Not even the progress of the war stifled the insatiable interest throughout the United States in the intriguing question of responsibility for the failures at Pearl Harbor. One factor which kept the memory green was the two-year statute of limitations in courts martial. In an undated letter hand-carried to Kimmel on August 27, 1943, Knox reminded him that the cutoff date in his case would be December 7, 1943. In view of the war he appealed to Kimmel “in the best interests of all concerned . . . not to plead the statute of limitations. . . .” The secretary assured the admiral of trial “at the earliest practicable date.” On September 7 Kimmel replied that he desired court martial “at the earliest practicable date” but forwarded a waiver after changing the form submitted to him to assure that his trial “would be in open court.”1
On September 11 Stimson told The Judge Advocate General, Cramer, “that inasmuch as the Navy had gotten a waiver of the statute of limitations out of Admiral Kimmel, we would be justified in asking General Short for the same thing.” He expressed the opinion that Short “will not be harmed; on the contrary he will probably be benefited by the delay.” Conforming with War Department wishes, Short submitted a formal waiver on September 20.2
Preparing for his own future defense with the same vigor he had devoted to readying the Fleet for war, Kimmel wrote to Knox on November 26, 1943. He requested copies of correspondence between CinCPAC and the Navy Department from January 1, 1941, to December 17, 1941. This included all communications “which could be construed as warnings of hostilities” as well as those “directing dispositions of fleet detachments or units, including aircraft and marines,” and all reports from CinCPAC of disposition of such units. Furthermore, he wanted all recommendations which he and Bloch had submitted “for the supply of personnel and equipment to the fleet, the 14th Naval District, the outlying islands, and the Army establishment in the Hawaiian Area.” In addition to this formidable list, Kimmel wanted copies of the Navy Department, Pacific Fleet, and Fourteenth Naval District war and operating plans “in effect on December 7, 1941.” He also asked for a copy of the publication entitled Joint Action of the Army and Navy and a complete transcript of the proceedings of the Roberts Commission.
Knox forwarded this request to Navy Judge Advocate General Gatch on November 30, 1943, asking him to assemble the material and prepare it for transmittal to Kimmel. Gatch in turn passed the task to CNO, asking that his office collect the material, except, of course, for the Roberts report.
Kimmel’s request staggered the CNO’s office, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations F. J. Horne wrote Knox a long letter on December 16, pointing out the horrendous problems of personnel, time, and security that were sure to arise. On December 23 Admiral Ernest J. King, who since March 18, 1942, had held the combined offices of CNO and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (Cominch), appended a sensible indorsement to Horne’s letter. “Since it is obvious that the material requested by Admiral Kimmel will be required sooner or later, I recommend that it be assembled now.” However, in view of the intelligence angle, he recommended “that a reply be made to Admiral Kimmel to the effect that while security considerations will not at this time permit delivery of the material requested, he is assured that it is being collected and preserved so as to be available at the appropriate time.”3
Congress was keeping an eye on the statute of limitations. On the morning of December 7, 1943, Senator Barkley phoned Stimson that a bill had passed the House and was pending in the Senate to waive the statute of limitations in the court martial cases of delinquency “occurring in the defense of Pearl Harbor.” He asked whether Stimson had any objection. The secretary replied that Short had already waived this statute, but Stimson “had no objection to the action of Congress if they wanted to take it.”4
Three days later Stimson met with Cramer and the latter’s assistant, as well as Colonel Otto Nelson, assistant secretary of the General Staff. They discussed “the hasty statute” which Congress had passed. Once more Congress wanted to know if the War Department objected. On Cramer’s advice, Stimson wrote to the director of the budget that he did not. In fact, Cramer thought the statute null “because it was not signed until a day or two after the two years’ Statute of Limitations had expired.” Stimson had “a little doubt on this point. . . .” He considered the legislation useless because they already had Short’s waiver. “In case he should change his mind and plead it,” Stimson wrote in his diary, “if the court held the plea still valid, we could still punish him for conduct unbecoming a gentleman and dismiss him from the Army on that score.”5 That would certainly be stretching the catchall Article of War to its limit, if not well beyond.
Kimmel continued to collect material for a confrontation. On January 18, 1944, be called upon his classmate Bill Halsey, on leave in Wilmington, Delaware. Evidently the ebullient Halsey was cocked and primed for battle in his friend’s behalf. “Admiral Halsey is outraged at the treatment I have received,” Kimmel recorded. “He will make it his mission after the war is over to see that I am vindicated. He has two officers on his staff preparing the data and opinions which I requested . . . in August 1943. He will make an affidavit and forward it to me.”
However, Halsey advised Kimmel “to wait until after the war” before taking any steps to clear himself, because such action prior to that time would have “repercussions that will adversely affect the war.” Kimmel then stated his “present policy”: “. . . to get ready in every way by taking depositions and preparing my case in detail; to take no steps to force the issue but if the issue be forced I would be glad of it.”6
Nevertheless, the Pearl Harbor problem could not stand indefinitely on one leg waiting for the conflict to end. At a press conference on February 25, 1944, Knox announced the assignment of Admiral Tommy Hart “to collect testimony from Navy officers concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor for use at the court martial of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. . . .” He wanted the job done at once “because many of the officers were scattered throughout the world and many were engaged in hazardous duties.” Knox described this inquiry as “an attempt to be absolutely square with Admiral Kimmel,” pointing out that “a high ranking officer in whom both the accused and the Navy Department had confidence” would take the testimony. He explained that “there was no change in the decision to postpone the court martial until after the ‘war situation had subsided and the trial can be held safely.’”7
Already, on February 22, Hart had held his first official session, a very brief one devoted to formalities.8 A dedicated, efficient officer, Hart had commanded the Asiatic Fleet in 1941. His orders did not require “findings of fact or opinion. . . .” He told the congressional committee, “It would have been going out of my field to have volunteered any.” His precept was “recording testimony that was being forgotten, or worse yet, was being lost on account of men dying.” He had neither instructions from nor discussion with Knox. He dealt entirely with Gatch, who told Hart “that Admiral Kimmel himself had pointed out . . . that testimony was being forgotten and lost and that something ought to be done.”9
Those such as Knox and Kimmel who were worrying about testimony’s being lost naturally had in mind the hazards of war. By a strange twist of the Norns’ thread, Knox himself died of a heart attack on April 28, 1944,10 while the Hart inquiry was in progress, an event which not only denied future Pearl Harbor investigations important testimony but deprived the nation of one of its most popular and effective public servants.
In May another flurry of congressional interest arose over the statute of limitations, due to expire early in June 1944. On May 30 Republican Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan released a letter from Kimmel and said he “had a communication from Short which he did not feel at liberty to disclose.”11 Probably this “communication” was less than sensational. On June 12, 1944, Short informed Kimmel in a brief note that he had received a wire from Ferguson “but decided to continue my policy of giving out no publicity.” Short added, “I suppose we shall continue to be a political football until the election is over but do not anticipate any real action by the War and Navy Departments.”12
Despite Kimmel’s having advised Halsey that he did not intend to force the issue, actually he kept the pot boiling to ensure that his case remained in the public eye. His letter to Ferguson urgently called for “a free, open and public trial at the earliest practicable date,” asserting “that he had retired from the Navy against his wishes.”13
The Army’s explanation that Short had waived the statute of limitations for the duration of the war or six months thereafter did not satisfy Ferguson. He wrote to The Judge Advocate General on June 3, 1944, making the very cogent point that “the army has not seen fit to take a waiver from anyone other than General Short. They have assumed on their part, at least up to two days ago, to hold to the theory that there could be only one person guilty for what happened” at Pearl Harbor.14 Ferguson continued to bird-dog this waiver through various extensions until at last Congress extended the statute expiration date to six months after the defeat of Japan.15
The spate of publicity in late May and early June by no means mollified Kimmel. Full of bile, he wrote his attorney Charles Rugg on June 2 with this somewhat sinister suggestion: “I suppose there is no such thing as instituting a libel suit against the United States Government, but I think we might think over this phase of the procedure. At any rate, the press should get a lead along this line.” The admiral believed he should avoid testifying before any investigation. “If I am subpeonaed [sic] and forced to attend, I should confine my remarks to a statement that I am ready, willing and anxious to appear before a general court martial, but that I am not interested in an investigation conducted and directed by interested parties who themselves should be defendants.” By the summer of 1944 Kimmel had convinced himself that virtually every man’s hand was against him. In a letter to Rugg on July 17 he even expressed fear that his and Rugg’s telephones might be tapped.16
Meanwhile, Hart continued his work. As might be expected from one so capable, he did an excellent job of obtaining an authoritative record of recollections and views. Later Hart explained his procedure to the congressional committee:
. . . my first idea was to get on paper the evidence of those people whom we might lose, and after a few days of taking testimony of men in Washington I went out into the field, out into the Pacific, to get that testimony, and the general sequence was that I first examined those who were outside of Washington when the war began rather than those who were there.
Hart interviewed forty witnesses, nineteen of whom appeared before no other inquiry. He urged Kimmel to participate. In fact, Hart’s orders from Knox directed him to notify Kimmel “that he has a right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and crossexamine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.”17 Kimmel always complained about the absence of these opportunities before the Roberts Commission; now Knox offered them all. But Kimmel decided not to accept.
He later wrote that he did not participate in Hart’s investigation on advice of counsel “because the stipulation demanded of me would have placed my fate completely in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. This I did regretfully because it was through my efforts that this investigation was initiated.”18 Kimmel told the author that he did not take part because he “did not want his hands tied.”19 In any case, Kimmel was dead set on a court martial and exceedingly suspicious of any action that might interfere with or prejudice his position in such a trial.
Of all the admirals the Navy could have assigned to this task, Hart was possibly the one best qualified to give Kimmel a knowledgeable hearing. He too had commanded a fleet in the Pacific in December 1941 and had suffered at Japanese hands. Yet Kimmel denied himself what was perhaps the most auspicious opportunity he ever had to present his case, marshal his chosen witnesses, and cross-examine others.
Hart wrote to Stark on May 20, 1944, giving him a brief account of his inquiry and explaining that he had decided against coming to London to take Stark’s testimony. Stark wrote back one of his long, pleasant letters on June 2. Knox had informed him of Hart’s mission, and Stark “was delighted that it was in such eminently fair and capable hands.” He was not at all surprised that Hart’s inquiry had led “into the Department. It couldn’t help it.” He added, “Feeling as I do about Kimmel, my one thought about a court martial has been that it would put him in a much better light. Were it not for this, and if he did not desire it, I would doubt the wisdom of a court.” Stark assured Hart: “I should be more than glad to have a talk over the whole thing with you as I have often wracked my brain as to wherein I may ‘have done those things which I ought not to have done, and left undone those things which I should have done,’ but as a rule I get not very far.”20
Hart ended his inquiry on June 15, 1944. Despite the valuable material produced, Congress was not satisfied. Senator Ferguson, who felt “very keenly about Pearl Harbor,” introduced a resolution establishing an Army Board and a Navy Court of Inquiry.21
The initiative for this action seems to have come from Kimmel and two of his attorneys, Rugg and Lieutenant Edward F. Hanify, USNR. The two lawyers went to Washington, where Rugg discussed the proposed legislation “with certain key figures in the House and the Senate.” At the end of a day’s discussion “the proposed draft of legislation was pretty well worked out. . . .” Hanify polished the draft in the Supreme Court’s law library, then took it to the office of Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, whose secretary typed it.22 Eventually Ferguson, destined to be an important member of the Pearl Harbor congressional committee, set the ball rolling for the Army as well as the Navy inquiries. These investigations were held concurrently, the Army’s from July 20 to October 20, the Navy’s from July 24 to October 19, 1944.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board represented the three mainstreams of the officer corps—the ranks, the National Guard, and West Point. Its president, Lieutenant General George Grunert, had enlisted as a private in 1898. He was no stranger to the military problems of the Far East, having commanded the Philippine Department in 1940 and 1941. Since 1942 he had been deputy chief of staff for Army Service Forces. His steady eye and decisive mouth under a small, clipped mustache hinted that he was not to be trifled with.
The next ranking member was moon-faced Major General Henry D. Russell. Behind his glasses his alert gaze bespoke undoubted intelligence. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Georgia, he also held a law degree from that institution. In 1916 he had entered the service through the National Guard. Since September 16, 1940, he had been a two-star general on active duty.
The board’s junior member, Major General Walter H. Frank, was its airman and West Pointer. He knew Hawaii well, having commanded the Eighteenth Wing there from September 1938 to November 1940. Although Frank looked as if he would have been at home lecturing peacefully in a college classroom, according to Mollison, he had “kept the air literally blue with the Navy” during his duty on Oahu. Since his Hawaiian assignment Frank had held several top posts, including that of the VII Air Force Service Command in England. His latest position was heading the Air Service Command at Patterson Field, Ohio.23
In later years Marshall informed his biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, “I gave no instructions about the Army inquiry except that there must be no friend of mine on the board.”24 Evidently he got his wish. The board’s assistant recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, gained the impression that “the Chief of Staff was not these three men’s most admired person.” MacArthur had replaced Grunert in the Philippines at Marshall’s orders, and Clausen believed that Grunert “had no love for Marshall.” Clausen further claimed that Marshall had prevented Frank from receiving his third star, so Frank was not fond of the Chief of Staff either. Clausen also pointed out that Russell had trained a regiment and wanted to accompany it overseas, but Marshall had relieved him and kept him in the United States.25 Later, when both the Army board and a follow-up inquiry which Clausen conducted had been completed, Clausen asked Marshall why these particular generals, who had reason to dislike him, had been selected. Marshall replied simply, “The only reason for their assignment was their availability.”26
If the suspicion lurks that the Army board might not be averse to taking Marshall down a peg or two, there is rather more solid cause to believe that the Navy entered the arena armed with a few preconceptions of its own. Much sympathy and support for Kimmel existed at all levels of the Navy. Writing to Kimmel on June 10, 1944, Poco Smith assured his former chief: “The reaction of Naval officers is all in your favor. They feel, as I do, that you will never be brought to trial and that there are a great many things unsaid about Pearl Harbor.” Almost without exception, the former naval personnel interviewed for this study lined up in Kimmel’s corner. During the formation of the Navy Court of Inquiry, Gatch made no secret of his pro-Kimmel bias. Captain Robert A. Lavender, USN, one of Kimmel’s counsels, on July 1 relayed to his client this information from Gatch:
. . . he [Gatch] told the Senate Committee that he could not possibly draw up any specifications that could be proved based upon investigation of the Roberts Report. He also said that he told the Committee in the very first sentence that he uttered that he had known you personally throughout all of his official life, that he had before Pearl Harbor the greatest admiration and respect for your ability and it had not changed in any particular since.
Apparently Gatch expected the situation “to develop into a general controversy between the Army and the Navy, as to the ultimate responsibility.” He also told Lavender “that all the Officers in the Department were behind” Kimmel. He assured Lavender that he hoped Kimmel would participate “and bring out everything” that he had “and pull no punches.”27
With the Navy’s top legal light taking such an attitude—that the investigation of Pearl Harbor was predestined to become a cat-and-dog fight between the Army and the Navy to see whose tail would drag the tin can and that the Navy Department’s officers were solidly behind Kimmel—one scarcely needed a crystal ball or tarot deck to predict the course of events.
In distinct contrast with Kimmel, Stark, who with Kimmel and Bloch had been designated “interested parties,” had precious little help from the organization which he had formerly headed. Sometime in the summer of 1944 he received a dispatch ordering him home to testify before the Navy court, but his orders gave Stark no idea what was in store for him. He would face the court “colder than a mackerel,” as his legal assistant, Lieutenant (j.g.) David W. Richmond, said.
Stark persuaded Hart to serve as his counsel. Hart’s testimony before the congressional committee indicates that he was by no means eager to take on this task, and if a war had not been in progress, he “certainly would not have done it.” One can understand that Hart might have had qualms about serving as counsel to an officer he had decided not to interview during his own investigation. His decision not to question Stark told its own story of just how important he considered Stark’s potential evidence to be. And now here was Stark in the position of an “interested party” before an official court of inquiry! No wonder Hart wanted legal assistance, and they agreed upon Richmond.
Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, who had been Stark’s assistant CNO, also served as one of his counsels before the Navy court but was not very active in that capacity.28
The Navy fielded an impressive court of inquiry. The members were senior to Stark and Kimmel. Wiry, pinch-featured Admiral Orin G. Murfin was its president. He had been a classmate of Hart’s in the Annapolis class of 1897. He knew the Pacific well from experience as commander, Asiatic Fleet; commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and commander of the navy yard at Pearl Harbor. He had retired on May 1, 1940.29 Richmond believed that Murfin had passed his prime and showed it during the sessions of the court.30
Next came Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus. Nicknamed Old Dutch, this large, fleshy man with a jutting nose and thick hands looked as if he could well have served under Holland’s banner in its great seafaring days. His post-World War I assignments included director of War Plans; command of Destroyers, Battle Force; and president of the War College. Although he reached statutory retirement age on December 1, 1941, he continued to serve as president of the War College. From 1942 to 1943 he was a member of the Navy General Board. In July 1944, the same month he joined the Navy court, he assumed additional duty as director of naval history.31 Richmond found him a man of good judgment and common sense.32 Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, Jr., who had served as Stark’s aide, agreed that Kalbfus “was commonly regarded as a good solid Naval Officer—not brilliant, but sound.”33
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews completed this seagoing triumvirate. Columnists Drew Pearson and Robert Allen once referred to this handsome, rather theatrical-looking officer somewhat nastily as “famous in Washington for his beautifully tailored clothes and for having been aide to Presidents of the United States.” But he had also served as chief of the Bureau of Navigation and had enjoyed various sea commands, including that of the Hawaiian Detachment. In 1942–1943 he commanded the Eastern Sea Frontier, as such being in charge of the Navy’s antisubmarine operation. In that capacity he struck Stimson as “perfectly useless. . . .”
Although placed on the retired list on November 1, 1943, Andrews continued on active duty as chairman of the Navy Manpower Survey Board, which post he held when he joined the Navy court.34 He may have brought with him a personal prejudice against Stark. Wellborn suspected that Andrews “may have considered Admiral Stark at least partially responsible for his not getting his fourth star, so he had a reason for an unfriendly feeling for Admiral Stark.”35
Kimmel was more than satisfied with this court, and with good reason. “Murfin stated that Andrews was a most loyal friend of mine, and that he was positive, intelligent and most earnest in his efforts to make sure that I was completely cleared,” Kimmel recorded later. Murfin also told Lavender “that he expected Kimmel to explode on several occasions on the stand, that as a matter of fact he hoped Kimmel would explode. . . .” What is more, he had “deliberately” asked questions to that end. The fact that Kimmel kept his temper and confined himself to answering questions “fully, frankly and forcefully” made Murfin “all the more angry” on Kimmel’s behalf.36
Kimmel looked forward to placing on record some information which had recently come to his attention. In February 1944 Safford had visited Kimmel. In a three-hour conference he told the admiral that he, Kimmel, might soon be court martialed and that he, Safford, would be a witness. So he had been collecting data and refreshing his memory. He had found that certain vital information had not been sent to Kimmel. His “sense of justice” offended, Safford sought out Kimmel to give him its essence orally.37 “This information made me almost sick,” said Kimmel.38
In the summer of 1944 King authorized Lavender to inspect the files containing the intercepts. Lavender had forty-three of these messages copied and authenticated. General McNarney, formerly of the Roberts Commission, who in 1942 had become deputy Chief of Staff, objected to the director of Naval Communications. As a result, the latter did not deliver the messages to Lavender.
Not the man to suffer rebuffs patiently, especially at the hands of McNarney, whom he despised, Kimmel officially requested the Navy court to place Lavender’s collection of intercepts in evidence. But the Navy Department refused. Follow-up brought the answer that his letter of request “had been misplaced.” Undaunted, the admiral personally delivered another to the deputy Commander in Chief. “Tell those bastards in the Navy Department that it will do no good to lose my letters,” he said vigorously. If they did so, he “would write the same letter daily to the Secretary of the Navy” until he got action. During this discussion a clerk brought in his original letter.39 Perhaps it really had been mislaid; perhaps someone realized that Kimmel was perfectly capable of bombarding them with daily missives for years on end until he obtained results.