The underlying problem was not solely one of duplication, but of providing the best possible intelligence for planning purposes.
Cab 54-3 extraction
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT).
S E C R E T.
D.C.O.S. 4.
(Also paper No: C.O.S. 420 (D.C.).)
COPY NO.17
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF.
CENTRAL MACHINERY FOR CO-ORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT.
General
We have been instructed by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee to investigate and report on a suggestion that some central machinery is now required for the coordination of certain types of intelligence.
2. The field of intelligence which it is now necessary to cover in time of peace in order to be properly prepared for the eventuality of war with any Great Power has been almost immeasurably extended and complicated by reason of –
(1) The extent to which modern war involves the whole of the resources of the nation; and
(2) The vast extension of the zone of operations that has been brought about by the advance of aviation.
3. As a result of our discussions we have formed the opinion that our intelligence organization requires some modification to cope with modern conditions. There are certain types of intelligence which can neither be comprehensively collected nor intelligently interpreted unless special arrangements are devised to establish direct and permanent liaison between the many departments, military and civil, who are in a position to make contributions to the general stock of information on the subject in question, and to give expert advice, each from its own technical viewpoint and experience, as to the significance of the material thus collected.
Industrial Intelligence
4. The first type of intelligence of this nature relates to industrial resources and, consequently, the potential war capacity of foreign countries. In 1929 the study of this problem necessitated the setting up of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries, composed of representatives of the Treasury, Foreign Office, Board of Trade and the Defence Departments, whose terms of reference are:-
(1) To establish direct liaison for the interchange of information and reports in regard to industrial intelligence in foreign countries between the Board of Trade and the Service Departments;
(2) To deal with all matters arising out of this interchange which may require joint discussion; and
(3) To discuss the significance of the more important information.
In addition a permanent whole-time staff was found to be essential to study this vast and complex problem, and the Industrial Intelligence Centre has been working very satisfactorily since 1931.
Other types of intelligence
5. Industrial Intelligence, however, is not the only type of intelligence calling for special treatment, and for the last two years there has been considerable interdepartmental discussion on the arrangements necessary for the central collection, collation and interpretation of intelligence relating to air targets in foreign countries.
There may also be other types of intelligence which, as a result of further experience, will be found later to need special treatment, but at present we have no recommendations to make on them.
Air targets in foreign countries
6. As regards air targets in foreign countries, we consider that our aim should be to ensure that the Defence Departments are in possession of such information as will enable our Air Forces to obtain the maximum effect on an enemy nation, by means of air attack, against those objectives the destruction or dislocation of which the Government consider would contribute most towards the attainment of the national aim.
7. We consider that this problem opens up a vast field for the collection of intelligence, which cannot be covered by the present intelligence branches of the Defence Departments. Before, however, putting forward any recommendations, we consider it advisable to state what the problem involves.
8. Briefly the problem can be considered under three heads:-
(i) Selection of target groups;
(ii) Collection of information;
(iii) Registration of information.
Registration of information
9. Dealing with the registration of information, we consider that this should be carried out in such a way as to facilitate the selection of suitable targets for the Government’s approval and to have immediately available all information which the Air Forces require to take immediate action against those objectives which the Government may decide are to be attacked. This information must, therefore, be tabulated and filed to conform to Air Staff requirements: the responsibility for selecting the method of registration to be adopted should, therefore, rest with the Air Ministry in discussion with the staffs of the other Defence Departments.
Selection of target groups
10. Air targets may be classified as -
(1) Military objectives (in the accepted sense of the term).
(2) Industrial targets.
(3) Non-military targets.
We attach as
Appendix I
a list showing the sub-division of targets in the industrial group.
Non-military targets are those which may be attacked in order to produce moral effect, whether the ultimate aim is to break the national will of the enemy or to stop work in particular localities. These targets include:-
(i) Crowded industrial areas where air attack would produce great moral effect.
(ii) Essential services, i.e., water supply, sanitation, fire fighting.
(iii) Centres of Government.
The reference to targets of this nature in this Report is not intended to prejudge the question as to whether or not they would, in the event of war, be attacked. If, however, it is possible that as a measure of reprisal or otherwise it were decided to do so, we must clearly be prepared beforehand by collecting the necessary information.
Collection of information
11. It is essential to collect as much information as possible regarding the groups of targets referred to in the preceding paragraph. Whilst purely military targets can be dealt with by the Defence Departments in consultation, each industrial target presents a specialist study of which the Intelligence Branches of the Defence Departments have little or no experience, and it is necessary to mobilize as much technical data as possible regarding them. The lines of investigation concerning them must follow similar channels in each group and the information produced so as to comply with registration requirements. In order that this may be done effectively, certain definitions have been evolved in the Air Ministry which we attach as
Appendix II
, and which should be applied when necessary.
Suggested organization
12. We are of opinion that the problem goes far beyond the bounds of the Defence Departments and includes questions which can only be dealt with in association with industrial experts and those connected with the public services. We suggest that it is undesirable, if it can be avoided, to set up any fresh organization if the needs can be met by adaptation of existing machinery. We believe that the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries is a suitable body to which the work might be referred, though that Committee and such sub-committees as it may form may require to co-opt additional members to deal with specific subjects.
13. If our proposal is adopted we are of opinion that the suggestions regarding the future composition of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries should emanate from that Committee itself, but we put forward the following suggestions for their consideration:-
(a) A primary need will be to decide whether the target groups mentioned in paragraph 4 are generally suitable or whether amendment is needed.
(b) Having settled the target groups to be studied, the next step is to obtain the Information required for registration. Since expert knowledge of each group is essential it would appear to be desirable to set up a number of sub-committees each charged with the study of one or more of the target groups enumerated in paragraph 9 and
Appendix I
, under chairmen nominated by the main committee, with the power to co-opt experts either from the Services or civil life.
(c) Each sub-committee should be in the closest possible touch with the registration branch at the Air Ministry, in order to ensure that the information which is being obtained is in the form required for registration and in order that the registration staff may indicate where gaps lie in the information provided. To ensure that this is done it is suggested that the Secretaries of the Sub-Committees should be provided by the Air Ministry and the Committee of Imperial Defence and organized on the lines adopted for the Supply Committees of the Principal Supply Officers Committee Organization, viz., Permanent Secretary or Secretaries to the Sub-Committees provided by the Air Ministry working with a Joint Secretary from the Committee of Imperial Defence, the latter being responsible for co-ordination.
14. We have not referred to the question of co-ordinating Service intelligence, but it would seem that the necessary co-ordination can be effected by an inter-Service Intelligence Committee composed of representatives of the three Service Intelligence Staffs, meeting at the request of one of the members. It is suggested that the Committee should be composed of
Admiralty – Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.
War Office – Head of M.I. (1) General Staff.
Air Ministry – Deputy Director of Intelligence.
15. Close liaison will, no doubt, be required between the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries and the Air Raid Precautions Department of the Home Office. That Department should be in a position to give valuable information on the question of air targets and should be represented on any new organization.
Recommendations
16. Our recommendations therefore are:-
(1) That the scope of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries should be enlarged to include “Air Targets Intelligence”; it being understood that other types of intelligence may subsequently be added.
(2) That in view of (l) above, the Sub-Committee should have the power to co-opt additional members or call on such persons as they considered necessary to deal with specific problems.
(3) That as a first step its terms of reference should be altered to read as follows:-
(a) To supervise co-ordinated interchange of information and reports between the Defence Departments and other departments concerned in regard to:-
(i) Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries.
(ii) Air Targets Intelligence.
(b) To deal with all matters arising out of this interchange which may require joint discussion; and
(c) To discuss the significance of the more important information.
(4) That the Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries should themselves put forward proposals as to any alterations which their additional responsibilities may necessitate in the composition of the Sub-committee.
(5) That the above proposals should be regarded as provisional and experimental.
(6) That the co-ordination of Service Intelligence should be carried out by an inter Service Intelligence Committee, composed as under, meeting at the request of one of the members–
Admiralty – Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.
War Office – Head of H.I. (1) General Staff.
Air Ministry – Deputy Director of Intelligence.
| (Signed) |
M.P.A. HANKEY (Chairman).
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W.M. JAMES, Vice-Admiral
D.C.N.S.
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J.G. DILL, D.M.O. & I.
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C.L. COURTNEY, D.C.A.S.
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2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
1st January, 1936.
APPENDIX I
INDUSTRIAL TARGETS
So far as the investigations by the Air Staff have progressed, the following groups appear to be essential: they are not placed in order of priority nor are they likely to be final:
(i) Electricity supply, i.e., power stations, grid system, etc.
(ii) Gas supply, including gas grid and coke ovens.
(iii) Oil supply, including depots, hydrogenation plants, etc.
(iv) Steel industry, including special steels required for armaments.
(v) Factories for and reserves of explosives, incendiary material, poison gas and their keys, e.g., nitric acid, chlorine, ammonia, etc.
(vi) Factories for and reserves of munitions, including projectiles, torpedoes, mines, bombs, S.A.A. guns, rifles, machine guns.
(vii) Factories for and reserves of motor vehicles, including tanks and tractors.
(viii) Factories for and reserves of special alloys, machine tools.
(ix) Transportation, i.e., railways, roads; water-ways. Transportation is common to targets in all three groups so that the key points in the various transportation systems, though remaining constant, will be applicable to the majority of industrial groups.
(x) Shipyards, shipping in harbour and shipbuilding establishments.
APPENDIX II
DEFINITIONS
(i) “Key” industries
are contributory industries which are more profitable for air attack than the industry which they supply. For instance, the whole output of the aircraft engine industry of a country might depend upon the output of one magneto factory. This factory would, therefore, be the “key” industry to the aircraft engine industry.
(ii) Basic industries.
These include coal and steel production on which the industry as a whole of a country largely depends. They cannot be classified as “keys” as defined above.
(iii) “Key” services
are public services, such as electricity, gas, transportation, on which industry depends and which may present more profitable targets for air attack than the industry itself. For instance, the destruction of one power station might cause the output of a group of factories to cease.
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The War Office
Whitehall
S.W.1
Colonel L.C. Hollis,
Committee of Imperial Defence,
Richmond Terrace,
WHITEHALL, S.W.l.
21st December, 1938.
Dear Hollis,
As promised on the telephone last night I am sending you herewith a copy of my Paper, which for want of a better title I have called “The Organization of Intelligence”. It does not pretend to cover all the ground or to deal in detail with every aspect of the problem. It will, however, give you I hope sufficient indication of the lines on which I suggest we might organize. I am convinced that something of this nature is required; we here in the War Office – and to a great extent at the Air Ministry and Admiralty – spend a great deal of our time in dealing with material which more rightly should be handled by the Foreign Office. Equally, at the Foreign Office they must have to cope with a number of Reports that are not strictly speaking political. What I mean is the type of Report which would have a bearing on Government policy, or preparations, for war. What I suggest we want, therefore, is a small organization, whose task is to handle this very considerable mass of information which falls between the true political and the military. I would describe it as Military/Political. I cannot see that my proposals would infringe in any way, either on the Service Departments or on the Foreign Office – rather should they lighten the burden of all of them.
I would emphasise, as I have done in my Paper, that the proposed Bureau would be solely advisory. It would have no executive power whatsoever. I emphasise this as I feel certain otherwise we shall meet great opposition from vested interests, who will be frightened that an organization of this nature will become too powerful. That is also the reason why I suggest that the Foreign Office representative should act as Chairman.
The reception of my proposals up to date – the Paper has only gone to D.M.O. & I., D.D.M.O., M.I.2., M.I.3. and S.I.S. – has been on the whole very encouraging. The D.M.O. and D.D.M.O. both agree on broad lines, though the D.M.O. suggests that “salt will have to be put on the tail of many people in Whitehall ere it goes through”. I have not had D.D.M.O.’s final comments, but hope to get them after Christmas. Nor have I seen the comments of M.I.2. and M.I.3.; but Dennys tells me that having discussed it very fully with his three sub-sections, they have come to the conclusion that it is a practical proposition and would mean, in their case, a reduction of some four officers. Menzies, who I believe discussed it with his Chief, is also in agreement, while insisting that a representative of S.I.S. should be part of the permanent body, since so much of the material that they would deal with would be supplied by his organization.
I should be most grateful if you and Ismay would now consider these proposals, and let me have your views in due course. I should also much value your advice as to how we should then proceed. Possibly the most diplomatic method might be to endeavour privately to enlist the sympathetic support of the Foreign Office before giving any wider circulation.
As you said last night this proposal, if proved acceptable, might considerably modify our present ideas with regard to the Middle East Bureau. For the moment, therefore, I feel that the latter should be left where it now is, in a state of suspended animation. Nevertheless, I think that at an early date after Christmas we must decide what we are going to do about this M.E. Bureau.
There is one other point on which the J.I.C. will also have to adjudicate, and that is to decide which Service should be responsible for the collection and collation of Air Defence Intelligence. At the moment this is not done satisfactorily, chiefly because in several foreign countries air defence comes under the control of the Air Ministry concerned, whereas in others this is not the case. The result is that for some countries Military Attachés are collecting this information and passing it home, in others this duty falls on the Air Attaché. It is not going to be very easy to find a satisfactory solution without overlapping, but the matter cannot be allowed to remain in its present state.
THE ORGANISATION OF INTELLIGENCE
The object of this Paper
1. The object of this paper is to discuss the existing Intelligence organisation; to ascertain whether this system produces the best results; and, should it appear as a consequence of this investigation, that some more efficient procedure is desirable, to submit proposals designed to make good the apparent defects.
2. It will simplify study of this subject if, at the outset, a distinction is made between the two main divisions under which Intelligence can be broadly classified. The first can be described as Military Intelligence – using the term Military in its widest sense – and the second as Political Intelligence.
The former includes all that technical data (e.g. armament, equipment, organisation of the armed forces etc.) which is of special interest to the three Defence Services. The latter comprises information on the system of government, economic and industrial conditions and the general trend of policy in foreign countries. Such matters are primarily the concern of the Foreign Office, though influencing to a lesser, but nevertheless considerable extent, other Government Departments. (For instance, it is clearly impossible to produce a well-balanced military appreciation without adequate knowledge of the political background).
3. Reduced to essentials, therefore, every Intelligence organisation, whether at the War Office, Admiralty, Foreign Office, or elsewhere, is normally handling two different categories of information. One is of particular interest and usually the immediate concern of one, or at most two Departments. The other, in varying degree, the concern of all Departments.
4. For the purposes of this paper – which is intended to deal with the wider aspects of Intelligence – there is no need to examine in detail the methods employed in the collection and collation of items falling within the first category. This is of local interest, and should be dealt with locally. It is in the second category – Political intelligence – which is common to all Departments, that overlapping and wasted effort may occur. And it is proposed, therefore, to confine discussion to this aspect alone of the problem.
The present system
5. The sources through which this Political Intelligence is obtained are many and various. They range from the Daily Press and the speeches of foreign statesmen, through Diplomatic and other official memoranda to Secret and Most Secret reports. And all these, with only few exceptions, are received by each Intelligence Directorate. How the latter deal with them is their affair; but every item has to be examined – if merely superficially – and its value assessed. This in itself means time; and frequently, where the Service Departments are concerned, it must mean wasted time. For much of this information is quite outside their province. True, it is of interest and widens the general knowledge of the officers dealing with it; but, too often, it may mean less time available for what is their first task – the collation of information of definite military value.
6. Under the present system such a state of affairs is inevitable, since no single Department is responsible for first assimilating this mass of material and for subsequently passing it on to other interested parties in an easily digestible form. It is not the task of the Foreign Office; though it is this Department which requires, and takes, the lion’s share. It is certainly not the task of the Service Departments, which only have an indirect connection, and which would indeed be guilty of a trespass should they attempt to do so. Yet every Department, for its own purposes, must, at the moment, be prepared to analyse the international political situation. There may be as many readings of the situation as there are commentators: there is certainly no doubt whatever that for some at least the time thus spent could have been better employed.
7. The disadvantages of this procedure become even more marked when, for example, a General Staff paper is called for. In nearly every case a political background will have to be produced on to which the military appreciation can then be hung. Provided that this appreciation is to be circulated only within the War Office, the War Office cannot be accused of exceeding its responsibilities. But, if it is to have a wider circulation, there is always the possibility that the political assumptions will be found not to be in accordance with Foreign Office views. And in such matters, it is this Department that must be the decisive factor.
8. That these and kindred difficulties have been recognised is shown in the recurrent demand – a demand, however, that has been invariably refused on the grounds of impracticability – for a Ministry of National Defence and a unified General Staff. Nevertheless, and in spite of these refusals, some measure of satisfaction has been given during the past ten years to the requests for closer co-operation. The Imperial Defence College has been established, the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence has been set up, while yet other additional sub-committees embracing the Defence Services have been added from time to time as the need for them became apparent. Moreover, it is through these sub-committees, on which all interested parties are represented, that agreed decisions are reached and agreed recommendations are submitted to the full Committee of Imperial Defence and to the Cabinet.
9. This is a perfectly natural and logical process, and it might have been expected that among the first subcommittees to be formed would have figured one to coordinate all Intelligence matters. This committee to be responsible for keeping world political developments under continuous observation, and for issuing, from time to time, a political summary or a memorandum that would form the basis of all major political or military appreciations. Such, however, is not the case. All that at present exists is a Joint Intelligence sub-committee (henceforth referred to as J.I.C.), with somewhat ill-defined duties and which meets only at infrequent intervals. Here surely is a deficiency which could and should be made good.
10. It has been proved by experience that, to enable the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee to function satisfactorily, a lesser body is required to prepare the material necessary for their deliberations. To meet this want the Joint Planning Committee has been called into being. Subsequently, the need for whole-time staff officers attached to the J.P.C. became apparent and, since their appointment, have constantly proved their value. Similar treatment might, with equal justification, be accorded to the analogous Intelligence Committee.
11. It seems, therefore, that to be logical the C.O.S. Committee should be provided with a J.I.C. complementary to, and working in the closest touch with, the J.P.C. In its present form the J.I.C. does not, and in fact cannot, fulfil this role; nor, it is believed, would the addition of a permanent staff officer from each of the Service Departments give it the wider scope that might be so profitably employed. Something more comprehensive seems to be demanded, and in the following paragraphs proposals will be submitted for developing this organisation on suitable lines.
The proposed system
12. It must be clearly understood from the start that the suggested organisation is designed to be purely advisory. It would take no decisions, nor lay down any policy. Equally it would in no way interfere with the complete liberty of action of any particular Department. These points deserve to be emphasised to allay apprehension which a scheme of this type may, quite naturally, raise.
Its principal task would be to sift all that political intelligence material, which hitherto has been dealt with by several departments, and, as the result of these labours, to compile a reasoned analysis of international affairs, either, periodically, in the form of a Secret summary, or, as and when required, in the form of a political appreciation. (The above would be the normal but doubtless it could be asked to undertake special investigation of particular subjects).
13. Having defined its main duties it is now necessary to set out the suggested composition of this organisation. For this it is considered advisable to maintain the J.I.C. as a foundation round which to build. Thus the three Deputy Directors of Intelligence (Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry) would continue to exercise general supervision and to form the connecting link between the proposed new organisation and the three Services. But, in view of the increased responsibilities that will be assigned to it in the future, it is important to strengthen this controlling body by the inclusion of a senior Foreign Office representative, who would also be asked to act as Chairman. (At present this duty devolves on D.D.M.I.)
14. It is not intended that these representatives of the four Departments most nearly concerned, should do more than guide the labours of the revitalised J.I.C. The work of collating the reports received, and of preparing the periodical summaries and appreciations, would be undertaken by a special staff drawn from all interested Government Departments. How the personnel will be provided, and the general allotment of duties, is best shown by a diagram. This is attached as Appendix A. The size of this staff and the suggested lay-out have been arrived at arbitrarily based on experience in the M.I. Directorate of the War Office. Obviously, it is only possible to lay down a definite establishment and conduct of work as the result of actual experience.
15. Opponents of these proposals will undoubtedly protest that a considerable increase of staff is entailed, and this, moreover at a period when it is difficult to select suitable personnel and when, in any case, it is inopportune further to augment their number. It is contended, however, that this may not ultimately be the case; since, if this organisation achieves what it is hoped to be capable of doing, it might then be possible to reduce the staffs of the several Intelligence Directorates. Under existing conditions it is quite certain that a great deal of valuable time is wasted daily through handling reports, which have no military significance and have only a political value. In the future all such reports would be the responsibility of the staff of the J.I.C. Furthermore, there should be an additional saving of time and labour for the M.I. Directorates if they no longer have to compile political appreciations as they are now compelled to do. Collectively, this should mean a considerable lightening of the burden, and the eventual possibility of effecting some reduction in personnel.
16. It may be argued that to remove this political side from the M.I. Directorate is to deprive it, and the War Office (Admiralty and Air Ministry) of essential information. Actually this would not be the case, since the J.I.C. summaries would adequately meet this need, and indeed, in an improved form since these summaries would represent a joint opinion and not that of one Service only. Furthermore, should a political appreciation be required by War Office (Admiralty and Air Ministry) this could always be called for by the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and this also as an agreed production should have an enhanced value.
17. A final word may be desirable as to the methods of circulating intelligence reports and other information under the system here envisaged. What is proposed is broadly as follows. No change would be made in the case of purely military reports. These would go as hitherto direct to the Department/Departments interested. Where, however, these primarily military reports contained items of political interest, copies or relevant extracts would be passed to J.I.C. for consideration. As regards political information contained in Foreign Office Telegrams, Official Despatches and memoranda from H.M. representatives abroad etc., this would always be passed to J.I.C. except in such cases as were only for action by a Department. Eventually, it might be possible to cease circulation of such items to M.I. Directorates, though in the early and experimental stages of the new procedure, it would be preferable to continue the present system, but on the understanding that where political intelligence was concerned no action by M.I. Directorates was necessary. (The case of F.O. has not been dealt with as conditions are so dissimilar from those in Service Ministries).
18. Such, in general terms, is the system it is suggested might be introduced. It is fully realised that much inter-departmental discussion will be necessary if final agreement is to be reached. Nevertheless, it is believed that, given a fair trial, it will go some way towards remedying an obvious lack in the machinery of the C.I.D., and will also provide a speedier and more efficient instrument for dealing with certain aspects of current international problems than is possible under the methods obtaining today.
The study of Propaganda
19. An additional argument in favour of these proposals is to be found in a memorandum by Sir Stephen Tallents dealing with his experiences as Director General designate Ministry of Information during the crisis last September (M.I.C.15). In this memorandum Sir Stephen Tallents states that: “The outstanding lesson, however, taught by the September rehearsal in the Ministry’s sphere, was the lack of machinery for securing the prompt, wide and efficient conveyance of British news and views to potentially enemy peoples.”
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He goes on to argue that it is essential to build up a nucleus organization in peace that will be capable of carrying out: “such continuous study of conditions and opinion in enemy countries as will ensure, at a moment which may come suddenly and will certainly be critical, a
just assessment of the vulnerable points in enemy public opinion and the lines on which they should, through all available channels be attacked.”
20. To fulfil this object Sir Stephen Tallents proposes the creation of a centre that would: “while conducting part of its work in secret, be able also to work openly and in normal conditions. This means that some peace-time ‘cover’ must be secured for it, whether by its attachment to some regular organization, or possibly through the recognised interest in German affairs for other peacetime purposes of the man in charge of it”.
It may also be added, to complete the picture that the “existing agencies” through which he proposes to collect the material necessary for his purpose, are the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, the S.I.S. organization, and the B.B.C.
21. The case for a reorganised and enlarged J.I.C. must stand or fall on its own merits; but it is at least noteworthy that all of the “existing agencies” cited by Sir Stephen Tallents – with the sole exception of the B.B.C. – are already represented, either directly or indirectly, in that body. Moreover, in the reconstituted J.I.C. could be found, – or so it would seem – not only the ideal cover that is being sought for, but also a permanent staff handling daily the very type of data that is required. By the addition of one more section to that organisation the peace-time propaganda nucleus, that is so urgently needed, could most readily be provided.
22. It is doubtless a simple matter to criticise this scheme, both in its indirect connection with a potential Ministry of Information, and also, more directly, in its original purpose as a common centre for the collation and distribution of Political Intelligence. Yet it would be difficult to deny entirely that, something on the lines set out above is either illogical or would contribute nothing to promote increased efficiency. No claim is made that these proposals are final and that there are no alternatives. They are tentative suggestions put forward as a basis for discussion and criticism, from which it is hoped agreement in principle might result. Once that has been achieved agreement on matters of detail should not present an insoluble problem. All that is now asked, is that criticism should be unbiased and constructive.
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In this connection the following extract from a recent memorandum of M.A. Berlin (No.1130 d/d 2.11.38) is significant.
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“I believe that propaganda in Germany, as far as it may affect military matters, is receiving wide study and attention. We know, for instance, that at the Wehrmachtsakademie, which corresponds to our Imperial Defence College, considerable time is devoted to the study of this subject both by civilian and military students.”
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It is fair to assume that the propaganda instrument has been allotted a prominent place in the scheme for “total war”.
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