10
COUNTERINSURGENCY
S INCE THE SECOND World War the United Kingdom has been confronted by a continual stream of insurgencies. After 1945 colonial and Cold War concerns converged, since imperial real estate – and especially the bases that overseas territories provided – was seen as central to the process of containing the Soviet Union. Whilst the transfer of power in India in 1947 pointed the way unambiguously towards the future, Britain was in no hurry to leave and a constant stream of colonial crises pressed upon Whitehall’s security concerns. 1 Meanwhile, as Britain’s global power dwindled, a growing intellectual and cultural consensus emerged challenging traditional forms of imperialism. Nationalist unrest spanned the entire empire, from the Americas to Asia to Africa. In part, this explains why the hotter moments of the Cold War increasingly occurred in the Third World. 2
This unrest exploded into a number of violent insurgencies. Zionist insurrection in the mandate of Palestine interrupted the celebrations at the end of the Second World War. Britain was ultimately forced to hand responsibility to the United Nations, which created the new state of Israel in 1948. In that same year, communist guerrillas launched an insurgency from the jungles of Malaya. Although Britain granted Malaya independence in 1957, the fighting continued for three more years. During the 1950s, British security forces were despatched to quell two more nationalist uprisings: Kenya (1952–6) and Cyprus (1955–9). Both colonies achieved independence. However, there was no let-up for British forces in the following decade. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan might have noticed the ‘wind of change’ blowing against imperialism, but Britain refused to relinquish the strategic colony of Aden without a fight. From 1963, security forces countered a brewing insurgency in the mountainous hinterland of southern Arabia and a vicious urban terrorism campaign inside Aden itself. Britain lost and was forced to evacuate in 1967, leaving behind the leftist state of South Yemen. By the early 1970s, when trouble was brewing in Northern Ireland and Oman, Whitehall had experienced a quarter of a century of almost unbroken counterinsurgency. 3
The JIC was unprepared for insurgency and was therefore often taken by surprise. Since its origins, the committee had served the Chiefs of Staff. It therefore traditionally focused on narrow military issues relating to conventional security threats. Naturally, this revolved around watching the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. And yet the rampant spread of insurgency raised two major problems. Firstly, it tied down increasing numbers of British troops. Security forces engaged in colonial policing operations would have been unable to combat the Soviets had they marched across central Europe. Secondly, Whitehall increasingly saw the colonial territories as a front line in the Cold War. Not only were they hotbeds for communist subversion and intrigue during the uneasy peace, but the empire was perceived as an arc of vulnerability in a potential Third World War.
Insurgencies could no longer escape the JIC’s attention. The Colonial Office reluctantly agreed to join the committee in October 1948. This was too late for the outbreak of violence in Malaya, and the JIC consistently misunderstood the insurgency as directly instigated by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the JIC began to expand its role to consider intelligence more broadly, as opposed merely to defence intelligence, and gradually evolved to challenge the military’s narrow understanding of security and threats. Firstly, the committee slowly attempted to monitor and provide warning of colonial unrest. Secondly, it devoted more attention to assessing insurgencies and their implications for British strategic planning. Thirdly, it even sought (generally unsuccessfully) to oversee reforms to colonial intelligence structures. 4
As Michael Herman has argued, immediately prior to Suez the JIC was firmly focused on traditional strategic issues. In the first six months of 1955, the JIC’s weekly ‘Survey of Intelligence’ (later known as the Red Book) was focused on the Soviet Union and major Cold War confrontations such as the Taiwan Strait. There were some ninety items on the USSR and eastern Europe, fifty on China, fifty-seven on Indochina and eighty-two on the Middle East, focused mostly on Egypt. Few other subjects were mentioned. More than 75 per cent of the JIC’s full papers in this period were on the Soviet Union. 5
The government was aware of this lacuna in the British assessment system. In early 1955, a senior Cabinet committee asked General Gerald Templer to conduct a review into colonial security. Then Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Templer had recently returned from two years in Malaya where he had served as combined high commissioner and director of operations – earning himself the epithet ‘Tiger of Malaya’. He valued intelligence highly and had wasted little time in revamping the Malayan Special Branch.
Templer sought the JIC’s advice and commissioned an assessment on colonial intelligence and security. The JIC issued its report on 23 March 1955. The timing and context are important: the assessment came in the wake of failures to predict (and swiftly respond to) the insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya, whilst violence in Cyprus erupted just one week later. Things clearly needed to change.
The JIC made a number of recommendations to Templer, which are clearly stated in the document reproduced below. Overall, however, the JIC pushed for greater coordination between the colonies and London. The committee sought clearer channels of communication to ensure that intelligence reached consumers in Whitehall as swiftly as possible. It also recommended that the Colonial Office be better integrated with the central intelligence machinery as a whole. As things stood, the weekly intelligence reviews did not cover colonial territories, whilst colonial officials were not properly integrated into the intelligence-drafting process. As a result, the JIC was unable to adequately consider insurgencies. The uprisings in Malaya and Kenya went unpredicted, whilst policymakers received inaccurate intelligence about the nature and causes of the violence.
The JIC’s assessment was highly influential in the policymaking sphere. Templer drew heavily on the committee’s conclusions in his report to the Cabinet. 6 His survey was a bombshell and made impact at the highest levels of government. Indeed the Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was warned by his private secretary, Philip de Zulueta, that the report was ‘frightening’. Consequently, Eden requested that the Cabinet discuss the findings as urgently as possible. 7 Templer’s report was so candid and critical that the government only released the full text in 2011 – a full fifty-six years after it was written.
Templer’s influential report on colonial security was broader than the JIC’s assessment. It spanned police training, issues of financing and potential trouble spots (although the latter drew heavily on another JIC paper). The JIC’s assessment on colonial intelligence and security annexed here, however, strongly influenced Templer’s discussion of intelligence organisation. Importantly, Templer’s clout ensured that many of the JIC’s initial recommendations would be met.
Broadly speaking, Templer used the JIC’s conclusions as a foundation. Combining them with his experience in Malaya, he added his own irascible and straight-talking style to the report. For example, he built on the committee’s musings about the difference between political and security intelligence. Arguing for interaction between the two, the JIC defined security intelligence as information required to protect a colony from subversion, sabotage and espionage. Political intelligence, by contrast, was all other information required for the effective governance of a colony. Building on this idea, Templer made a similar point – albeit more critically and in a far blunter style. Security intelligence, according to Templer, was neglected in the colonial context. It was ‘regarded as a kind of spicy condiment added to the Secretariat hot-pot by a supernumerary and possibly superfluous cook, instead of being a carefully planned and expertly served dish of its own’. 8
At the local level, Templer echoed JIC calls to strengthen local intelligence committees (LICs). Although all colonies had an LIC by 1955, their terms of reference differed greatly from territory to territory. The JIC hoped to issue greater guidance from London about the constitution and function of local committees. Templer agreed. Drawing on his own experiences in Malaya and on the JIC recommendations, he rated LICs as ‘a very useful step in the right direction’. 9 He sought to raise the LICs’ status, ensure access to the governor and improve coordination and output. Templer’s (and the JIC’s) recommendations were met. The Colonial Secretary sent fresh instructions to governors on the functioning of LICs in May 1956. 10
At the Whitehall level, Templer developed JIC ideas about Colonial Office integration. Contrasting with the committee’s polite calls for greater Colonial Office input into the intelligence machinery, Templer lamented the Colonial Office’s lack of ‘intelligence mindedness’. Moreover, he criticised it for being ‘an information rather than an action addressee’. It is likely that JIC members were thinking the same thing but, unlike Templer, were unable to commit such strong terms to paper. Templer recommended reform. He pushed for (and achieved) the creation of an Intelligence and Security Department within the Colonial Office. This promoted a hitherto absent ‘intelligence culture’ and transformed the relationship between the Colonial Office and central intelligence, allowing the JIC to better consider insurgency. 11
Directly building on the JIC’s recommendations, Templer also strengthened links between the committee and the Colonial Office. He backed the JIC’s request to reissue its charter under the authority of the Colonial Secretary (alongside the Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence). Once more, this was successfully achieved. Templer also recommended greater Colonial Office involvement in the JIC’s report-drafting process, exactly as the committee had requested. This, however, pushed the Colonial Office too far. Colonial officials vehemently opposed what they saw as JIC encroachment onto their jurisdiction. They argued that the committee misunderstood the complexities of colonial territories and overplayed the communist threat. Senior colonial officials even threatened a ‘Whitehall showdown’ in a long-running battle which lingered until after the JIC moved to the Cabinet Office in 1957. 12
In other cases, Templer made criticisms where the JIC had not. The committee, for example, praised the role of MI5 (and the document below gives a useful overview of MI5’s colonial role). Templer, however, sought to strengthen the system. He successfully pushed for deputies to aid the security intelligence adviser seconded to the Colonial Office from MI5, whilst unsuccessfully seeking to strengthen the role of MI5’s security liaison officers posted in the colonies. 13
Overall, Templer drew heavily on JIC conclusions in an influential review of colonial security. This led to important reforms which significantly aided the JIC’s ability to consider insurgency. In turn, the committee’s future assessments were then used by policy practitioners considering strategic planning. Insurgency had reached the intelligence agenda, and Whitehall was now better equipped to respond. Importantly, however, the JIC conclusions and Templer’s report started an important debate between the committee and the Colonial Office. They caused a reappraisal of the nature of the Cold War threat and the type of intelligence required to counter it. The JIC could no longer rely purely on defence intelligence and on conceptualising security in narrow militaristic terms. The world was changing. This JIC report not only aided the committee’s ability to assess insurgencies, but also formed part of the debate which ultimately preceded the JIC’s transition to the Cabinet Office, where it could take a more holistic account of security. With the Colonial Office better integrated into the intelligence machinery, policymakers were offered more accurate appreciations of future insurgencies.
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT)
J.I.C. (55) 28 COPY NO. 5
23rd March, 1955.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
COLONIAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
At the request of General Templer we have examined certain points relating to Colonial Security and Intelligence. Our report is at Annex. Our conclusions are as follows.
CONCLUSIONS
2. Intelligence Reports from the Colonies
The value of the periodic reports now rendered would be greatly increased if all Colonial Governors added regularly their own appraisal or evaluation of facts contained in the report, including an indication of likely future developments (Part I, para. 2).
3. Local Intelligence Committees
The guidance given to Colonial Governors over a period of years regarding the composition and working of Local Intelligence committees should be reviewed and consideration should be given to consolidating and re-issuing it in a single document (Part I, Paragraph 5).
4. The Functions of the Security Service in Colonial Territories
The present arrangements seem to enable the Security Service to make their contribution without weakening the responsibility of local Administrations for their own Security (Part I, para. 12).
5. Methods of handling and destination of Intelligence reports from the Colonies
In addition to existing arrangements for the dissemination of intelligence reports received from the colonies we consider that the JIC’s “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” should cover the Colonies. Arrangements should be made to enable the Colonial Office to take a full part in the drafting of the review by the Heads of Sections on Tuesday afternoons (Part I, paras. 15 and 17).
SECRET
U.K. EYES ONLY
6. Colonial Office representation on the Joint Intelligence Staff
Similar arrangements should be made to enable the Colonial Office to take a full part in the work of the Joint Intelligence Staff (Part I, para. 17).
7. The J.I.C. Charter and Colonial Intelligence
The J.I.C. Charter issued in 1948 by the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence, needs no substantive amendment, but should, in order to regularise and facilitate close co-operation between the Colonial Office and J.I.C., be withdrawn and reissued jointly by the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary (Part I, para. 26).
(Signed) P.H. DEAN
V. BOUCHER
W.H.L. McDONALD
J.A. SINCLAIR
D.G. WHITE
K.W.D. STRONG
C.Y. CARSTAIRS
C.E. KEYS (for D.N.I.)
Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
23rd March, 1955.
ANNEX
COLONIAL SECURITY
PART I
THE FORM WHICH INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM THE COLONIES SHOULD TAKE AND THE MATERIAL THEY SHOULD CONTAIN
1. Security Intelligence Reports are for the most part prepared by the special branches of the various Colonial police forces. They are submitted to Colonial Governors but are not normally forwarded to London. Governors, however, include relevant matter contained in local security intelligence reports in their monthly Intelligence Reports which are sent to the Colonial Office. For this reason it will be more useful to consider the requirement for intelligence reports generally, rather than the more restrictive requirements for security intelligence reports.
2. At the present time Colonial intelligence reports received in London are generally speaking factual documents; they do not usually attempt an evaluation of trends nor do they include any forecast of possible future developments. Their value would be greatly increased if all Colonial Governors added regularly a final section giving their own appraisal or evaluation of facts contained in the report, including an indication of likely future developments.
CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
3. Governors from time to time receive advice. Guidance from the Secretaries of State for the Colonies on the working of Local Intelligence Committees. These are also referred to in a Chiefs of Staff paper * “Procedure for Calling for Assistance from the Armed Forces to Support Foreign and Colonial Policy” The relevant section is as follows:–
“Local Intelligence Committees.
Local Intelligence Committees exist in certain Colonial territories and are organised partly for the purpose of co-ordinating all intelligence within a particular territory for the guidance of the Governor and the local Service Commanders, and partly to provide a properly constituted body with which the Joint Intelligence Committee can exchange views. These Committees when constituted are normally under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the Colonial Goverment and contain representatives of the Services and of any Departments of the Colonial Government (e.g. Police or Native Affairs) who by their knowledge and experience are in a special possition to assist the Committee. Local Intelligence Committees are not necessarily subordinate to Local Defence Committees but may be responsible directly to the Colonial Governor himself, whilst co-operating freely with the appropriate Joint Initelligence Committee.”
4. The foregoing extract, which was circulated in 1950, did not take fully into account the constitutional responsibilities of either the Secretary of State for the Colonies or of Governors; consequently it has not been followed to the letter. Local Intelligence Committees now exist in all Colonies and are advisory, and responsible to the Governors whose Intelligence report to the Secretary of State they draft. There is, of course, every reason for them to be in close touch with the appropriate regional Joint Intelligence Committees (i.e. J.I.C. (F.E.) and J.I.C. (M.E.)) and this is the practice. There has been very little contact between the J.I.C. (London) and the Local Intelligence Committees nor indeed, in practice, has there been a requirement for this. Occasions may arise when, because an external threat to a Colony has developed or if a Colony is outside the area of responsibility of a regional J.I.C., direct contact will become desirable. It can then be arranged on an ad hoc basis.
5. Although Local Intelligence Committees exist in all Colonies and the appointments of the members of each committee are known, there is no standard constitution for these committees. The level at which the different committees are constituted varies from Colony to Colony. Experience indicates that if representation on such a committee is at too high a level its value as a working body tends to diminish. A standard constitution would clearly be impracticable, and it would probably be better in any case to avoid too rigid a set-up; but it is suggested that the guidance given over a period of years should be reviewed and if necessary collated and reissued to all Governors, laying down a broad pattern of the way in which Local Intelligence Committees should be constituted and given guidance on the functions they should perform. These should perhaps be defined broadly as the study and proper presentation of all relevant security and political intelligence at monthly (or more frequent) intervals; the preparation where appropriate of studies relevant to their work; the continuous consideration of the state of intelligence in the Colony, and the submission of proposals for measures to improve it where appropriate; forecasts of likely future developments and perhaps also the preparation of periodic reviews of the general situation in the Colony from the intelligence point of view.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES. DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
6. As indicated above political intelligence and security intelligence in Colonial Territories must both overlap and interact. It is, therefore, difficult clearly to define them. As a rough and ready guide, however, it might be said that security intelligence is any information which may be needed to protect a Colony from subversion, sabotage and espionage; political intelligence is any other information required for the effective government of a Colony. Security intelligence includes all aspects of Communist activity and extremist “nationalist” activities. The Special Branch should collect and collate all information affecting the security of a colony and present it in collated form to the Local Intelligence committee where it can be related to political intelligence and the significance of both assessed before submission to the Governor.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES
7. The Director General of the Security Service is charged in his charter “in consultation with the Colonial Office (to) assist and advise Colonial administrations......”
8. Assistance and advice is given both in London and in the Colonial territories. In London advice is given to the Colonial Office at all levels on security policy for the Colonies and methods of implementing it. In addition, British and international communist policy towards the Colonies is studied centrally, and case work within the U.K. is conducted on behalf of the Colonies.
9. The Security Service has seconded to the Colonial Office a Security Intelligence Adviser (S.I.A.) who advises the Secretary of State and Colonial Governors on the organisation of the Special Branch and related intelligence matters. His work has been supported in a number of ways and particularly by training officers, who have already visited many Colonial areas to give training courses to members of Special Branches within their own Colonies. In addition, training courses to Colonial Special Branch Officers of the higher ranks are given periodically by the Security Service in London.
10. Security Service representation within Colonial areas is not always in the same form. In Gibraltar and Malta there are Defence Security Officers (D.S.Os). In most other Colonies the Security Service representative is called the Security Liaison Officer (S.L.O). In some instances the Security Service representative has been placed within the Special Branch either as an adviser to the Head of the Special Branch, or as a research officer within the Special Branch.
11. The Security Service representative in a Colony has the duty to inform the Governor, Service Commanders, the Commissioner of Police, and other appropriate local officials on matters affecting security. He is the normal channel for security business between the Special Branch and the Security Service Headquarters in London and other security organisations within the Commonwealth; and, through London, with the rest of the free world. He is so placed that he can give advice to the Special Branch, based on his own experience and backed by the authority and experience of the Security Service, and can bring matters to the attention of the Colonial Administration when he thinks it necessary. He can on occasion support this by getting the Security Service to intervene with the Colonial Office in London.
12. It is believed that the present arrangements enable the Security Service to make their contribution without weakening the responsibility of local Administrations for their own security.
METHODS OF HANDLING AND DESTINATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM THE COLONIES
13. As mentioned in paragraph 1 above, Special Branch reports as such are not generally received in London. Bearing in mind the difficulties of separating security from political intelligence, the present form in which security intelligence is collected, collated and disseminated in the Colonies, serves, in general, the purpose for which it is designed. The problem lies rather in ensuring that matters of security intelligence interest of moment are included in Governors’ regular monthly intelligence Reports. These normally reach London from all Colonies on or about the 20th of the following month and total collectively some 6-800 pages.
14. The Joint Intelligence Committee is kept informed of intelligence affecting colonial security in the following ways:–
(a) The Colonial Office compiles from reports received from Governors a monthly “Colonial Office Political Intelligence Summary”. These summaries are circulated to interested Departments on or about the twelfth of each month, and comprise some twenty pages of factual information, mainly on events that have occurred in each Colony during the last month but one, but also include more up to date information based on telegraphic reports.
(b) In addition, the Colonial Office compiles specially for the J.I.C. a much shorter selection from the above summary, called the “Colonial Office Review of Current Intelligence”. This, also, is brought up to date by the inclusion of additional items that have been reported since the Political Summary was compiled. It is circulated to the J.I.C. on or about the 24th of each month.
(c) Copies of Colonial Office Prints are circulated when issued.
(d) When disturbances are feared or take place in a Colony the Colonial Office circulate to Defence and other Departments copies of telegrams from Governors.
(e) In present circumstances regular reports on the situation from the Governors of Hong Kong and Kenya and the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya are circulated automatically to Directors of Intelligence.
(f) The War Office circulates a number of Military situation reports received from Cs.-in-C. in Colonies where active operations are in progress, e.g. Kenya.
(g) From time to time the Colonial Office representative on the Joint Intelligence Committee produces at a J.I.C. Meeting under “Unforeseen Items” an item of “hot” current intelligence from a Colonial territory.
15. The Joint Intelligence Committee approves each Thursday morning a “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” which (or a summary of which) is submitted for the information of Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. At present this does not cover the Colonies except incidentally (e.g. British Somaliland in references to the Haud). The “hot” reports from the Colonial Office representative (paragraph 14 (g) above) are not normally incorporated in the “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” or its summary. Colonial Intelligence Reports through Joint Intelligence Committee channels are limited to the “Colonial Office Review of Current Intelligence” (paragraph 14 (b) above). It would seem desirable that the “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” should cover important events and trends in the Colonies also and that arrangements should be made to enable the Colonial Office to take part in the drafting of the review by the Heads of Sections on Tuesday afternoons. It is understood that this would require regular telegraphic reports from named Colonies (such as those mentioned in paragraph 14 (g) above), and, in addition, telegraphic reports from any Colony where the situation demanded.
THE FUNCTIONS AND RELATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF IN THE COLONIAL OFFICE IN SO FAR AS THIS AFFECTS THE J.I.C. INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF COLONIAL OFFICE REPRESENTATIONS ON THE J.I.S.
16. The Colonial Office is represented on the Joint Intelligence Committee by the Under Secretary supervising its Defence Department. The same Department furnishes representation on the Joint Intelligence Staff when and as necessary calling in if required specialist advisors from the Geographical Department concerned.
17. The arrangements for representation on the Joint Intelligence Staff are satisfactory, subject to the condition in the last sentence of this paragraph. If the suggestions in paragraph 15 above are accepted and in order to make possible the rapid collation and presentation of intelligence from the Colonies in the Weekly Review and Summary, it will be neccessary for a Colonial Office representative to attend the weekly Heads of Sections meetings at the J.I.C. Both he and the Colonial Office representatives attending meetings of the Joint Intelligence Staff should be able to discuss, and modify where appropriate, their contributions.
THE J.I.C. CHARTER AND COLONIAL INTELLIGENCE
History of Charter
18. The present Charter of the J.I.C. was issued early in 1948 (D.O. (48) 21). It reads as follows:–
“The Joint Intelligence Committee is given the following responsibilities:–
(i) Under the Chiefs of Staff to plan, and to give higher direction to, operations of defence intelligence and security, to keep them under review in all fields and to report progress.
(ii) To assemble and appreciate available intelligence for presentation as required to the Chiefs of staff and to initiate other reports as the Committee may deem necessary.
(iii) To keep under review the organisation of intelligence as a whole and in particular the relations of its component parts so as to ensure efficiency, economy and a rapid adaptation to changing requirements, and to advise the Chiefs of Staff on what changes are deemed necessary.
(iv) To co-ordinate the general policy of Joint Intelligence Committees under United Kingdom Commands over-seas and to maintain an exchange of intelligence with them, and to maintain liaison with appropriate Commonweallth intelligence agencies.”
19. In none of the discussions connected with the charter was there any mention of Colonial Territories or the Colonial Office, which was not at that time represented on the J.I.C. The Charter was issued under the authority of the then Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence who circulated it for the information of the Defence Committee.
Colonial Office Representation
20. In the autumn of 1948, largely at the instance of the then Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister agreed to ask the Colonial Office to appoint a permanent representative on the J.I.C. Mr. Bevin’s minute to the Prime Minister read as follows:
“As you know it is my belief that our Colonial territories are likely to be one of the principal objectives of Communist attack in the near future. With this in mind it seems to me very important that we should do everything possible to ensure that we have the best possible intelligence about Comnunist activity in the Colonies, so that we may not be taken unawares.
As a first step towards this I suggest that the Colonial Office might consider appointing a permanent member of the J.I.C., so that the Colonial Office would remain in constant touch with the intelligence picture as a whole and with the development of communism throughout the world, in so far as it is known to our intelligence organisation. I am sure that such an appointment would be of great value not only to the Colonial Office but to the other departments represented on the J.I.C.”
21. On September 23, 1948, General Hollis, Principal Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence, supported the Foreign Secretary’s proposal in a minute to the Prime Minister as follows:
“My views on the Foreign Secretary’s proposal that the Colonial Office should have a permanent member on the J.I.C. are as follows.
The object of this proposal is to ensure that we have the best possible intelligence about Communist activity in the Colonies so that we may not be taken unawares. The best way to achieve this is to strengthen and tune up our Colonial Police Forces. We must have good Intelligence services on the spot so that communist activities can be apprehended right from the start, and not after they have secured a firm foothold. Recent events on the Gold Coast and in Malaya demonstrate this need.”
22. The Colonial Office accepted this invitation and after the Chiefs of Staff had given their approval a representative of the Colonial Office took his seat at the J.I.C. on October 8, 1948.
23. Since that date the Colonial Office have been represented at meetings of Directors and Deputy Directors but have had no regular representations of the J.I.C. or at Heads of Sections meetings.
Scope of charter
24. From the outset it has been assumed that the charter of the J.I.C. is wide enough to authorise them to deal with operation of defence intelligence and security in colonial territories. This view seems correct and the reference in paragraph (iv) of the Charter to “appropriate Commonwealth intelligence agencies” is clearly to the intelligence agencies in the self-governing territories of the Commonwealth. No change therefore in the present terms of reference of the J.I.C. appears necessary from this point of view.
25. At the time that the Colonial Office joined the JIC no changes were made in the Charter or in the issuing authorities, who remained the Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence only.
Conclusions
26. In these circumstances it is suggested that it would materially assist the Colonial Office to play a full part in the work of the J.I.C. and to give effect to the objects for which a representative of the Colonial Office was invited to join the J.I.C., if the present Charter of the J.I.C. were withdrawn and reissued under the authority of the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary.
27. The advantages of this would be as follows:–
(a) to place the Colonial Secretary in the same position as the other two Ministers as regards calling on the J.I.C. to prepare intelligence estimates etc. within its terms of reference;
(b) to record formally that the J.I.C. has a responsibility under its charter for intelligence and security in the colonial territories;
(c) to enable the J.I.C. more easily to ask for information, advice and assistance from the Colonial Office in the same way as it at present does from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Service Departments;
(d) to encourage and facilitate closer association and exchanges in the fields covered by the terms of references between the Colonial Office and the colonial territories on the one hand and the other departments represented on the J.I.C. on the other;
(e) to enable the J.I.C. to present to the Chiefs of Staff and to Ministers proper intelligence appreciations on the colonial territories, both individually and within the general framework of the threats posed to them by Russian and Chinese imperialism, Communism, nationalism, racialism etc., and to perform as regards those territories the functions with which it is charged at present in respect of intelligence and security in other territories.
*   C.O.S. (50) 289
Notes
1 .
John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–49 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), pp. 9–33.
2 .
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
3 .
David French, The British Way in Counter-insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 13–24.
4 .
Rory Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 195–221.
5 .
Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 113–15.
6 .
Gerald Templer, ‘Report on Colonial Security’, 23 April 1955. CAB 21/2925.
7 .
Note from de Zulueta to Eden, 13 May 1955, PREM 11/2247; note from Eden to Lord Chancellor, 5 June 1955, PREM 11/2247; Rory Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security’, Intelligence and National Security 25/6 (2010), p. 803.
8 .
Templer, ‘Report on Colonial Security’, p. 14.
9 .
Ibid., p. 16.
10 .
Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence’, p. 808.
11 .
Templer, ‘Report on Colonial Security’, pp. 15, 18–19.
12 .
Cormac, Confronting the Colonies , p. 72.
13 .
Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence’, pp. 805–6.