Expedition to Concord: Timeline
Let us consider each point in turn. First, the moonrise. U.S. Navy’s Sun and Moon Calculator gives a moonrise of 9:37 p.m., a waning gibbous with 90 percent (presumed at moonrise) of the moon’s visible disk illuminated. To once again prove this calculator accurate, we can look to both Paul Revere to Jeremy Belknap [circa 1798], and more importantly Jacques Vialle and Darrel Hoff, “The Astronomy of Paul Revere’s Ride,” Astronomy, April 1992, 13–18. The latter source independently calculated the moonrise at 9:36 p.m., and the waning gibbous at just 87 percent by midnight, in close agreement with the U.S. Navy’s calculator. Another source, Donald W. Olson and Russell L. Doescher, “Astronomical Computing: Paul Revere’s Midnight Ride,” Sky and Telescope, April 1992, 437–40, gives similar results. Whether the moon was at 87 percent or 90 percent is of little consequence to our historical survey. All sources generally agree on the moonrise time.
Mr. Waters states in Jeremy Belknap’s journal, Oct 25, 1775, in Proc. of MHS (1860), 4:84–86, that “a party of nine rode out of town with their blue surtouts, and passed through Cambridge just before night”. Civil twilight ended just before 7:00 p.m., per the U.S. Navy’s calculator, so we can perhaps guess that these men left before then. However, the quantity of nine is dubious. For more, see appendix 9.
Admiral Graves issued orders to have “The [Navy] Boats…assemble along side the Boyne by 8 o’Clock in the Evening” (Graves, Conduct, Apr 18, in MHS, this portion republished in NDAR, 1:192). Boyne seems to have been in Boston Harbor near Long Wharf, but her journals are unclear (in ADM, 51/129, UKNA). This activity, probably between the hour of 7:00 and 8:00 p.m., led Dr. Joseph Warren to suspect something was indeed going to happen that night. He sent for William Dawes, who probably immediately afterward prepared his horse and rode for Lexington.
However, as there is no evidence to support that Dawes alerted the countryside until he arrived at the Rev. Jonas Clarke’s parsonage, we might assume he was not in any rush. And why should he be? Dawes’s departure, as proposed in the text, was not an errand of urgency, but a warning that something was definitely astir. Dr. Warren had yet to witness anything concrete for which to raise an alarm. Furthermore, as Wheildon, Curiosities of History, 36, reports that the Charlestown Ferry was closed by 9:00 p.m., the boats drawn up against HMS Somerset, we can surmise that Boston Neck was closed by then too, and thus the town was shut. Therefore, we can then estimate that Dawes left before 9:00 p.m., but probably after 8:00 p.m. once the boats were seen collected at Boyne. Let us guess 8:30 p.m.
Mackenzie, Apr 18, in A British Fusilier, 50–51, states that the troops were to muster at the embarkation point at exactly 10:00 p.m. Warren seems to have witnessed this embarkation, before urgently summoning Revere at “About 10 o’Clock” (Paul Revere to Jeremy Belknap [circa 1798]). Note Revere says About. Mackenzie reported that his flank companies of the 23rd were the first complete companies to arrive, apparently the only ones on time. Warren must have waited a few minute to survey the scene, then sent a messenger (Revere says he was summoned to Warren’s house). Warren then rushed to his own house north of Faneuil Hall, a walk that took at least ten minutes. (If he ran, he would have drawn suspicion.) He then arrived at his house by about 10:20 p.m., with Revere arriving from his own nearby home moments later. After a brief discussion, Revere had to stop by North Church; tell his friends to light two lanterns; go home and get his coat, boots, and stirrups; meet two friends who would row him across; and, if tradition holds, go to a nearby house to get a woman’s undergarment with which to muffle their oars. (All of this comes from his letter, just cited.) At best, they had their boat ready by 10:45 p.m.
Revere’s crossing of the Charles took little time. Its expanse in that era was perhaps 0.3 nautical miles (estimated using modern digital mapping tools), and at a modest three knots for the rowboat to cross, the waterway could have been crossed in just six minutes. Let us give them an extra ten minutes to slow down and creep around the lurching HMS Somerset in their path. This puts Revere on the Charlestown shore by 11:00 p.m. and gives him just a few minutes to meet with Col. William Conant and get his horse. By 11:15 p.m., perhaps, he was on his way. (Revere, in the letter just cited, says “about 11 o’Clock”. Again, he says about.)
Before we continue, let us consider the speed of a horse. Susan E. Harris, Horse Gaits, Balance and Movement (New York: Howell Book House, 1993), gives the following average speeds for the four horse gaits: walk: 4 mph (pp. 32–35); trot: 6–8 mph (pp. 35–42); canter: 9–17 mph (not explicitly given, but inferred between a trot and gallop; pp. 42–47); gallop: 18–30 mph (45 mph for a race horse, which none of these were; pp. 47–49).
Using modern digital mapping tools, we can approximate Revere’s ride at about 12.5 miles (maybe thirteen, depending on how far he got before he was turned back by the first two mounted patrol). His route was from about the area of the modern USS Constitution’s dock, along Warren Street northwestward, becoming Main Street, then Mystic Avenue to High Street (in Medford), following this west where it becomes Medford Street and then joins Massachusetts Avenue (in modern Arlington), which he then took up to Lexington. Unlike Dawes, Revere was on a mission of urgency, trying to raise the alarm. He kept his horse at a canter and sometimes at a gallop, and if the horse was indeed the fastest in Charlestown, as legend supposes, we can suppose the mare averaged perhaps 15 mph, on the high end of a canter. Thus, in about one hour from his departure from Charlestown, he would have arrived in Lexington, 12.5 miles away by the route he took. We can allow a few extra minutes for his alerting the militia captain in Medford and a few other houses along the way. Revere then arrived in Lexington about 12:30 a.m., April 19.
Revere reported that Dawes arrived “about half an Hour” after him, so let us assume “about” 1:00 a.m. Again, no evidence supports that Dawes alerted anyone along the way. However, he was forced to take a more circuitous route, south past the Boston Neck and through Roxbury, west through Brighton, up the Great Bridge across the Charles River, through Cambridge, then up what is essentially the same route Massachusetts Avenue now takes, all the way to Lexington. This total distance is about 16.5 miles (appendix 8). If Dawes kept his horse (admitted to be an old nag) at a typical walking speed of 4 mph, this trip would have taken just past four hours. If we allow that he perhaps had to maneuver or hide to avoid British patrols, that he spent a few minutes chatting with the Boston Neck Guard, and so on, the time easily becomes closer to four and a half or even five hours. As a result, if we calculate back from 1:00 a.m., the time we can suppose he arrived based on Revere’s information, we again come to a Boston departure time of about 8:30 p.m.
Revere then reported they had time to refresh themselves, so we can suppose another half hour (1:30 a.m.), which was about the same time the militia alarm was raised on Lexington Green and Captain Parker sent out two scouts (per Rev. Jonas Clarke’s Opening of the War). Then, from Lexington Green to the present location of Revere’s capture site in the Minute Man National Park is about three miles. We know they stopped at many houses to alert the town between the Green and his capture, plus there was an introduction to Dr. Samuel Prescott, but we might guess that even Dawes was now cantering his horse, finally aware of the expedition. So we may estimate that it took them twenty minutes to travel those three miles (1:50 a.m.).
From the events following his capture, per Revere’s statement (as cited), we can deduce that he was detained for at least a half hour, or until about 2:20 a.m. If we allow ourselves to acknowledge the source of Elijah Sanderson’s [Third] Deposition, Dec 17, 1824, in Phinney, History of the Battle, 31–33, dubious because it was given almost fifty years after the fact, it claims that, just before his own release, he was given the time by one of his captors, who reported 2:15 a.m., in close agreement with my estimate. Note that Sanderson and the other three prisoners were released just before Revere, but let us allow ourselves a little longer for the British patrol to have indecision. Thus, Revere’s release was at perhaps 2:30 a.m.
We know from Revere’s statement also that he was released shortly after a volley of gunfire was heard on Lexington Green. Fischer, 135, makes the supposition that these were the militia unloading their weapons before entering Buckman Tavern, and Revere himself suggests these were fired outside the tavern. Thus, pairing this information with Rev. Jonas Clarke’s Opening of the War, we might guess that the first scout returned from Cambridge and told Parker there was no British column coming that he could see, at which Parker dismissed his men, though to be ready at the beat of a drum. Dismissed, they unloaded their muskets by firing and then went to grab a beer or rum. (The second scout never returned, because he rode all the way toward Menotomy and was captured by the British.)
Rev. Jonas Clarke’s Opening of the War says this first rider came back “Between 3 and 4 o’clock”, but it seems more likely he came back around 2:30. But is this time possible? Lexington Green to Cambridge, along modern Massachusetts Avenue, is about 8.7 miles, or about 17.4 miles round trip. For an “express rider” as Rev. Jonas Clarke called him, he should have had his horse at least at a fast canter (17 mph), if not a gallop, and so could have easily made it to Cambridge and back in an hour, fitting in nicely with this timeline. (Rhey departed around 1:30 a.m.) In fact, Rev. Jonas Clarke’s Opening of the War claims the scout checked the roads from Cambridge and Charlestown. Where two such roads connected was at Watson’s Corner just northwest of Cambridge center, closer to Lexington, thus making this timeline more probable still. Supposing the volley heard by Revere was indeed the militia dispersing, we can estimate this occurred a few minutes before Revere’s release (say 2:20 a.m.). Note also that Revere’s captors had to ride through Lexington to alert the British column, yet I have seen no deposition describing their second ride through the town, providing even more reason to think Parker had already dismissed his men. (Though it is equally plausible that they rode around the town, through the pastures.)
As for the British, a second account by an unknown author in Mackenzie’s diary in A British Fusilier, 62–63, reports that the mustering of troops, which was to begin at 10:00 p.m., was delayed: “the whole was not assembled ’till near 11.” Mackenzie himself adds, “This was not completed untill 12 o’ Clock” (ibid., 51), echoed by Pope (in Murdock, Late News, 27). (Cf. the second account in Mackenzie, Fusilier, 62, which claims it was near 1:00 a.m.)
After arranging themselves and moving upriver slightly to receive unwanted provisions, the troops were on the move by 2:00 a.m., as Barker (British in Boston, 32), Sutherland to Clinton, Apr 26, (in Murdock, Late News, 13; cf. the version to Gage, Apr 27, in French, Informers, 43), and Pope (in Murdock, Late News, 27) all agree.
We are left to guess when (and where) Lieutenant Colonel Smith split off Major Pitcairn and the leading British light infantry to march ahead to Lexington. Before we derive an educated guess, consider Sutherland’s April 27 correspondence to Gage, which says that between three and four in the morning the advance light infantry met with Revere’s mounted captors, but unfortunately it does not give us where they met. (In contrast, Gage’s Circumstantial Account, which on this point draws from Pitcairn to Gage, Apr 26, claims this happened about 3:00 a.m. within two miles of Lexington. This is an impossible timeline, because it would have required the British troops to stand outside Lexington doing nothing for some two hours.)
Let us tackle the guesswork from two directions: from Pitcairn’s point of view and from that of Smith’s express rider. Here I make a key assumption. It is logical to conclude that Smith sent his express rider back to Boston at about the same time he split off his front light infantry companies. Smith probably first concerned himself with securing the road ahead, and only then thought about his return to Boston. Thus, Pitcairn was sent first and the express rider was sent second, yet both events were probably nearly simultaneous. Where Smith made this decision along the route is important to our guesswork. For this, let us make some approximations based on the source material.
First, we will tackle this question from Pitcairn’s point of view. Smith’s April 22 letter to Gage states that he split off the light infantry, but makes no mention of Major Mitchell’s patrol. Had this patrol, the same mounted men who captured Paul Revere, been the reason for Smith’s sending Pitcairn and the lights ahead, surely he would have noted that in his letter. Sutherland’s April 27 letter to Gage is not explicit about the split-off, but implies that when they met with Mitchell’s patrol, Pitcairn was now in charge.
If we return to Sutherland’s statement that they met Mitchell and his men between three and four in the morning, let us average the range he gives and assume about 3:30 a.m. If we then logically assume that Mitchell’s patrol set out from west of Lexington just after Revere’s release, 2:30 a.m. as shown above, and took its time to carefully make its way unnoticed around Lexington Green, making their way at a cautious pace, not to arouse suspicion, in the interval of this hour they would have arrived near but west of Menotomy (modern Arlington). Thus, the probable area where Mitchell met Pitcairn was west of Menotomy.
Pitcairn and the six light companies were thus split off from Smith’s main column ahead of this 3:30 a.m. meeting with the patrol (again as implied by Sutherland to Gage, Apr 27), and so perhaps we can guess they split off somewhere near Menotomy center. As given in the present text, Smith probably split off Pitcairn after noting several inhabitants in Menotomy were aware of their march. Thus, Pitcairn was split off at least at Menotomy center, probably just west of it. (Side note: given Revere’s release at 2:30 a.m., it was also at about the time of the patrol’s meeting the lead six light companies—that is, 3:30 a.m.—that Revere began escorting Samuel Adams and John Hancock to Woburn.)
As we hone our guesswork, let us now turn to consideration of Smith’s express rider. Letter from Boston, July 5, 1775, in Detail and Conduct of the American War, 9–10, states “at five o’clock an express from Smith desiring a reinforcement produced an enquiry”. Thus, the rider came to Gage at about 5:00 a.m., probably just before, because the inquiry began then. As this source calls it an “express”, we can assume the messenger was mounted. If he was indeed dispatched where the split off of Pitcairn and the lights occurred, somewhere just west of Menotomy, he had to travel a distance of just over four miles to Cambridge center, then an additional 7.7 miles using the land route across the Charles, through Roxbury, then up to Boston, a total of about twelve miles (appendix 8). If we assume this messenger was indeed on horseback, which would have been prudent, we would hope he tried to canter his horse wherever possible, traveling the distance no quicker than about one hour. If his actual arrival at Province House was, say, 4:45 a.m., this would indicate the rider was not dispatched until no later than 3:45 a.m. However, this rider’s journey was through an alerted countryside and he must have halted at times, either to cautiously move his horse through the centers of Cambridge and Roxbury, so as not to alarm their inhabitants, or to avoid any roving militia already on their way. Thus, if we add a half hour to his ride, then his departure was at about 3:15 a.m.
Now, if we indeed believe Smith’s express rider was dispatched just after Pitcairn and the advance light infantry, and if we allow at least fifteen minutes for Pitcairn’s men to march ahead of the main column and meet Mitchell’s patrol (which again we have assumed was at 3:30 a.m.), we find our two conclusions in approximate agreement. Namely, the light infantry and the express rider were both dispatched about 3:15 a.m. (just west of Menotomy). However, when we consider small but time-consuming events such as the lights encountering two country milkmen (see main text), whom their vanguard apprehended, we find ourselves supposing Pitcairn was dispatched a few minutes earlier still, perhaps as early as 3:00 a.m. Let us split the difference and say 3:10 a.m. Unfortunately, all of these are just educated guesses, and without further evidence, we can do no better.
On the British arrival at Lexington Green, we have Robbins’s deposition in Force, 4:2:491, which claims “sometime before sunrise” the militia was formed, and the British arrived just moments later. Draper’s deposition (ibid., 495) gives “about half an hour before sunrise”. Barker, British in Boston, 32, puts the time “about 5 o’clock”. We can safely guess it was approximately sunrise, essentially 5:00 a.m., but certainly well within civil twilight, bright enough for all the combatants to see one another.
If we subscribe to the sunrise arrival (4:57 a.m., per Navy’s Sun and Moon Calculator) of the British at Lexington Green, and if we believe the William Munroe deposition, 1825, in Phinney, History of the Battle, 33–35, which states he found near two hundred torn paper musket cartridges (tossed away after loading) left on the road within one hundred rods (0.3 miles) of the Green, we can deduce that the light infantry charged their weapons very shortly before they entered Lexington center, at about 4:30 a.m. (Cf. Lister, Concord Fight, 23, who writes, “to the best of my recollection” this happened about 4:00 a.m.)
The skirmish and the reorganization of the British troops afterward might have taken as little as half an hour. Such a time frame is plausible if we assume Smith was still worried about getting his mission accomplished before the militia could muster at Concord. Since none of the sources provide a better estimate of the time, let us assume the British departed Lexington Green at about 5:30 a.m.
The distance they were to travel was barely more than six miles from Lexington Green to Concord center. If we guess about a three-mile-an-hour march, consistent with the speeds kept up by the column thus far (cf. Fischer, 317), this means about two hours of travel time, putting the detachment in Concord about 7:30 a.m. The British report by De Berniere to Gage [circa Apr 19] sets it at between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., impossibly late in the day, and Gage’s Circumstantial Account seems to echo De Berniere. However, the depositions of sixteen Americans at Concord (in Force, 4:2:497–98) has the British arriving two hours after sunrise, in close agreement with our estimate.
Adding to this guess, we can estimate that the light infantry arrived at Barrett’s Farm, an additional 2.5 miles from Concord center, just under an hour later. If we figure a little time for Smith to issue his orders to those six companies to march there, we can assign 8:30 a.m. as their arrival time at the farm. Along the way, just about 0.7 miles from Concord, was the North Bridge, where they crossed about twenty minutes after their departure from Concord center (near 7:50 a.m.), leaving three companies behind at the bridge and on the heights just west of it.
For the events at Concord, we have to work backward. On the British departure from Concord following their raid, two accounts agree on noon (De Berniere to Gage [circa Apr 19] and the second account in Mackenzie, Apr 19, in A British Fusilier, 65). Once the advance party from Barrett’s Farm returned to Concord center, we can give Smith a half hour to organize his men for the march. This is supported by Reverend Emerson’s diary in Emerson, Complete Works, 11:569, though, in the reverend’s nonmilitary mind, he saw “by their marches and counter-marches, discovered great fickleness and inconstancy of mind, sometimes advancing, sometimes returning to their former posts; till, at length they quitted the town”.
No other evidence supports fickleness on the part of the British, so we can assume Emerson was ignorant of the military movements he saw before him. This half-hour lag brings us to 11:30 a.m. The advance party traveled from Barrett’s Farm past the North Bridge and back to Concord center, 2.5 miles total, which took about an hour at a normal march. Thus, they left Barrett’s Farm about 10:30 a.m., having spent, based on their guessed arrival, about two hours at the farm.
From this, we can determine when the skirmish occurred at the North Bridge. Barker (in British in Boston, 34–35) writes that the light infantry companies were waiting in Concord center, following their retreat from North Bridge, for about an hour before the advance parties from Barrett’s Farm finally joined them there. This puts the three light companies from the bridge back in Concord center about 10:30 a.m. The distance from the east end of the North Bridge to Concord center was about 0.7 miles.
However, the first stretch of their withdrawal, from the east edge of the bridge to the present path leading up to the Old Manse, was a running retreat and so only took a few minutes. Then, if we trust Amos Barrett’s letter of 1825 (for he was there), the retreating lights consulted with the arriving grenadiers under Lieutenant Colonel Smith for about ten minutes. Figure in some extra time for getting organized, perhaps, and we are up to twenty minutes. The remainder of the distance to town center, 0.5 miles, would have taken about another ten minutes at a normal march. Thus, we have roughly thirty minutes from the retreat from the bridge to the companies’ arrival in town center, placing the start of the retreat at about 10:00 a.m.
The skirmish at the bridge took just a few minutes. Note that the militia was first on the overlooking heights. They took a few minutes to maneuver into column formation and come around from the hill to the main road, and from there marched to the bridge, a distance of about a quarter mile, which would have taken another five minutes. Thus, from the start of the militia movements to the British retreat was fifteen minutes or less. This places the start of the militia’s movements at about 9:45 a.m., with the Skirmish of North Bridge ending by 10:00 a.m.
Continuing to work backward, the British probably saw the militia loading their weapons and debating the march but minutes earlier, and it was only then that the British considered crossing to the opposite, eastern side of the bridge at, say, 9:40 a.m. Before this, Barker (in British in Boston, 33) claims the British and the Americans stared at each other across that small quarter-mile stretch for “a long time very near an hour”. In his April 26 letter to Gage, Laurie calls it “a Considerable time”, placing the British withdrawal from the heights to the western edge of the bridge, or conversely, the American arrival on the heights after departing Punkatasset Hill at about 8:40 a.m. If we believe our earlier deduced time of 7:50 a.m. for the British arrival at the heights and the bridge, then we have the Americans gathering on Punkatasset Hill for nearly an hour before marching down to these same heights, which is supported by Laurie’s letter to Gage. All of this, of course, is logical guesswork.
Using the known departure from Concord center as noon, let us find the times for the skirmishes. For the march back to Lexington, let us use the same average as before of about 3 mph. Even if they double-timed back, which does not appear to be the case, they constantly slowed to give volleys to the harassing militia. The distance from Concord center to Meriam’s Corner is about 1.3 miles, placing the fight there at about twenty-six minutes after the hour, or 12:30 p.m. in round terms. The distance to travel to Brooks Hill, the next skirmish, is about 0.9 miles, requiring eighteen minutes. Let us be careful not to compound our rounding errors, so starting with 12:26, this places them at Brooks Hill at 12:44, or 12:45 p.m. in round terms. It is another 0.7 miles to Bloody Curve, requiring fourteen minutes, giving a time of 12:58, or about 1:00 p.m. The stretch to the site of Parker’s Revenge is about 1.6 miles, requiring thirty-two minutes, putting us at 1:30 p.m. even. The distance to the north side of Fiske Hill is another 0.6 miles, requiring twelve minutes, putting the time at 1:42, or 1:40 p.m. in round terms.
To check our accuracy, let us consider their arrival time at the point east of Lexington Green midway to Munroe’s Tavern, where they met Percy’s reinforcement at about 2:30 p.m. per the evidence given below. This point is a distance of about two miles more, requiring forty minutes, which would have, by our series of deductions above, placed them before Percy’s reinforcement at about 2:22 p.m., in close agreement with the 2:30 p.m. evidence below. If we figure a few minutes of guesswork error, and possibly a few minutes for the British to be re-formed under heavy fire after they fled pell-mell from Fiske Hill (per De Berniere to Gage [circa 19 April]), we can rectify these last few minutes of difference.
Percy’s April 20 letter to Gage gives “about 2 o’clk” as the arrival of the British column into the waiting arms of Percy’s 1st Brigade, just east of Lexington Green. But 2:30 p.m. is given by Mackenzie, Apr 19, in A British Fusilier, 52 (and for this event Mackenzie himself was there), and the same is given in the second account (ibid., 65). As we have just deduced, the British retreat was at Fiske Hill at about 1:42 p.m., still two miles away from Percy’s reinforcement. Thus it is more likely the two forces met near 2:30 p.m., not “about 2” as Percy suggested. However, it was at about 2:00 p.m. (Mackenzie, A British Fusilier, 54) when they heard the straggling and distant gunshots. As the reinforcement needed a few minutes to deploy, and perhaps marched a bit farther to take the ideal high ground, they deployed into position at about 2:15 p.m.
On the reinforcement’s earlier march, Mackenzie (Apr 19, in A British Fusilier, 52–53), says the order was issued “dated at 6 o’Clock” to assemble at 7:30 a.m., but due to a mix-up with the marines, who were not properly informed, the whole was not assembled until 8:30 and did not march until 8:45 a.m. The distance they traveled through Roxbury, Cambridge, and Menotomy before reaching the point east of Lexington Green where they deployed was about 15.8 miles (appendix 8). At our usual figure of about three miles per hour for their march, this distance should have taken about five hours and fifteen minutes, putting them outside Lexington at about 2:00 p.m., in close agreement with the evidence presented above. However, as we have guessed their marching speed, and have not accounted for delays such as when Lord Percy met Lieutenant Gould and gained intelligence, we will defer to the previous conclusion of 2:15 p.m.
Meanwhile, Dr. Warren was seen in Charlestown about 8:00 a.m., according to a Dr. Welch of Charlestown (Life and Times, 457). It is reasonable to conclude that Warren’s intelligence came from a local who observed the mustering of the reinforcement on Boston Common before 7:30 a.m., so Warren left his home shortly thereafter. (Remember, the British were to be fully mustered by 7:30 a.m., so would have gathered before then.) After a brief time in Charlestown, Warren was observed leaving there at “About ten…riding hastily out of town”, per Jacob Rogers’s petition in Frothingham, Siege of Boston, 371–72. His hasty ride was for Menotomy, 6.5 miles away, probably arriving in under half an hour, around 10:30 a.m. (The prearranged meeting was for 10:00 a.m., per Committee of Safety to Bigelow, Apr 17, postscript, in JEPCM, 516.) All the while, the British reinforcement was still outbound. After traveling 11.5 miles at three miles per hour, given an 8:45 a.m. departure from Boston, the reinforcement reached Menotomy nearly four hours later, at 12:45 p.m. Warren was in Menotomy and watched them march by.
Returning again to the meeting of Smith’s expeditionary force and Percy’s reinforcement east of Lexington, De Berniere to Gage (circa Apr 19) claims the British departed there after about a half hour of rest, as does Barker, British in Boston, 36. Mackenzie, Apr 19, in A British Fusilier, 55, claims the British began the march at 3:15 p.m. Mackenzie’s times have proven accurate for our study, so we shall use his. (As adjutant of the 23rd Regiment, perhaps he carried a pocket watch.) He claims it took another half hour before he and his rear guard were actually on the move.
Starting at 3:45 p.m., we can deduce the march as before, using 3 mph as the average. The distance from the British position east of Lexington, near the modern Massachusetts Avenue/Woburn Street intersection, to Menotomy (modern Arlington) along Massachusetts Avenue, is about 4.5 miles, a march of about 1.5 hours, giving an arrival there at about 5:15 p.m.—perhaps closer to 5:00 p.m. when the head of the column drew near the town. (Remember, 3:45 p.m. is the time Mackenzie wrote that the rear guard gave up its position and joined the marching column.) It was another 2.2 miles to Watson’s Corner (modern Massachusetts Avenue at Rindge Avenue) in Cambridge, just north of Harvard College, and was, in round terms, about a 45-minute march. However, we must account for the heavy fighting through Menotomy. A modest 15 minutes might be appropriate, as the British did keep driving through the chaos of Menotomy. Thus, they came to Watson’s Corner about 6:00 p.m.
The remaining distance to the north face of Bunker Hill on Charlestown Peninsula was about 3.3 miles (appendix 8). This gives about 1:06 of marching. This takes about an hour and six minutes of marching. Add a few more minutes before this for the artillery to fire at Watson’s Corner and we have about an hour and fifteen minutes to march to Bunker Hill, thus arriving about 7:15 p.m. Percy to Gage, Apr 20, has the British arrived in Charlestown “between 7 & 8”, though in his other letters in Bolton, Letters of Hugh Earl Percy, 52, 54, he gives 8:00 p.m.
Mackenzie, A British Fusilier, 57, our reliable timekeeper, gives about 7:00 p.m. when they crossed the Neck (and thus arrived at the base of Bunker Hill shortly after). De Berniere to Gage (circa Apr 19) also gives “about seven”. Barker, British in Boston, 36, gives “between 7 and 8”. John Andrews to William Barrell, Apr 19, in Proc. of MHS (1866), 8:403–5, states the Americans followed them till 7:00 p.m., “by which time they got into Charlestown”. According to Mackenzie, A British Fusilier, 59, the British remained on the heights for a half hour before the light infantry and grenadiers marched to the town center, about a sixteen-minute walk from the north face of Bunker Hill, probably slower since they were exhausted and no longer pursued, so say twenty minutes at least. Thus, 7:00 p.m. seems likely as the time they began crossing the Neck, 7:15 when they assembled on Bunker Hill’s north face, 7:45 when the first companies descended to the town, and about 8:05 when the first regiments reached Charlestown center.
John Andrews to William Barrell, Apr 19, in Proc. of MHS (1866), 8:403–5, says the British were bringing over wounded until 10:00 p.m., making their about 8:00 p.m. arrival in the town center reasonable. If 8:00 p.m. seems a little early, with a 7:15 p.m. arrival on the heights, we should remember that Percy had sent Lieutenant Rooke to warn Gage (though we have no idea if Rooke knew Percy was going to turn to Charlestown). In any case, we can expect Gage knew wounded would be on their way and so prepared accordingly. (At least Gage knew by 7:00 p.m. the troops were marching to Charlestown, for John Andrews stated he watched them march there, daylight being still barely sufficient to do so.) To give us further support, the wounded Ensign Lister, in his Concord Fight, 33, claimed he was back at his lodgings by 9:00 p.m., and thus, at the latest, he embarked at 8:30 p.m. Perhaps we can guess that by 8:15 p.m. the first longboats were crossing to Boston with wounded.
The remainder of the timeline is murky. Mackenzie, A British Fusilier, 59, indicates that after the wounded, light infantry and grenadiers embarked, and new troops came over under General Pigot. Only then did Mackenzie’s 23rd Regiment and the marines finally descend Bunker Hill and into the town, not to arrive until near 10:00 p.m. It took another two hours to get the whole 23rd regiment over, and it was “past 12” midnight, per Mackenzie, that his regiment was landed at the North End (hence they departed from Charlestown center about midnight). Mackenzie suggests that his 23rd and the marines were the last of the main force to cross, so we can use his reported time of midnight as the final crossing of any of the troops that night. That is, we may guess that by just after midnight, all of the troops that marched that day were at last back in Boston.
The following summarizes the explanations given above. (Cf. Fischer, 315–17.)
| —Apr 18— | |
| 6:29 p.m. | Sunseta |
| 6:45 p.m. | British patrol departs Boston (“just before night”)b |
| 6:58 p.m. | End civil twilighta |
| 8:30 p.m. | Dawes departs Bostonc |
| 9:00 p.m. | Charlestown Ferry closed; Boston Neck closed (town sealed shut) |
| 9:37 p.m. | Moonrise (waning gibbous; 90 percent of the moon’s visible disk illuminated)a |
| 10:00 p.m. | British begin to muster on the Common; Warren calls for Revere |
| 10:20 p.m. | Warren sends Revere on his Midnight Ride |
| 10:45 p.m. | Revere crosses the Charles River |
| 11:00 p.m. | Revere arrives in Charlestown; first wave of British land at Lechmere Point |
| 11:15 p.m. | Revere departs Charlestown |
| —Apr 19— | |
| 12:00 a.m. | Second wave of British land at Lechmere Point |
| 12:30 a.m. | Revere arrives at Reverend Clarke’s home in Lexington (his horse canters) |
| 1:00 a.m. | Dawes arrives at Reverend Clarke’s home in Lexington (his horse walks) |
| 1:30 a.m. | Dawes and Revere depart to Concord;b militia assemble on Lexington Green; 2 scouts sent to Cambridge |
| 1:50 a.m. | Revere captured (approx. 3 miles west of Lexington Green) |
| 2:00 a.m. | British expeditionary force departs Phipps’s Farm |
| 2:20 a.m. | First Lexington scout returns; Parker dismisses militia, and they fire a volley |
| 2:30 a.m. | Revere released |
| 3:10 a.m. | Light infantry under Pitcairn split off from the expeditionary force’s main column, western outskirts of Menotomyd |
| 3:15 a.m. | Smith sends a messenger back to Boston for reinforcementsd |
| 3:30 a.m. | Revere escorts Samuel Adams and John Hancock to Woburnd |
| 3:30 a.m. | Mounted patrol meets Pitcairn’s advance light infantry, just west of Menotomyd |
| 4:28 a.m. | Begin civil twilighta |
| 4:30 a.m. | Pitcairn’s light infantry load their weapons outside Lexington |
| 4:45 a.m. | Smith’s messenger arrives in Boston |
| 4:57 a.m. | Sunrisea |
| 5:00 a.m. | Pitcairn’s light infantry arrive in Lexington; Skirmish of Lexington |
| 5:00 a.m. | Gage inquires why his reinforcement is not ready (soon discovers a communications breakdown) |
| 5:30 a.m. | British expeditionary force (rejoined) departs Lexingtond |
| 6:00 a.m. | Gage issues new orders to send a British reinforcement, to assemble at 7:30 a.m. |
| 7:30 a.m. | British expeditionary force arrives in Concordd |
| 7:30 a.m. | British reinforcement assembles on Boston Common; marines do not assemble due to a mistake |
| 7:30 a.m. | Dr. Warren departs his homed |
| 7:46 a.m. | Moonseta |
| 7:50 a.m. | Light infantry arrive at North Bridge; Americans move to Punkatasset Hilld |
| 8:00 a.m. | Dr. Warren crosses Charlestown Ferry with his horse |
| 8:30 a.m. | Advance light infantry arrive at Barrett’s Farmd |
| 8:30 a.m. | British reinforcement completed with arrival of marines |
| 8:40 a.m. | Americans move to heights over the North Bridge; British withdraw to the North Bridgec |
| 8:45 a.m. | British reinforcement departs Boston Common |
| 9:45 a.m. | Americans begin march to the North Bridgec |
| 10:00 a.m. | Skirmish of the North Bridge ends; British retreatc |
| 10:00 a.m. | Dr. Warren hastily departs Charlestown for Menotomy on horseback; Committee of Safety meeting begins there |
| 10:30 a.m. | Dr. Warren arrives in Menotomy on horsebackc |
| 10:30 a.m. | British advance light infantry companies from North Bridge arrive in Concord centerc |
| 10:30 a.m. | Advance light infantry depart Barrett’s Farmc |
| 11:30 a.m. | Advance light infantry arrive in Concord centerc |
| 12:00 p.m. | British expeditionary force departs Concord |
| 12:30 p.m. | Skirmish of Meriam’s Cornerc |
| 12:45 p.m. | Skirmish of Brook’s Hillc |
| 12:45 p.m. | British reinforcement passes Menotomyc |
| 1:00 p.m. | Skirmish of Bloody Curvec |
| 1:30 p.m. | Skirmish of Parker’s Revengec |
| 1:40 p.m. | Skirmish of Fiske Hillc |
| 2:15 p.m. | British reinforcement deploys near Munroe’s Tavern, east of Lexington Green |
| 2:30 p.m. | British expeditionary force meets Percy’s reinforcement |
| 3:15 p.m. | British combined force forms for departure |
| 3:45 p.m. | British combined force departs Lexington for Boston |
| 5:00 p.m. | Skirmish of Menotomyc |
| 6:00 p.m. | Skirmish of Watson’s Corner in Cambridgec |
| 6:30 p.m. | Sunseta |
| 7:00 p.m. | End civil twilighta |
| 7:00 p.m. | British combined force crosses Charlestown Neck |
| 7:15 p.m. | British combined force assembles on Bunker Hill |
| 7:45 p.m. | Select British regiments descend to Charlestown center |
| 8:05 p.m. | Select British troops gather in Charlestown centerc |
| 8:15 p.m. | British wounded, followed by light infantry and grenadiers, begin to cross Boston; fresh troops in turn brought to Charlestownc |
| 10:00 p.m. | Last of the British expeditionary force and wounded land in Boston |
| 10:41 p.m. | Moonrise (waning gibbous; 83 percent of the moon’s visible disk illuminated)a |
| —Apr 20— | |
| past 12:00 a.m. | Last of Percy’s British reinforcement land in Boston |
aU.S. Navy’s Sun and Moon Data Calculator.
bEstimated.
cDeduced from evidence, as given above.
dA reasoned guess, as given above.