The Confucian understanding of soul and familism are fascinating. The concepts of qi, hun and po sound somewhat similar but different from the Christian notions, and the Confucian idea of the family after death is different from Christianity. Most of all, Professor Fan states that the essential elements of the cosmos are qi which are both material and spiritual in nature according to the Confucian view. He further delineates qi as essential and non-essential which makes up the soul and the body of a human being respectively. I am not entirely clear what relationships of qi, soul and body are for the Confucian idea of a human being. Is a human being made of soul and body after all in Confucian view? I will briefly describe some differences between Christian and Confucian teaching with regards to human nature and what happens after death.
To understand the Christian account of human nature, it is important to look at the theological and anthropological teachings of the Church Fathers. Origen of Alexandria (185–254), one of the greatest Christian theologians and philosophers, shows that man is made of spirit (pneuma, spiritus), soul (psyche, anima) and body (soma, corpus). This understanding derives from St. Paul’s tripartite composition in 1 Thes. 5:23: “Now may the God of peace himself sanctify you completely, and may your whole spirit and soul and body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Origen believes that we can only know with certainty through the Bible (Origen, Homilies on Matthew, 18; Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah, 1, 7; Origen, Homilies on Ezekiel, 2, 5).1 He further says, “We believe it is the truth that there is no other true possibility (in regard to hermeneutics) besides the bibles which were written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; the Gospels, the Epistles, the Laws and the Prophets” (Origen, De Principiis, 1, 3, 1). His anthropology of the three components of a man is not a philosophical proof or analysis but a theological derivation to understand the mystery of a man toward God.
The human soul in the Bible employs the Hebrew word “nefesh” and the Greek word “psyche.” There are four different meanings of “nefesh.” It first refers to a necessary organ to maintain life, such as esophagus for swallowing food and trachea for breathing. The second meaning is a desire for material (Mic. 7: 1), the actual human (2 Sam 3: 21; Jer. 21: 27), desire and feeling of human for human act (1 Sam. 20: 4) or longing toward God (Ps. 24: 1; 41: 2). The third refers to life itself (Ps. 29: 4). The last meaning is that of an actual living person (Lev. 2: 1). There are misunderstandings when the individual concept is translated simply into “body,” “spirit” or “soul.” In the Bible, these terms “body,” “spirit” and “soul” express the whole person as a single combined concept.
According to Origen’s anthropology, man is created in the image of God (imago Dei) and “spirit” and “soul” are parts or components of a human being but not a human being itself. A complete human being is someone who is united with the soul received through the Holy Spirit.
It is also important to refer to Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature and personhood.2 Aquinas’s account of human nature includes, though is not limited to, three interrelated theses. A human person is a substance composed of an immaterial soul informing a material body. A human person is not identical to an immaterial spiritual substance. And finally, “animality” is fundamental to human nature.
A human being is a person according to Aquinas. He adopts the definition of personhood Boethius developed: “An individual substance of a rational nature” (Boethius, 2007, p. 29). “Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia” (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 29. 1). Having a rational nature distinguishes human beings from other material substances (Aquinas, SCG, II. 60; Aquinas, QDA, III). A human being is not only rational but is also a sensitive, animate and corporeal substance with a material nature (Aquinas, In BDT, V. 3). He thus distinguishes human beings from other types of persons3 as “rational animals” (Aquinas, In M, VII. 3. 1326). A human body is unique among the various kinds of animal bodies in that it is organized not only to support the capacity for sense perception, but also the capacity for rational thought. The disposition of a human body is determined by the presence of a rational soul as its “form.”4 As a substantial form, a rational soul is responsible for the existence of a human being, the actualization of the matter that composes a human being, and the unity of existence and activity in a human being (Aquinas, SCG, II. 68; Aquinas, In DA, II. 2). A substantial form is a “principle of organization” for a human body in the contemporary term. Various parts of a human being operate independently and function collectively to support the existence and activity of a living, sensing and thinking creature. Both independent operations of a body’s organ and functional unity with other organs are governed by the formal or functional unity of the organism itself.
A rational soul and the material body of the substantial form are not two separately existing substances. A substantial form is the actualization of a material body. Aquinas asserts:
Body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but from these two is made one actually existing substance. For the body of a human being is not actually the same in the soul’s presence and absence, but the soul makes it to be actually.
(Aquinas, SCG, II. 69)
A human being is not merely an aggregate of body and soul, for neither alone counts as a substance. A human being does not naturally exist without both a material body and a rational soul. According to the “hylomorphic theory” of Aquinas, when a rational soul informs matter, a new ontological entity, a human being, comes into existence (Aquinas, CT, 211). A rational soul’s special mode of being, however, does not entail complete independence from its material body. Some capacities of a rational soul, its vegetative and sensitive capacities that nonhuman animal also shares, act through material organs. A rational soul requires a material body to function completely for all its capacities to be actualized. Aquinas further argues that a rational soul communicates its being to a material body such that there is one being of the composite substance, a human being. Hence, a soul must be immediately joined to such a body (Aquinas, QDA, I. ad 1). A soul’s rational operation does not itself require a bodily organ (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 78. 4) and the objects of rational operation (what the mind thinks about) are universal, intelligible forms abstracted from phantasm.5 The mind has such phantasms through sense perception of particular material substances. Since the activity of sense perception requires specific organs, such as eyes, ears, nose, etc., a human mind needs a material human body (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 101. 2; Aquinas, SCG, II. 83; Aquinas, QDA, II).
Furthermore, a rational soul naturally unites to an individual body as its substantial form (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 76. 1; Aquinas, SCG, II. 68; Aquinas, In DA, II. 2). Aquinas claims that it is not a mind that understands, nor the soul which is the foundation for the mind’s rational capacities. Instead, human beings understand through their rational capacities by virtue of their souls; just as they see by means of their capacity for sight by virtue of their eyes and visual cortex (Aquinas, SCG, II. 76; Aquinas, In DA, III. 7). Therefore, because a human being naturally exists as composed of soul and body, a rational soul’s existence and operation are most properly in union with an individual material body.
Simply because Aquinas argues that a rational soul is immaterial (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 75.5), incorruptible (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 75.6) and capable of subsistence apart from a material body, he is not a substance dualist. He contends that a rational soul is the substantial form of a material body, and it appears that he would define a human being as a fundamentally biological organism. He asserts:
An animal is predicated of a human being essentially, not accidentally, and human is not placed in the definition of an animal, but conversely. Therefore, it must be the same form by which something is animal and by which it is human. Otherwise, a human being would not truly be that which is animal, such that animal would be essentially predicated of a human being … so neither is Socrates human by one soul and animal by another, but by one and the same.
(Aquinas, ST, Ia. 76.3)
Aquinas, however, does not permit the reduction of a human being to their animality. While a well-functioning cerebral cortex is required for a human mind’s operation, due to the mind’s dependence upon phantasms generated through sense perception, it is not essential for the mind’s operation of cognizing the universal, intelligible forms abstracted from phantasm (Aquinas, SCG, II. 62; Aquinas, QDA, II). The mind is not identical to the brain, nor is rational operation merely firing of neurons in a cerebral cortex. Human rational capacity cannot be wholly explained in merely neuro-physical terms (Krezman, 1999, pp. 350–368).
It would be appropriate to discuss “death” or “after death” according to Christian belief by metaphysical analysis and possibly natural law theory. Only a brief presentation of biblical teaching will be mentioned here due to limited space.
According to Christian doctrines, human beings are created in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1: 26–27). Jesus Christ, Incarnated Word, who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation and in him all things hold together (Col. 1: 15–17; Eph. 1: 3–5) became a man for the redemption of sinners, us human beings. The fundamental value and existential reason and end for Christian life is to become children of God through personal union with God (Rom. 8: 14) to live in eternal glory (2 Tim. 2: 8–13). Created human beings continue to pray with “hope” and “faith” to enter the kingdom of God, or Heaven, through a process of continuous creation and recreation (self-construction). This is achieved through living under the guidance of the Spirit and not the flesh (Gal. 5: 18–25), through Christ, with Christ and in Christ. Just as Jesus Christ rose from the dead, we similarly will resurrect as a spiritual body after death (1 Cor. 15: 44). Family and filial relationships are important (Eph. 5: 21–33, 6: 1–4), but these earthly relationships are not extended in heaven. At the resurrection, they neither marry nor are given in marriage but are like the angels in heaven (Mat. 22: 29–30).
Both the body and the soul are produced through the power of God, even though the formation of the body comes through the intermediate instrumentality of the natural semen, while God produces immediately the soul (Aquinas, SCG, II. 89). A rational soul, while separable from its body by one of its essential capacities, is naturally united to a human body for the sake of its other capacities because it is the substantial form of the body. Because of this natural unity, human organic structures are disposed toward sub-serving the rational soul’s capacities including the mind (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 91.3; Aquinas, QDA, X. ad 1–2; Aquinas, DA, II. 1, II. 19). Neither a rational soul nor the matter it informs is a complete substance on its own. Instead the two together comprise a complete substance, a human being. (Aquinas, T., ST, Ia. 29.1. ad 5; Aquinas, ST, Ia. 75. 4. ad 2). A mind is not identical to a brain, nor is rational operation merely the function of neurons in a cerebral cortex, though there are intimate relationships between the two (Aquinas, ST, Ia. 78.4). That is why Christian doctrine rejects the reductionistic and materialistic idea of neuroscience and neurotechnology, though there can be many advantages to advance our knowledge. St. Paul says,
No one knows what pertains to God except the Spirit of God. We have not received the spirit of the world but the Spirit that is from God, so that we may understand the things freely given us by God. And we speak about them not with words taught by human wisdom, but with words taught by the Spirit, describing spiritual realities in spiritual terms.
Accordingly, Christians pray to God to forgive our sins as we forgive those in debt to us (Lk 11:2–4).
Aquinas, T. (1939). Collationes in decem pracepta (CDP). J. B. Collins (Trans.), Explanation of the ten commandments. Retrieved from https://dhspriory.org/thomas/TenCommandments.htm
Aquinas, T. (1975). Summa contra gentiles (SCG). A. Pegis, J. F. Anderson, V. J. Bourke, & C. J. O’Neil (Trans.), Summa contra gentiles. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Aquinas, T. (1984). Quaestio disputata de anima (QDA). J. H. Robb (Trans.), The soul. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
Aquinas, T. (1987). Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate (In BDT). A. Maurer (Trans.), Faith, reason and theology: Questions I–IV of his commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Aquinas, T. (1995). Sententia super metaphysicam (In M). J. P. Rowan (Trans.), Commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Aquinas, T. (1999). Sententia libri De anima (In DA). R. Pasnau (Trans.), A commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Aquinas, T. (2009). Compedium theologiae (CT). R. J. Regan (Trans.), Compendium of theology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Aquinas, T. Summa theologiae (ST). Retrieved from www.newadvent.org/summa
Aristotle. (1984). The Nicomachean ethics (D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Boethius, S. (2007). Contra Eutyches et Nestorius. In H. F. Stewart (Trans.), The theological tractates. Grand Rapids, MI: Digireads.com.
Crombie, F. (1869). Origen: de Principiis. In A. Roberts & J. Donaldson (Eds.), Ante-Nicene Christian library: Translations of the writings of the fathers down to A.D: 325 (Vol. 10, The writings of Origen). Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark.
Hall, C. A. (2009). Origen: Homilies on numbers (Ancient Christian texts series, T. P. Scheck, Trans.). Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.
Halton, T. P. (1998). Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah and 1 Kings 28 (Fathers of the Church Patristic Series, J. C. Smith, Trans.). Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
Krezmann, N. (1999). The metaphysics of creation: Aquinas’s natural theology in Summa contra gentiles II. Oxford, England: Clarendon.
Menzies, A. (1896). Origen: Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. In J. Patrick (Trans.), Ante-Nicene fathers (Vol. 9). Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing.
Pasnau, R. (2002). Thomas Aquinas on human nature. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Scheck, T. P. (Ed.). (2010). Origen: Homilies 1–14 on Ezekiel (Ancient Christian writers series). Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.