1 Young (1977), which also has an excellent bibliography of radical critique of science. See also Burn {1952), Marcuse (3964), Marx and Engels (1970).
2 Braverman (1974). Albeit without a feminist perspective, Braverman situates the female work-force in the centre of his Marxist analysis of modern labour, scientific management, and the deskilling of working people in a period of increasing scientific and technical expertise.
3 See Ortner (1974) and de Beauvoir (1952). Both Ortner, from structuralist anthropology, and de Beauvoir, from existentialism, allow the ideology of the nature-culture split to dominate their feminist analyses. MacCormack (1977) draws on Mary Douglas's (1966, 1973) anthropological theories to challenge the nature-culture distinction. MacCormack analyses the female Sande sodality of Sierra Leone to stress women's collective construction of their own bodies for assuming active roles in the body politic. MacCormack's organicist and functionalist framework needs critical attention.
4 Nancy Hartsock's unpublished papers 'Objectivity and revolution: problems of knowledge in Marxist theory' and 'Social science, praxis, and political action' were crucial to me when I wrote this essay in 1978. For slightly later formulations, see Hartsock (1983a, 1983b). These papers are more useful for a feminist critique of the theory and practice of scientific objectivity than those of Habermas (1970) or Marcuse (1964).
5 See the University of Chicago 50th anniversary celebration symposium jointly produced by the biological and social sciences divisions (Redfield, 1942).
6 For early anarchist and Marxist socialisms on the meaning of nature for the body politic, see Kropotkin (1902) and Engels (1940).
7 See also Haraway (1989b). Yerkes links foundations, universities, neurophysiology and endocrinology, personnel management, psychopathology, educational testing, personality studies, social and sexual hygiene.
8 Yerkes and his peers were not using 'human engineering' simply as a metaphor. They explicitly saw physiological, biopsychological, and social sciences as key parts of rational management in advanced monopoly capitalism. The sciences inventoried raw materials, and the laboratory functioned as a pilot plant for human engineering (Yerkes, 1922). For a history of the project of human engineering, see Noble (1977), especially ch. 10.
9 See Emma Goldman (1931) for her keen analysis of the effects of sexual ignorance on working-class women. See Hall (1974) for background on the political context of sex research. For an insider's discussion, see Aberle and Corner (1953). The complicated network of scientific communities emerges clearly from Diana Long Hall's work.
10 Carpenter (1964) is a collection of his major papers. Carpenter moved from primate studies to concern with educational television in American rural and Third World contexts. Carpenter (1972) brought into communications systems work the same functionalist, hierarchical conceptions of organization he used in analysing primates (1945).
11 C.M. Child's (1928) gradient field theories entered social theory.
12 Baritz (1960) discusses Mayo's industrial mythology in the context of a general criticism of the subservient role to established power played by American social science. See also Heyl (1968), Henderson (1935), Parsons (1970). Stephen Cross, then a graduate student at Johns Hopkins, was my mentor for thinking about these issues. The theme of co-operation and competition in the anthropological focus on personality and culture in the 1930s was pervasive (e.g., Mead, 1937). Under Social Science Research Council auspices, May and Doob (1937) published a bibliography on the competition-co-operation theme.
1 Rayna Rapp helped construct this analysis when she was an anonymous reviewer for the original publication.
2 A powerful figure in British science politics since the Second World War, Zuckerman (1972, 1978) provided his own view of his science career. On a Rockefeller Research Fellowship, Zuckerman spent 1933-34 affiliated with Robert Yerkes' new Yale primate laboratories. Yerkes' and Zuckerman's correspondence in the Yerkes papers at Yale University archives shows their disenchantment with each other's approach to primate science.
3 For a critical history of functionalist explanation from the early nineteenth century in the mystification of capitalist class relations, see Young (1985).
4 Lancaster and Lee (1965). Based on the 1962-63 Primate Project at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Primate Behavior represents Sherwood Washburn's and David Hamburg's entrepreneurial effort to refound primate studies within the frameworks of medical, evolutionary, and social functionalism.
5 Documentation to reconstruct his career, grants, students, and projects was courteously provided by Washburn from his files.
6 Part II of their argument appeared as Zihlman (1978a).
7 For the nineteenth-century context of the relation of political and natural economy, see Young (1973, pp. 164-248).
8 Compare the role of physiology in the nineteenth century in the theoretical production of nature in terms of hierarchically organized, differentiated organisms (Cooter, 1979).
1 Thanks to members of the Baltimore Science for the People for helpful discussion of the ideas of this chapter. Useful work on ideological issues has been done by Science for the People, but they have tended to exempt from analysis the history and structure of biology, citing mainly illicit extensions into political or social areas. See Ann Arbor Science for the People (1977) and Chasin (1977). Sahlins (1976) and, with attention to the history of animal behaviour studies, Washburn (1978) defend the autonomy of the social sciences. More theoretical analysis has been undertaken by Radical Science Journal in London.
2 My method is analogous to Marx's reading of classical political economy and to the approach of Foucault (1970) and Jacob (1974).
3 Yerkes (1927a, 1932, 1943); Yerkes and Yerkes (1929).
4 Kohler (1976). On the general role of foundations in science, see Cohen (1976) and Fosdick (1952).
5 On systems, see Mesarovic (1968), von Beftalanffy (1968), Emery (1969), Pugh (1971), Lilienfeld (1978). On evolutionary strategy, see Dawkins (1976), Hamilton (1964). Stressing some of the non-oppressive potential of such forms of thought, Hutchinson (1978) provides an elegant explanation of history and basic ideas in systems-based ecology. See also MacArthur and Wilson (1967). Basic sociobiological reading includes Barash (1977), Wilson (1971, 1975, 1978), Caplan (1978).
6 Yerkes (1900, 1907, 1919); Yerkes et al. (1915); Yerkes, 'Testament', unpublished autobiography, in the R.M. Yerkes papers of the Yale library (RMY).
7 Yerkes (1935-6). The project was related to sex research on animals, 'primitive' people, and New Yorkers with marital problems (Hamilton, 1929; archives of the Committee for Research in Problems of Sex [CRPSj, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, especially files on Clark Wissler, 1928-31, and on Research Centers, Marital Research, 1923ff).
8 The organism-superorganism problem may be followed in Wheeler (1939), Emerson (1954), Kroeber (1917), Redfield (1942), Wilson (1971, pp. 12n, 282, 317-19; 1975, pp. 383-86).
9 CRPS ('Formulation of Program', 1922ff); Aberle and Corner (1953); Mead (1935); Gordon (1976); Miles and Terman (1929).
10 For example, CRPS (1921: Beginning of Program: Presentations of Project to NRC Divisions; 1921: Conference on Sex Problems).
11 CRPS (1923-37: Grantees: Declined). This folder includes an application from Margaret Sanger. Earl Zinn to Sanger, 23 April 1928, pleaded inadequate resources of the CRPS.
12 For critique of the idea of sexual repression as the form of the relation of capitalism and sex, see Foucault (1976).
13 RMY: Angell correspondence, 1923ff; Annual Reports of the Institute of Psychology, 1924-29; Testament, pp. 221-7.
14 RMY: Annual Reports of the Anthropoid Experiment Station of the Laboratories of Comparative Psychobiology (1930-35); later the Yale Laboratories of Primate Biology (1935-42); Angell correspondence. Fosdick (1952).
15 Yerkes, with colleagues like Fulton, established a new discipline within biology, primatology. See Ruch (1941).
16 Cybernetic systems are automated technological devices based on principles of internal regulation (such as feedback circuits). See especially Optner (1973), Singh (1966), Buckley (1968), Weiner (1954), Ashby (1961).
17 For example, see Weaver (1948); Gray (1963); Lettvin et al. (1959).
18 Cowdry (1930), Redfield (1942), Mesarovic (1968), Wilson et al. (1978).
19 Two fictional works develop the consequences of the new systems approach for human former-organisms: Pynchon (1974), Piercy (1976).
20 For texts illustrating this thesis: for molecular biology, Jacob (1974); for neural and behavioural sciences, Angyal (1941), Peterfreund and Schwartz (1966), Altmann (1967); for ecology, Odum (1955, 1959, 1971, 1977), Farley (1977); for political science, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Somit (1976), Eastman (1958); for ethics as quality control, Potter (1971), Stanley (1978).
21 Young (1985, pp. 164-248). Kropotkin (1902) proposed an anarchist natural economy. For a pacifist version see Allee (1938), and for comment, Caron (1977). Ghiselin (1974) provides a capitalist natural history.
22 On the disappearance of superorganisms, see Wilson (i 971, pp. 317-19, and 1975, pp. 383-6).
23 Crook (1970), Ellis (1965); for extension to primates, Crook and Gartlan (1966).
24 The principal linguist drawn upon by Wilson is Thomas A. Sebeok, who in turn built on the language phiolsophy of Charles Morris. See Sebeok (1968), Morris (1938).
25 Wilson (1963, 1968). The human sociology source Wilson cities is Murrell (1965).
26 Throughout On Human Nature, Wilson uses the technological metaphors of the developmental geneticist, C.H. Waddington (1957).
27 Transcending a critique of sexism as explicit justification of sex role differentiation, a feminist theory of knowledge addressing the fundamental dualism of man and nature, mind and body, controller and controlled, has begun to appear in many disciplinary and practical contexts. See Hartsock (1983a, 1983b), Harding (1978), Merchant (1980), Griffin (1978), all of which construct a kind of feminist humanism. The most important non-feminist critique of humanism as a logic of domination is Foucault (1970).
b Merchant (1980) analyses the metaphors of female Nature in her transformation from nurturing mother to patient resource in Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. Dominating nature was possible within both metaphor (and social) systems, but all limits seem to disappear in the capitalist form of patriarchy. Merchant helps in seeing this scientific-humanistic dialectic of apocalypse.
2 This language is Barash's: on knowing the self and free will (1979, pp. 90, 233-4); on biogrammar (p. 10); on the variable icing/constant cake theory of culture and biology (pp. 10-11), While claiming that he, speaking for science, is giving 'plain facts' (pp. 25, 29, 44, 112, 126), Barash uses insistently phallic language throughout the book: pollination becomes floral 'rape' in which male flowers 'bombard female flowers' and grow a pollen tube which 'forces its way to the ovary' (p. 30). Harem masters abound, and Barash savours the language of LeBoeuf, who studied nursing elephant seal puppies in sociobiological terms of 'double mother-suckers', 'super weaners', and, now in Barash's phrase, 'evolutionary stars'. Barash's lesson from these patriarchal puns is that males take evolutionary risks and win big when they 'strike it rich'. Be a female only if you have no choice; females must be content with 'modest evolutionary success' (p. 59),
3 In the 'Acknowledgments', Barash recognizes his lover as his 'co-shareholder in my fitness'.
4 'Marxists' seem to be chief among these comfortable weaklings (Barash, 1979, ch. 8).
5 The funniest extended example of Barash's rhetoric of persuasion by patrilineal naming is his introduction of Robert Trivers's theory of parental investment - as if cost-benefit analysis would startle anyone since at least the early nineteenth century.
Truly new and exciting ideas come along only rarely, even in science. I was privileged to be at the public unveiling of one of these ideas. It was December 1972, and the occasion was the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C. The featured symposium on the 'ecology and evolution of social behavior' was nearly completed when Harvard sociobiologist Robert Trivers began speaking. He used no notes, seeming to figure it all out as he went along, but I'm sure he wasn't doing anything of the sort. In any event, it was arresting - and brilliant. When the young Huxley first read Darwin, he is said to have exclaimed, 'How stupid of me not to have thought of this!' The ideas Bob Trivers presented that day had much the same appeal as Darwin's work - simple, elegant, important, and almost incontrovertibly .true'. (Barash, 1979, p. 125)