Chambois at 0800 hrs 20 August. At first, the attacks made little headway. Eventually, the sheer volume of troops fighting to escape overwhelmed the defensive positions near St Lambert enlarging the gaps in the interior ring enough to allow the extrication of portions of the 74th and 94th Corps. Heavy concentrations of Allied artillery fire and lack of fuel on the part of the Germans ensured that the escape would be carried out mainly on foot but the door had now been forced open.108
At approximately 0400 hrs, 2 SS Pz Corps began the second part of the breakout bid by attacking back into the Trun–Chambois area. The attack began from the area south of Vimoutiers and proceeded in the direction of Trun. The 9 SS Pz Div, advancing on the right, encountered parts of the 1 Pol Armd Div near St Gervais and Les Champeaux. On the left, the 2 SS Pz Div attacked along the line Fresnay-le-Samson–Champosoult–Coudehard. At first the 2 SS Pz Corps advance made good progress but it came to a stop in front of the range of hills, Hill 258 south of Les Champeaux, Hill 240 at Ecouches and Hill 262 north of Coudehard.109
Along the Dives, the German advances were not coordinated attacks with proper fire support and deliberate tactics, but rather a mass of individually armed soldiers working in small groups trying to escape. The pressure was taxing on the fragile defensive disposition of 10 Cdn Inf Bde and considerable German infiltration occurred east and northeast of Trun, and through St Lambert. At 0845 hrs, Wotherspoon informed Brigade that, unless support arrived, he could be pushed out of his positions.
As the morning wore on, Currie was forced back from the southern and central parts of St Lambert and concentrated his infantry and remaining tanks at the northern end of the town. Currie’s force was saved in part by the fact that the Germans did not want to re-take the town but wanted to hold open a crossing of the Dives that would allow them to move east. Any German attempt to move up the D13 was effectively countered by Currie’s force and massive concentrations of Canadian artillery fire. There were simply not enough infantry on the ground between 10 Cdn Inf Bde and the Pol Armd Div to stop the German exodus or to seal the gaps in the Allied defensive line. The only Canadian counter was massive amounts of artillery and cannon fire on the avenues of German movement.110
Meanwhile, the desperately needed Canadian infantry reinforcements were still not available. Wotherspoon, who had expected the arrival of the needed infantry reinforcements the night before, sent a stream of messages asking for the promised reinforcements. Rockingham’s 9 Cdn Inf Bde had not moved forward the previous night. The relief of his forces by 2 Cdn Inf Div had been completed after dark and Rockingham decided to wait until morning.
Rockingham’s brigade was formed up on the road ready to go at 0800 hrs when information started coming in of the German attacks. The Brigade had still not moved at 0945 hrs when the SAR request for assistance was passed on to 9 Cdn Inf Bde.111 The Brigade’s movement was slow, exacerbated by a lack of effective communication between the two brigades and conflicting reports as to the location of the various 10 Cdn Inf Bde units. Consequently, 18 Cdn Armd C Regt was tasked to provide a liaison officer to facilitate the relief process.112
The 9 Cdn Inf Bde’s relief of 10 Cdn Inf Bde troops began with the Lincs in Trun and was complete by 1000 hrs.113 Rockingham, instead of moving down the D13 to St Lambert, moved the remainder of the brigade to Neauphe-sur-Dives. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders assigned to take over St Lambert were ordered instead to Neauphe-sur-Dives, 2km north of St Lambert. ‘They did not attempt to relieve the SAR until the fighting had died down that evening.’114 The Highland Light Infantry of Canada who were waiting to link up with the 1st Hussars ‘were equally hesitant to get involved in this confused situation’ and did not move forward until the next day.115 The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was on its own!
Meanwhile, in accordance with orders received the previous evening, the Foot Guards pushed off at 0530 hrs to capture the high ground at Pt 261. The objective was occupied without opposition and the remainder of the regiment moved forward to Camembert. Elements from the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt had reached out even further, closing in on Vimoutiers itself. Initially 4 Cdn Armd Bde was told that they were to be stood down and would not be required for operations before first light 21 August, when the plan for the advance briefed the previous evening would be executed. Information that the Germans were now trying to break through the Canadian-Polish lines, however, resulted in all 4 Cdn Armd Bde units being recalled and returned to their original positions.116
Elements of the German 353 Inf Div managed to cross the Dives River at Moissy early in the morning of 20 August and reached Hill 262 south. The Pol Armd Div had not occupied this feature and at 1530 hrs, 1 SS Pz Div and 116 Pz Div succeeded in capturing the road fork half-a-mile northwest of Coudehard, opening up the Champosoult–Boisjos and Chambois–Vimoutiers roads.117 This action opened up the first clear escape route for the trapped German troops. The route ran through St Lambert–Moissy, then by back roads and tracks to the high ground at Mont Ormel and on to Vimoutiers. By the time the Poles closed this route, the Germans had opened another route around Hill 262 north.
By 1500 hrs, the Polish situation was steadily deteriorating. Attacked from all sides and cut off from the rest of 2 Cdn Corps, the Poles were unable to evacuate wounded and were running low on food, ammunition, fuel and medicine.118 By 1700 hrs, the Germans broke into the northern part of the Hill 262 perimeter and were not expelled until 1900 hrs. The toll on the Germans was enormous but they continued to keep the escape corridor open.119
The Poles reported that the Germans had broken through the area around St Lambert-sur-Dives and Moissy and had reached Pt 240.120 In response, at 1115 hrs the Grenadier Guards, who were being held in reserve on Pt 259 for the advance north, were now ordered into the centre of the gap to Pt 240, 1.25 miles east of the Polish position at Pt 262.121 In addition, the BCR were ordered to leave their supporting infantry in their old location pending the arrival of the 2 Cdn Armd Bde, who would take over the old positions, and were ordered to Pt 261.122 These moves resulted in the Foot Guards firmed up on Pt 258; the BCR astride the road from Trun near the village of Les Champeaux; while the Grenadier Guards occupied Pt 240, located above the village of Ecorches, which was situated between the two highways. This tactical disposition allowed the regiments to dominate the maze of dirt roads which the enemy was trying to use north of Trun and Chambois.123
At 1637 hrs, 4 Cdn Armd Bde Control reported that 100 German tanks were moving east towards the St Lambert–Moissy line and that this concentration was being engaged by artillery. Control also reported that German tanks and infantry were headed towards the position of B Sqn SAR on Hill 124.124 In anticipation of more efforts to break out, Kitching ordered Lieutenant Colonel D.S. Harkness of the 5 Anti-Tank Regiment to coordinate the anti-tank defence across the whole division front. To give added strength to the anti-tank screen, the 1st Hussars and the Highland Light Infantry were ordered to relieve B Sqn SAR on Pt 124.125 This battlegroup was slow to move and would not reach Pt 124 until 0730 hrs the next day: far too late to be of any assistance to B Sqn SAR.126
Maczek and his officers were openly critical of 4 Cdn Armd Div’s failure to cooperate with them during 20 August when the fighting was at its peak. According to Maczek, repeated requests for assistance were ignored until Simonds arrived at his divisional headquarters and was briefed on the Polish situation in Chambois and at Pt 262. Simonds ordered an immediate counter-attack by 4 Cdn Armd Bde to relieve the situation. Simonds then went to 4 Cdn Armd Div headquarters to make sure the orders were obeyed. Kitching protested the order and told Simonds, ‘To hell with them. They have run out of food and ammunition because of the inefficiency of their organization; our people have been fighting just as hard but we have managed to keep up our supply system.’127 Simonds silenced Kitching and ordered immediate action.
At 1900 hrs, Simonds ordered 4 Cdn Armd Bde to attack southeast from the Hordouseaux–Les Champeaux area towards Champosoult–Coudehard to seal the escape route and assist the hard-pressed Polish troops. Simonds placed 9 Cdn Inf Bde from 3 Div under Kitching’s command.128 At 1931 hrs, the Grenadier Guards received orders to advance south immediately to the area north of Coudehard and give all possible assistance to the Pol Armd Div. They were directed to leave without their supporting infantry, which was to remain in place.
The Foot Guards and the BCR were ordered to Pt 240 and arrived on the objective at 2200 hrs.129 At 2000 hrs, the Foot Guards with under command one company Lake Superior Regiment was tasked to move to Pt 239 immediately opposite Pt 240 and dominate the roads radiating from both St Lambert and Chambois. Two companies of the Lake Superior Regiment were subsequently ordered to join the Foot Guards at their position.130 At last light, the Foot Guards moved off and arrived on their objective without opposition.131 The BCR was ordered to move to Pt 240.
On 19 August and 20 August, the movements of the various units of the 4 Cdn Armd Div, both armour and infantry, made it almost impossible to define the division’s ‘front’. The division war diary stated that the Germans were attacking from the east and west and that many calls were received to seal off the numerous German escape routes. The units were mixed up and it was difficult to define any particular brigade areas.132 The fighting during the day was confused in part because the position of the Pol Armd Div was not known for certain. The division sitrep reported the main escape route to the northeast in the area of St Lambert was closed with extremely high casualties for the Germans, either killed or captured. For the period of 1400 hrs on 19 August to 1800 hrs 20 August, the division reported capturing 47 officers and 2,118 enlisted men.133
Early on the morning of 21 August in pouring rain, the Grenadier Guards, with a company from the Lake Superior Regiment under command, moved off to break through the line the Germans had thrown around the two Polish regiments on Pt 262. Each squadron of the Grenadier Guards was at less than half strength and, from the beginning, the combined force met with opposition.134 The advance was to be executed in two stages. It began with a mile run eastwards across the valley to Pt 239, occupied by the Foot Guards and Lake Superior Regiment on the previous evening. This move was to be followed by an advance of 2,200 yards due south across another valley and up a steep hill to Pt 262 above Coudehard. At 0800 hrs, No. 1 Sqn led off with seven tanks, followed by B Company Lake Sup Regt and No. 3 Sqn. The progress, however, was slow with roads blocked and lined with destroyed German vehicles, dead horses and men.135
Arriving at Pt 239 and finding the Foot Guards in secure possession of the position, Halpenny decided to add weight to the assault on Pt 262 by adding No. 3 Sqn of nine tanks to the battlegroup leaving only No. 2 Sqn to guard the line of communications.136 After a number of short actions, the force contacted the Pol Armd Div and advanced to Hill 262. The advance ran into a ring of self-propelled guns and tanks, resulting in a difficult and bloody fight. Amy’s squadron broke through to the Pol Armd Div at 1420 hrs but his squadron was now down to five working tanks.137
The echelon forces of the division now swung into action to resupply the Pol Armd Div. Five Priests from the Grenadier Guards battle lorry group made ten trips that night, bringing in supplies and taking out casualties. The Grenadier Guards and the BCR kept the lines of communications open against Germans who were still attempting to infiltrate through the Canadian-Polish positions.138
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was tasked with getting supplies through to the Polish units that had been cut off in Chambois. A recce in force was conducted by SAR who succeeded in getting through to Chambois and back early in the afternoon. At the same time, elements of 2 Cdn Armd Bde, supported by infantry, managed to get through to Chambois from the northwest. The first convoy of food, carried in half-tracks and carriers, got through at about 1700 hrs with three more convoys dispatched during the night.139
As a result of the day’s operations, firm contact was made with the Pol Armd Div, and the gaps in the Allied lines were closed at Pt 262 and along the Dives River.140 The Allies had finally succeeded in closing the Falaise Gap effectively, stopping the flow of German forces out of Normandy. Individual and small groups of German soldiers continued to infiltrate eastward through the Canadian lines but the vast majority were caught, swept into the prisoner-of-war cages and added to the thousands who had been taken earlier. There were still incidents, however, of Germans infiltrating through the valleys and woods during the night, sometimes bumping into Canadian artillery and Service Corps units who normally operated several miles behind the front lines. Headquarter security units had to be brought in on a number of occasions to take care of these stragglers.141
The main issues facing the support echelons during the Falaise Gap actions were the opening of the maintenance routes and the processing of prisoners. In the twenty-four-hour period ending 1600 hrs 21 August, the division processed over 2,255 prisoners of war.142 Also twenty-five more echelon vehicles had to be off-loaded and were pressed into service moving these prisoners. Clerks from the rear echelons had to be used as escorts since no front line troops could be spared. The total number of PWs taken by 4 Cdn Armd Div will never be accurately known. Many prisoners were processed through the cages of 3 Cdn Inf Div because the armoured division cages could not handle the volume.
The physical state of the division with respect to vehicles is not clear since the ADREPs for the period 17–29 August are missing from the AA&QMG war diary. The personnel state of the division’s regiments is, however, known through graphs kept by Proctor. On 21 August, the BCR, SAR and Lake Superior Regiment were reporting strengths above 85 per cent. The Grenadier Guards and Foot Guards were reporting 81 per cent; the Algonquin and Lincoln & Welland Regiment were at 75 per cent strength; and the Argylls were the worst of the infantry battalions at less than 65 per cent.143 The highest number of battle casualties incurred by the division was reported for 18–20 August at over ninety casualties. The division reported that it needed eleven officers and 814 ORs as reinforcements to replace the gaps in its ranks but received only six officers and forty ORs.144
The fighting in Normandy, which concluded with the battles to close the Falaise Gap, gave the Allies a great, if incomplete, victory. This battle could be called the German equivalent of the British evacuation of their troops from the continent at Dunkirk in May 1940 where a large number of troops escaped to fight another day but most of their equipment was lost in the evacuation. In theory, the Pocket could have been sealed off more quickly.145 The controversy continues over the question of who was responsible for leaving the doors open for so long, allowing tens of thousands of Germans to escape.
The command decisions made by the senior Allied generals to close the Falaise Gap remain a hotly debated topic. Martin Blumenson, in The Battle of the Generals, argues that the senior Allied leadership (Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley) ‘anticipated reality and set about laying future plans’.146 They felt that immediate operations to seal the Pocket around the German troops in the Falaise area would be successful and that the German armies in Normandy would be trapped and eliminated.
This attitude combined with a rising tide of optimism that the Germans could not withstand a defeat of this magnitude and still remain in the war, spawned a belief that the war would be over by Christmas. The senior Allied military leadership simply took for granted what would happen at Falaise before the tactical situation evolved to a state in which the desired outcome was assured. The result was operational carelessness and a misreading of what was required to defeat the German forces in Normandy. The ultimate mistake, according to Blumenson, was to ‘dismiss’ the fate of the German troops inside the closing Pocket.147
The nature of the battle was quite different from those that had been fought by the Anglo-Canadian forces in Normandy to that time. The action was dynamic and fluid and the location and nature of the combat was constantly changing. Situational awareness was crucial and consequential decisions had to be made in real time. There was no time to seek higher authority. The most problematic issue, however, was that it was not a tidy battlefield. Montgomery and Simonds were most comfortable with a well-planned, set-piece battle in which all the participants, including the enemy, did exactly what had been scripted for them.148 There were no defined boundaries for fronts or rear areas. Canadians were engaging Germans on all sides and sometimes in the rear. The nature of the battlefield, therefore, challenged the command paradigm of the senior Canadian leadership.
It had taken 2 Cdn Corps from 17 August to 22 August to close the Falaise Gap. First Cdn Army and, in particular, 2 Cdn Corps was judged to have not achieved their objectives quickly enough, provoking profound disappointment among senior Allied commanders.149 Closing the Falaise Gap had taken far longer than expected and had come at a greater cost than anticipated. Someone had to be held accountable. As the commander of the division spearheading the Canadian drive, the focus of attention landed on Kitching.
Simonds came to the conclusion that Kitching was ineffective. Simonds felt compelled to act and Simonds relieved Kitching of his command at noon on 21 August, Simonds informing him that he was to be replaced by Brigadier H. Foster. Foster arrived to take over command of the division at 1800 hrs.
The closing of the Falaise Gap highlighted the competing obligations inherent in the role of the Corps commander between his need to plan ahead of current operations so that he can shape the future battlefield while simultaneously ensuring that current operations are won. While the division commander was responsible for winning the immediate battle, it was the responsibility of the higher-level commander to ensure that lower-level commanders had the means and resources to win.
Simonds issued daily orders that outlined his intent for operations on the following day and, unfortunately, not all of them were found for examination. The intent signed by Simonds on 16 August requires closer examination since it establishes the start point in Simonds’ thinking as to how he was going to solve his part of the military problem of closing the escape route of the German forces in Normandy by linking up with US forces moving north towards the Falaise area.
Simonds’ orders had two implied tasks: to capture Trun and the high ground dominating it from the southwest and northeast and to be prepared to advance in a northeasterly direction on Lisieux. Two key points must be made at this juncture. The direction to use armoured divisions to close the Gap came directly from Montgomery. While the selection of armoured divisions could be rationalized based on the need to travel fast to close the Gap, the terrain in the Falaise-to-Vimoutiers region was totally unsuited for armour warfare or tactics. The terrain, because of the numerous hedges, hills, forests and rivers, was best suited to the employment of infantry divisions which, with their greater complement of infantry, could better cover the ground. The only way to mitigate the risk inherent in these orders to the armoured regiments was to ensure that infantry always accompanied the tanks.
Kitching was initially ordered to establish a blocking position by setting up on a number of key terrain features to dominate the area between Falaise and Trun along the Falaise–Argentan highway and to establish contact with the Polish Armd Div in the Trun area. This task changed to establishing a blocking position to dominate the area north of the Trun–Vimoutiers highway. The mission expanded to include the capture of Trun (17 August) and the cutting of the Trun–Vimoutiers road, then the capture of the area St Lambert–Moissy (18 August) and finally to move to Chambois (19 August). The taking of Trun required a small modification to the initial deployment. Taking over the responsibility for establishing a defensive line along the Dives River was a significantly more complex task altogether.
In military operations and, in particular, land operations, there is a constant friction between two variables – the requirement to defeat enemy forces, and the requirement to take ground. Examining the military actions and command decisions in and around 18–21 August through this lens allows an important perspective on what happened in this timeframe. In the early part of the Normandy campaign, ground was the primary focus in order to expand the bridgehead. On 17–18 August, the emphasis was still on ground as the Canadians and the Pol Armd Div tried to close the Falaise Gap. The timeframe 19–21 August represented the cusp of the two variables in which Simonds as the higher level commander had to make crucial decisions as to where his main effort would be – sealing the fate of German Seventh Army or launching the pursuit after the escaped German forces.
The requirement to be prepared to move northeast significantly shaped how Simonds orchestrated the movement of his forces from 18 August onwards and shaped the disposition of 4 Cdn Armd Division. The record of conversation between Simonds and Brigadier Mann at First Cdn Army HQ on 19 August reflected Simonds dilemma and uncertainty. Using this construct, Simonds’ orders to split 4 Cdn Armd Div as he did must lead to the conclusion that by 19 August Simonds believed that pursuing the escaped German forces was more important than destroying the remnants of the German forces in the Pocket. Even with the desperate fighting that had begun on the evening of 19/20 August the Minutes of the First Cdn Army Joint Conference held at 0830 hrs 20 August stated that the ground plan for 20 August was for 2 Cdn Corps to regroup in preparation for the advance east. 2 Cdn Corps was to be relieved by 12 British Corps. Once the relief was accomplished the corps would advance on the axis Orbec–Bernay–Elbeuf.150
When the tactical situation began to change drastically on the evening 18–19 August, Simonds’ initial solution was not to redeploy 4 Cdn Armd Bde along the Dives line but to commit the 2 Cdn Corps reserve, the 2 Cdn Armd Bde, to this line. The problem, however, was that these units arrived too late to help Kitching or his division.151 Simonds’ second move to help Kitching was placing 9 Cdn Inf Bde under command on the evening of 19 August but, as mentioned above, Rockingham’s battalions were also late in starting the move to St Lambert leaving Kitching and Jefferson to battle on with only the resources of the division and with a tactical disposition neither wanted.
The scattered disposition of 4 Cdn Armd Div was the direct result of orders by Simonds and not based on a course of action designed by Kitching. Simonds was not only identifying what he wanted done but also the formations that should execute his orders, which at times was contrary to orders recently given by Kitching. Kitching would have been in a better position to decide which units were best able to meet the intent of Simonds’ orders while lessening the confusion and frustration of the units at the changing orders. Instead, Kitching was left to try and maintain control over a division with components of two brigades moving off in different directions, which were not mutually supporting and without any discernible fronts but forced to engage in combat in all directions.
Simonds’ management of the command arrangements in the Trun–Chambois area complicated and constrained any freedom of action Kitching had in responding to the tactical situation. Two terms are important to understanding within this context: ‘under command’ and ‘relief’. When one unit relieves another, the control of the area of the unit that has been relieved shifts to the commander of the relieving unit. In the case of 9 Cdn Inf Bde, when the Stormont Dundas and Glengary Highlanders relieved the Lincs in Trun, command over the area of Trun shifted from Kitching to Major General D. Spry the GOC of 3 Cdn Inf Div. The assigned plan for the relief of 10 Cdn Inf Bde by 3 Cdn Inf Div meant that the defence of the line of the River Dives should have been the responsibility of Spry by the evening of 20 August, had the relief plan been executed as directed. This would have meant that Kitching would have had only one task and that was the drive to Vimoutiers as directed in the plan briefed on the evening of 19 August. Instead, both 9 Cdn Inf Bde and 2 Cdn Armd Bde were late, which meant that 10 Cdn Inf Bde had to hold the line much longer than expected and Kitching had to divide his attention between holding the Dives line and launching the drive to Vimoutiers on the morning of 21 August.
The second term is ‘under command’. When a unit is placed under command of another organization, it means that the new commander now has control over the unit and can assign that unit missions and tasks without consulting with the previous commander. Units would shift under command of another unit on a temporary basis, typically to accomplish a specific mission. In this case, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 9 Cdn Inf Bde and one squadron of the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt were placed under Kitching’s command, but Kitching was not free to use these formations as he saw fit.
There are three points that need to be highlighted within this discussion: the units were assigned too late to make any meaningful contribution to the battle; they were only assigned to Kitching until 0800 hrs 21 August; and two units came with assigned missions, which Kitching was not allowed to change. Had the 2 Cdn Armd Bde and the 9 Cdn Inf Bde come under Kitching’s command early on 19 August, it would have allowed Kitching much more flexibility in fighting the tactical battle.
Both the 2 Cdn Armd Bde and the 9 Cdn Inf Bde had to move south from the Falaise–Damblainville area to reach the Trun–Chambois area. Kitching’s units were much closer to the German escape routes and could have moved more quickly into the battle. Understanding that time was the critical factor, a better course of action would have had the 2 Cdn Armd Bde and the 9 Cdn Inf Bde relieve the 4 Cdn Armd Div units along the Trun–Vimoutiers axis with 2 Cdn Armd Bde assigned the task of executing the requirement to advance to Vimoutiers. These two units could have reached the Trun–Vimoutiers areas more quickly relieving the 4 Cdn Armd Bde for use by Kitching along the Dives River line earlier on 20 August.
Releasing 4 Cdn Armd Bde from the Trun–Vimoutiers axis would have allowed Kitching to concentrate the entire strength of his armoured division against the German escape routes between Trun and Chambois and would have greatly simplified the command arrangements within the area. Spry would have controlled the area north of the Trun–Vimoutiers highway; Kitching would have controlled the area from the highway south to Chambois; and Maczek could have retained his position at Pt 262 as a blocking force against any attack from the outside. Instead, Simonds was late in committing required forces; the forces that were committed were late in arriving; and the concept of operations for the relief complicated the command and control structure within the area. Spry, Kitching and Maczek were now trying to control the tactical battle with no one in overall control to ensure a coordinated effort. Simonds seemed content to have three separate division commanders involved in the fight, each with his own objectives and no one commander with the requisite authority to orchestrate the Canadian forces to meet the unfolding situation when the Germans attacked or when the relief brigades failed to meet required timelines.152 It has been argued that Jefferson and Kitching appeared ‘unwilling’ to change their plan by committing the recently relieved Lincs from Trun or the last two companies of Argylls to the St Lambert battle instead of waiting for the planned infantry battalions from 9 Cdn Inf Bde, but it is not clear that Kitching actually had the latitude to make those changes.153
Complicating the operations on 20 August even further was Simonds’ intent for operations that day. His intent stated that 2 Cdn Corps would assist 12 Corps in a sweep-up of the area to the front and then commence the advance northeast.154 Simonds was fixated on moving northeast using 4 Cdn Armd Bde and this imperative constrained the options available to Kitching to close the gap along the Dives River. The fact that orders were given for the advance northeast despite the fact that the gap had not been closed and German forces were known to still be on the western side of the river raises serious questions as to Simonds’ situational awareness at this critical juncture.
The decision to commit 4 Cdn Armd Bde to closing the escape routes happened at 1915 hrs on 20 August when Kitching ordered the Grenadier Guards to launch an immediate attack to Coudehard.155 Their mission was to open the lines of communications with the Pol Armd Div. Kitching’s opposition to being ordered to help the Pol Armd Div can be understood in part by the fact that he was denied the opportunity to use his armoured brigade to aid his own troops who were in dire straits along the Dives River line. When his stood-down armoured brigade was finally committed to battle, it was to help the Pol Armd Div and not his own men!
Kitching’s frustration may have been already heightened by the fact that neither 9 Cdn Inf Bde nor 2 Cdn Armd Bde was going to arrive in time to influence the battle or help out his own units who were fighting for their lives. While he may have felt his assessment of the Pol Armd Div was correct, in the end, Kitching’s outburst and possible insubordinate reaction to Simonds’ order to help the Pol Armd Div must now be viewed as the main factor in his dismissal despite the successful series of combat actions that Kitching had led the division through since Totalize.
Naturally, Kitching was shocked and upset at the decision to relieve him and made a number of points in his defence. The first involved the long delay in sending Moncel to command the armoured brigade. Kitching also complained that the division had had too many changes in orders over a period of ten days and had taken very heavy casualties in commanders, soldiers and tanks in its first battles. According to Kitching, Simonds had no rebuttal for any of these very valid points.156
The arrival of Moncel to command 4 Cdn Armd Bde on 15 August would have alleviated some of the command and leadership problems caused by casualties throughout the armoured brigade and probably would have helped the division capture its objectives on 15 August. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the armoured brigade would have been more effective than it was in the 16–21 August timeframe under Moncel. Once Halpenny was given command, the brigade operated quite well and accomplished all of its assigned tasks during this period.
It seems peculiar though that the 2 Cdn Corps diarist felt compelled to make an entry in the 2 Cdn Corps war diary on 17 August to say that Moncel was taking over 4 Cdn Armd Bde. Kitching’s request to have Moncel take over the armoured brigade had obviously made it to Corps Headquarters but why a three day delay in the notation and why did it take a further two days for him to get to the brigade when Moncel was only two hours away from the battlefield? These questions may never be adequately answered.
Kitching’s comment about casualties among the officers in the armoured regiments was valid. Simply stated, they were high. The robbing of the regiment commanders to command the armoured brigade combined with the casualties among the rest of the officers had a ripple down effect on leadership within the armoured brigade. A typical armoured regiment had thirty-eight officers. By 26 August the Foot Guards had nineteen, the Grenadier Guards twenty-three, the BCR sixteen and the SAR had twenty-three officers remaining from the original cadre that began the month.
On average, 45 per cent of the original officer complement in the armoured brigade became casualties in the period from the start of operations on 8 August to the time Kitching was relieved on 21 August. What is even more compelling is the loss of senior officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) in 4 Cdn Armd Bde. Their casualty rate was 56 per cent with the brigadier and two of three regimental COs as casualties.157 Yet the brigade remained in almost continuous contact with the Germans during that thirteen day period and continued to fight. The junior leadership cadre stepped up and the regiments performed well, which is a testament to the quality of the men, their leadership and their training before entering Normandy.
Kitching’s complaint over changing orders has already been highlighted. Viewed in hindsight, Kitching was subjected to changing orders on each day from 7 August until his relief on 21 August. Some were by design as in Totalize and many as a result of the fluid battle conditions being encountered. What is clear, however, is that the leadership team of Kitching, Wigle and Proctor and the regimental and battalion leaders as a whole were up to the challenge of each new task.
The war diary of 4 Cdn Armd Div summed up their experience as follows:
The tremendous feats performed by the infantry and armoured brigades during the past two days in completing the destruction of the enemy in Normandy and its full importance has not yet been realized by any of the personnel in the div. No one yet realizes that the heavy fighting south from Caen to the Trun Chambois area has sealed the fate of the German Seventh Army. Perhaps it is because everyone has been so busy killing Germans or planning to kill Germans or doing their job in the best way they know in confusing circumstances, that the full importance of this victory is not yet apparent to them.158
The story of defeat, rout, confusion, disorganization and disaster of the German Seventh Army in Normandy was clearly written along the route from Falaise to Vimoutiers.159
The examination and conclusions drawn from the complex set of operations from the initial landings in Normandy to the closing of the Falaise Gap will be debated for some time to come. Arguments as to whether the Normandy campaign succeeded or failed will never be answered to everyone’s satisfaction. In the end, it was Kitching’s and Maczek’s armoured divisions that carried the burden of plugging the First Cdn Army side of the gap. The combat environment that they had to fight through was not of their making but based on the decisions made by commanders at the higher levels of Allied command; namely Montgomery and Bradley.
During the 16–22 August phase of the Normandy campaign, the Canadians were to find themselves simultaneously fighting offensive and defensive battles. Instead of the armoured divisions being employed in their role as exploitation forces, units were gathered in battle groups and sent off to seize towns, dominant hills or crossroads. What resulted was a series of clashes and battles varying in time and intensity, depending on the degree to which the Germans could organize a response. Maintaining control and keeping communications open became challenging, especially in the hilly terrain of the Falaise–Trun–Vimoutiers area. The situation was confusing and difficult to control and placed an enormous strain on all formations, but an even greater strain on those charged with commanding those formations.160
Due to the nature of the fighting, the squadron and regimental officers became the on-scene commanders who had to make independent decisions, weighing their mission against the situation they were facing on the ground. The only way Kitching could influence this type of battle was by ensuring that his subordinate commanders understood the intent of his orders, and through the interjection of reserves and supporting forces, such as artillery and tactical aircraft, at decisive points. Unfortunately for Kitching, when additional forces were eventually made available, they arrived too late to be of assistance.
The battles waged to close the Falaise Gap became the ultimate testing ground for Kitching and the men of the 4 Cdn Armd Div. The desperate combat conditions combined with the physical state of the leadership, men and equipment of the division ensured that the fighting would test every aspect of their training, professional competence and maturity as a fighting formation. The record of the division and its accomplishments speak for themselves. They penetrated the furthest of any Canadian unit during Totalize and, despite many setbacks, they achieved their objectives in Tractable. They were the first to the Dives River and succeeded in gaining and holding St Lambert-sur-Dives and their portion of the Gap. In the words of Corporal Stu Johns of the Grenadier Guards, ‘By the time we closed the gap we had figured out how to fight the regiment.’161 The same could be said of the entire division.
The 4 Cdn Armd Div entered Normandy as an untried, inexperienced organization which, in the span of fourteen days of continuous conflict, became a mature fighting formation. Given the significant challenges the division had to overcome during the unfolding battles of August 1944, Kitching and the 4 Cdn Armd Div performed much better than history has recorded. In the end, Kitching was an able commander in an almost impossible situation.
His lasting contribution to the division, however, was that he trained and mentored his senior staff officers, Wigle and Proctor, and had led the division through its baptism of fire. A new group of very capable commanders were now in command of the regiments and battalions. The division and its men would distinguish themselves in the pursuit phase of the campaign in Northwest Europe and would be the first Allied troops to cross the Seine River. It had taken twentyone tough days, but, as Corporal Johns stated, they had figured it out.