The report was also hugely detailed. It provided information on Russian economic production, fuel, power and industry; but also its intentions towards Scandinavian and Baltic states, Germany, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece, in addition to the Western powers, the Black Sea region, the Middle East and the Far East. Summarising the conclusions, the JIC stated that Russia’s primary policy would be directed towards ‘achieving the greatest possible measure of security’. To achieve this, ‘Russia will … draw the States lying along her borders, and particularly those in Europe, into her strategic system’. Overall the report was sensible and offered a balanced assessment, but it did little to help settle debate.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet. December
1944.
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of TOP SECRET
Copy No. 32
J.I.C.(44)467(O)(Final.) RESTRICTED CIRCULATION
18th December
, 1944
Circulated for the consideration for the Chiefs of Staff
WAR CABINET.
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee.
RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND INTENTIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF HER SECURITY. REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE.
IN this paper we consider Russia’s strategic interests in the period after the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, from the point of view of her security. We also consider the policy that Russia may be intending to pursue in the post-war period in supporting her interests. We examine in detail, in an Annex, Russia’s strategic interests and policy in various countries. We have assumed that the depth of defence needed for the adequate deployment of air defences will not be greatly different from what it is to-day. We do not take account of forms of warfare not at present in use.
2. We must emphasise that any study of Russia’s strategic interests and policy must be speculative as we have little evidence to show what view Russia herself takes of her strategic interests or what policy she intends to pursue. Moreover, Russian policy at present depends very largely on the decisions of Marshal Stalin; he is over 65 and it is impossible to predict what changes in the internal and foreign policies of Russia might follow his removal from the scene. We report as follows:-
3. Russia after the war will present a phenomenon new in modern history, a land empire containing within its frontiers a large, youthful and rapidly expanding population, nearly all the raw materials essential for an adequate war economy, and an industry capable of supporting in the field armies substantially larger than those of any other Power in Europe. In addition to this Russia’s immense size and the distribution of her natural resources give her great advantages in depth of defence and dispersal of economically important targets; the only exceptions are the Caucasus oilfields, the coal, iron and industries of the Ukraine and, of lesser economic importance, the industrial areas of Moscow and Leningrad. Even these areas are far less vulnerable to attack than the corresponding areas in any other country in Europe.
4. Russia has already shown that she can make good military use of these natural resources. Although her level of technical efficiency is still below that of the most advanced modern Powers, she has proved her capacity to deploy and maintain in the field very large forces and to defeat immensely powerful German armies. Russia’s technical and military efficiency are likely to increase; it is probable that there will be an improvement in the general standard of education and that technical training will be further developed, which will tend to raise the level of technical efficiency; similarly, the growth of a military tradition based on the experience gained in the present war is likely to bring about an improvement in Russia’s military efficiency.
5. If, as we expect, no violent political upheaval takes place in Russia after the war, the military and economic development of the country will continue without serious disturbance, not perhaps at the exceptional intensity
of the years before this war, but at least on an upward curve. Russia will contain within her own frontiers such military and economic resources as would enable her to face without serious defeat even a combination of the major European Powers. It is true that Russia will probably want to import considerable quantities of oil, but her object would be to conserve her own internal resources and to facilitate industrial expansion and the development of road transport. Since Russian oil production in 1950 may be as high as 50 million tons, these additional imports could, if necessary, be dispensed with in time of war.
6. Russia could, therefore, with much less risk than any other Power in Europe, pursue a policy of isolation and rely exclusively on her own military strength to protect her against aggression. For reasons of geography and communications a serious threat to Russia’s security can only be mounted across Russia’s western frontier between the Baltic and the Carpathians; in all other directions considerations of terrain or communications make it impossible to deploy sufficient forces to challenge the Russian armies or involve advances of many hundreds of miles before strategically or economically important areas can be reached. Russia can therefore concentrate her immense strength very largely on the defence of her Western frontier.
7. Russia’s desire for absolute security will, however, be very great. There is little doubt that the Russian Government is determined to raise the standard of living of the Russian people to something approaching that of the Western Powers; the fact that by the end of this war a large number of Russian soldiers will have had personal experience of the greater comfort available to the countries of the West will give a great impetus to this determination. Much of the industry of European Russia has been devastated; if the desired improvement of the standard of living is to be achieved, not only will the devastated areas have to be restored, but also there will have to be a great deal of fresh industrial and agricultural development. A programme of this size will require a long period of peace, and it would be considerably speeded up if Russia could import industrial equipment from abroad and exact large reparations deliveries from Germany.
8. Russia, therefore, will not be prepared to take any chances, and however small may be the risk of aggression, particularly in the period immediately after the war, she will seek to build up a system of security outside her frontiers in order to make sure, so far as is humanly possible, that she is left in peace and that her development is never again imperilled by the appalling devastation and misery of wars such as she has twice experienced within a generation.
9. With this end in view Russia will at least experiment with a policy of collaboration with the British Empire and the United States. She will consider it natural that world affairs should be largely regulated by these three Powers and she will tend to took on any world security organisation as a from of Grand Alliance through which this triumvirate will be able to settle the disputes of the lesser Powers. She will not regard a world security organisation as a suitable body to settle serious disputes between the three great Powers themselves, since she will argue that if they fall out the foundation of world security will have been destroyed.
10. While Russia will be prepared to join a world security organisation, if its aims are in line with her conception of its proper functions, she will insure against the failure of such an organisation by building up along her frontiers a system of buffer States closely linked with her and by destroying for the longest possible period the power of aggression of Germany and Japan. Thus in Europe, Russia will regard Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia as forming her protective screen. She will, however, probably regard Norway and Greece as being outside her sphere so long as she is satisfied with British collaboration. She will wish to dominate the Black Sea and to be able effectively to control the passage of warships through the Straits. In the Middle East she will want to control North Persia. In the Far East, apart from the acquisition of Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles, she will try to get some form of control over Manchuria before 1904, which gave her control of Dairen and Port Arthur and of the lines of communication running to them.
11. Russia will tend to regard these territories as falling naturally within her special sphere of interest and
will not admit that there could be any conflict between such a national security system and a world security organisation. Russia will hope that the creation of such a protective screen will ensure that if at any time a combination of hostile Powers should seek to challenge her, the first shock of aggression would be taken so far as possible outside Russia’s borders. Such a system would also add depth to Russia’s defences, give greater time for mobilisation, increase the chance that the fighting would not take place on Russian soil and deny to the enemy the support of neighbouring States. She will wish to import oil from Roumania and possibly coal from Poland. She will also wish to prevent Germany from making use of the heavy industries of Silesia or importing oil from Roumania. Russia’s relations with the States concerned will be affected by the practical possibility of exercising control over them, by their strategic importance and by the extent to which Russia feels that she can rely on the sincere collaboration of the local government and on the sympathy of the people as a whole. Generally speaking, Russia will wish to occupy in the strategically important countries along her frontiers a position rather similar to that of Great Britain in Egypt; that is to say, Russia will allow these countries independence so long as she is in a position to ensure that they pursue a policy that tends to protect her strategic interests.
12. Outside this bastion of associated Powers Russia will do her utmost to make certain that Germany and Japan are for longest possible time rendered incapable of aggression. As stated above, a serious threat to the security of Russia as a whole can in practice only be mounted across her western frontier between the Baltic and the Carpathians. This would involve the use of German territory and for this reason it will be the keystone of Russia’s post-war policy to ensure that Germany is kept weak. Russia will favour the military and economic disarmament of Germany and perhaps her political dismemberment; she will attach importance to blasting the economic bases of Germany’s military power. As part of the policy of dominating Germany, Russia will look to the Western Powers and particularly to Great Britain and France to act as the other side of the ring round Germany and she will regard as the acid tests of the sincerity
of their collaboration their determination to make and keep Germany weak. Russia would regard as a potential menace to her security any trend towards a reconciliation between the Western Powers and Germany. If events took such a turn, Russia might seek to outbid the Western Powers and thereby win Germany over to her side; alternatively, if Russia feared that Germany was joining a potentially hostile combination against her, she might launch a preventive war on Germany.
13. Though Japan could not be so serious a menace to Russia as Germany, Russia will nevertheless wish to make sure that if she was to fight a war in Europe, she will be able to do so without the threat of Japanese aggression in her rear. She will therefore favour the strict demilitarisation of Japan and control over her economy. Russia will hope that the control she will secure over the resources of Manchuria and Korea will not only enable her to develop her Far Eastern territories and so greatly increase her military strength there, but also make it difficult for Japan, cut off from these resources, to build up an adequate war economy.
Conclusion.
14. In the period after the war Russia’s policy will be directed primarily towards achieving the greatest possible measure of security. She will not regard as sufficient even the security inherent in her vast size and great resources in men and materials, but will wish to take every possible precaution against being again invaded, however small the risk may seem to be. Russia has a further reason for seeking security: she will wish to raise the standard of living of her people to something more nearly approaching that of the Western Powers. To achieve this she will need a prolonged period of peace in which to restore the devastated areas and, in addition, to develop her industry and agriculture. Particularly in the years immediately after the war this programme of internal development would be greatly faciliated if Russia could import industrial equipment.
15. In order to achieve the greatest possible security Russia will wish to improve her strategic frontiers and to draw the States lying along her borders, and particularly those in Europe, into her strategic system. Provided that the other Great Powers are prepared to accept Russia’s predominance in these border States and provided that they follow a policy designed to prevent any revival of German and Japanese military power, Russia will have achieved the greatest possible measure of security and could not hope to increase it by further territorial expansion. Nor is it easy to see what else Russia could under such conditions hope to gain from a policy of aggression.
16. As a further measure of insurance Russia will at least experiment with collaboration with Great Britain and America in the interest of world security and particularly in removing the danger of German or Japanese aggression. If Russia came to believe that Great Britain and America were not sincerely collaborating along these lines, she would probably push her military frontiers forward into the border States in Europe, try by political intrigue to stir up trouble in Greece, the whole of the Middle East and India, and exploit her influence over the Communist parties in the countries concerned to stimulate opposition to an anti-Russian policy. If war appeared imminent Russia might strike first at the oil resources of the Middle East.
17. While, therefore, Russia will not, in our opinion, follow an aggressive policy of territorial expansion, her suspicion of British and American policy will nevertheless continue to cause difficulty as will also her tactlessness in the handling of international affairs. Accordingly Russia’s relations with the British Empire and the United States will depend very largely on the ability of each side to convince the other of the sincerity of its desire for collaboration. (Signed)
V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.
E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE.
J. A. SINCLAIR.
F. INGLIS.
C. G. VICKERS.
Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
18th December, 1944.
ANNEX.
Economic Background.
Man-power
.
1. Owing to the high natural increase in the Russian birthrate and despite the permanent casualties from the present war, military man-power should be greater in five to ten years than it was on the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Even if land operations in any future war were on the scale of the present Russian commitment, shortage of man-power would not prove a limiting factor. The number of men in Russia between the ages of 15 and 34 which is estimated to have numbered about 30 million in 1940, will probably increase to about 37 million in 1955. German man-power between these ages was about 11 million and will slightly decline over the period.
2. In 1940 there were in Russia about 49 million men between the ages of 15 and 64. In 1955 the number will probably increase to about 67 million. Education, both elementary and technical, has made considerable progress during the last few years. Thus, not only is the labour force increasing numerically but individual productive capacity should also increase.
3. The above numerical estimates take no account of the effects of the present war on which statistical information is lacking. We do not think, however, that these will alter the broad trends of population.
Internal Resources of Raw Materials
.
4. Russia possesses large resources of foodstuffs and raw materials which should in the long run render her self-supporting in time of war, though some imports of tin, copper, natural rubber and wool are at present necessary. Her resources are widely dispersed and are in the main at a considerable distance from her frontiers. Two exceptions are first the Ukraine, an important source of foodstuffs, iron and manganese ore and coal; and second, the Caucasus, from which Russia gets about 75 per cent of her petroleum supplies.
Fuel and Power
.
5. In 1945, production of coal in the U.S.S.R. will approach the 1940 level, that of oil may be as much as 25 per cent above and that of electric power about 10 per cent above. During the next five years a steady expansion of all three (and particularly coal, as the Donbass is restored) may be expected at rates which may amount to 5-10 per cent per annum.
6. It is, however, very difficult to forecast how far these supplies of fuel and power will be adequate to meet requirements. Before the war, the consumption of coal and particularly of power was relatively small by western standards having regard to Russia’s size and population. In coal and oil and possibly in power as well, there was a tendency for production to lag behind plans — pointing to a fuel and power bottleneck. Development of hydro-electric power stations may help to fill the gap but will take a long time.
7. Russia’s post-war fuel and power requirements will naturally depend on the kind of industrial expansion which she plans. If the long term objective is the kind of standard of living enjoyed before the war say in the United Kingdom or Germany, an enormous programme of capital expansion will be required, and this will require large fuel supplies.
8. Coal production may prove to be a brake on industrial expansion unless supplemented by the use of oil in industry on a considerable scale; and much the same consideration applies to power. The oil needs of an expanded road transport plan are unpredictable but may be very large.
9. Russia may therefore wish to import Polish coal at least until the productive capacity of the Donbass is fully restored.
10. Russia’s oil production in 1940 was about 32 million tons and may have risen to about 40 million tons in 1944. About three quarters of this comes from the Caucasus. By 1950 production might be as high as 50 million tons. Such suppiles will probably be sufficient not to constitute a serious limiting factor on Russia’s military and industrial effort in time of war. In peace time it would be sufficient to enable great advances to be made in industrial development and in the standards of life. Further supplies might facilitate more progress in industrial expansion, and would enable a yet higher standard of living to be attained through the development of road traffic. In time of war it would ease the Russian task.
11. The output of the Caucasus oilfields will probably increase somewhat during the next ten years, and will
probably continue to be a major source of oil for Russia during the foreseeable future. At present the Caucasus is believed to account for nearly three-quarters of the proved reserves of oil in Russia. There are believed to be considerable reserves in other parts of Russia, and as these are developed the reserves in the Caucasus will represent a smaller proportion of the total than is the case now. While the Russians can hardly fear that there is early danger of reserves being exhausted, it is possible that, with the large prospective increase in her requirements, Russia may consider it desirable to conserve some of her own supplies and to secure a share in supplies elsewhere. This line of throught has arisen in the United States which has much larger proved reserves than Russia.
12. We, therefore, think that Russia will wish to import oil from Roumania and possibly elsewhere and to develop oilfields in North Persia.
Industrial Areas
.
13. Russia’s long-dated industrial plans have been based on defence and strategic considerations. Industry has in consequence been developed as much as possible in areas remote from her frontiers, especially in the Volga-Urals and Kuzbas (Western Siberia) industrial regions. Important exceptions are, of course, the Moscow-Leningrad industrial region and that of the Ukraine.
14. Broadly speaking, within a period of say 10–15 years, Russia’s industrial capacity should suffice to enable her in time of war to be independent of imports, and this capacity will naturally increase with the reconstruction of Ukrainian industry and with the completion of long-term projects for the development of communications and industrialisation of outlying areas such as the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East. Russia east of Lake Baikal, however, lacks the population and resources required to make this area independent of imports from the rest of Russia or overseas. There is accordingly a need to add to the economic resources of Russia’s Far Eastern territories.
Mercantile Marine
.
15. To carry the imports needed for the rapid completion of her programme of reconstruction and development,
Russia may greatly expand her mercantile marine. It would be in keeping with her general policy to use her own ships so far as possible rather than to rely on foreign vessels. After the period of reconstruction foreign trade will not be so necessary for Russian economy, but it is probable she will continue to trade wherever she thinks it to her advantage to do so. We think, however, that she will so plan her economy that the continuance of her foreign trade for the maintenance of her economy in time of war will not be essential.
16. It is against this general background that we examine below in greater detail Russia’s economic situation and her strategic interests and policy in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.
Russia’s Strategic Interests in Certain Areas.
Norway, Sweden and the Far North
.
17. Russia’s principal interests in this area requiring protection will be the mines of Petsamo, which will be an important source of nickel, the ports on the Murman coast and the sea route round the North Cape; this is the shortest route for supplies from Western Europe and America, if the Baltic and Black Sea routes are closed, as they have been in this war.
18. All the above and her Northern sea route to the Far East are vulnerable to attack by any Power with naval and air forces based on North Norway. Russia’s security would therefore be increased if she were in occupation of North Norway or had bases there; but we do not think that this need dictate a Russian occupation of this area in time of peace, as it could so easily be occupied when the need arose. It would, however, be in Russia’s strategic interest that Norway and Sweden should at least not fall under the exclusive influence of any potentially hostile Power or group of Powers.
19. So far as concerns Russia’s policy in this area, present evidence suggests that she would regard it as natural that Norway should be closely associated with Great Britain. The Russian Government, indeed, stated in December 1941 that they would be prepared to support arrangements whereby Great Britain would have the right to maintain naval bases in Norway. We therefore think that, so long as Russia is satisfied with the
collaboration she is receiving from Great Britain, she will see no need herself to secure bases in Norway. Russia is likely, however, to consider the maintenance of an ocean-going fleet in Far Northern waters desirable for the protection of her interests.
20. In the immediate post-war period Russia is not likely to be well disposed towards Sweden, and she will be particularly suspicious of Sweden’s relations with Finland. If there is any sign that Sweden is intriguing with the anti-Russian parties in Finland, Russia will bring pressure to bear to put an end to this. Russia will similarly try to prevent Swedish collaboration with Germany. Russia would also view with suspicion signs that Sweden was aligning herself politically with Great Britain.
Finland and the Baltic
.
21. Russia’s principal strategic interests in the Baltic are the defence of the industrial area of Leningrad, of her coast-line in the Eastern Baltic and sea communications in the Baltic.
22. The defence of Leningrad would be greatly improved by the occupation of South Finland; but so long as Finland follows a policy friendly towards Russia and is not closely associated with any potentially hostile Power or group of Powers the defence of Leningrad would be adequately assured by Russia’s possesion of the Baltic States and by the base at Porkkalla which she has obtained in the armistice with Finland.
23. Since, as stated above, the maintenance of overseas trade is not likely to be of major importance for the maintenance of Russia’s economy in time of war, it will not be essential for the protection of Russian security to undertake the large commitments involved in an attempt to control the sea routes out of the Baltic. It will, however, be strategically advantageous for her to control sea communications in the Eastern Baltic, which would enable Russia to deny to Germany a large proportion of her supplies of iron ore from Sweden. In this connexion it would be to her advantage to occupy the Aland Islands, but she has hitherto showed no signs of wishing to do so.
24. Russia’s policy in defence of these interests may be as follows. It is just possible that the Russians may after the war try to stage a plebiscite in Finland such
as would lead to a Finnish application for incorporation in the Soviet Union. On the whole we think such a move unlikely, since it would not be easy to fake a plebiscite in Finland unless the whole country was under Russian occupation and possibly not even then. It seems more probable that Russia will be content with the degree of military control allowed her under the armistice terms. In addition, she will require that the Government in power in Finland should follow a policy of friendship and close collaboration with Russia. If any Finnish Government showed signs of breaking away from this policy the Russians would either seek to overthrow it by intriguing with the opposition parties in Finland or in the last resort would use force to secure the overthrow of the Government.
25. Russia would wish to annex Königsberg and probably also Tilsit in order to increase her security in the Eastern Baltic. Königsberg would also be an additional port for Lithuania and White Russia.
26. Russia will probably insist on some form of international control over the Kiel Canal, even though she will be aware that no international agreement is likely to keep the Canal or, for that matter the exit from the Baltic, open for the passage of Russian ships in time of war. Russia is unlikely to have any particular political interest in Denmark and, indeed, she stated in December 1941 that she would agree to the establishment of British naval bases there.
RUSSIA
’S
WESTERN
FRONTIER
.
27. For reasons of geography and communications a serious threat to the security of Russia as a whole can only be mounted across her Western frontier between the Baltic and the Carpathians. In this area Russia’s frontier is geographically ill-defined and has no strong natural defences. Russia therefore requires considerable depth of defence to ensure that the enemy cannot by surprise-attack overrun Moscow and the industrial areas and sources of raw materials in the Ukraine. Russia also needs depth for the deployment of her air defences of these centres.
28. South of the Carpathians the poor communications of South-East Europe would make it very difficult to mount a major-attack on the Ukraine.
29. Russia’s western frontier can in practice only be seriously threatened by Germany or by other Powers acting in concert with Germany. A threat might in theory develop from a combination of Poland with other Powers, but to be a serious menace this would also require the use of German territory. Accordingly the security of Russia’s western frontier will depend above all else on the solution of the German problem.
30. In order to ensure that the menace of German aggression shall be eliminated for the longest possible period, Russia will wish, first to keep Germany weak, secondly to build up along her own frontiers a system of buffer States designed to take the first shock of aggression and to give added depth to her own defence, and thirdly to ensure that the Western Powers continue to act as the other side of the ring around Germany. We examine below the policy that Russia is likely to pursue towards the countries concerned in order to secure these objectives.
Germany
31. It is not possible to forecast the precise lines of Russian policy towards Germany. Stalin appears to favour the breaking up of Germany into a number of independent states; on the other hand, the Russian representative on the European Advisory Commission has strongly advocated the retention or creation of a central German Government. Though these proposals are not mutually exclusive, they suggest that Russian views on territorial questions have not yet crystallised. In general, however, Russia’s main preoccupation in her policy towards Germany will be to ensure as far as possible that she does not again threaten Russian security. In the economic field it seems likely from her armistice terms with the satellites, that she will make heavy demands for reparation and satisfy the claim by the wholesale removal of industrial plant and equipment, transport facilities and the raw material surpluses from her zone of occupation; and by the use of several million German prisoners of war in the rebuilding of her devastated areas. Further, Russia is likely to exercise her political influence over her Western neighbours in the direction of dissociating their economies from that of Germany and perhaps of depriving Germany even in peace time of imports of strategic
materials from these sources. Though Russia might not be prepared to submit her own trade in raw materials to any form of international control, even if it were designed primarily to control German imports of such materials, she would probably be willing to give her general support to such a system so long as it served to keep Germany weak. She would be likely to intensify the violence of her economic measures against Germany if she regarded Anglo-American policy as being coloured by the desire to conserve the industrial potential of Western Germany, none the less if it were advocated in the interest of general European or world prosperity.
32. If Germany is kept dismembered, the complexion of the Governments of the resulting States would be a matter of secondary importance to Russia. No doubt she would support any Left-wing parties prepared to collaborate with her; but she would be equally ready to work with any other parties that were similarly disposed. If Germany were not dismembered, or having been dismembered were reunited, Russia would not necessarily welcome the development of a unified Communist Germany such as might become a dangerous rival to Communist Russia.
Poland.
33. While Poland by herself cannot be a menace to Russia, an attack between the Baltic and the Carpathians must come through Polish territory and it will therefore be in Russia’s strategic interest to ensure that Poland’s foreign policy is based on co-operation with Russia.
34. Russia considers that Poland’s eastern frontier should run along the Curzon Line, leaving Vilna and Lvov in Russian hands. As compensation she is prepared to give Poland a large slice of Germany as far west as the Oder and East Prussia, with the exception of Königsberg and perhaps Tilsit. With East Prussia thus removed from German control, a frontier along the Curzon Line would, so long as Germany is kept weak and Poland is co-operative, adequately safeguard Russia’s strategic interests between the Baltic and the Carpathians. The extent to which Russia will be prepared to allow Poland relative independence within these frontiers will largely be governed by how far she feels that she can rely on Poland’s collaboration. For so long, however as Russia is not satisfied that Poland is willing to pursue
a policy of collaboration Polish independence is likely to be more nominal than real.
35. In the period immediately after the war Russian forces will be in occupation of eastern Germany and the Russians will certainly insist on maintaining troops and air bases on their lines of communication through Poland. How soon, if ever, these troops will be withdrawn will depend on Russia’s appreciation of Polish readiness to collaborate, particularly in measures for common action to meet any threat to Russia’s western frontier.
Balkans.
36. South of the Carpathians the best defensive line would run along the Carpathians to the Galatz Gap and thence along the Danube estuary. The threat from this direction is not, however, as great as north of the Carpathians. Russia will have a strategic interest in ensuring that Roumania shall not be hostile and thus a potential base for attack. Moreover, although it would be an advantage to Russia’s economy to have the Roumanian oilfields, it would not be essential in time of war. On balance, we think that it will not be necessary for Russia, who will certainly exercise very great influence in all the Balkan countries except perhaps Greece, to hold a frontier further west than the 1940 frontier along the line of the Pruth.
37. Roumania
.—Russia will probably be prepared to leave Roumania nominally independent, but will exercise close control over her. She will probably also maintain bases in Roumania and try to secure some form of control over the disposal of Roumanian oil. Having this control over Roumania, Russia will be satisfied with a frontier along the Pruth, leaving Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in Russian hands. Russia will also favour the return to Roumania of at least the greater part of the territories ceded to Hungary under the Vienna award.
38. Bulgaria
.—Russia will similarly control Bulgaria but here the control is likely to be more indirect, both because there is much less to be got out of Bulgaria economically and because the Russians can rely on the generally pro-Russian attitude of the Bulgarian people. Russia has so far refuted any Bulgarian claims to Greek Thrace.
39. Yugoslavia
.—Russia’s interest in Yugoslavia will be
less than her interest in Roumania and Bulgaria, but she will nevertheless wish to have considerable influence in Yugoslavia, particularly in view of the possible future relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
40. Greece.—Russia has stated that she regards Greece as being within the British sphere of interest. She did not occupy Salonika when she was in a position to do so and we see no reason why in the post-war years she should depart from this policy so long as she is satisfied with British collaboration. This statement of Russian policy suggests that she regards the Mediterranean as falling rather within the British sphere of influence, since if she herself aspired to play a leading role in the Mediterranean she would probably wish as a first step to get Greece and the Ægean Islands under her control, direct or indirect.
The Western Powers.
41. It will strategically be most important to Russia that the Western Powers should continue to act as the other side of the ring round Germany and pursue a policy designed to prevent any revival of German military power. So long as they do this, Russia is not likely to have any other special interest in Western Europe, though she would no doubt welcome the replacement of the Franco régime in Spain, and perhaps also the Salazar régime in Portugal, by a less anti-Russian Government. Russia will seek to maintain close relations with a resurgent France both because France will be the Western Power most closely concerned with the prevention of German aggression and also because Russia may not wish any Western bloc
to fall too exclusively under British influence.
42. Russia would regard any trend towards a reconciliation between the Western Powers and Germany as a potential menace to her security. If Russia thought that the policy of the Western Powers was developing along such lines, she might seek to bring pressure to bear on them and particularly on Great Britain by indulging in political intrigue designed to stir up trouble in Greece, in the Middle East as a whole, and particularly in Persia, Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, in Afghanistan and in India. Russia might also seek to exploit to the full her political influence over the Communist parties in the countries of Western Europe and generally by
political intrigue to stimulate opposition on to anti-Russian policy. Russia might consider that her security required that she should at least have the right to maintain armed forces in Finland, Poland, Czecho-slovakia, Hungary and Roumania, in order to gain depth of defence and more times of military and economic mobilisation. If Russia believed that attack by the Western Powers was imminent, it is possible that she might seek to forestall it by a campaign in Persia and Iraq designed to deny to the Western Powers the oil resources of this area and to increase her security against air attack on her own oil resources in the Caucasus.
43. If Russia thought that Germany was likely to join the Western bloc
forming against her, she might launch a preventive war against Germany. Alternatively, it is possible that she might seek to outbid the Western Powers and so win Germany over to her side, though fear of thus allowing Germany dangerously to increase her military power might decide Russia against this course.
BLACK
SEA AND THE
STRAITS
.
44. Russia’s strategic interest in the Black Sea will be the defence of her coast line against amphibious assault and also to protect her shipping there.
45. Russia will not have a major strategic interest in controlling the sea routes in and through the Mediterranean which, in any case, could not be secured without assuming very large commitments. We therefore think that Russia’s strategic interest will only require that she should dominate the Black Sea, for which purpose she will require, as far as possible, to control the Straits. Full control of movement through the Straits could only be assured by occupations of a considerable stretch of territory on either side of them and of bases dominating the sea routes through the Ægean. We do not, however, think it would be essential to Russia’s security to extend her territory so far; it would be sufficient for Russia’s strategic interests if she had air and naval supremacy in the Black Sea and if Turkey was not closely associated with any potentially hostile Power or group of Powers.
46. As regards the Straits, Russia has already indicated that the Montreux Convention governing the passage of warships must be revised. She is likely to insist that
she shall have the right of passage for her warships as she thinks fit and the last word in deciding whether or not warships of other Powers should pass through the Straits. Russia will maintain an impressive fleet in the Black Sea. Since a serious threat to Russian control of the Straits would, in practice, depend on the establishment, by some major Power, of bases in Turkish territory, Russia is likely to desire that Turkey should remain independent and not allied to any major Power. Russia is therefore likely to work for the termination of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance and may try to win Turkey over to her side. It is also possible that Russia may demand from Turkey the return of the province of Kars, which passed into Turkish hands at the end of the last war.
MIDDLE
EAST
.
47. Russia’s principal strategic need in the Middle East is to ensure adequate defence for the South Caucasus oilfields, which are essential for the maintenance of her war economy. These oil-bearing areas are protected against land attacks by very strong natural defences, and by the great distance from any adequate base from which a land attack against them could be mounted. The communications in the areas bordering on South Caucasus would require much development before they would be capable of maintaining land armies sufficient to constitute any serious menace to the armies that Russia could deploy in defence of the oilfields. We therefore do not consider that there can be any serious land threat to the oilfields.
48. There remains the threat of air attack. Oilfields, as such, are not particularly vulnerable to any form of air attack at present in use; but the Russians will have seen, at Ploesti, the damage that can be done to oil refineries and transport facilities by intensive air attack from comparatively distant bases. One method of increasing the defence of Russia’s oil industry would be to locate the refineries at a considerable distance from the frontiers and build protected pipelines to them. Provided Russia takes this precaution, the protection of her oil supplies from the South Caucasus could be adequately secured within her present frontiers. It would not be essential for Russia’s war economy to possess oilfields in Northern Persia, but for reasons given it would be of considerable advantage to develop supplies there both for peace and war.
49. In the event of a threat of hostilities with Great Britain and the United States and possibly even if there was a threat of operations in the Middle East by the United States alone, Russia would have a strategic interest in being able to deny them the oil resources of the Middle East.
50. Since about 75 per cent of Russia’s oil supplies come from the Caucasus she will be sensitive to any potential threat to them however remote. She will therefore wish to increase her security in this area and present indications are that, although her strategic interests may not demand it, she is determined to obtain some degree of control over Northern Persia. The control of Azerbaijan would give Russia certain military advantages. She would have greater space for the quick deployment of her forces which would otherwise be hemmed in to the mountains on the Persian frontier; the maintenance of forces in Persia would be greatly eased by the possession of Persian ports on the Caspian Sea; and she would be in a better position rapidly to seize the key communication centre and airfields at Tehran if any hostile Power threatened to establish forces in Persia. She would, moreover, be well placed quickly to develop a threat against the airfields of the Middle East.
51. While, as stated above, this probably is not essential to Russia’s security, she may regard it as an added measure of insurance. Moreover, she may think that the British oil interests in Southern Persia will give Great Britain a considerable measure of control in that area; she may, therefore, wish, by controlling North Persia, to ensure that the whole country does not fall too much under the influence of Great Britain backed by the United States. Provided that Russia gets what she wants in Northern Persia, she will probably acquiesce in the status quo in Iraq, though she would probably prefer that Great Britain should cease to enjoy there the special position that she now has.
52. In general, Russia wishes to stand on an equal footing with other great Powers in the Middle East. She would prefer, as far as possible, to see in the Middle East a group of independent States with no special ties with any great Power. She is therefore likely to oppose Arab union
if it appears to be under British inspiration, and also French claims to a predominant position in the Levant. Russia may prefer that Palestine should become independent of British control.
FAR
EAST
.
53. From Sinkiang to Manchuria Russia has an enormous land frontier with China; but China is militarily weak and will remain so for very many years to come. Even if China emerges from this war orderly and united, she could not be a menace to Russia until she had developed into a first-class military Power or unless she entered into a close association with the United States. In any case geographical considerations rule out a major attack on Russia across the frontier from Sinkiang to Manchuria.
54. The Power in the Far East with whose aggressive ambitions Russia has to reckon is Japan, who, like Germany, dreams of world domination and who, also like Germany, has in the past fought a successful war against Russia. Moreover, Japan has long desired to drive Russia from the dangerous proximity of the Maritime Provinces. Accordingly, Russia’s strategic interests in the Far East in relation to her security will be concerned primarily with the defence of the Trans-Siberian Railway east of Lake Baikal and the Maritime Provinces, particularly Vladivostok, from attack by Japan either direct or through Manchuria or Korea. Japan, however, can never be so serious a menace as Germany, because even a successful attack from this direction, though it would be a serious blow to Russia’s prestige, would scarcely menace her security as a whole, in view of the enormous distances the attack would have to cover before it reached areas strategically or economically vital to her.
55. Accordingly, the first requisite for Russia’s strategic security in the Far East is that Japan’s power of aggression should be eliminated for the longest possible period. So long as Japan is weak, the only other Power capable of threatening Russia’s security in the Far East would be the United States, either alone or in concert with the British Empire, and therefore, provided these Powers followed a policy of collaboration with Russia, it would not be essential for her to alter her present frontiers in the Far East.
56. As in other areas, however, Russia will wish to insure against aggression to a greater degree than the essential minimum. The security of the Maritime Provinces from attack from overseas would be increased if Russia held Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles; this would also reduce any threat to the airfields of Russian Sakhalin. Security from attack overland would be greatly increased by control over Manchuria and Korea, which would give much greater depth to the defence of the Maritime Provinces and cover the lines of communication with the rest of Russia. At present the main line is the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is very vulnerable to attack from Manchuria; but the Russians are believed to be building another line further north, branching off from the Trans-Siberian Railway west of Lake Baikal.
57. Economically also control over Manchuria and Korea would greatly increase Russia’s security in the Far East. At present the Russian population east of Lake Baikal is only some 5 to 6 million. This area is deficient in food and is incapable of supporting an armament industry sufficient to maintain large armed forces. Manchuria and Korea have a population of 65 million, and are rich sources of raw materials. Supplies of food are such as would make the whole area self-supporting. There are industrial areas capable over a long period of substantial development; but coking coal from North China might be necessary if full use is to be made of all the resources.
58. Russia’s security in the Far East would also be materially increased if she controlled the South Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur as naval bases, whose use could not easily be denied her by Japan. It would also be of some advantage to her to have the North-East Korean warm-water ports of Rashin and Seishin as potential bases within the Japan Sea.
59. Thus, with Manchuria and Korea, the whole of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, Russia’s Far Eastern possessions would form a powerful military and economic bloc, self-sufficient in food and capable of maintaining large armed forces without much support from the rest of Russia. Moreover, Russia would be in a position to ensure that Japan could not draw from Manchuria and Korea the resources that are essential to her economy and war industry.
60. We have scarcely any evidence to guide us as to Russian intentions in the Far East and it is therefore difficult to estimate to what extent Russia will try to secure these strategic advantages or to go beyond them. We think it almost certain that she will demand Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles. She will probably also wish in one way or another effectively to control Korea and Manchuria, including particularly the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. We cannot at present say how Russia will seek to achieve such a control and probably much will depend on the course of events in China after the war. It is true that Stalin’s statements at the Teheran Conference indicated that Russia accepted the Cairo Declaration that Manchuria should be returned to China and Korea made independent; but if Russia comes into the war, it is probable that at the time of Japan’s final defeat Russian forces will be in occupation of at least a part and probably the whole of Manchuria. If China showed signs of relapsing into chaos and civil war Russia would not find it difficult, while nominally respecting China’s sovereignty over Manchuria, to secure a special position rather on the lines of the pre-1904 arrangement. Russia then had a lease of the Liaotung Peninsular with its two ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the right to run the railway leading to it and also the right to maintain troops to guard the railway. The Czarist government were able to build up these railway guard troops to a force of 100,000 men and the present Russian Government could probably improve on this. Russia’s desiderata in Korea might be secured by a treaty on similar lines with a nominally independent Korean Government. We do not think that Russia would rely on the support of the Chinese Communists to give her such far-reaching concessions in Manchuria and Korea. Such arrangements could probably be stretched to cover the stationing of air forces in Manchuria and Korea and effective economic control. This would adequately safeguard Russia’s strategic interests.
61. The only disadvantage might be the opposition of the 65 million people of Manchuria and Korea. Initially this would probably not be a serious problem as these people have in the past shown little power of resistance to foreign domination; but the development of Chinese nationalism is likely to continue and the existence of a nationalist China just across the border might in time
stimulate resistance in Manchuria and perhaps Korea as well, and so present the Russians with a considerable security problem. It is, however, unlikely that such considerations would deter Russia from seeking to control Manchuria and Korea.
62. Russia will no doubt continue to hold her present positon in Chinese Mongolia and might possibly even annex it. Sinkiang is not of great importance to her and she will probably be prepared to leave it under Chinese control so long as that is reasonably effective; if Chinese control broke down Russia might resume the position she acquired there during the disturbances of 1932 and held up to 1942, with the object of suppressing disorder so close to her frontiers.
63. There is no evidence at present to show that Russia is likely to display any major interest in the rest of the Far East.
Russia’s Post-War Naval Policy
.
64. Before the present war Russia was developing her Navy and was building a considerable ocean-going fleet, including battleships and heavy cruisers, at Leningrad and Nikolaev. This building programme was virtually abandoned in 1941. Her eagerness to secure additions to her Navy from the resources of her Allies and enemies indicates her intention to continue the development of her fleet after the war. The Russians are sufficiently realist to appreciate that during a war against a major naval Power there would be little chance of redisposing heavy warships between the various coastlines in the Arctic, Baltic and Black Sea, and that it would only be possible to move ships to the Far East by the difficult and limited Northern Sea route. Consequently, the Russian fleets on their various stations will have to be more or less self-contained.
65. An ocean-going fleet would probably be maintained in Northern Waters. The Baltic Sea defence will be provided mainly by submarines and light surface craft, supported by Naval aircraft. In the Black Sea, Russia will raise her own prestige and impress the Balkans and Near East by a display of surface warships, but light craft and submarines will predominate in the defence of her frontiers there.
Far Eastern Waters
.
66. The benefits to be derived from seaborne trade, both with her Western territories and in the Pacific, are likely to result in the building up of her mercantile fleet.
67. For the purposes of her economy in war, however, the maintenance of ocean trade routes will not be essential. It is, therefore, unlikely that Russia will station a powerful ocean-going fleet in the Pacific even if she acquires bases in South Manchuria; the development of the necessary facilities for building and maintaining heavy warships in the Far East would in any case take a long time. It seems more likely that Russia will maintain powerful land-based air forces to protect the sea approaches to her Far Eastern territories.