7

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

U P UNTIL 1947 there had been debate within His Majesty’s Government as to the Soviet Union’s future actions: would they remain friendly or would there be a return of the pre-war caution and hostility? Ultimately Russian actions would provide an answer. A succession of scares, crises and misperceptions served to highlight the belief that Stalin could not be trusted. The JIC predicted that he would avert war at all costs, but it was certainly thought that he would resort to subterfuge and underhanded tactics to undermine the West’s position.

The 1948 JIC was in a far superior position compared to its earlier incarnations. It had emerged from the war victorious, having proved its value, and this had been recognised in an increased stature, a new charter and a more senior chairman. Yet despite this, the committee failed to predict the Berlin Blockade, the first real major confrontation of the Cold War.

Germany, and particularly Berlin, was seen as a window into the Soviet Union. In the JIC’s words, Germany was a critical arena because it ‘stands out as the most important single prize in the political and ideological struggle now in progress between the Soviet Union and the West’. 1 Here not only was there evidence of Russian intent, but also the opportunities for espionage were greatly increased. Berlin was thus to become, in the words of several American and Russian individuals based there, a ‘battleground’. 2 Part of the explanation lay in the way that Marshall Aid had created an ever-expanding gap between the prosperity of the West and that of the East. In Berlin, perhaps more than anywhere else, the difference was glaring. The decision to create ‘Bizonia’, a merged Anglo-American zone in 1947 (France joined in 1949), was too much for Stalin. From early 1948 those crossing into Berlin were increasingly harassed.

One implication of the JIC’s view that war with the Soviet Union was unlikely before 1955 was that an evolving list of ‘indicators’ was prepared. The idea was that the compartmentalisation of Soviet policymaking, in addition to the immense difficulties it posed as an intelligence target, meant that intelligence forewarning was unlikely. Indicators were therefore necessary to suggest that hostilities were imminent, that a decision to go to war had been taken. An American report in mid-1948 had provided a list of 112 factors that might be taken to imply the Russians were heading towards war. The JIC, in its version – which is included in the appended assessment – narrowed this list down to a mere 81 indicators. These included not just military signs, but economic and political ones too. They were divided into two aspects: ‘preliminary preparations for an offensive’ and ‘immediate preparations for an offensive’.

The JIC’s assessment, on 18 June 1948, judged that ‘we believe the Russian armed forces to be in a high state of mobilisation and therefore able to undertake a limited offensive with little warning’. 3 Just a few days later the Russians cut transport links (road, rail, and river) between the western sectors of Berlin and western Germany. Thus the classic situation existed: evidence that something was about to happen but no information on the specifics of when, where, what etc. Consequently, the JIC produced no advance warning of the blockade.

The Berlin Blockade lasted from June 1948 to May 1949. The first reference to it by the JIC was some two weeks after it began. William Hayter, the Chairman, introduced events in Berlin by stating that the ‘general situation demanded constant vigilance’, and therefore proposed the introduction of a short periodical report on ‘Russian preparations for war’. This sort of tactical assessment had served the JIC well during the Second World War. 4 Within a fortnight, and despite deteriorating relations in Berlin, the JIC concluded that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union was preparing to launch hostilities. The situation clearly remained fluid, though, and it was decided that the committee should revisit the topic every week. 5

Just as with the fall of Norway in 1940, the Blockade of Berlin and the failure of the JIC to give any warning seem to have been something of a wake-up call for intelligence consumers. The Chiefs of Staff Committee requested a report on what might be done to avoid the Russians launching a surprise attack. This coincided with debates within Whitehall on measures to improve intelligence and, more precisely, on the gaps in coverage. The subsequent JIC report – which is included below – did little to allay fears. ‘Preparations for war on a larger scale might … become apparent, despite all attempts at concealment’. 6

The first substantial attempt to place the Berlin Blockade within wider Soviet intentions was completed in early 1949. Despite Soviet sabre rattling, events in Berlin revealed much to the JIC about the Russian psyche. It was still judged that Stalin would wish to avoid war before the mid-1950s and that, if anything, the successful Berlin Airlift had revealed the limits of Soviet policy, for despite their ‘protests and threats’ over the Western response, ‘there has been no serious attempt to prevent it’. 7

For the JIC there were two aspects to the blockade: the failure to predict it, and the ability, once it was underway, to provide a series of useful assessments. This pattern would be repeated often. What does this reveal about the JIC system? Firstly, it shows that it was able to adapt, relatively quickly, to developing situations. It also exposes something of the problems in identifying and reading Russian intentions: a feeling that something was about to happen but no detailed information as to the specifics. Finally, it also underlines the steadying tone of balanced JIC forecasts. It is clear that the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, appreciated the JIC’s views as William Hayter, the Chairman, was tasked with personally briefing him on a weekly basis. 8 This was important, and the significance of Berlin should not be underestimated.

ANNEX.

(J.I.C.(48)42(0)Final)

(18th June, 1948.)

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

INDICATIONS OF RUSSIAN PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR.

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

We have examined the indications which might appear if the Russians were preparing to launch an offensive. We believe the Russian armed forces to be in a high state of mobilisation and therefore able to undertake a limited offensive with little warning. Preparations for war on a larger scale might, however, become apparent, despite all attempts at concealment. We have listed at Annex those indications which we consider might be observed by the British representatives in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria, or in countries within or adjacent to the Soviet orbit. We have taken note of the suggestions made by the British and American Service Attaches in Prague * and of a paper prepared by J.I.C. Germany. †

2. Certain precautions are normally undertaken by any State in its own defence; e.g. training of the armed forces and organisation of a skeleton civil defence. To these may be added improvements, on purely economic grounds, in communications and productive facilities. Since there is no reason to deduce hostile intentions from such measures, we have not detailed them in this report.

3. We have divided the list of indications of hostile intentions into two main classes:–

(a) preliminary preparations for an offensive

(b) immediate preparations for an offensive.

4. We recommend that copies of this report be forwarded to British Representatives in countries listed in the attached Appendix, and to the Joint Intelligence Committees abroad. They should not regard it as superseding in any way the more detailed questionnaires prepared by Departments or by the Joint Intelligence Committee, London, but as a framework for the reports requested in paragraph 6, below.

5. Posts in each country should arrange for Service Attaches, in consultation where possible with their American colleagues, to co-ordinate the coverage of their areas.

6. Items in the Annex which are marked with an asterisk are considered to be those which are bound to precede an offensive and, as such, should be the subject of a report by telegram as soon as they are detected. The remaining items should be reported by routine methods, as they are observed.

7. While it is not considered necessary to furnish periodic reports, it is recommended that the lists at Annex be reviewed monthly by Service Attaches in order to ensure that the examination of any possible indication is not overlooked.

8. The lists set out in the Annex should in no way be regarded as exhaustive, and any other indication which is considered to have a bearing on Russian preparations for war should be made the subject of a report.

(Signed) W.G. HAYTER
E.W.L. LONGLEY COOK
C.D. PACKARD
L.F. PENDRED
K.W.D. STRONG.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

18th June, 1948.

ANNEX

PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS FOR AN OFFENSIVE

These include: an abnormal intensification of defensive measures; any undue increase in the armed forces; the conversion of Industry towards a war footing; and a marked increase in Communist political activity. We give below a list of indications of this type; although it includes both long-term and short-term preparations, the fact that many of the indications may appear at any time up to the outbreak of war renders further sub-division of the list impracticable.

Military.

1. Marked increase in the tempo of training in the army, particularly in field training of higher formations, or of specialist formations such as airborne troops.

*2. Reinforcement of army units to war establishment.

3. The re-equipping of units, and replacement of static guards with older men.

4. The supplying of arms to Communist parties in the countries associated with the West.

5. Increased activity of Communist para–military organisations.

6. Appearance of numbers of ex-Paulus and Seydlitz personnel in the Western Zone of Germany.

*7. Sabotage of installations, centres of communication etc. of strategic importance.

*8. Marked increase in the number of airfields and aircraft dispersal points, improvement in present airfields, and assembly of airfield construction equipment.

9. A strengthening of the Soviet Air Force; redeployment of air support units.

10. The replacement of flying training units by first line units.

11. A marked increase in armament practice and night flying in the Air Force.

12. Aircraft and searchlight co-operation exercises.

13. Provision of accommodation e.g. large scale building or requisitioning troops and aircrews.

14. Construction of sites for guided missiles.

*15. Efforts towards dispersal of military formations, installations and dumps.

*16. Provision of camouflage for airfields, installations, buildings and ships.

17. Increased attention to passive defence against air, chemical, and biological attack, including:–

(a) The construction of underground factories and stores.

*(b) erection of shelters, including submarine pens.

*(c) blackout arrangements.

*(d) issue of respirators.

*(e) training of civilians.

18. A speed up in refitting programmes at shipyards.

19. Combined operations training on a large scale.

20. Build-up of stocks of fuel, ammunition and stores at a number of ports simultaneously.

21. The requisitioning of auxiliary craft and fishing vessels.

22. Stricter control of sea traffic and fishing vessels in approaches to Russian and satellite ports.

*23. The collection of large numbers of barges, and the clearing, widening and deepening of canals and locks.

*24. Unusual movements of minelaying and minesweeping craft.

25. The installation of anti-submarine nets and boom defences.

26. Removal into Russia of Walther submarine components under construction in Germany.

27. A marked increase in the complements of Russian merchant ships.

28. The appearance of Russian Naval personnel in unimportant ports.

29. The building of large numbers of landing craft.

Economic.

30. Signs of conversion and re-tooling of plants for production of war materials.

31. An increase in the number of plants producing war materials.

32. An increase in the number of factories on which strongest security measures are imposed, an unusual measure of industrial dispersal, and camouflage of plants.

33. A reduction of effort in non-military production.

34. Evidence of production of unusual equipment, such as parachutes and civil defence equipment, by non-military factories.

35. An increase in the production of canned goods.

36. Stockpiling of essential commodities such as food, oil and rubber.

37. Unexplained alterations in the Ministerial control of industries.

38. Changes in the budget structure, which may indicate a hidden increase in the expenditure on the armed forces.

39. Large scale withdrawals from foreign countries of Russian controlled funds.

40. Synchronisation of times for the completion of contracts at various factories and yards.

41. An increase in the number of German technicians removed to the Soviet Union.

42. A large increase in the number of women employed in industry.

43. The improvement of rail systems, including the strengthening of bridges, laying of extra tracks, and construction of new sidings and marshalling yards.

44. The extension of the Russian broad gauge lines to the West, or of standard gauge lines to the East.

*45. The collection of large quantities of locomotives and rolling stock, including railway “flats”.

*46. The assumption of the operational control of railways by the Soviet military authorities.

47. Improvement or extension of roads, the strengthening of bridges, and provision of alternative bridges or fords, with approaches; an increase in the production of bridging equipment.

48. Requisitioning of civil transport, accommodation or foodstuffs.

49. The appearance of increased numbers of water tankers (rail or road).

*50. Reduction in the number of civil telephone lines available to the public, with consequent abnormal delays.

Political.

51. An intensification of the normal propaganda campaign, designed to convince the Soviet and satellite peoples that they are about to be the victims of capitalist aggression.

52. An intensification of the normal propaganda campaign suggesting that the Anglo-American Powers are establishing bases with offensive intent.

53. Strike action by Communist parties on the grounds that the workers should not help preparations for an “imperialist” war against the Soviet Union.

54. Increase in staff of Russian Embassies or introduction of Russian military training missions.

IMMEDIATE PREPARATION FOR AN OFFENSIVE.

In selecting the indications listed below we have taken into account current appreciations of Russian capabilities and intentions.

Military.

*55. The appearance outside the Soviet Union of large quantities of MT, particularly of Soviet manufacture.

*56. The appearance of tank transporters in large numbers.

57. Abnormal laying of field lines near frontiers.

58. The identification of any new higher headquarters, or evidence of regrouping.

59. Changes in the position of Army units with reference to the frontier or to the likely lines of advance.

60. Call up of reservists, and comb-out of industrial workers.

61. Evidence that troops are moving to concentration areas.

*62. Abnormal officer reconnaissance near frontiers.

63. Transfer eastward, disbandment, or large-scale replacement by Soviet personnel of units of satellite armed forces.

*64. Stockpiling, particularly near frontiers, main communication centres, or airfields.

65. Medical preparations – Hospitals, hospital trains, etc.

*66. Appearance of large quantities of bridging and road mending materials.

67. Sudden increase in number of defections.

*68. Additional security measures including:–

(a) Intensification of frontier controls and river patrols.

(b) Increase in the number of areas closed to civilian movement.

(c) Increase in the use of cipher and closed telephone lines.

*69. Cessation of flying rights to foreign civil aircraft over certain countries.

*70. Deployment of A.A. guns, searchlights, barrage balloons and radar, particularly round airfields, stockpiles and centres of communication.

71. The preparation of emergency airstrips and a marked increase in the number of satellite landing grounds.

72. The development of dispersal areas.

*73. A marked increase in the volume of high grade cypher traffic, including Naval W/T traffic.

*74. Call up of that portion of the male population of North Germany which has had seafaring experience. (These have all been registered already).

*75. Concentration of landing craft in south Baltic ports.

*76. Concentration of merchant shipping, especially in the south Baltic.

*77. Fitting of warheads to torpedoes; ammunitioning of ships; landing of practice ammunition.

*78. A simultaneous exodus of warships from a number of ports.

*79. Laying of mines in the south Baltic.

*80. Arming of merchant ships.

81. A general withdrawal of Russian controlled merchant shipping from foreign waters.

Political.

82. Intensification of strike action (see Item 53 above).

APPENDIX

Finland

Germany

Austria

Czechoslovakia

Poland

Yugoslavia

Greece

Hungary

Bulgaria

Roumania

Soviet Union

Turkey

Persia

France

Belgium

Holland

Luxembourg

Norway

Sweden

Denmark

Italy

Afghanistan

Palestine

Syria

Lebanon

Transjordan

Iraq

Pakistan

India

Burma

China

Egypt.

*  *  *

J.I.C. (48) 78 (0)

LIMITED CIRCULATION.

16th July, 1948.

Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of staff CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MEASURES TO PREVENT THE RUSSIANS OBTAINING

STRATEGIC SURPRISE.

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

We have been instructed * + to examine what further arrangements are necessary to prevent the Russians obtaining strategic surprise, including any further steps that might need to be taken to accelerate the passage of tactical information on Russian activities across the Zonal frontiers.

2. We believe that the Soviet Armed Forces in Germany are sufficiently strong and sufficiently prepared to be able to undertake, with little or no warning, a limited offensive against likely opposition. Their formations are so disposed that this could be done with little preliminary movement.

3. Nevertheless, the fighter defences of Russia itself, and the Russian strategic long range bomber force, have not yet reached the standard of efficiency which we would expect if they are to play a major part in any immediate war. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the necessary administrative or industrial preparations having been made, or of general mobilisation having taken place. We do not, therefore, consider that the Russians are at present contemplating a major war.

4. Subject to the difficulties stated in paragraph 2 above, we have already taken certain action which may provide warning of preparations for war, as follows:-

Action to prevent the Russians Obtaining Strategic Surprise.

5. We have prepared and circulated to British representatives in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria, and in the countries within or adjacent to the Soviet orbit, as well as to the joint intelligence authorities concerned, a report examining the indications which might appear if the Russians were preparing to launch an offensive. This report, of which a copy is annexed * ø , lists indications of hostile intentions and emphasises those which are considered to be bound to precede an offensive and which must therefore be reported by telegram at once.

Tactical intelligence concerning Soviet Military Activities

6. We have taken the necessary action to institute an organisation to obtain tactical intelligence concerning Soviet Military activities up to a depth of fifty miles in the Soviet Zone. The ultimate aim of the organisation is to obtain this intelligence by covering twelve targets within the fifty mile belt. This should ensure that no major Soviet Military move could take place within that belt without the responsible agency getting early knowledge of it and passing information back possibly within twenty four hours. Four of the most important targets are already covered and urgent consideration is being given to include a fifth, Rostock. Clandestine W/T communications are not at present provided for this network but the problem of providing this method of communication is under consideration with Germany.

Photographic reconnaissance.

7. We are having prepared lists of air photographic targets which are considered most desirable and worthwhile to complete in the near future, and also a comprehensive list of targets for clandestine air reconnaissance in Satellite countries. Consultations are in progress with the authorities in Germany on the feasibility of supplementing intelligence from ground sources by those means.

Future Reports.

8. We intend to prepare periodical reviews of the short term indications of Russian preparedness for war drawing attention to any evidence that might indicate an alteration in Soviet intentions. Should significant intelligence of immediate importance arise, this will, of course, at once be brought to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff.

Recommendations.

9. We therefore recommend that the Chiefs of Staff:– Take note of the arrangements made to prevent the Russians from obtaining strategic surprise and to obtain tactical intelligence concerning Soviet military activities across the Zonal frontiers.

(Signed) W.G. HAYTER

E.W.L. LONGLEY-COOK

C.D. PACKARD

L.F. FEMDRAD

K.W.D. STRONG.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1

16th July 1948.

* AAP/15/Air and AAP/15/5/Air

† J.I.C. Germany 48 (24) (Revised)

* C.O.S. (48) 92nd Meeting Item 1. Confidential Annex.

* J.I.C. (48) 42 (0) Final

Notes

1 .	JIC(48)121(Revised Final), ‘Possibility of War Before the End of 1956’, 27 January 1949, TNA: CAB 159/5.
2 .	David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War (London: Yale University Press, 1997).
3 .	The American and British papers are both in JIC(48)42(0)Final, ‘Indications of Russian Preparedness for War’, 18 June 1948, TNA: CAB 158/3.
4 .	JIC(48) 67th Meeting (0), 2 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4. The first such report is JIC(48)70(0)Final, ‘Short Term Indications of Soviet Preparedness for War’, 1 October 1948, TNA: CAB 159/3.
5 .	JIC(48) 73rd Meeting (0), 16 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4.
6 .	JIC(48)78(0), ‘Measures to Prevent the Russians Obtaining Strategic Surprise’, 16 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/3.
7 .	JIC(48)121(Revised Final), ‘Possibility of War before the End of 1956’, 27 January 1949, TNA: CAB 159/5.
8 .	JIC(48) 80th Meeting (0), 30 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4.