6

SIGINT TARGETING

F OR AT LEAST the first two decades of the Cold War, the Joint Intelligence Committee served partly as a manager of the British intelligence community. It helped to review and reform structures whilst also assisting in the setting of targets and priorities. In the immediate post-war period the central machinery for the strategic management of the British intelligence community was underdeveloped. The year 1948 saw the emergence of the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department in the Foreign Office, absorbing the Services Liaison Department, which had previously been home to the chair of the JIC. This brought with it stronger liaison and intelligence coordination functions. But perhaps the most important step forward occurred in 1950, when Clement Attlee requested a thorough review of the intelligence and security services by Norman Brook. At this point no-one knew what Britain was spending on intelligence – still less whether there was any way of measuring efficiency and effectiveness. The following year, Brook’s recommendations led to the creation of the Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS), which took a lead on relating resources to priorities and targets. 1 In 1968, this system was enhanced with the creation of a Cabinet Office Intelligence Coordinator, who assisted PSIS with priorities and budgets. 2

Perhaps the most demanding management task was overseeing Britain’s largest intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), located at Eastcote on the outskirts of London. This organisation had only recently moved from Bletchley Park and ‘GCHQ’ was the new title for an organisation of code breakers that had hitherto been owned by MI6 and was only just emerging as an intelligence service in its own right. 3 Indeed, in 1948 the Director of GCHQ, Edward Travis, did not sit on the JIC. 4

For the JIC the spring of 1948 constituted an unsettled period dominated by accelerating East–West tensions in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The previous year had produced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, to which the uncompromising Soviet response had been the formation of the Cominform. March 1948 brought the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia and Soviet pressure upon Scandinavia, events which spurred the completion of the Brussels Treaty and also led to highly secret negotiations at the Pentagon in Washington between British, American and Canadian officials seeking to explore a framework for a future North Atlantic alliance. By early April 1948 the West had begun to experience its first serious difficulties with rail transport to its sectors in Berlin, prefiguring a major confrontation over that city that would result in the Berlin Airlift and the despatch of American B-29 bombers to Britain during the autumn of the same year. In the Middle East and Asia, Britain had cause for concern about the situation in Palestine, Indochina, China and Korea, although in Malaya the outbreak of the ‘Emergency’ was still some months away. 5

It was against this background that the JIC sought to prioritise Britain’s signals intelligence requirements for 1948, identifying some forty-seven general target areas for the country’s sigint effort and dividing them into five different levels of priority. In doing this the JIC was working within the definition of its duties as laid down by the recently redrafted JIC charter of 27 February 1948, under which it was supposed to give ‘higher direction to operations of defence intelligence and security’. 6 Despite its clear remit, in reality the JIC was tussling with several other Whitehall bodies that directed the British sigint effort, including the London Signals Intelligence Board (LSIB) and the London Signals Intelligence Committee. 7 Over the next twenty years, the function of some of these powerful additional bodies that included the sigint elements of the armed forces overlapped with the work of the JIC, resulting in bureaucratic confrontations. Indeed, in 1951 the Brook Report had raised the option of abolishing the LSIB altogether and giving its functions to the JIC. 8 In the end it was left to the Chiefs of Staff to work out the exact relationship between these bodies in what Patrick Reilly, the JIC Chairman, described as ‘a very tricky field’. 9

The JIC gave the top sigint priority to four areas of Soviet activity related to strategic air attack and defence. These were the development of Soviet atomic, chemical or biological weapons; other new Soviet weapons; the Soviet air force; and guided weapons. This emphasis was a reflection of the intense concern which had been displayed by the Chiefs of Staff from as early as 1944 at the likely post-war disparity between the strength of Western military forces in western Europe compared with those of the Soviet Union. 10 This concern had been exacerbated during June 1945 and again in July 1946 by two highly classified studies that emphasised the radical scientific and technical developments that had recently taken place in the field of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and in associated methods of strategic delivery, particularly the guided rocket. These reports noted that in contrast to the wide dispersal of population and infrastructure enjoyed by the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain was relatively crowded and hence seemed rather vulnerable to these new weapons. 11

Consequently, it was the view of the COS that for as long as methods of attack remained far ahead of those of defence, the only credible British strategy appeared to be deterrence in peace, and an immediate pre-emptive air strike against the Soviet Union’s own strategic capabilities in war. Consequently, Soviet fighter defences constituted an important British signals intelligence target. The central place of the strategic air offensive in British post-war defence planning certainly explains the high priority accorded in this document to the acquisition of signals intelligence on subjects such as the Soviet metropolitan fighter defence force.

In comparison with Soviet strategic offensive and defensive capabilities everything else was considered less urgent. Typically, despite the problems posed by aggressive Soviet espionage, underlined by the Igor Gouzenku affair and the subsequent arrest of Alan Nunn May, sigint relating to the ‘organisation and activities of Soviet espionage and counter-espionage services’ was accorded only a secondary level of priority, along with such significant political issues as the ‘question of succession to Stalin’. More surprisingly, although Britain encountered serious difficulties in the Middle East during the late 1940s, subjects such as ‘Arab nationalism’ and the ‘Zionist movement including its intelligence services’ were accorded only fourth and fifth levels of priority.

What was actually achieved as a result of the high level of priority allocated by the JIC to signals intelligence on Soviet strategic weapons? As historians have now shown, the rate of intelligence success against Stalin’s bomb project was not high. 12 Indeed, JIC papers repeatedly make the assertion that ‘our intelligence about Soviet development of atomic weapons is very scanty’. 13 By contrast, JIC papers for the 1940s appear to display detailed knowledge in other areas such as the capabilities of the Soviet air force and Soviet troop movements in south east Europe. These two areas were partly indicative of a new kind of intelligence gathering that focused on non-communications intercepts such as radar and telemetry. Over the duration of the Cold War this new field, known as ‘elint’, would be of growing importance as GCHQ struggled to achieve success against high-grade Soviet communications traffic. 14

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 40
LIMITED CIRCULATION.

J.I.C. (48)19(0)(2nd Revised Draft)

11th May 1948

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SIGINT INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS-1948

Draft Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

We have examined our intelligence requirements for Defence purposes from Sigint sources in order to guide the Sigint Board in allocating its resources.

2. We have consulted the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office (India Department).

3. We have listed subjects of defence interest and have grouped them into five priority classes. These are attached at Annex. We realize however that technical factors will influence the final allocation of priorities.

4. Any further requirements that the departments may pass to L.S.I.C. should in future be related to this list, by bearing an indication of priority.

5. We propose to review these requirements in a year’s time.

Ministry of Defence S.W.1.

11th May 1948

ANNEX

PRIORITY LIST

(No attempt has been made to arrange subjects in order of importance within each priority class)

PRIORITY I

1. Development in the Soviet Union of atomic, biological and chemical methods of warfare (together with associated raw materials).

2. Development in the Soviet Union of scientific principles and inventions leading to new weapons, equipment or methods of warfare.

3. Strategic and tactical doctrines, state of training, armament and aircraft of:-

(a) Soviet long-range bomber force.

(b) Soviet metropolitan fighter defence force (including P.V.O.).

4. Development in the Soviet Union of guided weapons.

PRIORITY II

5. Manpower, call-up and mobilisation of Soviet armed forces.

6. Strategical and tactical doctrines, state of construction and training and construction programme (especially new types) of:-

(a) Soviet submarines.

(b) Soviet air forces, including armaments (other than in Priority I).

(c) Soviet airborne forces.

7. Strategic industries (e.g. armaments, aircraft, fuels, steel, chemicals, power) in the Soviet Union.

8. Strategic stock-piling in the Soviet Union.

9. Railways in the Soviet Union.

10. Soviet economic successes or reverses (such as the drought of 1946) likely to have an effect on foreign policy.

11. Organisation and activities of Soviet espionage and counter-espionage services.

12. Significant internal political development in Soviet Union (especially question of succession to Stalin).

13. Soviet reactions to associations (actual or proposed) between powers outside the Soviet sphere of influence.

14. Soviet intentions in Germany and Austria, including Soviet employment of German Service and other personnel.

15. Organisation of, and foreign assistance to, Greek rebels (including any international brigade activities).

PRIORITY III

16. Strategic and tactical doctrines, training and morale of Soviet armed forces (except as already detailed in I and II).

17. Organisation of Soviet armed forces, including high command and M.V.D. troops.

18. Unit and formation identifications, locations, and movements of Soviet armed forces, including M.V.D. troops.

19. Present and future warship construction (with details of performance and armament) in the Soviet Union.

20. Weapons and equipment in the Soviet army (technical details).

21. Airfields in the Soviet Union, and areas under Soviet influence.

22. Location, organisation and activities of defence research and development establishments in the Soviet Union.

23. Movements and activities of the leading personalities concerned with scientific research and development in the Soviet bloc and the Soviet occupied countries.

24. Scientific and technical education in the Soviet Union.

25. Movements of Soviet officials or service personnel to disturbed areas on the borders of the Soviet spheres of influence, such as Germany, Albania, India, Pakistan and the Far East.

26. Relations of India, Pakistan and neighbouring countries with foreign countries, particularly the Soviet Union, and with each other.

27. Soviet relations with the Jews in Palestine (particularly extent of Soviet and satellite assistance of emigration).

28. Organisation and activities of national communist parties and communist-inspired movements (including Cominform).

29. Indications of establishments in foreign countries in place of Soviet agencies designed to assist the Soviet Union in war.

PRIORITY IV

30. Soviet assistance to satellite armed forces.

31. Developments of bases, harbours and strategic waterways in the Soviet Union and satellite countries.

32. Soviet administrative network with particular reference to its vulnerability in war.

33. Arctic developments by Soviet Union, particularly extension of meteorological research and aircraft patrols.

34. Relations of satellite countries with neighbours outside Soviet Union.

35. Arab nationalism and relations of Arab states with U.K. and U.S.A.

36. Attitude of Soviet Union, France, Italy and Arab states towards future of ex-Italian colonies, especially Libya.

37. Organisation and activities of satellite espionage and counter-espionage.

38. Soviet intentions in India, Pakistan and Moslem countries.

PRIORITY V

39. Unit identification of Yugoslav armed forces.

40. Static defence system of the Soviet Union and satellite countries (other than P.V.O.).

41. Any marked increase of telecommunications facilities in frontier areas of the Soviet Union and satellite countries, notably Caucasus, Balkans, White Russia.

42. Contributions by the satellite countries to Soviet industrial potential.

43. Deliveries of grain from the Soviet Union to other countries.

44. Relations between satellite countries.

45. Soviet intentions in China and Korea.

46. Organisations and activities of Chinese penetrations of non-Chinese territories in the Far East, particularly their intelligence services.

47. Organisations and activities of:-

(a) Zionist movement including its intelligence services.

(b) Clandestine right wing French and Italian movements.

(c) Right wing movements in the satellite countries.

Notes

1 .	Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Counting the Cost of Intelligence: The Treasury, National Service and GCHQ’, English Historical Review 128/532 (2013), pp. 596–627.
2 .	J. W. Young, ‘The Wilson Government’s Reform of Intelligence Co-Ordination, 1967–68’, Intelligence and National Security 16/2 (2001), pp. 133–51.
3 .	The first book to discuss GCHQ extensively was James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: America’s National Security Agency and Its Special Relationship with Britain’s GCHQ (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), pp. 313–14.
4 .	Memo by Cliffe to Bridges, ‘Committee on Sir Norman Brook’s Report on Intelligence Services; Monday 30th July 1951 at 4.30 p.m.’, TNA: CAB 301/18.
5 .	Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945–1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983); Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Raymond Smith, ‘A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945–7’, International Affairs 64/4 (1988), pp. 631–47.
6 .	JIC(48)21, ‘Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee’, 27 February 1948, f.2, L/WS/1/1051, IOLR.
7 .	‘The Signals intelligence Organisation’, Top Secret Cream, Appendix A, approved at COS(46) 182nd meeting, 13 December 1946. TNA: FO 1093/478.
8 .	Memo by Cliffe to Bridges, ‘Admiral Brooking’s Report on Noise Listening’, July 1951, TNA: CAB 301/18.
9 .	Reilly to Brook, 16 February 1951, ibid.
10 .	Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942–1947 (London: Sherwood Press, 1988), pp. 55–178.
11 .	COS(45)402(0), ‘Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War’, 16 June 1945, TNA: f.1A, AIR 2/12027; TWC(46)15(Revise), ‘Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War’, 1 July 1946, TNA: DEFE 2/1252.
12 .	Michael S. Goodman, ‘British Intelligence and the Soviet Atomic Bomb, 1945–1950’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26/2 (2003), pp. 120–51.
13 .	JIC(47)65(0) Final, ‘Summary of the Principal External Factors Affecting Commonwealth Security’, 29 October 1947, attached to JP(47)139(Final) 30 October 1947, f.115, L/WS/1/986, IOLR.
14 .	JIC (45)10(0), ‘Potentialities of the Soviet Air Force’, 26 November 1945, TNA: N16448/16448/38, FO 371/48005.