17
THE FALKLANDS WAR
O N 2 APRIL 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. Although the ensuing war lasted only until mid-June, it became the defining event of Margaret Thatcher’s long premiership. Sir Frank Cooper, permanent under-secretary at the Ministry of Defence, believed that Thatcher ‘regard[ed] it as the high peak of her whole prime ministerial life’. 1
The invasion famously took Thatcher by surprise. ‘The war’, she recalled, ‘was very sudden’ and ‘no one had predicted the Argentine invasion more than a few hours in advance.’ 2 The factors explaining this make the Falklands War a highly instructive case study when considering intelligence and policy. The threat framework constructed by intelligence between the mid-1970s and early 1982 allowed the Falklands to escape ministerial attention. The JIC failed to provide warning and ministers were caught unawares.
The Argentine threat to the Falkland Islands had long been on the JIC’s agenda. The committee concluded as early as March 1965 that invasion was unlikely, and this pattern continued throughout the mid-to-late 1970s when JIC assessments became more regular as tension increased. 3 Throughout this period, JIC members were in consensus and broadly argued that Argentina would not do anything rash until faced with a clear breakdown in negotiations. 4 Moreover, the JIC had established a model whereby escalation would occur gradually. Argentine intentions towards the Falklands, however, remained a low priority until October 1981 – and even then additional resources were not found to meet the growing importance. 5
The last full JIC assessment before the invasion came in July 1981. According to the Franks inquiry, it had ‘considerable influence on the thinking of Ministers and officials’. 6 Demonstrating continuity with previous assessments, the JIC judged that Argentina still sought sovereignty of the Falklands. Once again, however, intelligence suggested that Buenos Aires hoped to achieve this through peaceful means – but would turn to force as a last resort. Although noting some concerning trends, the JIC ultimately concluded that ‘extreme Argentine reactions’ were not imminent. 7 Unfortunately, the JIC paper remains classified and a Freedom of Information request has proved unsuccessful. This is surprising given that the conclusions have already been summarised in detail by Lawrence Freedman in his official history.
Nonetheless, the JIC paper proved influential in policy circles. It shaped government thinking. Firstly, the assessment reinforced the Foreign Office assumption that Argentina would follow the standard escalation path, beginning with the withdrawal of services. 8 Nicholas Ridley, the FCO minister with responsibility for the Falklands, echoed these conclusions just days after the report was published. He warned that if negotiations broke down, the UK ‘must expect retaliatory action’, beginning with withdrawal of Argentine services and escalating in the longer term towards ‘some sort of military action’. 9
Secondly, the JIC assessment influenced ministers and senior officials when they discussed a draft paper for the Defence Committee in early September 1981. Reinforced by the intelligence assessment, the draft paper recommended three choices of action ranging from opening negotiations with Argentina without the islanders’ consent to setting contingency preparations in motion. Officials decided that it was a poor moment to put such unpalatable decisions to the Defence Committee, not least because the Argentine government was changing and more talks were due in December. Accordingly, the draft paper turned into a minute on the current situation. 10
Thirdly, the MoD explicitly built on JIC conclusions. On receiving the report, defence officials judged that there had been a marginal increase in the threat, ‘but not enough for us to alter our position from 1979’. 11 The following September, they did, however, compose a paper considering the defence implications of seeking to deter or counter by military means options available to Argentina which had been put forward by the JIC. The MoD’s conclusion is worth quoting at length:
Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistic difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of national resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable. 12
Fourthly, the JIC assessment created a threat framework which influenced ministerial thinking up until the invasion. As late as 24 March 1982, Lord Carrington and Thatcher were still reliant upon on the JIC’s July assessment. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary explicitly informed his Prime Minister that Argentine options remained as set out in the JIC paper. Moreover, the threat levels and model of escalation also remained in place. Military action might take place as a final resort if negotiations broke down, but the more immediate response would see Argentina cutting off essential services to the islands. 13 Influenced by the JIC’s model and framework, no meeting of the Defence Committee was held to discuss the Falklands during this period, and there was no reference to the islands at Cabinet level until 25 March. 14
It is perhaps surprising that the JIC’s July 1981 assessment and model remained in place for so long. The Latin America Current Intelligence Group met eighteen times between July 1981 and March 1982 – but did not discuss the Falklands. On four separate occasions officials considered whether or not to update the JIC assessment, but invariably decided against it. When assessing the Argentine threat to the Falklands, the Assessments Staff relied on four criteria. Firstly, progress in Argentina’s dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel; secondly, the political and economic situation in Argentina; thirdly, the state of interservice rivalry in Argentina; and fourthly, Argentina’s perception of the prospects of making progress by negotiation. Information received after July 1981 was not thought to indicate any significant change in these factors. 15
This approach opens up the JIC to two counts of intelligence failure: perseveration and an overreliance on secret intelligence. For example, the British ambassador in Argentina, Anthony Williams, sent an acute warning to the Foreign Office in autumn 1981. Based largely on open sources, the warning did not break the committee’s cognitive rigidity. Overly dependent on secret intelligence, officials in London were not persuaded. 16 Similarly, the acquisition of power by Leopoldo Galtieri in December 1981 did not warrant a new assessment or a challenge of the existing intelligence consensus. The change of government was discussed neither in the ‘Weekly Survey of Intelligence’ nor in a JIC note. Officials broadly assumed that Galtieri would maintain the position of his predecessor, thereby making the crux of the JIC’s 1981 paper valid. 17 Again this is surprising as, to achieve the presidency, Galtieri was forced to rely upon the support of the Argentine navy, whose commander-in-chief held a particularly hardline view about Argentine claims to the Falklands. Other new intelligence was also assessed within this framework. Accordingly, single pieces of material were dismissed on the grounds that each did not increase the risk beyond the JIC’s report of July 1981. 18 The JIC was left unaware of a top secret Argentine national security directive circulated in January 1982. This stated that the junta ‘resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective’. 19
The Franks inquiry criticised the Joint Intelligence Organisation for overemphasising secret intelligence, which was more reassuring about prospects of early moves towards confrontation. Whitehall’s central intelligence machinery overlooked open source intelligence and the weight of the Argentine press campaign in 1982. For example, the JIO dismissed material arising from the press by believing it was probably designed to exert pressure on the UK in negotiations. 20 The Falklands War emphasised the importance of a genuinely all-source intelligence assessment machine.
At the end of March 1982, the Latin America Current Intelligence Group put together an immediate assessment at very short notice. It was so highly classified that only Thatcher and her most senior colleagues saw it. Although concerned with events in South Georgia, where Argentina had established a presence, it concluded that the possibility of Argentina escalating the situation by landing a military force on another dependency of the Falklands could not be ruled out. According to the CIG, however, Argentina did not wish to be the first to adopt forcible measures. Once again, the model of escalation beginning with diplomatic pressure remained in place. Thatcher was left feeling deeply uneasy by the JIC assessment but still did not expect an imminent invasion. Uncertainty reigned. Only afterwards did a separate piece of intelligence, obtained through an intercept, confirm that an Argentine task force was on its way to the islands. A gloomy and confused atmosphere descended on Thatcher’s room in the House of Commons. 21
The JIC did not predict the Falklands invasion. The Prime Minister was ‘deeply disturbed’ about the JIC’s performance. She summoned Patrick Wright, the newly appointed Chairman, to Chequers to be ‘dressed down at considerable length for failing to predict the attack’. The meeting left Wright in need of ‘a very strong drink’. 22 The JIC did, however, assess the situation once underway. This was done through current intelligence and immediate assessments. From January 1967, the JIC’s current intelligence was augmented with special assessments and notes. The former covered important issues of immediate interest, whilst the latter examined longer-term matters of less urgency or expanded on a topic already covered by a special assessment. In September 1974, immediate assessments replaced special assessments. They remain classified. 23
The JIC was the key provider of intelligence to the War Cabinet. Shortly after the invasion, the committee decided to disseminate a daily intelligence briefing which included sections on Argentine military dispositions and intentions, as well as reaction from other Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. The JIC issued a total of seventy-five daily assessments and twenty-three more detailed notes between 4 April and 18 June. Although the committee met twice a week during the war, the bulk of the work was conducted by the Latin America CIG. As Lawrence Freedman points out, the greatest challenge was not content but timing, given that Argentina was four hours behind London. 24
One JIC immediate assessment of the Falklands War has, however, slipped through the net after being sent to the Americans. It is reproduced below. 25 Prepared by the Latin America CIG a couple of weeks after the invasion, it offers a unique insight into JIC current intelligence. The assessment was received through the top secret cable known as UMBRA, which signified highly sensitive communications or signals intelligence. It also sheds intriguing light on the relationship between the UK and the US. American attempts to show impartiality over the conflict caused ‘incessant irritation’ in London. The document reveals how Britain anxiously awaited the American response to an Argentine request to access the civilian Landsat satellite so as to provide images of the Falklands area. According to the CIG, the political ramifications of American agreement would be far greater than the military. From 21 to 23 April, NASA duly programmed the civilian Landsat satellite to take the required pictures. From the American perspective, Landsat was a civilian programme without intelligence value. If the US acquiesced to British requests then it would jeopardise the project by implying it had espionage functions. 26
The CIG assessed that the quality of images from Landsat would not offer the Argentines much intelligence. Britain expressed concern to Washington nonetheless. After some negotiation, America decided to use technical problems as a reason for not giving satellite material to Argentina. The following month, however, some material was transmitted to Buenos Aires. It revealed little. 27
As well as creating a threat framework upon which policymakers relied, the JIC’s performance (especially prior to the invasion) had longer-lasting implications. Although Franks ultimately cleared the JIC of failing to provide warning, the inquiry recommended a number of reforms to the committee’s structure. Franks argued that the chair of the JIC should be a full-time position and a more critical and independent role. Consequently, he recommended that the Chairman should be appointed by the Prime Minister and be a member of the Cabinet Office. 28 This challenged JIC tradition, whereby the Chairman had long been drawn from the Foreign Office. In practice, Franks’s recommendation did not make a great deal of difference and several subsequent Prime Ministers have chosen to appoint Chairs from the Foreign Office. 29
TOP SECRET CODEWORD
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02 DTG: 171715Z APR 82 PSN: 044079
JIC JIR 1011 SIT276 TOR: 107/1910Z
DISTRIBUTION: NONE /001
[…]
INFO CSE
TOP SECRET […] – DELICATE SOURCE – (UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED)
DATED 17 APRIL 1982
[…]
THE FOLLOWING IS AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT/JIC(82)(IA)29 PREPARED BY THE LATIN AMERICA CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP AT THEIR MEETING WHICH ENDED AT NOON ON 17 APRIL 1982
FALKLAND ISLANDS – 17 APRIL 1982 – TOP SECRET UMBRA – DELICATE SOURCE (UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED)
MAIN POINTS
A LARGE PART OF THE ARGENTINE FLEET IS BELIEVED TO BE AT SEA. ARGENTINA HAS REQUESTED LANDSAT PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR 21-23 APRIL. TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS HAVE THREATENED BRITISH CITIZENS AND INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY. ARGENTINA HAS PREPARED A DRAFT NOTE FOR INVOKING ACTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY. THE SOVIET UNION IS REPORTED TO BE READY TO OFFER ARGENTINA SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND LAND BASED MISSILES IN EXCHANGE FOR GRAIN. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS DENIED IN A TELEGRAM TO THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN VENEZUELA THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL. THE HIGH LEVEL OF SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE AREA IS UNUSUAL.
ARGENTINE MILITARY
1. A GROUP OF FOUR ARGENTINE WARSHIPS WAS NOTED TO BE ABOUT 70 MILES SOUTH EAST OF THEIR BASE PORT OF PUERTO BELGRANO ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL; THEY WERE POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN GUNNERY FIRING AND TACTICAL EXERCISES. WE BELIEVE ANOTHER GROUP OF SHIPS WHICH PROBABLY INCLUDES THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, IS AT SEA. WE DO NOT KNOW ITS POSITION. THERE IS NOW EVIDENCE THAT SHORT RANGE GROUND TO AIR MISSILES HAVE BEEN SITED CLOSE TO PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD.
2. ARGENTINA, WHICH IS A SUBSCRIBER TO THE LANDSAT PROJECT, HAS MADE A REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE LANDSAT PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE TO BE TASKED TO COVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 21–23 APRIL. THE SATELLITE WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE NO INFORMATION OF MILITARY VALUE AND IT PRODUCES VERY LOW RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHS (80 METER). THE COVERAGE WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES AND A FEW MILES OF SURROUNDING SEA. WE DOUBT WHETHER ARGENTINA WOULD BE ABLE TO DERIVE ANY MILITARY INFORMATION OF VALUE FROM THIS REQUEST. THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE WOULD OUTWEIGH THE MILITARY.
ARGENTINE INTERNAL.
3. THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN ARGENTINA APPARENTLY ON CHARGES OF SPYING. REPORTS INDICATE THAT TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AND OTHER POLITICALLY MOTIVATED GROUPS FROM LATIN AMERICA MIGHT TAKE ACTION IN BRITAIN OR AGAINST BRITISH MISSIONS ABROAD. THE STAFF OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO ARE AT PARTICULAR RISK.
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS
4. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS PREPARED A DRAFT NOTE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE OAS REQUESTING A SPECIAL MEETING TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS ON ACTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY. (SUCH CONSULTATIONS IN THE OAS GOVERNING BOARD MAY PRECEDE A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE RIO TREATY STATES, ACTING AS THE RIO TREATY ORGAN OF CONSULTATION). THE MINISTRY HAS NOT AS YET INSTRUCTED ITS REPRESENTATIVE TO PRESENT THE NOTE; WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT ARGENTINA IS LIKELY TO DO THIS WHILE MR HAIG’S MISSION CONTINUES.
Notes
1 .
Frank Cooper quoted in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 412.
2 .
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 173.
3 .
Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (Franks report), Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983), paras 19, 305.
4 .
Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. I: The Origins of the Falklands War (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 156. For an overview of the various JIC assessments see Franks report, paras. 50, 77.
5 .
Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 155; Franks report, para. 311.
6 .
Franks report, para. 306.
7 .
Ibid., para. 95; Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 137.
8 .
Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 151.
9 .
Ridley to Carrington, 20 July 1981, Thatcher Foundation Archive.
10 .
Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 137.
11 .
Ibid., p. 148.
12 .
Falklands: MOD draft paper, ‘Defence Implications of Argentine Action against the Falkland Islands’, 14 September 1981, TNA: PREM 19/643.
13 .
Carrington to Thatcher, 24 March 1982, PM/82/23, Thatcher Foundation Archive.
14 .
Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 262.
15 .
Franks report, paras 307–8.
16 .
Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2011), pp. 392–3.
17 .
Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 156.
18 .
For examples see Franks report, para. 151; note by H. Lowles (DIS), 10 March 1982, Thatcher Foundation archive.
19 .
Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Vol. 1: Not for Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013), p. 661.
20 .
Franks report, para. 316.
21 .
Ibid., para. 310; Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , pp. 206–7; Moore, Margaret Thatcher , p. 665.
22 .
Moore, Margaret Thatcher , p. 670.
23 .
National Archives, ‘CAB 189 Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Committee: Assessments and Notes’, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=C15827 (last accessed 11 November 2013).
24 .
Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II: War and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 28. This volume offers good descriptions of some of the JIC assessments throughout the war.
25 .
JIC(82)(IA)29, 17 April 1982; see also Carlos Osorio, Sarah Christiano and Erin Maskell (eds), ‘Reagan on the Falkland/Malvinas: “Give [] Maggie enough to carry on …”’ National Security Archive website, 1 April 2012, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB374/ (last accessed 11 November 2013).
26 .
Ibid., pp. 165, 384–5.
27 .
Ibid, pp. 384–5.
28 .
Franks report, para. 319.
29 .
Len Scott, ‘British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 146.