During the first three years of the Second World War Britain was almost always forced to wage a defensive war. In those years, few of Britain’s island fortresses were able to hold out once air superiority was lost. This was true in the battle for Crete and Britain’s two principal island fortresses in the Far East, Hong Kong and Singapore. During the war only one island fortress held out despite the fact that the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica controlled the air for over two years, the island of Malta.
Malta’s location 60 miles east of Sicily and 1,000 miles from British bases in Egypt as well as 1,000 miles from the British base of Gibraltar placed an enormous burden on the Royal Navy. In order to make Malta an operational base for submarines and destroyers, convoys carrying supplies from east or west had to run the gauntlet of Axis air and surface attacks. In addition to re-supplying the Malta naval base with oil and ships’ supplies it was necessary to re-supply the RAF with aviation fuel, spare parts and new aircraft. The attrition in Spitfires and Hurricanes was always a major concern. The British Army maintained a permanent garrison on Malta of about 22,000 infantry and artillery men, who also had to be fully supplied (for an excellent account of the trials experienced by these men, see S.A.M. Hudson’s UXB Malta: Royal Engineers Bomb Disposal 1940–44). On top of all these tasks the Royal Navy had the burden of supplying food to Malta’s civilian population of 270,000. The extent of German and Italian air raids on Malta is summarised in the Oxford Companion to World War II.
Hitler’s invasion of the USSR in June 1941 … diverted Luftwaffe units to the German-Soviet War, but raids were renewed in December with even greater intensity. During January 1942 there were 262, during February 236, and in March and April twice the tonnage of bombs that London had suffered during the Blitz was dropped on Malta.130
In early September 1941 Captain Leach received orders from the Admiralty to take Prince of Wales to Gibraltar for the purpose of reinforcing the ships that would escort a convoy to Malta, one of only three convoys sent to the island that year. The one that involved Prince of Wales was given the code name Operation Halberd. The escort for the twelve transport and merchant ships consisted of three battleships, one aircraft carrier, five cruisers, eighteen destroyers, one corvette and nine submarines. The Commander-in-Chief, Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, flew his flag in HMS Nelson. The Royal Navy’s squadron permanently at Gibraltar was known as Force H, and for Operation Halberd it was reinforced by units from the Home Fleet including Prince of Wales. The fast cruisers and destroyers in Force H were given the responsibility of escorting the convoy all the way to Grand Harbour, Malta. This escort called Force X was under the command of Rear-Admiral H.M. Burrough, flying his flag in the light cruiser HMS Kenya. Prince of Wales had been added to Force H because of the possibility that the Italian Navy might attempt to redeem its defeat in the Battle of Cape Matapan with its newest battleships.
It was exceedingly fortunate that Operation Halberd took place in September as Admiral Doenitz had not yet ordered substantial numbers of his U-boats into the Mediterranean and Air Marshal Goering had transferred most of his Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers from airfields in Sicily to bases near the Russian front. Thus, German strength in the Western Mediterranean was negligible. In the event, enemy opposition to Force H and Force X came entirely from the Regia Aeronautica. One of its torpedo bombers, the SIAI Marchetti SM 79 was considered outstanding. Despite the presence of Fulmar fighter aircraft from the carrier Ark Royal the Italians started their torpedo bomber attacks on the morning of 27 September. That day Prince of Wales’ anti-aircraft guns were in constant use. Prince of Wales shot down two Italian aircraft without coming to any harm, but the flagship HMS Nelson was torpedoed and severely damaged. After dark on 28 September one of the merchant ships, Imperial Star, was torpedoed in moonlight and had to be abandoned. These losses were considered well within the acceptable limit for a Malta convoy.
Operation Halberd might have triggered a major engagement with the Italian Fleet. In 1938 Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, had paid a courtesy call on the flagship of Admiral Riccardi, later the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy. After an elaborate luncheon, Riccardi showed his British guests his palatial cabin. He took some pride in pointing out a book on his bedside table, The Life of Nelson. During the war Cunningham decided that Riccardi had not profited much from his nightly reading, as after learning that Force H had departed Gibraltar obviously headed for Malta, Riccardi ordered Fleet Admiral Iachino to steam out of Naples to intercept it. Admiral Iachino’s fleet consisted of only two battleships, six cruisers and fourteen destroyers as part of the Italian fleet remained in port due to fuel shortages. There are two quite different versions of what the Italian Fleet did next, the first of which comes from Admiral Cunningham, written in 1949.
Very careful preparations had been made for the defence of the convoy. Every available long-range fighter in Egypt or elsewhere on the station was sent to Malta, while all the submarines from Malta took up their stations off Naples, Taranto and north of Sicily in case the Italian Fleet came out to interfere. Actually it did emerge from Naples and came south, but made off again when Force ‘H’ went after it.131
In 1981 over 30 years later another version of events appeared in The World Almanac of World War II edited by Brigadier Peter Young, who had been one of Britain’s most decorated soldiers. The chronology of this almanac was largely prepared by Donald Sommerville, historian of University College, Oxford. His chronology for 24–30 September 1941 reads as follows:
Mediterranean Operation Halberd is launched in a major effort to carry supplies from Gibraltar to Malta, there are nine transports in the convoy and their escorts and covering force include three battleships, one carrier, five cruisers and 18 destroyers. On 26 September Admiral Iachino leads two battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers of the Italian Fleet out to intercept. The remainder of the Italian Fleet stays in port, ostensibly because of fuel shortage. On 27 September both sides fail to find the main enemy force by air reconnaissance … the heavy ships do not make contact.132
Given that Sommerville wrote this 40 years after the incident and had access to more information than did Admiral Cunningham, it would seem likely that his version of events is more accurate. There remains an unanswered question. Why would Admiral Riccardi risk the almost certain destruction of two battleships by a superior British force? It is conceivable that he hoped to lure Force H close to the Italian mainland where it could be assailed by waves of torpedo bombers. If the Italians had succeeded in sinking any British capital ships with their torpedo bombers, it might well have dispelled the conviction in certain circles of the Royal Navy that battleships manoeuvring in the open sea could defend themselves from torpedo bombers without fighter aircraft.
Geoffrey Brooke, who was aboard Prince of Wales for her entire life, would become one of her best chroniclers. Of her involvement in Operation Halberd, he wrote:
The ship’s first encounter with hostile aircraft had certainly gone well. The whole operation had, in fact, exceeded all hopes and the double success provided yet another fillip to the confidence and already high spirits of Prince of Wales. She sailed later that evening to arrive at Scapa on October 6.133
On 16 October, from an unknown location in home waters, Leach wrote to Churchill.
My Dear Prime Minister,
On behalf of myself and the other three officers of the Prince of Wales who recently received awards for their service I write to thank you most sincerely for your kind message of congratulations which was most thoroughly appreciated.
I have not yet seen the full list and consequently do not know if any of my ship’s company appear in it. But I will pass on your kind message to them in due course, should any of their names be included.
The Prince of Wales flourishes and I believe that big strides have been made in the reliability of the main armament machinery since you were on board. I hope in the near future to have an opportunity of confirming this view.
I do so much wish that you had been on board during Operation ‘Halberd’. There were sights to be seen which would have rejoiced your heart and the whole operation was an invaluable experience for us. The Prince of Wales hopes that you are well and sends her best wishes for your continued prosperity.
Yours Sincerely,
John Leach134
In the autumn of 1941 the Prime Minister and the First Sea Lord debated long and hard over whether two capital ships accompanied by an aircraft carrier should be sent to Singapore as a deterrent to the Japanese. Churchill won the debate, but in the judgment of most historians he made a strategic error of the first magnitude.
There is an American aspect of this debate that is largely unknown. Based on their cables to one another that autumn it seems beyond question that at Placentia Bay Roosevelt and Churchill had reached some understanding about sending reinforcements to the Far East in an effort to deter a Japanese attack. The earliest possible deployment would have had to involve British battleships and American heavy bombers. Historians have made little mention of their understanding because of the absence of archival evidence.
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips was named Commander-in-Chief of the squadron that was meant to deter the Japanese. This squadron would consist of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse together with an escort of four destroyers. The new fleet carrier, HMS Indomitable, had been designated to be part of this squadron, but she had run aground off Jamaica in early November and was unable to join Prince of Wales and Repulse in time. No other British carriers were available.
While Phillips never lacked courage and was obviously intelligent, his judgment was flawed. In 1938 the British plan for the defence of Hong Kong was referred to as ‘Standard C’. It involved a British presence that retained no more than a mere foothold on Hong Kong Island, but which would deny the Japanese any anchorage. After Phillips became Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff he sent a minute to the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, which was both dramatic and foolhardy:
I have always felt that this decision to adopt Standard ‘C’ was fundamentally wrong and not in accordance with our position as a great maritime Power. Hong Kong is our most exposed outpost and ought to be properly defended with 15-inch guns and everything else we can put there. No other country would leave an outpost of this nature in an undefended state.135
Admiral Phillips had no recent sea experience and had never been in a ship that had to defend herself from attack by enemy aircraft. Both in appearance and in personality Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach were almost complete opposites. The Admiral was diminutive, standing only five feet two inches to Leach’s six feet two inches, and he lacked the latter’s charm. They did share, however, a total commitment to their mission. They both knew that if deterrence failed, they would have to engage both the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Air Force under circumstances that highly favoured the enemy.
Admiral Phillips had already acquired a reputation for having the sharpest mind in the Royal Navy. On 18 May 1940 John Colville, then Churchill’s youngest private secretary, wrote in his diary, ‘the position [in France] is still critical, and Admiral Phillips, the best brain in the Navy, asserts to the P.M. that the Cabinet have now got to take a fundamental decision.’136 Unfortunately, this exalted reputation did not make Admiral Phillips a better admiral.
The name Hastings Ismay suggests a mysterious character in a British spy novel. In the Second World War he was in fact a highly regarded general in the British Army. Those who knew him best called him ‘Pug’ after the small Chinese dog breed with a snub nose and wrinkled face. To quote John Colville, Ismay ‘was the main channel of communication between Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, of whose committee he was a full member, and he was equally trusted by both.’137 Ismay was devastated when the news reached Whitehall that both Prince of Wales and Repulse had been lost and he grieved for Tom Phillips. Nevertheless, when the time came for him to write his wartime memoirs, Ismay did not unnecessarily eulogise his friend.
Tom Phillips had been successively Director of Plans, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, and Vice-Chief of Naval Staff of the Admiralty. We had worked together for many years in peace and war, and I had always greatly admired his courage, industry, integrity and professional competence. His whole heart and soul were in the Navy, and he believed that there was nothing that it could not do. In particular, he refused to admit that properly armed and well-fought ships had anything to fear from air power. Nor was he alone in that opinion. Even Winston Churchill, whose forecasts were not often at fault, was one of the many who did not ‘believe that well-built modern warships properly defended by armour and A-A guns were likely to fall a prey to hostile aircraft.’ The battles-royal which raged between Tom Phillips and Arthur Harris [later Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris] when they were Directors of Plans in their respective departments were never-ending, and always inconclusive. On one occasion, when the situation which would arise in the event of Italy entering the war on the side of Germany was under discussion, Tom Phillips insisted that our Fleet would have free use of the Mediterranean, however strong the Italian Air Force might be. Bert Harris exploded, ‘One day, Tom, you will be standing on a box on your bridge (Tom was diminutive in stature) and your ship will be smashed to pieces by bombers and torpedo aircraft. As she sinks, your last words will be, ‘That was a … great mine!’138
On 24 October 1941 Prince of Wales steamed out of the Firth of Clyde after taking Admiral Phillips and his staff aboard at Greenock. Her second port of call was Cape Town, South Africa. Pound had told Churchill he would make a final decision on whether to send Prince of Wales on to Singapore after she reached Cape Town; however, it seems clear enough in hindsight that Pound had already lost the debate.
On 10 November 1941 Churchill gave a speech at the Lord Mayor’s Day Luncheon at the Mansion House, London. It was an unmistakable war warning to Japan. After first talking about conditions in occupied Europe and the improvements over the last year in Britain’s military situation, Churchill turned to the Far East. After making reference to the sinking of the Bismarck and the cowing of the Italian Navy, he revealed that Britain was strong enough to provide a naval force of heavy ships in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. He asserted that the movement of these naval forces was in conjunction with the US Main Fleet.
Despite Japan’s four-year war with China that had been characterised by the most despicable acts of barbarism, Churchill spoke with politeness and considerable restraint. He pointed out that he had voted for the 1902 treaty between Britain and Japan. He spoke of himself as being a sentimental well-wisher to the Japanese and an admirer of their many gifts and qualities, but in his next breath he revealed his total commitment to the special relationship with the US. He told his listeners and his wider audience in the US and Japan, that in the event that the two countries went to war, the British declaration of war would follow within the hour. In the entire history of Anglo-American relations no previous Prime Minister had ever committed Britain to a war to defend American life and liberty.
Churchill tried hard to convince the Japanese of the utter folly of a war with the US by contrasting the industrial strength of the two countries. He pointed out that America produced around 90,000,000 tons of steel annually whereas Japan only produced around 7,000,000 tons. He also vowed to protect British interests in the Far East and expressed his admiration for the Chinese people in defending their homeland.
Churchill’s speech omitted any reference to the very real Japanese threat to the Netherlands East Indies. He had been unable to get Roosevelt to make an unequivocal statement that it was in American’s vital interest to protect the Dutch colony. For the Japanese the vital issue was oil, not steel. Japanese domestic production only provided a fraction of the oil needed by the Imperial Japanese Navy. The nearest source of oil was the Netherlands East Indies. In 1940 that colony produced nearly 60 million barrels of oil per annum, more than any other country in Asia.
After the Netherlands was overrun by the German Army in five days, Japan saw an opportunity to gain the upper hand over a weak colony. With no hope of survival without British or American intervention, the Dutch colony extended every courtesy to Japan’s so-called chief trade negotiator, Kenkichi Yoshizawa. At the conclusion of his mission he was given an opulent farewell banquet by Governor General von Starkenborgh-Stachouwer and his American-born wife. Their long dinner table was beautifully appointed with fine crystal and china. The Governor General’s wife was the only lady at the table. The 30 men were formally attired in dinner jackets or military dress uniforms and sixteen barefooted servants hovered in the background. To all appearances this was a glittering social occasion to honour Yoshizawa; in reality it was little more than a face-saving gesture. While the colony finally agreed to increase its oil exports to Japan, they refused to yield to Japanese demands that their entire economy be placed under Japanese control.
Churchill’s ‘war warning’ to Japan on 11 November 1941 utterly failed to deter Japanese aggression. The military oligarchy that ruled Japan were convinced that the Japanese were destined to be the masters of all of Asia and that oil was essential to success in their war with China and in their inevitable future wars with Britain and the US.
On the 23-day cruise to Cape Town, Prince of Wales had no contacts with U-boats or enemy aircraft and Leach was able to catch up with some personal correspondence. One of his surviving letters is a handwritten note to General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, which is dated 15 November, the day before his ship reached Cape Town. The two had become acquainted on the voyage to Placentia Bay three months before.
Thank you so much for your note. I do think it was good of you, with all of your innumerable activities, to find time to write to me … We are certainly getting our fair share of excitement and change … I hope you are fit and flourishing. Thank you again so much for your letter.
Yours Sincerely,
John Leach139
It was extraordinary for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to take the time to write to Leach. Clearly the two men had the beginnings of a friendship.
Before her departure from Cape Town, Prince of Wales received a welcome addition to her anti-aircraft armament in the form of a single 40mm Bofors. 26 November 1941 was the penultimate day of Prince of Wales’ ten-day voyage from Cape Town to Colombo. Because of the publicity surrounding Prince of Wales’ arrival in Cape Town, not to mention her highly visible presence in the harbour, the Japanese were well aware of her movements. There is little reason to believe that the Japanese did not take note of her stopover in Colombo.
Halfway across the Pacific in Hawaii, on the other side of the International Date Line, personnel from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu kept close track of US Navy ships entering or leaving Pearl Harbor. On most days the Japanese at the Consulate knew precisely which battleships and carriers were at their moorings. This information was coded and transmitted to Tokyo.
26 November 1941 was the day that 30 Japanese warships, including six aircraft carriers, departed from remote Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands which lie north of the Japanese Home Islands. With the possible exception of personnel in the Far East Combined Bureau, which will be discussed in the next chapter, neither the Royal Navy nor the US Navy had the slightest knowledge of this furtive movement, which represented the most powerful naval strike force in the Pacific or any other ocean. In retrospect this was the first day of the final countdown to disaster for the US Navy at Pearl Harbor and for the Royal Navy in the South China Sea.
On arrival at Colombo Admiral Phillips and his key staff disembarked and were immediately flown to Singapore to confer with the service chiefs there. Leach then took his ship south of Ceylon to rendezvous with Repulse under the command of Captain W.G. Tennant, a close friend, who was his senior in rank. The remainder of Leach’s journey to Singapore was much more relaxed. He now had total authority over his own ship, was under the command of a trusted friend and the two ships were no longer in an active war zone. He could also look forward to a very special reunion; his son Henry was a midshipman in the light cruiser HMS Mauritius, refitting at Singapore. Perhaps the only enervating aspect of their journey across the Indian Ocean was the weather. Prince of Wales’ company were experiencing tropical heat that they had not known before.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, an American war correspondent called Cecil Brown had arrived in Singapore on Sunday 3 August. Brown, who had been expelled from Italy by Mussolini’s government and arrested by the German Army in Yugoslavia, was totally committed to Britain’s cause. He was destined to write the most famous firsthand account of Prince of Wales’ and Repulse’s final action. On his arrival in Singapore he checked in at Raffles Hotel.
I had dinner tonight in the beautiful palm-lined courtyard of Raffles Hotel. Each table, set on the grass, had a pink shaded lamp and a vase of orchids. The Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders band played for the smartly dressed officials and women in gay print dresses. The members of the band wore plaid hats and white coats and kilts, and the war seemed a million miles away.140
The legendary Raffles Hotel, named after Sir Stamford Raffles, the Englishman who founded the City of the Lion on a site that had been a mangrove swamp, was for many synonymous with Singapore. The long bar, known as Cad’s Alley, attracted all types including rubber planters, sea captains and sundry adventurers. It was renowned for the ‘Singapore gin sling’ – two ounces of gin, one of cherry brandy, a dash of Cointreau, lemon juice and bitters.
Raffles’s legend grew in part from its literary guests. Joseph Conrad is said to have been sitting on one of its verandas when he read a report in the Straits Times of a foundering ship whose crew had left hundreds of native passengers to their fate. Supposedly this story inspired him to write Lord Jim. Somerset Maugham, who spent a good bit of his life in south-east Asia, has been quoted as saying, ‘Raffles stood for all the fables of the exotic East.’ Noel Coward called Singapore ‘a first class place for second class people.’
Singapore is situated only a few degrees north of the equator. The heat and the humidity created an unhealthy environment for most Caucasians until they were acclimatised. Before his father’s arrival Midshipman Leach had seen the effect on the Army garrison with whom he billeted while his ship was in dry dock. ‘Subalterns of the Regiment with which I stayed spent their working hours (0900 to 1300) riding motor bicycles around the rugger field (“always useful to be able to carry a dispatch”).’141 The younger Leach also wrote of the wealth and poverty that he saw in Singapore. ‘The island is full of contrasts in the modern high-rise blocks of the business and shopping centres, and the rustic simplicity of the picturesque native kampongs; the impeccable bungalows of the well-to-do, and the squalid ramshackle huts of shanty town …’142
Both Cecil Brown and Midshipman Henry Leach had the opportunity to assess the situation in Singapore in the final months preceding the Japanese onslaught. Independently each came to the same troubling conclusion: the whole military establishment seemed to be lethargic and complacent to a degree that could not be explained by the climate or the remoteness of Britain’s war with Germany and Italy. In retrospect much of the blame can be attributed to lack of rigorous, dynamic leadership by the Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. Like other British and American senior commanders Brooke-Popham underestimated the Japanese threat. On 3 December he held an off-the-record conference for about 30 correspondents who included Cecil Brown. Brooke-Popham’s remarks revealed a rather limited understanding of both Japanese capabilities and intentions. Brown, who took copious notes, wrote the following:
I asked Sir Robert, ‘What is Japan going to do?’ ‘Although Japan does not have any particular affection for Germany, being on the initiative, she is quite likely to copy Germany’s methods whenever applicable,’ Sir Robert said. ‘That is, to strike at the weakness, rather than strength, and accomplish her objectives by intimidations rather than war.’
…
‘What do you think is going to happen?’ I asked again. ‘Well, Sir Robert said, ‘We are looking about, wondering what Japan is going to do. Japan doesn’t seem to have a policy of what to do step by step. You know there are signs of defence steps too. She is doing things in Indo-China to defend herself there. Japan is beginning to be afraid she is going to be attacked.’
…
Kennard of the Malaya Broadcasting asked how American planes compared with Japanese. ‘Oh, we are not worried about that,’ Sir Robert said. ‘But what about these Brewster Buffaloes – are they good enough?’ ‘They could give a very good account of themselves,’ Sir Robert assured us. ‘Don’t you think that we need some of the machines that Britain has at home?’ ‘Oh no,’ Sir Robert said scornfully. ‘If we need any of these super Spitfires and hyper Hurricanes we can get them out here quick enough.’143
The arrival of Prince of Wales and other unidentified heavy units of the Royal Navy at Singapore was publicised, primarily for the benefit of Japan. On 2 December Prince of Wales and Repulse reached the Singapore Naval Base shortly after 17.30 to find a large crowd eagerly awaiting them. There is a photograph of Admiral Phillips, his chief of staff Rear Admiral Palliser and his young staff officer for plans, Commander Michael Goodenough, watching their arrival. Phillips wears a particularly stern expression. Duff and Diana Cooper were part of the crowd. In August Churchill had decided to send Cooper, the erstwhile First Lord of the Admiralty, to Singapore to report directly to him on the situation. By 1 November Cooper had completed his report and he sent his aide Tony Keswick to London with instructions to deliver it personally to the Prime Minister. This report would soon become irrelevant. Cooper, who was always devoted to the Royal Navy, observed the arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse with pride.
It was a great moment when they came around the bend into the narrow waters of the straits that divide Singapore from the mainland. We were all at the naval base to welcome them, and they arrived punctual to the minute with their escort of four destroyers. They conferred a sense of complete security.144
It is inexplicable that these two ships would have ‘conferred a sense of complete security’ on a former First Lord of the Admiralty.
On 4 December Admiral Phillips, accompanied by three of his naval staff officers, left Singapore by seaplane for a conference in Manila with the senior US commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart. That night Admiral Phillips’ aircraft landed at Labuan Island six miles off the west coast of North Borneo where the Admiral dined and spent the night at Government House. His host was Hugh Humphrey, the British resident whose other roles included the post of naval reporting officer. It was a serene setting on a tropical evening far removed from the cares of the world. ‘At dinner Humphrey asked Phillips whether there would be a war with Japan and received the answer, “I don’t think so.”’145 Phillips apparently did not elaborate, but one can surmise that he, like Churchill, could not bring himself to believe that the rulers of Japan would do something so foolhardy.
Henry and his father had not seen one another for more than a year and had had no time to discuss the battle with the Bismarck, the voyage with Churchill or the action in the Mediterranean. Beyond that there was much that Henry wanted to share with his father about his life in the Royal Navy. Henry’s first opportunity to visit his father was on Saturday evening, 6 December on board Prince of Wales. (Because of the International Date Line, Singapore was one day ahead of London, Washington and Pearl Harbor.) Being accustomed to the strict dress code of the Royal Navy, Henry dressed in the evening uniform equivalent to a dinner jacket. To his surprise Henry discovered that his father, who was always meticulous about the dress code, was still wearing his white tropical uniform consisting of an open neck shirt and shorts.
Admiral Phillips had not yet returned from his meeting in Manila with General MacArthur and Admiral Hart; this meant that the Admiral’s dining quarters were available. While Leach had the option of taking his son to dinner in the wardroom with the other officers, he preferred to dine in private. Before dinner they had a chance to talk in the captain’s cabin where Leach had been writing a letter to his wife, Evelyn, at his roll-top desk. He handed the last page of the letter to Henry who added a note to his mother.
Henry was offered a cigarette with the comment, ‘I don’t know what bad habits you’ve fallen into this year.’146 After they had talked about family matters, their conversation turned to naval subjects. Leach asked his son about Mauritius’s RDF (Radio Direction Finding). This was a reference to what would be renamed radar. Henry had served in Mauritius for nine months and had kept watch regularly on the bridge, but he had never even heard of RDF.
The approaching war in the Pacific was foremost in Leach’s mind. Referring to the mounting Japanese threat, he asked his son, ‘What d’you make of the situation out here?’147 Like other midshipmen Henry had total confidence in the Royal Navy. He replied, ‘Let ‘em come … Let’s have a crack at them.’148 With a grave look his father quietly said, ‘I don’t think you have any idea of the enormity of the odds we are up against.’149
That night, the final Saturday night of peace, the smartly dressed ladies and gentlemen at Raffles carried on as if nothing would ever change.