SECRET
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT)
| J.I.C. (64) 26 (Terms of Reference) |
COPY NO. 26
|
| 27th February, 1964 |
IMMEDIATE |
U.K. EYES ONLY
CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM OR UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
Note by the Secretary
The Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S. 17th Meeting/64 Item 9) have invited the J.I.C. to examine the consequences of deeper United States involvement in Vietnam and of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam. An up to date report on this subject is also required urgently by the Foreign Office, and Departments mainly concerned have been asked to send contributions by 10 a.m. on MONDAY, 2nd MARCH to the J.I.S. (2nd Team)
who will prepare a Preliminary Draft for early circulation.
2. The report will be based on relevant material in J.I.C. (64) 22 (Final) and J.I.C. (62) 12 (Final), and an examination of the various forms which United States action might possibly take. A list of these is attached at Annex.
(Signed) J.M.C. VIVIAN
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
27th February, 1964.
SECRET – U.K. EYES ONLY
ANNEX TO
J..I.C. (64) 26 (Terms of Reference)
POSSIBLE FORMS OF UNITED STATES ACTION
South Vietnam
(a) Stationing of United States forces in Saigon or other population centres.
(b) Participation of United States combat forces in the fighting either individually or in support of South Vietnam forces.
(c) Direct air attacks on Viet Cong targets.
(d) In connection with (b) use of tactical nuclear weapons in the fighting.
(e) Air surveillance of the land and sea frontiers to prevent infiltration by the Viet Cong.
(f) Implementation of SEATO plan 7 (counter insurgency in Vietnam) thereby involving other SEATO countries in the fighting.
North Vietnam
(a) Invasion by United States combat troops.
(b) Support for invasion by South Vietnam combat units.
(c) Support for the establishment of South Vietnamese guerrilla operations including covert sabotage and terrorist activities.
(d) Air attacks on lines of communication or installations used for supplying the Viet Cong.
(e) Bombing of military and population centres with aim of weakening the economy.
(f) Naval blockade or harrassing [sic] by light naval forces.
(g) Bombing of targets in China close to North Vietnam border.
(h) Use of selective nuclear bombing.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of………………….
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 10
J.I.C. (64) 26 (Final)
| 12 March, 1964 |
U.K. EYES ONLY |
CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM OR UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS
In Part I of our report at Annex we examine the implications of deeper United States involvement in Vietnam in the form of either a heavier commitment, including combat troops, in South Vietnam or of action against North Vietnam. In Part II we examine the likely consequences of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam.
2. Since 1962 the United States has provided massive military assistance to South Vietnam. Over the same period the rapid expansion of the South Vietnamese forces has inevitably resulted in a number of weaknesses which have been aggravated by the recent coups and the consequent confusion in the military and civil administration. Since January, 1964 Viet Cong military and subversive activities have increased throughout the country. Prospects of any significant improvement in the military situation in the immediate future are not good.
3. We conclude that:-
PART I
(a) Whatever the form of United States action and whatever the degree of South Vietnamese Government/United States military success against the Viet Cong thereby achieved, decisive and final defeat of the Viet Cong cannot be achieved by military means alone. The fundamental task remains that of inducing the South Vietnamese authorities to undertake and persist in a programme of the necessary administrative, social and economic measures, and to winning popular confidence in, and support for such a programme;
(b) a heavier United States military commitment in South Vietnam in the form of the garrisoning of key towns and/or the introduction and use of combat units, might halt the present deterioration in the military situation and give the South Vietnamese Government a breathing space to get new measures under way, but it would raise difficult problems and might in the longer run be counter-productive;
(c) even full-scale intervention would not lead to a lasting solution for a very long time, if at all;
(d) the cutting off of North Vietnamese assistance to the Viet Cong would not ensure a speedy end to the insurrection in South Vietnam;
(e) if the United States took military action confined to South Vietnam the North Vietnamese would probably increase their covert support to the Viet Cong and appeal to the Soviet Union and China for increased material support, the Chinese would give them full diplomatic and propaganda support and probably step up military supplies. The communist countries generally would probably mount a world-wide campaign, in particular demanding the reconvening of Geneva Conference in the interests of maintaining peace;
(f) there is some scope for covert support for guerrilla activity among the tribes of north-west North Vietnam and this if successful could lead to localised disturbances and perhaps to revolts elsewhere in the countryside, the news of which could have some effect on Viet Cong morale, and encourage Government forces in South Vietnam;
(g) if the United States took military action against North Vietnam the Chinese would give direct military support, including “volunteers” and air cover to the North Vietnamese. They might give overt support to the Pathet Lao in Laos, and would step up their subversive effort elsewhere in the area. Unless they expected general war, they would not take military or other decisive action against Hong Kong;
(h) the first Soviet objective would be to avoid the issue if at all possible by seeking to deter the United States from action against North Vietnam. The Soviet Union might also put pressure on North Vietnam to make some temporary concessions, if they thought this would work. If the United States went ahead with action against North Vietnam the Soviet Union would probably supply the North Vietnamese with some arms and ammunition and might well reconsider the possibility of arms supply to China to the same end. Nevertheless the Russians would wish to keep their involvement to a minimum, and in any case would stop short of any action which might lead to their involvement in nuclear war;
(i) it would be difficult for the United States to obtain much support internationally for direct military action against North Vietnam, or to avoid condemnation in the United Nations;
(j) a limited non-nuclear war in Vietnam would probably be protracted and indecisive; it would not spread outside mainland South East Asia and it could lead to severe strains within SEATO;
PART II
(k) if, as the eventual result of United States withdrawal, South Vietnam were to fall under complete or partial communist control, the West would suffer a severe blow in the context of the world–wide struggle against communism; the United States and SEATO would be discredited and the latter would probably disintegrate; communist influence in South East Asia would increase; and the whole Western position in the area would be seriously damaged.
(Signed) BERNARD BURROWS
of [sic] behalf of the
Joint Intelligence Committee
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
12th March, 1964
ANNEX TO
J.I.C. (64) 26 (Final)
the consequences oF deeper united states involvement in VIETNAM OR UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
In this report we examine in Part I the consequences of deeper United States involvement in Vietnam and in Part II the consequences of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam. We set out an introduction to both parts of the paper in a single section immediately below.
INTRODUCTION
The Viet Cong
2. We believe that the strength of the Viet Cong regular forces has now risen to about 25,000 men. In addition there is a large reservoir of at least 100,000 partly armed and trained supporters in South Vietnam, the number may even be as high as 200,000. The population of South Vietnam is about 15 million and that of North Vietnam about 18 million.
3. The Government of North Vietnam exercises general direction over the Viet Cong. Some equipment, mainly small arms and light support weapons and medical items, from North Vietnam reaches the Viet Cong in the hands of the infiltrators, who numbered about 3,000 in 1963. But in the main the guerillas [sic] rely on obtaining weapons, about 6,000 in 1963, by capture from South Vietnamese Government forces, and recruits by local “recruiting”. The hard core of the Viet Cong are by now so well indoctrinated and trained that even if it were possible to cut off their ties with North Vietnam this would probably have little or no immediate effect on their ability to continue their operations, although it might have some effect on their morale and it would force them to rely entirely on local sources for expansion. It would not significantly reduce the problem of defeating the Viet Cong for a very considerable time.
4. Although it might be possible to seal off the frontier between North and South Vietnam, large stretches of the South Vietnamese frontier with Laos and Cambodia are controlled by the Viet Cong, and the terrain is such that interdiction of supply routes across it would be virtually impossible. Furthermore the long coastline offers considerable scope for the smuggling of arms by sea.
5. Civil Administrative Activities
. The broad Viet Cong aim has been to weaken and ultimately supplant the Government by controlling as much countryside as possible and isolating the urban centres remaining under Government control. Starting in relatively inaccessible areas the Viet Cong’s plan was to establish zones whose original main purpose was to train and re-group military cadres, serve as a launching area for attacks, and to provide reception centres for infiltrators and arms. These areas have been progressively increased. Certain of them have become completely communist-controlled and strong enough to resist attack by government forces. In these areas the Viet Cong levy and collect taxes, finance and direct agricultural programmes, engage in multifarious economic and commercial enterprises, conscript cadres and indoctrinate the populace. Though coercion and extortion are used in many cases, the Viet Cong are under strict orders to respect the peasant and his property. All this presupposes some sort of administrative machinery. Whilst the broad co-ordination of policy appears to be carried out by the Liberation Front presumably in Hanoi, the Viet Cong war zones and organisations in South Vietnam appear to have a very large measure of local autonomy probably with overt party organisations in the controlled areas, and also provisional local government units similar to those established in the war against the French. If it is true, as reported recently, that civil administrative specialists are infiltrating from North Vietnam and dispersing to various areas in the communist-held south, this could mark an important stage in the consolidation of the Viet Cong foothold. The United States, and South Vietnamese Forces
6. Following the United States decision to increase military aid to South Vietnam, a United States Military Assistance Command M.A.C.(V) was set up in Saigon in January, 1962 and was completely formed by May, 1962. This Command replaced the United States M.A.A.G. which had operated in South Vietnam for some years, and which remains in the country, subordinate to M.A.C.(V). The clear determination on the part of the Americans to give massive aid overtly to the South Vietnamese had an immediate result. At practically all levels of the official South Vietnamese civil and military hierarchy, morale began to rise and the defeatist sentiment, which had been widespread in 1961, began to dissipate. However, any hopes that there might have been for a quick solution to the problem have been dissolved by the drawn out and bitter 1962/1963 campaigns.
7. The United States build-up was impressive. In late 1961 barely a thousand United States servicemen were stationed in South Vietnam. There are now about 15,000 in the country. These do not include combat troops but in practice American supporting units are frequently closely involved in actual operations.
8. The present strength of the South Vietnamese army is about 196,000. In addition there are para-military forces of about 200,000 mainly in the Civil Guard and Self Defence Corps. The rapid expansion of the Government forces has inevitably resulted in a number of weaknesses which have been aggravated by the recent coups and the consequent confusion and bewilderment thrown up by the fresh wave of changes in the High Command, corps and divisional commanders and provincial chiefs (who are also military sector commanders). Uncertainty about what is going on and fear of further changes and further dismissals have induced a form of paralysis and a reluctance to display initiative or to take offensive action.
The Military Situation
9. There is not much time left before the arrival of the south-west monsoon in May/June. The rains and the resultant flooding in the Delta area have generally had the effect of restricting the activities of the Security Forces and of the Viet Cong but in the mountains the Viet Cong are less affected than the Security Forces. The situation continues quietly to deteriorate. The capability of the Viet Cong is increasing. They are successfully penetrating more and more hamlets and villages and it is possible that they could now over-run some of the chief towns of districts (but not of provinces) before Government reinforcements could intervene. Prospects of any significant improvement in the military situation in the immediate future are not good. If some confidence in the military leadership can be restored, however, and if action can displace the current inaction, further deterioration could be checked. The Government will need to use the monsoon period to organise the administration, to bring continuity to senior military appointments, to perfect a comprehensive pacification plan (which we would expect to include a fresh approach to the strategic hamlets programme) and win popular support, if they are to be in a position at the beginning of the next dry season, October/November, to make positive progress. Pacification has always been a long-term project. Recent events have made it even longer.
TOP SECRET – U.K. EYES ONLY
PART I
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN
VIETNAM ACTION CONFINED TO SOUTH VIETNAM
Types of Action
10. Possible forms of United States action confined to South Vietnam include the following:-
(a) maintenance of aid more or less at present levels but with increased pressure on the South Vietnamese to get on with the job themselves;
(b) stationing of United States forces in Saigon or other population centres;
(c) participation of United States combat forces in the fighting either independently or in support of South Vietnam forces;
(d) the transfer of offensive elements of the U.S.A.F. to bases in South Vietnam for combat missions against Viet Cong targets;
(e) implementation of SEATO plan 7 (counter-insurgency in Vietnam) thereby involving other SEATO countries in the fighting.
Effectiveness of such action and problems involved
11. Whatever the form of United States action and whatever the degree of South Vietnamese Government/United States military success against the Viet Cong thereby achieved, decisive and final defeat of the Viet Cong cannot be achieved by military means alone. The fundamental task remains that of inducing the South Vietnamese authorities to undertake and persist in a programme of the necessary administrative, social and economic measures, and to winning popular confidence in, and support for such a programme. If the South Vietnamese can be induced to go ahead on these lines there might then be a reasonable chance of ultimate success against the Viet Cong. In the meantime, however, in order to halt the present deterioration in the military situation and to give the South Vietnamese Government a breathing space to get new measures under way, there is clearly a requirement for some greater military effort mainly by the South Vietnamese forces but perhaps also by United States forces. We therefore examine the probable effectiveness of various forms of United States action under
the criterion of achieving a temporary stabilisation of the situation rather than of aiming at any more radical solution such as complete annihilation of the Viet Cong.
12. The problems facing the United States Forces brought into South Vietnam would vary in direct proportion to the scale of intervention. If it were limited to garrisoning key towns only, their difficulties would be localised and could be largely resolved with the assistance of the South Vietnamese administration. The arrival of United States forces for garrison duties could initially provide a substantial boost to the morale of the South Vietnamese Government forces. The long term value of this operation would depend largely on the effectiveness of the Government forces thus released for action against the Viet Cong. There would also be a risk that any improvement would eventually be counterbalanced by increased assistance to the Viet Cong by the North Vietnamese (see paragraph 19 below).
13. Limited operations in the interior with United States combat units, either initially or as a second step if the garrisoning of key towns did not produce adequate results, could also have a useful effect on the morale of Government forces and would be effective in rapid clearing of small selected areas. They would, however, involve formidable difficulties and inevitably the use of tough methods. The identification of friendly Vietnamese from the Viet Cong could only be resolved with the wholehearted co-operation of the South Vietnamese authorities and the setting up of a form of military control in the areas of operations. Appreciating this difficulty, the Viet Cong would probably rely entirely on guerilla [sic] tactics and, judging from British experience in Malaya, it would probably be necessary for United States and South Vietnamese forces to outnumber guerrillas [sic] many times over. There would be even greater risk of increased North Vietnamese support.
14. We believe that full-scale intervention, which would require 100,000 or more United States combat troops, would involve proportionately greater difficulties for the United States in South Vietnam. In addition to the military problems of setting up a major base area and communications zone, they would have to establish in effect a military government, with or without the cooperation of the civil power, and probably in the face of increasing xenophobia on the part of the general population. They would have to induce the indigenous forces to accept a subordinate role in the prosecution of the war and in the maintenance of law and order throughout the country. In view of South Vietnam’s limited road and rail communications, its difficult terrain and few tactically sited airfields, the supply problem would be complex and difficult. Air support would be essential for such operations to be effective and the congested state of the limited number of airfields indicate that some construction of new airfields would have to be undertaken. While the Viet Cong would certainly be held in check, the United States commitment could not be substantially reduced without leading to a resurgence of present problems, unless and until considerable progress had been made in establishing a desirable system of internal security which could be run by a non-communist South Vietnamese government. This would almost certainly take a very long time.
15. The likelihood of successful interdiction by conventional air attacks of the Viet Cong supply lines and bases is remote.
16. The SEATO Council resolved in March 1961 that it would not acquiesce in a communist takeover of Vietnam. The practical military aid which individual members of SEATO could give would depend on circumstances at the time but it seems unlikely that France and possibly Pakistan would wish to become involved. In any case the problems involved in intervention by SEATO forces would not be less than those described in paragraphs 11 to 15 above.
CONSEQUENCES
17. United States intervention by means of the introduction of garrison or combat troops would create a major international crisis. The communists would seek to secure condemnation of the United States action in the Security Council and the passage of resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of their forces. A full-scale propaganda campaign would probably be accompanied by threats of military counter-action. Communist propaganda, emphasising the reactionary nature of the Republican regime in South Vietnam, and the indigenous nature of the revolutionary struggle and drawing a comparison between United States action in South Vietnam and their support for other “corrupt dictatorial” regimes (e.g. Korea, Formosa) might have some success in blurring the real issues involved, and would undoubtedly appeal to the anti-colonialist powers.
18. Effects in Laos.
It is difficult to conceive that the situation in Laos would remain unchanged. If no settlement to the Laotian problems had been achieved, the North Vietnamese forces would probably make greater use of Laotian territory for infiltration in South Vietnam. This in turn might induce the United States to extend military operations to Southern Laos in order to prevent communist reinforcements from reaching South Vietnam. It would be in Souvanna Phouma’s interest to isolate Laos from the struggle to the south east. It is doubtful, however, whether his weak administration would be able to stop a large increase in infiltration through Laotian territory. Again there would be grave danger of the Phoumi and Pathet Lao factions seizing the opportunity to extend the fighting in Laos.
North Vietnam
19. The first reaction of North Vietnam would be to increase her covert support to the Viet Cong. North Vietnam has already threatened, in a communication to the International Control Commission, to match United States intervention “man for man and gun for gun”. She would also probably appeal to the Soviet Union and China for increased material support, and, depending on her immediate assessment of the scale of intervention, might feel bound to ask them to be ready to assist in the defence of North Vietnam. Doubtless the North Vietnamese would appreciate that open aggression across her southern frontier would invite a sharp reaction from the United States and very probably cause an increase in the scale of United States intervention. Since this would increase the danger of eventual United States incursion into North Vietnam, it is doubtful if the North Vietnamese would take such a step without first assuring herself of the full and active support of the Soviet Union or China. We believe that no such assurance would be given by the Soviet Union and that the Chinese would only give this support if it appeared to them that the United States intended invading North Vietnam. It seems
probable, therefore, that North Vietnamese reactions would be confined to covert support.
China
20. China’s suspicions of United States intentions could lead her to believe that any large scale United States intervention in South Vietnam was a direct threat to North Vietnam and consequently to China’s strategic interests. The Chinese would probably hesitate to become directly involved but, should the North Vietnamese have become openly engaged in South Vietnam, they would be reluctant to see her defeated.
China
21. Chinese reactions would depend on the type and success of United States intervention and on assessment of its aim. If the United States forces were to fail to achieve any substantial success against the Viet Cong at least outside the southern half of South Vietnam, there is no reason to suppose that the Chinese would do more than they have so far. They would use every bit of bluster and political pressure to hamper the United States effort and would give the North Vietnamese all the help in the way of equipment and advice that the North Vietnamese requested, in order to prevent the suppression of the insurgency and to keep the United States bogged down. It is doubtful whether the Chinese would feel compelled to intervene themselves, even to the extent of putting token forces into North Vietnam. They might concentrate forces on the border and set up some sort of joint military command, but in the last resort they would probably resign themselves to a temporary setback.
22. If on the other hand the United States appeared to be on the way to complete success and to establishing a strong military presence on the frontier of North Vietnam, it must be assumed that China would react more sharply. If they considered North Vietnam to be threatened, or if they believed, perhaps erroneously, that the United States had the intention of crossing the 17th Parallel or making some other incursion into North Vietnamese territory (for example air attack on tactical targets), there is little doubt that they would do their utmost to ensure the security of North Vietnam, even to the extent of sending their own forces in and of intervening in the fighting themselves. China could not afford to let the Americans have a completely unopposed
military success on her own doorstep and the possibility of the development of a Korean type war in Indo-China could not therefore be excluded.
The Soviet Union
23. United States intervention would place the Soviet Union in a dilemma, aggravated by her providing the Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference. On the one hand, if the Russians failed to support the North Vietnamese, Chinese influence in Hanoi would inevitably become preponderant. On the other hand, they would certainly reject any policy which involved them in armed conflict with the United States in Indo-China. Above all, such a conflict would entail the risk of nuclear escalation. Soviet influence in Indo-China has since 1954 tended to be on the side of moderation and restraint. Indo-China is not of the first importance to Russia strategically, and although the Soviet Government have come out in support of the insurgency in South Vietnam as a “just” revolutionary struggle, we believe that the Soviet Union would wish to avoid actions by the communist powers which could invite an enlargement of the conflict. Their private advice would be in this vein but their public attitude would be to make the greatest possible fuss.
ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
Types of Action
24. The type of action that the United States could carry out against North Vietnam could vary in extent from the relatively indirect measures of naval blockade and the support of South Vietnamese infiltration of North Vietnam to full-scale invasion with nuclear or conventional bombing. In the choice of the measures to be taken the ensurances of a speedy and effective result would be a major consideration. The possible forms of intervention considered are as follows:–
Indirect Support
(a) Support for the South Vietnamese in –
(i) Ranger type operations;
(ii) Covert support for insurgency in North Vietnam;
(iii) Limited war operations across the 17th parallel;
(b) naval blockade of North Vietnam;
(c) support for Right wing and Neutralist forces in Laos against the Pathet Lao and D.R.V. forces which could extend United States/Lao operations into North Vietnam.
Direct Support
(d) invasion of North Vietnam by United States and South Vietnamese forces from the air and sea;
(e) the bombing or bombardment of military targets and population centres in North Vietnam;
(f) the extension of bombing targets to include parts of Southern China.
Problems and Effectiveness of Type of Action
25. Indirect Support
(a) Ranger type operations
. There is a lack of worthwhile targets for short penetration operations. Deeper penetration targets are likely to be more rewarding but introduce problems of supply and require a higher standard of training. No quick or decisive results could be expected by this method because South Vietnamese forces have shown little aptitude for this type of operation against the Viet Cong. There have been raids into communist territory since mid–1961. These have been conducted in secrecy so far as the South Vietnamese were concerned but trials of captured guerrillas by the North Vietnamese have been public. These operations appear to have had little success;
(b) Covert support for insurgency
. There are large areas in the north west of North Vietnam where the mountain tribes are not subject to day-to-day government control and there are indications that resentment of government authority exists among these tribes. There is therefore some scope for the fostering of guerrilla activity in this area. The problems of covert supply would be difficult, but communications are such that these problems are probably surmountable. North Vietnam is at present going through political and economic crises and there is discontent among the Vietnamese peasants as well as among the tribes. Guerilla [sic] activity by the tribes could lead to localised disturbances and perhaps to revolts elsewhere in the countryside. As news of these reached South Vietnam, this could lower the morale of the Viet Cong and correspondingly raise that of the Government forces. It would obviously be essential if the risk of international repercussions were to be kept to a minimum, that the support operations should be so conducted that the United States would be able to deny direct responsibility.
(c) Limited war operations
. The South Vietnamese Army has now been trained in counter insurgency operations, it would therefore take some time to revive an effective force for limited war operations across the frontier; nor is the terrain south of the Red River delta suitable for operations by conventionally equipped forces.
(d) Naval blockade
. It would be extremely difficult to make a naval blockade effective against coastal junk traffic within the Gulf of Tonking. Even a successful blockade would have but little effect on the jungle war.
(e) Operations in Laos
. If the Viet Cong supply routes could be cut by military action in Laos some advantage would be obtained but only in the long term. Politically, this course would be most difficult because of the “neutralist solution” for Laos.
26. Direct Support
(a) Invasion of North Vietnam
. Direct invasion would, by the diversion of North Vietnamese resources to meet it, be likely to have an immediate effect upon supply of personnel and arms to the Viet Cong, though this would not diminish the Viet Cong resistance for some time because they can live on their fat. The nearer the invasion point to the Hanoi-Haiphong (Red River delta) area the more decisive the result could be though equally, the sharper the reaction from North Vietnam and the Chinese. We consider that if invasion was undertaken in –
(i) the Dong Hoi area, an important centre controlling operations in South Vietnam and the supply route across the 17th parallel would be eliminated. Opposition would initially be confined to little more than one North Vietnamese Division. However, such an operation would not cut the supply line to the South through Laos nor bring a speedy end to Viet Cong resistance;
(ii) the Vinh area. The normal supply routes to South Vietnam across the 17th parallel and through Laos could be cut. Opposition would initially be confined to one
North Vietnamese
Division though reinforcements from the Delta area could more easily be brought up. Direct
Chinese military support for the North Vietnamese would be probable;
(iii) the Red River delta area. This would strike directly at the heart of the country. The landing would quickly be opposed by about five divisions. An initial advantage might be obtained but direct Chinese military involvement would be certain which would lead to a long drawn out “Korean” type war.
(b) Bombing of Viet Cong supply routes in North Vietnam
. Identification of targets on the Viet Cong supply routes would be so difficult as to make tactical interdiction ineffective and uneconomical.
(c) Other air attacks
. Conventional bombing of population centres in North Vietnam or targets in South China although conceivably effective as punitive measures would not be decisive in bringing the Viet Cong under control. The use of nuclear weapons raises issues which go beyond the scope of this report.
CONSEQUENCES
North Vietnam
27. In the face of a threat of United States action against North Vietnam, or even in the initial stages of such action, the North Vietnamese would have to consider whether they were prepared to allow matters to go to the point where the devastation of North Vietnam might become inevitable. We cannot confidently predict the psychological attitude of the North Vietnamese leaders, but it may be an indication of the dependence of their attitude on the Chinese reaction that they have officially announced that if the United States intervene they will have to reckon with “China or eventually the Socialist camp as a whole.”
China
28. (a) If the United States took military action against North Vietnam by means of air strikes; the Chinese would:-
(i) say that the situation in South Vietnam was not the result of North Vietnamese or Chinese action; give North Vietnam maximum diplomatic and propaganda support and mount a worldwide campaign for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference in the interests of maintaining peace;
(ii) provide what air cover they could for North Vietnam using their own planes and pilots, and airfields in China if those in North Vietnam were untenable, and supplying A.A. artillery where necessary. The terms of the Geneva Agreement would make it difficult for them to maintain the fiction that the pilots were volunteers in the North Vietnamese air force or that the planes were North Vietnamese. Nevertheless they might be expected to adopt what devices were possible in order to maintain the fiction that China was not directly involved. They would do this partly for propaganda purposes, and partly to minimise the chances of United States retaliation against targets in China;
(iii) threaten to bomb similar targets in South Vietnam. An air defence system would need to be created to meet this threat.
(b) If the United States took military action against North Vietnam using ground forces; the Chinese would:-
(i) act as in sub-paragraph (a) (i) above;
(ii) take ground and air action as in the case of North Korea and occupy North Vietnam with regular Chinese units, which they would probably describe as volunteers for the reasons in (a) (ii). If once involved in such an operation their objective would probably be confined to the ejection of American forces from North Vietnam and the elimination of the threat they would represent to the Chinese frontier, although we would expect a very significant increase in Viet Cong activities as South Vietnamese and American forces were deployed to cover the Northern frontier. In the event of action by land against North Vietnam, in addition to sending units into North Vietnam, the Chinese might well give overt support to the Pathet Lao in Laos and step up their subversive efforts elsewhere in the area.
(c) If United States naval forces were used in air or other attacks against North Vietnam, the possibility of light coastal forces being used in North Vietnamese waters or their immediate vicinity cannot be excluded. As the Chinese would wish to localise the conflict to Indo-China they would not be used except in the Gulf of Tonking. If United States naval forces were used to blockade North Vietnam, it is unlikely that Chinese naval forces would intervene.
29. The Chinese actions would be dictated primarily by the threat to South China that United States military action in Northern Indo-China would represent. In these circumstances, the Chinese would be unlikely to be influenced by Russian advice, or action unless the Russians were to take the two extreme steps, both equally unlikely, of –
(a) engaging themselves to give the Chinese full military support, and cover against the United States retaliation against the Chinese mainland;
or
(b) serving notice on the Chinese that if they did not avoid a clash and force the North Vietnamese to do so, they would cut off P.O.L. and other vital deliveries.
30. The possibility of war in the Far East inevitably represents some threat to Hong Kong but in all the circumstances described above the Chinese would wish to confine action to Indo-China and unless they became convinced that intervention in Vietnam would be quickly followed by general war, they would not take military or other decisive action against Hong Kong. They would, however, be likely to put some pressure on the Colony both in order to discourage the United Kingdom from supporting the Americans and to interest the United Kingdom in ending United States intervention.
The Soviet Union
31. Both as the major communist power and as a co-chairman of the Geneva Agreement the Soviet Union would be immediately involved. The Russians have already reacted to the press reports from the United States in a TASS statement issued on 25th February which says that “the Soviet people cannot remain indifferent to such developments (i.e. the extension by the United States of the war in South Vietnam) and will render the necessary assistance and support to this struggle” (i.e. the liberation struggle of the South Vietnamese). The attitude implied in this statement would not necessarily preclude the possibility that at the same time as warning off the United States the Soviet Union might urge caution on the North Vietnamese to avoid any action which might place the Soviet Union in an excessively awkward dilemma.
32. A United States threat of direct military action against North Vietnam would face the Russians with a decision which they have never been called upon to face before. If the Americans added a warning concerning action against Chinese territory the Russian dilemma would be intensified. They would obviously wish to do their utmost to avoid getting involved militarily in a clash with the United States. At the very least such a clash would negate their present policy of trying to maintain reasonable relations with the United States. They would recognise that at the worst such a clash even in North Vietnam would risk escalation to nuclear war.
33. At the same time to counsel negotiation or “surrender” by North Vietnam would be to accept that the Americans could similarly threaten other states allied to the Soviet Union if they continue to support “national liberation movements”. The possibility of some future action against Cuba would be obvious. Faced with this issue and with the possibility that the Chinese might support the North Vietnamese in defiance of the United States, it would be very difficult indeed for the Russians not to back the North Vietnamese at least in public. The first Soviet objective would therefore be to avoid the issue if at all possible by seeking to deter the United States from proceeding against North Vietnam by threat of incalculable consequences, and if this failed by mobilising international pressure against the United States. If the United States nevertheless persisted the Russians would probably supply the North Vietnamese with some arms and ammunition and might well reconsider the possibility of arms supply to China to the same end. In the last resort it seems likely that the Soviet Union would choose not to risk escalation of the conflict by direct military intervention and would probably maintain their attitude even in the face of United States air action against South China. Beyond this point it becomes increasingly hazardous to predict Soviet reactions.
International Reactions
34. Outside the communist world, the international reaction to overt United States action against North Vietnam would probably be to regard it as aggression. Although many Asian and African countries are increasingly suspicious of Chinese support for revolutionary and subversive movements, old habits die hard and their attitude for example, in the United Nations, towards United States action would certainly be hostile. France would certainly disapprove strongly, and we see little prospect of spontaneous positive support from any other major country in the present state of opinion about South East Asian affairs; although the United States might persuade some of her allies to abstain. Therefore if the Soviet Union appealed to the United Nations, the United States might well have to resort to use of the veto in the Security Council on a motion of condemnation. The communist countries might be reluctant to appeal to the General Assembly because of their liability to loss of voting rights through being in arrears with their contributions. Nevertheless the United States would probably be unable to prevent an emergency session from passing a motion of condemnation. At the same time the North Vietnamese Government would probably appeal to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman [sic] to call an international conference to discuss the problem, and to call on the United States to desist from further action in the meantime.
OTHER IMPLICATIONS
35. A limited non-nuclear war, whether confined to Vietnam or extended to other countries in South East Asia, would probably be protracted and indecisive. If it spread, there would be severe strains within SEATO, arising in particular from France’s favouring a neutralist solution for South Vietnam, and possibly Pakistan’s new attitude to China. With the United States preoccupied in Vietnam and United Kingdom and Commonwealth forces earmarked for possible action under existing commitments in mainland South East Asia, anti-Western elements elsewhere might exploit the opportunities so offered.
PART II
A UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
36. If the United States decided to withdraw from South Vietnam, and therefore a negotiated settlement had to be sought, the communists would be unlikely to agree to any arrangement potentially less damaging to the other side than that arrived at in Laos. There would thus be a very real prospect of South Vietnam eventually falling wholly or partially under communist control.
37. The loss to the West of South Vietnam would be a major blow to the West in the world-wide struggle against communism. It would cause an immediate crisis of confidence in the relations of the United States with her Asian allies, some at least of whom might seek accommodation with China. The United States and SEATO would be discredited and the latter would probably disintegrate. Neutralist pressure would develop in Thailand, which the present right-wing regime would be unable to resist even if it managed to obtain a specific guarantee of United States protection. Non-communist neutrals would lose confidence in the West; Cambodia’s traditional policy of neutrality might be maintained on paper, but in practice she would lean heavily towards China and Burma might well increase her efforts to stay on good terms with China. Indonesia and India might become even more suspicious of China’s intentions than they are at present, but would be unlikely to make any radical changes in their foreign policy. Communist influence amongst the overseas Chinese communities in South East Asia would increase, and communist and pro-communist parties throughout the region would gain in confidence. The economic consequences for the West would probably be confined initially to losses of trade and investment in South Vietnam itself. The French have a particularly big stake which they might however be able to retain. The long term economic effects are difficult to predict but in our view would not necessarily be significant.
38. The general western position in South East Asia would be seriously damaged; the strategic position would be impaired directly by the increased subversive and military threat and indirectly through loss of political prestige. It is impossible, for example, to say whether Malaysia would lose confidence in the West as guarantors of her defence against the threat from China or decide that the increased threat to her safety required still closer ties.
CONCLUSIONS
39. We conclude that:-
PART I
(a) whatever the form of United States action and whatever the degree of South Vietnamese Government/United States military success against the Viet Cong thereby achieved, decisive and final defeat of the Viet Cong cannot be achieved by military means alone. The fundamental task remains that of inducing the South Vietnamese authorities to undertake and persist in a programme of the necessary administrative, social and economic measures, and to winning popular confidence in, and support for such a programme;
(b) a heavier United States military commitment in South Vietnam in the form of the garrisoning of key towns and/or the introduction and use of combat units, might halt the present deterioration in the military situation and give the South Vietnamese Government a breathing space to get new measures under way, but it would raise difficult problems and might in the longer run be counter-productive;
(c) even full scale intervention would not lead to a lasting solution for a very long time, if at all;
(d) the cutting off of North Vietnamese assistance to the Viet Cong would not ensure a speedy end to the insurrection in South Vietnam;
(e) if the United States took military action confined to South
Vietnam the North Vietnamese would probably increase their covert support to the Viet Cong and appeal to the Soviet Union and China for increased material support, the Chinese would give them full diplomatic and propaganda support and probably step up military supplies. The communist countries generally would probably mount a world-wide campaign, in particular demanding the reconvening of Geneva Conference in the interests of maintaining peace;
(f) there is some scope for covert support for guerilla [sic] activity among the tribes of north-west North Vietnam and this if successful could lead to localised disturbances and perhaps to revolts elsewhere in the countryside, the news of which could have some effect on Viet Cong morale, and encourage Government forces in South Vietnam;
(g) if the United States took military action against North Vietnam the Chinese would give direct military support, including “volunteers” and air cover to the North Vietnamese. They might give overt support to the Pathet Lao in Laos, and would step up their subversive effort elsewhere in the area. Unless they expected general war, they would not take military or other decisive action against Hong Kong;
(h) the first Soviet objective would be to avoid the issue if at all possible by seeking to deter the United States from action against North Vietnam. The Soviet Union might also put pressure on North Vietnam to make some temporary concessions, if they thought this would work. If the United States went ahead with action against North Vietnam the Soviet Union would probably supply the North Vietnamese with some arms and ammunition and might well reconsider the possibility of arms supply to China to the same end. Nevertheless the Russians would wish to keep their involvement to a minimum, and in any case would stop short of any action which might lead to their involvement in nuclear war;
(i) it would be difficult for the United States to obtain much support internationally for direct military action against North Vietnam, or to avoid condemnation in the United Nations;
(j) a limited non-nuclear war in Vietnam would probably be protracted and indecisive; it would not spread outside mainland South East Asia and it could lead to severe strains within SEATO;
PART II
(k) if, as the eventual result of United States withdrawal, South Vietnam were to fall under complete or partial communist control, the West would suffer a severe blow in the context of the world-wide struggle against communism; the United States and SEATO would be discredited and the latter would probably disintegrate; communist influence in South East Asia would increase; and the whole Western position in the area would be seriously damaged.