16

NORTHERN IRELAND:
DIRECT RULE

S INCE ITS CREATION in 1936, the JIC has overwhelmingly focused on developments overseas. From eastern Europe to the Middle East to Malaysia, the committee has scoured the globe for threats to British security and interests. From the late 1960s, however, the JIC was also forced to concentrate on issues closer to home. An escalation of intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland brought about the lengthy period known as the Troubles. As was often the case regarding irregular and non-Cold War threats, however, the JIC was slow off the mark.

The JIC began to consider Ireland in the months leading up to April 1966, when officials grew concerned about security during the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising. As the historian Eunan O’Halpin has revealed, however, the JIC then proceeded to ignore the deteriorating political and security conditions in Northern Ireland over the following couple of years. The JIC did not revisit the situation until 1968 in the aftermath of unrest following the civil rights marches. At this point, the committee established an Ulster Working Group. Although the JIC was initially surprised by the extent of the unfolding crisis, Northern Ireland featured fairly regularly on the JIC agenda by the summer of 1969. 1

Demonstrating interesting similarities with the committee’s response to earlier unrest in the British colonies, the JIC’s role was twofold. Firstly, it sought to improve the intelligence system in Northern Ireland. Given the initial flaws in the machinery, this proved to be an important function. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself, Edward Heath, read and annotated the JIC Secretary’s valedictory thoughts on the topic in 1972, and in fact called for action to implement some of the points made. 2 The committee’s input into the intelligence and security machinery raises interesting questions about its role in setting the parameters of intelligence operations, from internment to sanctioning the infamous five interrogation techniques (including stress positions and sleep deprivation). Secondly, the JIC maintained its traditional role of intelligence assessment to aid policy formulation. This chapter focuses on the latter role.

As the Troubles became a regular fixture on the JIC agenda, the committee began to update policymakers on the security situation as well as the strength and intentions of the paramilitary groups. 3 Perhaps owing to the complexity, sensitivity and proximity of the violence, the JIC felt compelled to issue both a warning and a reminder to its consumers in 1971. The assessment opened by stating that ‘the summary below only highlights some of the major points in the paper and cannot by its very nature convey the nuances of the Irish situation’. Such a statement is highly unusual and perhaps represents JIC caution given the contentious issues involved. The committee was apparently more conscious of political misuse of its intelligence with regard to Ireland than to other irregular threats in more far-flung places. The same report also included a reminder to the government of the importance of policy in shaping the landscape of the conflict, including that such matters lay beyond the jurisdiction of the JIC. The committee, of course, does not recommend policy but it seems strange that, again when it came to Ireland, a reminder was necessary. 4

JIC intelligence assessments did, however, influence policy debates. The imposition of direct rule in March 1972 instructively demonstrates the interaction between the JIC and the policy community. Military planners and the most senior policymakers needed intelligence to inform contingency planning. Heath’s strategy was based on the assumption that in circumstances of direct rule ‘we could continue to rely on the loyalty of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the public service in Northern Ireland’. But the Prime Minister had concerns. He asked his Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling: ‘Suppose that that assumption proved to be invalid. Have we alternative plans ready?’ 5 Maudling reassured Heath that there was no reason to assume that ‘the vast majority [of NI civil service] would not remain basically loyal’. He believed that the RUC would remain faithful but would be ‘likely to need a good deal of stiffening’. Maudling informed Heath that JIC reports on intelligence requirements remained valid but that the issue was being looked at again. 6

New evidence began to question this optimistic outlook. Lord Carrington, the Defence Secretary, had recently visited Northern Ireland and warned of a real risk of mass withdrawal of labour from all public services, including not only the civil service but also the police. Summarising the new information, which also included other reports and a recent JIC paper, Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, warned that ‘direct rule would represent an even more appalling strain on our resources than we have hitherto been prepared to contemplate’. If Carrington was correct, according to Trend, ministers needed to abandon the concept of direct rule as had hitherto been conceived, and instead be prepared to consider ‘something like military government and martial law administration’. 7

Ministers needed a fresh intelligence assessment of the implications of direct rule. So too did the military. Indeed, the Chiefs of Staff emphasised the ‘urgent need’ for an assessment upon which planning could be based. This was particularly the case given that word was beginning to reach the military that ministers now feared direct rule would have a much more serious effect on the police and civil service than had previously been assumed. Despite the urgency and to the frustration of the military, intelligence was not immediately forthcoming. The JIC had been provided with a list of questions to consider, but, for reasons that remain unclear, the committee had not actually started the assessment. The Chiefs of Staff were forced to ask the Permanent Under-Secretary at the MoD to pressure Trend to get the ball rolling. 8

The JIC’s report was eventually issued on 6 January 1972 and is reproduced below. Acknowledging the highly speculative nature of the assessment, the JIC broadly concluded that reactions to direct rule would depend principally on the circumstances of its introduction. 9 Trend later summarised the conclusions for the Prime Minister:

A recent JIC assessment of reactions to direct rule suggests that the majority of the RUC and the Civil Service would remain loyal but that for the bulk of the Protestant population (and to some extent for the RUC) much would depend on the circumstances in which measures were taken, the way in which they were presented, and what they appeared to be leading to. Assurances regarding the border would be important; the reaction to the possibility of minor boundary adjustments is difficult to assess. 10

Trend explicitly drew on the JIC’s conclusions when briefing Heath on policy options. The Cabinet Secretary’s advice, offered in January 1972, is worth quoting in full:

We must accept that we have really reached the end of the road as regards solutions which do not carry a serious risk of direct rule as the inevitable outcome; and we can perhaps extract some comfort from the latest JIC assessment which, in assessing probable reactions to the introduction of direct rule, says that ‘the Protestant reaction would probably be calmest if direct rule were introduced at a time when IRA violence had ceased but their capacity for violence remained unimpaired and there seemed a high risk of its resurgence in the not too distant future. In these circumstances the Protestants would probably be ready to wait and see what occurred.’ We may not be far from the point at which these conditions could be said, broadly, to have been realised. If so, we are perhaps approaching the juncture at which the Home Secretary’s plan could be launched with the least risk of provoking an uncontrollable situation. 11 If we let that moment pass, it may not recur – if only because attitudes will tend to harden once again as the Protestants believe that they have ‘won’ and the Catholics retreat into sullen opposition. This suggests that, in principle, we should perhaps be prepared to give the plan a run at the right moment, even if only faute de mieux . 12

Trend’s plan was overtaken by events. Bloody Sunday, the killing of fourteen unarmed civilians by the British army, occurred ten days later. The republican backlash clearly negated Trend’s belief that the JIC’s aforementioned criteria were close to being met. Despite this, something needed to be done. Violence had escalated too far.

Heath hesitated. The JIC had warned him that both sides would see direct rule as the first step towards reunification. However, the head of the army in Northern Ireland assured him that any Protestant backlash would develop slowly, allowing reinforcements to be sent. 13 Accordingly, direct rule was implemented in late March 1972. Interestingly, the civil service of Northern Ireland adapted to direct rule remarkably well. In line with JIC predictions, it remained loyal. Indeed, the civil service helped provide continuity and stability in the administration of key services. 14 Although seen as a temporary measure, direct rule would last until 1999.

U.K. EYES ONLY
SECRET

PERIMETER

THIS DOCUMEMT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT

JIC(A)(71) 54	COPY NO 152
6 January 1972	PERIMETER UK EYES ONLY
CABINET	NOT FOR INTEGRATED OR EXCHANGE POST OFFICERS

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (A)

…

THE PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

…

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (A)

PART I – SUMMARY

1. Predictions can at this stage only be highly speculative. Reactions to Direct Rule would depend principally on the circumstances of its introduction, particularly in relation to the security situation, and on what the two Communities believed would follow it. The current belief among both Catholics and Protestants is that Direct Rule would be the first step towards reunification. Opinions in Northern Ireland are changeable, particularly on the Protestant side and this paper will need to be kept under constant review.

2. There is a degree of general recognition among Protestants that it is now impossible to return to the system that has prevailed hitherto. They would, if Direct Rule were introduced, attach the highest importance to a pledge that the consent of the majority would be needed before reunification could take place, although it might be difficult to dispel doubts about Her Majesty’s Government’s ability or willingness to keep the pledge for any length of time. If such a pledge were not believed, they might oppose the measure with violence. But even in this case the violence would probably be of manageable proportions unless Protestants believed they were in danger of being handed over to the South at an early stage without their consent.

3. A majority of the Civil Services, Judiciary and RUC would be likely to co-operate. The attitude of the RUC would be critical for the continued flow of intelligence. The essential point for them would be their confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’s intentions on the border.

4. The Catholics would see the measure as ending the Unionist monopoly of power and expect it to be used to introduce radical changes. The Brady IRA would probably step up violence against the Army and RUC if they could, while the Gouldingites would be likely to concentrate on the Civil Disobedience campaign. Both would use intimidation where necessary. Direct Rule would be welcomed in the Republic if it seemed likely to be the prelude to radical change in the North.

5. Even if IRA violence were to be suppressed now, it could be expected to break out again before very long and Catholics would not acquiesce in permanent Unionist rule. Direct Rule would not by itself make much difference to the situation. Neither Community has full trust in Westminster. Most would see Direct Rule as providing at best a breathing space, perhaps a short one, in which Her Majesty’s Government could introduce new policies. If early proposals for radical change were not made by Westminster, continued action against the IRA could persuade Catholics that Her Majesty’s Government’s purpose was to ensure Protestant domination.

Signed STEWART CRAWFORD Chairman, on
behalf of the Joint Intelligence
Committee (A)

Cabinet Office

6 January 1972

THE PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION
OF DIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

PART II:            MAIN REPORT

INTRODUCTION

Predicting the effects of Direct Rule in Northern Ireland is highly speculative. It is important to bear this in mind from the outset, for in January 1972 the Committee cannot be sure of the circumstances in which the measure might be introduced, the immediate policies Her Majesty’s Government might adopt, or even the long-term purpose of Direct Rule. Opinions in Northern Ireland are changeable, particularly on the Protestant side, and this paper will need to be kept under constant review.

2. We therefore begin this paper by setting out some of the major considerations which might govern the timing of the measure and the reasons for its introduction, together with some of the assumptions which seem likely to govern Her Majesty’s Government’s policy. With these points in mind we then describe probable first reactions to Direct Rule. The likely reactions of people in Northern Ireland to various constitutional arrangements which might be considered following the imposition of Direct Rule are discussed in the Annex.

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH DIRECT RULE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED AND POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

3. Direct Rule might be introduced because it appeared to be the only way to stop the security or general political situation getting out of hand, or because Her Majesty’s Government wished to introduce a particular policy in an effort to get round a political stalemate in Northern Ireland itself, or for a combination of both these reasons. The major purpose of Direct Rule would probably be to prevent further deterioration in the overall position. If, however, the worst were over, and the security situation had become sufficiently stable for it to be generally recognised by both Protestants and Catholics that a major revival of IRA activity was unlikely in the immediate future, the main object of taking further power into Westminster’s hands would be to introduce new policies designed to produce a longer-term solution to the general political problems of the province. In either case, it would be each Community’s expectation of what would accompany and follow Direct Rule, rather than the measure itself, which would govern their reactions.

The Assumptions

4. We take it that, in introducing Direct Rule, Her Majesty’s Government would be guided by the following assumptions –

i. The efforts of the security forces against the IRA would continue under Direct Rule as long as the IRA’s campaign of violence lasted; action against Protestants would be taken if their reaction was a violent one.

ii. The search for a solution would continue on the basis that an active, permanent and guaranteed role must be found for the minority in the life and public affairs of the province.

iii. If the North and South wished to form a united country Her Majesty’s Government would not obstruct that solution. Reunification would be acknowledged as an honourable and legitimate aim, but one which could only be achieved by consent of the people of the North.

iv. Direct Rule would be a temporary measure until such time as other arrangements could be made.

We further assume that these points would be made in the public statement issued at the time of the introduction of Direct Rule, which would also explain the working arrangements.

The Current Contingency Plans for Direct Rule

5. These provide for a Minister (or the Governor) to be vested with full authority for all existing responsibilities of the Northern Ireland Government. He would exercise this authority through existing departmental machinery, including the civil service departments in Belfast, supported by a suitable staff of his own. It might be necessary to introduce personnel from Britain, possibly even on a large scale.

PROBABLE FIRST REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE

The Current Protestant Mood

6. There is a degree of general recognition among Protestants that it is now impossible to return to the system which prevailed hitherto. The Protestant position has been eroded by the increasing involvement of Westminster and the gradual Unionist retreat before pressure for reform. The successes scored by the Army have not lifted Protestant spirits as much as might have been expected and many seem cautious and uncertain about the future, including the future viability of Stormont. At the same time the continued level of violence may just possibly be beginning to make some see the need for a negotiated settlement with the Catholics rather than violent measures against the IRA whenever they reassert themselves. While unemployment has been a constant factor in the lives of many, and a relatively modest increase or decrease is not therefore likely greatly to affect the mood of Protestant workers, many of the middle class are worried about the economic implications of a continuance of the present situation. The middle class, moreover, together with an increasing number of the working class, are weary of violence and disenchanted with the present politics and politicians of Northern Ireland. These people feel that if changes are not made, the present type of violent campaign will recur in a few years even if the IRA should be defeated now. They are not clear about what changes are needed, and many look to increasing integration with the South through the EEC to provide a long-term answer, but the fact that the need for change is seen, and that men like Boal and Paisley are beginning to discuss, however obliquely, the political nature of Ireland as a whole, is a sign of hope.

The Overall Protestant View

7. Most Protestants would see Direct Rule as putting an end to their position as the permanently dominant power in Northern Ireland. They would therefore attach the highest importance to a pledge by Her Majesty’s Government that integration with the South could take place only in accordance with the will of the majority in the North and also to a continued security effort to give substance to that pledge. Nevertheless, many Protestants would fear that Direct Rule was a first step towards reunification. Their basic aim has been to preserve what they see as the Protestant way of life and their basic fear that this would be impossible in what they regard as a theocratic Republic. So far this has meant keeping power in Protestant hands, the continued dominance of the Unionist Party and the prevention of those who wish to alter the status of Northern Ireland from achieving or sharing power. If the nature of the Republic were to change, in particular so as to remove elements in the constitution which give the Roman Catholic Church a special position, the idea of reunification might become more acceptable to Protestants. At present, however, they believe the only way of preserving their identity is to keep power in their own hands. Rule from Westminster in whatever form would breach this safeguard. Moreover, there is widespread scepticism among Protestants about the ability of Whitehall/Westminster to match the wiles of the Irish Catholics, North or South, as well as uncertainty about the will of Her Majesty’s Government to support the Protestant case.

General Protestant Reactions

8. Protestant reactions to the introduction of Direct Rule in hypothetical circumstances are inherently hard to assess, and our information about their moods and resources remains scanty. It is probable that the nature and extent of their immediate reaction would be largely determined by 2 things –

a. the security situation at time of its introduction;

b. their confidence that Her Majesty’s Government would stand by their pledge about reunification with the South embodied in the 1949 Act.

These two considerations might interact. If the security situation were bad and the IRA claimed that the introduction of Direct Rule was a victory which would be followed by more violence and eventual reunification, then there would be a danger that the Protestants might, whatever Her Majesty’s Government said, believe the IRA claim and react with violence in the first place against the Catholics but possibly also against the security forces. If the security situation was good, many Protestants would see no advantage for themselves in the introduction of Direct Rule and might be led by extremist propaganda to believe that it showed Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to go back on its word about reunification. Again violence might be the result. The Protestant reaction would probably be calmest if Direct Rule were introduced at a time when IRA violence had ceased but their capacity for violence remained unimpaired and there seemed a high risk of its resurgence in the not too distant future. In these circumstances the Protestants would probably be ready to wait and see what occurred.

9. Should Direct Rule be introduced in circumstances where Protestants reacted violently, there is reason to believe that any armed resistance to the security forces that they offered would probably be of manageable proportions, provided that Her Majesty’s Government could bring home to them that there was no question of their being reunited with the South against their will. The Protestants have arms, and an organisational nucleus in the Ulster Special Constabulary Association and the Orange Order. The existence of the vigilante groups and recent Protestant restraint shows organised discipline and control. The UDR contains trained men some of whom might join Protestant bands in an emergency. The Protestants would, nevertheless, be reluctant to take on the Army, and so far lack a coherent programme or a leader to rally to in opposition to Direct Rule. There is no new Carson on the horizon at the moment, and we believe it unlikely that such a leader would emerge in response to Direct Rule. The Protestants could not expect to get much support in Westminster if they resisted Direct Rule forcibly; on the contrary, they might conclude that such resistance might encourage public demands in Britain for the withdrawal of the Army. They would find themselves in a quandary and might see their only practical course of action to lie in the declaration of an independent Protestant Ulster. The idea of UDI has already its emotional attractions for some, but few Protestants would be prepared to take practical steps towards it in the face of opposition from the Army. An economically prosperous and politically stable independent Northern Ireland is virtually impossible to envisage as the end result of defiance of the United Kingdom.

10. Violence is more likely to be triggered off if the circumstances in which Direct Rule was imposed gave colour to IRA propaganda that it was a prelude to early reunification, and led Protestants to believe that it would not preserve their way of life. Although Protestants would be very reluctant to take on the security forces in an attempt to frustrate Direct Rule they could attack the Catholics as an instinctive emotional reaction if driven to desperation, and this would in turn lead to clashes with the security forces. So far as can be judged now, it is unlikely that violent conflict would last for more than a few weeks and improbable that it would be widespread. Even in the worst case, Protestants would be likely to react by destroying capital assets and utilities and in some cases by emigration, together with a civil disobedience campaign, rather than by mounting and sustaining an IRA-type campaign of their own. It is also possible that some at least would decide to come to terms with the South. Many Protestants would in any case believe that the threat of armed opposition, coupled with a civil disobedience campaign, was a better bargaining counter to use with London than actual armed resistance.

The Civil Service and Judiciary

11. In most probable circumstances, the very great majority of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and Judiciary, whatever their regrets for the past and fears for the future, would be likely to co-operate with Westminster. The Court system, however, might be disrupted by refusal of Protestant juries to convict Protestants or by intimidation of witnesses.

The RUC

12. The RUC would find themselves in a more difficult position than the Civil Service or Judiciary. Some senior members could well take early retirement. Whatever the circumstances the RUC would be likely to remain a cohesive force and to continue to play its part in maintaining Law and Order. But we believe that if Direct Rule were introduced at a time when most Protestants failed to see its justification, the RUC would be less ready to co-operate with the security forces. The effect of this could be serious, particularly in the Intelligence field, as it would be likely to coincide with the need to devote more effort to the Protestant target while maintaining coverage of the Catholics.

The Catholics

13. Catholic demands from many quarters have widened in scope since 1969 and now include, as a minimum, the destruction of Stormont and an end to the Unionist Party’s monopoly of power. The institution of Direct Rule would arouse hopes among Catholics North and South that these aims were on their way to realisation and would be welcomed as a blow against the Unionist Party. Like the Protestants, however, many Catholics distrust Westminster and believe that Irish affairs ought to be managed by the Irish. They would expect that Her Majesty’s Government would swiftly come forward with proposals for political advance. Meanwhile the civil disobedience campaign would be maintained as a means of pressure on Her Majesty’s Government, particularly for an end to internment.

Catholics and the Security Situation

14. Reactions in the Catholic Community to Direct Rule would be deeply influenced by the security situation and the policies adopted by Her Majesty’s Government to meet it. Many in the Catholic enclaves at present see the Army as operating to repress the Catholics as a Community, not just against the IRA, on behalf of continued Protestant domination. To some degree, they see this as the result of Stormont dictating policy to Westminster and to this extent might regard Direct Rule as providing the chance for a new policy to develop. If Direct Rule had to be imposed when the security position was serious the need for continued action against the IRA would confirm many Catholics in the belief that Her Majesty’s Government are inherently oppressive towards them. The prospects would clearly be better if the security situation were well in hand. The Catholics would in that event expect the cessation of IRA activities to be accompanied by action to remove from Protestant hands the arms which they see as a threat to the Catholic Community.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party

15. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) would share the hopes of many Catholics that Direct Rule was the prelude to major political changes. It is doubtful, however, whether the Party would be prepared to take or respond to any immediate constructive initiative following its introduction. The SDLP is in some disarray and does not have a consistent policy.

The IRA

16. The Brady IRA have always welcomed the prospect of Direct Rule as heralding the “final round” with British imperialism. Their hope would be to exploit the situation through violence, keeping their hold on their supporters by the use of intimidation where necessary. They might be tempted to extend violence to Great Britain. If trouble were to develop between the security forces and Protestant mobs this would rebound to the operational advantage of the IRA.

17. The Goulding leadership are less disposed to violence than the Bradyites and have spoken against the prospect of Direct Rule on the grounds that it would “reduce democracy”. Their long-term aim is to achieve positions of influence through existing political bodies and then to overthrow the system from within by violence if necessary, thus ushering in the “People’s Republic”. The Goulding IRA have been heavily involved in the civil disobedience campaign and would probably wish to concentrate on stepping up this rather than on attacking the security forces. They would be the more disposed to take this line, and might persuade some Brady supporters to follow them, if the security situation had become stabilised and there was a risk that militant IRA action could alienate the Catholic Community by putting at risk the chances of political advance through negotiation with Her Majesty’s Government and Protestants. They, also, would continue to maintain cohesion using intimidation where necessary.

The Republic

18. Lynch would welcome Direct Rule if he believed it to be the prelude to radical change in the North. His long-term aim is, and will continue to be, reunification, perhaps under a new constitution. He and other Ministers have spoken in vague terms since 1969 about the need for radical changes in the constitution and laws of the Republic to accommodate a substantial non-Catholic minority. Lynch has proposed inter-party talks in Dublin about what those changes might be. In the short term Lynch wants first the abolition or complete transformation of the present Stormont system (without which step, he believes, the minority can have no confidence that they will never again be subjected to a permanent Unionist regime): secondly, some public hint by Her Majesty’s Government that they look in the long term towards reunification: and thirdly a change of emphasis on the security front from military action against the IRA to an attempt to win back the confidence of the minority by demonstrating the impartiality of Her Majesty’s Government. This Lynch believes to entail not merely the abolition of the present Stormont system, but changes in the present policies of internment, cratering and arms searches. Lynch’s aims are shared by all parties in the Republic and are unlikely to change. Lynch has a strong political interest in seeing the present situation brought to an end: it weakens his own position as against the extremists in his own party and outside; it threatens the spread of violence, perhaps involving Irish Security Forces, along the Border; and it is already starting to bring about a deterioration in the internal situation in the Republic which must eventually endanger the democratic system. Above all, he believes that the IRA cannot be defeated purely by military means. In principle, therefore, Lynch would probably be prepared to welcome (and later support) Direct Rule provided that it satisfied, or promised to satisfy, his major short-term aims.

19. We cannot be sure what sort of Government might follow if Lynch were to go. But it is probable that it would be either less effective or less accommodating.

Attitudes Once Direct Rule Has Been Introduced

20. While Direct Rule could provide a breathing space it will not, by itself, do much more, and the breathing space would be likely to be short. Both Catholics and Protestants would see it as important not so much in itself but in what they believe it would lead to. If no major political initiative were taken fairly soon after its introduction the disillusionment currently felt by most Catholics with Westminster would deepen, especially if operations against the IRA continued. Neither Community, in effect, is likely to trust Westminster for long and while Direct Rule could provide the opportunity for radical change by removing the Unionists from power at least temporarily, the chance could be a fleeting one and its advent could be judged only according to moods in the province at the time. An Annex discusses the reactions of people in Northern Ireland to the main courses of action which they believe Her Majesty’s Government might take following the introduction of Direct Rule, depending on what Her Majesty’s Government says at the time.

ANNEX TO JIC(A)(7l) 54

WHAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN THE NORTH TO FOLLOW DIRECT RULE

1. There are a number of courses of action, consistent with the assumptions of this paper (paragraph 4) which Her Majesty’s Government might announce at the time of the imposition of Direct Rule or which the Communities in Northern Ireland might be led to expect. The spectrum of possibilities is a wide one, but people in Northern Ireland would probably see these reduced in general terms to three options for Her Majesty’s Government: the restoration of an independent Stormont together with constitutional devices to protect the interest of the minority; radical changes indicating an intention that Northern Ireland should in the future be fully integrated into the United Kingdom; and changes similar to those in the first alternative but including elements suggesting a desire to facilitate a closer relationship with the Irish Republic. There would in practice probably be little difference between the second and third possibilities in terms of the actual reforms introduced. Reactions will be chiefly determined by what the Communities understand Her Majesty’s Government’s ultimate intentions to be. As regards the reaction of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the RUC, in particular, we consider that our assessment in paragraph 11 and 12 of the main report is likely to remain valid under each option.

Restoration of an Independent Stormont

2. Even if the IRA were forced to abandon violence and were discredited with the Catholic working class, the Catholics would not acquiesce in continued Unionist rule. The SDLP and Catholic moderates are not totally blind to the need eventually to come to terms with the Protestants, but civil disobedience and their withdrawal from Parliamentary and other office would be likely to continue so long as they believed Stormont would remain permanently dominated by the Unionist Party.

3. It would be possible to devise constitutional means of protecting the interests of the minority in Stormont. Nonetheless, the Unionist Party would, if it held together, be able to retain a permanently dominating position in any elected central decision-making body like Stormont. In these circumstances non-sectarian parties would have little influence. A period of peace and the implementation of current reforms, together with Faulkner’s “green paper” proposals, could perhaps do something to alter this situation and permit the emergence of parties based on the general, rather than the communal, interest. But the hope would be a slim one. Without radical reform a resurgence of violence in the next few years would be looked on as a virtual certainty even if the IRA can be suppressed this time round.

Northern Ireland Permanently Integrated into the United Kingdom

4. This might take a number of forms but the essential points would be the complete subordination of Stormont to Westminster and the transfer of responsibility for security. It would be possible on this hypothesis to secure by legislation at Westminster the introduction of various reforms in Northern Ireland similar to those in the previous alternative, in order to protect the position of the minority. Nevertheless Protestants might well fear that concessions to Catholics would lead in the end to reunification and their becoming a minority in the South, while Catholics might continue to see reunification as their only guarantee in the long run from domination by the Protestants. The touchstone, so far as Protestants were concerned, for judging whether reforms were or were not a step towards reunification would be whether Stormont, under whatever name, remained and whether they thus retained the power to decide this basic question. Catholics would judge the situation similarly. All would turn on how Her Majesty’s Government expressed their policy towards reunification.

Reforms Looking Towards Eventual Reunification

5. This alternative would include reforms similar to those indicated above, and also institutional measures to encourage co-operation with Dublin. The Catholics would be encouraged to co-operate in Direct Rule and to negotiate seriously with the Protestants about what arrangements should follow if they believed this could open the way to reunification in the longer term. Most Catholics probably would not press for it immediately, partly because of the immense problem of integrating the Protestants into the Republic and partly because of the economic and social benefits of continued British citizenship. As a long-term aspiration, however, it would be important, and steps towards it, however small, would undercut the appeal of the IRA and diminish the risk of resumed violence after the end of the current campaign. Nor would most Protestants be likely to react with violence if it became evident that Her Majesty’s Government’s ultimate and long term aim was to negotiate with the South. One possible effect of Direct Rule might indeed be to encourage the discussion that has just begun about the possible future constitution of a united Ireland. If it became apparent to both Communities in Northern Ireland that Her Majesty’s Government was prepared to encourage such a debate, Catholics would probably be prepared to co-operate, while Protestants could perhaps overcome their present fears of an immediate sellout to the Roman Catholic South.

RESTRICTED

UK EYES ONLY

JIC (A) (71) 54

THE PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

…

DISTRIBUTION

UNITED KINGDOM

Cabinet Ministers (if approved by the Secretary of the Cabinet)

Secretary of the Cabinet

Secretary, Counter Subversion Committee

Chiefs of Staff: to take note

Metropolitan Police Office, Mr P E Brodie

Ministry of Defence: D of DOP

Secretary, Defence Policy Staff

Director, Communications

Electronic Security Group

Joint Intelligence Committee (A)

Joint Intelligence Committee (B)

Secretary, Official Committee on Northern Ireland (For issue to Committee)

Secretary, Official Committee on Northern Ireland

Sub-Committee on Contingency Planning (For issue to Committee)

MILITARY COMMANDS

Secretary CICC (West)

Secretary, UK Cs–in–C Committee

UNITED KINGDOM NORTHERN IRELAND AUTHORITIES

Director of Operations, Northern Ireland (Lieut-Gen Sir Harry Tuzo)

Director of Intelligence, Northern Ireland

UK Representative, Northern Ireland (Mr H F T Smith)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH POST

Dublin, BE

Cabinet Office

7 January 1972

Notes

1 .	Eunan O’Halpin, ‘“A Poor Thing but Our Own”: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland, 1965–72’, Intelligence and National Security 23/5 (2008), pp. 665–6.
2 .	Eunan O’Halpin, ‘The Value and Limits of Experience in the Early Years of the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1969–1972’, in Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (eds), Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 189–90.
3 .	Initially, these assessments overwhelmingly focused on the nationalist groups.
4 .	‘The Situation in Northern Ireland to the end of 1971’, 10 September 1971, JIC(A)(71)44, TNA: CAB 186/9.
5 .	Prime Minister to Home Secretary, 24 September 1971, TNA: PREM 15/481.
6 .	Home Secretary to Prime Minister, 4 October 1971, TNA: PREM 15/482.
7 .	Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister, ‘Northern Ireland’, 5 October 1971, TNA: PREM 15/482.
8 .	Confidential annex to Chiefs of Staff minutes, 26 October 1971, CoS 36th Meeting 1971, TNA: DEFE 4/261.
9 .	‘The Probable Reactions to the Introduction of Direct Rule in Northern Ireland’, 6 January 1972, JIC(A)(71)54, TNA: CAB 186/9.
10 .	Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister, ‘Northern Ireland, Annex: Detailed Elements of the Proposed Reform’, 26 January 1972, TNA: PREM 15/1001.
11 .	The Home Secretary’s plan involved more of a direct approach from Westminster. This included reassurances regarding the border, a redefinition of the powers of government in Northern Ireland and a change in the composition of the government.
12 .	Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister, ‘Northern Ireland’, 19 January 1972, TNA: PREM 15/1001.
13 .	William Beattie Smith, The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis, 1969–73: From Violence to Power-Sharing (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), p. 192.
14 .	Paul Carmichael and Robert Osborne, ‘The Northern Ireland Civil Service under Direct Rule and Devolution’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 69/2 (2003), p. 207.